public comment no. 245-nfpa 652-2013 [ chapter 7 ]...public comment no. 245-nfpa 652-2013 [ chapter...

Public Comment No. 245-NFPA 652-2013 [ Chapter 7 ]

Chapter 7 Process Hazards Analysis7.1 * General Requirements.7.1.1 Responsibility.

The owner/operator of a facility where combustible particulate solids are present in either a process or a facility compartment shall be responsible to ensure a process hazards analysis is completed in accordance with the requirements of this chapter.7.1.2

The requirements of Chapter 7 shall be applied retroactively.7.2 Criteria.7.2.1 * Overview.The process hazards analysis shall consider the fire, deflagration, and explosion hazards and provide recommendations to ensure that the objectives in Section 4.2 are met.7.2.1.1

The process hazards analysis shall determine where a fire, deflagration, and explosion hazard exists.7.2.2 * Qualifications.

The process hazards analysis shall be performed or led by a qualified person.7.2.3 * Minimum Interval.

A revalidation of the process hazards analysis shall be performed a minimum of every 5 years.7.2.4 Documentation.

The results of the process hazards analysis review shall be documented, including any necessary action items requiring change to the process materials, physical process, process operations, or facilities associated with the process.7.3 Methodology.7.3.1 General.

The process hazards analysis shall include the following:

(1) Identify the portions of the process or facility areas where a fire, deflagration, and explosion hazard exists

(2) Identify specific fire and deflagration scenarios and determine their consequences, including fires, deflagrations, and explosions

(3) Identify the means and develop a plan by which fire, deflagration, and explosion events can be prevented or mitigated

(4) Identify operating ranges

7.3.2 Material Evaluation.7.3.2.1 *

The process hazards analysis shall be based on data used in Chapter 5 of material that is representative of the dust present.7.3.3 Process Systems.

Page 370 of 898National Fire Protection Association Report

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7.3.3.1 *Each part of the process system where combustible dust is present shall beevaluated.7.3.3.2 *

The potential for a dust fire, deflagration, or explosion in a process system component shall be based on whether the dust fire, deflagration, or explosion hazard exists.7.3.3.3

Where a dust fire, deflagration, or explosion hazard exists within a process system, the hazards shall be managed in accordance with this standard.7.3.4 Facility Compartments.7.3.4.1 *

Each facility compartment where combustible dust is present shall beevaluated.7.3.4.2 *The potential for a dust fire, deflagration, or explosion in a facility compartment shall be based upon whether a dust fire, deflagration, or explosion hazard exists.7.3.4.2.1 *

The evaluation of dust deflagration hazard in a facility compartment shall include a comparison of actual or intended dust accumulation to the threshold housekeeping dust accumulation that would present a potential for flash-fire exposure to personnel or compartment failure due to explosiveoverpressure.7.3.4.2.2

Threshold housekeeping dust accumulation levels and non-routine dust accumulation levels (i.e., from a process upset) shall be in accordance with relevant industry or commodity-specific NFPA standards. (See 1.3.1 .)7.3.4.3

Where a dust fire, deflagration, or explosion hazard exists within a facility compartment, the effects of the fire, deflagration, or explosion shall be managed in accordance with this standard.

Statement of Problem and Substantiation for Public Comment

Delete the entire chapter. While I am in favor of the concept of hazard analysis, the application of PHA as directed by this chapter for many facilities handling combustible dust will be onerous, expensive and unnecessary. Many operations are covered very well by existing NPFA industry or commodity specific standards and the prescriptive requirements in those standards are easy to understand. Chapter 5 on hazard identification addresses the point of a PHA in identifying the presence of a hazard, Chapters 8 & 9 address the 'analysis' component of a PHA with requirements to eliminate, control or mitigate the hazard and where not covered by these chapters, Chapter 6 provides an option for a Performance Based analysis where a qualified practitioner could use a PHA of a level suitable to the Risk. Although A.7.1 claims not to be requiring application of a "PSM-type PHA" it is almost guaranteed that some AHJs will default to a PSM type product.

Submitter Information Verification



Submitter Full Name: Henry FeboOrganization: FM GlobalStreet Address: City:State: Zip: Submittal Date: Wed Nov 13 09:42:37 EST 2013

Committee Statement

Committee Action:

Rejected

Resolution: The Committee believes that throughout the draft standard a logical case for Chapter 7 has been established, and with the changes incorporated as a result of the Second Draft, the inclusion of the hazard analysis chapter is further substantiated. Chapter 7 is intended to guide the process to identifywhere hazards exist and the DHA (now that this change is included)provides information learned about the process (es) so that correctivemeasures can be defined. The Committee does not support the recommendation to delete this chapter.



Public Comment No. 21-NFPA 652-2013 [ Section No. 7.1.1 ]

7.1.1 Responsibility.The owner/operator of a facility where combustible particulate solids dust fire or deflagration hazards are present in either a process or a facility compartment shall be responsible to ensure a process hazards analysis is completed in accordance with the requirements of this chapter.


Section 7.1.1: a. This section requires the completion of a process hazard analysis for all processes/facility compartments where combustible particulate solids are present. The mere presence of a combustible particulate solid should not trigger this requirement. Doing so would unnecessary obligate thousands of facilities without combustible dust deflagration or fire hazards to conduct process hazard analyses. The requirement to conduct a hazard analysis should be triggered by the presences of a fire or deflagration hazard, determinations that are already required by the Standard. Proposed language changes:

b. The owner/operator of a facility where combustible dust fire or deflagration hazards are present in either a process or a facility compartment shall be responsible to ensure a process hazards analysis is completed in accordance with the requirements of this chapter.


