Provincial Government in South Africa

16–18 August 2000Holiday Inn Garden Court

Umtata

Introduction 5Ms Xoliswa Jozana, Head of Department, Department of Political Science, University of the Transkei (Unitra)

Welcoming Remarks 7Dr Michael Lange, Resident Representative, Konrad Adenauer Foundation

Opening Remarks 11Ms Xoliswa Jozana, Head of Department, Department of Political Science, University of the Transkei (Unitra)

Opening Remarks 15Prof. Peggy Nomfundo Luswazi, Registrar Academic, Unitra

Keynote Address: Provincial Government in South Africa 17Mr Zam Titus, Director General, Ministry of Provincial and Local Government

International Perspectives on the Allocation of Powers Between the 21Tiers of Government: The Case of NigeriaProf. Jerry Kuye, School of Public Management and Administration, University of Pretoria

Intergovernmental Relations in South Africa: A Comparative Analysis 25Mr Rashid Kalema, School of Government, University of Western Cape

Provincial Government in South Africa Since 1994 37Dr David Pottie, Electoral Institute of South Africa

Igoli 2002: Towards a Megacity Government 49Mr Sam Kongwa, Department of Political Studies, Unitra

Table of Contents

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Public Participation in Provincial Legislative Processes in South Africa 53Dr Greg Houston, Human Science Research Council

Accommodating Groupism in a Liberal Democratic Dispensation 71Dr Eric Labuschagne, Department of Political Studies, Unitra

The Impact of Constitutional Relationships Between the Three Spheres of Government: 77The South African PerspectiveMr Sitembe Msaseni, Department of Political Science and Public Administration,University of Port Elizabeth

Transformational Challenges in Provincial Administration 85Mr Masilo Mabeta, United Democratic Movement

The IFP Perspective on Provincial Government 89Minister Narend Singh, Inkatha Freedom Party

Prospecting for Productivity: Enhancing Good Governance in the Provinces 97Dr Heather Nel, School of Public Administration and Management, University of Port Elizabeth

Prospects for Provincial Government in South Africa: The Way Forward 107Dr Mohammed Sutry, National Council of Provinces

Transparency International and the Fight Against Corruption 111Ms Gladwell Otieno, Transparency International, Germany

Programme 117

Participants’ List 119

Seminar Reports 123

Occasional Paper Series 125

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Table of Contents

The adoption of a political dispensation that could provide for the dispersal of political authority fromthe center to regional areas was a compromise reached by the negotiating parties before the 1994 elec-tions in South Africa. Prior to that compromise, the African National Congress (ANC) favoured astrong central government, while the National Party advocated the devolution of strong powers to theregions.

During the constitutional negotiations, an agreement was reached on the decentralisation of governmentthereby giving significant powers to the regions. Strong regional governments were agreed on in orderto encourage democratic participation, promote local initiatives and foster a redistribution of resourcesand economic development. Nine provinces were identified based on economic, social and populationcriteria.

South Africa, like Yugoslavia, is characterised by significant territorially defined communal diversitiesof, for example, culture, language, ethnicity as well as economic disparities. Historically, pluralist soci-eties such as the United States, Switzerland and India opted for such devolution of power to states,regions or provinces so as to bring about national unity. National unity and political stability wereequally influential in persuading the ANC leadership to agree to decentralisation of power to theprovinces.

It is against this background that the need to evolve special arrangements to accommodate regionalinterests and demands for regional autonomy was recognised by the ANC government. However, thedivision of political authority and the distribution of political responsibilities as they relate to the twolevels of government – central and provincial – have not been entrenched in the Constitution. SouthAfrica’s provincial governments have little autonomy and indeed are weak in relation to the powers ofthe national government. All the provinces possess legislatures, cabinets and premiers that are con-cerned with local affairs such as education, health services, highways, tourism and fish and game. Thepublic demand for services far outstrips the financial ability of both the provinces and the ailing localgovernments, particularly in the poorest of these provinces, the Eastern Cape. The performance ofmany of these provinces, therefore, has a mixed record.

The Department of Political Studies, in collaboration with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, organiseda conference on intergovernmental relations to address the problems that confront the system of provin-cial government in South Africa. The international conference entitled Provincial Government in SouthAfrica took place in Umtata, Eastern Cape from 16 to 18 August 2000. This provided a forum for acad-emics, non-governmental organisations, politicians, political parties and government representatives toshare perspectives on the provincial system of government in South Africa.

The conference aimed at stimulating debate on the role and future of the provincial governments inSouth Africa and at generating proposals for capacity building and/or alternatives to the present politi-

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Introduction

cal dispensation. The papers were a blend of theoretical and practical contributions to the ongoingdebate around ways of ensuring efficiency, democracy and more responsive governments in theprovinces. The conference therefore provided a forum to take a fresh look at the Constitution and tofind a new balance in intergovernmental relations.

Some of the key questions that the conference hoped to address were the following: How can thecapacity of these provinces be enhanced to ensure delivery at this level of government? Are the provin-cial governments strong and competent to supervise and control local governments? Is the system ofprovincial government costly and wasteful in view of the duplication of political structures and func-tions? How can the system be modified in order to make it efficient and cost effective? More impor-tantly, is there an evident shift in South Africa from a quasi-federal structure to a more federal or moreunitary form of government?

Ms Xoliswa JozanaHead of Department, Department of Political Science, University of the Transkei (Unitra)

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Introduction

INTRODUCTIONOn behalf of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation(KAF), I would like to extend a warm welcometo you all. This is now the fifth conferenceKAF has organised jointly with the Universityof the Transkei’s (Unitra’s) Department ofPolitical Studies.

The forthcoming deliberations will focus onan issue which is of particular significance toKAF, since questions relating to the role ofprovincial governments in the new democraticdispensation of South Africa have formed partand parcel of KAF’s ongoing involvement inthe consolidation of new political dispensa-tions, not only in South Africa but around theworld.

1. A BRIEF BACKGROUNDFor those wondering what kind of organisationKAF is, allow me to sketch a brief backgroundto the German political foundations and to out-line some of the reasoning behind KAF’sinvolvement in academic endeavours of thisnature.

The German political foundations are aunique feature of today’s democratic culture inGermany. The move behind their creation –which dates back to the 1960s – was the expec-tation that political and civic education wouldhelp develop and consolidate democracy inpost-war Germany.

Both in Germany and abroad, these founda-tions seek to further develop and encouragepeople to engage in political debate, therebystrengthening democracy and promoting a plu-ralistic society. By engaging in a variety ofactivities, they help to strengthen the concept

of human rights, assist economic developmentas well as help to implement social justice andthe rule of law.

KAF is one of six political foundations inGermany today and is closely affiliated to theChristian Democratic Union Party – a centristpolitical party founded after the Second WorldWar. It proudly bears the name of one of itsfounding members, Konrad Adenauer, whosubsequently became the first Chancellor ofpost-war Germany.

The international activities of KAF are root-ed in the Christian concept of human nature.By advocating Christian values, the Foundationis helping to establish Christian Democraticprinciples not only in Germany, but worldwide.

KAF has been cooperating with partnersthroughout the world for almost 40 years.Currently, some 80 colleagues oversee some200 projects and programmes in more than 100countries. In this way, KAF makes a uniquecontribution to policies serving peace and jus-tice in international relations.

2. KAF IN SOUTH AFRICAKAF currently has wide-ranging programmesin different parts of Africa, as well as in thedifferent provinces of South Africa. TheFoundation cooperates with centrist politicalparties and their respective think-tanks, as wellas with reputable education and research insti-tutions, as witnessed by today’s event.

Since the beginning of our involvement inSouth Africa we have actively participated inprojects concentrating on, among other things,constitutional development at federal, provin-cial and local levels.

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Welcoming Remarks

Michael Lange

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Lange

A large number of the Johannesburg office’sresearch and seminar publications have tackledconstitutional issues, as can be noted from thetitles of some of these publications:• Implementing Federalism in the Final

Constitution of South Africa• The Final Constitution of South Africa: Local

Government Provisions and theirImplications

• Future Challenges for Local Government inthe 21st Century

• Local-Provincial Government Relations• The Constitutional Basis of Local

Government• Constitution and Law• Subnational Constitutional Governance

3. FEDERALISMGermany is a federal state. During the KemptonPark negotiations, we believed strongly that thenew South Africa could gain from our experi-ence with a federal system of governance.

This conviction formed the basis of a stronginteraction ever since between the German gov-ernmental aid agencies – such as the GermanAgency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) – andother semi- or non-governmental bodies – suchas the German political foundations – the aimof which was to provide knowledge and experi-ence with our particular form of federalism.

The new constitutional system of SouthAfrica designed at the Kempton Park confer-ence and further refined in the ConstitutionalAssembly at Cape Town is, in the end, a decen-tralised system of government, i.e., a systemwith certain federal characteristics.

At the Kempton Park constitutional negotia-tions it was clear that the new provinces had tohave some measure of legislative authority.Some parties argued for more powers for theprovinces while others were more centralisti-cally inclined.

The result of this debate was an agreementthat provinces should have a list of legislativepowers concurrent with the national govern-ment. This new concept in South African con-stitutional law, namely concurrency, has sincebecome an essential element of South Africa’snew constitutional system.

4. CONCURRENCYConcurrency is a concept that is accepted insome other decentralised or federal systems,

such as Canada and Germany. South Africa –as a result of well-intentioned advice – hasdeveloped a rather unique political dispensationwith much less provincial powers than is thecase in the Federal Republic of Germany. Thismight explain the fact that the application ofconcurrency in South Africa is fraught withproblems.

The new South African Constitution envis-ages the development of legislation in the con-current field in a manner based on sharedresponsibility between national and provincialgovernments.

The practice in South Africa, however, oftencreates the impression that national Parliamentis very active in the concurrent field, while thevarious provincial legislatures have only passeda limited number of laws on concurrent matters.It can therefore be argued that provinces haveup to now not fully utilised their constitutional-ly allocated legislative authority.

A reason for this may be found in the limiteddrafting capacity of provinces compared toother spheres of government.

We know that finding the required number ofqualified people needed to run a decentralised,more federal system of governance – with itsdifferent tiers of government – is not an easytask, especially looking at the circumstancesprevailing in South Africa. We have thereforebeen providing expertise from Germany in allmatters concerning cooperative governance, aswell as training for a number of differentgroups of government officials in all spheres ofgovernment.

CONCLUSIONGermany, with its federal approach to gover-nance, sets a reasonably good example infavour of provincial autonomy regarding thedefinition of rights and responsibilities, espe-cially in areas of particular provincial concern,such as cultural affairs, education and taxation.

Germany’s federal system is, however, notperfect – and this has become more apparentover the past couple of years.

Improvements also need to be made in SouthAfrica. A recently published report by theMinister of Provincial and Local Governmentchallenges the state to reassess the roles,responsibilities and relationships between theprovinces and the national government.

Several aspects of the current system of co-

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Lange

operative governance in South Africa havecome under scrutiny and certain suggestionshave been forwarded.

A case in point is the power of taxation,where the report concluded that, “… increasedtaxation powers at provincial level could helpenhance accountability at the margin forprovincial expenditures …”

Another point has been the effectiveness ofthe National Council of Provinces (NCOP) andthe suggestion that the NCOP needs to carryout its oversight function more competently andeffectively.

Criticism was also expressed about the effi-cacy of the intergovernmental forum which, thereport says, “… has failed as a multilateral,intergovernmental policy planning body upon

whom government could rely for support,advice and the implementation of its develop-ment programme”.

This symposium is designed not only to stim-ulate debate on the role of provincial govern-ments in the current South African constitution-al framework, but also to answer the difficultquestion as to the extent to which a provincialconstitutional framework may or may not giveexpression to a particular view regarding therights and responsibilities of the citizens inquestion.

Let these proceedings be KAF’s humble con-tribution to the resolution of all these difficultchallenges. I wish you fruitful deliberations andhope you find the forthcoming dialogue inspir-ing and worthwhile.

INTRODUCTIONThe theme of this year’s conference focuses onperspectives on the provincial system of gov-ernment. The conference aims at stimulatingdebate on the role and future of the system ofprovincial government and at generating pro-posals for capacity building and/or alternativesto the present political dispensation. It is hopedthat the conference offers a forum in which the-oretical and practical contributions to the ongo-ing debate about the ways of ensuring efficien-cy, democracy and more responsive govern-ments in the provinces can be made. The con-ference is also an opportunity to take a freshlook at the Constitution and the way in which itcan provide a new balance in intergovernmen-tal relations.

1. INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONSLet me take this opportunity to make a fewobservations about intergovernmental relationsin general, and South Africa’s provincial sys-tem in particular.

The provincial system of government as apower-sharing formula can be seen as ananswer to debilitating obstacles to progress inthe social, economic and political spheres. Ithas been perceived elsewhere as the mostviable formula for sustaining the ideology ofdiversity in unity. The true genius of powersharing among the levels of government there-fore lies in the ability to reconcile diversity inunity.

The provincial system of government has anumber of advantages in terms of governance,management of the economy and democraticlife. Its major objective is to ensure that all citi-

zens have, to the greatest possible extent,access to public services of comparable andoptimal quality. However, it is important thateach province has the means to pursue thisquest for quality in its own way. That requiresinnovative and creative redistribution mecha-nisms to benefit even the less wealthyprovinces.

2. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES Productive intergovernmental relations must bebased upon certain principles and I proposefour fundamental principles:• Cooperation. More often than not, it is

important to cooperate because governmentjurisdictions touch on each other in almost allsectors of activity. The need for cooperationis obvious for purposes of pooling resourcesand talents to achieve national objectives.

• Fairness. For intergovernmental relations toyield positive results, there must be a mea-sure of redistribution among the constituententities of the system so that even the lesswealthy provinces are able to provide theircitizens with services of acceptable quality.

• Exchange of information and communica-tion. Exchanging information allows the constituent units of the political system tocompare their performance, assess theirrespective initiatives and establish a healthyemulation. Communication is essential foreffective public service and enhances therelations among the three levels of govern-ment. A communication breakdown betweenthe different spheres of government in SouthAfrica has been identified as the cause ofpoor relations among the three levels, result-

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Opening Remarks

Xoliswa Jozana

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Jozana

ing in uncoordinated programmes and poli-cies.

• Transparency. Transparency enables the pub-lic to be aware of the respective contributionsof the different governments. The publicmust be able to assess the performance ofeach province. The need for transparency inthe system is to gain trust with the public ser-vants that administer programmes and pro-vide funding for contracted services.

3. DIVERSITYThe reality of the diversities of culture, lan-guage and ethnicity must have been at the heartof the adoption of the formula of power sharingbetween the central government and the nineprovinces in South Africa. Historically, plural-ist societies such as the United States, India andSwitzerland opted for the devolution of powerto states, regions or provinces in order to bringabout national unity. National unity and politi-cal stability were equally influential when themajor parties in the negotiation process inSouth Africa agreed on the decentralisation ofpower to the provinces. This was a compromisereached by the negotiating parties before the1994 elections. Non-racial regional govern-ments were agreed on in order to encouragedemocratic participation, to promote local ini-tiatives and to foster redistribution of resourcesand economic development. The nine regionswere identified on the basis of economic, socialand population criteria.

4. WEAKNESSES OF THE SYSTEMThe assumption behind the adoption of the sys-tem of provincial government in South Africawas that the subnational units would performcertain functions more effectively than thenational government. Provinces are responsiblefor delivery while the national governmentretains responsibility for norms and standards.The provincial governments, however, operateas implementing agencies for central govern-ment.

Cheema and Rondinelli in a book entitledDecentralisation and Development PolicyImplementation in Developing Countriesobserve:

“In more than a few countries decentralisa-tion may have been seen as a convenientway for national leaders to rid themselvesof responsibility for regional and local gov-

ernment development problems by transfer-ring them to local units of government. Thispertains to a situation whereby responsibili-ties are assigned to provinces withoutaccompanying funding better known as‘unfunded mandates’.”

In other words, they are given tasks by the cen-tral government without the money to performthem. Consequently, the provinces are veryweak and unable to provide effective service totheir communities. The weak and non-viablesubnational governments have given rise to thedebate on their relevance to South Africa’spolitical system or, put bluntly, whether SouthAfrica needs them or not.

The provincial administrations are costly andcomplex and the public demand for services faroutstrips the financial ability of the provinces.They lack money to finance programmes andofficials are poorly trained and, in someprovinces, corruption is rife. Mismanagement,corruption, waste and inefficiency led to theappointment of a commission by formerPresident, Nelson Mandela, to investigate theiroperation.

The report of the Maphai Commission rec-ommended more control by central governmentand a virtual takeover of weak provinces suchas the Eastern Cape. Owing to poor delivery,corruption and mismanagement, the provincesin South Africa have few friends. Some criticshave adopted a radical position to suggest thatthe provincial system is a disaster and must bescrapped.

To suggest that the provincial system must beabandoned is an impractical solution to thereality on the ground in South Africa. Citizengroups at grassroots level have little chance ofbeing heard by the centre and have far betterprospects at the provincial level. Even if SouthAfrica were to switch to a unitary system, someform of regional government offices staffed byofficials would be necessary.

My point of departure in thinking about cen-tral–provincial relations is the primary need forprovision of services to the people. Public ser-vice must be our watchword. The assumptionbehind the provincial system of government, asstated above, is the provision of public services.It is too easy to look at central–provincial gov-ernment relations in terms of concentration ordevolution of power or from the vantage pointof a gain or loss for one level of government.

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Jozana

To view provincial responsibilities in terms ofwho gets what ignores the aspect of public ser-vice. Yet it is the citizens’ health, safety andwelfare that is at stake.

CONCLUSIONI would like to pose a few questions that I hopewill be touched on by the papers at this confer-ence.

How can the capacity of the provinces inSouth Africa be enhanced to ensure delivery atthis level of government?

Are the provincial governments strong andcompetent to supervise and control local gov-ernment?

How can the duplication of functions andresponsibilities be improved? How can the sys-tem be made efficient and cost effective?

INTRODUCTIONOn behalf of the management and universitycommunity I welcome you as distinguishedguests and participants to this meaningful con-ference. In Xhosa we say namkelekile, whichsimply means, you are well received.

Those who have followed the national debatein the media on the future size and shape of ter-tiary institutions in South Africa are aware thatthis conference is taking place at a time whenin the history of higher education, tertiary insti-tutions – especially black institutions – are fac-ing serious challenges with regard to their mis-sions and future identity.

Despite all these problems, the University ofthe Transkei (Unitra) is optimistic and is facingthe future with a problem-solving and forward-thinking attitude. Our planning and actions areguided by Unitra’s new mission which reads:

“Unitra is committed to excellence in pro-viding service to its clientele through opti-mal utilisation of its resources, and in offer-ing relevant and effective teaching, researchand community outreach programmes witha special emphasis on the promotion of sus-tainable rural development.”

This mission is a commitment by this institu-tion to become a major resource centre for thedevelopment of the Eastern Cape.

The university is refocusing its programmesto address through teaching, research and com-munity development activities, the key agendaof the region and province as reflected in theprovincial integrated rural development strate-gy.

You are friends of the Eastern Cape; friendsof Unitra in that your participation in this con-

ference contributes to the fulfilment of thismission.

1. UNITRA–KAF COOPERATIONThis conference is a joint project of theGerman-based Konrad Adenauer Foundation(KAF) and Unitra’s Political Science depart-ment. It is a long time since 1996, when formerUnitra Principal Prof. Moleah and I visited theKAF offices in Johannesburg. The aim of thattrip was to introduce Unitra to KAF and otherGerman foundations. We were exploring possi-bilities of establishing partnerships to fosterUnitra’s development and that of the region.

As a strategy to ensure success of our mis-sion, Prof. Moleah suggested I open the discus-sion in German and that contrary to normalprotocol I should do most of the talking toappeal to the sentiments of our German col-leagues and soften their hearts. I did just that.Indeed, when later Prof. Oseghae, former Headof the Political Science department, put for-ward a proposal for financing an annual confer-ence, he found soft ground. All three confer-ences that have taken place so far have put ourPolitical Science department on the academicand political map of this province, this countryand indeed the world.

In my view, KAF deserves to be thanked forcontributing to Unitra’s development in the fol-lowing ways:• The conference has promoted national and

international networking and has made a dif-ference to the political and academic land-scape of the province. We always look for-ward to this annual event.

• The inter-party political debate which is

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Opening Remarks

Peggy Nomfundo Luswazi

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Luswazi

always an integral part of the programmecontributes towards the peace dialogue. AsAlfonso Cabal in his book The University asan Institute Today writes: “Relations amongpeople are closer if they become dialogues.” Imust admit that there was a time during theanti-apartheid struggle when foreign organi-sations such as KAF were looked upon withsuspicion by those engaged in the struggle,including myself. But engaging in opendebate and dialogue at this conference means,in the words of Alfonso Cabal, that we “sub-ordinate the stubborn and egoistic intereststhat often convert dialogues into quarrels andwe elevate them to shared values and aims”.This must be done since, as Cabal concludes,“dialogue can make hostile elements agreeharmoniously and efficiently”.

• We also recognise that KAF and all speakersat this conference are here to promote scien-tific knowledge production. The Germanword for science is wissenschaft. Literally, itmeans knowledge creation or production.Wissen means knowledge and schaiffenmeans to create or produce. Two Germanauthors, Martin Thunert and Sylvia Neuner,explain that politics is a field which constant-ly needs new ideas and concepts in order totackle complex and urgent tasks facing theworld. This conference then becomes a plat-form for an exchange of ideas between science – the politically interested publicespecially in the province and those engagedin political practice. Unitra’s PoliticalScience department then serves as a politicalthink-tank to assist in preparing decisionmakers for the process of decision making onkey issues in our society.

• Having worked for development agencies inthe past, when I hear the term “developmentaid” I foresee problems because foreign aideasily creates dependence and can stifledevelopment. To the German developmentscientist O. Odenstedt, aid between material-ly unequal partners is meaningful if it helpspeople to help themselves.

2. HOPES AND EXPECTATIONSFinally, allow me to say a word about the hopesand expectations of ordinary citizens and laypeople like myself, on this conference and its

theme of provincial governance. Our hopeswere raised in 1993/94 by political scientistsand politicians who promised and assured us ofthe following:• That it is much easier for a country with a

federal structure as opposed to a centralisedstate to take account of regional problems,and this appealed to many. Grassroots organi-sations expected they would have a greatersay in the affairs of the province.

• That a federal structure binds the country’sexternal unity with internal diversity.

• That a federal structure enhances our engage-ment in the political process through regionaland local elections which are easier to under-stand and identify with.

Although we note all these advantages, weordinary people lack differentiated terms of ref-erence to guide us in analysing how well orbadly our province is faring in comparison toother provinces or to provincial systems else-where. All we read and hear about is chaos,corruption, etc. But is the story as simple asthat, or are the provincial problems so complexthat they need a more sophisticated analysis inorder to enable us to arrive at workable solu-tions? We do not know, for instance, to whatextent our province participates in the nationallegislative process. In the field of education weare certainly more aware of national thanprovincial legislature. Is this because there areno education laws passed at provincial level?Whether this marks a strength or a weakness, Icannot tell.

CONCLUSIONWe have also read that the province takesresponsibility and implements national policiesand laws, for example, the planning of buildingprojects. I therefore become concerned when,travelling, for example, to Bisho or Libode, Isee new settlements of crowded, tiny match boxhouses with no space for gardens: I see ourrural landscape change to slums under the newdispensation. To me, this is a contradiction. Butto whom do I direct my complaint, who is toblame? Is it the province, national policy or pri-vate industry?

We hope this conference will lead us toanswers on aspects such as these. We wish youfruitful deliberations in the days ahead.

INTRODUCTIONThere is much debate around the issue ofprovinces in South Africa. Some have the viewthat we do not need provinces and others ques-tion the number of provinces we have in thecountry. Others raise issues related to function-al allocation, service delivery, mismanagement,etc. There is also the view that we shouldswitch over to a unitary system – for ours is aquasi-federal system.

All these questions arise because we have avibrant democracy which allows for freedom ofexpression. In order for us to understand fullythe debate surrounding provinces, we need tounderstand the constitutional responsibilities ofprovinces.

Our provinces are a creature of statute.Initially, provision for the establishment ofprovinces was embodied in the 1993 InterimConstitution. Thereafter, the ConstitutionalAssembly conducted an in-depth study into thegovernmental system that would serve ourcountry into the new millennium.

The Constitutional Assembly considerednumerous issues as well as reviewing the sys-tems currently in use around the world. Thereports of the various theme committees wereunanimous that we should establish a three-tiersystem, which ensures that government isbrought closer to the people.

The issue for government is therefore notabout whether or not we should haveprovinces, it is more about ensuring thatprovinces are properly capacitated so that theycan give full effect to their constitutional man-date. This standpoint led to President Mbeki –in June 1999 – establishing a new Ministry for

Provincial and Local Government. When onefocuses on the role of provinces one can there-fore not analyse this in isolation from thebroader challenges facing government.

When delivering his 2000 budget speech inParliament, Minister Mufamadi stated:

“The issue of governance continues toengage the minds of practitioners andscholars all over the world. The first fiveyears of democratic governance in ourcountry has given us a basis to test the via-bility of theories, systems and structureswhich are germane to this issue. There is noterminus, where, as practitioners, we sitback and proclaim that our democracy isfinally developed to perfection. In humanaffairs there are always new issues to con-front, new methods to apply and newinsights to discover.”

1. THE PRESIDENT’S COORDINATING COUNCILIt was as a result of the continuing need for usto examine the system of government that, onthe 15 October 1999, the President, the pre-miers of the nine provinces and the Minister forProvincial and Local Government, agreed thatthe President’s Coordinating Council (PCC) beestablished.

