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The Forensic Examiner, Summer 2006 v15 i2 p6(12)

Psychological profiles of terrorists. (Cover story) Reuben Vaisman-Tzachor.

Full Text: COPYRIGHT 2006 American College of Forensic Examiners

Abstract

This article proposes a psychological framework for understanding the minds of terrorists based on

scientific analysis of actuarial data, psychological analysis of multiple sources, and synthesis of existing

reports from around the world. This study explores the likely psychological makeup of terrorists and their

motivations based on the evidence of their actions, selection of means, selection of targets, public

statements, and characteristic histories. The discussion of a psychological profile in this study is offered inthe context-of its use in efforts aimed as greater security and terrorism prevention strategies. The

framework is offered in conjunction with a thrust to develop a set of national terrorism prevention

protocols, which will effectively address the challenges presented by the threats of domestic and

international terrorism on U.S. soil and in international arenas.

Key Words: terrorism, psychological profile, terrorists, prevention protocol

**********

This article is eligible for CE credit in the following categories: ACFEI, CHS, APA. See page 4 for a key to

these CE abbreviations and complete CE approval statements.

Reuben Vaisman-Tzachor, PHD, DABPS, DAPA

The Need for Psychological Profiling Of Terrorists

News media and professional in the field continue to report serious problems with existing terrorism

prevention efforts. Failure of police and intelligence agencies to properly use tacit knowledge routinely

leads to ineffective technology, use for the task of terrorism prevention (Tenner, 2001; Vaisman-Tzachof

2005). Gross definition errors, particularly regarding the likely means, for a terrorist attack, inevitably lead

to unsuccessful efforts in terrorism prevention.

Existing preventive protocols have also been plagued by designers' failures to understand the difference

between knowledge-based, scientifically derived preventive efforts and those that are guided by heuristics

(mental short-cttts). [For a complete discussion of this concept, please read in Kahneman & Tversky (1972,

1973; 1979, 1982).] Those responsible fog creating procedures for terrorism prevention are unfortunately

often guided by images of horror movies and a general sense of vulnerability (Navarro, 2004). Furthermore,

those assigned to implement terrorism prevention procedures often do not know What types of people to

look foil [Instead, they apply the same preventive 'efforts to in a cookie-cutter style, which renders them

ineffective, costly, time consuming, and easily disrupted (Ripley, 2004; Crumley, 2003).




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It has been noted and widely 7 documented (Garfinkel, 2001; Hogan, 2001; Vaisman-Tzachor, 1991; 19975

2004) that available technologies and procedures routinely used around, the world by Other prevention

agencies are not put to use in the United States where and When they should be (e.g., pre-flight interviews,

explosives chemical detection kits, bomb-sniffing dogs, depressurizing chambers, etc.), leaving large

segments of the United States unnecessarily exposed to terrorism (Allison, 2005, Thompson, 2005).

Consequently, current terrorism prevention efforts are easily thwarted and overcome by relatively simple

and often primitive means (Vaisman-Tzachor. 2005). The paucity of effective terrorism prevention

protocols should come as no Surprise given reported difficulties in effectively collecting, disseminating,

and responding to intelligence information (Hogan, 2001; Weldon, 2005). The 9/11 commission report

issued by the congressional committee on terrorist attacks on the United States has made that point

exceedingly clear (Kean et al., 2004). The most sophisticated and the best-funded intelligence-gathering

technology in the world (possessed by the United States) has been designed to deal with Cold-War era

ballistic missile threats, neglecting the human-intelligence resources and infrastructures necessary to deal

with the gathering threat of terrorism (Tenner, 2001; Hogan Weldon). In fact, it is evident that news media

reporters are better able to locate and obtain interviews with the likes of Osama bin Laden and other

terrorists than the CIA and the FBI have been over the years (Ghosh, 2005).

Furthermore, terrorism prevention efforts continue to rely on faulty and erroneous assumptions thatinvariably result in incorrect conclusions and poor administrative decisions (Portella, 2004; Sweet, 2003;

Jonietz, 2003). With that, the appointment of newly established, self-anointed experts in terrorism (the

outcrop of which seems to have multiplied in recent years) to decision-making positions, such as the

Transportation Security Administration, add to the growing fiasco of terrorism prevention (Shah, 2003;

Dittmann, 2003; Vaisman-Tzachor, 2005).

The problems leading to prevention errors, failures to detect terrorists' preparatory activities, and

inappropriate use of terrorism prevention resources have been a result of the lack of systematic definitions

of terrorists' motives. The academic community's attempts to create such definitions were largely

descriptive and parsimonious but fell short in their functional significance and predictive validity (Seger,

1990; Edwards, 2003; Sageman, 2003), rendering them useless for the development of a coherent terrorismprevention strategy. Some proposed that terrorism was primarily a rational and strategic political vehicle for

the attainment of political ends (Crenshaw, 1997, Crenshaw & Pimlott, 1997; Navarro, 2004), citing

terrorists' desire to call the public's attention to their cause as the main motive, despite evidence indicating

that terrorism is highly effective at inducing fear and worry and is invariably politically counterproductive

(Merari, 1985). Others proposed that terrorism was an expression of violent believers with uncompromising

ideologies and creeds who have a particular psychological makeup (Meloy, 2004; Meloy, Mohandie,

Hempel & Shiva, 2001; Holler, 1951) who characteristically present with pathological narcissism or

psychopathy (and other permutations of these psychological constructs) without particular political intents

(Post, 1987; Reich, 1990). However, these definitions (and many commonly used definitions of terrorism)

fail to view the world from the terrorists' perspectives. These empathic failures invariably lead to the

incorrect use of preventive efforts (Anonymous, 2003; DEBKAfile, 2004; Hass, 2004).

Empathic failures also prevail in the intelligence community, in political arenas, and in the executive

branches of government when it comes to the general understanding of people from other cultures and,

more specifically, in understanding terrorists from other cultures (Middle Eastern, Arab, and Muslim).

Nuances of language and meta-communications are frequently misinterpreted. Duplicity of meanings by

people from other origins usually escapes those in the United States who are responsible for deciphering the

global politics of terrorism (Anonymous, 2003; Rubinstein, 2004; CNN, 2004; Zagorin, 2005).

