public opinion and military intervention afghanistan, iraq and libya

Public Opinion and Military Intervention:Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya

BEN CLEMENTS

BRITAIN has participated in several mili-tary interventions of varying duration,extent and political controversy in recentyears. During Tony Blair’s time in office,the armed forces were involved in oper-ations in Sierra Leone, Bosnia and Ko-sovo prior to 9/11 and in Afghanistanand Iraq as part of the internationalresponse to terrorism post-9/11. Britainstill has extensive military forces sta-tioned in Afghanistan, due to withdrawfrom 2014 onwards, and there has beena growing wariness in domestic opinionas casualties have steadily risen sinceoperations were stepped up in 2006.Britain’s military operations in Iraq for-mally ended in April 2009, but the issuewas deeply controversial within domes-tic politics before and after the invasionin 2003, becoming one of the definingissues of Blair’s premiership before hestepped down in 2007.

Indeed, the controversy surroundingthe invasion and occupation of Iraq, aswell as Britain’s role in multinationaloperations in Afghanistan since 2001,has arguably led to a diffuse sense ofpublic ‘fatigue’ with overseas militaryinterventions, accentuated by wide-spread economic hardship and the emer-gence of ‘austerity politics’. Pollingundertaken on the war in Afghanistanin recent years consistently shows only avery small minority in favour of troopsremaining in Afghanistan, with largemajorities wanting troops returned toBritain either immediately or soon.1 AnITV News/ComRes poll carried out inSeptember–October 2011 found that 57

per cent agreed that troops should bewithdrawn immediately, with 26 percent disagreeing. Moreover, 71 per centagreed that the war was unwinnable,with just 12 per cent dissenting from thisview.2 In a period of deficit reduction,cuts and public-sector retrenchment, itmight be expected that the public areeven less willing for Britain’s forces tobe committed abroad, with the expendi-ture that such costly operations necessar-ily entail.

In this context, this article assesses indetail public attitudes towards militaryaction in Libya, the Coalition govern-ment’s first major foreign policy test.This article assesses the public mood inthree areas of analysis. First, it examinesattitudes in a comparative perspective,assessing views across NATO membercountries, including those that did anddid not play a direct military role. Sec-ond, it examines which groups in theBritish population were more likely tosupport or oppose involvement in Libya,providing a comparison with attitudestowards the military interventions inIraq and Afghanistan. Third, it assesseshow the popular mood changed overtime, in respect of three indicators: sup-port for the intervention in principle;evaluations of how military action pro-gressed; and Cameron’s perceived han-dling of the issue. Before looking atpublic opinion, the article provides anoverview of the Coalition government’sforeign policy agenda and the wider cir-cumstances surrounding the militaryintervention in Libya.

The Political Quarterly, Vol. 84, No. 1, January–March 2013

© The Author 2013. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2013Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA 119

The Coalition government andforeign policyThe Conservative party in opposition,under David Cameron’s leadership andwith William Hague as Shadow ForeignSecretary, developed their thinking onforeign policy in significant ways, partlyas a necessary response to the foreignpolicy priorities and major overseasactions—both perceived failures and suc-cesses—of the New Labour governments.The renewed thinking on policies and pri-orities was encapsulated in the designationof their beliefs as ‘liberal conservatism’.Beech concludes that, based on thisintellectual evolution while in opposi-tion, there had been

a quite distinctive step change in the Conserva-tive party’s global view, and quite an un-Conservative one at that. This can be understoodas a clear foreign policy discontinuity with pre-vious Conservative leaderships since MargaretThatcher.3

Reflecting on the politically controversialmilitary interventions undertaken whenTony Blair was Prime Minister, in partic-ular the divisive invasion and occupa-tion of Iraq, Cameron argued thatBritish foreign policy needed to showmore ‘patience’ and ‘humility’ in future.4

In essence, and in contrast to NewLabour’s foreign policy and militaryengagements, ‘jaw-jaw would, it seemed,be given greater prominence than war-war’.5 Other changes, promoted in majorspeeches and policy documents,included a greater emphasis on eco-nomic and commercial objectives in thepromotion of the national interest,including strengthened bilateral ties withemerging economies, a firmer approachto the UK–US special relationship and amore balanced and inclusive decision-making process in the foreign policyarena, including a greater role for theForeign Secretary and the Foreign andCommonwealth Office.