Submitter Full Name: Jennifer GradnigoOrganization: CRAStreet Address:City: State: Zip:Submittal Date: Wed Oct 09 13:16:52 EDT 2013

Committee Statement



CommitteeAction:

Rejected but see related SR

Resolution: SR-40-NFPA 652-2014Statement: Section 7.1.1:

a. This section requires the completion of a process hazard analysis for allprocesses/facility compartments where combustible particulate solids arepresent. The mere presence of a combustible particulate solid should nottrigger this requirement. Doing so would unnecessary obligate thousands offacilities without combustible dust deflagration or fire hazards to conduct process hazard analyses. The requirement to conduct a hazard analysis should be triggered by the presences of a fire or deflagration hazard, determinations that are already required by the Standard.

The Committee agrees with the submitter of PC No. 21 and approves the changes shown in this SR. The Committee also modified this to be consistent with the use of the defined term compartment per work of aCommittee task group that reviewed this issue and made recommendations to the full committee.




7.1.1 Responsibility.The owner/operator of a facility where combustible particulate solids are present in either a process or a facility compartment shall be responsible to ensure a process hazards analysis is completed when changes are made to a process in accordance with the requirements of this chapter.


It is not necessary to perform a process hazard analysis on every dust producing process in existence today. Most of these processes have been around for a very long time and the hazards are well known. It is a waste of resources to perform PHAs on existing processes. As this currently reads, every farmer in America would have to do a PHA on their private grain elevators or barn where they store feed for the cows. However, there is value to performing a PHA as part of a management of change process.


Submitter Full Name: Matthew BujewskiOrganization: MJB Risk ConsultingStreet Address: City:State: Zip: Submittal Date: Fri Oct 25 10:32:02 EDT 2013

Committee Statement

Committee Action:

Rejected

Resolution: The recommended changes in this public comment are currently addressed in Section 9.9 of this draft standard on management of change (MOC), so the Committee does not support the proposed revision in this requirement.




7.1.1 Responsibility.The owner/operator of a facility having more than 50 employees regularly on site and where combustible particulate solids are present in either a process or a facility compartment shall be responsible to ensure a process hazards analysis is completed in accordance with the requirements of this chapter, except where an industry or commodity-specific NFPA standard does not have a similar requirement .




Chapter 7, Hazard Assessment: This provision is unnecessary, very costly, and unjustifiably onerous in the great majority of establishments subject to the standard. Whether to require such assessments requires a close familiarity with the practical costs and benefits conferred by PHA’s in particular industries. Not every bakery (baking presumably being a “process”), grain transfer station (presumably, the “process” of merely handling), wood working shop and similar small facilities requires a process hazards analysis (PHA) — yet, chapter 7 would require them all to have one, without distinction. As the former chairman of the NFPA 61 committee wrote, this chapter “would require every farmer in America to do a PHA on their dust producing farm equipment and their storage silos or barns.” That does not make sense.Chapter 7 provides a good example of why NFPA 652 should not effectively displace the commodity- and industry-specific dust standards. Chapter 7 is not appropriate for many industries in which the characteristics of the substance and the technology are well understood, such as agricultural dusts. Process hazard analysis was developed in the chemical industry, which has novel chemicals, or varied and complex chemical processes, the behavior of which together can be dynamic and often difficult to predict. Fires and non-dust ignitions are much more common in chemical plants than dust explosions; they require the coincidence of only three elements, whereas combustible dust explosions require the coincidence of five elements. By contrast, the ignition behavior of agricultural dusts and their handling processes have long been known, have remained essentially unchanged for decades, and are not complex. As a result, the NFPA 61 committee has rejected proposals for mandatory PHA’s. It concluded that, with regard to agricultural dusts, the benefits of mandating such analyses cannot be justified by their very substantial costs.Furthermore, so long as a facility is designed by a qualified person, a PHA in many industries is not justifiable and will impose large costs on many small entities to hire expensive consultants to review processes that are already well understood by their managers. The small number (if any) of injuries and deaths, and the small amount of property damage, that might be prevented by this provision cannot possibly be justified by the large costs it will impose.We made similar comments during the public input stage. With respect, the Committee’s reasons for rejecting them are either incorrect or do not come to grips with them. The Committee responded as follows: “The intent of this chapter section is to require the process of assessing the risk in any operation, regardless of size. A second intent of this chapter is to provide a step by step [method for analysis (?)], as well as examples on how to accomplish this at minimal cost to the operation. The process hazard analysis methodology is not the same as the OSHA PSM methodology and not intended to trigger the same level of work. Modified the definition of process hazard analysis to make this clear. Additionally, the Committee added language to annex, A.6.1, to help user with hazard analysis.”The Committee’s statement that, “The intent of this chapter section is to require the process of assessing the risk in any operation, regardless of size,” does not explain why the standard should apply regardless of size. What about a family bakery or farm with only five employees? And with respect, the Committee’s assertion that it “[m]odified the definition of process hazard analysis to make [it] clear” that the required PHA “methodology is not the same as the OSHA PSM methodology and not intended to trigger the same level of work,” is not correct. The definition in 3.3.27 of a PHA as a “systematic review” of potential hazards imposes precisely the same duty as that imposed by paragraph (e) of the PSM Standard—systematic review of every possible hazard scenario. It is the requirement for a systematic review that makes PHA’s so expensive, so onerous and, in many industries, so unjustifiable, especially in industries, such as the agriculture industry, where dust behavior has been well understood for many, many years.