Similar complaints are prevalent in a book published by congressman Curt Weldon, the vice chairman of




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the congressional Homeland Security Committee and vice chairman of the House Armed Services

Committee (2005), regarding failures in the U.S. intelligence community. He points out that the CIA

refused to adapt to the implicit changes in the terrorism landscape, where Iran has become the primary

sponsor and purveyor of terrorism while creating closer ties to al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, as well as to

other organizations such as Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, and Ansar al Islam. This refusal is largely politically

based and is driven by explicit information provided by Iranian leaders who deny such connections (Frantz,

2005; Weldon, 2005). Unfortunately, these nuances are often overlooked or misinterpreted by members of

the U.S. intelligence community who come from a Westernized culture where what is stated is usuallyconsistent with what is intended and eventually carried out. Consequently, decisions made in the United

States by the executive branch and the preventive efforts that result miss many critical changes in the

tactics, strategic alliances, and maneuvers of the political organizations and countries that support and

supply terrorist organizations, ultimately misconstruing the actual meaning behind terrorist actions and

intentions.

The first conclusion that must be drawn from this introduction is that the creation of a reasonably

appropriate set of scientifically derived psychological profiles, including variables such as psychological,

social, religious, and political motives, as well as behavioral patterns that have been acquired and collected

over the years, will allow for a more targeted, correctly guided, and efficient effort in terrorism prevention.

Similarly, terrorism prevention efforts, using available technology appropriately and cost-effectively, willemerge as coherent protocols for prevention. Better profile definitions will engender the development of

new and more appropriate technology to handle the likely threats. Therefore, better definitions of terrorism,

more awareness of the likely means and the likely targets used by terrorists, a more thorough understanding

of the political agendas that drive terrorism, and clearer definitions of the psychological motives that lead to

terrorist behaviors will result in applicable preventive efforts targeted against real threats and challenges,

not those that are heuristically derived.

What is a Profile?

The most common misconception regarding profiling is that either race or nationality serve as the only

criterion on which to generate a profile. Subsequent to this assumption comes the assertion in popularmedia and political discussions that formulating prevention strategies based on race or ethnicity alone is

essentially unconstitutional. Contrary to popular belief, however, the terrorist population comprises

numerous profiles that fit the various terrorist organizations and their respective nationalities, ethnic and

cultural backgrounds, religious affiliations, and psychological makeups (Anonymous, 2003; Sageman,

2004; Zagorin & Dully, 2005).

There is even evidence of intergroup variability within international terrorist organizations that are known

to span over most continents, such as al-Qaeda, with terrorist cells recruited from many countries, different

ethnic groups, and sometimes divergent religious affiliations. For example, there is ample evidence that

al-Qaeda agents have infiltrated Iraq and have been active in post-liberated Iraq. They have cooperated with

Kurdish nationalist Ansar al-Islam in Northern Iraq, the predominantly Sunni Muslim Saddam loyalistswho are remnants of the former Ba'ath regime security apparatus in the North and around Bagdad, other

paid militia remnants, the fedayeen of the old Saddam Hussein regime who are Iraqi nationalists, various

predominantly Shia Muslim mujahedin (or holy warrior foreigners) including non-Arab Iranian

fundamentalists, and Arabs from Yemen and Egypt, who include believers in the Wahabi fundamentalist

version of Islam from neighboring Saudi Arabia and Yemen (Bennet & Ware, 2003; Ramesar &

Weisskopf, 2004; Bennet & Walt, 2004; Sageman; Weldon, 2005).

Consequently, one must conclude that there are probably numerous profiles for numerous terrorist targets

that vary along ideological lines, technical capacities, and group affiliations. The international flight/




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domestic flight terrorist, the domestic public-building attacker, the foreign U.S. facility attacker, the

domestic or foreign chemical terrorist, the domestic or foreign nuclear terrorist, and the attacker of national

symbols and government agencies each possess unique and distinct characteristics.

Each target group requires the development of a distinct profile of a likely terrorist based on statistical

analyses (not heuristics, nor on purely race/nationality factors) of existing historical data and credible

known threats, both from archives and from the intelligence community.

Note that some categories are construed with overlapping boundaries; some members who belong to one

category could be included in another category. This is because terrorists are not exclusive in the methods

or targets they select, and terrorists may change their orientations and group affiliations. The overlap in the

list of profiles accommodates variations in the working definitions of the categories offered by experts in

the field. Ehud Sprinzak (2001) for example, describes the megalomaniacal hyper-terrorist as an entirely

new category of terrorists, distinguished by innovative, self-anointed individuals with larger-than-life

callings but little interest in political ends. Members in this category could range from locals such as David

Koresh of the Branch Davidians or Jose Padilla, the Dirty Bomber, to international terrorists such as Carlos

the Jackal or Osama bin Laden of Al Qaeda. Considering overlap between the categories for a particular

profile provides better coverage of the entire gamut of terrorist activity and allows for the introduction of

changes as new information is made available.

Each profile of a likely terrorist must have as many determinants as possible to facilitate a better match

with a real terrorist in future preventive efforts. Possible factors include age range, educational background,

ethnicity, socio-economic status, national origin, psychological makeup, marital status, character type,

current economic state, criminal background, religious affiliation, immigration status, and social

affiliations.

Determinants extracted from historical data, known

threats, and other sources are then rank-ordered

according to their relative importance in the generation

of a profile. Elements such as Arab ethnic or national

background, for example, are found to be repetitively

present in the historical data analysis of terrorism

perpetrators and are highly important in the list of

determinant variables (Anonymous, 2003; Sageman,

2004). Similar in importance due to its prevalence in the

terrorist activity data is a Muslim religious affiliation or

membership in organizations sympathetic to funda

mental Islam (Anonymous, 2003; Meloy, 2004; Navarro,

2004; Sageman; Weldon, 2005). Age range is factored

heavily in the formulation of terrorism profiles based on

data indicating that perpetrators tended to be betweenlate adolescent to younger adults. (Surviving older

terrorists become senior leaders and usually attempt to

"graduate" into politics, thereby seeking greater

legitimacy.) Other distinct characteristics of terrorism

profiles were perpetrators who had fewer social and

emotional ties to the communities in which they lived,

tended to be unmarried, and did not have families of

their own (Sageman; McDermott, 2005).




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Social and psychological marginality with a negative

disposition toward society were also elements common

in the American-born and domestic terrorists (Lewis,

2004; Meloy, 2004; Meloy, 2000). A psyhological

profile consistent with Cluster B personality

configuations (including antisocial, borderline,

narcissistic, and histrionic personalities), with

pathological narcissism scoring the highest (followed by psychopathy, narcissism, paranoia, and general

unhappiness), is a very significant determinant of a likely terrorist (Ghosh, 2005; McDermott; Meloy, 2004;

Meloy, 2000).