The Conservative–Liberal Democratcoalition that took office in May 2010

was still expected to show broad conti-nuity with aspects of New Labour’s for-eign policy approach, as evidenced inthe Coalition Agreement, although thenew government marked out a differ-ence from the previous government inrelation to ‘liberal interventionism’.6

Under New Labour, both parties hadsupported the war in Afghanistan underthe aegis of the broader internationalfight against terrorism, while the LiberalDemocrats had been the leading politicalopponents of the invasion of Iraq. Fur-ther differentiating themselves fromNew Labour, shortly after the 2010 gen-eral election, David Cameron and LiamFox (then Defence Secretary), grapplingwith Britain’s role in Afghanistan,emphasised that they did not intendto intervene, ‘Blair-style’, in foreignconflicts.7 Moreover, the Coalition’sNational Security Strategy, published inOctober 2010, focused on

preventing rather than on intervening in con-flict, and appeared to herald the end of liberalinterventionism so that if a Kosovo-type situa-tion arose, the new government might take adifferent approach from Blair’s.8

Military intervention in LibyaEvents intruded in late 2010 and early2011 in the form of a series of uprisingsagainst repressive regimes and theirautocratic leaders in North African andMiddle Eastern countries, a phenomenoncollectively labelled the ‘Arab Spring’.While incumbent leaders were forcedfrom office in both Tunisia and Egypt,in Libya the military and security forcesof Colonel Gaddafi made serious effortsto quell the armed uprising—whichbegan in February 2011—with Gaddafiadamant that he would crush the oppo-sition and remain in power. In the con-text of growing calls for some form ofintervention, the UN authorised a man-date for military action in the form ofResolution 1973. Cameron and NicolasSarkozy, the French president, were

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prime movers behind the Security Coun-cil resolution which went further thanimposing a ‘no-fly zone’, as some coun-tries specifically desired, and instead au-thorised ‘all necessary measures’.9 TheUN resolution gave backing for airstrikes to protect civilians from attacksby Gaddafi’s forces, with action com-mencing on 19 March. In April, togetherwith US President Barack Obama, Cam-eron and Sarkozy published a joint letterin The Times, Le Monde and The Interna-tional Herald Tribune setting out the aimsof international community for theLibyan intervention, which served toemphasise the wider international back-ing for the action undertaken.10 Theintervention was broadly underpinnedby an international consensus of sorts:NATO-led multinational action had thesupport of regional bodies, such as theArab League. While Germany abstainedin the UN vote alongside Russia andChina, and was criticised by other coun-tries for doing so, there were not themajor divisions between EU memberstates that had occurred so visibly overIraq.

Recurrent Eurozone crises aside, thecrisis in Libya provided the Coalitiongovernment with its first major foreignpolicy test and the difficult and politi-cally sensitive choice of whether to pushfor—and commit British forces to—mili-tary action. It also raised familiar issuesabout Britain’s relation with the US and‘going the UN route’ to gain broad inter-national legitimacy, versus relying onissue-specific coalitions of the willing. Instark contrast to the partisan alignmentson the Iraq issue—where the LiberalDemocrats and other smaller partieswere strongly opposed to the invasionin 2003, as well as the Labour partybeing divided internally—there was abroad domestic consensus underpinningBritain’s role in Libya. When the issuewas put to the vote in the House ofCommons on 22 March 2011, 557 MPsendorsed the government motion, with

just thirteen against (including elevenLabour members)—a huge majority of544. Justifying the rationale for Britishparticipation, Cameron made clear tothe public that involvement in Libyawas ‘not merely an outbreak of do-goo-dery, but also “hard-headed” … rootedin national interests, and limited inscope’.11 Cameron insisted that action inLibya was ‘necessary, legal and right’.12

The Shadow Foreign Secretary, DouglasAlexander, claimed that the Labourparty’s stance on the issue should beinformed, yet not paralysed, by the ‘longshadow’ cast by Iraq.13 Both the highlycontroversial Iraq invasion and the long-standing—and increasingly unpopular—involvement of British forces in Afghani-stan coloured political and media debateover the merits or otherwise of gettinginvolved in action in the case of Libya.On the Iraq issue, in the high-stakes par-liamentary vote in March 2003, the gov-ernment motion passed by 412 votes to149, with widespread Conservativebacking. Despite the government’s vic-tory, what was particularly notable wasthe size of the rebellion by backbenchLabour MPs on an amendment opposingthe government’s stance: they numbered139 in total.14

The successful NATO-led campaign inLibya lasted for around seven monthsbefore it was officially declared thataction would end on 31 October 2011.Key developments in this periodincluded the rebels entering and assum-ing control of Tripoli in August, withGaddafi fleeing, and a succession ofcountries recognising the National Tran-sitional Council as the legitimatenational authority. The Libyan leaderwas finally captured and killed in Octo-ber 2011, after rebels had moved on andattacked the last strongholds of theGaddafi regime. The various aspects inwhich the Libyan intervention is similarto or different from previous episodes ofmilitary intervention—its explicit UNbacking and widespread regional and

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international support; its clearer andmore urgent humanitarian rationale; itsrestricted military involvement, avoidingmajor ground operations; and the fact itoffered less potential for large-scalecasualties—make it pertinent to examinepublic opinion on this issue.