Submitter Full Name: ARTHUR SAPPEROrganization: for United States Beet Sugar AssociationStreet Address: City:State: Zip: Submittal Date: Mon Nov 18 09:24:05 EST 2013

Committee Statement

Committee Action:

Rejected

Resolution: It is not the Committee's intent with this standard to establish a threshold based on personnel or employees below which the consequences do not apply. Such a threshold determination does not account for contractors or responders who might be on site or situations such as high school wood shops where there are students present who would not be considered employees. So, the Committee does not support the recommended revision proposed in this public comment.




7.1.2The requirements of Chapter 7 shall be applied retroactively.


Applying Chapter 7 retroactively introduces several major issues for Owners:- Completing PHA's on all existing processes with combustible dusts is a monumental task which will take years to complete. In reality, Owners would identify high hazard processes to complete a hazard analysis, not every process. - To perform a PHA, the material properties will need to be know which then causes Chapter 5 to be retroactive- Performing a PHA on all processes can lead will extensive changes to existing facilities by implementing mitigations in Chapter 8 which are not intended to be retroactive.- Requiring Owners to meet objectives of section 4.2 may require impractical or impossible physical changes to existing processes and buildings. Existing facilities may not be located or constructed to achieve the requirements of 4.2.1.2 or 4.2.4.


Submitter Full Name: Craig FroehlingOrganization: Cargill, Inc.Street Address: City:State: Zip: Submittal Date: Mon Nov 11 17:12:48 EST 2013

Committee Statement

Committee Action:

Rejected

Resolution: These comments all recommend that the DHA not be implemented with a retroactive application. The Committee believes that it is essential for these hazard identification steps be implemented as soon as possible and that through the retroactivity concept that is included with SR No. 41 a workableapproach can be achieved. The Committee is not in support of removing theretroactivity requirement from the standard.




7.1.2Option 1: The requirements of Chapter 7 shallbe applied retroactivelyapply to new processes and to existing processes that are undergoing material modification. Material modification shall include modifications ormaintenance/repair that exceeds 25% of the original process cost.Option 2: The owner/operator of a facility shall prepare a schedule forcompleting process hazard analyses of affected process/facility compartments within a 5-year period of effective date of the Standard. The schedule shall demonstrate reasonable progress in each of the five years (all process hazard analyses cannot be completed in the 5 th year) .


Section 7.1.2 Process Hazard Analysis, Retroactivity:a. This section indicates that the requirements of Chapter 7 shall be applied retroactively. This would require a facility owner to 1) have completed process hazard analyses on all existing combustible dust processes on the effective date of the Standard, and 2) according to Sections 7.3.3.3 and 7.3.4.3 “manage hazards in accordance with the Standard”. These two sections obligate a facility owner to have completed upgrades of all existing processes to NFPA 652 requirements by the effective date of the Standard. This is not only unachievable, but inconsistent with other NFPA Standards.

b. As a point of reference, when OSHA promulgated the Process Safety Standard (which appears to be the model for many of the concepts in NFPA 652), officials recognized the challenges associated with completing the initial PHA’s and did not require immediate completion.

c. A reasonable approach (and one used extensively by the EPA when it promulgates new regulations) is to require conformance for new processes and when existing processes undergo material modifications. As an alternative, a 5-year period for completion of initial PHA’s (approach taken by OSHA) could be followed. Recommended options for changes to section 7.1.2 are provided below.

d. Option 1: The requirements of Chapter 7 shall apply to new processes and to existing processes that are undergoing material modification. Material modification shall include modifications or maintenance/repair that exceeds 25% of the original process cost.

e. Option 2: The owner/operator of a facility shall prepare a schedule for completing process hazard analyses of affected process/facility compartments within a 5-year period of effective date of the Standard. The schedule shall demonstrate reasonable progress in each of the five years (all process hazard analyses cannot be completed in the 5th year).




Submitter Full Name: Jennifer GradnigoOrganization: CRAStreet Address:City: State: Zip:Submittal Date: Wed Oct 09 13:19:11 EDT 2013

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:


Resolution: SR-41-NFPA 652-2014Statement: Section 7.1.2 Process Hazard Analysis, Retroactivity:

a. This section indicates that the requirements of Chapter 7 shall be applied retroactively. This would require a facility owner to 1) have completed process hazard analyses on all existing combustible dust processes on the effective date of the Standard, and 2) according to Sections 7.3.3.3 and 7.3.4.3 “manage hazards in accordance with the Standard”. These two sections obligate a facility owner to have completed upgrades of all existing processes to NFPA 652 requirements by the effective date of the Standard. This is not only unachievable, but inconsistent with other NFPA Standards.





The Committee agreed with the principle outlined in Public Comment No. 22 and used it as the basis for developing this SR.




7.1.2The requirements of Chapter 7 shall be applied retroactively. Where a process or operation is covered by another NFPA commodity or industry specific code, it shall be permitted to be evaluated by that code without implementation of a PHA


The requirement that PHA be applied retroactively is onerous, expensive and unnecessary. Many operations are covered very well by existing NFPA industry or commodity specific standards and the prescriptive requirements in those standards are easy to understand. The addition of using existing code requirements as an althernative to a PHA is a reasonable alternative to the full PHA process. This is submitted as a possible alternative should PC-245 be rejected by the committee



Committee Statement

Committee Action:

Rejected





7.1.2The requirements of Chapter 7 shall not be applied retroactively.


This section provides that the process hazard requirements are retroactive. It is simply not feasible that a full process hazard evaluation will have been done as of the day of enactment of NFPA 652 in the thousands of facilities that have not done them previously. There should be a five year phase-in period for the requirements of this chapter. We made comments to this effect in January 2013, and the Correlating Committee made a similar recommendation. However, the requested changes in the Chapter have not been made. Finally, process hazard analysis should not be required every five years if there have been no changes in the facility necessitating such a re-evaluation.