Foreign-born terrorists who committed acts of terrorism within the United States, almost without exception,

tended to have immigration statuses that were more transitional and often illegal (e.g., visa overstay

violations or immigrated illegally into the country) (Tempest, Krikorian, & Romney, 2005; McDermott;

Weldon, 2005). All too often, those groomed for future terrorist activities lived a lifestyle beyond what their

socio-economic status could afford them prior to commission of their act.

This is because they were, to a large extent, funded and financed by sources other than their own incomes

(Anonymous, 2003; Navarro; McDermott). A few of the perpetrators had criminal backgrounds but were of

lower rank in the terrorist organizations, presented a lesser menace, and posed a relatively lesser challenge

to prevention efforts (e.g.., Richard Reid and Jose Padilla) (Lewis, 2004; Navarro; Meloy, 2004; Meloy,

2000). Gender was pervasively male, with few female exceptions, and group attacks were more common

with the exception of suicide bombers, who usually carried out their attacks alone (Sageman, 2003;

Dietlind, 2005).

As can be surmised, each factor generates a set of internal grades for the likelihood of a match to the likely

terrorist. For example, Silke found the median age of high-risk male terrorism perpetrators was 23, while

the median age of low-risk male terrorism perpetrators was 28 (1999).

The Social and Economic Factors Contributing to Terrorism

The social and economic factors that contribute to the development of terrorists cannot be overstated. The

emotional needs that terrorist organizations satisfy are well-documented phenomena known to the

psychological community (McDermott, 2005; Sageman, 2004; Magnarelli, 2003; Meloy, 2000; Post, 1987).

Similarly, the economic realities and necessities of distressed communities have been exploited in the

recruitment and ultimate launching of many terrorist attacks (McGeary, 2003; Smiles, 2003; Navarro,

2004). Likewise, the psychology, history, religion, and mythology of terrorism cannot be overstated, as they

affect the social acceptance of the terrorist organization or the terrorist individuals within a particular

sheltering community (Anonymous, 2003; Navarro; McDermott; Ghosh, 2005). More often than not, the

terrorist is regarded as a mythical figure who represents a messianic being to members of those national

groups and social entities, who are disenfranchised by political, religious, or ethnic circumstances.

In many places where they are entrenched, terrorist organizations employ their financial tools and

bureaucratic apparatus to establish schools, infirmaries, and other institutions to benefit the societies in

which they are then protected. In doing so, such organizations only act to strengthen the existing

identifications within the local populace and the terrorists' political messages (McDermott; Tempest et al.,

2005).

These were the cases in the establishment of madrassas (religious schools) in Afghanistan by the Taliban,

the establishment of schools and infirmaries in Lebanon by Amal and Hezbollah, and the establishment of




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schools and infirmaries alongside other municipal infrastructures in the Gaza Strip by Hamas.

In many ways, the social psychology models that have been developed to understand the social

organization, group structures, and criminal and drug-smuggling behaviors around the world parallel the

developments in terrorist social communities (Lichtenwald, 2003; Weldon, 2005; Ghosh, 2005). The

internal pyramidal hierarchies of terrorist organizations and the respective levels of skills, knowledge, and

commitment to the terrorist tasks at each level, as well as the behavioral characteristics and the behavioral

manifestations at each level, mimic those seen in drug-trafficking organizations (Lichtenwald; Sageman,

2004; McDermott, 2005). Oftentimes, the same strategies applied to drug smuggling operations are used in

terrorist activities. In the case of drug smuggling, cartels allow law enforcement to capture lower-level drug

"mules" to reinforce their profile definitions of smugglers at that level while leaving the more elusive cartel

leaders out of law enforcement sights. When these principles are applied to terrorism, it takes the form of

maintaining a steady stream of lower-level terrorism activity in Iraq in order to sufficiently distract

Americans from developing a more coherent and complete domestic terrorism prevention protocol in

America, thereby buying al-Qaeda time to regroup and launch another spectacular attack on U.S. soil

(Weldon).

Essentially, in every place where people are in a state of distress (e.g., economic, national, or political) and

their plight is not sufficiently noticed, terrorism can get them noticed. Likewise, in every place wherepeoples' subjective sense of powerlessness is palpable, terrorism will remain a viable option for effective

empowerment.

However, these same human factors that define terrorists as people with motives and purpose also reveal

exploitable psychological weaknesses that create vulnerabilities (Meloy, 2004; Navarro, 2004). This

defnition illustrates the multifaceted nature of a terrorist who can have malevolent and/or charismatic

characteristics, be a follower and/or a believer of a creed or ideology, and who is an antisocial criminal

and/or a respected member of society (McDermott, 2005; Anonymous, 2003; Navarro; Meloy, 2004;

Meloy, 2000). These factors also generate behaviors that identify, quantiff/, and qualify terrorist individuals

and groups.

Terrorists tend to also become mythological archetypes of their respective societies and communities,

particularly in the Third World and the Middle East, where they become heroes of their peoples (Post,

1987; Mishal & Sela, 2000; Anonymous, 2003).

This is, to a large extent, because of historical antecedents, which engendered motivations among many in

Middle Eastern and Muslim societies to find affinity with terrorism and to identify with Occidentalism--a

global hatred of the West in general and anti-Semitism in particular (Gabriel, 2002; Juergensmeyer, 2000;

Lewis, 2003; Anonymous; Sageman, 2003). All too often, corrupt and illegitimate regimes in such

countries use the basic political principles proposed by Machiavelli--which include scape-goating another

group of people (e.g., Jews, Americans)--in order to distract the populace from the in-aptitude and cynicism

of their own leadership (Weldon, 2005; McDermott, 2005). Thus, a marriage of convenience often prevailsbetween countries, societies, criminals, and terrorist organizations, while the local people are compelled to

passively join the struggle in mute assent (Weldon; Ghosh, 2005).

So, the social mechanisms that give rise to terrorism as a viable option and sustain terrorism within certain

communities are also determinants of the terrorist threat.

This factor must be included in a definition of the terrorist as a member of a social fabric and particular

communities. Consequently, social behaviors, social and cultural affiliations, and political affinities define

the pieces of the puzzle of who is a likely terrorist. For example, membership in a nation with an

illegitimate and corrupt regime that supports (overtly or covertly) or tolerates terrorist organizations (e.g.,




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Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran) may present a potential for one to belong to a terrorist group. Likewise,

membership in disenfranchised societies and groups within nations, such as Chechen nationals in Russia,

Sunni Muslims in Iraq, and Palestinians in Israel, presents the potential for membership in or sympathy

toward terrorist organizations.