The Council will not replace the Ministersand Members of the Executive Council(Minmecs). Minmecs have an important sec-toral function and will continue to deal with thedetail of policy and its implementation. TheCouncil, on the other hand, discusses frame-work and transversal issues impacting onenhancing development, strengthening theinstitutions of governance and improving the

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Keynote Address: Provincial Government in South Africa

Zam Titus

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Titus

quality of service delivery. It will be supportedby a forum of provincial director-generals andrelevant national director-generals and is con-vened by the Director-General for Provincialand Local Government.

Among other things, the Council addressesthe following issues:• Enhancing the ability of provincial execu-

tives to make an impact on the elaboration ofnational policies.

• Strengthening the capacity of provincial gov-ernments to implement government policiesand programmes.

• Integrating provincial growth and develop-ment strategies within the national develop-ment plans.

• Improving cooperation between the nationaland provincial spheres of government withregard to the strengthening of local govern-ment.

• Improving cooperation with regard to fiscalissues.

• Enhancing cooperation with regard to theinstitutionalisation of a cooperative relation-ship between the elected institutions and thestructures of traditional leadership.

• Ensuring that there are coordinated pro-grammes of implementation and the estab-lishment of the necessary structures withregard to such issues as rural development,urban renewal, safety and security, etc.

• Increasing the possibility for all citizens tointeract with all spheres of government toensure that our system of governance func-tions in a manner which empowers citizens.

2. COOPERATIVE GOVERNMENTOne may ask what the character of the SouthAfrican state is: the answer might be found insection 46 of the Constitution.

The Constitution creates a system of govern-ment based on the three spheres of government:national, provincial and local government. Eachhas legislative and executive powers within itsown functional area, although the bulk of thesepowers are exercised concurrently betweennational and provincial government ordevolved to local government.

These spheres of government are not inde-pendent of each other, rather they are depen-dent and interrelated yet functionally distinc-tive. Each sphere of government is specificallydirected by the Constitution, among other

things, to preserve peace, the national unity andthe indivisibility of the Republic of SouthAfrica. Moreover, the fiscal regime of thecountry ensures equitable allocations for eachsphere of government within a framework oftight fiscal discipline.

Some would call this structural arrangementquasi-federalism. In South Africa it goes by thename of cooperative government. Cooperativegovernment is a product of the political forces,the history and the aspirations of SouthAfricans. The principles of cooperative gover-nance enable the three spheres to cooperate soas to ensure, among others, coordination, shar-ing of resources and the involvement of localcommunities.

Given the challenge of reconstructing a coun-try divided for hundreds of years on the basis ofrace, ethnicity, ideology and wealth, any blue-print for government necessarily had to balancedecentralisation and political competition withcommon citizenship, national unity and a singlegovernment, thus heralding the development ofthe country. Cooperative government seeks toachieve unity of vision, destiny and purpose,even as it recognises diversity of interest andopinion.

Cooperation, it can then be said, is one of thecentral pillars of the South African constitution-al order. The will to cooperate, it may be fur-ther argued, is the impetus that was needed todeliver the South Africa of today from hostility,conflict and stagnation. Arguably too, coopera-tion characterises the way in which governmentgoverns, as well as the institutional and policyarchitecture in key areas such as macro-eco-nomic policy and regional and internationalrelations. The Government of National Unity(GNU) was an experimental form of coopera-tive government.

Cooperation does not mean acquiescenceagreement on everything or absence of dis-agreement or subversion of valid viewpoints toa dominant viewpoint. Nor is it a counterpointto strong political and economic leadership. Allof these are accommodated within the Consti-tution by principles such as multi-party democ-racy, and independent institutions such as theHuman Rights Commission, etc.

3. THREE SPHERES OF GOVERNMENTThe spheres of government must be understoodto be component parts of a larger single body,

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the government of the Republic of SouthAfrica. This is clearly pronounced in the found-ing provisions of the Constitution through thestatement that “the Republic of South Africa isone, sovereign, democratic state…” (Section 1).

The preference for the word “sphere”, asopposed to “tier”, was premised on a deliberateattempt to ensure that all levels of governmentwere accorded equal status and treatment. TheConstitution deliberately refers to the term“spheres”, as the term “tiers” would emphasisethe existence of a hierarchical relationshipbetween the three levels of government, withlocal government occupying the lowest rung.We cannot, however, deny – and mustacknowledge – the existence of a hierarchy ofsorts in our system of government as expressedin the monitoring, support and supervision sec-tions of the Constitution (sections 100, 125[3],139, 154[1] and 155[6]). What the Constitutionattempts to emphasise is the need for coopera-tive government as stipulated in Chapter 3.

The existence of the three spheres in SouthAfrica is fact. When analysing the role andplace of provinces in our system of governance,we have to bear in mind that provinces do notexist independently from the other spheres.

Our Constitution assigns to provinces a num-ber of strategic functions regarding the ongoingevolution of local government. The role ofprovincial governments in this regard includes:• A strategic role: Provinces have to develop a

vision and a framework for integrated eco-nomic, social and community development inthe province through the respective provin-cial growth and development strategies.

• A development role: Provincial governmentsshould ensure that municipal planning andbudgetary processes give priority to the basicneeds of the community and promote socialand economic development.

• An intergovernmental role: Provincial gov-ernments should establish forums andprocesses for the purpose of including localgovernment and traditional leaders in deci-sion making.

• A regulatory role: Section 155(7) of theConstitution gives national and provincialgovernments the legislative and executiveauthority to see to the effective performanceby municipalities of their functions throughlegislative and other means.

• An institutional development and capacity

building role: Provincial governments estab-lish municipalities, and are enjoined by sec-tion 155(6) of the Constitution to promote thedevelopment of local government capacity toenable municipalities to perform their func-tions and manage their own affairs. Theseresponsibilities give provincial governmentan important role in the institutional develop-ment of municipalities.

• A fiscal role: Provincial governments play arole in monitoring the financial status ofmunicipalities through the provincial taskteams implementing project viability.

• A monitoring role: Provincial governmentshave a key role in monitoring local govern-ment in order to ensure that high standards ofpublic service and good government aremaintained.

• An intervention role: Provincial governmentsare given powers to intervene in the affairs oflocal government so as to protect and pro-mote minimum standards of local govern-ment service delivery and ensure that localgovernment fulfils its constitutional mandate.

What is the role of premiers? It is important tostate that municipalities are required to workwith provincial and national government inorder to enhance the effectiveness of provincialand local programmes.

South Africa, like all other developing coun-tries, is faced with a number of challenges. Insome instances, when searching for solutions,we tend to focus on our constitutional struc-tures. Sometimes we tend to forget that the pri-mary challenge is to capacitate those who are ingovernment and promote accountability.

What does this entail for an institution suchas the University of Transkei (Unitra)? Is thecurriculum at Unitra meant to address thedevelopment needs of the Eastern CapeProvince? Are there any university programmesspecifically targeting the capacity needs of theprovince? What about legislative drafting?Does the university have any project meant topromote good governance and to facilitatedebate on complex and intricate issues such asthe monitoring and supervision framework forSouth Africa; the challenges arising from glob-alisation; the national overrides and the func-tional allocation as provided for in schedules 4and 5?

Our academic institutions have a greaterresponsibility that transcends pure analytical

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work. We have to ask ourselves a number ofsearching and pointed questions – what can wedo to assist this province and the rest of thecountry in deepening constitutional democracy,enhancing good governance and promoting anenvironment which will bring about stabilityand prosperity. What work can an institution ofthis nature do to foster cooperative governmentand strengthen our complex system of intergov-ernmental fiscal relations, particularly issuesrelating to the vertical split of revenue collectednationally.

A doctor friend of mine often says that if anypart of your body gives you a problem, itshould simply be chopped off. The continuedexistence or desirability of any constitutionalstructure cannot be decided upon simply on thebasis of its current performance. As ourPresident said: “the system of governance weare working to create is radically different fromthe one we inherited.” Let us all bear in mindthat our nascent democracy is six years old andwe also have to acknowledge that there is ayawning gap between theory and practice.

Today, unlike yesteryear, we are aware thatsome provinces lack the capability to monitor,support and supervise local government effec-tively, either due to their lack of capacity orabsence of resources to do so. So what we maywant to look at are the options/strategies avail-able to overcome this. We are also aware thatsome political commentators and politicianshave suggested that provincial governmentsneed more powers if they are to be effective.While we should all be willing to entertainthese debates, we must, collectively, first assesswhether or not provinces have the capacity toexecute the current functions they enjoy.

CONCLUSIONAccruing from the experience of the past sixyears of democratic government, we haveacquired a better understanding of how best to

optimise the work of our institutions of govern-ment. We have been able to identity weakness-es in the system; inasmuch as we have identi-fied strengths and opportunities. So, when weconsider the weaknesses in the provincial sys-tem of government, we must do so havingfocused on the entirety of our system of gover-nance.

Our governance system is presently beingreviewed, and we are looking at this challengebearing in mind that governance institutions theworld over, are restructuring to meet the chal-lenge of the 21st century. We are also awarethat the global trends towards the restructuringof governance take place within the parenthesisof the twin pressures of globalisation anddecentralisation.

Our transformation is informed by the coun-try’s vision as embodied in the South AfricanConstitution, which is to “improve the qualityof life of all citizens and free the potential ofeach person”, and to “build a united and demo-cratic South Africa able to take its rightfulplace as a sovereign state in the family ofnations”. This should serve as our guide in thediscussions about South Africa’s governancesystem and should also apply to the discussionsrelating to the provincial system of govern-ment.

I am convinced that the deliberations that willunfold throughout this conference will con-tribute immensely to the current debates.Indeed, this conference could not have takenplace at a more ideal time. I have no doubt thatour discussions will provide government withsome indication as to how this country’s acade-mic institutions are positioning themselves dur-ing this phase of consolidation.

Let us, together, build a winning nation. Ourcentres of learning have a role to play in thisregard: they must spawn real debate.

I trust that I have sown the seeds of action for– in the end – it is only action that counts.

INTRODUCTIONMilitary regimes should not be tolerated in thepursuit of modern governance. The Nigeriansituation should constitute a lesson for newdemocracies in understanding that the ability toabrogate civil liberties by a handful of “unedu-cated rat packs” should not be allowed.

The disgrace Nigeria faced for the past 30years should not be allowed to repeat itself.The lesson for South Africa is that it must con-tinue to “civilianise” its armed forces and notallow the confines of civil liberties to be takenfor granted. The custodians of civil governancemust be protected within the confines of theconstitution.

These failures and the protracted politicalinstability in Nigeria over the years, led to adominance of the military in the running of thenation. The election of the new government ofPresident Olusegun Obasanjo should constitutethe template for future governments. However,the shape and size of the apparatus of the state,should be addressed. The implications of thethree-tiered governance structure must berevisited. The multiplicity of states must bestopped and the real issue of managing theeconomy should be brought into question. It ison this premise that this paper rests its case.

1. OVERVIEWThe Nigerian Constitution of 1963 existed for alittle over two years before the country wasoverthrown by the military on 15 January 1966.This military incursion into the lives ofNigerians survived for 14 years. The prolifera-tion of states, the prosecutions of the civil warand the commandist hierarchical approach of

the military to governance, all combined to cre-ate considerable standardisation and centralisa-tion. The states were governed, for instance, bymilitary administrators who answered directly,not to the citizens of their states, but to the fed-eral military government at the centre. The cli-max of this standardisation process was thelocal government reform of 1976 which sawthe adoption of a uniform system of local gov-ernment for the whole country, whereas underour democratic system, the form and structureof local government was entirely the responsi-bility of regional or state governments – whichwould have in mind the need of the local gov-ernment system to reflect the diversity withinthe state or region. Also, in 1976, seven newstates were created, bringing the total numberof states to 19.

2. THE CONSTITUTIONS2.1 The 1954 Constitutional frameworkNigeria became a Federation in 1954. ThisConstitution provided for four regions – theNorthern Region, the Western and EasternRegions and a Federal Territory – Lagos. TheConstitution also established a LegislativeHouse and styled the House of Representatives,which also legislated for the Federal Territory.The legislatures of the Northern and WesternRegions were bicameral in nature with eachhaving a House of Assembly and a House ofChiefs. The legislatures of the East and theCameroons were kingship based.

2.2 The 1960 ConstitutionThis is the second schedule of the NigerianConstitution. It marked the dawn of indepen-

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International Perspectives on theAllocation of Powers Between the Tiers

of Government: The Case of Nigeria

Jerry Kuye

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dence from Britain with the parliamentaryIndependence Act of 1960 from the BritishParliament.

2.3 The 1963 Republican ConstitutionThis Constitution lasted for well over two yearsbefore the military overthrew the government.This marked the beginning of the Nigeriandilemma.

2.4 The 1979 Presidential ConstitutionThe 1979 Constitution was produced by aConstituent Assembly and modified by the mil-itary. It was to take effect after almost 14 yearsof military dictatorship, and its aim was to jetti-son the parliamentary system in which colonialNigeria had considerable tutelage, opting forthe executive presidential system, generallyalong the lines of the practice in the UnitedStates.

The Constituent Assembly confirmed by con-stitutional fiat the centralising and standardis-ing propensities of the military. For the firsttime in Nigeria’s federal constitution making,constitutions of the federating states were abol-ished. There was now only one constitution forNigeria and its component states.

Under the new arrangement, it was acceptedthat the structure of the legislature of the states,the structure of the state executive and thestructure of the state courts were all uniformlyregulated by the one constitution of the FederalRepublic of Nigeria (FRN). Even the numberand names of the local governments existing inNigeria were listed in the Constitution, notwith-standing that Section 7 thereof stated that:

“The structure of local government bydemocratically elected local governmentcouncils under this constitution guaranteedthat the government of every state shouldensure their existence under a law, whichprovides for the establishment, structure,composition, finance and functions of suchcouncils.”

The 1979 Constitution made an effort to giveevery Nigerian a sense of belonging and had todo with the composition of federal, state andlocal governments. It was accepted that thecomposition of the local, state and other agen-cies would be structured in such a manner thatthe diversity of Nigeria would be reflected in itsdeliberations.

Strangely enough, this idea did not materi-

alise. It should, however, be noted that sectionS.6 (6)(c) of the Constitution dealing with thefundamental objectives and directives of theprinciples of state policy could be consideredunjust. This was a form of affirmative action.The same principle applied to admission to mil-itary institutions.

With respect to the structure of the FederalExecutive, the Constitution stipulated that thePresident shall appoint at least one ministerfrom each state, who shall be an indigene ofsuch state. But nowhere in the Constitution wasthe word “indigene” defined. Nor was there anyprovision in the Constitution as to conditions tobe fulfilled before a “non-indigene”, howsoeverdefined, could acquire the residency status ofthe state of his/her domicile.

The 1979 Constitution was in operation for alittle over four years before the elected civilianadministration was once again ousted followinganother military coup d’etat. A period of fouryears was hardly enough time to put the Consti-tution to a critical test and to assess fully itsmerits and demerits in terms of promoting“unity in diversity”.

3. THE SECOND MILITARY ERAThe second coming of the military lasted foralmost 15 years (31 December 1983 to 29 May1999). This was a period of hell for the inhabi-tants of Nigeria. It was also a period of confu-sion regarding policy mandates. It marked theblatant abrogation of law and order and the vio-lation of the constitutional rights of mostNigerians.

The 1989 Constitution, which had no lifespan of its own, called for the operational ele-vation of local governance structures as a thirdtier of government. This led to the creation orincrease in state structures from 19 to 21. Thisnumber subsequently increased in 1991 from21 to 30, and finally in 1997 from 30 to 36. Asa result, the federal government grew steadilystronger and the state governments grew steadi-ly weaker throughout the period of militaryrule. Due to the monopoly of power by the mil-itary (now more than 29 years in 39 years ofNigeria’s existence as an independent nation)Nigeria’s history is recorded with painful punc-tuations.

The Constitution also provided for three vice-presidents and for power sharing at the execu-tive level of the federal and state governments.

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It also established a Federal Character Com-mission to elevate the federal character provi-sions of the 1979 Constitution to a level wherethese provisions become justiciable. However,the 1995 Constitution never materialised.

4. THE 1999 PRESIDENTIAL CONSTITUTIONThis Constitution was put into effect on 5 May1999 by a military government. The opinion inNigeria is that the present 1999 Constitutiondoes not address sufficiently the problems ofthe multi-ethnic, multilingual and multireli-gious construct of the Nigerian federation. Thisis evident in the latest series of ethnic clashes inthe north of Nigeria.

Nigeria has today returned to democraticcivilian governance. Most Nigerians believe inthe indivisibility of the Nigerian nation statebased on the principles of freedom, equality,equity and justice for all her citizens asenshrined in the Constitution. Many Nigeriansare optimistic that as the search for “unity indiversity” continues over time, an acceptableconstitutional and conventional arrangementwill evolve, which will satisfactorily addressthe ethnic, cultural, social and religious diversi-ty of the Nigerian population.

5. LOCAL GOVERNMENT RESTRUCTURINGMost Nigerians accept the fact that a dual struc-ture of governance at local level is needed(although this creates a burden on the bureau-cratic structure) and that the procedure for theincorporation of new states should be through areferendum. For a city or town, a two-thirdsmajority in the provincial council – simple inthe State Assembly – should support it; allthese proceeded by a referendum. It is furthercontended that at the administrative level, anadministrator and not a governor should handlethe governance of the state.

5.1 State structureListed below are responsibilities state structuresshould have:• public schools• public health• hospitals (can enter into private sector part-

nership)• emergency medical services (ambulances)• court buildings• building inspections• child protection service

• child support enforcement• pre-trial detention centres• library services• agricultural extension• marriage certificates• birth certificates• death certificates• public school transportation• sheriff (providing public safety to those areas

outside the jurisdiction of incorporated citiesor towns).

5.2 City or townA city or town’s responsibilities include:• building permits• parks and recreation• parking control (vehicle parking spaces)• animal control• business names and business licences• police department• fire service• environmental sanitation• market allocation and development• estate development and town planning• property rates• sewer and water• public works, street cleaning, maintenance,

repairs, potholes, streetlights and outages,traffic signal malfunction.

6. SOME SOLUTIONSThe political landscape of Nigeria can bechanged through political accommodation. Thestate structure needs to be revisited and thenumber of local governments need to bereduced. The capacity to pay and maintainthese structures is not feasible under the currenteconomic set up because the 768 local govern-ment areas in Nigeria would need to be restruc-tured to meet the actual needs of the 36 statestructure.

The past political situation in Nigeria sawitself creating a panacea for the continued inter-ference of civil democratic rights by the mili-tary. Some so-called political scientists, evenrecently, have praised the position of the mili-tary in Nigerian politics. The simple answer isthat they either benefited from the squanderingof the excesses of the military or, they them-selves, were mere admirers of the idea of mili-tary insurrection.

The provision of free primary education inNigeria was a luxury most Nigerians never ben-

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efited from. Although the concept was laud-able, the mechanics at local level were impossi-ble to implement. Healthcare continues to posea problem at local level. Service delivery is leftto local councils and local governments toimplement. The issue here is that the three tiersof government in reality mushroomed into four,with local municipalities unable to deliver tothe people.

On the political front, there needs to be acareful preservation of democratic values. Withthe new government of President OlusegunObasanjo, tactical restructuring of the local tierneeds to be examined. The ability to pay forgoods and services calls into question the via-bility of the existence of most local governmentauthorities.

Some critical issues at all tiers of governmentin Nigeria must be addressed. These include theactual nature of the federal state, the viability ofthe current state structure of 36 and the finan-cial consequences of managing the apparatus ofgovernance. There is also the question of capi-tal expenditure to develop new infrastructuresat the various state levels. Is it wise to continu-ously create states just to address the politicalvolatility in which past and current govern-ments see them? The economic capacity ofmost of these states to function does not exist.As the number of states continues to grow, sowill expectations of the state and local tiers ofgovernment.

The preservation of geo-politics in Nigeria isa recipe for the future breakdown in the abilityof these structures to maintain governing infra-structures. Does Nigeria really need the currentstate structure?

CONCLUSIONAre there failures in the current structure? Thesystem at present comprises federal, state andlocal tiers of government. The complex natureof ethno-politics and geo-economic structuresmakes it almost impossible to address all theneeds of the nation.

If we accept that the functions of local gov-ernment are strictly in the areas of cities andtowns, then it is not surprising to note that mostof the developments and service deliveries arein the capital centres where government oper-ates. The rest of the jurisdictions within thethird tier are left undeveloped. Service deliveryis almost non-existent.

My core opinion is that Nigeria should aban-don the three-tier system and reshape thebureaucracy to a two-tier operation. The costsare minimal and service delivery ability will beincreased.

In a budget speech of 1999, the former Headof State, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, stat-ed:

“In 1999, the Federation Account Revenueis estimated at N262.4 billion. The existingallocation formula will be maintained.Therefore, the federal government willreceive N127.2 billion; states – N63 billion;local government councils – N52.5 billion;the Federal Capital Territory – N2.6 billionand special funds – N17.1 billion” (1999Budget, Nigeria).

Having said this, the economy still experienceda severe shortfall. Therefore, the recipe forgood governance is one that calls into questionthe reality of having multitiered governmentstructures in as complex a society as Nigeria.

REFERENCETHE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC

OF NIGERIA, 1999. Government Printer,Nigeria.

INTRODUCTIONThe size and complexity of most modern statesis such that some form of decentralised or de-concentrated authority is essential. Irrespectiveof the federal or unitary character of a state, thenumber of tiers of authority, the division ofpowers between them and the financialresources they have at their disposal will all, indifferent ways, influence the overall perfor-mance of government both in the advancementof democracy and in the delivery of services.

The new South African Constitution sets outthe structure of the state and delineates, inbroad terms, the responsibilities of the differenttiers of government. As a product of the multi-party negotiations which took place between1992 and 1994, and which aimed to establishas broad a consensual base as possible, the con-stitution provides an enabling framework ratherthan a prescriptive one. Thus, while it specifiesthat certain goals should be pursued, it does notsay how this should happen; in yet otherinstances it simply states that certain policiesmay be followed. Because of this, national leg-islation must be enacted before many of theprovisions of the Constitution can be giveneffect.

The development of an effective system ofintergovernmental relations (IGR) in particularwill need to be supported by appropriate policypronouncements and by legislation. Theprocess, moreover, will be a complex onewhich will entail striking a balance between thetechnical requirements for interaction betweenthe different tiers of the governing hierarchyand the imperatives of political power rela-tions. The development of an operational sys-

tem of IGR will need to accommodate the aspi-rations and vested interests of the different tiersof government and at the same time manageareas of disputes. However, this is a processthat is as likely to be worked out in practice asto be dictated by legislative fiat. In that respect,South Africa has much that it can learn fromthe experiences of countries elsewhere in theworld, since IGR are the subject of contestationand debate in most modern states.

Although South Africa’s history and socialand political economies have given distinctivecharacter to the state, a comparative perspec-tive affords the opportunity to learn, from bothdifferences and similarities, what the possibleconsequences of perusing particular paths inthe development of IGR might be. This is notto suggest just that a comparative perspectivehas been overlooked thus far, but rather thatcomparisons have been drawn from a relativelynarrow range of countries in Europe and NorthAmerica.

This comparative analysis draws from theexperiences of six countries – Mexico, Brazil,Argentina, Spain, India and Malaysia – hithertolittle studied in the South African context. Theyare all, with the exception of Spain, developingcountries that have been through or are under-going periods of transition.

They are all, furthermore, states that haveattempted with varying degrees of success tograpple with and accommodate political andsocial diversity in their intergovernmentalstructures. The discussion in this paper is selec-tive and focuses on a number of key themesrather than a systematic analysis of IGR in thecountries reviewed.

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Intergovernmental Relations in South Africa: A Comparative

Analysis

Rashid Kalema

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1. THE CONCEPT OF IGRThough focusing on local government, Bothaprovides an insightful definition of IGR.

“The concept of intergovernmental relationsassumes importance where there is a divi-sion of powers at both administrative andlegislative levels among different tiers ofgovernment. Put differently, it is creativemechanism to maintain cooperative rela-tionships and coordination among andbetween vertical and horizontal sites”(1996, p. 67).

Looking at the above quotation, we can deducetwo things: first, that the IGR are forms ofinteraction between various levels of govern-ment (vertical interaction) on the one hand andbetween equal governmental jurisdictions (hori-zontal interactions) within a given state.

Second, that the definition alludes to coordi-nation and cooperation as objectives of IGR.Redcliffe-Maud and Wood (1974) offer broaderperspectives of IGR: they include interventions,directions, control and consultations, and thesedo not always enhance coordination or corpora-tion. Instead these elements could work to rein-force subjection of one level of government byanother, or such relations may take the form ofassistance and support of one or more levels byanother, particularly higher level of govern-ment.

There is a tendency to restrict the descriptionof IGR to formal, especially constitutional orlegal, provisions. While these prescribed pat-terns are, however, important, they are almostsupplemented by formal, semiformal and infor-mal relations. IGR have also been classifiedinto constitutional, political and financial rela-tions (Boraine, 1995). Boraine’s reference tothe constitution is important in that the consti-tution is a product of national (central) govern-ment legislature and all levels of governmentare by this fact subject to central government.This implies that provincial and local govern-ments are subordinate to the national govern-ment and their relations reflect this fact. Theposition of central government vis-à-vis otherlevels is the source of much misgiving, suspi-cion, debate and even mischief in IGR (Lungu,1998).

2. IGR IN THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA – A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE The adoption of a new Constitution in early

1997 represented the formal and final repudia-tion of apartheid rule. Significantly, the Consti-tution also specifies that in the configuration ofthe state there will be “national, provincial andlocal spheres of government” and that thesewill be “distinctive, interdependent and interre-lated” (para. 40.1) The decision to describe thedifferent levels of government as “spheres”rather than “tiers” was a conscious attempt tomove away from the notion of a hierarchy withall the connotations of subordinancy. In prac-tice, however, this has not generally proven tobe the case, as the essence of hierarchy remainsprevalent in IGR.