Public opinion across countriesLibya was a multinational effort com-prising NATO members and contribu-tions made by various other countries(such as Qatar and the United ArabEmirates). We can use available cross-national polling data to see whetherthere were clear differences in levels ofsupport across countries. For example,considering the prominent role playedon the international stage by Cameronand Sarkozy and their countries’ subse-quent contribution to the military opera-tions, was there greater support inBritain and France than in other Euro-pean countries? Table 1 presents a com-parison of overall levels of publicsupport for several NATO membercountries. In terms of NATO’s Europeanmembers represented in Table 1, Britainand France were fully involved in theairstrikes against Gaddafi’s regime,along with the US; Italy and Spain lim-ited their role to reconnaissance mis-sions; and Germany was not involved

militarily. Results are shown for twoseparate opinion polls, one conducted atthe turn of March–April 2011 (FinancialTimes/Harris) and the other in late April(Reuters/Ipsos MORI), several weeksinto military action. Both ask about sup-port or opposition for military action,although the first poll also included aneutral option for survey respondents(‘neither’).

Looking at the first poll, in which sixcountries were surveyed, support washighest in France, Britain and Spain (37per cent or above), and lowest in Italyand the US. Interestingly, in the contextof their government’s conspicuousabstention in the UN vote, public opin-ion in Germany was not the most likelyto be opposed to action—the percentagefound here was 39, compared with 49per cent in Italy, where there was alsothe lowest proportion of neutral opinion(at 21 per cent). In the second poll (notincluding Germany and Spain), supportis noticeably highest in France (at 63 percent) compared to Britain (50 per cent)and the US (55 per cent). Again, supportis lowest in Italy, at 40 per cent, with aclear majority opposed (60 per cent).Allowing for the difference in responseoptions in the two polls, they produce aconsistent finding in relation to thecountry most likely (France) and leastlikely (Italy) to support military action.

Table 1: Cross-national public opinion towards military action in Libya

Financial Times/Harris,March-April 2011

Reuters/Ipsos MORI,April 2011

Support (%) Neither (%) Oppose (%) Support (%) Oppose (%)

US 32 31 37 55 45Britain 37 28 36 50 49France 40 30 31 63 37Germany 34 27 39 – –Italy 29 21 49 40 60Spain 37 29 34 – –

Note: Samples based on adults aged 16–64.Question: ‘To what extent do you support or oppose the current military intervention in Libya?’Question: ‘Do you support or oppose the UK and allied military action in Libya?’



The Financial Times/Harris poll alsogauged respondents’ views on possibleextensions of NATO’s military action(shown in Table 2). These ranged fromoperational changes—including deploy-ing attack helicopters—through to morefar-reaching objectives, such as regimechange. Table 2 shows the proportion ofrespondents in each country that sup-ported, opposed or took a neutral posi-tion on different types of military action.The most popular action across countrieswas regime change—something that waseventually to be realised by the rebelsand the external forces—though therewas little enthusiasm for the deploymentof ground troops and even less for thebombing of non-military targets, the lat-ter option having obvious resonancewith civilian casualties and ‘collateraldamage’. There was stronger support forthe use of attack helicopters in the US,Britain and France, and the British andFrench deployed these from early June.There was less support for this option inGermany, Italy and Spain.

Is there any association between theextent of European countries’ involve-ment in the Libyan intervention andpublic support for military action?Table 1 shows that support for militaryaction was somewhat higher in Britainand France compared to Spain and Italyin the Financial Times poll and consider-ably higher than in Italy in the Reuterspoll. Overall, Table 2 shows that therewas generally higher public support forextending military involvement in dif-ferent ways in those European countriesplaying a fuller military role in the Lib-yan intervention—Britain and France—than in Germany, Italy and Spain. Thisis evident, for example, in relation tothe potential use of ground troops andthe deployment of attack helicopters.