In conclusion, the more detailed the profiles are, the greater the likelihood of finding a reasonably good

match between the profile of the likely terrorist and the actual terrorist. Consequently, this will create a

greater probability for success of preventive efforts in generating coherent, meaningful, and accurate

preventive protocols. It is also expected to put to rest the concerns regarding violations of civil liberties and

the constitutionality of the use of profiles.

The Relationship Between the Profile of a Terrorist and Prevention Efforts

The better the match between the person/item/threat at hand and the definition of the likely terrorist, then

the greater the scrutiny and more complete the application of the preventive treatment will be.

Using the profile in this way would minimize how the public experiences preventative measures,

streamlining prevention efforts while focusing on those most likely to be terrorists.

A missing element in many of the existing analyses of terrorism behaviors and the motivations for terrorismis the goal of achieving notoriety. Recent sociological studies clearly indicate that Osama bin Laden is the

most popular person in the world, particularly because his posters decorate the walls of many major

mosques and street walls of Middle-Eastern cities (Anonymous, 2003; Navarro, 2004).

Achieving notoriety and drawing attention to a plight or cause are foremost in the minds of terrorist

organizations. Hence, internationally known targets are always preferred over less known ones (e.g., The

World Trade Center was preferable over the Chrysler Tower, even though people in both buildings were

engaged in similar types of international trade.). Also, because groups want to achieve notoriety with a

particular audience, the likely targets are those that are more culturally relevant to the target audience (e.g.,

The Oklahoma Federal Building was more culturally relevant to the Christian Identity group and potential

sympathizers than other targets in the area but not necessarily so to the American public at large.).

Hence, threat analyses focusing on the United States' perceived (or real) vulnerabilities in areas such as

biological, chemical, or nuclear arenas appeal to the imagination of the American public, which has been

raised on a diet of Hollywood disaster movies (Seger, 1990). However, in the rest of the world, particularly

in the Middle East, there is a grave concern for the repercussions of such attacks, such as the ripple effects

that biological, chemical, or nuclear contamination in America could have on their own turf (Anonymous,

2003; DEBKAfile, 2004). Traditional cultures of the Middle East emphasize the interdependence in the

global community and have an appreciation for the mutual connectivity that exists between nations (Hass,

2004).

In contrast, the inherently individualistic perspective prevalent in America seems to routinely cause analyststo underestimate these global concerns and seems to direct preventive efforts into the wrong arenas.

When it comes to the selection of terrorist targets, terrorist planners view things differently than American

analysts because of the journalistic value and the type of media coverage expected from any particular form

of attack on any particular target (Hass, 2004). Terrorist leadership painstakingly considers the visual and

visceral effects that media coverage would have, and they time attacks to coincide with the evening news

broadcasts of relevant target audiences. Consequently, an attack on an American nuclear reactor would

constitute a bad investment of terrorist resources because the subsequent radioactive pollution would

prevent optimal media exposure because media would not be allowed to go into contaminated areas.




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Likewise, contrary to threat analyses about the vulnerability of the U.S. water supply (Seger, 1990), a

terrorist attack on water resources will not receive the type of "good" media coverage that a bombed

skyscraper would because there would be nothing to show on television screens. Additionally, cultural

context has to be considered in the selection of terrorist targets. For instance, the Muslim culture, with its

rich tradition based on a nomadic herdsman mentality and desert tribal morality, would frown on the

destruction of such important natural resources as water supplies.

Psychological Profile of a Terrorist

Disclaimer." Most active or retired terrorists are not willing participants in psychological studies. Thus, the

majority of the information in this study is based on conjectures from biographical material, media reports,

interviews by other professionals, and the author's field experience in terrorism prevention--not from

controlled psychological studies. A discussion of a psychological profile of a terrorist in this study is

offered only in the context of its use in prevention efforts. Hence, the rule that is applied in this section is

that the veracity of this psychological theory is only in its consequences. Therefore, the psychological

profile offered here is the result of analysis of biographical commonalities, established behavioral patterns,

and recognized responses to existing preventive efforts and political maneuvers over decades and across

various conflict areas. Furthermore, it is proposed only for its use in preventive work and to improve

prediction responses for preventive efforts.

Recent efforts by Post and Denny (2002), Sageman (2003), and other colleagues include interviewing and

testing terrorists held in captivity in Israel and in other holding facilities across the world, which have

yielded some interesting results, albeit with serious methodological constraints. For example, the captive

population may be a poor representative sample of the overall terrorist population, particularly the terrorism

leadership, which remains largely unstudied. Furthermore, the effects of life in captivity in Israeli and in

American prisons cannot be underestimated in the overall presentation of the psychological profiles that

emerge from such studies (Zimbardo, 1971; Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973; Zagorin & Duffy, 2005).

Nevertheless, the commonalities with other sources and the corroboration of observations made elsewhere

in this study warrant our attention.

Hence, the psychological profile of a terrorist has to be taken in the context of all other variables previously

discussed and in the context of cultural and national specifics.

The conclusions are based on experiences and reviews by Silke (2003) and Sageman (2004) stating

terrorists are essentially normal individuals from a psychological perspective. For those more familiar with

such technical definitions, terrorists display a character organization embedded in the Cluster B of

personality disorder taxonomy as proposed in the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (1994). Variants of such typology include

individuals who either can move more fluidly along the theoretical continuum of the cluster configuration

and present with other characteristics, or persons who affiliate themselves with terrorist organizations

because of their entrenched anti-social character (Meloy, 2004).

The narcissistic character organization, the most likely and the most widely accepted psychological

configuration, starts with the developmental history of a person, which includes one's psychological

development into an emotionally self-sufficient individual. This character development is heralded by the

subjective discovery at an early age that one's parents will not meet one's emotional needs (e.g., Arafat's

mother died when he was 4 years old, and he was raised by an uncle in Jerusalem; Zacarias Moussaoui has

had no contact with his father for years; Richard Reid's father was in prison for most of Reid's childhood).

Following that discovery, there is a period of trial and error in which the child develops an independent

style of emotional gratification using one's talents to fulfill emotional needs through alternative resources




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(e.g., Richard Reid's youth was marked by petty theft and mugging; Ararat started his career as a weapons

smuggler; 18-year-old Hussain Omar was declared a "vulnerable young adult" by British social services).

Concurrently, the development of a grandiose sense of oneself as special also emerges, primarily as a

psychological defense from a subjective feeling that one is insignificant and unloved by one's inadequate,

insufficient, or unavailable parents.