2.1 State/provincial relationsOne of the most controversial issues in thedebate that preceded the drafting of the InterimConstitution was whether the South FarinaState should be unitary or federal in nature.This reflected a tension between the need fordevolution of power – which was seen by theAfrican National Congress (ANC) alliance asbeing of importance in taking democracy to thepeople – and the expressed fear that the devolu-tion of too much authority to the provinces,could lead to a situation where the nationalidentity would be thwarted by political intransi-gence at lower levels. Since then, experiencesin the province of the Western Cape, where theruling National Party (NP) attempted to gerry-mander municipal boundaries to exclude blackcommunities, and in Kwa-Zulu Natal (KZN)where the provincial government expressedtheir intention to establish a Zulu kingdom,have reinforced these fears (Tapscott, 1999).

The final Constitution stipulates that “theRepublic of South Africa is one, sovereign,democratic state.” Despite this, however, thestate reflects many of the characteristics of afederal state and relations between the centreand the periphery are, in some instances, notdifferent from those in many federations.

Added to this, the demand for greater autono-my at the provincial level and for self-govern-ment at other levels, remains a source of dis-content which carries with it the potential forpolitical and social instability.

The new Constitution assigns authority toprovincial legislatures to enact legislation with-in their defined spheres of competence (para.114). It also spells out the functional areas ofexclusive provincial legislative competence as

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well as areas of concurrent responsibility withthe national government. With provisos, theConstitution also stipulates that “the implemen-tation of provincial legislation in a province isan exclusive provincial executive power”. Thisimplies significantly more autonomy thanunder the previous dispensation, where provin-cial authority largely represented de-concentrat-ed power from the national government.

There are, however, a number of conditionsunder which the autonomy of a province maybe overridden by national government. Thismight occur “when a province cannot or doesnot fulfil an executive obligation in terms oflegislation or the constitution”. The interven-tion may be in the form of a directive to theprovincial executive, or the assumption of theresponsibilities of the province to fulfil itsobligations. The conditions under which suchan intervention might take place, would includeinstances where essential national standards arenot being maintained, where economic unity ornational security are threatened or where aprovince’s actions are prejudicial to anotherprovince or to the country as a whole.

An assessment of IGR in the six countrystudies reveals that the unitary–federal statedistinction is less a dichotomy than a continu-um. That is to say, the use of the term “federa-tion” is of less consequence than the way inwhich power is devolved to lower tiers of gov-ernment and the competencies which they areassigned. Thus, the Malaysian federation is ahighly centralised system which, in effect,devolves less authority to the states (provinces)than is the case in South Africa.

The establishment of federal states has some-times been the outcome of efforts to amalga-mate and accommodate the political aspirationsof pre-existing states which may not haveformed part of the national state. In Argentinathe establishment of a federation arose as partof an attempt to resolve tensions between polit-ically powerful groupings in the major urbancentre, Buenos Aires, and the largely autono-mous rural provinces. The founding of the fed-eration was based on three considerations: geo-graphical (occasioned by the remoteness of theprovinces and the need for a central base), ideo-logical (the conviction that power should bedissolved), and practical (managing relationsbetween the disparate provinces was extremelycomplex).

In terms of constitution, the provinces osten-sibly devolve powers to the federal governmentand residual powers are seen to vest in theprovinces. In practice, however, the centralstate arrogates considerable authority to itself.This is because the constitutionally defined sys-tem of federation is based on three principles:subordination, participation and coordination.Under the principle of subordination, the feder-al government has supremacy by virtue of thefact that it derives its mandate directly from thefederal constitution, which sets the parametersfor constitutions drawn up by the provinces.

The constitution specifies the competenciesassigned to the central and provincial govern-ments as well as areas of concurrent responsi-bility. Among the competencies assigned exclu-sively to the states are internal relations, theright to federal intervention in other tiers ofgovernment, the right to declare martial law, aswell as a host of other responsibilities for theoverall development of the nation. The intervireos competencies assigned to the provincesare also extensive and are shielded by the con-stitution from arbitrary intervention by the fed-eral government, to administer primary educa-tion, among many other responsibilities.

Among the competencies incidental to theprovinces, is the right to raise standing armiesin the event of external invasion or imminentdanger where delay would threaten the wholenation. The decision would need to be ratifiedby the federal government. The provinces alsocontrol their own police forces although theircompetencies are narrowly confined to publicsecurity and the enforcement of hygiene andmorality laws.

Despite what appears to be extensive provin-cial autonomy, the federal government reservesconsiderable constitutional authority to inter-vene in the affairs of the provinces and munici-palities if this is deemed to be necessary toenforce the federal constitution or to protect thenational interest.

In India, IGR have predominantly revolvedaround centre-state relations with local govern-ment, somewhat surprisingly, only gainingstatutory status through the introduction of con-stitutional amendments in the 1990s. It is ofinterest to observe that state (provincial) bound-aries were drawn up to accommodate ethno-lin-guistic divisions rather than according to eco-nomically funded units. In that respect, the

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Indian Constitution allows considerable flexi-bility to the Union (central) government to cre-ate autonomous regions or district councils toaccommodate the aspiration of specific ethnicgroups. This asymmetrical approach could beof relevance in resolving seemingly intractableboundary disputes such as those at BushbuckRidge.

The Indian Constitution assigns governmentcompetencies according to a Union list, a Statelist and a Concurrent list – which collectivelydetermine the legislative spheres of the IndianParliament and State Legislature. The Union’sextensive responsibilities include defence, for-eign affairs, banking, currency and specific taxand levying. The state’s competencies includeresponsibility for public order and police, localgovernment, public health, education and statetaxes, among others. Even in those states thatare fully autonomous with their statutorydomain, the Union Parliament predominatesover the State Legislature fields’. Thus theState Legislature is subject to the power of theUnion Parliament to legislate on matters enu-merated in the Union and Concurrent list.

The central bias in the Indian Constitution isfurther reflected in the power which the Uniongovernment has to intervene directly in theaffairs of the states. These include power interms of the proclamation of a state of emer-gency – subject to a two-thirds majority of theCouncil of States (similar in function to theNational Council of Provinces [NCOP] inSouth Africa) – power to legislate over matterscovered by the State list, where it is deemed tobe in the national interest; as well a proclama-tion of Failure of Constitutional Machinery,made by the president declaring that the powersof a state legislature will be exercised by orunder the authority of Parliament . In addition,all state governors are appointed by thePresident of the Union, with powers of over-sight over the affairs of the state. Generallyspeaking, however, the Union government doesnot intervene in the administrative activities ofthe states, and even in the case of concurrentresponsibility, executive decisions are normallymade at state level.

The history of IGR in Mexico has been oneof continuing tension between the central gov-ernment and the states. Part of this tensionstems from the constitution which has someform of “co-sovereignty” between federal and

state government but, at the same time, under-scores the supremacy of national sovereignty.In legal terms, the federal government and thestate are co-extensive entities, both of whichare subordinate to the Constitution. At thenational level the interests of the states are rep-resented through a second chamber similar tothe American senate.

Despite this federalist structure, however,there have always been strong tendenciestowards centralisation of power. Part of thiscentralisation tendency stems from the orienta-tion of the Constitution. The Mexican Consti-tution, like the South African, was drafted with-in the contest of a broad social programme –the Mexican revolution – to transform the stateand society. This vision was largely shared byall tiers of government and, in a sense, socialrights have tended to predominate over politicalrights. Since this national vision emanated fromthe federal government, as a consequence, itslaws have historically been virtually identical tofederal laws.

In the 1980s there was an attempt both torecognise and modernise public administrationand to improve intergovernmental coordination.Amendments to the Constitution in 1993 grant-ed the state the rights to participate in the for-mulation of the National Development Plan. Inthat year the Planning Act assigned to the fed-eral government the responsibility of conveningthe state governments to develop a coordinatedsystem of national planning.

In order to give effect to this intergovernmen-tal coordination, State Planning Committees(Coplades) were established ( building earliereconomic promotional committees (Coplades)to coordinate planning between the federal gov-ernment and the states. The Coplades alsoinvolved representatives from civil society inan effort to promote democratic planning.Municipal Development Planning Committees(Coplades) were also established to promotecoordination between a state and local govern-ment. Despite their laudable objective, theCoplades suffered from their excessive size andfrom a shortage of information for effectiveplanning.

During the course of the past two decades,other steps were taken to promote IGR, includ-ing the establishment of intergovernmental con-gresses. The first of these was the IndividualCoordination Covenant which was a mecha-

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nism for the transfer of fiscal resources to indi-vidual state administrations according to estab-lished norms and criteria. After 1983 the con-gresses were renamed Development Covenants(Covenio Unico de Desarollo, CUD) and werecharged with coordinating federal and stateactivities in the promotion of regional econom-ic development and the strengthening of munic-ipal governments. At this time, there was anattempt to channel more resources to the stateand municipal levels to give true meaning tothe federal system. The National System ofFederal Coordination (discussed below) was afurther initiative in that direction.

A change of government in the early 1980s,however, saw an undermining of the covenantsystem and that of the Coplades, and increasingcentralisation of decision making on financialmatters. It was argued that increased centralisa-tion was necessary in that the decentralisationof resources and responsibilities to the stateswas leading to excessive bureaucracy and poli-cy incoherence. However, a recent change ofgovernment has seen yet another swing backtowards decentralisation. This has becomepolitically necessary in that various state gover-norships are now in opposition hands and thepower relations between the states and the fed-eral executive are more matched.

In common with many countries in SouthAmerica, Brazil has passed through variouscycles of military and civilian rule. The federalsystem followed, nevertheless, derives from theAmerican bicameral model, with a congressand a senate. In terms of the Constitution, thethree tiers of government (federal, state andlocal) have both distinct and concurrent compe-tencies. Most states assume responsibility foragriculture, finance, education, health, com-merce and industry, among others, while themunicipalities’ responsibilities are largely ser-vice oriented, for example, water, sewerage,etc.

Despite the constitutionally prescribed com-petencies of the states, the federal governmentcan overrule the state legislature when thenational interest is threatened, when there isdangerous public disorder, or when statefinances are seriously in arrears. Such interven-tions are subject to a ruling of the supremecourt and generally only occur after the break-down of lengthy talks between the federal gov-ernment and the state government involved.

This is because IGR in Brazil are largelyinformal and rely on extensive political lobby-ing and brokered deals between the differenttiers of government. The channel of lobbying isgenerally upward with officials and politiciansfrom lower tiers, municipal councillors andmayors, petitioning the state legislature. Thesein turn petition congress people and senators,while governors appeal to federal ministers andto the president. The relationships are seldomstructured, and rely on personal communica-tion, telephone calls, faxes, etc.

2.2 Autonomous regions – the Spanish caseSpain, in contrast, is considered quasi-federaland yet devolves considerable power to itsregions. The Spanish case is of interest, further,in the way that power is devolved asymmetri-cally to different parts of the country. Up until1978 the state was divided according to central,provincial and local tiers of government.Changes to the Constitution in that year intro-duced “autonomous regions” as a fourth tier ofgovernment between the provinces and the cen-tral state. The establishment of autonomousregions was an attempt to accommodate thestrong, and sporadically violent, demands forself-government that were characteristic ofSpanish political life for much of the precedingdecades.

Typically, an autonomous region is formedthrough an amalgamation of two or more adja-cent provinces and municipalities with a com-mon historical, cultural and economic back-ground. Alternatively, it might be comprised ofa single province which has its own historicalidentity. The decision to form an autonomousregion is a voluntary one, adopted by munici-palities and provinces themselves, but goesaccording to the provisions set down by theConstitution in what are known as “statutes ofautonomy”. In exceptional cases, the centralgovernment may authorise the formation of anautonomous region where this does not involvemore than one province.

Unlike the provinces which have no realpolitical autonomy and whose affairs are close-ly regulated from the centre, the autonomy con-ferred on autonomous regions assigns themconsiderable ultra vires powers to manage theaffairs of the region. These include responsibil-ity for the organisation of self-governing insti-tutions, the demarcation of municipal bound-

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aries, regional legislation, town planning, hous-ing, transport and infrastructural developmentas well as many other sectoral responsibilities.They also have the right to generate revenuethrough a variety of tax mechanisms.

In establishing themselves as autonomous,regions may decide on a “fast lane” or a “slowlane” in achieving their autonomy. Thosechoosing the fast lane will assume immediateresponsibility for the competencies assigned tothem in terms of the Constitution. Those in theslow lane assume full responsibility progres-sively over a five-year period. This provisionensures that the lack of capacity is not a limit-ing factor to political demands for regionalautonomy.

Although autonomous regions have the com-petence to legislate on a wide sphere of activi-ties, their status does not confer on them anyeconomic or social privileges that are denied toSpanish citizens living elsewhere in the coun-try. That is to say, irrespective of the form ofgovernment under which they live, all Span-iards have the same rights and the same free-dom of movement to reside or work whereverthey choose.

Despite the considerable authority devolvedto autonomous regions, the central governmentstill retains considerable power over matters ofnational interest. Thus it assumes responsibilityfor international relations, defence, the admin-istration of justice, labour legislation, foreigntrade, banking and planning of the nationaleconomy, in addition to a host of regulatoryresponsibilities. Furthermore, while the ultravires competencies of autonomous regions areextensive and protect them from central gov-ernment, they are also subject to exceptionalclauses in the Constitution.

Thus, if an autonomous region fails to com-ply with obligations imposed by the Constitu-tion, or if it acts in a manner which threatensthe national interest, the central governmentmay issue directives to the president of theregion to comply with the legislation. Shouldthese directives be ignored, the governmentmay – following an absolute majority of theSenate – adopt measures to ensure that theregion fulfils its constitutional obligations. Inthat respect, it is important to note that, in addi-tion to defence, security and law and order arenational competencies, and a delegate appoint-ed by central government manages the police in

each autonomous region. The power to dealwith recalcitrant regions, although latent withinthe central government, is nevertheless real.

The establishment of autonomous regionswas, in essence, an attempt to resolve animpasse in the political life of Spain and toblunt the secessionist ambitions of the Basqueand Catellonian regions, among others. To thatextent, it has been considerably successful. Atthe same time as indicated, this arrangementhas not served to emasculate the central gov-ernment, which still retains considerable powerto manage the state as a whole.

Although the demands for provincial autono-my in KZN, or for a Boere Staat elsewhere,have not reached the levels of Spain in the1970s, the Spanish option might be consideredin the long run if the current system of IGRproves to be incapable of accommodating thesepolitical aspirations and, in the case of KZN, ofstemming the ongoing violence.

2.3 The role of the provincial/state governorThe role of the provincial/state governor isworth comparing with that of provincial pre-miers in South Africa. In Argentina and India,one of the mechanisms employed by the centralgovernment to ensure that national policy isimplemented at the provincial level, is theappointment of provincial governors to act asagents of the federal government. This provi-sion is a powerful one in that it ensures centralgovernment oversight of the activities of theprovinces. It is noteworthy, that in instanceswhere provincial/state governors are politicalappointees of the ruling party, the central gov-ernment appears to have more confidence indevolving far reaching powers to the provinces,and particularly control over the provincialpolice force. It must also be noted, however,that arrangements of this nature are often thesource of discontent, in that they are seen toundermine the political autonomy of theprovinces.

In Brazil, in contrast, governors are directlyelected in each state and wield considerablepolitical and economic power. Many own, orcontrol, the main local media (television beingthe most popular of these). They also controlthe state’s budget and disbursement, the statepolice and are responsible for all state-levelpolitical appointments, in addition to state oper-ated banks. Typically, these governors also

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exert influence over the state delegation in con-gress. For these reasons, the president, federalministers and other agencies must weigh upcarefully the demands, as well as the power, ofcertain governors when elaborating major poli-cy decisions, especially when there are conflict-ing demands and when congress’s approval isrequired.

3. MECHANISMS FOR THE PROMOTION OF IGRAND DISPUTE RESOLUTIONChapter 3 of the South African Constitutionspells out the parameters for the promotion ofcooperative governance and emphasises thefact that the three tiers of the government havedistinct powers and responsibilities which mustbe respected. These parameters specify, interalia, that all spheres of government must“respect the constitutional status, institutions,powers and functions of government in otherspheres; exercise their powers and functions ina manner that does not encroach on the geo-graphical, functional, or institutional integrityof the government in other spheres”, etc.

The Constitution further specifies that thedifferent tiers of government must cooperatewith the others “in mutual trust and good faith”,inter alia by “fostering friendly relations”, byassisting and supporting each other, by coordi-nating their actions, adhering to agreed proce-dures and by avoiding legal proceedings againsteach other. These values, however, representstatements of intent rather than a formula foraction.

At present there are no formal proceduresspecified for the achievement of this intergov-ernmental harmony – if, indeed, this were everpossible – and an organ of state involved in anintergovernmental dispute is exhorted to“exhaust all remedies before it approaches acourt to resolve a dispute”. (para. 41.4) An actof parliament is required to establish appropri-ate mechanisms and procedures to facilitate set-tlement of intergovernmental disputes. (para.41.3)

Where conflicts between national and provin-cial governments do arise, national legislationwill prevail. These relate to threats, nationalpolicies, norms and standards, to national secu-rity, economic unity, the environment, the pro-motion of equal opportunities, etc. (para. 146).If none of these conditions apply, then provin-cial legislation prevails over national legisla-

tion. On balance, however, the outcomes of dis-putes are weighted in favour of the nationalgovernment.

The national government has established anumber of mechanisms to promote IGR. Theseinclude the intergovernmental forum (IGF),Ministers and Members of the ExecutiveCouncil (Minmecs) and technical intergovern-mental committees. The issues raised by theIGF thus far, have tended to address rather dis-tinct and technocratic issues, but have not reallytouched on the substance and processes of IGR.They have also not seriously addressed howintergovernmental structures might be ratio-nalised, nor have they defined the specific roleof intergovernmental institutions. At the sametime, thus far, the Minmecs have not been wellintegrated with the IGF, and the IGF is not pro-viding overall coordination of the Minmecs.

The recent establishment of the NCOP pro-vides a direct channel for provincial govern-ments to participate in policy formulation atnational level. Although the Constitution alsomakes provision for the national government tooverride the objections of the NCOP, thiswould require a two-thirds majority. Such anoverride, however, would require a consider-able degree of unanimity among political par-ties at the national level.

A similar mechanism has been institution-alised in Argentina to ensure that the provincesare, to an extent, able to participate in the for-mulation of federal policy. A bicameral systemof government makes provision for a congressand senate; three senators from each provincerepresent provincial interests at the federallevel.

All six countries reviewed are constitutional,defined as federations, with the implication thatthe state governments have a substantial degreeof autonomy from the centre. In practice, in allsix cases the federal governments reserve con-siderable authority to intervene and overrule thedecisions of subordinate tiers of government.Although the threat of intervention is latent,rather than actualised, it does nevertheless setthe parameters for IGR, and asserts the primaryrole of the federal government.

It is evident, however, that the central gov-ernments seldom invoke their override powersand rely, instead, on politically invoked solu-tions or institutions established to promote dis-pute resolution. Thus, in Spain a Constitutional

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Tribunal is empowered to resolve disputes overcompetencies. The decisions of the Constitu-tional Tribunal, which functions like theConstitutional Court in South Africa, are bind-ing. The Constitution also makes provision for“laws on harmonisation” which are intended topromote coordination and cooperation betweenthe central government and autonomousregions. These may be resolved either by theConstitutional Tribunal or in an ordinary courtof law, depending on the substance of the dis-pute. In general, however, attempts are made toavoid conflicts through the reciprocal referralof reports on interventions and resolutionsbetween local institutions and the state andautonomous regions. At the same time, theestablishment of a National Commission forLocal Administration and Provincial Commis-sions, promotes collaboration between munici-palities and provinces.

In the case of Argentina, the principle of thesupremacy of the federation is such that thecentral government complies with federal law,and this may be enforced by provincial militiathat are subject to federal control.

In the first three decades of the Indian state’sexistence, intergovernmental disputes weregenerally resolved in the ruling party’s caucus.This was because the Congress Party was incontrol of both the Union and most of the stategovernments. Since then, hegemony of Con-gress has diminished and intergovernmentaldisputes have become more contentious. Onbalance, dispute resolution is heavily weightedin favour of the central government. This isbecause the President’s power to intervene incentre-state relations is mandated by the consti-tution and is considerable. The Proclamation ofEmergency due to what is termed a “failure ofconstitutional machinery” (popularly known asthe president’s rule) has been invoked in anumber of instances and remains a problematicissue in central-state relations.

In instances of interstate dispute, the UnionParliament is constitutionally empowered toadjudicate contested matters. In addition, thepresident is empowered to establish an inter-state council to investigate and advise on dis-putes that have arisen between states, to makerecommendations and to facilitate better coor-dination between them.

Although provision is made in the MalaysianConstitution for dispute resolution, through the

Federal Court, the country has been singularlyfree from intergovernmental disputes and onlytwo formal cases have been addressed in thepast 40 years.

This seeming harmony is a function of sever-al factors. Firstly, the central government’spowers are overwhelming, while the states haveonly minor powers; secondly, constitutionalprovisions are heavily weighted in favour of thecentre, and thirdly, the central government andall the state governments – except one – belongto the same coalition party, which has dominat-ed the political arena since independence. Inthis context, most intergovernmental disputesare settled at party level. Despite this, theMalaysian Constitution makes provision forvarious councils (a National Finance Council, aNational Land Council and a National Councilfor Local Government) to encourage uniformityat the state level in terms of legislature, policyand implementation. Both state and federalgovernments are compelled to consult thesecouncils (which have state and federal mem-bers) with respect to legislation and policy.

One further instrument is available to centralgovernment to exert its will over the states, thisrelates to its sole right to amend the Constitu-tion in Parliament. The arrangement, similar tothat which prevailed in South Africa prior to1994, permits the ruling party to change theConstitution to suit its own needs. TheMalaysian situation points to the restrictionsplaced on equitable IGR when a constitution issubordinated to parliament. Under this arrange-ment, any legitimate challenge to central gov-ernment policy made by a state governmentmay be rendered illegal by the federal govern-ment exercising its rights to amend the consti-tution.

4. FINANCIAL MATTERSControl over the distribution of financialresources and the amounts allocated to the dif-ferent tiers of government are among the mostcontentious issues in IGR throughout the world.In South Africa the Constitution makes provi-sion for the allocation of financial resources,for budgeting and for treasury control. It alsostipulates that national legislation is necessaryto give effect to most of the important provi-sions on the allocation and disbursement ofpublic funds. Among the more significant pro-visions made by the Constitution are that there

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must be an equitable division of revenue raisednationally among the national, provincial andlocal spheres of government. The criteria underwhich revenue is allocated to the different tiersmust take into account various factors includingthe national interest, the national debt, the fiscalcapacity and the efficiency of the provinces andmunicipalities, as well as their developmentneeds and the economic disparities betweenprovinces. The Finance and Fiscal Commissionwill play an important role in deriving appro-priate formulae for the allocation of revenue.From a comparative perspective, the Argen-tinean federal Constitution assigns considerablecompetence to the provinces to raise localtaxes, to establish provincial banks and to man-age their own financial affairs. Although theConstitution assigns specific sources of revenueto the central government and the provinces,constitutional reforms in 1994 establishedmechanisms for the equitable disposal of allfunds raised by the different tiers of govern-ment. Under the Federal Joint Participation ofTaxes law, 42.3% of revenue is allocated to thecentral government, 56.6% to the provinces andone per cent to the national treasury. This splitwas made according to agreed criteria on thespecific responsibilities and needs of the differ-ent tiers of government.

In India, the central government has greaterpowers of taxation than the state but, accordingto constitutional principles, it is obliged to dis-tribute a portion of this revenue to the states. Inthat regard, there are four kinds of tax sharing,namely:• Duties levied by the Union and appropriated

by the states.• Taxes levied and collected by the union and

distributed between the union and the states. • Surcharges on certain duties and taxes for the

purposes of the union. • Taxes which are levied and collected by the

union and which may be distributed betweenthe union and the states.

The principles for the sharing of these taxes andduties are decided upon by a Finance Commis-sion appointed by the president for a five-yearperiod. Despite their attempts at objectivity, theresolution of successive finance commissionshave been heavily criticised by the states, andfiscal federalism remains a source of consider-able intergovernmental tension.

In Malaysia, the central government controls

all major sources, while the power of the stateto raise income is confined to water rates,licences and rents on state property, among oth-ers. Each state, however, receives a captivationgrant from the central government, according tothe size of its population. Additional grantsmay be made to any state by the federal parlia-ment entirely at its discretion.

In 1980, Mexico inaugurated a NationalSystem of Federal Coordination as a mecha-nism for more equitable revenue sharing by thethree levels of government. The system was anattempt to develop a more integrated tax basewhich would avoid the multiplication of taxesacross three tiers of government. It was alsointended to promote a more participatory andless discretionary system of grant allocationfrom the federal government to the states.Despite the best intentions of this system of fis-cal coordination, it has served to increase ratherthan decrease the states’ dependency on centralgovernment. This was because, in the drive tocreate a more integrated and uniform tax sys-tem, they lost control over a number of lucra-tive tax sources – value added tax (VAT), forexample – which were taken over by the federalgovernment that still controlled 81% of thenational revenue and accounted for 78% ofspending, indicating that both income andspending remain highly centralised.