Public opinion within BritainAs well as placing opinion in Britain ina comparative context, we can assess thebasis of support and opposition byexamining attitudes on a cross-sectional

Table 2: Cross-national public opinion towards extending NATO’s involvementin Libya

US (%) Britain (%) France (%) Germany (%) Italy (%) Spain (%)

Bombing of non-military targetsSupport 15 19 11 7 6 8Neither 30 28 24 16 11 23Oppose 54 53 65 77 83 69A regime changeSupport 45 49 60 57 56 50Neither 39 37 28 30 20 30Oppose 16 14 12 14 24 20Deployment of ground troopsSupport 17 23 20 11 12 19Neither 27 29 28 22 19 31Oppose 56 48 51 67 70 51Use of attack helicoptersSupport 39 37 35 30 22 23Neither 35 39 35 30 21 32Oppose 26 24 31 40 58 45

Source: Financial Times/Harris, 25–31 May 2011.Note: Country samples based on adults aged 16–64.Question: ‘Do you support or oppose an extension of NATO’s military intervention in Libya to include thefollowing?’



basis. This allows us to pinpoint whichsocial groups were more or less infavour of the Libyan intervention. Interms of the overall distribution of opin-ion on this question, public opinion wasclearly against intervention in Libya,perhaps influenced by the ‘shadow’ ofthe Iraq conflict and Britain’s on-goingoperations in Afghanistan (over 350 Brit-ish military personnel had lost their livesby the end of February 2011, nearly allof them from 2006 onwards). Basedupon figures from the British ElectionStudy’s Continuous Monitoring Survey(CMS), which has undertaken monthlycross-sectional surveys of the populationsince 2004, 28 per cent approved of theaction, 50 per cent disapproved and 22per cent offered a neutral opinion(excluding ‘don’t know’ responses).

However, we need to go beyond theoverall proportions approving or disap-proving and look at which particularsocietal groups were more likely to sup-port (or oppose) military action. We canalso place attitudes towards the inter-vention in Libya in the context of publicopinion towards Britain’s involvementin Afghanistan and Iraq. For this pur-pose we can again use the CMS. Previ-ous CMS surveys have carried questionsasking about approval or disapprovalfor these three different interventions.Here, all of the monthly surveys whichasked a question on attitudes towardseach intervention are pooled to create alarger sample of respondents, enabling amore robust comparison of group differ-ences. The questions on military inter-vention were asked over the followingperiods: Iraq—April 2004 to January2010; Afghanistan—February to Decem-ber 2010; and Libya—March to May2011.

The data for each military interventionare based on responses to the followingthree questions:

(a) Overall, do you approve or disap-prove of Britain’s involvement in

military action in Libya? Stronglyapprove; approve; neither approvenor disapprove; disapprove; stronglydisapprove; don’t know.

(b) Please tell me whether you stronglyapprove, approve, disapprove, orstrongly disapprove of Britain’sinvolvement in the war against theTaliban inAfghanistan. Strongly approve.Approve. Disapprove. Strongly dis-approve. Don’t know.

(c) Please tell me whether you stronglyapprove, approve, disapprove, orstrongly disapprove of Britain’sinvolvement in the war with Iraq.Strongly approve. Approve. Disap-prove. Strongly disapprove. Don’tknow.

While all questions asked aboutapproval or disapproval, one differenceto note is that the question asking aboutLibya included a neutral responseoption (‘neither approve nor disap-prove’), which was not included in thequestions for Iraq and Afghanistan.Table 3 shows the overall levels ofapproval and disapproval for each mili-tary intervention for a range of societalgroups, classified by sex, ethnic back-ground, education, occupation, region,partisanship and newspaper readership.The proportions giving a neutralresponse are also shown for the questionon Libya. Each group’s level of approvalcan be compared across the three mili-tary interventions and, within eachinstance of military conflict, to the figurefor ‘all’, representing all respondents inthe pooled sample for each question.The difference in response categories forthe Libya question means that weshould not focus on the precise level ofapproval for each group across interven-tions; instead we should assess whetherparticular groups are broadly more sup-portive of military actions overseas. Itshould be borne in mind that the pres-ence of the neutral response in the Libyaquestion means levels of approval (and



disapproval) are probably lower thanthey otherwise would be.