In essence, this defensive reversal of reality, in which a person who is otherwise normal perceives him or

herself as "better than the rest," serves to justify why one's parents are insufficiently loving. In fact, many of

the devastating acts of terror that have taken place since the 1990s were masterminded by innovative

self-anointed individuals with larger-than-life callings who perceived themselves in historical terms and

believed they were personally responsible for bringing about change (Spirnzak, 2001; Sageman, 2004;

Ghosh, 2005). Particularly crucial colorations to the nascent grandiose sense of self and narcissistic

entitlement are the development of strong ideological, nationalistic, and/or religious convictions (e.g.,

Arafat's conviction to free Palestine from Israel; nationalistic aspirations such as Gerry Adams'

multi-generational family affiliation with the Republican political party, Sinn Fein, and the IRA; Mohamed

Atta's fastidious life of austere self-denial, leading to his ultimate role in commandeering an airplane that

crashed into the World Trade Center Towers).

Despite having the capacity for emotional self-sufficiency, people who are narcissistically organized are

typically emotionally starved and wanting. Hence, they seek out social affiliation or require the approval of

alternative social groups (e.g., Ararat started by leading the Palestinian Student League in Cairo in his

youth; Richard Reid converted to Islam in Feltham Young Offender's Institution in London).

The most common consequence of the narcissistic character organization is difficulty with adult

interpersonal relationships when the emotionally self-sufficient have to place themselves in the imperfect

and inexperienced hands of others to love. This leads to typical intimacy compromises and isolation such as

selecting a mate who is perceived as inferior or moving away from one's family of origin. Examples of such

are Mohamed Atta, who lived away from his family and reportedly had great difficulty in interpersonal

relationships (McDermott, 2005), and Marwan Abu Ubeida, who left his family to live with insurgents until

his eventual deployment in a suicide mission (Ghosh, 2005). Thus, the person who is narcissistically

organized is generally easily recruited to join a group with a cause and, specifically, is an excellent

candidate for a suicide mission. This is true, even if that person is married and has children, by virtue of an

inherent limited capacity for intimacy (making a wife and children subjectively less important to the

would-be terrorist) and stronger affiliations towards other social groups, such as a terrorist group, which is

perceived as subjectively more important. In fact, many of the terrorists interviewed or studied by experts

have moved away from their families of origin en route to becoming members of terrorist organizations or

as part of their preparation for future attacks (Post & Denny, 2002; Meloy, 2000; Sageman, 2003; Navarro,

2004; McDermott).

Such individuals seem to pursue notoriety when recognition and admiration by others supplants the moredesirable but seemingly unattainable love and intimacy. This plays well into the inherent terrorist group

agenda of gaining public awareness to their cause by gaining notoriety. The psychological motives of the

individual and the political motives of the terrorist group converge on the common behaviors of outrageous

violence and glorified mayhem (Shermer, 2006).

Furthermore, narcissistic individuals tend to exhibit a sense of grandiose entitlement, which fits perfectly

into the emerging terrorist group's members' belief that they are special in some fundamental way (Ghosh,

2005; McDermott, 2005). The pride that develops in such groups gives way to its individual narcissistic

members seeing themselves as superior to others (i.e., their rights and needs are more important than those




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of others), and to them more readily taking offense at others' actions as wrongs against them. Subsequently,

narcissistically organized individuals with a grandiose sense of entitlement are much less likely to forgive

others and much more likely to insist on full repayment for past offenses. Thus they personally exact such

retribution from the infidels, the imperialists, the Zionists, and the Westerners. (Navarro, 2004; Meloy,

2004; McDermott; Shermer, 2006).

Plagued by persistent emotional hunger, narcissists' affiliation needs are intensified and expressed as

stronger bonds with their social groups. Other social psychological phenomena that are concurrently

observed are the developments of increased group cohesion, alliance with the group mentality, groupthink

(Janis, 1971), which results in the exclusion of alternative perspectives, and the risky shift (Doise, 1969;

Wallach, Kogan, & Bern, 1962), which involves the tendency to assume greater personal risks when

operating within a group. The emergence of high-achieving mentalities and competitiveness, which are

sustained by unmitigated emotional hunger (i.e., the drive to accomplish more without ever achieving

satisfaction), has been observed in members of terrorist organizations. This was the case with Mohamed

Atta, one of the 9/11 leaders, whose young adult life was marked by fierce competitiveness and pursuit of

scholastic excellence (McDermott, 2005). Additionally, it was observed in others held in captivity (such as

Mohammed al-Qahtani, believed to have been the 20th hijacker in the 9/11 attacks), who compete against

other detainees for the martyrdom title (Zagorin & Dully, 2005).

This psychological adaptation has also been supported by evolutionary psychology theories, which state

that young men in particular want to display their bravery, are deeply offended by injustice, and may risk

their own lives even to the point of certain death (Colin, 2002).

Narcissistic individuals are also easily recruitable based on the promises of specialness and immortality,

which fit into the sense of self-importance. For instance, recruiting someone to conduct a terrorist attack

because of the person's special talents has been a routine approach for many terrorist organizations (Ghosh,

2005; Shermer, 2006). Crenshaw (2002) observed that becoming a so-called martyr in the Middle East

brings fame to the recruits. Their acts are framed as something extremely honorable and brave.

Additionally, their place in history is established by the numerous posters that decorate the hometown walls

that are used to praise them. These practices do not escape potential recruits who are seeking confirmationof their grandiosity and sense of self-importance.

Heads of terrorist organizations are clearly notoriety- and fame-oriented, tending more toward the histrionic

side of the Cluster B spectrum. Their interests in the ongoing struggle (process-oriented) are greater than

their interests in achieving workable solutions to the problems of the people and groups they claim to

represent.

Hence, Osama bin Laden or Abu Mousab al-Zarqawi appear in personal TV or radio communiques that

convey minimal important information but promote them as idols and as symbols of their causes. Osama

bin Laden and Abu Mousab al-Zarqawi also insist on declaring to the world that they exist and are willing

to do so in defiance of personal security considerations. Over time, some members in this category who areshrewd enough to survive capitalize on their immense popularity within their communities and reform into

career politicians, forgoing terrorism for more promising and legitimate political processes.

Some in the Irish Republican Army leadership and some in the Palestinian Liberation Organization

leadership have done so; some in the surviving al-Qaeda leadership are expected to make the shift to

politics with the passage of many years.

The roles of slight, hate, and other negative consequences of American activities for motivating and

recruiting terrorists have been largely overstated by the media.




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Research indicates that for the most part, those initiating and leading terrorism activity have not been

directly adversely affected by actions of the target society (e.g., they did not experience personal or familial

loss) that could justify their actions (Sageman, 2004; Shermer, 2006). Instead, it's quite the opposite.