In Brazil as discussed above, IGR are largelya matter of power brokering. In the allocationof revenues to the different tiers of governmentthis system applies no less and emphasis is gen-erally placed on those areas where the federalgovernment derives its principal support. Localgovernments have been allowed to own theirown banks and, since 1987, have been permit-ted to receive loans directly from the multilater-al funding agencies – although these are under-written by the federal government.

The 1987–1998 constitutional assembly, inparticular, was strongly oriented to state andmunicipal interests and in addition to insertingrevenue sharing bloc grant formulas into thenew Constitution, also reduced the federal gov-ernment’s overall share of tax revenues. Thisstep was, however, taken without a concomitantdecrease in the responsibilities of the federalgovernment (and by implication, a reduction inits expenditure obligations) and this in turn leadto chronic budgetary deficits at the nationallevel. This crisis necessitated the introduction

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of a Fiscal Stabilisation Plan which empoweredthe Minister of Finance to reduce and or sus-pend transfers to the state and municipal levels,as a temporary measure. The implementation ofthis plan entailed a protracted process of bar-gaining, involving the minister of finance, gov-ernors, state finance secretaries and senatorsand represented something of a triumph forpolitically brokered IGR.

In that respect perhaps the most significantfeature of national fiscal affairs in Brazil is itsoverly political nature. The allocation of thenational budget, in particular, involves intenselobbying at congressional level, as members ofcongress, senators and other political figuresstrive to achieve the best deals for their homeconstituencies. This process, which is some-what chaotic at times, is seen as preferable tothe technocratic formula-based funding thatexisted under the military regime. Critics of thetechnocratic approach point to the fact that theformula applied failed to take into accountregional disparities, local issues or the socio-economic standing of different communities.

Perhaps the most important lesson to learnfrom the Brazilian experience is the fact thatwhere a constitution assigns considerable fiscalautonomy to lowers tiers of government, thepotential exists for uncoordinated financialmanagement, overspending and ultimately ram-pant corruption. This is because the provincialgovernments have little accountability otherthan to themselves. The collapse of the stateeconomies, however, impacts adversely on thenational economy as a whole, worseningdeficits and driving up inflation rates.

5. LESSONS FROM THE CASE STUDIESThe structure of government, and by implica-tion the structure of IGR, may be set up asym-metrically, and need not apply to all provincesor local governments in the same uniform way.That is to say, political realities may sometimesneed to shape IGR rather than the converse:• Competence can be assigned to lower tiers of

government gradually; this is particularly

pertinent in the case of municipalities whichpresently lack capacity.

• Labels such as “federal” and “unitary” areless important than the manner in which IGRare structured and function in practice.

• The political dimensions of IGR are alwaysthe most contentious and mechanisms areneeded to accommodate them.

• IGR in South Africa tend to focus on rela-tions between the central government and theprovinces. The case of Mexico, however,points to the potential of involving local gov-ernments in joint planning structures.

• The effective flow of information betweenthe different spheres of government is essen-tial to the development of an affective IGRsystem.

CONCLUSIONThe South African Constitution makes provi-sion for national legislature to regulate IGR.Yet as the six country studies illustrate, IGR arealways dynamic and evolve over time toaccommodate changing social, economic andpolitical relations. Attempts to codify IGR,while they might bring greater legal precisionto the process, will not necessary relieve inter-governmental tensions and may, in practice,aggravate them. This is because the most con-tentious issues in IGR as indicated are general-ly of a political, not a technical nature. Policyframed to support IGR should therefore takecognisance of the need to maintain a flexibleframework for promoting greater cooperationbetween the different spheres of government.

In the final analysis, it must also be borne inmind that neither a constitution nor an effectivesystem of IGR can guarantee political stabilityin a country. Certainly the recent histories ofArgentina, Brazil, Mexico and Spain have beentroubled ones, swinging variously from democ-racy to dictatorship, military rule and back todemocracy. While sound IGR are not a suffi-cient condition for a stable democracy, theirabsence is, however, likely to aggravate the sit-uation.

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BORAINE, A. 1995. Central, provincial and localrelations in South Africa, in Reddy, P.S. (ed.)Perspectives in Local Government Manage-ment and Development in Africa. Pinetown,South Africa: Kohler Carton and Print, forUniversity of Durban - Westville.

BOTHA. T. 1996. Intergovernmental relation -The South African experience, in Reddy, P.S.(ed.) Readings in Local government Manage-ment: A Southern African Perspective.Kenwyn, Cape Town: Juta Co. Ltd. pp. 67-81.

DCD. THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONSAUDIT. 1999. Towards a culture of coopera-tive government. The final report of theIntergovernmental Relations audit.December, 1999.

LUNGU, G.F., MADZIVHANDILA, L AND ISMAIL,N. 1996. Decentralisation policies of localgovernment in Anglophone Africa: Lessonsfor South Africa. Administrato Publica. Vol.7 No. 1, pp. 34-35.

LUNGU, G.F. 1997. IntergovernmentalRelations. A paper presented at a conferenceon training for Emergent Local GovernmentManagers of the Executive LeadershipInstitute for South Africa, at Port Elizabeth

Technikon, Port Elizabeth, South Africa.March 9-14.

LUNGU, G.F. 1998. Local provincialIntergovernmental Relations: A comparativePerspective. A paper presented at theIntergovernmental Relations Summit held atthe VW Conference Centre, Midrand,Gauteng South Africa, April 22–23, 1998.

OYUGI, W.O. 1985. Local government inKenya: A case of institutional decline, inMawhood, T, (ed.) Local Government in theThird World: The Experience of TropicalAfrica. Chichester, England: John Wiley &Sons. pp. 107-140.

REDCLIFFE-MAUD, J.P. AND WOOD, B. 1974.English Local Government Reformed.London: Oxford University Press.

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA .1996. Constitutionof the Republic of South Africa, 1996.Constitutional Assembly, Cape Town:Government Printers.

TAPSCOTT, C. Intergovernmental relations inSouth Africa – A comparative analysis, inIntergovernmental Relations: An Internation-al Comparative Study. School of Governmentand the national Democratic Institute forInternational Affairs. UWC, Cape Town.

REFERENCES

ABSTRACTProvincial government, initially a product ofthe negotiated political transition in SouthAfrica, has subsequently become an entrenchedfeature of South African politics following thepassage of the Constitution in 1996. The struc-ture and form of provincial government thusreflects a careful balancing act structured bythe shifting power relations of post-apartheidSouth Africa. The country is neither explicitlyfederal nor centrist, although provincial government finds itself in a peculiar, and sometimes precarious, position vis-à-vis bothnational and local government. For example,provincial government has relatively few areasof legislative autonomy and is highly depen-dent upon the national government for financialtransfers since its lacks revenue powers. Inelectoral terms, however, the diversity of politi-cal parties represented in provincial legislaturessuggests that it be regarded as a level of stateoffice worth contesting. This paper surveysseveral aspects of this position, including elec-toral, political and financial considerationsabout the sustainability of provincial govern-ment in South Africa.

INTRODUCTION1

In 1994, nine provincial governments and leg-islatures were introduced to the people ofSouth Africa.

The current make-up of provincial govern-ment is largely a result of the pre-electionnegotiations over the form of the post-apartheidstate system. South Africa was to settle on athree-tiered system of government with nation-al, provincial and local government. In the pre-

1994 negotiations, the National Party (NP) –now called the New National Party (NNP) –and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) were thestrongest proponents of strong regional govern-ment and a federal state structure for SouthAfrica. As Lodge has written:

“The case for South African democracy’sassuming a federal form was based chieflyon the supposed political benefits of amulti-centered political dispensation in eth-nically divided societies. Dividing execu-tive authority between central and regionalgovernment would give minorities, definedin different ways, a stake in the system.”2

Both the NP and the IFP were able to protecttheir regional power bases through the promo-tion of decentralised state power. The prospectof gaining regional office was therefore astrong drawcard for parties that could not hopeto achieve political power at national level.While the NP is the majority party in theWestern Cape, the IFP stronghold is in Kwa-Zulu-Natal (KZN) and as a result each partyholds the premier’s post in the respectiveprovinces. Although South Africa (and sevenof the provinces) was governed by the AfricanNational Congress (ANC) – as the leading part-ner in the Government of National Unity(GNU) – the IFP and the NP also had a stake inparliamentary politics with their regionalstrongholds.

While federalism did not appear among the34 constitutional principles that laid thegroundwork for the Interim Constitution of1993, it was nevertheless implied in at least 10of the principles and in the division of concur-rent and exclusive powers for national and

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provincial government.3 Federalism was alsoretained in the drafting of the final Constitutionof 1996. Devenish notes that the 1996 Constitu-tion was designed to promote cooperative fed-eralism rather than competitive federalism.4However, as will be shown below, the emerg-ing politics of federalism in South Africa hasnot necessarily led to strong and effectiveprovincial government. In fact, financial insta-bility, political turmoil and calls from somequarters to re-think the role and purpose ofprovincial government have marked the experi-ence of provincial government since 1994.

1. BUILDING PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTThe establishment of provincial governmentposed a number of administrative and financialchallenges for South Africa. For a start, ninenew provinces had to be demarcated for elec-toral and administrative purposes. In somecases former homeland administrations had tobe integrated with the previous regional struc-tures of the apartheid era and the new provin-cial legislatures had to be established fromscratch.

The boundaries and number of provinceswere confirmed in the final Constitution of1996. But even the selection of provincial capi-tals posed a challenge to the new government.For example, in the new Eastern Capeprovince, five cities laid claim to capital statuswith the matter eventually being settled infavour of Bisho, the former capital of Ciskei.The fact that so many cities laid claim to thetitle speaks to the fact that the Eastern Capeadministration was being forged out of diverse

and competing territorial administrations. InKZN, a different solution was found with bothUlundi and Pietermaritzburg serving as dualcapitals and the provincial legislature rotatesbetween the two cities. Moreover, the choice ofprovincial capital played a role in a provincialboundary dispute involving the Bushbuckridgeregion of the Northern Province. The residentspreferred to be serviced from the Mpumulangacapital of Nelspruit, only two hours away bycar, rather than the Northern Province capital ofPietersburg, which was an overnight drive.Lodge argues that this political affiliation is agood sign that formal borders aside, popularpolitical affiliations are in the process of beingreconstructed around regionalism.5

2. PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS AND REPRESENTATIONThe structure of formal electoral representationin provincial legislatures is therefore a matterof concern if South Africa is to succeed in giv-ing effective voice to this emerging regional-ism. The Constitution stipulates that a provin-cial legislature should consist of between 30and 80 members. The number of members,which differs among provinces, is determinedusing a formula prescribed by national legisla-tion. The 1998 Electoral Act provides forawarding one seat for every 100 000 personswhose ordinary place of residence is within thatprovince. The Independent Electoral Com-mission (IEC) is charged with making thisdetermination. Table 1 indicates the seat alloca-tions to provinces for 1994 and 1999.

Each provincial legislature is elected in termsof proportional representation (PR) with anexecutive comprised of a premier and a numberof members who form an executive council.The premier is elected by the provincial legisla-ture. From 1994 to 1999, national and provin-cial government were structured in terms of aGNU. The GNU rules meant that consensualpolitics and PR were to play a role in the com-position of the executive and the distribution ofcabinet portfolios. Under the rules for theGNU, a party required at least 10% of the seatsin the provincial legislature to be representedby a member in the executive council.

The 1994 elections resulted in the ANC gain-ing provincial power as the majority party inseven of the nine provinces.6 Only in KZN(IFP) and the Western Cape (NP) do other

Table 1: Seat allocations to provincial legisla-tures: 1994 and 1999

Provincial No. of No. oflegislature seats – 1994 seats – 1999

Eastern Cape 56 63Free State 30 30Gauteng 86 73KwaZulu-Natal 81 80Mpumulanga 30 30North-West 30 33Northern Cape 30 30Northern Province 40 49Western Cape 42 42Total 425 430

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political parties hold greater power and the pre-miership. The ANC and the NP were the onlytwo parties to win seats in every province. TheFreedom Front (FF) won seats in sevenprovinces and the Democratic Party (DP) wonseats in five. Table 2 compares the provincialelection results for 1994 and 1999, indicatingthe number of seats attained by each party.

Participation in the 1999 provincial electionswas marked in several ways:• 26 parties contested the 1999 elections• 15 parties contested the National Assembly

and provincial assemblies• 1 party contested the National Assembly only• 10 parties contested for provincial assembly

seats only (each of these contested in oneprovince only)

• 13 parties won seats in the NationalAssembly

• 12 of those same parties won seats in provin-cial assemblies

• none of the parties contesting provincialassemblies only won any seats

• women in provincial government: 27.6 % ofMembers of the Provincial Legislature(MPLs) are women, slightly lower than the29.7% of women in the National Assembly.There are 20 women of 99 Members of theExecutive Council (MECs), 20.2% of thetotal.

Table 3 compares the distribution of totalprovincial seats by party for 1994 and 1999.

The election results provide evidence for theimportance of provincial elections:• Provincial elections provide an opportunity

for political parties to gain greater representa-tion than might be possible at national level –the United Christian Democratic Party(UCDP) and the United Democratic Move-ment (UDM) built strength in regions. TheUCDP was eighth nationally, but came sec-ond in one province. The UDM was fifthnationally but second in two provinces.

Table 3: Distribution of total provincial seatsby party: 1994 and 1999

Party 1994 1999

ANC 266 289NP/NNP 82 38IFP 44 37FF 14 5DP 12 40PAC 3 2ACDP 3 3MF 1 2FA Did not exist 1UCDP Did not exist 3UDM Did not exist 10Total seats 425 430

Table 2: 1994 and 1999 Provincial election results7

Province Seats won in 1994 and 1999 provincial legislature elections8 Total seats

Eastern Cape 1994: ANC 48, NP 6, DP 1, PAC 1 561999: ANC 47, NNP 2 PAC 1, UDM 9 63

Eastern Transvaal 1994: ANC 25, NP 3, FF 2 30Mpumulanga 1999: ANC 26, NNP 1, UDM 1, FF 1, DP 1 30KwaZulu-Natal 1994: ANC 26, NP 9, IFP 41, DP 2, PAC 1, ACDP 1, MF 1 81

1999: ANC 32, NNP 3, IFP 34, DP 7, ACDP 1, MF 2, UDM 1 80Northern Cape 1994: ANC 15, NP 12, FF 2, DP 1 30

1999: ANC 20, DP 1, NNP 8, FF 1 30Northern Transvaal 1994: ANC 38, NP 1, FF 1 40Northern Province 1999: ANC 44, DP 1, NNP 1, PAC 1, UDM 1, ACDP 1 49North-West 1994: ANC 26, NP 3, FF 1 30

1999: ANC 27, UCDP 3, DP 1, NNP 1, FF 1 33Orange Free State 1994: ANC 24, NP 4, FF 2 30Free State 1999: ANC 25, NNP 2, DP 2, FF 1 30PWV 1994: ANC 50, NP 21, IFP 3, FF 5, DP 5, PAC 1, ACDP 1 86Gauteng 1999: ANC 50, DP, 13, NNP 3, IFP 3, ACDP 1, Federal Alliance 1, 73

UDM 1, FF 1Western Cape 1994: ANC 14, NP 23, FF 1, DP 3, ACDP 1 42

1999: ANC 18, NNP 17, DP 5, ACDP 1, UDM 1 42

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• Provincial races also show the relativelyequal strength of several parties at provinciallevel. The DP, NNP and IFP have roughlythe same number of total provincial seats,however, the IFP won seats in only twoprovinces while the DP and NNP won seatsin every province along with the ANC.

• Regional representation varies and buildsrespect for diverse political identities, e.g.:

– the ANC was first nationally, first in eightprovinces– the DP was second nationally, second inthree provinces, third in five and fourth inone– the IFP was third nationally, first in oneprovince, but only fourth, eighth, ninth,tenth and eleventh in the other provinces– the NNP was fourth nationally, second intwo provinces, third in four and fourth inthree.

Provinces also play a role in the determinationof candidates for the National Assembly. As in1994, a total of 400 seats were contested in the1999 elections for the National Assembly. Inthe PR electoral system adopted in SouthAfrica these seats are filled from the party lists.The list system in South Africa is closed, andparty executives select names for the lists. Thecomposition of the list for the National Assem-bly comprises two types of allocations: the firstis a direct list (“national to national”) for 200seats in the National Assembly while the sec-ond allocation of 200 seats is drawn from theprovinces. This “provincial to national” list isofficially known as the list for regional seatsreserved for the National Assembly. The num-ber of regional seats allocated to each provinceis determined on the basis of the voting popula-tion and representations by interested parties.Table 4 indicates the seat allocations assignedto each province for its share of the regionallists for the National Assembly.

Provincial representation in the national gov-ernment also extends beyond the NationalAssembly. The provinces also achieve repre-sentation in the National Council of Provinces(NCOP). Along with the National Assembly,the NCOP is a component of Parliament. It rep-resents the provinces to ensure that provincialinterests are taken into account in national gov-ernment. The NCOP replaced the formerSenate when the 1996 Constitution was adoptedand came into operation on 4 February 1997.

The NCOP may legislate in areas fallingunder the functional jurisdiction of provinces(discussed below) and all national bills referredto it by the National Assembly, but it may notinitiate money bills. Bills amending theConstitution must also be referred to the NCOPand can only be passed with a supporting voteof at least six provinces.

There are 90 delegates in the NCOP. There isa single delegation from each of the nine pro-vinces and each delegation comprises 10 dele-gates. The 10 delegates are:• four special delegates consisting of the pre-

mier of the province or a member of theprovincial legislature designated by the pre-mier and three other special delegates

• six permanent delegates drawn from theprovincial legislature in proportion to the rep-resentation of their respective political partiesin that legislature.

Each delegation has a single vote and all ques-tions before the NCOP are agreed when at leastfive provinces vote in favour of the question.9

The NCOP is presided over by a chairperson,elected for a term of five years from among thepermanent delegates to the chamber. Prior tothe 1999 elections the ANC had a two-thirdsmajority of the total delegates to the NCOP (60of the 90 seats). The IFP’s largely regionalpowerbase in KZN was evident in the composi-tion of the NCOP, with the province compris-ing the entire basis of its representation in thechamber (5).10 By contrast, the FF, also withfive members in the NCOP, drew its membersfrom five different provinces.11 The NCOP istherefore able to reflect not only the diversity ofprovincial parties, but does so as a reflection of

Table 4: Regional (“provincial to national”)allocations to National Assembly, 1994 and1999

Province 1994 1999

Eastern Cape 28 27Free State 15 14Gauteng 43 46KwaZulu-Natal 40 38Mpumulanga 14 14Northern Cape 4 4Northern Province 20 20North West 15 17Western Cape 21 20Total 200 200

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the different basis of regional party politicalsupport (concentrated in the case of the IFP anddispersed for the FF). However, the block vot-ing procedure of the NCOP (based on one voteper provincial delegation) consolidates theprovincial power of the ANC in the nationalgovernment since it holds a majority in six ofthe nine delegations.

The NCOP is rooted in the provinces byvirtue of its powers, purpose and representationbut it is also part of the National Assembly. It istherefore designed as a bridge between nationalpower and provincial power. But provincialpower and the ability of provincial legislaturesto structure that power effectively have had arather mixed record since 1994.

3. PROVINCIAL POWERSOn 10 May 1994, the central government as-sumed the powers of the four former provincesand the homelands. In effect, the new provincesdid not have any power and would only receivetheir powers as central government determinedthat the new provinces had established new ad-ministrations capable of exercising that power.Some premiers began to complain that they hadassumed offices without power.12

In August 1994 an intergovernmental forumwas established to determine the distribution ofpowers between national and provincial gov-ernments.

The restructuring and amalgamation of former homeland administrations posed anadditional immediate challenge to effectiveprovincial government. For example, the creation of the Eastern Cape province involvedthe amalgamation of the former homelands ofTranskei and Ciskei with part of the formerCape Province. As a result:

“The legacy of the old Transkei and Ciskeito the new Eastern Cape government waschaos. More than a dozen reports by variousauditor-generals indicate that no reliableaccounts were kept from about 1987. Somany records have been destroyed or lostthat it is now virtually impossible to findout where the money went, to constructasset registers for inherited offices, or tohold anybody accountable for the mess.”13

The nine provinces created in terms of theInterim Constitution brought about a new sys-tem of government in South Africa. But in thecourse of drafting the 1996 Constitution the

place of the provinces in the overall form of thestate remained contentious. The extent of thepowers and functions of the provinces was partof the debate over the degree to which theSouth African state would be federal or cen-tralised. In the end a model of cooperative gov-ernment was adopted to promote coordinatedgovernance instead of allowing the provinces to“compete with each other and the national gov-ernment for power and resources.”14

Under the new Constitution, provincial gov-ernment has relatively few areas of exclusivelegislative competence. Provinces have execu-tive authority only to the extent that they havethe necessary administrative capacity andnational government may, under some circum-stances, take over functions that a provincialgovernment cannot properly perform. Nationalgovernment also bears a responsibility toensure that the provinces build that capacity.The exclusive areas of provincial legislativecompetence are set out in Schedule 5 of theConstitution as follows:• Abattoirs• Ambulance services• Archives other than national archives• Libraries other than national libraries• Liquor licences• Museums other than national museums• Provincial planning• Provincial cultural matters• Provincial recreation and sport• Provincial roads and traffic• Veterinary services excluding regulation of

the profession.15

Provincial government also has oversight pow-ers with respect to certain areas of local govern-ment. With the adoption of the 1996 Constitu-tion, however, provincial government saw theremoval of some powers that it had enjoyedunder the Interim Constitution. For example,provincial government lost the power to deter-mine the remuneration of provincial premiers,MECs and traditional chiefs. Further, Parlia-ment was given the power to intervene in areasof exclusive provincial jurisdiction by passinglegislation which is necessary to:• maintain national, economic unity or essen-

tial national standards• establish minimum standards for service pro-

vision• prevent unreasonable action being taken by a

province which is prejudicial to the interests

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of another province or the country as awhole.16

In practice, however, the lines of distinctionbetween national and provincial areas of com-petence are not so clear cut since the Con-stitution envisages shared or concurrent powersand legislation in so many areas.17 These con-current powers include areas such as education,housing, welfare, environment, health, tourism,agriculture, trade, etc. Moreover, with respectto matters of concern outside the authority ofprovincial legislation, a provincial legislaturemay make recommendations to the NationalAssembly.18 In the event of jurisdictional dis-putes between national and provincial legisla-tion, the Constitution also provides for conflictresolution. Where there is a dispute, the Con-stitutional Court “must prefer any reasonableinterpretation of the legislation that avoids aconflict, over any alternative interpretation thatresults in conflict”.19

An important source of provincial power liesin the Constitutional provisions for provinces toadopt their own provincial constitutions.20

However, only two provinces (the WesternCape and KZN) have sought to exercise thispower. The KZN constitutional process hasendorsed a strong federalist interpretation of therole of provinces in South Africa. This agendacan be summarised with reference to the draftconstitutional text submitted by the IFP in1995. This draft called for the province to berenamed the Kingdom of KZN and for theretention of a Zulu monarch without executivepowers. In addition, the kingdom would haveits own independent judiciary, constitutionalcourt and militia. Clearly, the IFP strategy wasto expand the boundaries of provincial power.In September 1996 the Constitutional Court,however, rejected the provincial constitutionaltext approved by the KZN legislature. Subse-quently the IFP dropped many of its demandsand later drafts accepted that a provincial con-stitution had to conform to the national consti-tutional guidelines.

The exercise of provincial power by opposi-tion parties in both the Western Cape and KZNalso led to delays in the scheduling of localgovernment elections in those two provinces.Whereas the rest of the country voted in thefirst democratic local government elections inNovember 1995, parts of the Western Cape andall of KZN had to wait for the following year,

owing to various demarcation disputes. InKZN, the IFP was determined to ensure a rolefor traditional leaders in the transitional region-al councils that would represent residents inrural areas. Ultimately local elections did takeplace in June 1996. The dispute, and the delay,indicated that substantial provincial variationsexisted with respect to the acceptable form ofgovernment in the country.

4. THE PROVINCIAL LEGISLATIVE RECORDThe flow of legislation emanating from provin-cial government has been slow. This is partlyowing to the restricted areas of exclusive leg-islative competence. As a result, most of thelaws passed by provincial government havebeen of a technical nature, designed to bringvarious provincial practices in line with nation-al legislation or the Constitution. Aside fromlegislation of a technical nature, provincial leg-islatures have enacted laws that provide region-al institutions with an enabling framework fornational legislation.

The Development Facilitation Act (DFA) of1995 is a case in point. The DFA was designedto speed up the delivery of basic services byeliminating procedures and regulations – muchof them inherited from the apartheid era, andnow encumbering government with excessiveduplication. In order to respond to differentneeds in the provinces, the DFA provided forregional development tribunals that wouldenable public participation in the selection ofdevelopment priorities in the provinces. As partof this process, provinces were able to developtheir own parallel legislation. In KZN, where apolitical rivalry between the ANC and the IFPpersists, efforts to draft provincial enabling leg-islation for the DFA to be implemented nevertook route. The result is that developmentefforts that KZN must continue to respond toare an often-bewildering array of regulationsthat differ between urban and rural areas, andfrom district to district within the province.Table 5 summarises the provincial legislativerecord for the period 1994-1997.