It is evident that there are clear differ-ences in levels of approval across socialgroup categories. Those likely to bemore supportive across all interventions

include men and those belonging to awhite ethnic group. The consistentlylargest differentials across social groupcategories are between men and women.The gaps in approval levels betweenmen and women were as follows: Libya

Table 3: Approval and disapproval of military interventions by social groups

Groupcategory

LIBYA AFGHANISTAN IRAQ

%Approve

%Neither

%Disapprove

%Approve

%Disapprove

%Approve

%Disapprove

All 28 22 50 35 65 30 70Male 36 20 44 45 55 37 63Female 20 24 56 25 75 23 77White ethnicgroup

28 22 50 35 65 30 70

Other ethnicgroup

25 22 54 30 70 22 78

Finishededucation:21 or over

33 23 44 36 64 27 73

Finishededucation:20 or under

26 21 53 34 66 31 69

Salariat 32 22 46 38 63 30 70Otheroccupatizonor neverworked

25 22 53 33 67 30 70

Lives inEngland

28 22 50 34 66 30 70

Lives in Wales 29 24 47 37 64 32 69Lives inScotland

30 20 50 41 59 30 70

Conservativesupporter

33 22 45 36 64 29 71

Laboursupporter

27 21 51 43 57 44 56

LiberalDemocratsupporter

34 20 45 31 69 18 83

Other party/noparty

23 23 54 26 74 22 78

Reads tabloidmost often

25 23 52 34 66 33 67

Readsbroadsheetmost often

37 19 44 36 64 25 75

None readmost often

39 23 38 35 65 26 74

Does not reada newspaper

25 22 54 34 66 29 71

Source: British Election Study – Continuous Monitoring Survey. Weighted data. ‘Don’t know’ responsesexcluded.

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—16 per cent; Afghanistan—20 per cent;and Iraq—14 per cent. Similarly, on thebasis of ethnic background, the gaps inapproval levels were: Libya—3 per cent;Afghanistan—5 per cent; and Iraq—8per cent. There are some differences onthe basis of education: those who fin-ished full-time education aged 21 orolder (many of whom will hold adegree-level qualification) were moresupportive of the intervention in Libyabut less likely to approve of the war inIraq. In terms of occupational grade,members of the salariat (those in sala-ried, white-collar jobs) were more likelyto approve of Britain’s role in Libya andAfghanistan, but no more likely thanother occupational grades (and thosewho have never been in work) to sup-port the Iraq war. Looking at the regionswhere people live, it is evident thatthose living in Scotland were clearlymore supportive of the war in Afghani-stan, while regional differences weremore muted for Iraq and Libya.

There are also group differences inlevels of approval on the basis of partyloyalties and newspaper readership. Thepattern of support for partisans is inter-esting. Specifically, Liberal Democratsupporters were less likely to approve ofBritain’s involvement in Iraq (wherethey took a strong anti-war stance) andAfghanistan, but were more supportiveof action in Libya than Labour partisanswere. The widest gap in attitudesoccurred on the Iraq war, with just 18per cent of Liberal Democrat supportersin favour compared to 44 and 29 percent of Labour and Conservative parti-sans, respectively. Broadsheet readerswere more likely than tabloid readers toapprove of Britain’s involvement inLibya; conversely, tabloid readers weremore supportive of the war in Iraq.There was little difference in viewstowards the conflict in Afghanistan.

To look in more detail at group divi-sions on the issue, Table 4 shows theassociations between two areas in which

there were often clear differences in lev-els of approval: sex and partisanship. Itshows, separately for men and women,levels of approval (again combining‘strongly approve’ or ‘approve’) for theaction in Libya, Iraq and Afghanistanfor the different groups of party sup-porters. Across supporters of the mainpolitical parties (Labour, Conservativeand Liberal Democrat), men are alwaysmore favourable towards military action,as is also the case for those who supporta minor party or do not have a partisanaffiliation. The approval differentialsbetween men and women are generallylargest for Conservative supporters andsmallest for Liberal Democrat support-ers. For example, 46 per cent of Conser-

Table 4: Approval of military interven-tions: Partisanship by gender

LIBYA Con(%)

Lab(%)

LibDem(%)

Otherparty/

none (%)

MenApprove 46 33 39 29WomenApprove 21 20 29 17Difference 25 13 10 12

AFGHANISTAN Con(%)

Lab(%)

LibDem(%)

Otherparty/

none (%)


IRAQ Con(%)

Lab(%)

LibDem(%)

Otherparty/

none (%)


Source: British Election Study – Continuous Monitor-ing Surveys. Weighted data. ‘Don’t know’ responsesexcluded.‘Difference’: percentage of men who approve minusthe percentage of women who approve.



vative-supporting men favoured actionin Libya compared to 21 per cent ofwomen supporting the Conservatives,while the figures for Afghanistan were47 and 26 per cent, respectively. Womensupporting the Liberal Democrats weremost likely to approve of military actionin Libya, while Labour-supportingwomen were most in favour of theactions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Over-all, across partisan affiliations, menwere more likely than women to sup-port military action in Libya, Iraq andAfghanistan, with sizeable gaps inapproval levels within each partisancategory.

