ps4882d: politics of global migration - term paper assignment #2- · 2017-12-23 · tracing back to...

PS4882D: Politics of Global Migration

- Term Paper Assignment #2-

The Hidden Dimension of Myanmar’s Democratic Transition

Myanmar’s “Final Solution”: The False Promise of Naturalized Citizenship & State Persecution of the Muslim Rohingya Population

Written By: Jeremy Ho Wei Liang

Matric No: A0094695L

3670 Words (Excluding References)

The Hidden Dimension of Myanmar’s Road to Democracy

1 Written By: Jeremy Ho Wei Liang (A0094695L)

Introduction

Myanmar has been praised for its commitment to democratization for establishing precedents

for norms pertaining to human and citizenship rights, ending decades of military junta rule.

Burmese society is also becoming more active in the civil-political sphere, determined to address

the human rights and civil liberties lacunas that have emerged as a result of the Tatmadaw’s

suffocating authoritarian rule1. However, despite this roadmap towards a democratic transition,

Myanmar’s Rohingya Muslims continue to suffer under asymmetric and draconian state

persecution. Located in the impoverished and severely under-developed region of Rakhine, the

Rohingya people are forced into a situation of chronic despair and statelessness, living under

constant threats of fear and state sponsored persecution. Denied access to full citizenship, their

indigenous ethnic identity is not recognized by the state, and citizenship rights accorded to Burmese

Buddhists and other Burmese are not extended to the Rohingya owing to their lack of formal

citizenship status2. As a result of this unholy trinity, the Rohingyas are left with little recourse and

access to the democratic discourses of equitable justice and basic human rights, rights that are

increasingly being enjoyed Myanmar’s Buddhist majority.

In addition to the above-mentioned climate of state-sponsored persecution, a chronic sense of

distrust and resentment colours the interaction between the majority of Myanmar’s Buddhists and

the marginalized Rohingya population. Consequentially, periodic clashes between Muslims and

Buddhists often escalate into full-scale violence, with the Rohingyas bearing the brunt of the

Burmese state’s heavy-handed response to quell the violence, often to appalling ends3. This ruthless

persecution and discrimination raises an analytical puzzle for the relationship between Myanmar’s

1 Pederson, Morten B. "Myanmar's Democratic Opening: The Process and Prospect of Reform." In Debating Democratization in Myanmar, by Nick Cheesman, Nicholas Farrelly and Trevor Wilson, 19-42. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2014. 2 Callahan, Mary P. Political Authority in Burma's Ethnic Minority States: Devolution, Occupation and Coexistence. Policy Studies Report, Washington: East-West Center Washington, 2007. 3 Cheesman, Nick. "Democratization, Violence, and Myanmar." In Debating Democratization in Myanmar, by Nick Cheesman, Nicholas Farrelly and Trevor Wilson, 331-350. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2014.



democratic transition and the lack of human and citizenship rights accorded to the Rohingya

population. The nature of this analytical puzzle revolves around a fundamental paradox: why,

despite domestic and international efforts at facilitating Myanmar’s democratic transition, has there

been increasing tensions and an evolution of a networked system of persecution against Myanmar’s

Muslim Rohingya population? In attempting to offer an account for this paradox, this paper posits

that the ironical nature of democratic transition, more specifically, Myanmar’s calibrated granting

of civil liberties (freedom of speech and expression) and its insistence on privileging the Buddhist

majority populace vis-à-vis the sustained marginalization of the Rohingyas provides a plausible and

realistic account for the perpetuation and stigmatization of the Rohingya population.

Understanding the nature and extent of Myanmar’s persecution of the Rohingyas

Myanmar’s continued deprivation of the Rohingya’s claims to citizenship along with its

accompanying rights forms the strategic basis upon which the Rohingyas are forced into a position

of statelessness. This status of stateless persons opens the floodgates for the Rohingyas to face

asymmetric persecution, with little to no avenues to seek proper recourse and equitable justice4.