Terrorist leaders often come from relatively privileged life circumstances (e.g., Sami al-Aryan's privileged

upbringing in Kuwait; Yasser Arafat's middle-class upbringing in Jerusalem and Cairo; and Abu Mousab

al-Zarqawi's middle-class family from Jordan). However, for the most part, terrorist leaders had

experienced slights, or blows to the ego, as well as psychologically demeaning encounters with the target

society or its representatives (e.g., Ararat was held by Israel in 1948 as a prisoner of war and was later

released with thousands of others; Osama bin Laden was rejected by U.S. intelligence as an ally in the war

in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion). In fact, research indicates that the lower a person's rank

membership in the terrorist organization, the greater the likelihood that he or she was personally exposed to

real personal losses (e.g., a family members' death, loss of property) and subsequently the easier he or she is

to recruit based on retaliatory convictions against the target society. There is a greater propensity to having

some and often more serious negative consequences from past encounters with members and

representatives of the target society among those actually involved in terrorism operations in the field (e.g.,

suicide bombers, rock throwers).

In general, it appears from the research evidence, contrary to assertions offered in the popular media, thatthe narcissistic injuries (psychological injuries of one's sense of importance and invulnerability), rather than

personal losses, are those that are "more likely to motivate terrorist-organization memberships and eventual

terrorist retaliatory actions. This is true because narcissistic injuries resonate more intensely than real

injuries do with those whose psychological make-ups are narcissistically organized (Cluster B

configurations). These people are more easily triggered by such experiences into grandiose retaliatory

actions and, thus, are more easily exploitable by recruiting efforts of the terrorist organizations (Perina,

2002; Meloy, 2004; Navarro, 2004; Gutman & Melman, 2005; Ghosh, 2OO5).

There is, however, an additional category of accidental terrorists. These are unwitting participants recruited

to execute a crucial aspect of the attack without their prior knowledge or consent. In this category are

people who because of their psychological weaknesses (e.g., lower intelligence, lesser sophistication, anddependent characteristics) could become unwitting participants in terrorist activity following effective

recruitment by sophisticated terrorists (Taylor & Quayle, 1994). Any terrorist psychological profile must

also consider this common but potentially deadly possibility and close this otherwise evident loophole. One

such example is the plot by Nezar Hindawi, who tricked his pregnant girlfriend into flying from London to

Israel to supposedly meet his family before their eventual wedding. Unbeknownst to her, he placed a bomb

in her suitcase that was set to detonate in mid-flight. A routine airport security check by Israeli terrorism

prevention agents discovered the hidden bomb, and Nezar Hindawi was consequently arrested by London

police and imprisoned.

The Role of Social Models and Group Processes in Terrorist Recruitment and Terrorist Activity

Individuals primarily associate with terrorist groups to satisfy their emotional needs and to compensate for

the loss of family affiliation through socialization and group cohesion. A clear indication of the importance

of social benefits derived from such membership in terrorist organizations comes from the story of Nezar

Hindawi.

When Hindawi was refused membership in other Palestinian terrorist groups, he formed his own terrorist

group, the Jordanian Revolutionary Movement, with two other family members. He later contacted the

Syrian intelligence services and convinced Syria to supply his tiny group with weapons and funds to carry

out attacks against Israel (Taylor & Quayle, 1994).




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His later exploits notwithstanding, he clearly demonstrated the pull of such organizations and the attraction

of belonging, which terrorist groups enjoy worldwide.

Terrorist organizations, however, not only enjoy popularity among the many potential recruits but also

experience characteristic changes resulting from external pressures and social isolation culminating in

groupthink (Janis, 1960). Groupthink involves pressure to tow the proverbial party line and reject

information that challenges the group's beliefs. It also changes a group's goals over time from external goals

(political change through armed struggle) to internal goals (maintenance of the group). Finally, it changes a

group's time reference from a short-term struggle to long-term garnering of political power and political

legitimacy.

At the leadership level, all characteristic sociological phenomena observed in the genesis and maintenance

of other bureaucracies comes into evidence. The groups make clear and persistent efforts to maintain the

terrorist organization, oftentimes at the expense of the purpose of the organization itself. Efforts are made

to maximize the capacity of the bureaucratic institutions, which are organized hierarchically in a typical

pyramid structure with command and control mechanisms, and to maximize redundancy via the

establishment of franchises, cells, local networks, leaderless networks, and individual operators (Stern,

2003; Sageman, 2003).

The Role of the Media in the Psychology of Terrorism

The media coverage and the types of exposure become part of the thinking and planning of terrorist attacks

because of media access to terrorist sites (e.g., site of an attack and terrorist training camps) and to terrorists

(e.g., for interviews and photo shoots). Unwittingly then, media reporting enhances the success of terrorist

attacks and becomes an instrument in the terrorist act (e.g., A1-Jazzerah's broadcast of Abu Mousab

al-Zarqawi's or Osama bin Laden's recorded messages). In essence, the media had become the primary

vehicle declaring the terrorist message and recruiting new terrorists. Paradoxically, our investment in the

democratic principles of media freedom plays into the sentiments of the narcissistically organized potential

terrorism recruits every time we exercise our democratic freedoms around the globe.

Conversely, however, media reporters have been able to gain access to terrorist leaders, foot soldiers, their

families, and terrorist training camps, which provide insight into the minds of the terrorists that no other

scholars have been able to produce. However, media information about terrorists has been largely excluded

from any serious consideration by the intelligence and academic communities so far (Shah, 2003).

Media reporters and those who have had contacts with known terrorists or who have gained access to

terrorists are an invaluable source of information about terrorists, and their experience should be exploited.

The Role of Marginality in the Psychology of Terrorism

The propensity of would-be terrorists to initially be attracted to marginal groups, which gives someexpression to their personal sense of alienation, is well-documented (Merari, 2002; Meloy, 2004). Some

persons (e.g., Timothy McVeigh, Terry Nichols, Jose Padilla, and John Walker-Lynd) started their

illustrious terrorist careers by joining marginal groups at the fringes of societies, which provided a sense of

purpose and an acceptance by others of like-minds. It was in the marginal groups that ostracized persons

began the psychological transformation into their future identities as terrorists. As Hoffer (1951), Shermer

(2006), and others argued, the phenomenon of suicide terrorism is not a personal or individual

phenomenon, it is a group phenomenon and, therefore, it is very much the product of group processes and

influences. Terrorist groups appeal to recruits' religious piety or patriotic sentients, especially suicide

terrorists, but neither fanaticism nor nationalism alone are necessary or sufficient to incite suicide terrorists.




18 11/16/2006

The key ingredient may be the individual susceptibility to indoctrination.