Public opinion over timeWhile we can gain considerable insightfrom analysing public opinion in acomparative perspective and by lookingat attitudes across population groups,these both represent ‘static’ analyses. Asother overseas conflicts have shown,the public mood can shift over time inresponse to real or perceived opera-tional successes and failures abroad andpolitical events at home. In Britain andthe US, public opinion turned againstthe 2003 Iraq War after the initial inva-sion and the overthrow of Saddam

Hussein’s regime. Similarly, publicapproval for Britain’s role in Afghani-stan has fallen over time. We can builda ‘dynamic’ picture of the public moodusing three areas of evaluation com-monly used in public opinion research:first, support for military action in prin-ciple; second, assessments of how mili-tary operations are progressing; third,how political leaders are handling theissue. It is important to examine theseseparately, as even those who maintainthat taking action was the right thingmay shift their assessment on the issue—and their leader’s handling of it—in anegative direction, while those whoopposed the action in principle can stillacknowledge when military operationsare progressing well and a leader ismanaging the issue competently.

Figures 1–3 chart public opinionover time for these three differentindicators. They are based on regularonline polling conducted by YouGovfrom the outset of the intervention inMarch through to the formal conclu-sion of the NATO mission at the endof October. Figures 1–3 show the pro-portions of respondents overtime with (a) a positive opinion, (b) anegative opinion and (c) no opinioneither way.

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Figure 1: Public opinion towards whether it was right or wrong to take militaryaction in LibyaSource: Compiled by the author from YouGov polls.Question: ‘Do you think Britain, France, the US and other countries are right or wrong to take militaryaction in Libya?’



Figure 1 shows public opinion on thequestion of whether military action wasright or wrong. This type of questionmeasures ‘generalised support for war’,and is commonly used in surveys andopinion polls.15 There is considerableoscillation in the proportions believingthat the intervention was right or wrong,and the lines often run in close proxim-ity in April and May. During June andJuly the proportions against the actionexceed those who support it; the reverseis the case from August onwards, as therebels steadily gained ground and tookTripoli. There is a final spurt of supportin October, no doubt influenced by thedeath of Gaddafi and the sense of aneventual resolution to the internal fight-ing. The proportion with no opinion

(‘don’t know’) stays broadly the sameover time.

Figure 2 shows evaluations of militaryaction in Libya (‘well’, ‘badly’ or ‘don’tknow’). Overall, there is greater fluctua-tion in the public mood on this indicatorand also sharper differences betweenviewpoints over time, showing thatassessments are probably more sensitiveto developments on the ground, asreported by the media and articulatedby political leaders. There is an increase—albeit uneven—in negative evaluationsin the early months of the conflict; theydecline sharply during August. Conse-quently, positive assessments of the situ-ation rise sharply during August andthen increase again in October. Thesharp increase in positive evaluations

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Figure 3: Public opinion towards David Cameron’s handling of the issueSource: Compiled by the author from YouGov polls.Question: ‘How well or badly do you think David Cameron has responded to the situation in Libya?’

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Figure 2: Public opinion towards how military action is going in LibyaSource: Compiled by the author from YouGov polls.Question: ‘Overall, do you think the Coalition’s military action in Libya is going well or badly?’



during mid to late August clearly corre-sponds again to the rebel forces’advance into and eventual capture ofthe Libyan capital, Tripoli. The spike insupport in October also represents aresponse to the capture and killing ofGaddafi and the ending of major hostili-ties in much of the country.

Figure 3 charts public evaluations ofCameron’s handling of the issue (‘well’,‘badly’ or ‘don’t know’). There is somedecline in positive evaluations fromApril to June; they pick up in Augustand also rise again in October. Negativeevaluations decline during August–Octo-ber. As in Figures 1 and 2, there is lessfluctuation in the proportions reportingno opinion.

For comparison, Figure 4 shows pub-lic attitudes in the US towards militaryaction in Libya (those who ‘support’,‘oppose’ or are ‘undecided’), with thequestion’s wording explicitly referring to‘President Obama’s decision’. It usesdata from regular polling undertaken byRasmussen from March through toOctober 2011, based on nationally repre-sentative samples. The data show thatthe proportion opposed increased duringMay–July, but then decreased duringAugust. Correspondingly, the proportionin favour rose in August, fell back some-what in September, then increased againin October. There is evidence thereforethat the public mood across countries

changed in a similar direction at keypoints in the Libya operation.