Tracing back to the historical roots of Myanmar’s politicized issue of ethnicity and citizenship, the

issue and basis of contention lies in the changing and highly subjective legal status of the Rohingya

population. Because independence was accorded to Burma in a short period of three years following

the end of World War II, the British’s haphazard process of fluid citizenship registration resulted in

the Rohingyas being accorded various national and citizenship identities – identities that are now

being contested and denied recognition by the Burmese state. This process of haphazard and

disorganized registration identified and registered the Rohingyas under two broad and distinct

categories: Rakhine Muslims or Rohingya, the former carrying more weight than the latter, though

4 Kyaw, Nyi Nyi. Rohingya Muslims : Myanmar's forgotten people. Commentary, Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2008.



the two categories are still disregarded by the state5. This ascription of fluid citizenship status and

identities could arguably be translated and viewed through the lens of Sadiq’s concept of “paper

citizens”6. Contextualizing Sadiq’s conceptual arguments to the situation of the Rohingyas, these

native residents, residing mainly in Rakhine state only exist in (arbitrary) documentary form, not

substance – at least in relation to the according of citizenship rights by the Burmese state. Though

registered under the two above-mentioned categories, the absence of any codified citizenship laws,

prior to 1982, created a citizen-legal lacuna, which continues to be exploited by the Burmese state.

Specifically, Myanmar’s freehanded exploitation of this lacuna has translated into the arbitrary

accordance and/or denial of rights and treatment of the Rohingya people by various factions and

stakeholders within the Burmese state7. Unfortunately, the codification of Myanmar’s 1982

Citizenship Law has not mediated nor resolved this impasse but instead, has only served to

reinforce the structural barriers and reified state-backed oppression of the Rohingya – an argument

which will be explored in the later course of this paper.

As a majoritarian Buddhist state, the Tatmadaw’s monopoly over power and society

translated into the maintenance of the delicate social-religious harmony as well as a calibrated

system of tolerance towards religious pluralism and the open practice of different faiths. For

example, the 2008 Burmese constitution codified statutory articles that accorded special rights and

privileges for Buddhism as the dominant state religion. However, in the following pursuant

statutory articles, the 2008 constitution also provided legal recognition and protection for religious

freedom and worship – acknowledging the open practice and recognition of Islamic, Hindu and

5 Phillips, Alexandra. "The World’s Blind Spot: “Shedding Light on the Persecuted." Harvard International Review 35, no. 2 (2013): Published Online. 6 Sadiq, Kamal. Paper Citizens: How Illegal Immigrants Acquire Citizenship in Developing Countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 7 Kipgen, Nehginpao. "Conflict in Rakhine State in Myanmar: Rohingya Muslims' Conundrum." Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 33, no. 2 (2013): 298-310.



even Christian faiths8. However, the loosening of the Tatmadaw’s authoritarian grip over Burmese

society, coupled with the growth and incorporation of democratic norms has translated into

democracy becoming the basis on which persecution, stigmatization and discrimination of the

Rohingya is being perpetuated.

The double-whammy blowback of Myanmar’s efforts at democratization and international humanitarian aid

Heeding to international pressure for accelerating its democratic transition, Myanmar has

acquiesced to the slow granting of civil liberties. One such transformation has been the nurturing of

a climate of free speech and the pardoning of incarcerated individuals found guilty of speaking out

against the social-political rule of the Tatmadaw9. Despite efforts at democratization, Myanmar’s

2010 decision to grant political amnesty to Ashin Wirathu, a Buddhist-extremist spiritual leader of

the anti-Islam movement is a case in point to highlight a dark-side to Myanmar’s democratic

transition. Well revered amongst the majoritarian Buddhist community, Wirathu is known for his

promotion of communal violence aimed at purging Rakhine of the Rohingya Muslims10. Leveraging

on the democratic climate that promotes free speech and expression, Wirathu has spoken out,

criticizing the Rohingya as illegal migrants that should be purged and denied the right to exist in the

sovereign territory of Rakhine and Myanmar. Together with other Buddhist extremists, Wirathu has

entrenched a widespread fear against Islam. The Rohingyas have been demonized as a group of

fanatical individuals determined to overwhelm the majority of Myanmar’s Buddhist population,

with the eventual goal of laying claim to the entirety of Rakhine land. Consequentially, inter-

marriages between Muslim Rohingyas and Buddhist Burmese, when discovered, are forcefully

ended and politicized by Buddhist fundamentalists. This paradoxical deprivation of an individual’s