Indoctrination is the organizational process that prepares the suicide terrorist as a martyr and makes sure he

or she doesn't change his or her mind (Shermer; Ghosh, 2005; Dietlind, 2005).

Political and religious groups that are marginal but legal are considered by many experts as breeding

grounds for terrorists of the future (e.g., The Muslim Brotherhood in Arab countries and the Christian

Identity movement in the United States).

Although perhaps legal, their sermons and messages, when activating a sense of being wronged into

behavioral changes, could ultimately result in terrorist convictions and behaviors. The general rule of

thumb is that the greater the degree of group marginality from societies' norms (more different, more

isolated, more distinct), and the more militantly active the group (both in proselytizing and in increasing

internal cohesion), then the greater the risk is for potential terrorism. As has been previously established, as

isolation increases, critical thinking decreases. Without access to alternative information sources, members

encode new belief systems. Group tenets are never challenged, only recited.

Platitude conditioning replaces reasoning processes. Although the isolation process itself is not

pathological, the end result is, because these actions create a closed belief system where conspiratorial

beliefs against mainstream society can readily develop (Gilmartin, 1996; McDermott, 2005).

Summary and Conclusion

As can be appreciated by this study, terrorists represent a complex phenomenon of social, psychological,

ideological, religious, and political sets of motives and behaviors intertwined. This report was an attempt to

create a picture consistent with state-of-the-art information on the subject matter and to illuminate some of

the current flaws in the narrow view(s) regarding terrorists.

Although a clearer picture should emerge out of this study regarding the many motivations for terrorism

(political, psychological, and social), the ways and directions in which preventive efforts ought to be

directed is lacking because it is based largely on actuarial data and anecdotal information and is guided bytheory. It can only be tested against the realities, which will unfold in the struggle with terrorism in the

years to come.

Consequently, this report is being offered with the earnest and urgent recommendation that existing

terrorism prevention protocols for all domains be compared against this data. Similarly, there is an equally

earnest recommendation to steer clear of oversimplified thinking about terrorists as either-or (a political

phenomena or a psychological phenomena) in the creation of prevention protocols. Finally, this study calls

for better implementation of psychological study and fundamental faceto-face empathic interviews, which

are currently under-used in prevention efforts.

The Psychological Motives for Terrorism

* A desire to be regarded as special is the most common and strong motive--the romantic view of the

terrorist as special and having a unique mission.

*The desire to be known to the target audience is a strong motive--having a poster of one's image as a

martyr posted on the walls of one's home town is titillating.

* The desire to be vicariously approved of by members of one's own reference group--activated into

terrorist actions by favorable sentiments in one's own community.




18 11/16/2006

* The desire to achieve personal congruence by aligning actions with ideological/religious convictions--not

an expression of hatred (Hoffer, 1951).

* A desire to affiliate and be with others of a like-mind; in recent cease-fire negotiations with Israel, the

Hamas faction demanded to stop the killings of its leadership in order to protect its group integrity, instead

of demanding other important political concessions over which they are supposedly fighting.

* The experience of social and psychological isolation resulting in little interface with other views--leadingto preservation and hardening of opinions justifying terrorism.

* Vengeance for originally offended individuals who were perceived to have been unjustly treated by

members/representatives of the target group--Eamon Collins testified that he joined the IRA in the

mid-1970s following his brutal arrest and manhandling by British soldiers.

* Experience of an insult to the person's grandiose sense of self, but not necessarily a serious personal loss

in the hands of the target group--Marwan Abu Ubeida lost his sense of national dignity after American

forces did not leave Iraq following the ousting of Saddam Hussein.

Distinctions Between Terrorist Leaders and Foot Soldiers

The differential dimensions in the motives between leaders and foot soldiers suggest that the types of

terrorist group members have similar psychological motives but vary in their respective importance. As has

been observed by psychological studies of drug trafficking persons and international smugglers

(Lichtenwald, 2003), there are significant psychological differences between the various levels of terrorist

involvement. It is important to not only study the terrorists who conduct operations themselves but also the

leaders who press and send these young people into committing terrorists acts (Shermer, 2006).

The Mastermind

* A career terrorist who remains comfortably in the background, engages in planning, tends to be moreinclined toward the exact sciences, has relatively strong ideological convictions and possesses relatively

lesser notoriety desires.

* Considers terrorism consequences carefully, understands the political map, holds back some important

aspects of information about operational plans that are disconfirming or aversive, and is not self-sacrificing

(Sageman, 2004).

* Example: Ramzi Yousef, believed to have masterminded the 9/11 attacks. Also Sami al-Aryan, a teacher

at Southern Florida University who developed the most extensive terrorism financing network and

recruitment web in the United States for the Islamic Jihad in the Middle East (Gutman & Melman, 2005).

The Ring Leader

* A field officer whose terrorism career is somewhat shorter by a few years, with stronger notoriety needs

and strong ideological convictions; tends to be more inclined toward the social sciences; has good

organizational and leadership characteristics.

* Interpersonal charisma is evident, can motivate others, and could be a teacher or preacher (Sageman,

2003). People in this category tend to be best represented by the classic narcissistic character organization,

but are not necessarily pathologically organized.




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* Example: the charismatic Abu Moussab aI-Zarqawi, who has graduated to higher ranks by the successes

of his attacks on United-States led coalition forces in Iraq.

The Pilot/Suicide Bomber

* A terrorist who flies the airplane into a building, has a short terrorism career, has strong notoriety needs

and zealous ideological or religious convictions, possesses some particular skill-set that is desirable or

developed by the terrorist organization (usually in the technical arena), and has the greatest degree of socialisolation, which enables this person to knowingly kill him or herself.

* Members in this category tend to the more pathological brand of narcissism and could also be members of

the antisocial configuration within Cluster B.

* Example: Jose Padilla, the Dirty Bomber; Mohamed Atta, who led the attacks on the World Trade

Centers (McDermott, 2005); the Belgian suicide bomber, Muriel Degauque, whose illustrious terrorist

career was started by antisocial behaviors such as running away from home and extensive drug use during

her youth (Dietlind, 2005).

The Foot Soldier

* A terrorist who hijacks the airplane or is a suicide bomber, has a short terrorism career, has strong

notoriety needs and zealous ideological or religious convictions, has a greater degree of social isolation,

tends to be most easily recruitable, trusts others in the organization, and is easily deceived--may not know

he or she is flying to his or her death.

* Persons in this category may belong to the more insidious and less-than-stable borderline character

organization within the Cluster B configuration.