Submitter Full Name: MARC FLEISCHAKEROrganization: ARENT FOX LLPAffilliation: NOPA, NFPA, IOMSAStreet Address: City:State: Zip: Submittal Date: Wed Nov 13 14:32:05 EST 2013

Committee Statement

Committee Action:

Rejected





7.1.2The requirements of Chapter 7 shall not be applied retroactively. They shall be phased in over a five year period by owner/operators.


It is simply not feasible that a full process hazard evaluation will have been done as of the day of enactment of NFPA 652 in the thousands of facilities that have not done them previously. There should be a five year phase-in period for the requirements of this Chapter. We made comments to this effect in January 2013, and the Correlating Committee made a similar recommendation. However, the requested changes in this Chapter have not been made. Finally, process hazard analysis should not be required every five years if there have been no changes in the facility necessitating such a re-evaluation.


Submitter Full Name: MARC FLEISCHAKEROrganization: ARENT FOX LLPAffilliation: NOPA, NGFA, IOMSAStreet Address: City:State: Zip: Submittal Date: Wed Nov 13 14:36:03 EST 2013

Committee Statement



Committee Action:














A PHA should not have to be done for every dust producing process that is in existence since the beginning of the world. Again, these processes and hazards are well known and it is a waste of resources to retroactively perform PHAs on everything that produces dust. This is too far reaching and should not be made retroactive regardless of the time frame allowed to complete. This is not a fundamental concept and exceeds the scope of this document.


Submitter Full Name: Matthew BujewskiOrganization: MJB Risk ConsultingStreet Address: City:State: Zip: Submittal Date: Fri Oct 25 10:36:40 EDT 2013

Committee Statement

Committee Action:

Rejected







The Rubber Manufacturers Association recommends that NFPA 652 should not apply to facilities retroactively upon enactment of the standard. Section 7.1.2 specifies that, “The requirements of Chapter 7 shall be applied retroactively.” A retroactivity provision also appears in the following sections of 652: 1.6.2, 1.6.3, 1.6.4, 7.1.2, 8.4.1, 8.5.1, 8.5.4.1, 8.5.5.1, 9.1. RMA interprets this retroactivity provision to mean that the standard is effective when enacted.

The inclusion of these retroactivity provisions means that most of NFPA 652 will be effective immediately upon enactment. Requiring facilities to be in compliance with NFPA 652 upon the date of enactment is not practical because it will cost facilities millions of dollars and years to achieve and in some circumstances may weaken actions facilities are currently doing to manage combustible dust. RMA recommends that NFPA 652 include additional time for compliance. Specifically we recommend that NFPA 652 specify that facilities shall use best faith efforts to come into compliance in a reasonable amount of time which at a minimum should provide facilities several years for implementation.


Submitter Full Name: SARAH AMICKOrganization: RUBBER MANUFACTURERS ASSNStreet Address: City:State: Zip: Submittal Date: Fri Nov 15 14:58:26 EST 2013

Committee Statement

Committee Action:

Rejected





7.1.2

The requirements ofRequirements in Chapter 7 to consider or evaluate hazards shall be applied retroactively. Requirements in Chapter 7 to recommend changes to, or change, a facility or equipment shall not be applied retroactively.


If Chapter 7 merely required a PHA, then this provision might make sense as written. But other provisions can be read to require that changes to equipment and facilities be made in response to PHA findings. It thus can be read to completely undo the grandfather clause.The Committee stated in response to a previous similar comment that, “The chapter does not require to implement the changes retroactively, but to have a plan in place based upon a process hazard analysis…. Implementation can be done in stages, and the implementation period will be addressed in chapter 8 (hazard management).” With respect, reliance on chapter 8 does not solve the problem posed by section 7.2.1 as written. As written, it arguably means that a recommendation to implement a capital change must be implemented despite section 1.6.2 and despite the careful wording of chapter 8. The commentary cannot undo this problem. For the sake of clarity, and to ensure that facility owners are enmeshed in controversy with AHJ’s, the provision should either be struck or amended as follows:Requirements in Chapter 7 to consider or evaluate hazards shall be applied retroactively. Requirements in Chapter 7 to recommend changes to, or change, a facility or equipment shall not be applied retroactively.Furthermore, a phase-in period is needed to be stated expressly in the standard.


Submitter Full Name: ARTHUR SAPPEROrganization: for United States Beet Sugar AssociationStreet Address:City: State: Zip:Submittal Date: Mon Nov 18 09:27:07 EST 2013

Committee Statement



CommitteeAction:

Rejected







CC NOTE: The following CC Note appeared in the First Draft Report.

The Correlating Committee requests that the TC consider establishing some time frame for phasing in the development of an implementation plan for the PHA requirement on a retroactive basis.


Submitter Full Name: CC on CMD-AACOrganization: CC on Combustible DustsStreet Address: City:State: Zip: Submittal Date: Thu Sep 19 08:52:45 EDT 2013

Committee Statement



Committee Action:












7.2.1 * Overview.The process hazards analysis shall consider shall identify the fire, deflagration, and explosion hazards and , assess the risks, and provide recommendations to ensure that the objectives in Section 4.2 are met.7.2.1.1

The process hazards analysis shall determine where a fire, deflagration, andexplosion hazard existsmitigate the hazards when the User deems the risk to be intolerable .