8 Grundy-Warr, Carl, and Elaine Wong. "Sanctuary Under a Plastic Sheet – The Unresolved Problem of Rohingya Refugees." IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, 1997: 79-91. 9 South, Ashley. "Political Transition in Myanmar: A New Model for Democratization." Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, no. 2 (2004): 233-255. 10 Beech, Hannah. The Face of Buddhist Terror. July 1, 2013. http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2146000,00.html (accessed March 14, 2015).



freedom to make choices is hijacked by radicals such as Wirathu to posit that the Rohingya are

engaged in forced conversion of Buddhist women, with the aim of boosting their population to

overwhelm the Buddhist population residing in Rakhine11. Given such stereotypical portrayal of the

Rohingya, with little to no counter-balancing alternatives being presented, Wirathu is able to freely

perpetuate a climate of extreme Islamophobia against the Muslim Rohingyas, paranoia that is

manifested through violent communal clashes in Rakhine state.

The respective unwillingness and inability of the Burmese state and international human

rights organizations to bring individuals such as Wirathu to justice has created a pervasive climate

of perceived winners and losers in Myanmar. Because the persecution of the Rohingyas takes place

amidst a climate of widespread anti-Islam sentiments that are legitimized, supported and

perpetuated by the state, the Rohingyas are condemned to a position of perpetual losers and

structural-chronic discrimination12. To make matters worse, restricted by Myanmar’s right to

sovereignty over its domestic affairs, the international community’s efforts at documenting and

addressing the violation of the Rohingya’s human rights are severely limited by terms set by Thein

Sein’s government13. Even if humanitarian aid or human rights officials manage to reach Rakhine

state, the distribution of resources and access to the Rohingya people is never guaranteed. This

uncertainty stems from the high degrees of autonomy granted to the border police that guard and

polices over Rakhine state. Together with municipal (Buddhist) law enforcement and police

officials, rampant corruption and an entrenched ethos of discrimination towards the Rohingyas

11 Gravers, Mikael. "Anti-Muslim Buddhist Nationalism in Burma and Sri Lanka: Religious Violence and Globalized Imaginaries of Endangered Identities." Contemporary Buddhism: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 2015: Published Online. 12 BBC News Asia. Burmese leader defends 'anti Muslim' monk Ashin Wirathu. June 24, 2013. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-23027492 (accessed March 14, 2015). 13 Nichols, Michelle. U.N. committee expresses concern for Myanmar's Muslims. November 26, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/26/us-myanmar-un-idUSBRE8AP16Y20121126 (accessed March 14, 2015).



results in syphoning of international aid supplies and the denial of entry permits to foreign aid and

humanitarian organizations14.

Building upon existing prejudices stacked against the Rohingya people, international

humanitarian (aid) organizations face structural and chronic resentment by the non-Muslim

communities in all provinces in Rakhine state. Part of Myanmar’s commitment to democratic

reforms has been the supposed partnership with domestic and international civil society to address

existing human rights lacunas under the framework of what Keck and Sikkink term a “transnational

advocacy network”15. Following massive international news coverage and grassroots reports of

flagrant violations of the Rohingya’s human rights, humanitarian aid has been calibrated towards

addressing the marginalized Rohingya community. The Rohingyas have long been recipients of

international aid, given their historical status as discriminated illegal Bengali immigrants who had

migrated into Rakhine province from Bangladesh under British colonial rule16. However, because

most humanitarian aid seeks to alleviate the plight of the Rohingyas, those who do not benefit from

these aid relief missions – who are often economically and socially better off, but still languishing

in poverty – often become resentful and jealous of these international organizations and agencies17.