* Example: Richard Reid, who was caught in his attempt at blowing up American Airlines Flight 63 from

Paris to the United States; John Walker Lynd, the American Taliban; or Marwan Abu Ubeida, the Iraqiinsurgent suicide bomber.

Why Do Terrorists Target America?

By assuming an empathic therapeutic stance, it is possible to undersand the political landscape and the

declared political goals of terrorists. Following are some basic premises that underlie the ideological and

religious justifications for the members of the various terrorist organizations and their political goals

pertaining to the United States:

* Terrorists and their ideologues view the United States as the number one perpetrator of global terrorism

in creating and promoting economic inequality and exploitation in other countries around the world (e.g.,

supporting exploitative regimes like Saudi Arabia; establishing a global capitalist economy).

* Terrorists and their ideologues view the United States as the perpetrator of global terrorism in military

support of terrorist groups and regimes in other countries of the world (e.g., selling arms to terrorist groups

like the Taliban in the 1980s; supporting military regimes thai terrorize their own people, such as Chile's

Pinochet or Argentina's military Juntas).

* Terrorists and their ideologues view the United States as exerting undue dominance and arrogant,

imperialistic intervention strategies around the globe (intervening in countries without the consensus of

their populations, such as the 1980's "Peace Keeping Mission in Lebanon;" intervening in countries without




18 11/16/2006

the consensus of the rest of the global community, as in the Iraq war).

* Terrorists and their ideologues view the United States as being at war with freedom fighters (terrorists),

with Arabs (theocratic anti-American countries and organizations), and with Islam (extreme Islamists),

which gives impetus for the terrorist campaign to continue (Murphy, 2005; Elliolt, 2003; Parenti, 2002).

Acknowledgments

This study was conceived with the generous financial support of grants from the U.S. Department ofDefense and U.S. Department of Energy in the years 2003 and 2004, sponsored by Sandia National

Laboratories, SELDON Team, in Albuquerque, New Mexico.

Editorial assistance was provided by Dr. Alete Atom from Alliant International University, California

School of Professional Psychology in Los Angeles, California. Research and editorial assistance was

provided by Lee Smith, BS, from California Lutheran University in Thousand Oaks, California.

References

Due to space constraints, the complete list of references for this article appears online at www.add.com

(Click "Online CE").

Reuben Valsman-Tzachor, PhD, DABPS, DAPA, CHS-III, was born in Israel and served in the Israeli

military as a Navy caprain, a weapons systems officer, and as a gun-ship commanding officer. He has had

extensive anti-terrorism warfare experience and direct involvement in many combat military operations

against terrorists in the Middle East. He later served as a supervisor in the Israeli government terrorism

prevention agency based in the western United States. In this role as a supervisor he authored, field-tested,

and implemented numerous terrorism prevention protocols for various theaters in the region. He obtained

his doctorate in clinical psychology from Alliant International University, California School of Professional

Psychology in Los Angeles, where he is currently an adjunct professor. He has been a Diplomate of the

American College of Forensic Examiners since 1998, and he is a Diplomate of the American Board

Psychological Specialties.

He is also a Diplomate of the American Psychotherapy Association. He is Certified in Homeland Security

Specialty at Level III (CHS-III). He has conducted research and published numerous articles on the topic of

terrorism prevention and participated as an expert consultant in a project for the development of a national

terrorism prevention strategy by Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico. He currently

owns a private practice in Los Angeles, California.

Earn CE Credit

To earn CE credit, complete the exam for this article on page 66 or complete the exam online at

www.acfei.com (select "Online CE").

Internal Grading of Factors of Potential Terrorists The internal grading for the age factor of a potential terrorismperpetrator match would include the following: * 18-25 years old Great likelihood for a match * 16-18 years old and 25-30 years old Some likelihood for a match * <16 years old and >30 years old Small likelihood for a match




18 11/16/2006

Similarly, the internal grading for the immigration factor inforeign-born domestic U.S. terrorism perpetrators would include thefollowing: * Illegal/undocumented Great likelihood for a match * Tourist/diplomatic status High likelihood for a match * Work/student visa Good likelihood for a match

* Permanent resident Some likelihood for a match * Naturalized citizen Small likelihood for a match * U.S. born citizen Slight likelihood for a match The internal grading for marital status as a factor in the matchbetween any person to the potential terrorism perpetrator include thefollowing; * Single/bachelor Great likelihood for a match * Steady relationship High likelihood for a match * Married/engaged Some likelihood for a match

* Married with children Small likelihood for a match The internal grading for relevant religious, ethnic, or politicalaffiliation would be as follows: * Membership in relevant organization Greater likelihood for match (Arab, Muslim) * Membership in relevant social group High likelihood for match (Arab, Muslim) * Relevant sympathetic sentiments Some likelihood for match (to Arabs, to Muslims) * No clear affiliations (to Arabs, to Small likelihood for match Muslims)

The internal grading for the psychological makeup of terroristscharacters and interpersonal presentations would be as follows: * Pathological narcissism Great likelihood for a match * Psychopathy (with or without High likelihood for a match criminality) * Narcissism Some likelihood for a match * Paranoia Small likelihood for a match * General unhappiness Slight likelihood for a match Using Profiles in Pre-flight Screenings

Using an accurate terrorist profile, screeners could simplify theflight pre-screening process and focus their efforts on those mostlikely to commit terrorist acts. For example, security checks atdomestic and international flights include the following: * Passenger does not match No Risk No Security Check the profile at all* Passenger matches the Minimal Risk Minimal Security Check profile slightly* Passenger matches the Some Risk Some Security Check profile somewhat* Passenger matches the Grave Risk Complete Security Check profile substantially* Passenger matches the Imminent Risk Refuse to Fly, Call PD




profile perfectly Comparing the Motives of Terrorist Foot Soldiers and Terrorist LeadersThe following is a schematic breakdown suggesting differences inpsychological motives for terrorism between the leaders and thesoldiers within terror-ist organizations (Stern, 2003: Foot Soldiers, Field Officers Leaders, Commanders * More easily recruitable-- * Less easily recruitable-stubborn, grandiosity, emotionally less grandiose

hungry* More likely motivated by * More likely motivated by power frustration/aggression* Stronger religious/ * More practically oriented ideological convictions* Sometimes repetitive * Better educated and socialized criminals--petty crime background* Greater isolation from * Greater connection to family and family and own society own society* Desire to be known-- * Stronger desire for notoriety notoriety* Target audience--own people * Target audience-the world* Martyrdom wishes--wish to be * No martyrdom wishes special* Short terrorism career-- * Life-long terrorism career

usually dies or gets captured

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