These requirements for PHA not only requires identification of hazards, but also recommendations, which implies completing a risk evaluation. The definition of Process Hazard Analysis should be updated accordingly.

Related Public Comments for This Document

Related Comment RelationshipPublic Comment No. 137-NFPA 652-2013 [Section No. 5.4.3.5]



Committee Statement

Committee Action:


Resolution: SR-42-NFPA 652-2014Statement: These requirements for PHA not only requires identification of hazards, but

also recommendations, which implies completing a risk evaluation. The definition of Process Hazard Analysis should be updated accordingly.




7.2.1 * Overview.The process hazards analysis shall consider the fire, deflagration, and explosion hazards and (except as excluded by the grandfather clause insection 1.6.2) provide recommendations to ensure that the objectives inSection 4.2 are met.7.2.1.1

The process hazards analysis shall determine where a fire, deflagration, and explosion hazard exists.


This provision would apply retroactively. Yet, because the phrase “and provide recommendations to ensure that the objectives in Section 4.2 are met” is so broad, it can be read to require recommendations for capital changes to equipment and facilities that the grandfather provision is designed to avoid. It thus can be read to completely undo the grandfather clause.The Committee stated in response to a previous similar comment that, “The chapter does not require to implement the changes retroactively, but to have a plan in place based upon a process hazard analysis…. Implementation can be done in stages, and the implementation period will be addressed in chapter 8 (hazard management).” With respect, reliance on chapter 8 does not solve the problem posed by section 7.2.1 as written. As written, it arguably means that a recommendation to implement a capital change must be implemented despite 1.6.2 and despite the careful wording of chapter 8. The commentary cannot undo this problem.



Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected

Resolution: The Committee directs the submitter of PC No. 585 to the phase-in period established for the retroactivity provision in SR No. 41. It is not the intent to exclude blanket retroactivity to existing facilities.




7.2.2* Qualifications.The process hazards analysis shall be performed or led by a qualified person.


This proposed language matches what is currently stated in section 6.1.1 and allows more flexibility to the owner/operator in whom they choose to perform this work.


Submitter Full Name: J. YountOrganization: ConAgra Food IngredientsStreet Address: City:State: Zip: Submittal Date: Fri Nov 15 15:48:25 EST 2013

Committee Statement

Committee Action:

Rejected

Resolution: The submitter provided no special technical recommendation for changing the draft standard, so there is no action for the Committee to take on this comment other than to reject.




7.2.3 * Minimum Interval.A revalidation of the process hazards analysis shall be performed a minimum of every 5 years.

Also delete the related Annex material


The requirement for periodic revalidation will certainly be interpreted as PSM driven whether intended by the committee or not. While I agree that managing change is important in any hazardous operation, requiring the PHA be repeated on any size operation and even if prescriptive solutions from other codes are completed is unnecessary. I suggest the current requirements in paragraph 9.9 are perfectly sufficient in achieving what is intended by this section without the cost, documentation, etc. The related Annex material should also be removed.This is submitted as a possible alternative should PC-245 be rejected by the committee



Committee Statement

Committee Action:

Accepted

Resolution: SR-43-NFPA 652-2014Statement: The requirement for periodic revalidation will certainly be interpreted as PSM

driven whether intended by the committee or not. While I agree that managing change is important in any hazardous operation, requiring the PHA be repeated on any size operation and even if prescriptive solutions from other codes are completed is unnecessary. I suggest the current requirements in paragraph 9.9 are perfectly sufficient in achieving what is intended by this section without the cost, documentation, etc. The related Annex material should also be removed.

This is submitted as a possible alternative should PC-245 be rejected by the committee




7.2.3* Minimum Interval.A revalidation of the process hazards analysis shall be performed a minimum of every 5 years The owner-operator shall at least every 5 years determine whether and to what extent changes to the process require changes to the process hazard analysis. The process hazard analysis shall be updatedaccordingly .


The Committee amended this provision to make clear that it “does not imply a whole new process hazard analysis must be completed.” This is a helpful change. But because the key word “revalidation” is undefined, an AHJ could misunderstand it as imposing a requirement to re-do the PHA. The wording should more clearly reflect what the provision is trying to accomplish—to require that the PHA be examined to the extent that the process has been changed since the PHA or last updated.The provision should therefore be amended to read: “The owner/operator shall at least every 5 years determine whether and to what extent changes to the process require changes to the process hazard analysis. The process hazard analysis shall be updated accordingly.”



Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected

Resolution: The Committee accepted an alternative Public Comment that recommended deleting the referenced paragraph, so now this comment is not relevant as the Committee supports removing the requirement rather than modifying it.




7.2.4 Documentation.The results of the process hazards analysis review shall be documented, including (except as excluded by the grandfather clause in section 1.6.2) any necessary action items requiring change to the process materials, physical process, process operations, or facilities associated with the process.


This provision would apply retroactively. Yet, because it covers precisely the type of physical changes to equipment and facilities that the grandfather provision is designed to avoid, it can be read to completely undo the grandfather clause. Specifically, the phrase “any necessary action items requiring change to the process materials, physical process, process operations, or facilities associated with the process” could be read to require capital changes exempted by the grandfather clause. The Committee stated in response to a previous similar comment that, “The chapter does not require to implement the changes retroactively, but to have a plan in place based upon a process hazard analysis…. Implementation can be done in stages, and the implementation period will be addressed in chapter 8 (hazard management).” With respect, reliance on chapter 8 does not solve the problem posed by section 7.2.1 as written. As written, it arguably means that a recommendation to implement a capital change must be implemented despite section 1.6.2 and despite the careful wording of chapter 8. The commentary cannot undo this problem.



Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected

Resolution: The Committee notes other changes in this chapter and also Chapter 1 that address the concerns outlined in the substantiation by this submitter for this comment.




7.3.1 General.The process hazards analysis shall include the following:


(2) Identify specific fire and deflagration scenarios and determine their consequences, including fires, deflagrations, and explosions andlikelihood of occurrence.

(3) Identify the means and develop a plan safegaurds which are in place by which fire, deflagration, and explosion events can be prevented or mitigated

(4) Identify operating ranges Evaluate the risk with existing safegaurds andrecommend additional safegaurds if the User deems the risks areintollerable.


The proposed language change more accurately and clearly describes the PHA activities. The Process Hazard Analysis as described throughout the document should be reviewed for consistency throughout the standard. The risk assessment in Chapter 8 should be a part of PHA as described in 7.2.1 and not a separate analysis. The existing language in NFPA 652 for risk assessment and PHA is inconsistent and will be confusing to the user.

see PC139 on section 7.2.1


Related Comment RelationshipPublic Comment No. 182-NFPA 652-2013 [New Section after 8.3.1]Public Comment No. 240-NFPA 652-2013 [Section No. 8.3.1]



Committee Statement



Committee Action:


Resolution: SR-44-NFPA 652-2014Statement: The proposed language change more accurately and clearly describes the

PHA activities. The Process Hazard Analysis as described throughout the document should be reviewed for consistency throughout the standard. The risk assessment in Chapter 8 should be a part of PHA as described in 7.2.1 and not a separate analysis. The existing language in NFPA 652 for risk assessment and PHA is inconsistent and will be confusing to the user.


Annex: Added combustible dust to align with scope of this standard and remove the word minimum as this implies there are additional steps. There may be many types of activities but they all fall under the general hazard analysis steps described in the standard. see comment from Craig Froehling for 7.3.1 that suggest changes that better aligns the decription for a hazard analysis with industry








(4) Identify safe operating ranges


The PHA should be focused on the identification of safe operating ranges.


Submitter Full Name: Walter FrankOrganization: Frank Risk Solutions, Inc.Street Address: City: State:Zip: Submittal Date: Mon Nov 11 20:42:01 EST 2013

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:










(1) Identify the portions of the process or facility areas where a fire, deflagration, and explosion hazard exists, based on a risk assessment performed pursuant to this standard of the representative conditions in those areas





The Rubber Manufacturers Association recommends that section 7.3.1 be changed to read: “The process hazards analysis shall include the following: (1)Identify the portions of the process or facility areas where combustible dust is located and where a fire, deflagration, and explosion hazard exists, based on a risk assessment performed pursuant to this standard of the representative conditions in those areas. (2)Identify specific fire and deflagration scenarios and determine their consequences, including fires, deflagrations, and explosions (3)Identify the means and develop a plan by which fire, deflagration, and explosion events can be prevented or mitigated (4)Identify operating ranges.”


Submitter Full Name: SARAH AMICKOrganization: RUBBER MANUFACTURERS ASSNStreet Address: City: State:Zip: Submittal Date: Fri Nov 15 15:00:08 EST 2013

Committee Statement



CommitteeAction:












Identify the

(3) Referring to the pertinent requirements in Chapter 8 and their applicability to specific process materials and equipment, identify the means and develop a plan by which fire, deflagration, and explosion events can be prevented or mitigated

(4) Identify operating ranges and limitations of the identified prevention and mitigation measures


The proposed insert is intended to provide an explicit link to the fire and explosion prevention requirements in Chapter 8, so that the process hazard analysis and resulting recommendations will be consistent with Chapter 8 provisions.


Submitter Full Name: Robert ZaloshOrganization: FirexploStreet Address: City:State: Zip: Submittal Date: Fri Nov 15 20:02:24 EST 2013

Committee Statement



Committee Action:











(2) Identify specific fire and deflagration scenarios and determine their consequences, including fires, deflagrations, and explosions, and the potential for fire and explosion propagation beyond the site of the initial fire or explosion




The additional wording is intended to require the process hazard analysis to identify the potential for dust explosion propagation so that the applicability of Chapter 8 explosion isolation requirements will be established.



Committee Statement



Committee Action:












(3) Identify the Except as excluded by the grandfather clause in section 1.6.2), identify the means and develop a plan by which fire, deflagration, and explosion events can be prevented or mitigated



This provision poses the same retroactivity problems as other provisions.



Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:








Public Comment No. 146-NFPA 652-2013 [ Section No. 7.3.2.1 ]

7.3.2.1 *The process hazards analysis shall be based on data used indeveloped in Chapter accordance with Chapter 5 of for material that is representative ofthe dust present.


This seeks to clarify the intent of the requirement.


Submitter Full Name: Walter FrankOrganization: Frank Risk Solutions, Inc.Street Address: City: State:Zip: Submittal Date: Mon Nov 11 20:43:54 EST 2013

Committee Statement

Committee Action: Rejected but see related SRResolution: SR-45-NFPA 652-2014Statement: This seeks to clarify the intent of the requirement.




7.3.2.1*The process hazards analysis shall be based on data used in Chapter 5 of material that is representative of the dust present.

Comment: this section should be revised as follows: The process hazard analysis shall be based on data used in Chapter 5 for ofmaterial that is representative of the dust present and process and technology information collected in 9.10.1(5).


Substantiation: The proposed requirement does not take into account all of the data required for the process hazard analysis. Paragraph 9.10.1(5) requires the collection of essential process and technology information, and the suggested revision captures that data.