As a result of this local acrimony, there has been a Buddhist backlash against the intervention

and involvement of international humanitarian agencies, criticizing these aid agencies for their non-

adherence to the democratic principle of equal treatment of all persons. Religious fundamentalists

such as Ashin Wirathu further played up this resentment, to the point where local enforcement

officers detained 10 Rohingya staff employed by international NGOs such as Medecins Sans 14 Grundy-Warr, Carl. "The Silence and Violence of Forced Migration: The Myanmar-Thailand Border." In International Migration in Southeast Asia, by Aris Ananta and Evi Nurvidya Arifin, 228-272. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004. 15 Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. Activists Beyond Borders. New York: Cornell University Press, 1998. 16 Ullah, Akm Ahsan. "Rohingya Refugees to Bangladesh: Historical Exclusions and Contemporary Marginalization." Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies 9 (2011): 139–161. 17 Kipgen, Nehginpao. "Addressing the Rohingya Problem." Journal of Asian and African Studies, 2013: 1-14.



Frontieres. These aid workers were often charged on the basis of treason and the exacerbation of

sectarian violence, fuelled by stereotypical association with Islamist militant groups such as Al

Qaeda18. Because of this hostile climate of fear along with the refusal to grant humanitarian aid

organizations access to Rakhine state, there has been an erratic delivery of medical and food aid,

exacerbating the plight of the Rohingya. Additionally, the strict regulation of foreign humanitarian

organizations has translated into the Burmese state having the upper hand against the Rohingyas19.

This position of strength revolves around the dual ability to unilaterally dictate the terms and

conditions by which the Rohingya should be treated, coupled with the relatively unrestrained and

unregulated use of coercive and violent force to purge the Rohingya Muslims.

The active participation of law enforcement officials in systemic violence perpetuates the

violence and displacement of the Rohingyas. For instance, the communal violence that erupted in

2012 following the murder and rape of an ethnic Rakhine Buddhist women by a group of Muslim

men, showed both the tacit and explicit involvement of law enforcement officials in facilitating

communal violence20. Using the death of Ma Thida Htwe as a pretext for vigilante justice, both

communal and state backed violence against the Muslim population erupted. The violence that

ensued escalated to an unprecedented scale to the extent that a vast section of Muslim dwellings in

Northern Rakhine had been torched and permanently destroyed, rendering the land uninhabitable.

This destruction of the land forced thousands of Rohingya to flee to state erected internally

displaced persons (IDP) camps located in Rakhine’s capital, Sittwe21. Though difficult if not

impossible to prove, Rohingya residents have alleged that local Buddhist law enforcement officials

18 Agence France Presse. 10 Aid Workers Held in Myanmar: UN. July 6, 2012. http://www.rnw.nl/english/bulletin/10-aidworkers-held-myanmar-un (accessed March 14, 2015). 19 Human Rights Watch. “The Government Could Have Stopped This”: Sectarian Violence and Ensuing Abuses in Burma’s Arakan State . HRW Report, New York: Human Rights Watch, 2012. 20 BBC News Asia. Burma violence: 20,000 displaced in Rakhine state. October 28, 2012. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-20114326 (accessed March 14, 2015). 21 UNHCR. Myanmar: 2015 UNHCR Country Operations Profile. March 1, 2015. http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e4877d6.html (accessed March 14, 2015).



either stood by or actively participated in torching Rohingya dwellings and forcefully arresting and

beating Muslim men22. Polarized by a growing rural-urban divide that affects the ability for various

parties to adapt to Myanmar’s democratic changes, the ghettoization of Rohingyas in centralized

IDP camps could arguably constitute the Burmese state’s very own “final solution” to purge the

Rohingyas. This free-handed use of asymmetric discrimination and violence is evidenced in satellite

imagery showing ravaged Muslim settlement areas vis-à-vis the intact and relatively well-preserved

non-Muslim section of Rakhine’s Kyaukpyu township, as shown in figures 1 and 2 below.

Figure 1: Satellite imagery of Rakhine’s coastal town of Kyaukpyu prior to the communal violence (9 March 2012)23 The land and settlement area towards the right of the dotted yellow line indicates the Muslim quarter of this land area, while the land area on the left is inhabited by Buddhist Rakhines

22 Human Rights Watch. “The Government Could Have Stopped This”: Sectarian Violence and Ensuing Abuses in Burma’s Arakan State . HRW Report, New York: Human Rights Watch, 2012. 23 Human Rights Watch. Burma: New Violence in Arakan State: Satellite Imagery Shows Widespread Destruction of Rohingya Homes, Property. October 27, 2012. http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/26/burma-new-violence-arakan-state (accessed March 14, 2015).