As table 5 indicates, provincial legislatureshave passed relatively few pieces of legislation.In addition to their limited legislative output,provincial legislatures have met for a relativelyfew number of days each year. The provinciallegislatures have not typically convened forextended sittings. For example, the Northern

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Province legislature sat 23 days in 1994, 38 in1995, 45 in 1996 and 42 in 1997. As these fig-ures indicate, there is an overall trend of length-ier legislative sittings. But to take anotherexample, the KZN legislature only sat for 27days in 1996, passing 12 pieces of legislation.In response to this record, the ANC complainedthat: “This is totally unacceptable. We cannotget bills through the House because we spendhalf our time correcting technical mistakes.”21

All three counts (the brief length of the leg-islative sessions, the limited amount of legisla-tion passed and the type of legislation) indicatethe relatively narrow scope of provincial pow-ers under the Constitution. Under a harsherlight, these considerations may also indicateunderperformance on the part of provincialgovernment. But the limited legislative outputat provincial level is also due to the lack ofcapacity at provincial level. This assessmentcannot be based solely on the criteria above,but it can be supported with reference to theadministrative and financial management in theprovinces.

5. PROVINCIAL GOVERNANCEThe provinces employ some 800 000 of thecountry’s 1.15 million public servants. Asmany as 400 000 of these may have been inher-ited from the former homeland administrations.Moreover, provincial government holds severallabour-intensive functions such as health andnon-tertiary education, thereby contributing tothe high number of provincial civil servants.22

If one excludes these categories, the provincesemploy just over 230 000 people, or 20.13% ofthe entire civil service. Even so, this figure isnearly three times the total number of non-uni-formed (excludes defence force and police)

civil servants employed by the national govern-ment (76 513 persons).

In addition to the large absolute number ofprovincial civil servants, the distribution ofcivil servants across the provinces is alsoskewed. The Constitution delegates the samefunctions to every province and yet the ratio ofcivil servants to population varies greatly fromprovince to province.23 For example, inGauteng, there is a ratio of one civil servant toevery 58 persons, whereas in the Eastern Cape,the ratio is one for every 42 persons (theprovincial average is 47). This might be inter-preted that Gauteng is using its civil servantsmore effectively than is the Eastern Cape. Butif we exclude the health and education sectorsof public employees, the ratio is quite different.The ratio of “other” civil servants to provincialpopulation in Gauteng becomes 142 (theprovincial average) and the Eastern Capebecomes 261. Given the other difficulties expe-rienced in the Eastern Cape provincial adminis-tration, this ratio suggests that the civil servicein the Eastern Cape is vastly overstretched. Theimplication for public sector restructuring isthat depending on which ratio is consideredacceptable, one province or another would beaffected by significant retrenchments, rationali-sation of services, or additional national toprovincial financial transfers.

Since 1994, government at all levels in SouthAfrica has been preoccupied with improvinggovernment administration and the delivery ofservices while keeping an eye on financial sus-tainability. In 1997, Paseka Ncholo, DirectorGeneral of Public Service and Administrationreleased a report on governance within the nineprovinces.24 The report signalled that nationalgovernment policy was often set without dueconsideration to the organisational, financialand service delivery implications in theprovinces. National government was furthercriticised for insufficient provision of supportin respect of capacity, clarity over managementof key functions and adequate communications.

Provinces shared a number of common prob-lems. Among them were: political interferencein administration, over centralisation of man-agement, weak strategic planning, poor budgetformulation and spending controls, insufficientdepartmental organisation and inappropriatehuman resource distribution. This report foundthat three provinces – the Eastern Cape, KZN

Table 5: Provincial acts/laws – 1994–1997

Province 1994 1995 1996 1997

Eastern Cape 5 12 3 9Free State 6 6 13 7Gauteng 3 6 11 10KwaZulu-Natal 9 4 12 10Mpumulanga 8 8 5 4Northern Cape 8 6 5 7Northern Province 6 9 8 4North West 24 16 4 11Western Cape 12 8 8 13

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and Northern Province – were on the verge ofcollapse. Perhaps not surprisingly, each of theseprovinces had inherited former homelandadministrations. The report identified furtherproblems in financial management, humanresource management, chronic staff shortages,and the prevalence of fraud and theft. Planningwas not coordinated and the salary bill was dis-torted by double payments and a high numberof “supernumeraries” (those employees who nolonger have a designated post but continue todraw a salary; most supernumeraries were leftover after the amalgamation of homelandadministrations). Poor communication and inef-fective and centralised management hamperedeffective policy implementation.

The 1998 Presidential Review Commission(PRC) also directed its attention to theprovinces. It did not intend to replicate thework of the Ncholo provincial audits, choosinginstead to evaluate five provinces: KZN,Gauteng, Northern Province, Eastern Cape andWestern Cape. The PRC was mandated toreview the structure of all levels of governmentwith an eye to improving government structure,administration and service delivery. The PRCidentified five principle issues from theprovinces surveyed for the report:• Widespread confusion over the different roles

of political and administrative leadership.• Range of problems in human resource man-

agement.• Overcentralised financial decision-making

and poor management of funds.• General lack of strategic planning.• Poor state of information technology.25

The PRC therefore confirmed many of the find-ings of the Ncholo audits. It found that theNorthern Province and the Eastern Cape hadthe most serious capacity problems and urgedcentral government “to maintain constant vigi-lance over these two provinces” and further:

“The National Government should thereforenot hesitate, in certain dire circumstances,to resume functions delegated to certainprovinces or their departments, where thoseprovinces provide irrefutable evidence ofinability to carry on those functions.”26

The PRC noted that it was a sad but unintendedconsequence of the federal system of govern-ment in South Africa – as well as the sunsetclauses regarding the entrenchment of publicsector employees agreed to in the negotiations

prior to the 1994 elections – that public servicewas in a deplorable condition in some provin-ces. The existence of the provinces had tendedto consolidate the bloated civil service of theformer homelands and given the poor financialcontrol of some of those former areas it was notsurprising that the current systems were defec-tive.27 Of equal importance, however, was thePRC recommendation that central governmentshould re-visit the role and powers of provin-cial government. This theme would assumeincreased prominence as the 1999 electionsapproached.

6. FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITYThe Interim Constitution of 1993 stipulated thatprovinces are entitled to an equitable share ofrevenue collected nationally. There are twosteps to this process: first, resources must bedivided between national and provincial gov-ernments (a vertical division), and second, thetotal provincial share must then be dividedamong the nine provinces (a horizontal divi-sion). Transfers to provincial government maybe affected by changes in population, policiesthat affect provincial government’s ability toraise its own revenue, and the changing distrib-ution of responsibility for service deliveryamong national, provincial and local govern-ment. For example, national legislationdesigned to address backlogs in infrastructureand services may impose a greater or lesserfinancial and administrative burden on someprovinces than others. Meeting national policystandards therefore imposes direct financialcosts on the provinces. Further still, legislationpassed during the period 1994–1999 withrespect to housing delivery has added moreresponsibility for local government, over whichprovincial government has political oversight.The overall picture for provincial governmentsis therefore one of a moving playing field.Some of these dimensions are sketched in thesection that follows.

The Borrowing Powers of Provincial Govern-ment Act of 1996 regulates provincial spendingpower. The Budget Council (comprising theMinister of Finance and the provincial MECsfor Finance) decided that provinces would notborrow in the financial years 1997–1998 and1998–1999. However, a number of provinceswere forced to use overdrafts at commercialbanks to cover basic salary and administration

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costs during this period. In 1997, both FinanceMinister Trevor Manuel and ConstitutionalAffairs Minister Valli Moosa warned provinceswhich overspent that political heads and direc-tor-generals would be held responsible.28

Projected overruns for the 1997–1998 finan-cial year were R8 billion – approximately 10%of the budgeted provincial allocation of R80.8billion.29 The Eastern Cape’s overspending wasthe highest, projected at R2.7 billion.30 In fact,provincial budget deficits were stabilised some-what in 1997–1998, running a 2.3% deficit andby 1998–1999, two of the provinces in theworst financial shape, the Eastern Cape andKZN – ran in-year surpluses.31 In his 1999 bud-get speech, Finance Minister Trevor Manuelpraised the provinces for their efforts to controloverexpenditures.32

Nevertheless, the overall state of provincialfinances remains precarious. Some haveblamed provincial overspending on the wagebill of provincial public servants and the inabil-ity, or unwillingness, of provincial governmentto retrench public sector workers. The 1998wage bill, as a percentage of provincial bud-gets, ranged from a low of 55% in the WesternCape to a high of 65.4% in the NorthernProvince.33 Labour relations play a role in thisdynamic with tabled wage demands rangingfrom 9.5% to 15.0%. Increased spending onwages leaves provinces no choice but to cutcapital expenditure; a recipe that only leads to afurther downward spiral in the poorerprovinces.34

Others have cited the responsibility ofprovincial governments to extend services tothose who had previously been excluded fromaccess to public services. Furthermore, the costof integrating former homeland bureaucrats(approximately 400 000 employees) has to betaken into account. To alleviate the financialburden of past practices by these bureaucrats,national government absorbed R1 billion incash debts run up by the former homelandsprior to 1994.35 These debts were largely in theform of overdrafts, with loans to the formerhomelands having been absorbed by nationalgovernment in 1996. Finally, attention has alsobeen focused on improving the budget skillsand spending practices in the provinces toensure that provincial administrations draftrealistic and sustainable budgets.

Provinces have highly restricted revenue-

raising powers and are dependent on centralgovernment for their fiscal status. At present,provincial own revenue amounts to only 5% oftheir total budget and is collected primarilyfrom user charges such as motor vehicle licens-ing and hospital fees. The remainder of provin-cial revenue comes from central government.Central government has thus far rejected pro-posals to enable provinces to collect a sur-charge on personal income tax. Given the ques-tions raised about provincial administrativecapacity, central government is wary of sharingtax powers with the provinces.

In the medium term, provinces must improvetheir expenditure controls while cutting costsbefore the national government does it forthem. But provinces face a number of chal-lenges in this regard:• Provinces do not control salary levels; these

are negotiated at national level. • Provinces have very limited retrenchment

powers. • National policy decisions, such as the exten-

sion of free health care to pregnant womenand children under the age of six, eat intoprovincial revenue by reducing hospital feeswhile increasing service costs.

• The national Department of Finance began totransfer money on a weekly, not monthlybasis. As a result provinces can no longerearn the interest on unspent money throughthe residual weeks of the month.36

• Costs in the big three – services, education,health and welfare – are difficult to drivedownwards without provincial governmentbearing the political costs of an unhappyelectorate.

Against this background provinces are likely toface ever-tightening fiscal options.

7. POLITICAL INTRIGUE AND PROVINCIAL PERFORMANCELodge argues that federal politics in SouthAfrica since 1994 has vastly increased the com-plexity for the ANC running its own innerorganisational life.37 Between 1994 and 1998there were three changes of leadership (FreeState, Gauteng and Eastern Cape) in the sevenANC-led provinces and two of them (Free Stateand Gauteng) were highly contested. The ANChas also faced considerable internal dissent inMpumulanga were the premier and members ofhis executive committee have been investigated

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for fraud. Part of the problem lies with the needfor the ANC to expand rapidly to fill all of theposts it achieved after the 1994 elections. Insome cases political “outsiders” were calledupon, “deployed” in the language of the ANC,to fill the new positions. In other instances,rivalries developed when different individualsheld the posts of provincial party leader andpremier. And at a more general level, ANCmembers were still learning the ropes in termsof running a government.

The ANC was not alone in changing leader-ship in the provinces. KZN has had three pre-miers since 1994. In turn, Frank Mdlalose, BenNgubane, and most recently, Lionel Mtshalihave rotated into the premier’s office as a resultof internal party shake-ups within the IFP. Inthe Western Cape, Gerald Morkel of the NPreplaced Hernus Kriel in April 1998 followingKriel’s resignation.

Changes in provincial leadership did not stopin the run-up to the 1999 elections. In anattempt to avoid these intra-party rivalries andchallenges the ANC executive adopted the rec-ommendation that in future, premiers will beappointed by national structures. As a result ofthis policy, the ANC removed three of its cur-rent premiers (Free State, Gauteng and Mpu-mulanga) from the top spot when it selectedcandidates for the provincial party lists.

Explaining the ANC national executive’sdecision, ANC Secretary-General KgalemaMothlanthe dismissed the interpretation that thenational leadership was disciplining provincialleaders. Instead, he said that ANC PresidentThabo Mbeki was merely exercising his prerog-ative to appoint candidates for the top spot ofthe provincial list: “It’s only fair, because theANC is more concerned with the ability to runthe provincial administration than the populari-ty of an individual. The same prerogative goesto the premier, who has the power to appointMECs.”38 For some, this move reflects yetanother indication that the ANC national execu-tive is set to trim the power of the provinces.39

While the future of the provinces is underscrutiny from the party elite, it has alsoreceived mixed reviews from below. Publicperceptions of provincial government provideyet another perspective with which to evaluatethe track record and viability of this tier of gov-ernment. A Human Sciences Research Council(HSRC) survey indicated substantial provincial

variations in perceptions of the way in whichthe country is being run.40 Only in North West(60%) and Free State (56%) were a majority ofrespondents satisfied with the way South Africais being run. In the rest of the provinces, themajority were dissatisfied. Nationwide, 49%were dissatisfied with the way the country isbeing run, and slightly more than a third (37%)were satisfied. This figure marks a substantialdecline from the 64% who claimed to be satis-fied with the way the country was being run in1994.

On the whole, one-third of respondents(32%) are satisfied with the way in which theirprovince is run. With regard to provincial gov-ernment, for every five satisfied respondentsthere are nine who are dissatisfied. In theprovinces governed by opposition parties – theWestern Cape and KZN – respondents are evenmore dissatisfied than the average SouthAfrican resident with the way in which both thecountry and the province are being run. How-ever, the ANC-run provinces of the NorthernCape and Northern Province joined them in thiscategory. The average satisfaction rates withboth national and provincial government werehigher in the Free State, Mpumulanga, Gautengand North West.

8. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT PROSPECTSThe 1999 elections reflected the continuing tur-bulence of provincial government. The WesternCape and KZN remained hotly contestedprovinces. Further, whereas the ANC hasretained power in seven of the nine provincesas this chapter has argued, the future status ofprovincial leadership and provincial administra-tion cannot be taken for granted. Provincialgovernment in South Africa will continue toface challenges on four main fronts:• The ongoing federalism debate is unlikely to

subside as many opposition parties press forgreater power at provincial level. The emer-gence of two new parties with substantialprovincial levels of electoral support (theUDM in the Eastern Cape and the UCDP inthe North West) indicate that ANC hegemo-ny cannot be taken for granted. Further, former homeland leaders lead both of theseparties, and they may therefore present a pairof wildcards at provincial level.

• The ANC itself occupies an uneasy seat ofnational–provincial relations within its lead-

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ership structures, and between leaders andsupporters. In the immediate aftermath of theelections there is a spirit of triumph, but asthe experience since 1994 has indicated, lead-ership challenges, regional divisions, andinternal debate are likely to remain featuresof ANC internal relations.

• The ongoing fiscal crisis at provincial leveland the role of national payments to provin-cial government are both likely to keepprovincial financial administrators in thenews. The South African economy remains atense balancing act and government revenuearrangements are themselves very much tiedto a policy of fiscal prudence. The pressureon provincial government to get fiscal mat-ters under control is therefore likely to con-tinue.

• While the overall constitutional status ofprovincial government is highly unlikely tochange, there will most certainly be discus-sion about the relative powers and status ofprovincial government within the context ofcooperative governance. In May 1999, ANCSecretary-General Kgalema Motlantherevealed that discussion on the future statusof the provinces could start soon after theJune elections. He stated that the view withinthe ANC was that cities such as Durban,Cape Town and Johannesburg were of“greater importance than some provincialgovernments because they have biggerresponsibilities”.41 Motlanthe compared thecity of Durban to the Free State province andconcluded that “it is obvious that the mayor

of Durban has more responsibilities anddemands than the premier of the Free State:the Durban metropolitan budget is even big-ger than Namibia’s”.42 Motlanthe acknowl-edged that many current provincial leaderswould surely resist any perceived demotionin power.

But is the size of the budget really the measureof the importance of a tier of government?Friedman argues that provinces were meant tobe vehicles for democracy, not management ofservice provision.43

Friedman reminds us that provinces providevoters and parties a stake in the electoral sys-tem if they cannot win power at national level.That way they are not relegated merely to criti-cising, but can try to put some of their ideasinto practise in their region.

CONCLUSIONFor these and other reasons discussed in thispaper, provincial government will thereforeremain an important centre of attention forreform and debate. While the debate betweenthose who advocate a unitary and centrist con-ception of the state versus those who prefer astrongly federal South Africa has been settledin favour of the compromise of cooperativegovernance, provincial government’s relativestatus is still open for discussion. This fluiditywill also persist in terms of provincial govern-ment’s performance. Some provinces willshine, while others will continue to struggle toachieve their policy goals. The one certainty isthat the debate will remain vigorous.

ENDNOTES

1) This paper is an adaptation of a paper pub-lished in Andrew Reynolds, ed. Election 99South Africa: From Mandela to Mbeki

(Oxford: James Currey, Cape Town: DavidPhilip, New York: St. Martin’s, 2000).

2) Tom Lodge, South African Politics Since

48

Pottie

1994 (Cape Town and Johannesburg:David Philip, 1999), p.13.

3) T.R.H. Davenport, The Transfer of Powerin South Africa (Cape Town: David Philip,1998), p.64.

4) G.E. Devenish, A Commentary on theSouth African Constitution (Durban:Butterworths, 1998), p.169.

5) Lodge, p. 25.6) For a detailed analysis of the 1994 election

results in South Africa see AndrewReynolds, ed. Election ’94: The Cam-paigns, Results and Future Prospects(Cape Town: David Philip, 1994).

7) For detailed tables of 1999 election resultssee: Electoral Institute of Southern Africa,National and Provincial Election Results:South African Elections, June 1999(Johannesburg: EISA, 1999).

8) ANC – African National Congress; NP – National Party; NNP – New NationalParty; IFP – Inkatha Freedom Party; FF – Freedom Front; DP – DemocraticParty; PAC – Pan-Africanist Congress;ACDP – African Christian DemocraticParty; MF – Minority Front; UDM –United Democratic Movement; UCDP –United Christian Democratic Party.

9) However, for ordinary bills not affectingthe provinces each delegate has one vote.

10) The IFP did win seats in Gauteng, but itgained an insufficient percentage of thevote to gain representation in the NCOPdelegation from Gauteng.

11) The FF does have members in seven pro-vincial legislatures, but gained an insuffi-cient percentage of the vote in two of thoseprovinces to gain representation in theNCOP delegation from those provinces.

12) South African Institute of Race Relations,1994/95 Race Relations Survey (Johannes-burg: SAIRR, 1995), p. 351.

13) The Daily Dispatch, 26 August 1997.14) Mayibuye, May 1995, p. 9.15) Constitution of South Africa, 1996,

Schedule 5, Part A.16) Constitution, Sec 44(2) read with Sec 76(1).17) See Schedule 4, Constitution.18) Constitution, Sec 104 (5).19) Constitution, Sec 150.

20) Constitution, Sec 104 (1a).21) The Daily News, 4 December 1996.22) J.P. Landman. “How big and how costly is

the civil service?” Centre for PolicyStudies, Policy Brief 4, July 1998. p.3.

23) Ibid. p.4.24) Department of Public Service and

Administration, The Provincial ReviewReport, August 1997.

25) Developing a Culture of Good Gover-nance: Report of the Presidential ReviewCommission on the Reform and Trans-formation of the Public Service in SouthAfrica, 27 February 1998, Sec 2.6.4.

26) Ibid.27) Ibid.28) Daily Dispatch, 26 August 1997.29) South African Institute of Race Relations,

Survey 1997/98 (Johannesburg: SAIRR,1998), p. 485.

30) Early in 1998, the MECs for Education andWelfare were removed from their posts inthe Eastern Cape owing to the inability ofthe provincial government to pay pensions.

31) Business Day, 12 March 1998.32) Business Day, 18 February 1999.33) The Sunday Times, 22 March 1998.34) Finance Minister Trevor Manuel has stated

that public sector personnel costs hadincreased 12.2% a year between 1995 and1998. In 1999, personnel costs wouldaccount for about 51% of non-interest statespending. Minister of Finance, BudgetSpeech, 17 February 1999.

35) Business Day, 9 April 1998.36) Private service providers who rely on gov-

ernment contracts are also caught in thisspiral when government is slow to pay feesor cuts back on its demand for services.The Sunday Times, 2 May 1999.

37) Lodge, p. 16.38) The Sunday Independent, 16 May 1999.39) The Sunday Times, 25 April 1999.40) Human Sciences Research Council, Media

Release, 11 March 1999.41) The Sunday Independent, 16 May 1999.42) Ibid.43) Stephen Friedman, “Why we need provin-

cial governments,” Business Day, 9 March1999.

INTRODUCTIONThere have been concerns regarding the ratio-nale behind the plan of Igoli 2002. One sourceof acrimony is between the service providers ofthis new Johannesburg Unicity MetropolitanCouncil (JUMC), who have embarked on theplan, and the average citizen who is supposedto benefit from the successful implementationof the unicity concept.

1. UNICITY STRUCTURE AND AIMSThe new JUMC – comprising Midrand,Modderfontein, the Northern, Eastern, Westernand Southern Metropolitan local councils – isdestined to introduce major changes in theadministrative, operational and financial struc-tures of the Greater Johannesburg MetropolitanArea and its environs. Igoli 2002 managementenvisages that such changes:

“will address the problem of fragmentationin political governance and within the coun-cil’s administrative structures. GreaterJohannesburg, including Midrand, willimprove the city’s leading position withinthe national economy and its ability toextend service provision to residents,ratepayers and business.”1

2. CUSTOMER SERVICEOf interest are the planned central distributionservice functions: metropolitan police services,heritage services, emergency management ser-vices and planning services. These decen-tralised regional administrations will providelocal communities with health care, social ser-vices, housing, libraries and sport and recre-ation facilities.

3. UTILITIES, AGENCIES AND CORPORATISEDENTITIESPerhaps of greater significance is the establish-ment of utilities, agencies and corporatisedentities (UACs). These are essentiallyautonomous business enterprises which are tooperate under the Companies Act. Their majorresponsibility will be developing businessplans, which will focus on:• service delivery• customer care improvements• environmental protection• efficiency• profitability• safety standards• social and economic development• innovative income-generating ideas.The city will, however, continue to be associat-ed with the enterprises by: determining theirareas of operation; granting licences; acting asshareholders; drawing dividends from utilities;providing subsidies for agencies; determiningtariffs and capital expenditure; human re-sources development; and corporate planningand quality control.2

4. THE FINANCIAL PLANThe financial plan “focuses on achieving finan-cial sustainability by reducing the operatingdeficit, improving payment levels, reducingwastage, improving efficiency and increasingcapital expenditure to sustainable levels”.3

5. FULFILLING A MANDATEIgoli 2002 is premised on section 152 of theConstitution, which mandates local govern-ment to:

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Igoli 2002: Towards a Megacity Government

Sam Kongwa

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Kongwa

• provide democratic and accountable govern-ment for local communities

• ensure the provision of services to communi-ties in a sustainable manner

• promote social and economic development• promote a safe and healthy environment• encourage the involvement of communities

and community organisations in matters oflocal government.

6. OVERALL OBJECTIVESThe overall objectives of Igoli 2002 are totransform the Greater Johannesburg region byenhancing service delivery, promoting accessi-bility, encouraging and facilitating communityparticipation and promoting political involve-ment and policy making. Ultimately, it is hopedthat Johannesburg will be an efficient city – onewhich will be pleasurable to live in and pos-sessing an enabling environment to attractinvestors.

In order to ensure that Igoli 2002 objectivesare consolidated and go beyond the short- andmedium-term, Igoli 2010 – a long-term per-spective – has already been presented to gov-ernment, business, labour and the community.

7. HUMANKIND IS BECOMING PREDOMINANTLYURBANThe move by Greater Johannesburg towards amegacity government reflects a global trend,and mankind’s inability to control the forcesdictating this trend:• For the first time in human history there are

more people living in urban areas than in thecountryside, and this proportion of urbandwellers is increasing at a much faster ratethan ever expected.

• The world urban population increased from29% in 1950, to 47% in 1998 and is projectedto reach 55% in 2015.

• In Europe and North America, it is estimatedthat four out of five people are urban-dwellers.4

• The developing world is fast following thistrend. In 1950 the top five world’s most pop-ulous cities were New York, Tokyo, London,Paris and Moscow. Today, London, Paris andMoscow have been succeeded by MexicoCity, São Paulo and Mumbai (Bombay). It isprojected that by 2015, the top five will beLagos, Shanghai, Mumbai, Jakarta andTokyo.

• In 1975, there were only five megacities inthe world with ten million plus people. In1995, this had increased to 15 and it is esti-mated that by 2015 the number will increaseto 26.

8. REASONS FOR THE MEGACITY TRENDUrban dwellers have been attracted and encour-aged by the globalisation of commerce, tradeand industry. This globalisation process takesplace predominantly in the urban areas. Morepeople therefore flock to cities and towns for:opportunities; services created in the worldwide web (www) process; recreation; educationand development skills; the emotional valuecreated by the bright lights of the city’s sloganand as centres for international communication.

In addition, the increasing mechanisation ofthe main employment rural sector – agriculture– has reduced employment opportunities in thissector, and therefore forces people to migrate tocities. As globalisation of the world economyincreases, there are likely to be more peopleleaving rural areas and heading for the“promised land” of the megacity where oftenthey will encounter unemployment, homeless-ness, crime, worse poverty and even less waterand good sanitation.

9. IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRACYOur concern with this trend as political scien-tists is not so much about the socio-economicconsequences, but about the political implica-tions; about decentralisation and its impact ondemocracy, and about the future of provincialgovernment in South Africa and worldwide.

Problems caused by this inexorable globaltrend towards the megacity concept – andtherefore the danger that Igoli 2002 poses – aremany. These include:• People’s loss of participation in the political

process. • Increasing amalgamation of cities, leading to

a megacity, is an affront on local politicalautonomy.