Submitter Full Name: Richard Krock

Organization: The Vinyl Institute

Affilliation:

These materials were developed through a cooperative effort involving the Vinyl Institute's outside counsel, Lawrence P. Halprin of Keller and Heckman LLP, the Vinyl Institute staff and the Vinyl Institute member company representatives. These comments also reflect input we received from other trade associations.

Street Address:City: State: Zip:Submittal Date: Tue Nov 12 14:39:00 EST 2013

Committee Statement





7.3.2.1 *The process hazards hazard analysis shall be based on data used inChapter 5 of for material that is representative of the dust present and process and technology information collected in 9 .10.1(5).


The proposed requirement does not take into account all of the data required for the process hazard analysis. Paragraph 9.10.1(5) requires the collection of essential process and technology information, and the suggested revision captures that data.


Submitter Full Name: MARIE MARTINKOOrganization: SPIStreet Address: City:State: Zip: Submittal Date: Wed Nov 13 14:04:21 EST 2013

Committee Statement





7.3.2.1 *The process hazards analysis shall be based on data used in Chapter 5 of material that is representative of the dust present.

The process hazard analysis shall be based on data used in Chapter 5 for of material that is representative of the dust present and process and technology information collected in 9.10.1(5).


Substantiation: The proposed requirement does not take into account all of the data required for the process hazard analysis. Paragraph 9.10.1(5) requires the collection of essential process and technology information, and the suggested revision captures that data.


Submitter Full Name: Stan Lancey

Organization: American Forest & Paper Ass

Affilliation:

These materials were developed through a cooperative effort involvingAF&PA/AWC 's outside counsel, Lawrence P. Halprin of Keller andHeckman LLP, AF&PA/AWC staff and AF&PA/AWC member companyrepresentatives. These comments also reflect input we received from other trade associations.

Street Address:City: State: Zip:Submittal Date: Fri Nov 08 16:19:06 EST 2013

Committee Statement





7.3.3 Process Systems.7.3.3.1 *

Each part of the process system where combustible dust is present shall be evaluated.7.3.3.2 *

The potential for a dust fire, deflagration, or explosion in a process system component shall be based on whether the dust fire, deflagration, or explosion hazard exists.7.3.3.3

Where a dust fire, deflagration, or explosion hazard exists within a process system, the hazards shall be managed that hazard is identified during an initial hazard analysis on existing equipment, the owner/operator shall develop and execute a plan acceptable to the Authority Having Jurisdiction, to manage the hazards in accordance with this standard.


Proposed addition to Section 7.3.3.3: Where that hazard is identified during an initial hazard analysis on existing equipment, the owner/operator shall develop and execute a plan acceptable to the Authority Having Jurisdiction, to manage the hazards in accordance with this standard.


Submitter Full Name: Jennifer GradnigoOrganization: CRAStreet Address: City:State: Zip: Submittal Date: Wed Oct 09 13:23:11 EDT 2013

Committee Statement

Committee Action:

Rejected

Resolution: The Committee has addressed issues outlined in this comment through action on SR No. 31 and SR No. 44.




7.3.3.1*Each part of the process system where combustible dust is present or where combustible particulate solids could cause combustible dust to be present shall be evaluated.


Section 7.1.1 states that a PHA is necessary where combustible particulate solids are present. This change is suggested here for consistency with 7.1.1 and other changes suggested in Ch. 1.


Submitter Full Name: Dale HansenOrganization: Harrington Group, Inc.Street Address: City:State: Zip: Submittal Date: Fri Nov 15 12:33:48 EST 2013

Committee Statement

Committee Action:

Accepted

Resolution: SR-46-NFPA 652-2014Statement: Section 7.1.1 states that a PHA is necessary where combustible

particulate solids are present. This change is suggested here for consistency with 7.1.1 and other changes suggested in Ch. 1.




7.3.3.1*Each part of the The representative process system where combustible dust is present shall be evaluated.


The Rubber Manufacturers Association has concern that as drafted the word “each part” of the process system in section 7.3.3.1 may be burdensome. We recommend that the language in section 7.3.3.1 should be changed to read: “The representative process system where combustible dust is present shall be evaluated.” Annex A section A.7.3.4.1 states that “where multiple compartments present essentially the same hazard, a single evaluation might be appropriate.” RMA recommends that section 7.3.3.1 should include the clarifying language in A.7.3.4.1.



Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected

Resolution: The situations addressed in this public comment are rarely identical and could be handled together if documented; each of the situations needs to be evaluated to determine the conditions based on evaluation of each hazard.




7.3.3.1 *Each part of the process system where a significant amount of combustible dust is present shall be evaluated.


Each part of the process system where combustible dust is present shall be evaluated.As stated, even parts of a process system with insignificant amounts of dust must be evaluated. This is unjustifiable. Some threshold is needed.



Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected

Resolution: The proposed introduction of the word "significant" creates an unenforceable condition, so the Committee does not support the proposed revision.




7.3.3.1 *Each part of the process system where combustible dust is present at or above housekeeping threshold accumulation levels shall be evaluated.


The draft states: "Each part of the process system where combustible dust is present shall be evaluated.” This is unjustifiable. Some threshold is required.



Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected

Resolution: The proposed introduction of the word "significant" creates an unenforceable condition, so the Committee does not support the proposed revision.




7.3.3.2 *The potential for a dust fire, deflagration, or explosion in a process system component shall be based on whether the dust fire, deflagration, or explosion hazard exists.


The requirement should be deleted as it adds no value or information for the user. At an extreme, this statement could be misinterpreted to mean hazards are everywhere and equal and all need to be mitigated.