Figure 2: Satellite imagery of Rakhine’s coastal town of Kyaukpyu after to the communal violence (25 October 2012)24 Myanmar’s Final Solution: IDP camps and the (false) promise of citizenship

Forcefully displaced and prevented from returning to their ancestral lands, the Rohingyas are

forced to seek refuge in IDP camps. However, because of the intensity of the communal violence

that ensued, emergency laws have been translated into a permanent segregation and militarization

of the perimeters of the IDP camps. While the 2012 violence also affected and displaced a small

Buddhist population, efforts have been made to prioritize their well being vis-à-vis the Rohingyas25.

For instance, with the number of Rohingya outnumbering Burmese (Buddhist) nationals 3 to 1 in

the IDP camps, border guards and local police forces have institutionalized a system of regularized

and restricted movement for the Rakhine native and Rohingyas respectively. Rakhine Buddhist

camps are deliberately situated closer to towns and markets, and Rakhine people are free to move

about as they please, often with the provision of security by local police. On the other hand, citing

24 Ibid. 25 Ekeh, Chizom, and Martin Smith. Minorities in Burma. Briefing Report, London: Minority Rights Group International, 2012.



(hypocritical) safety precautions, the Rohingyas are denied freedom of movement, and have

sporadic access to food and medicinal supplies. In addition, despite the possession of authorization

letters from the central government, foreign aid organizations are often denied access to these IDP

camps. Often times, this restricted access is due either to the breakdown in communication flows or

the simple ignorance of the border guards who wield disproportionate amounts of delegated

authority from the central state26. The deprivation of sanitation facilities, irregular inflow of medical

supplies and the killing of many Rohingya professionals – many of who include doctor and nurses,

results in premature deaths and the spread of easily preventable diseases amongst the Rohingyas27.

The dehumanization and persecution of Rohingyas in these IDP camps was heavily criticized by

UN’s special envoy to Myanmar, Yanghee Lee who stated that the conditions in the Rohingya

camps were “deplorable”28 and the most appalling that she has ever seen. Lee’s public criticism

against Myanmar’s government was joined by a global chorus, calling for President Thein Sein to

remain committed to his democratic roadmap by showing committed efforts to address the

abhorrence of human rights violations against the Rohingyas29.

Returning back to the earlier reference to Myanmar’s Citizenship law, Thein Sein’s

government has demonstrated its ability to stage a democratic façade, appeasing international calls

for committed change, while continuing its persecution of the Rohingya. Government-sponsored

rhetoric that housing the Rohingyas in secured IDP camps ensures their safety and well-being is but

a masked disguise for what is otherwise a well-orchestrated propaganda scheme that is full of

baloney. Myanmar remains committed to its decision to deny citizenship rights as well as its refusal

26 Gill, Fiona Shaista. Human Rights and Statelessness: The Case Study of the Rohingya in Myanmar. Masters Thesis, Taiwan: National Sun Yet-sen University, 2014. 27 Brady, Brendan. "Fears of humanitarian crisis in western Myanmar’s camps for internally displaced persons." Canadian Medical Association Journal 9, no. 185 (2013): 445-446. 28 PressTV News. UN: Living conditions inside Rohingya camps "deplorable". July 26, 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PeO04GTWDLA (accessed March 14, 2015). 29 Zarni, Maung, and Alice Cowley. "The Slow-Burning Genocide of Myanmar's Rohingya." Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 23, no. 3 (2014): 681-752.



to acknowledge the existence of the Rohingya people30. Following Bangladesh’s 1978 decision to

engage in a mass repatriation exercise of Rohingya refugees, the Burmese government conducted a

