Saguitan v . City of Mandaluyong328 SCRA 137, GR 135087 (2000)

Facts: On October 13, 1994, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City issued a resolution authorizing Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos to institute expropriation proceeding over the property of Alberto Suguitan located at Boni Avenue and Sto. Rosario Streets in Mandaluyong City for the expansion of Mandaluyong Medical Center. On January 20, 1995, Mayor Abalos wrote Alberto Suguitan offering to buy his property, but Suguitan refused to sell. Consequently, the City of Mandaluyong filed a complaint for expropriation with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. Suguitan filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court denied the said motion and subsequently, it allowed the expropriation of the subject property. Aggrieved by the said order, the heirs of Suguitan asserted that the City of Mandaluyong may only exercise its delegated power of eminent domain by means of an ordinance as required by Section 19 of Republic Act No. 7160, and not by means of a mere resolution.

Issue: WON the city of Mandaluyong has validly exercised its power of expropriation.

Held: NEGATIVE

Ratio: The Court ruled that the basis for the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local government units is Section 19 of RA 7160 which provides that: "A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose, or welfare for the benefits of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws; Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted; Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated; Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property. In the present case, the City of Mandaluyong sought to exercise the power of eminent domain over

petitioners' property by means of a resolution, in contravention of the first requisite. The law in this case is clear and free from ambiguity. Section 19 of the Code requires an ordinance, not a resolution, for the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Therefore, while the Court remains conscious of the constitutional policy of promoting local autonomy, it cannot grant judicial sanction to a local government unit's exercise of its delegated power of eminent domain in contravention of the very law giving it such power.   

Estate Or Heirs Of The Late Ex-Justice Jose B. L. Reyes Vs. City Of ManilaG.R. No. 132431 February 13, 2004

FACTS: The case is a petition for review and certiorari filed by the heirs of J.B.L. Reyes against respondent Court of Appeals and City of Manila et.al. The case esteemed from the decision of the C.A. for the issuance of protective custody in favor of respondent on the contested 11 parcels of land owned by the petitioner situated at Sta. Cruz District, Manila with a total land area of 13, 940 square meters and covered by TCT no. 24359 issued by the Register of Deeds, Manila. The land in question was initially occupied and leased by different tenants, among them are respondents Abiog, Maglonso and members of Sampaguita Bisig ng Magkakabitbahay, Incorporated (SBMI). On May 9, 1994, petitioners obtained a favorable judgments against Abiog pursuant to the decision rendered by the MTC Manila, Branch 3 in Civil Case No 142851-CV and against Maglonsoin Civil Case No. 144205-CV on May 4, 1995. While the case is under adjudication, the respondents City of Manila intervenes and file a complaint for imminent domain (expropriation) on April 25, 1995 based on its approved Ordinance No 7818 enacted on November 29, 1993 authorizing the City Mayor of Manila to expropriate certain parcels of land with an aggregate area of 9,930square meters, more or less. It argued that the purpose of expropriation is for a socialize housing project of the city which would otherwise benefit its underprivileged and homeless citizens. However, petitioner turned down the offer on various reasons among them, the failure of both to arrive at an amicable offer for the settlement of the case.

ISSUE:

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Whether the CA has jurisdiction to issue the protective order despite the finality of order rendered by the trial court?

Whether respondent City deprived petitioners of their property without due process of law?

Whether the respondent City of Manila complied with the legal requirements for expropriation provided under Section 9 and 10 of R.A. 7279?

HELD: RA 7279 Sections 9 states the order of priority in the acquisition of property subject of any expropriation intended for public purpose. Section 10thereof, made a significant pronouncement that “the expropriation may be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted underscoring supplied”. Before respondent City can exercise its power of eminent domain, the same must be sanctioned and must not violate any law. Reiterating the provision of R.A. 7279, it would bear stressing that private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only after the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted. Compliance with these conditions is mandatory because these are the only safeguards of oftentimes helpless owners of private property against violation of due process when their property is forcibly taken from them for public use. The state in its paramount interest of promoting public good and general welfare cannot simply ignore the rights of its citizens and such must take precedence over the interest of private property owners. Individual rights affected by the exercise of such right are also entitled to protection, bearing in mind that the exercise of this superior right cannot override the guarantee of due process extended by the law to owners of the property to be expropriated. Due to the fatal infirmity in the City’s exercise of the power of eminent domain, its complaint for expropriation was turned down by the court. Petitions granted and decision of C.A. was reversed and set aside.