When examined in more depth on apartisan basis, the YouGov data showthat Conservative supporters tended tohave the most favourable ratings of thePrime Minister on this issue, and morepositive assessments of how the militaryaction was going. Labour supporterswere consistently likely to have lesspositive assessments on these two indi-cators. Liberal Democrat supportersoccupied a broadly intermediate positionon these two indicators, although theirlevels of support were closer to thoseexpressed by Conservative supportersthan those held by Labour partisans. Itis not surprising that there are sharp dif-ferences between partisan groups whenevaluating the prime minister’s role, asthis represents a ‘mediated’ issue ques-tion. These

tend to invite opinions which will invariably, ifnot inevitably, be filtered through pre-existingpartisan loyalties or beliefs – they will be politi-cally conditioned’. When faced with such aquestion, respondents’ thinking will engageboth the issue at hand and a clear politicalreference point (such as a leader or govern-ment).16

Based on the data shown in Figure 4,there was also a partisan basis to publicopinion in the US, with Democrats moresupportive than Independents andRepublicans of their President’s decision

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Figure 4: Public opinion in the US towards military action in LibyaSource: Rasmussen Reports.Question: ‘Do you agree or disagree with President Obama’s decision to take military action in Libya?’



to participate in military action (detailsnot reported here).

ConclusionWhat conclusions can be drawn for pub-lic opinion and future scenarios in whichBritish forces could be committed to mil-itary action overseas? First, the cross-sec-tional profile of opinion showed that themore supportive groups included men,those from white ethnic groups and,when categorised socio-economically,those with higher educational attainmentor in higher-level occupations. Attitudesare also underpinned by attitudinal fac-tors, such as partisanship, political trustand media usage. Men were more sup-portive than women of military inter-vention across partisan categories.Second, the ‘dynamic’ analysis allowedus to build a clearer picture of shifts inpublic opinion over the duration ofNATO’s involvement in Libya. Whilethey may be shaped by pre-existing atti-tudes, such as party loyalties, publicassessments are malleable and respondto major developments ‘on the ground’,shifting in a positive or negative direc-tion, as was the case with previous mili-tary interventions. The shifts in Britishpublic opinion shown here may be par-alleled in the popular mood in othercountries that participated in the Libyanintervention.

Third, what tentative comments canbe made regarding public opinion,should international developments leadto a possible future intervention whichraises the question of British involve-ment? The annual Chatham House–You-Gov Survey on international affairs(fieldwork undertaken in June 2011)gauged public opinion on this topic andfound:

The survey results show a striking scepticismamong the general public and opinion-formersabout British military intervention abroad …There also seemed to be scepticism about inter-vention more widely, with nearly half of all

respondents saying Britain should not involveitself in any way in uprisings like those inEgypt and Libya.17

Specifically, amongst the general public,35 per cent supported military actionagainst Iran to prevent them acquiringnuclear weapons, compared to 47 percent who were opposed. In relation topopular uprisings in overseas countries,21 per cent of the general public thoughtBritain had a moral responsibility tosupport them and 17 per cent thoughtBritain should support them contingenton it being in the national interest, whilea plurality—47 per cent—said Britainshould not be involved at all in suchuprisings. This scepticism about militaryinvolvement overseas is underlined bythe results of a YouGov poll undertakenin late August 2011 asking whether simi-lar support to that given to the Libyanrebels should be offered to protesters inSyria rebelling against Bashar Assad’sregime. Just 21 per cent said such sup-port should be offered, with 49 per centagainst and a sizeable proportion (30per cent) unsure. Across social groups,men were more likely to agree thanwomen (27 compared to 16 per cent);differences were less pronounced forpartisanship and social class.18

Evidence from the Pew Research Cen-tre’s Global Attitudes Project Spring2011 survey shows, however, that thereis widespread acceptance that militaryforce is sometimes needed to maintainorder in international affairs (70 percent in Britain), as well as substantialsupport for UN backing for using forceto deal with international threats (67per cent in Britain).19 Clearly, the widerbody of survey evidence provides amixed picture of public opinion on thisissue. Whether public opinion wouldbroadly support or oppose a role forBritain in a future military interventionis contingent on variable aspects of theinternational scene (the stated rationalefor the intervention; the nature and



extent of military operations; the role ofregional and international support,including UN endorsement) as well asthe domestic political situation (includ-ing the presence or absence of a party-political consensus and the popularity—or otherwise—of the current prime min-ister and government).