1983 nation-wide census that excluded the recognition of the Rohingya as one of Myanmar’s 135

recognized ethnicities. Using a Scottian analytical framework, Myanmar’s government’s citizenship

census and their codification of the 1982 citizenship law can be seen as their attempt to survey the

entire citizenry of their land, empowering the state with opportunities to implement measures to

identify and classify people in accordance with certain preferences and prejudices31. Furthermore,

because Bangladesh is not a signatory state to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of

Refugees nor to its 1967 protocol32, both the Rohingya and the international community’s hands are

tied, unable to exert pressure on Bangladesh to accord the Rohingya rights and prevent their non-

refoulement back to Myanmar. In one fell swoop; this deliberate omission of the Rohingyas

rendered them stateless, reifying existential prejudices that are stacked against them33.

Myanmar’s government has offered what it regards as a mutual compromise to provide

substantial citizenship rights and democratic freedoms to render the Rohingyas more than mere

paper citizens: the promise of naturalized citizenship. Myanmar’s only indicator and guidelines for

citizenship lies in its 1982 Citizenship law, which designates two main distinct categories of

citizens: full or naturalized34. The former is accorded to persons who are classified under one of

eight recognized national races, while the latter applies to foreign nationals and/or immigrants who

are able to provide substantive and conclusive evidence that they have had past generations who

30 Berlie, Jean. The Burmanization of Myanmar's Muslims. Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 2008. 31 Scott, James. Seeing Like a State. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998. 32 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. States Parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol. April 1, 2011. http://www.unhcr.org/3b73b0d63.html (accessed March 14, 2015). 33 Human Rights Watch. “The Government Could Have Stopped This”: Sectarian Violence and Ensuing Abuses in Burma’s Arakan State . HRW Report, New York: Human Rights Watch, 2012. 34 Thawnghmung, Ardeth Maung. Beyond Armed Resistance: Ethnonational Politics in Burma. Policy Studies Report, Honolulu: East-West Center, 2011.



lived and resided in Burma prior to its attainment of independence in 194835. For the Rohingya, the

implementation of the letter of the 1982 citizenship law is Myanmar’s attempt to drive the final nail

in their citizenship coffin. In order for Rohingyas to begin the process of citizenship registration,

they would have to first, fundamentally accept their status as a lower class citizen, with limited

access to citizenship rights that are otherwise fully enjoyed by Burmese holding full citizenship

status. To do so, let alone qualify for registration, they would have to identify themselves as

“Bengali” – an (illegal) immigrant in the eyes of the Burmese state, a requirement that many

Rohingya refuse. This refusal is based on a well-founded fear that due to their status as an illegal

immigrant, they would remain at the mercy of the Burmese state, and should the state decide to turn

against them, they would have little to no recourse to equitable justice36. To agree to identify

themselves as Bengali would also mean forfeiting and disregarding their ancestral and historical

roots as native people to Rakhine, resulting in the permanent forfeiture of their right to self-

determination. Even if individuals are willing to agree to these asymmetric terms, the Rohingyas

would still have to shoulder the onerous burden of proof to provide documentary or oral evidence

that they have ancestors that resided on the land on which they are living on. This requirement is a

near impossible task given both the process of fluid and erratic citizenship registration under the

British that had resulted in the destruction (or non-existence) of documentation37.

Taken at its face value, the olive fig offered by the Burmese state is actually a masked attempt

at permanent segregation and purging of the Rohingya people, and it is no surprise that most

Rohingyas refuse to agree to such onerous terms for access to partial citizenship. In its attempt to

survey and regulate the state, Myanmar’s government has imposed two added structural pressures

to force Rohingyas to identify and register themselves as Bengali – a clear anti-thesis and a paradox

35 Holliday, Ian. "National Unity Struggles in Myanmar: A Degenerate Case of Governance for Harmony in Asia." Asian Survey 47, no. 3 (2007): 374-392. 36 Holliday, Ian. "Addressing Myanmar's Citizenship Crisis." Journal of Contemporary Asia 44, no. 3 (2014): 404-421. 37 Ibid.