• The activities of the envisaged GreaterJohannesburg Metropolitan area, for exam-ple, are so enormous and of such vital impor-tance to the national economy, that centralgovernment is increasingly involved in theirplanning, operations and funding.

The exercise becomes a central governmentshow. Already the Department of Finance has

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budgeted for a R550 million grant to kick-startthe Igoli 2002 process. Central governmentinvolvement tends to debilitate local democra-cy.

Lessons from other countries which havegone through the process that Igoli 2002 pro-poses, confirm that local participation in theprocess is often the first casualty. This fact wasconfirmed in a recent report published after theamalgamation of several small Canadian citiesand towns:

“The move towards government efficiencycan hamper the public’s ability to partici-pate in the political process. What is givenup is immediate participation. People willfeel less access to their government.”5

The fusion of towns, municipalities and citiesled to a reduction in the number of local politi-cians, and thus less representation.

It appears that this loss is acknowledged byeverybody, but those in favour of amalgama-tion express a cynical defence of this assault onlocal democracy by saying that the loss of par-ticipation in local democracy is a price worthpaying. A Canadian professor argues, for exam-ple, that “the multiplicity of governments andmunicipalities is an impediment to growth”. Hegoes on to point out that economic growth ishindered when potential investors are forced tovisit several municipalities, in one region, toobtain services and information.

CONCLUSIONDrawing from international experience, we findthat even within original decentralised provin-cial governments, amalgamation produced verypowerful and often arrogant executive mayors,such as New York City’s ex-Mayor Giuliani. Itis interesting that Igoli 2002 does not evenmention this aspect.

The argument of the advocates of amalgama-tion is the same: amalgamation will result inconsiderable cost-savings as a result ofeconomies of scale, and less duplication of ser-vices. But these savings – which no amalgama-tion has proved – are often not passed on to theordinary people; they usually go into the pock-ets of new bureaucrats – of the entrepreneurs ofthe corporatised utilities and services.

Political education is difficult to promote in amegacity because of its sheer size. Local issuesdisappear from the political agenda. The onlyrelevant issues are those concerning nationalpolitical parties because the stakes are now toohigh and the central politicians are reluctant toleave the stage of the Greater Johannesburgunicity to the local community or to indepen-dents. Invariably, the same party ruling at thecentre rules in the megacity, leading to the dis-appearance of political accountability.

To sum up: the concept of Igoli 2002 shouldbe “killed” because it does not advance democ-racy.

1) Igoli News, July 2000. p. 2.2) Igoli 2002: Making Greater Johannesburg

Work, Greater Johannesburg MetropolitanCouncil, July 2000, provides a detailedplan.

3) Ibid., p. 8.

4) Fred Pearce, Metropolitan Monsters,Geographical Magazine, February 2000vol. 72, no. 2, discusses this trend, the char-acteristics of megacities and the economicimpact.

5) Ibid. discusses this point.

ENDNOTES

INTRODUCTIONIt is widely accepted among scholars that pub-lic participation in political processes is avirtue in its own right, and a sine qua non of ademocracy (Dowse and Hughes, 1986:266). Ahealthy democracy is generally seen as one inwhich the citizens participate regularly in for-mal political activities,1 despite the lack ofagreement among scholars about the requirednature and degree of participation.2

There is a wide variety of approaches to thestudy of public participation in political activi-ties. Three of these have particular relevance tothis paper: • The first looks at levels/degree of participa-

tion in political activities, and focuses onelectoral turnout (Rose, 1980; Crewe, 1981;Borg, 1995); involvement in campaign activ-ity (Kenny, 1993); involvement in interestgroups (Le Roy, 1995); active membershipof a political party, etc.

• The second looks at the social variables thatinfluence individual and group participationin political activities, and includes studies ofsocio-economic status (Tingsten, 1937:155);education (Linder, 1994: 95-6; Powell, 1986:27-8; Seligson et. al., 1995:166-71; Muller et.al., 1987; Lijphart, 1997:2-3), environment3(Kenny, 1993); race (Olsen, 1970); ethnicity;gender; personality (Campbell et. al, 1960;Dowse and Hughes, 1986:279ff), etc.

• The third approach examines attitudinal rea-sons for non-participation, and includes stud-ies of apathy and lack of interest (Campbell,1962; Milbrath, 1972; Verba, Nie and Kim,1971); cynicism about political influencethrough participation4 (Agger, Goldstein and

Pearl, 1961; Baker, 1973; Brody, 1978);alienation from the political system5 (Brodyand Page, 1973; Olsen, 1969); etc.

However, the overwhelming majority of stud-ies on political participation focus on electiondata. Thus, voter turnout is used to determinelevels/degree of participation. The social vari-ables influencing participation are determinedby examining the various social characteristicsof voters, and attitudinal reasons for non-par-ticipation are determined by focusing on non-voters.

The introduction of a new democracy inSouth Africa provides a range of possibilitiesto extend the study of political participationbeyond the focus on election data for two rea-sons, both arising from the introduction offorms of participatory and direct democracy.6

Firstly, the new democracy has entrenched anumber of processes and established a varietyof institutions for citizen participation at alllevels of the political structure. These includemechanisms for public participation, for exam-ple, through the Integrated DevelopmentPlanning (IDP) processes at the local level,petitions and public hearings in the legislativeprocess at provincial and national level, Greenand White Paper processes of provincial andnational government departments, etc. In addi-tion, a number of consultative forums havebeen introduced since 1994 to engage civilsociety actively in the legislative, policy-mak-ing and planning processes of government atlocal, provincial and national levels.

Secondly, there is a statutory (including insome cases, a constitutional) obligation forinstitutions at all levels of the political structure

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Public Participation in ProvincialLegislative Processes in South Africa

Gregory Houston

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to facilitate public participation in theirprocesses. Local authorities, for example, arelegally obliged to facilitate public participationin their IDP processes, while provincial andnational legislatures have a similar constitution-al obligation. Democratic governance in SouthAfrica therefore goes beyond the establishmentof processes and structures for public participa-tion to include the requirement that institutionsof governance actively engage with civil soci-ety in the process of carrying out their activi-ties. The result has been the establishment of anumber of processes and structures to facilitatepublic participation by civil society, both asindividuals and as members of collectivities, inthe legislative, policy-making and planningprocesses of organs of governance.

This paper examines public participation inprovincial legislative processes in South Africa,which are defined as voluntary activities bywhich members of the public, directly or indi-rectly, share in the legislative activities ofprovincial legislatures.7 The paper begins withan examination of the statutory and other provi-sions for public participation in legislativeprocesses, and the steps taken by various legislatures to educate the population about par-ticipation processes as well as to facilitate pub-lic participation. This is followed by an analysisof levels of public participation in variousprocesses, knowledge about the legislature andlegislative processes, intention to participate invarious processes, and perceptions of ability toinfluence government decisions.

At present no other study exists which exam-ines public participation in the legislativeprocesses by focusing on levels/degree of polit-ical participation in South Africa. However,this is a preliminary study, and focuses on theregional and racial dimensions of public partici-pation in legislative processes. The study there-fore tries not to exhaust the range of social andattitudinal factors that influence individual par-ticipation in democratic governance. The focusis on knowledge and understanding of politicalprocesses and institutions, intention to partici-pate and perceptions of the ability to influencegovernment decisions as factors underlying lev-els/degree of citizen participation. The exis-tence of participatory democratic structures andprocesses present a range of possibilities for thestudy of public participation in democratic gov-ernance in South Africa. Such studies may, for

example, examine the influence of varioussocial factors such as education, socio-econom-ic status, ethnicity, age, environment, and gen-der on levels/degree of public participation indemocratic governance. Attitudinal studiescould examine non-participation by focusing onapathy, lack of political efficacy, etc. Theycould also focus on a range of participatoryprocesses, such as the IDP processes of localgovernment structures, participation in the poli-cy-making processes of national governmentdepartments, etc.

1. STATUTORY AND OTHER MEASURES FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATIONIt is necessary to begin by establishing theimportance of public participation in the leg-islative processes of a democracy through ananalysis of the role of its legislative structures.The South African Constitution (Act 108 of1996) sets out two broad powers for the nation-al and provincial legislatures: legislation andoversight. Section 114 of the Constitution readsas follows:

(1) “In exercising its legislative power, aprovincial legislature may –

a. consider, pass, amend or reject any Billbefore the legislature; and b. initiate or prepare legislation, exceptmoney bills.

(2) A provincial legislature must provide formechanisms –

(a) to ensure that all provincial executiveorgans of state in the province areaccountable to it; and(b) to maintain oversight of –

(i) the exercise of provincial executiveauthority in the province, including theimplementation of legislation; and (ii) any provincial organ of state.”

Sections 55 and 68 of the Constitution make thesame provisions for the National Assembly andNational Council of Provinces (NCOP), respec-tively.

First, legislatures are charged with consider-ing, passing, amending or rejecting any billplaced before them by the executive, and withinitiating or preparing legislation. They are thusmeant to be deliberative bodies, and not simplystructures that serve as “rubber stamps” for theexecutive. In dealing with legislation initiatedby the executive, legislatures provide theopportunity for elected representatives to scru-

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tinise draft legislation for their practicality, rel-evance, comprehensiveness, clarity, anticipatedimpact, constitutionality, etc., and to introduceother views – such as those of the public andthe opposition – in the legislative process (referto Proctor, 1999:12).

Legislatures can also initiate legislation inareas where the executive has failed, or isreluctant, to take the initiative. This can comefrom two sources: the standing committees orprivate members’ bills. Provincial legislaturesalso have the capacity to take legislation intothe NCOP, which is also tasked with initiatinglegislation. Thus, through their representationin the second chamber of the National Parlia-ment, members of provincial legislatures caninitiate legislation in the national legislaturethat has broader application to all provinces.

Second, legislatures are charged with theresponsibility for due diligence and oversight.In this respect, the legislature is responsible formonitoring “the administration and effective-ness of the programmes that have been enactedinto law” (School of Government UWC,1998:2, cited in Senay and Besdziek, 1999:4).Senay and Besdziek (1999:6-7) point out that,among others, oversight must be exercised bythe provincial legislature over:• the work and activities of the executive coun-

cil, as well as of the provincial public admin-istration and other organs of state

• the policies drafted by the executive council,the administration and other organs of state

• the implementation of policies by the execu-tive, the administration and other organs ofstate

• the legislation drafted by the executive andadministration

• the impact of administrative action onprovincial residents.

In this task, the legislature is charged withmaintaining oversight over the executive and itsagencies, the exercise of their power andauthority, and the implementation of legislation(refer to Proctor, 1999:20). The oversight taskof the legislature is, of course, linked to theexecutive’s responsibility to account for itsfunctions and conduct:

“(I)t must respond to concerns and criti-cisms raised in parliament about its actionsbecause members of parliament are democ-ratically elected representatives of the peo-ple” (Senay and Besdziek, 1999:10).

The South African Constitution makes explicitthis responsibility of the provincial executive inSection 133.

(1) “The members of the executive councilof a province are responsible for the func-tions of the executive assigned to them bythe premier.(2) Members of the executive council of aprovince are accountable, collectively andindividually, to the legislature for the exer-cise of their powers and the performance oftheir functions.(3) Members of the executive council of aprovince must –

(a) act in accordance with the Constitu-tion and, if a provincial constitution hasbeen passed for the province, also thatconstitution; and(b) provide the legislature with full andregular reports concerning matters undertheir control”(cited in Senay and Besdziek, 1999:11).

Ian Sinclair (1982:70, cited in Maloka)summed up the oversight work of legislaturesas follows:

“… the main opportunities or proceduresfor the parliament to scrutinise and criticisethe government are through the debate onthe address in reply; the budget process;debates on particular bills … private members’ notices of motion and privatemembers’ bills; debates on matters of publicimportance and censure of a minister, mem-ber or government. Along with these proce-dures are the debates on government state-ments, petitions, and, of course, QuestionTime.”

The legislative and oversight tasks of legisla-tures are carried out in plenary sessions and instanding committees. Parliamentary committeeshave emerged as the most prominent institu-tions for holding the executive accountable andfor conducting the bulk of the legislature’sother work (refer to Proctor, 1999:20). Standingcommittees have the power to initiate policyand legislation as well as to exercise oversightover the executive and administration (Senayand Besdziek, 1999:16). The latter arises fromthe power they have to summon members ofthe executive council and departmental officialsto answer questions and to undertake investiga-tions into departmental activities. Standingcommittees also provide an opportunity for the

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legislature to hear interest groups and toinvolve the public in the policy and legislativeprocess (Kotzé 1997:18, cited in Senay andBesdziek, 1999:16).

Public input is essential in a legislature’s leg-islative and oversight responsibilities for a vari-ety of reasons. First, members of the provinciallegislature, as the representatives of the elec-torate of the province, are charged with accept-ing policies and laws arising from the execu-tive, as well as making or initiating policies andlaws that are consistent with the interests of thepopulation. This charge places a responsibilityon the legislature to obtain as much publicinput on proposed legislation as possible.Public input in the legislative process alsoallows a diversity of viewpoints to be aired(Hilliard and Kemp, 1999:46), thus allowingthe registration of popular support or oppositionto proposed legislation.

Second, the oversight responsibility of aprovincial legislature requires input from theprovincial population on issues of governancein order to enable the legislature to hold theexecutive accountable. Public input provides anunderstanding of needs and the impact of poli-cy and legislation, and promotes the develop-ment of priorities. It is through interaction withthe public that the legislature can know whatthe electorate expects from the government andwhether the implementation of policy and legis-lation is inadequate or not, and thereby promotethe development of priorities for the executiveauthority.

Furthermore, as Hilliard and Kemp (1999:43) put it, “(t)he citizen … has a surveillancerole to play to ensure that the public functionar-ies comply with the mandate that was grantedto them ... .”

Public accountability is made effectivethrough the public’s input in areas where publicfunctionaries fail to comply with the mandateto provide good, effective government. Ulti-mately, good governance is best served bythese consequences of public interaction withthe legislative authority.

Most important, however, public participa-tion in the legislative process and the account-ability and oversight tasks of legislatures isessential for long term democratic stability(refer to Khululekani Institute For Democracy,1999:1). Public participation promotes legiti-macy and public support for legislation and

government policies, and thereby ensuresdemocratic stability.

The most important mechanisms for publicinvolvement in the legislative processes are:lobbying by organised groups, the raising ofissues by constituents at parliamentary con-stituency offices,8 petitions and public hearings. • Lobbying is used by organised groups in civil

society to present well-reasoned arguments totargeted decision makers.9 It may includedetailed written representations outlining agroup’s views on a particular issue. Influen-tial decision makers may also be approachedpersonally. Lobbying is of particular rele-vance to organisations of civil society such astrade unions, business associations, voluntaryand mutual benefit associations, and advoca-cy and lobbying groups. A lobbying cam-paign, if it is strong enough, can give rise tochanges in proposed legislation, and canforce society to confront certain issues byfocusing attention on them.10

• Members of the public can raise issues at theconstituency offices of their elected represen-tatives, who then raise these issues in the leg-islature on their behalf. Thus, parliamentaryconstituency offices can contribute to the leg-islature’s accountability and oversight tasksby serving as a barometer of communityneeds, and helping to determine priorities(refer to Proctor, 1999:23). Furthermore,such offices provide a direct link with mem-bers of the legislature, and could therebyreduce delays in responding to citizens’ prob-lems (refer to Proctor, 1999:9).

• Petitions allow individuals or groups to raiseissues in a formal way without having to gothrough a particular member of the legisla-ture. They are useful mechanisms for unor-ganised sectors of society to come together toraise particular issues for consideration bythe legislative authority.

• Public hearings are normally convened bystanding committees and afford the public theopportunity to make a written and/or oralsubmission on any matter for which a publichearing has been convened. Here, both indi-viduals and groups have the opportunity totable a written comment or address the stand-ing committee on the relevant issue.

All legislative bodies at national and provinciallevels are required to facilitate public involve-ment in their legislative and other processes.

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Sections 59 and 72 of the South AfricanConstitution charge the National Assembly andthe Council of Provinces respectively withresponsibility for facilitating public participa-tion in the national legislative process. Forexample, Section 59 stipulates that:

(1) “The National Assembly must –(a) facilitate public involvement in thelegislative and other processes of theAssembly and its committees; and (b) conduct its business in an open man-ner, and hold its sittings, and those of itscommittees, in public, but reasonablemeasures may be taken –

(i) to regulate public access, includingaccess to the media, to the Assemblyand its committees; and(ii) to provide for the searching of anyperson and, where appropriate, therefusal of entry to, or the removal of,any person.

(2) The National Assembly may not excludethe public, including the media, from a sit-ting of a committee unless it is reasonableand justifiable to do so in an open anddemocratic society.”

The national legislature has set up the PublicParticipation and Information Section to facili-tate public participation in the legislativeprocess. This Section has set itself the follow-ing objectives:• Developing and providing information about

Parliament and promoting the understandingof the institution.

• Making Parliament accessible to the public.• Building Parliament’s profile as a key institu-

tion of democracy.• Supporting a public education campaign to

reach out to all South Africans, particularlymarginalised groups.

• Mobilising the media in providing informa-tion to the public about Parliament (Mbete-Kgositsile, 1999:5).

This office has two tasks: The first is to providepublic education about the workings of the legislature and the mechanisms for publicinvolvement in the legislative processes; andthe second is to facilitate the public’s use of themechanisms for public participation in the leg-islative processes.

The Public Participation and InformationSection has emphasised marginalised groups –the youth and women, particularly rural women

– in its efforts to canvass views from specificsectors of society regarding issues of particularimportance to them (Mbete-Kgositsile, 1999:6).Its public consultancy programmes are supple-mented by various programmes aimed at edu-cating the public about participation processes,and include the National Youth Parliament(NYP), which is a countrywide “edutainment”pilot project with each province represented byabout 15 schools at the provincial youth parlia-ments; community meetings and workshopsconducted at parliamentary constituencyoffices; and briefing sessions during whichmembers of parliament address visitors to par-liament on any relevant legislative topic (Khu-lulekani Institute for Democracy, 1999:17).

The Constitution also enjoins provincial leg-islatures to facilitate public involvement in thelegislative processes. Section 118 of theConstitution of the Republic of South Africastipulates that:

(1) “A Provincial Legislature must –(a) facilitate public involvement in thelegislative and other processes of the leg-islature and its committees; and(b) conduct its business in an open man-ner, and hold its sittings, and those of itscommittees, in public, but reasonablemeasures may be taken –

(iii) to regulate public access, includingaccess to the media, to the legislatureand its committees; and(iv) to provide for the searching of anyperson and, where appropriate, therefusal of entry to, or the removal of,any person.

(2) A provincial legislature may not excludethe public, including the media, from a sit-ting of a committee unless it is reasonableand justifiable to do so in an open anddemocratic society.”

Some of the provincial legislatures have enact-ed their own constitutions, which, in somecases, make provision for public participation.They have also engaged in a number of activi-ties to educate the public about participationmechanisms and to facilitate public participa-tion. The Western Cape Legislature’s standingcommittee meetings as well as sittings of theHouse are open to the public and other interest-ed bodies. Standing committees also advertisepublic hearings in the local daily newspapers.In addition, bills and invitations for comment

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on them are published in the Provincial Ga-zette. In the event that submissions are to beconsidered, the relevant parties are invited topresent their submissions to the standing com-mittee.

In addition to the above, the Western CapeLegislature receives groups of school children,community groups, and other interested partieson visits to its building. These groups are takenon a basic tour of the main facilities and thelegislature’s chamber where they are addressedon the history of the building, parliament,provincial emblems and the legislative process.These tours are initiated by members of theprovincial legislature and the Office of theSpeaker.

In 1998 the Western Cape Legislature pro-duced two internal information documentsrelating to the legislature: a basic Visitor’sGuide and a more comprehensive WesternCape Parliamentary Information Pack. Thedocuments provide information on the func-tions and responsibilities of the legislature, thelegislative process, provincial symbols andemblems, functions and duties of parliamentaryoffice-bearers, facts and figures relating to thelegislature, etc.

The Western Cape Legislature has not, how-ever, established an office dedicated to dealingwith public participation: at present the Libraryand Research Service is managing this func-tion. The Western Cape Legislature has, never-theless, begun a process to establish such anoffice and to find ways to encourage and facili-tate public participation.11

In KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), the Public Partici-pation Unit provides information on legislativedevelopments through action-alert documentsto notify people of public hearings. The Unitalso runs regional workshops to bring commu-nity organisations together to plan jointresponses to legislative issues. It provides train-ing to community-based trainers on the struc-ture of the provincial legislature, and on how tointeract by lobbying and drafting submissions.In addition, there is a volunteer monitoring pro-gramme whereby information on legislativematters is disseminated through non-govern-mental organisations (NGOs) to communities.The Unit is also developing information packsfor distribution aimed at alerting stakeholdersto imminent legislation and providing informa-tion in both English and Zulu on how they can

take part (Khululekani Institute for Democracy,1999:16).

Although the Northern Cape has not estab-lished an office dedicated to dealing with pub-lic participation, it has put in place a number ofmeasures to educate the public about participa-tion processes and to encourage their participa-tion. The NYP has been established to educatethe youth about the processes of democraticpractice. A number of publications are utilised,including newsletters, brochures, flyers, hand-books, pictorial pamphlets and newspaperadverts. The legislature also conducts seminarson legislative matters, which are led by mem-bers of the provincial legislature. The elderlyare encouraged to visit the legislature’s cham-ber, where members of the provincial legisla-ture take part in mock debates. Visiting schoolchildren are shown video recordings of actualdebates, led through the debate, and given theopportunity to ask questions during the educa-tion programme.12

The Free State Legislature uses constituencyoffices to facilitate public participation in theprovincial legislative processes. The main fea-ture of this programme is an invitation for peti-tions (Khululekani Institute for Democracy,1999:14-15).

The Gauteng Legislature has set up theStanding Committee on Petitions and PublicParticipation, together with an office of supportstaff to this Committee, to facilitate public par-ticipation in the process of governance in thisprovince.13 The main activities of the Com-mittee and the office include: the receipt andprocessing of petitions; the production ofposters; the production of a leaflet series thatprovides information on the functioning of thelegislature and how the public should beinvolved in the legislature’s processes; andongoing workshops of two types, namely, one-day lay person’s education workshops, andtwo-day trainer’s workshops to prepare trainersto educate their own communities on the peti-tions and public participation process. Themain vehicles for implementing public partici-pation are the parliamentary constituencyoffices, through which the legislature facilitatescontact between members of the public andmembers of the provincial legislature(Khululekani Institute for Democracy,1999:15). In addition, the legislature has triedto bring public involvement closer to the people

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by holding public hearings in six regions of theprovince.

The Programme on Governance of theCanadian International Development Agencyassisted the Public Participation Office of theGauteng Legislature by organising workshopsin seven disadvantaged communities to preparefor public hearings to be held by the welfarecommittee of the Provincial Legislature. Thefirst stage of the outreach programme was aworkshop to explain the role and function ofthe provincial legislature and to explain theissues to be addressed by the committee. Thesecond stage was designed to assist peopleinterested in preparing a presentation or state-ment to be used at the welfare committee’spublic hearings (Sutherland, 1999:37-8). Inaddition, the Khululekani Institute for Demo-cracy works with elected representatives in thisprovince to facilitate interaction in parliamen-tary constituency offices (Khululekani Institutefor Democracy, 1999:15). The legislature alsointends to go on a province-wide road show, todraw the public’s attention to the role of thelegislature, as well as to increase awarenessabout public participation processes.

2. LEVELS OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, PUBLICKNOWLEDGE ABOUT PARTICIPATION PROCESSES, AND INTENTION TO PARTICIPATETwo methodologies are used in this study: thefirst is derived from the results of a nationalsurvey conducted by the Human SciencesResearch Council (HSRC) in March 1999; andthe other is a series of focus group interviewsconducted in Gauteng in late 1999.

The HSRC survey was administered to ran-dom clustered national probability samples of2200 respondents14 throughout the Republic ofSouth Africa in March 1999.15 The universe forthe sample design was all members of theSouth African population over 18 years, whichwas stratified according to the nine provincesand the four racial groups. Some of the dataused in this analysis are drawn from selectedquestions in the survey around topics such asparticipation in legislative processes; knowl-edge about legislative processes; intention toparticipate in legislative processes; and percep-tions of ability to influence government deci-sions.

Ten focus group interviews were conductedin informal settlements in Gauteng.16 The uni-

verse for the sample design was all adultAfrican people in these areas over the age of 18years. Each focus group brought togetherbetween 10 and 18 randomly selected individu-als of various ages and both sexes,17 drawnfrom the most disadvantaged sectors of societyin terms of education, unemployment, poverty,etc. Use was made of a semi-structured inter-view format, and an attempt was made to covertopics such as participation in provincial leg-islative processes; knowledge of the politicalsystem; awareness of and involvement in publicparticipation education programmes; and inten-tion to participate in provincial legislativeprocesses.18

Tables 1 and 2 (over page) provide indica-tions of the level of participation in various leg-islative processes.

It is clear that there is a low degree of publicparticipation at all levels of the political struc-ture. Over 60% of respondents have neverattended a public hearing of a provincial legis-lature and 17% seldom do so. Slightly morethan 12% of respondents indicated that theyoften attend public hearings of provincial legis-latures while only 3.5% of respondents indicat-ed continuous attendance at such hearings.Over 60% of those respondents who indicatedtheir attendance at a public hearing stated thatthey never present statements at these hearings.Close to 15% indicated that they seldom pre-sent statements. 12.8% and 6.1% of the respon-dents who attended public hearings presentedstatements often or continuously, respectively.Interaction with parliamentary constituencyoffices is particularly low, with 73.2% ofrespondents indicating that they never madeinquiries at these offices, and 12.2% indicatingthat they seldom do so. Only 6.7% of respon-dents often made inquiries at parliamentaryconstituency offices and 2.1% do so continu-ously.