Related Comment RelationshipPublic Comment No. 142-NFPA 652-2013 [Section No. 7.3.4.2 [Excluding any Sub-Sections]]



Committee Statement

Committee Action:


Resolution: SR-47-NFPA 652-2014Statement: The Committee incorporated changes into paragraph 7.3.3.2 and

included a revised 7.3.3.3.




7.3.3.2*The potential for probability that a dust fire , or deflagration , or explosion in a process system component will occur shall be based on whether the representative conditions under which the dust fire, deflagration, or explosion hazard exists is present in the facility are sufficient for a fire or deflagration .


The Rubber Manufactures Association recommends that the word “potential” in section 7.3.3.2 be replaced with the word “probability.” Specifically, RMA recommends that section 7.3.3.2 be revised to read: “The probability that a dust fire or deflagration in a process system component will occur shall be based on whether the representative conditions under which the dust is present in the facility are sufficient for a fire or deflagration.



Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected

Resolution: The Committee accomplished a modification similar to that recommended by the submitter in SR No. 47 by adding the new 7.3.3.3. The Committee believes the changes in SR No. 47 address the changes intended by the submitter.




7.3.3.2*The potential for a dust fire, deflagration, or explosion in a process systemcomponent shall be based on whether the dust fire, deflagration, or explosionhazard exists.

7.3.3.2.1 The potential for a dust explosion in process equipment shall account for the potential of accumulated combustible dust being dispersed due to both normal and possible upset operating conditions.


The dust explosion hazard evaluation should account for all the combustible dust in the equipment providing there is a mechanism to disperse the accumulated dust not normally in suspension.



Committee Statement

Committee Action:

Rejected

Resolution: The Committee believes the standard already addresses the need to look at upset conditions in other places and that the standard does not limit its application to only normal operating conditions. In addition, the Committee believes the DHA operator should know enough to include normal and upset conditions, so no further changes are included.




7.3.3.2 *The potential for a dust fire, deflagration, or explosion in a process system component shall be based on whether the dust fire, deflagration, or explosion hazard exists.


The provision states an unnecessary truism. No one needs to be told that a conclusion that a hazard exists must be based “upon whether the conditions necessary and sufficient for a fire or deflagration exist.” We are aware that the Committee previously wrote in response to a previous comment that, “These sections are needed to clari[f]y in the standard when for a dust fire, deflagration, and/or explosion exist and that they are based on when the conditions exist. So that during the process hazard analysis, when the user is evaluating a part of a process system or facility that does not have the conditions for a fire, deflagraion and/or explosion, no further action is required.” With respect, the provision should be re-examined for usefulness.



Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:


Resolution: SR-47-NFPA 652-2014Statement: The Committee incorporated changes into paragraph 7.3.3.2 and

included a revised 7.3.3.3.




7.3.3.3Where a dust fire, deflagration, or explosion hazard exists within a process system, the hazards shall be managed in accordance with this standard.


The provision is redundant with Chapter 8 and unnecessary.



Committee Statement

Committee Action: RejectedResolution: This paragraph has been moved to Chapter 4 as part of SR No. 31.




7.3.4 Facility Compartments Buildings or Rooms .7.3.4.1 *

Each facility compartment where combustible dust Each building orroom where a combustible dust fire, deflagration or explosion hazard is present shall be evaluated.7.3.4. 2 *The potential for a dust fire, deflagration, or explosion in a facility compartment shall be based upon whether a dust fire, deflagration, or explosion hazard exists.1.1 Where multiple building or rooms present essentially the same hazard it shall be permitted to conduct a single evaluation as representative of all similar buildings or rooms

7.3.4.2. 1 *The evaluation of dust deflagration hazard in a facility compartment shalla building or room shall include a comparison of actual or intended dustaccumulation to the threshold housekeeping dust accumulation that would present a potential for flash-fire exposure to personnel or compartment failure due to explosive overpressure .7.3.4.2. 2 1Threshold housekeeping dust accumulation levels and non-routine dust accumulation levels (i.e., from a process upset) shall be in accordance with relevant industry or commodity-specific NFPA standards. (See 1.3.1.)7.3.4.3

Where a dust fire, deflagration, or explosion hazard exists within a facilitycompartment building or room , the effects of the fire, deflagration, or explosion shall be managed in accordance with this or any industry or commodity specific NFPA standard.


Why create unique terms (facility compartment) when common terms (building or room) will do as well. Putting the A.7.3.4.1 material in the main body of the code is more appropriate to insure the option is equally valid to the main requirement. Adding the additional text to the basic requirement and removal of 7.3.4.2 will simplify the understanding of the need. The text in 7.3.4.2 is nearly duplication of the main requirement. The deleted text in new 7.3.4.2 (existing 7.3.4.2.1) adds nothing to the understanding of the requirement. The added text to 7.3.4.3 makes it clear the hazard may be managed by other existing standards.





Committee Statement

Committee Action:


Resolution: SR-49-NFPA 652-2014Statement: Why create unique terms (facility compartment) when common terms

(building or room) will do as well. Putting the A.7.3.4.1 material in the main body of the code is more appropriate to insure the option is equally valid to the main requirement. Adding the additional text to the basic requirement and removal of 7.3.4.2 will simplify the understanding of the need. The text in 7.3.4.2 is nearly duplication of the main requirement. The deleted text in new 7.3.4.2 (existing 7.3.4.2.1) adds nothing to the understanding of the requirement. The added text to 7.3.4.3 makes it clear the hazard may be managed by other existing standa

public comment no. 245-nfpa 652-2013 [ chapter 7 ]...public comment no. 245-nfpa 652-2013 [ chapter...

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