Pasong Bayabas Farmers Vs. CaGR Nos. 142359 & 142980, May 25, 2004

FACTS: Lakeview Development Corporation (LDC)

bought a parcel of land, issued it in the name of its successor, the Credito Asiatic, Incorporated (CAI) and subsequently subdivided it into two parcels

LDC/CAI undertook to develop its 75-hectare property into a residential and industrial estate

CAI embarked on the development of the housing project into three phases and secured a locational clearance for the project from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC

CAI decided to continue with the development of its Hakone Housing Project but the project was stymied by a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction

The plaintiffs alleged that they had reached an agreements with the respondent that they would remain in peaceful possession of their farm holdings but notwithstanding such, the defendant ordered the bulldozing of the property

In answer to the complaint, CAI denied that it allowed the plaintiffs to possess and cultivate the landholding with fixed rentals

Meanwhile, CAI and 6 of the 14 plaintiffs entered into a compromise agreement which eventually led to all of the other plaintiffs entering into an agreement with CAI

CAI was stymied anew when a Petition for Compulsory Coverage under Rep. Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) was filed before the DAR by seventeen (17) individuals who alleged that they are farmers who have occupied a parcel of public agricultural land adjacent to Pasong Bayabas River

According to the petitioners, the said illegal bulldozing activities would convert the land from agricultural to non-agricultural land, thereby depriving the members of the PBFAI of their tenancy rights over the property. For this reason, the petitioners prayed that a temporary restraining order be issued ex-parte to stop the bulldozing of the property, and that a preliminary injunction or a status quo order be later issued to enjoin the same.

ISSUES:(1) Whether the property subject of the suit is covered by Rep. Act No. 6657, the Agrarian Reform Law (CARL);(2) Whether the DARAB had original and appellate jurisdiction over the complaint of the petitioner PBFAI against the private respondent;

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(3) Whether the petitioners-members of the PBFAI have a cause of action against the private respondent for possession and cultivation of the property in suit;(4) Whether the dismissal by the RTC of the complaint in Civil Case No. BCV-87-13 is a bar to the complaint of the petitioners-members of the PBFAI; and(5) Whether the appellate court committed a reversible error in dismissing the petition for review in CA-G.R. SP No. 49363.

HELD: The contention of the petitioners has no

merit. Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect only on June

15, 1988. But long before the law took effect, the property subject of the suit had already been reclassified and converted from agricultural to non-agricultural or residential land.

With our finding that the property subject of the suit was classified as residential land since 1976, the DARAB had no original and appellate jurisdiction over the property subject of the action of the petitioner PBFAI and its members.

Since the members of the petitioner PBFAI were not the tenants of the private respondent CAI, the petitioners and its members had no cause of action against the private respondent for possession of the landholding to maintain possession thereof and for damages.

When the complaint was filed, twenty-five (25) of the thirty -seven(37) members of the petitioners had already executed separate deeds of quitclaim in favor of the private respondent CAI over the portions of the landholding they respectively claimed, after receiving from the private respondent CAI varied sums of money. In executing the said deeds, the members of the petitioner PBFAI thereby waived their respective claims over the property. Hence, they have no right whatsoever to still remain in possession of the same.

Petition denied.

Dacanay v. Asistio 208 SCRA 404Facts: Way back in January 5, 1979, the Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC) enacted MMC Ordinance 79-02, which allowed certain city and municipal public streets and roads to be sites

for many vendors applied for licenses to conduct such activities in said streets.

On Dec. 20, 1987, the RTC of Caloocan City ruled that the streets were of public dominion and ordered the demolition of said stalls. But Mayor Martinez, who had advocated the demolition of the said stalls, has been replaced by Mayor Asistio. Mayor Asistio did not carry out the order of the RTC, for humanitarian reasons. Francisco Dacanay, a concerned citizen and a resident along Heroes del ’96 street, filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Mayor, thru the City Engineer, to remove the said stalls. Will the petition prosper?

Held: Yes, for the plain and simple reason that public roads cannot be the object of leases and thus cannot be bargain away thru contracts. Public roads should serve the purpose for which they were built: for public use as arteries of travel for vehicles and pedestrians.

ISSUE: May public streets be leased or licensed to market stallholders by virtue of a city ordinance or resolution of Metropolitan Manila Commission?

HELD: NO1. A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man. Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or other contract2. The vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve such as for traveling3. Any executive order or city resolution cannot change the nature of the public street because it is going to be contrary to the general law

HELD: There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which the private respondent’s market stalls are sought to be evicted are public streets. A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man. Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or other contract. The right of the public to use the city streets may not be bargained away through contract. The interests of the few should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community.

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