Respondents in the Eastern Cape indicate ahigher level of participation than any otherprovince in all the processes dealt with in thetable. This province is closely followed byGauteng and KZN. The Northern Cape, FreeState, Western Cape and North West have limit-ed attendance at public hearings of their provin-cial legislatures, as well as below the nationalaverage for presentation of a statement or opin-ion at a public hearing. Public interaction withparliamentary constituency offices is also low in

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the Free State, Northern Cape, North West andMpumalanga provinces. Respondents from theNorthern Cape registered the highest levels ofpeople who never participate in certain politicalactivities, ranging from 83.9% who never attenda public hearing of the provincial legislature, to87.7% who never make inquiries at parliamen-tary constituency offices. The Western Cape fol-lows closely behind in levels of non-participa-tion, while 88.3% of respondents from the FreeState do not make inquiries at parliamentaryconstituency offices.

The racial dimension is particularly signifi-cant, given South Africa’s history and continu-ing racial polarisation at the political level.19

Thus, participation by Africans is highest in allthe areas of participation covered in the table.Just above 50% of Africans never attend a pub-lic hearing of a provincial legislature or pre-sented a statement at a public hearing.However, those African respondents who sel-dom (which indicates at least some activity),often or continuously engaged in these activi-ties are more than the national average in eachcase. In particular, more than 15% of Africanrespondents indicated that they often participat-ed in each of these activities. Interaction withparliamentary constituency offices is particular-ly low for Africans, with about 69% who nevermake inquiries at these offices.

Table 1: Participation in various processes and institutions by province, March 1999

Participation EC FS GT KN MP NC NP NW WC Total

Never attend a public hearing of a provincial legislature 56.0 78.2 54.2 53.2 70.2 83.9 63.9 65.7 81.0 61.8Seldom attend a public hearing of a provincial legislature 12.8 16.6 26.2 19.0 11.8 9.7 9.4 20.1 9.2 17.0Often attend a public hearing of a provincial legislature 23.0 2.9 14.9 9.3 13.5 4.9 18.3 10.1 3.6 12.6Continuously attend a public hearing of a provincial legislature 0.1 2.4 2.5 4.2 1.8 0.0 3.8 0.4 0.6 3.5Never present a statement or opinion at a public hearing 50.4 71.9 54.1 58.6 69.8 83.3 58.4 66.7 81.7 61.8Seldom present a statement or opinion at a public hearing 15.4 18.9 21.2 13.3 11.3 6.9 10.0 15.0 7.7 14.6Often present a statement or opinion at a public hearing 18.9 7.8 14.4 8.2 12.9 8.2 22.6 13.8 4.7 12.8Continuously present a statement or opinion at a public hearing 11.9 1.5 8.3 8.7 1.8 0.0 4.4 0.8 1.6 6.1Never make inquiries at parliamentary constituency offices 62.1 88.3 66.3 71.4 84.7 87.7 74.1 76.6 83.3 73.3Seldom make inquiries at parliamentary constituency offices 11.7 9.7 23.0 6.4 10.2 8.7 9.5 15.5 5.0 12.2Often make inquiries at parliamentary constituency offices 14.0 1.5 6.9 4.2 2.6 2.0 10.6 3.9 6.1 6.7Continuously makeinquiries at parliamentary constituency offices 5.6 0.5 1.1 3.0 0.7 0.0 1.1 0.4 1.8 2.1

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Participation by whites and Indians is partic-ularly low, while there is a slightly higher levelof participation by coloureds. Thus, 5.3% ofIndians and 2.3% of whites often attend publichearings of a provincial legislature; not oneIndian and only 1.1% of whites indicated thatthey continuously attend public hearings of aprovincial legislature; not one Indian respon-dent indicated that they often or continuouslypresent a statement at a public hearing, whileonly 3.0% and 1.6% respectively of whiterespondents often or continuously presented astatement at a public hearing; none of theIndian respondents often or continuously madeinquiries at parliamentary constituency offices;and 3.8% and 1% respectively of white respon-dents stated that they often or continuouslymade inquiries at parliamentary constituencyoffices. Non-participation by whites is particu-larly high, ranging from 89.1% who neverattend a public hearing of a provincial hearingto 90.2% who never present a statement at apublic hearing.

Non-participation was also high for colouredsat all levels of the political structure. Thus,77.8% never attend a public hearing of aprovincial legislature, 78.2% of those who doattend public hearings never present a statementat a public hearing, and 83.1% never makeinquiries at parliamentary constituency offices.However, more coloured respondents partici-pate often or continuously in political processesthan do Indian and white respondents.

The survey data were supported by the focusgroup interviews, which indicated a low levelof participation among residents of Gauteng’surban informal settlements. The overwhelming

majority of interviewees had limited interactionwith formal political structures and processes.Not one of the approximately 160 intervieweeshad participated in any formal way in theprocesses of provincial structures. None of theparticipants had interacted with parliamentaryconstituency offices, nor had there been anyparticipation in processes of the national legis-lature and government departments. The onlyform of participation was at local level, includ-ing attending ward meetings, taking complaintsto councillors, and attempting to influence localgovernment decisions through various organi-sations of civil society. These varied from set-tlement to settlement, but the overall impres-sion was also a low level of interaction withlocal government structures.

Public participation in political processes isdependent to some extent on:20

• public knowledge about participation mecha-nisms in legislative processes

• intention to participate in legislative process-es

• perceptions of ability to influence govern-ment.

Tables 3 and 4 (over page) provide figures indi-cating levels of understanding and knowledgeof various processes and institutions.

The survey indicated widespread lack ofknowledge about the Green and White Paperprocesses, with only slightly lower numbers ofpeople believing they had insufficient or noknowledge about the processes surroundingbills and acts of parliament. These range fromthe 78.7% who believed they had insufficient orno knowledge of the act process, to the 91.1%who believed they had insufficient knowledge

Table 2: Participation in various processes and institutions by race, March 1999

Participation African Coloured Indian White Total

Never attend a public hearing of a provincial legislature 54.3 77.8 74.0 89.1 61.8Seldom attend a public hearing of a provincial legislature 20.1 7.6 19.1 6.1 17.0Often attend a public hearing of a provincial legislature 15.1 9.6 5.3 2.3 12.6Continuously attend a public hearing of a provincial legislature 4.2 2.4 0.0 1.1 3.5Never present a statement or opinion at a public hearing 53.9 78.2 76.9 90.2 61.8Seldom present a statement or opinion at a public hearing 17.2 6.9 21.5 4.2 14.6Often present a statement or opinion at a public hearing 15.9 6.5 0.0 3.0 12.8Continuously present a statement or opinion at a public hearing 7.3 5.3 0.0 1.6 6.1Never make inquiries at parliamentary constituency offices 68.9 83.1 76.4 89.8 73.2Seldom make inquiries at parliamentary constituency offices 14.2 5.4 22.0 3.9 12.2Often make inquiries at parliamentary constituency offices 7.6 5.6 0.0 3.8 6.7Continuously make inquiries at parliamentary constituency offices 2.2 3.4 0.0 1.0 2.1

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of the Green Paper process. One in 10 peoplehave sufficient knowledge of the white paperprocess, while only 8% of respondents indicat-ed sufficient knowledge of the green paperprocess. This suggests a relationship betweenlevels of participation and levels of understand-ing and knowledge about political processes.

This connection is even more clearly demon-strated when the provincial variable is takeninto account. The Eastern Cape, for example,which displays higher levels of participationthan the other provinces, also has relativelyhigh levels of understanding and knowledge ofpolitical processes and institutions. In theWestern Cape, by contrast, between 84.3% and91.1% of respondents indicated insufficient or

no knowledge of a process. This province alsohas a low degree of participation.

In some cases less than 10% and in othersless than 20% of Africans, coloureds andIndians indicated sufficient knowledge of apolitical process. Very few Indian respondentsbelieved they had sufficient knowledge of anyof the processes. Although whites are the mostknowledgeable about political processes andinstitutions, they also have a low level of par-ticipation. For this group, then, there must beother reasons for the low level of participationin political processes.

The focus group interviews similarly reveal-ed high levels of ignorance about policy-mak-ing and legislative processes and institutions.

Table 3: Understanding and knowledge of processes by province, March 1999

Understanding EC FS GT KN MP NC NP NW WC Total

Insufficient or no knowledge of Green Paper process 79.8 91.6 89.3 95.4 92.1 94.0 97.5 95.0 91.2 91.1Sufficient knowledge of Green Paper process 20.2 8.4 10.7 4.6 7.9 6.0 2.5 5.0 8.8 8.9Insufficient or no knowledge of White Paper process 82.2 89.1 85.2 95.2 92.9 90.7 95.9 91.2 89.5 89.6Sufficient knowledge of White Paper process 17.8 10.9 14.8 4.8 7.1 9.3 4.1 8.8 10.5 10.4Insufficient or no knowledge of the Bill process 78.7 86.3 78.2 89.5 83.6 77.0 91.9 81.4 84.3 83.6Sufficient knowledge of the Bill process 21.3 13.7 21.8 10.5 16.4 23.0 8.1 18.6 15.7 16.4Insufficient or no knowledge of the Act process 71.3 83.8 79.1 71.6 82.6 79.1 91.4 75.4 85.5 78.7Sufficient knowledge of the Act process 28.7 16.2 20.9 28.4 17.4 20.9 8.6 24.6 14.5 21.3

Table 4: Understanding and knowledge of processes and institutions by race, March 1999

Understanding African Coloured Indian White Total

Insufficient or no knowledge of Green Paper process 92.5 89.9 91.3 84.4 91.1Sufficient knowledge of Green Paper process 7.5 10.1 8.7 15.6 8.9Insufficient or no knowledge of White Paper process 91.4 87.6 93.2 80.7 89.6Sufficient knowledge of White Paper process 8.6 12.4 6.8 19.3 10.4Insufficient or no knowledge of the Bill process 86.5 86.2 84.3 66.2 83.6Sufficient knowledge of the Bill process 13.5 13.8 15.7 33.7 16.4Insufficient or no knowledge of the Act process 81.8 86.5 81.6 56.5 78.7Sufficient knowledge of the Act process 18.2 13.5 18.4 43.5 21.3

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Most of the interviewees in the focus groupswere unaware of the role of legislatures, andsome interviewees were even unaware of theexistence of provincial legislatures. Althoughmost of the interviewees were aware of peti-tions, most had not participated in drawing up apetition. Moreover, virtually all the intervie-wees were unaware of the public hearingprocess. The lack of knowledge about con-stituency offices was almost total, with only ahandful of interviewees aware of the closestconstituency office to their homes. In addition,none of the interviewees in Gauteng had heardof the Petitions and Public Participation Officeof the legislature, or of any attempts to expand

public knowledge about participation processesthrough leaflets, posters and workshops. Thislack of knowledge about political institutionsand participation processes is an important fac-tor underlying low levels of participation.

It is clear that knowledge and understandingof political processes and institutions is onlyone factor that affects participation. Participa-tion is also determined by the willingness ofcitizens to participate. Tables 5 and 6 indicatethe level of intention to participate in variousprocesses. Respondents were asked how likelyis it that they would engage in particular formsof participation.

The majority of respondents (54.6%) indicat-

Table 5: Intention to participate in various processes and institutions by province, March 1999

Intention to participate EC FS GT KN MP NC NP NW WC Total

Likely to complain to a member of the provincial or national legislature 56.2 37.6 47.5 24.5 44.7 25.7 36.3 28.8 21.4 36.3Unlikely to complain to a member of the provincial or national legislature 40.1 57.7 47.8 59.9 51.8 73.9 51.4 65.7 67.2 54.6Likely to participate in a public hearing of a provincial legislature 49.5 45.2 49.0 32.2 58.1 29.2 48.5 42.9 38.2 43.9Unlikely to participate in a public hearing of a provincial legislature 37.7 48.8 46.2 52.0 24.4 44.5 19.0 24.1 30.7 38.7Likely to participate in a public hearing in the national legislature 57.6 31.3 37.6 21.9 35.6 19.4 31.9 32.0 35.0 35.0Unlikely to participate in a public hearing in the national legislature 27.2 62.3 57.2 52.9 41.0 49.3 27.0 31.8 34.2 43.7

Table 6: Intention to participate in various processes by race, March 1999

Intention to participate African Coloured Indian White Total

Likely to complain to a member of the provincial or national legislature 41.6 28.8 18.0 23.6 36.3Unlikely to complain to a member of the provincial or national legislature 49.8 61.8 71.7 72.2 54.5Likely to participate in a public hearing of a provincial legislature 48.8 40.1 35.0 21.6 43.9Unlikely to participate in a public hearing of a provincial legislature 35.3 24.8 52.5 63.6 38.7Likely to participate in a public hearing in the national legislature 37.4 35.1 42.2 20.2 35.0Unlikely to participate in a public hearing in the national legislature 41.3 29.3 40.8 67.1 43.7

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ed that they were unlikely to complain to amember of the provincial or national legisla-ture. Just more than one-third of respondentsindicated an intention to complain to membersof provincial and national legislatures. Morerespondents indicated that they were likely toparticipate in a public hearing of a provinciallegislature (43.9%) than those that indicatedthey were unlikely to do so (38.7%). Respond-ents were less likely (43.7%) than likely (35%)to participate in a public hearing of the nationallegislature. Thus, the likelihood of participationin legislative processes decreases at levels high-er up the political system. The table demon-strates a progressive decline in willingness toparticipate in institutions at higher levels.

There was a markedly higher likelihood ofparticipation by people from the Eastern Capein participatory processes at virtually all levelsof the political structure than people from theother provinces. Respondents from the WesternCape indicated a lower likelihood of participat-ing than any other province, with some vari-ance. In KZN and the Northern Cape, for exam-ple, there was a marked reluctance to interactwith the provincial and national levels of gov-ernment. Respondents in the Eastern Cape weremore likely to participate in public hearings ofthe national legislature than in public hearingsof the provincial legislature. In all the otherprovinces there was a higher likelihood of par-ticipation in the processes of legislatures at theprovincial level than at the national level.21

More African, coloured, Indian and whiterespondents believed they were unlikely to taketheir complaints to a member of the provincialor national legislature than respondents in these

groups who were likely to do so. More whiterespondents were unlikely to participate in pub-lic hearings at all levels of the political struc-ture than respondents in this group who werelikely to participate in this process. The majori-ty of African respondents indicated that theywould be unlikely to participate in public hear-ings of the national legislature. The proportionof Indians (52.5%) and whites (63.6%) whoindicated that they were unlikely to participatein a public hearing of a provincial legislature isparticularly high. These figures, together withthe figures indicating a lack of intention to par-ticipate in the other processes in table 6, sug-gest reluctance on the part of these groups toparticipate in political processes in the newSouth Africa. Willingness to participate for allfour groups declines progressively at higherlevels of the political structure.

The focus groups demonstrated a high will-ingness to participate at the local level, and aprogressive decline in willingness to participatein institutions at higher levels. This could bedue to a number of factors, including a primaryconcern with issues that fall within the domainof local government structures, the distancebetween local communities and the location ofstructures at higher levels, as well as ignoranceabout the role of the latter structures. The focusgroup interviews indicated a direct relationshipbetween lack of knowledge about the role ofprovincial legislatures and willingness to par-ticipate. Initially there was limited interestamong the interviewees in the participatoryprocesses of the provincial legislatures. How-ever, once the group was informed about therole played by the provincial legislatures, and

Table 7: Perceptions of ability to influence government decisions by province, March 1999

Perceptions EC FS GT KN MP NC NP NW WC Total

It is possible to influence national government decisions 76.8 52.8 56.3 23.7 40.6 40.8 46.0 41.5 21.9 45.1It is NOT possible to influence national government decisions 20.5 40.3 36.7 58.7 53.8 50.8 44.6 54.7 43.1 43.4It is possible to influence provincial government decisions 62.8 44.8 52.4 18.7 33.9 29.8 40.8 31.9 18.5 38.5It is NOT possible to influence provincial government decisions 22.1 45.8 39.6 56.5 51.6 50.4 45.5 55.8 36.9 45.0It is possible to influence local government decisions 69.9 53.5 55.8 34.5 35.9 41.2 39.5 32.7 25.6 45.0It is NOT possible to influence local government decisions 26.5 39.3 32.1 46.1 50.4 45.1 48.1 57.6 35.0 40.0

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the importance of public participation, therewas a notable increase in enthusiasm about par-ticipation. It follows that increasing the public’sknowledge about the role of legislatures, aboutthe importance of public participation, andabout participation processes may well lead toan increase in levels of public participation.

The level of public participation and inten-tion to participate in legislative processes willalso be influenced by people’s perceptions oftheir ability to influence government decisions.Respondents were asked to agree or disagree tothe statement: “People like you can have aninfluence on government decisions.”

Roughly the same number of respondentsbelieved it was (45.1%) and was not (43.4%)possible to influence national government deci-sions. More respondents believed it was notpossible to influence provincial governmentdecisions (45%) than believed it was possibleto influence decisions (38.5%) at this level. Themajority of respondents (45%) believed it waspossible to influence local government deci-sions. Nevertheless, the proportion of respon-dents who believe it is not possible to influencegovernment decisions is high (above 40%) forall levels of government.

The majority of respondents in the EasternCape believed they were able to influence gov-ernment decisions at all levels of the politicalstructure. This corresponds to very low propor-tions who believed it is not possible to influ-ence government decisions at all levels. Therewas a strong feeling among respondents fromKZN that it was not possible to influence gov-ernment decisions at the national and provinciallevels, with about 46.1% of respondents fromthis province feeling this way about local gov-ernment. In the North West province the major-ity of respondents believed it was not possibleto influence government decisions at all levelsof the political structure. KZN and the Western

Province are notable for the small numbers ofpeople who believed they could influence gov-ernment decisions at all levels of the politicalstructure. This can be related to the lower like-lihood of participation in political processesexpressed by respondents from some of theseprovinces.

White respondents were particularly scepticalabout their ability to influence governmentdecisions. There were more respondents in thisgroup who believed it was not possible to influ-ence government decisions than believed it waspossible to influence government at all levels ofthe political structure. By contrast, more Afri-can respondents believed it was possible toinfluence national, provincial and local govern-ment decisions than believed it was not possi-ble to do so. However, around 40% of Africanrespondents indicated that it was not possible toinfluence national, provincial and local govern-ment decisions.

Almost two-thirds of the Indian respondentsbelieved it was not possible to influenceprovincial government decisions, compared to21% who believed they could influence deci-sions at this level. The majority of Indianrespondents also believed it was not possible toinfluence decisions made at the national level.More Indian respondents believed, however, itwas possible to influence local governmentdecisions (40%) than believed it was not possi-ble (35.4%) to do so. The majority of colouredrespondents believed it was not possible toinfluence decisions made at the local, provin-cial and national levels. However, these weregenerally lower than the national averages forpeople who believed it was not possible toinfluence local, provincial and national govern-ment decisions.

There may be many reasons for low levels ofpublic participation, but one reason that hasparticular relevance for participation in legisla-

Table 8: Perceptions of ability to influence government decisions by race, March 1999

Perceptions African Coloured Indian White Total

It is possible to influence national government decisions 50.6 33.5 32.7 25.6 45.1It is NOT possible to influence national government decisions 39.8 41.1 55.1 62.4 43.4It is possible to influence provincial government decisions 43.1 27.4 21.1 23.6 38.4It is NOT possible to influence provincial government decisions 43.0 35.0 64.4 58.1 45.0It is possible to influence local government decisions 47.2 33.6 40.0 41.3 45.0It is NOT possible to influence local government decisions 40.3 34.9 35.4 43.0 40.0

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tive – and other – processes may be a beliefamong the public that their input would not begiven adequate consideration. This perceptionis particularly clear among white respondents,and to a lesser extent among Indian and Africanrespondents, at the provincial and national lev-els. It is therefore necessary to remove anydoubt that people – and particular race groups –may have about their ability to influence gov-ernment decisions in order to encourage partici-pation in political processes.

CONCLUSIONSouth Africa’s new democracy defines democ-ratic governance as regular interaction betweenthe citizens and popularly elected institutions.This includes, at one level, the establishment ofa number of mechanisms and processes forpublic participation and, at another level, theobligation imposed on various political struc-tures to facilitate public participation in theiractivities. The former includes lobbying byorganised groups, the raising of issues by con-stituents at parliamentary constituency offices,petitions and public hearings for participationin the activities of legislative structures. Thelatter includes the establishment of offices andagencies and a variety of programmes by thevarious legislatures to encourage participationin their activities. It has, however, been demon-strated that public participation in legislativeprocesses is generally low, and is particularlylow for coloureds, Indians and whites. In part,the reason for this is a general lack of knowl-edge about the role of political structures andthe mechanisms for public participation.

The latter was clearly demonstrated in thefocus group interviews, where there was verylimited knowledge of political institutions andprocesses as well as low levels of participation.It therefore follows that a public educationcampaign is required to increase knowledgeabout the functions of political structures andthe mechanisms for public participation.

There are, however, distinct regional as wellas racial variations in the level of intention toparticipate in various processes, which indicatereasons other than lack of knowledge for the

low levels of participation. In particular,respondents in the Western Cape indicated lowlevels of willingness to participate in processesat all levels of the political structure, whileIndian and white respondents indicated reluc-tance to participate in these processes. In part,this reluctance to participate can be explainedby perceptions of the ability to influence gov-ernment decisions. Once again, respondentsfrom the Western Cape, as well as Indian andwhite respondents, were sceptical about theirability to influence government decisions. Thisindicates a direct relationship between willing-ness to participate and perceptions of ability toinfluence government decisions.

In other words, in regions and among racialgroups where there is scepticism about the abil-ity to influence government decisions, there arelow levels of intention to participate in politicalprocesses. Perceptions that it is not possible toinfluence political decisions in certain provin-ces and among certain racial groups arise froma variety of factors, including alienation fromthe political system, opposition to the rulingparty, lack of faith in democratic institutions,perceptions that public inputs are not givenadequate attention, etc.

On the other hand, the focus interviews indi-cated that lack of knowledge about the politicalsystem and mechanisms for participation wereprimarily responsible for low levels of partici-pation. As pointed out above, once the partici-pants were informed about the role played bythe provincial legislatures, and the importanceof public participation, there was a notableincrease in enthusiasm about participation.Lack of knowledge about the political system,as well as perceptions of ability to influencegovernment decisions are therefore importantfactors underlying low levels of public partici-pation in political processes.

It is important, then, that action be taken inthese two areas to avoid the danger of margin-alising sectors of the population either throughignorance of their right to – as well as mecha-nisms to – participate in democratic processesor by decreasing their disposition to participatein the political system.

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1) Stephen Rosenstone and John Hansen(1993: 238) have found, for example, thatin the United States the smaller the numberof participants in political activity, thegreater the inequality in participation. Insuch cases, participation is likely to be highamong more privileged citizens – thosewith high incomes, better education, etc. –thus undermining political equality bymaking influence unequal (refer toLijphart, 1997:1). Perhaps the most signifi-cant link between high levels of participa-tion and democracy is the legitimacy theformer confers.

2) Ben-Eliezer (1993:408n) points out thatscholars such as Schumpeter (1950) andMorris-Jones (1954) advocate a relativelylow degree of participation for democracywhile Bachrach (1967) and Pateman (1970)advocate a high degree of participation.

3) This includes length of residence, presenceof active community organisations, institu-tional factors, such as registration require-ments and processes, the electoral system,the frequency of elections, etc. (refer toLijphart, 1997:7-8).

4) This is generally called the feeling of lackof political efficacy or the feeling that oneis incapable of influencing the decision-making process. It includes lack of internalpolitical efficacy, or the feeling that as anindividual one has no influence on govern-ment decisions, and lack of external political efficacy, which is the feeling thatgovernments’ do not respond to citizens’concerns.

5) Alienation can include non-allegiance, dis-affection, estrangement, political power-lessness, and anomie.

6) Formal democracy generally has four fea-tures: “regular free and fair elections; uni-versal suffrage; accountability of the state’sadministrative organs to the elected repre-sentatives; and effective guarantees forfreedom of expression and association aswell as protection against arbitrary stateaction.” Participatory democracy entails afifth dimension, namely, high levels of par-ticipation in the political process through avariety of institutional channels (refer toHuber, et. al., 1997).

7) There are a wide variety of ways in whichpeople participate in politics, which rangesfrom voting, active membership of a politi-cal party or interest group, to holding pub-lic office, with a range of different types ofactivity in between. Dowse and Hughes(1986: 267) draw on Milbrath’s (1965:19)typology of political activities and Verbaand Nye’s (1972: 79-80) study of modes ofparticipation. Political participation is seento take the form of a hierarchy of involve-ment, ranging from the person engagedonly in voting, to the person only engagedin near-to-home concerns, people engagedpurely with personal problems, the cam-paigners involved in electoral campaigns,and activists who involve themselves in thewhole field of political activity, includingthe holding of political office (Dowse andHughes, 1986:267). However, in this studypolitical participation is limited to partici-pation in democratic legislative processesas defined.

8) It must be noted, however, that constituen-cy offices are not directly related to thelegislature. Instead, they are agencies ofpolitical parties. They nevertheless func-tion as mechanisms for public participa-tion.

9) There is a wide variety of interest groupssuch as business organisations, tradeunions, civic organisations, action groups,environmental groups, and national self-help and voluntary non-governmentalorganisations that try to influence legisla-tive and policy-making processes on a vari-ety of issues through this mechanism.

10) An example of how interest groups canaffect legislation in South Africa throughan effective lobbying campaign is given byDouglas (1997).

11) This information was supplied by JamesRetief, Senior Librarian of the WesternCape Provincial Legislature.