of its road towards democratic transition. First, the provision of the 1982 law denies citizenship to

children born to non-citizens. This would place a moral pressure on Rohingya women to register

themselves as naturalized (Bengali) citizens in the hopes of ensuring that their children will have

access to state services such as education and healthcare38. Second, border guards policing the IDP

camps have been reported to violently coerce Rohingyas to begin the citizenship registration

process. Any Rohingya that refused to comply would often be suspected and charged of Islamist

militant activities39. However, the Rohingya are led and coerced into a position that's in between a

rock and a hard place – on one hand, the state (heeding calls by the international community to

address asymmetric human rights) is aggressively pushing the Rohingyas to agree to naturalized

citizenship, a push that continues to be rejected by most Rohingyas. On the other hand, the process

by which the Rohingyas are to seek citizenship is so onerous, that many do not, and will not qualify

for registration in the first place, rendering Myanmar’s offer of naturalized citizenship an empty

promise. Coupled with this false promise is the continued outbreak of sporadic violence against the

Rohingyas by local Buddhists and law enforcement officials. These officials often confiscate or

revoke the identity cards held by naturalized Rohingyas, rendering them without the citizenship

documentation necessary to start the process of citizenship registration, forcing them into a position

of permanent statelessness40. Given the rampant corruption and autonomy devolved to local law

enforcement officials, there is little to no checks on this discretionary and arbitrary use of power

against the Rohingya41. As a result, there will continue to be a permanent ghettoization of most of

Rakhine’s Rohingyas in IDP camps, mired by perpetual poverty and draconian state policies and

prejudices that will continue to deprive them of the benefits of Myanmar’s democratic transition. 38 Kashyap, Aruna. Burma’s Bluff on the Two-Child Policy for Rohingyas. June 21, 2013. http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/21/burma-s-bluff-two-child-policy-rohingyas (accessed March 14, 2015). 39 Human Rights Watch. "All You Can Do Is Pray": Crimes Against Humanity and Ethinic Cleansing of Rohingya Muslims in Burma's Arakan State. New York: Human Rights Watch, 2013. 40 Dinmore, Guy. Uncertain future for hundreds of thousands as white cards are revoked. April 1, 2015. http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/13852-uncertain-future-for-hundreds-of-thousands-as-white-cards-are-revoked.html (accessed April 2, 2015). 41 Holliday, Ian. "Myanmar in 2012: Toward a Normal State." Asian Survey 53, no. 1 (2013): 93-100.



Conclusion

Structurally and systematically prejudiced and marginalized, Myanmar’s Rohingya people

continue to face both a certain and uncertain future. Their asymmetric deprivation of access to

citizenship registration and rights continue to mire them a state of perpetual statelessness and

despair. This identification as stateless persons translates into their permanent residence in IDP

camps, where Burmese law enforcement officials wield full discretion over their fate. The

Rohingyas plight is further exacerbated by the fact that international humanitarian relief efforts and

attempts to exert normative and moral pressure on Thein Sein’s government are hamstrung both by

the principle of state sovereignty, as well as Myanmar’s strict refusal or regulation of foreign

humanitarian missions. Ironically, Myanmar’s democratic transitions (at least with respect to the

Rohingyas) seem to constitute more of a bane than a boon. Hardline Buddhist fundamentalists such

as Ashin Wirathu who enjoy the backing of the state continue to have the free hand to ruthlessly

exploit the democratic tenets of free speech and civil liberties, perpetuating systemic violence

against the Rohingya. Stupefied by the unintended blowback of their efforts to push Myanmar

towards a democratic path, the international community continues to be bewildered by the scale and

extent of Thein Sein’s purging of the Rohingya, all under the guise of the mantra of democratic

transition. Moving forward, it seems that the burden now rests on both Burmese civil society and

the international community to somehow manipulate Keck and Sikkink’s concept of transnational

advocacy networks to achieve a substantial breakthrough in the Rohingya’s statelessness and moral

impasse. Efforts must be undertaken to address the apparent democratic paradox, because given the

status quo, it seems ironical that military-authoritarian rule, at least in relation to the Rohingya’s

situation, seems to be a system of governance that should be preferred, given its ability to accord

the Rohingyas some substantial degree of protection against asymmetric violence and hardline

prejudices.

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