Fourth, while Libya represents a for-eign policy success for the Coalitiongovernment—and for Cameron’s leader-ship in particular—its importance forpublic perceptions more generally is,arguably, limited. Matthew d’Anconahas argued:

Cameron’s achievement in Libya will notcement the public’s image of him definitely, as,say, the Falklands did its perception ofThatcher as the Iron Lady, or as Iraq brandedBlair as an absentee adventurer and congenitalliar. Its impact, I think, will be subliminal: ahazy sense that this Prime Minister might, afterall, be rather competent, good at fixingthings, brave and not bombastic.20

Set against perceptions of competencebased on handling of foreign policy,however, are public assessments of theCoalition government’s and Cameron’sperformance on a range of more pressing,and less tractable, domestic issues,including economic management and thequality of public services—the ‘bread-and-butter’ concerns which influence vot-ing behaviour and election outcomes.

Notes1 Based on YouGov polling data, available at:http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/vtz3xqd2gf/YG-Archives-Pol-Trackers-Afghanistan-040712.pdf

2 Data available at: http://www.comres.co.uk/polls/The_Index_(Afghanistan)_2_Oct11.pdf.

3 Matt Beech, ‘British Conservatism and ForeignPolicy: Traditions and Ideas Shaping Cameron’sGlobal View’, British Journal of Politics and Interna-tional Relations, 2011, vol. 13, no. 3, p. 361.

4 Rhiannon Vickers, ‘The Con-Lib Agenda forForeign Policy and International Development’,in The Cameron-Clegg Government. Coalition Poli-tics in an Age of Austerity, ed. Simon Lee andMatt Beech, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2011, p.205.

5 Peter Dorey, Mark Garnett and Andrew Denham,From Crisis to Coalition: The Conservative Party,1997–2010, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2011, p. 128.

6 Andrew Gamble, ‘Britain in the World’, inDevelopments in British Politics 9, ed. R. Heffer-nan, P. Cowley and C. Hay, Basingstoke, Pal-grave, 2011, p. 317.

7 Patrick Wintour, ‘Afghanistan WithdrawalBefore 2015, Says David Cameron’, The Guard-ian, 26 June 2010.

8 Vickers, ‘The Con-Lib Agenda’, p. 212.9 Patrick Wintour and Nicholas Watt, ‘DavidCameron’s Libyan War: Why the PM FeltGaddafi Had to Be Stopped’, The Guardian, 2October 2011.

10 For the full text, see: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/opinion/15iht-edlib-ya15.html?_r=1;

11 The Economist, ‘The Ghost of Tony’, 24 March2011.

12 The Economist, ‘Bagehot: David Cameron’sWar’, 27 August 2011.

13 Douglas Alexander, ‘Why MPs Must Say Yes onLibya’, The Guardian, 21 March 2011.

14 Tom Quinn, ‘Tony Blair’s Second Term’, in Brit-ain at the Polls 2005, ed. John Bartle and AnthonyKing, Washington, CQ Press, 2005, p. 4.

15 Emanuel Gregory Boussios and Stephen Cole,‘Do Individual Characteristics Matter? AnAnalysis of Americans’ Opinions Toward theKorean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf and Iraq Wars’,Journal of Applied Security Research, vol. 5, no.3, 2010, pp. 279–305, p. 283.

16 Maurice Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in Ameri-can National Elections, New Haven, Yale Uni-versity Press, 1981, pp. 80–81.

17 Jane Kinninmont, ‘Arab Spring: Where Nextfor UK Policy?’, in The Chatham House–YouGovSurvey 2011. British Attitudes Towards the UK’sInternational Priorities, p. 29. Available at:http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/0711ch_yougov_analysis.pdf

18 Results available at: http://cdn.yougov.com/today_uk_import/yg-archives-pol-st-results-26-290811.pdf. See also the more recentYouGov survey on attitudes towards possiblemilitary action in Syria at: http://cdn.yougov.com/cumulus_uploads/document/wu3f2fqyga/YG-ArchivesPR-YouGov-Syria-intervention-080212v2.pdf

19 Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Project,The American-Western European Values Gap,November 2011. Available at: http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2011/11/Pew-Global-Atti-tudes-Values-Report-FINAL-November-17-2011-10AM-EST.pdf

20 Matthew d’Ancona, ‘Libya Won’t Make DavidCameron’s Reputation, But It’s Certainly AStart’, Daily Telegraph, 27 August 2011.

P U B L I C O P I N I O N A N D M I L I T A R Y I N T E R V E N T I O N 131


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