12) This information was supplied by Mr J. C.Qwemesha, Head of Committees andProceedings, Northern Cape ProvincialLegislature.

13) This information was supplied by thePetitions and Public Participation Office ofthe Gauteng Provincial Legislature.

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14) We have applied the term “interviewees”to people who participated in the focusgroups and the term “respondents” to peo-ple who were interviewed for the nationalsurveys.

15) The HSRC has conducted regular nationalsurveys of public opinion for several years.The survey instrument comprised a ques-tionnaire consisting of 38 pages of ques-tions. It was divided into different topicsand the duration of interviews of respon-dents was between 60 and 90 minutes. Asample of 2200 respondents was selectedthroughout South Africa in clusters of eightand situated in 338 census enumeratorareas (EAs) as determined in the 1996 cen-sus. Each EA was classified in terms of adominant lifestyle category, based on anHSRC analysis of the 1996 census data. Inorder to enhance adequate representation inthe sample from each of the nine provincesand from each of the four dominant racialpopulation groups, the sample was strati-fied by province and by race. Dispropor-tionately large samples were drawn fromareas known to be inhabited by the twosmallest components of the population,namely (i) areas with dominantly Indianpopulations and (ii) the Northern Cape. Interms of population group (race), thespread was sufficiently wide to facilitatestatistical generalisations about opinionsprevailing among persons of each of thepopulation groups. Each case was thenweighted so that the resultant weighteddataset would approximate the distributionof the population of South Africa in termsof population group and province.

16) Focus group interviews were held in thefollowing informal settlements: Nellma-pius, Free and Fair (Cullinan); Alexandratownship; Freedom Square (Thembisa);Diepsloot (Randburg), Atteridgeville(Extension 6); Wattville; Mandela Village(Mamelodi); Mandela Village – Block S(Soshanguve); and Thokoza. In all, 160people participated in the ten focus groupinterviews.

17) There was very little difference in theresponses to the set of questions dealt withhere based on variables such as age, educa-tion and sex. Only a very small number ofyoung people, who also tended to be better

educated, had some knowledge of politicalprocesses and institutions. The extent oftheir knowledge was, however, also verylimited, and most were as unaware of par-ticipation processes as the older intervie-wees were.

18) At the end of each focus group interviewthe interviewees were given a brief ques-tionnaire which covered the schedule forthe focus groups in somewhat more detail.This was done in order to ensure that if anyparticipant was reluctant to talk for anyreason, the data would be picked up in thequestionnaire.

19) The results for the first democratic electionin April 1994 demonstrate the salience ofgroup identity in South African politics.The results indicate a racial censusalthough considerable cross-racial votingtook place with all the major parties draw-ing support from every race group. TheNational Party (NP) was supported by 65%of the coloured and Indian voters in the1994 election, with 60-70% of colouredvoters in the Western Cape voting for theparty (Reynolds, 1994). Similarly, a largeproportion of the white vote went to theNP. Apartheid indoctrinated racial fears ofAfrican domination and suspicion of blackadministrative competence, loss of relativestatus in the racial hierarchy, and competi-tion for jobs and housing were in large partresponsible for this support (Finnegan,1994; Adam, 1994:27-28). The FreedomFront (a conservative Afrikaner politicalparty) achieved 2.17% (400 000 white vot-ers) of the support of national voters in theelections. 94% of the support gained by theAfrican National Congress came from theAfrican community (Reynolds, 1994).

20) There is a wide variety of other reasonswhy people do not participate in politicalprocesses, such as apathy, lack of interest,alienation from the political system, feel-ings of lack of political efficacy, oppositionto the ruling party, etc. The focus onknowledge of participation mechanisms iscrucial because these processes are new inSouth Africa, while the majority of SouthAfrican citizens have only recently beenallowed to participate in provincial andnational political processes. In addition,intention to participate in legislative pro-

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cesses provides insight into levels of alien-ation, particularly among certain racialgroups. Finally, perceptions of ability toinfluence government provide insight intolevels of perception of lack of political effi-cacy.

21) One should avoid reading too much intothese figures because it is possible that low

levels of intention to participate may signi-fy satisfaction with the performance of theprovincial legislature instead of alienationor feelings of lack of political efficacy. Bycontrast, high levels of intention to partici-pate may signal dissatisfaction with theperformance of the provincial legislatureand a desire to intervene where possible.

ADAM, H. 1994. Ethnic versus Civic National-ism: South Africa’s non-racialism in compar-ative perspective. South African SociologicalReview, 7(1).

AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (ANC). 1994.The Reconstruction and DevelopmentProgramme. Johannesburg: African NationalCongress.

AGGER, R. E., GOLDRICH, D. AND PEARL, S.1961. Political Cynicism: Measurement andmeaning. The Journal of Politics, 23: 383-92.

BACHRACH, P. 1967. The Theory of DemocraticElitism: A Critique. Boston: Little Brown.

BAKER, K. L. 1973. Political participation,political efficacy, and socialisation inGermany. Comparative Politics, 6: 73-98.

BEN-ELIEZER. 1993. The meaning of politicalparticipation in a nonliberal democracy: TheIsraeli experience, Comparative Politics(July): 397-412.

BORG, S. 1995. Electoral Participation, in JanW. van Deth and Elinor Scarbrough (eds.)The Impact of values. Volume 4, Beliefs inGovernment. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.

BRODY, R. A. 1978. The puzzle of political par-ticipation in America, in A. King (ed.) TheNew American Political System. Washington

DC: American Enterprise Institute for PublicPolicy.

BRODY, R. A. AND PAGE, B. I. 1973. Indiffer-ence, alienation, and rational decisions: Theeffects of candidate evaluations on turnoutand the vote, Public Choice, 15: 1-17.

CAMPBELL, A. 1962. The Passive Citizen. ActaSociologica, 6: 9-12.

CAMPBELL, A. ET. AL. 1960. The AmericanVoter, New York: Wiley.

CREWE, I. 1981. Electoral Participation, inDavid Butler, Howard R. Penniman andAustin Ranney (eds.) Democracy at thePolls: A comparative study of competitivenational elections. Washington DC:American Enterprise Institute.

DOUGLAS, C. 1997. Liberal law shows that lob-bying can work, Fast Facts, South AfricanInstitute of Race Relations, December.

DOWSE R. E. AND HUGHES, J. A. 1986. PoliticalSociology, 2nd Edition. Chichester, NewYork, Brisbane, Toronto, Singapore: JohnWiley & Sons.

FINNEGAN, W. 1994. The election Mandela lost, New York Review of Books, October 20.

HILLIARD, V. G. AND KEMP, N. D. 1999. Citizenparticipation crucial to good governance and

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administration in South Africa, Politeia,18(3).

HUBER, E., RUESCHEMEYER, D. AND STEPHENS,J. D. 1997. The Paradoxes of ContemporaryDemocracy: Formal, Participatory, andSocial Dimensions, Comparative Politics(April): 323-341.

KENNY, C. 1993. The microenvironment ofpolitical participation, American PoliticsQuarterly, 21(2) (April): 223-238.

KHULULEKANI INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY.1999. Public Participation and Governancein South Africa, Conference Report, CapeTown, October 1999, Khululekani Institute,Cape Town.

LE ROY, M. 1995. Participation, size, anddemocracy: Bridging the Gap betweenCitizens and the Swedish State, ComparativePolitics, (April): 297-316.

LIJPHART, A. 1997. Unequal Participation:Democracy’s unresolved dilemma, AmericanPolitical Science Review, 91(1) (March): 1-13.

LINDER, W. 1994. Swiss Democracy: Possiblesolutions to conflict in multicultural societies.New York: St. Martin’s Press.

MALOKA, E. (forthcoming) The GautengLegislature: The first five years, in M. Khosaet. al. (eds.), Democracy and GovernanceReview, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishers.

MBETE-KGOSITSILE, B. 1999. Opening Address:By the Deputy Speaker of the NationalAssembly, in Khululekani Institute forDemocracy, Public Participation andGovernance in South Africa, ConferenceReport, Cape Town, October 1998,Khululekani Institute, Cape Town.

MILBRATH, L. 1965. Political Participation.Chicago: Rand McNally.

MILBRATH, L. 1972. Individuals and the Polity,unpublished paper. Buffalo: State Universityof New York.

MORRIS-JONES, W. H. 1954. In defence of polit-ical apathy, Political Studies, 2: 25-37.

MULLER, E. N. ET. AL. 1987. Education, partici-pation, and support for democratic norms,Comparative Politics, 20: 19-33.

OLSEN, M. E. 1969. Two categories of PoliticalAlienation, Social Forces, 47: 288-299.

OLSEN, M. E. 1970. The Social and PoliticalParticipation of Blacks, American Sociologi-cal Review, 35: 682-697.

PATEMAN, C. 1970. Participation and Demo-

cratic Theory. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.

POWELL, G. B. 1986. American voter turnout incomparative perspective, American PoliticalScience Review, 80 (March): 17-43.

PROCTOR, R. 1999. Report on the RulesWorkshop, Discussion Document, GautengProvincial Legislature, Johannesburg.

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA. 1996. Constitutionof the Republic of South Africa. GovernmentGazette, Pretoria.

REYNOLDS, A. (ED.) 1994. Elections ’94 SouthAfrica, London: James Curry.

ROSE, R. (ED.) 1980. Electoral Participation: Acomparative analysis. Beverly Hills: Sage.

ROSENSTONE, S. J. AND HANSEN, J. M. 1993.Mobilisation, Participation, and Democracyin America. New York: Macmillan.

SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT. 1998. TheLegislative Research Series: LegislativeStanding Committees’, Legislative TrainingProgramme, University of the Western Cape.

SCHUMPETER, J. A. 1950. Capitalism, Socialismand Democracy. New York: Harper.

SELIGSON, M. A., CONROY, A., MACÍAS, R. C.,PÉREZ, O. J. AND STEIN, A. J. 1995. Whovotes in Central America? A comparativeanalysis, in M. Seligson and J. A. Booth(eds.) Elections and Democracy in CentralAmerica, Revisited. Chapel Hill: Universityof North Carolina Press.

SENAY, C. AND BESDZIEK, D. 1999. Enhancingoversight – The role of provincial standingcommittees in an open, transparent andaccountable democracy, unpublished paper.

SINCLAIR, I. 1982. Government, Parliament andthe Administration, in J. R. Nethercote (ed.),Parliament and Bureaucracy: ParliamentaryScrutiny of Administration – Prospects andProblems in the 1980s. New South Wales:Hale and Iremonger.

SUTHERLAND, S. L. 1999. Supporting Democra-cy: The South Africa–Canada Programme onGovernance, International DevelopmentResearch Centre, Ottawa.

TINGSTEN, H. 1937. Political Behaviour:Studies in election statistics. London: P. S.King & Sons.

VERBA, S. AND NIE, N. 1972. Participation inAmerica: Political Democracy and SocialEquality. New York: Harper & Row.

VERBA, S., NIE, N. AND KIM, J. 1971. Modes ofPolitical Participation. Beverley Hills: Sage.

“What became of the Black People ofSumer?” the traveller asked the old man,“for ancient records show that the people ofSumer were black. What happened tothem?”“Ah,” the old man sighed. “They lost theirhistory, so they died”

(A Sumer Legend, from Williams C., The destruction of black civilisation, 1996).

INTRODUCTION – THE PROBLEMThis paper argues that an essential requirementfor the success of any liberal democratic gov-ernment is the inclusion of certain groupings,just because they are groupings.

A problem arises, however, when one con-siders the fact that a democratic government isbuilt upon the principles of democracy, whichin turn is built upon the principles of liberal-ism, which in turn has its roots in the attempt todissolve group-loyalties.

The problem is then: How can we accommo-date certain group-loyalties in a liberal democ-ratic dispensation if those group-loyalties areexactly the opposite of what any democracy isbuilt upon?

1. COMMUNITARIANISM VERSUS LIBERALISM?Not too long ago, way back in the early 1990s,we were introduced to a new school of thinkingcommonly referred to as “communitarianism”or, as I wish to call it, “groupism”. This newtheoretical approach came after a worldwideresurgence of group identities. In general itwas, and still is, a very definite attempt to giverecognition to and justification for peopleorganising themselves into groups.1

At the same time Rustow wrote about a tideof democratic change “sweeping the world, notonly in the once-monolithic communist regionsbut also in a wave that started in MediterraneanEurope in the mid-1970s and spread to LatinAmerica, Asia, Africa and even South Africa”2

– a global wave of democratisation based on“liberal” democratic principles.

The question that suddenly confronted theacademic fraternity was: Is liberalism or “indi-vidualism” (the latter as one of the underlyingprinciples of liberalism) not the direct oppositeof communitarianism or groupism (the latter asone of the underlying principles of communi-tarianism)? This question, if answered affirma-tively, would then have implied an academicreflection on a world that is developing into amutually excluding and divergent division.

“The Liberal-Communitarian Debate”3 asMarkate Daly recaps it, was born. He qualifiesthe “debate” however as:

“Not a conflict between the values of liber-ty and of community. The debate focuseson the theoretical and social consequencesof stressing either liberty or community asthe primary value in society.”

The alternative of either stressing the one or theother in a society thus appears to be a societywhere the values of liberalism and the values ofcommunitarianism complement one another. Inother words, a society where individualism andgroupism coexist without the one infringingupon the rights of the other.

However, while the idea of peaceful coexis-tence appears to be very attractive, it doesappear also to be unattainable. Why else wouldthere be a tendency for either liberty excluding

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community or vice versa? More to the point:Are they not in principle at loggerheads witheach other where the one has been introducedpurposely to negate the other? This is preciselywhat George Ketab’s introductory comments toNotes on pluralism4 alludes to when he com-ments:

“Constitutional democracy exists in order togive people a chance to be individuals.”

However, as he continues, what we find todayare “people-citizens of constitutional democra-cies – clamouring for groups”.

Constitutional democracy has according tothis analysis failed in its raison d’être. If group-clamouring is the order of the day, then thenotion that democracy has conquered the worldis a fallacy. We might even have to concludethat the third reverse wave of democratisationhas started. Von Beyme’s “third growth-waveof right-wing extremism” that started in the1980s, was just the beginning.5 Huntington notonly had it right with his notion that historically“a primary wave of democratisation” is usuallyfollowed by “a reverse wave of democratisa-tion.6 His prediction that The Clash of Civilisa-tions?7 might be the future of world politics,has definite merits. If one considers the way inwhich their members belonging to a certaingroup unite countries on a broader scale, hiswords acquire prophetic status.

2. A SOLUTION?Stephen Holmes appears to have the solution.In the same edition of Social Research fromwhich Ketab was earlier quoted from, hereminds us that liberalism excludes “exclusive”groupism and vice versa. He writes:

“They (liberals) strove to dilute or relativisegroup identity just enough to increase thechances for peaceful coexistence and mutu-ally beneficial cooperation. … The startingpoint for liberalism is not the atomistic indi-vidual, then, but the moral and emotionalconflict that ensues when differentlysocialised individuals clumsily rub shoul-ders and attempt to coexist. Liberals are notblind to loyalty, therefore, but insteadassume that loyalty is sometimes good andsometimes bad, depending largely on theway conflicting affiliations and affinitiesare handled politically. While liberals arenot anticommunitarian in a militant sense,they reasonably refuse to apotheosise loyal-

ty as the source of all meaning and the highest human good, insisting that a sharpdistinction be made between group identifi-cations to be encouraged and factionalismsand xenophobias to be discouraged.”8

If one now were to study Ketab’s “group-clam-ouring” and remember Holmes’ warningagainst factionalisms and xenophobias based onzealous misplaced loyalty, then the lastingimpression still is that:• the resurgence of groupism on a global scale

is indeed very close to, if not very distinctfrom, examples of factionalisms and xeno-phobias in the making

• this resurgence might hold a sure threat todemocracy and democratisation in the future.

However, the principle that we now have totake into account is that the accommodation ofgroupism in a liberal democratic dispensation ispossible provided that group-loyalty does notturn bad, that is, when a member’s opportunityto be an individual is threatened or, in extremecases, annulled.

According to this principle neither individu-alism nor groupism is ever absolute. In a dis-tinct context they each qualify to exist side-by-side given that each functions as “a relativeinterpretation of the absolute”. The opposite of“a relative interpretation of the absolute” ismankind’s tendency to want to make “absoluteinterpretations of the relative”. We like to thinkof ourselves as masters of the universe whereour interpretations carry absolute weight. In allof history this has been the cause of many con-flicts where political ideas were considered tobe absolute. If the idea then fails and does notget actualised, it is discarded. So if the practiceof absolute individualism fails, the alternativeis to resort to the other extreme … absolutecommunitarianism (with no democracy).9

Also, the fact that groupism is not discreditedper se, says something about its value. Holmesrefers to group identity diluted “just enough” toincrease the changes for peaceful coexistenceand of liberals being not anti-communitarian ina “militant” sense. This does not prove my nextpoint but, within the context of Holmes’s arti-cle, hints at the fact that there might be some-thing commendable in groupism.

This commendable virtue is the principle thatpeople organising into groups is a factual aswell as a “necessary” condition of living.Organising as part of a social club in the pub-

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lic-social sphere or merely relating to a familyto share your personal-private life, herebyaddresses the human need to belong. This needis a natural inclination of the “wise man”(homo sapiens) which prompts him or her toattach him- or herself to the living and the deadalike.

You join the local church or you buy yourselfa new car – in both cases you address your needto belong by finding anchor-points in your life.When the storms of life then erupt, you have ashelter where you can wait for the storms toabate. Especially in our modern world wherepeople are flooded with useless information,people escape their fate by clinging on to cer-tain fixities.

It remains unequivocally true that a groupcan be cruel to, and destructive for, a democra-cy.10 Yet the reality of bad groupism being soclose to its good side, gives us no excuse topenalise groupism as such.

We are subsequently left with the generalprinciple that groupism is valuable as long as itdoes not turn into exclusive groupism wherethe opportunity to be an individual is denied.

But having solved the problem of communi-tarianism versus liberalism in principle stillrequires us to give it a practical side. For thepurpose of this paper we will make it practicalin the public-social/political sphere where theencompassing group-mark is culture. A simpledefinition for culture would be the arts andother manifestations of human intellectualachievement regarded collectively.

For the purpose of our discussion and also asour next example of accommodating groupismin a liberal democratic dispensation, we refer toAvishai Margalit and Moshe Halbertal’s defini-tion. Once more in the fall 1994 edition ofSocial Research11 one finds their definition ofculture as:

“A comprehensive way of life [with the lat-ter] that can only exist in a group, in con-trast to a lifestyle, which may characterisethe particular manner in which individualslead their lives.”12

They then plead for the protection of cultureaccording to which:

“Human beings have a right to culture – notjust any culture, but their own.”

A culture can, however, as they readily admit: “Contradict(s) the status of the individual ina liberal society… when the group norms

cannot be reconciled with the conception ofthe individual in a liberal society”.13

Arranged marriages, for example, deny thepartners their freedom of choice; so does thenotion that women should not be allowed to geteducation; or the idea that all Afrikaans-speak-ing boys should play rugby. The list is endless.The bottom line remains that in the case of cul-ture there again arises a conflict betweengroupism and individualism. Principally we canquickly subscribe the remedy as it was workedout in the above. This would then mean that theobligation is on the state to neutralise any cul-tural expression that disallows individualchoice. The classic Sotho experience comes tomind.

3. THE SOTHO EXPERIENCEAs Sandra Burman reminds us,14 the problemof dealing with “threatening groups” is nothingnew in African and especially South Africanhistory:

“In the early days of the Cape Administra-tion, the magistrates were very aware of thehostility of the Sotho chiefs, and feared that,given the right conditions, they mightattempt to lead a revolt against the Capegovernment.”15

In their reaction, the Cape government tried toneutralise the chiefs by dividing them. Juniorchiefs’ interests were tied to those of the gov-ernment by, for example, appointing them inthe police force. Several of the sons of chiefswere also send to Cape Town in the hope thatthey would acquire a new set of values.16 Witha similar agenda of neutralising group-loyalty,the people were targeted. The chiefs’ followerswere weaned from them through “carefully cal-culated” alterations to Sotho law in exchangefor government protection from unwelcomeimpositions by their chiefs.17 Widows, forexample, received the right to custody and agirl was allowed to marry against her father’swishes when she had reached the age of maturi-ty.

Another way of weaning them away was byenticing the people with more money in theeconomy with traders buying goods from theSotho in exchange for money. Missionariesalso made their contribution by drawing peopleaway from their Sotho heritage through conver-sions and European school education while, atthe same time, condemning Sotho customs. For

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their part district medical officers were discred-iting traditional superstitions in the process ofproviding medical care.

Initially during the first eight years the effortsdid pay off. However, in particular with themajor changes to Sotho law, uneasiness withthe white man’s burden was beginning to show.Through several acts of defiance – among oth-ers the “War of the Guns” – the white man, hisway of life, his religion and his laws weredenunciated. Instead of expanding its influenceand conversely eroding the power of the chiefs,the government’s efforts drew the people closerto each other and to the chiefs.

On the whole the Sotho experience provesthat:

“For any government to introduce effectivelaws making radical changes in the dailypractices of a population, it must either havethe use of overwhelming force and be pre-pared to use it ruthlessly, or it must obtainthe cooperation of the people … virtuallynothing can be done without popular sup-port.”

The first possibility is by nature undemocratic.If the second option to neutralise exclusivegroupism is taken, then the administration orgovernment has to be satisfied with gradualchanges to established customs based on con-sideration and consultation. In the process, theadministration will also have to make inevitableconcessions. It will further have to dependheavily on the assistance of missionaries andmedical officers. As a final and most importantrecourse, the administration will have to acceptthat it needs the support of the paramount chiefand his heir; the administration will also needto bolster its power.18

The solution for dealing with an exclusivepublic-social/political culture as an expressionof groupism, is therefore the neutralisation ofits group loyalty which will in turn lead to theeventual dilution or relativisation of that cultur-al group identity, or so it would seem. But thecase is alas not as clear-cut as that. The compli-cation steps in when we stop to consider theobligation/s of the liberal state.

4. THE LIBERAL STATE AND ITS OBLIGATION/SThe liberal state is primarily defined by itsobligation to protect and advance individualrights. There ought to be no arguing in that.This is so, as Holmes has reminded us right at

the outset, not because the atomistic individualis that important but because individual rightshelp to defuse the destructive effect of irra-tional group loyalties. Loyalty is herein notnecessarily a bad thing but it can grow into one.

In the same manner that unrestrained loyaltythreatens individual rights, it can also developinto a threat for state security. This situationarises when this kind of loyalty requires the fur-ther rejection of shared values and symbols of asociety and indirectly of state authority. Marga-lit and Halbertal explain the connection:

“(But) these shared values and symbols aremeant to serve as the focus for citizens’identification with the state, as well as thesource of their willingness to defend it evenat the risk of their lives.”19

The liberal state is thus called upon explicitly toprotect the rights of the individual and implicit-ly itself. In order to do this, it must qualify as a“strong” state. “(S)tatelessness means rightless-ness”20 and “statelessness” is nothing else than“weak” statehood. A weak state will not onlyfail in its protection of individual rights; it willin tandem also contribute to its own downfall.

This notion that a strong state is needed forthe protection of individual rights – as well asfor its own survival – has been apparent indemocratisation efforts where weak states havebeen associated with democracy and subse-quently also with liberalism. The resultant dis-pensation was one where little to no rights couldbe guaranteed. In fact, newly democratisedcountries after 1974 have been plagued withlawlessness. In the former Soviet Union, forexample, organised crime has been bloomingsince the abolishment of the old order. SouthAfrica has proved itself to be another exampleof lawlessness and subsequent rightlessness.The law-abiding citizen in South Africa hasbeen the victim of a relatively uncontrolledcrime frenzy ever since the inception of democ-racy in 1994. For South Africans then, the thirdwave of democratisation did not only bring anew political dispensation. It also had a newcriminal dispensation with which to contend.21

On the issue of identifying democracy andmore in particular liberalism with a strong state,a substantive misunderstanding must be clari-fied. The healthy maintenance of law and orderessential for the survival of the liberal state, isoften depicted as an illiberal characteristic. Infact, statism is regarded as illiberal. The truth

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is, however, that a liberal dispensation requiresa strong state in order for it to exist. So liberal-ism utilises the state’s authority for its ownends. The existence of centralised and bureau-cratic states does, therefore, not mean thatstateness itself is inherently illiberal.22

There is, however, an example of a liberalstate’s obligation that comes much closer to anilliberal obligation. This brings us once againback to our topic of discussion where we have,up to now, drawn the following conclusion:• Groupism is valuable as long as it does not

degenerate into exclusive groupism where theopportunity to be an individual is negativelyaffected or even denied.

• With an exclusive public-social/political cul-ture as a case in point, the state has the oblig-ation – or so it would seem – to neutralise itsgroup loyalty through democratic means.

However, and this must certainly qualify as theproverbial upset of the apple cart, Margalit andHalbertal insist that human beings have abirthright23 to their “own” culture even if thatexclusive culture contradicts the status of theindividual in the liberal society.

Moreover, the state might be required to:24

• “use illiberal means. For example, granting aparticular cultural group the opportunity topreserve its cultural homogeneity in a givenregion under certain circumstances may exactthe price of preventing outsiders from livingthere, even if they are willing to pay thegoing prices for homes in that area

• abjure its neutrality, in our view, not for thesake of the majority, but in order to make itpossible for members of minority groups toretain their identity”.

The state is thus expected to use illiberal meansto condone illiberal behaviour. The justificationis as follows:25

“The right to culture is, thus, not the right toidentify with a group but the right to secureone’s personality identity.”

Personality identity as opposed to personalidentity (with the latter qualifying one as an

anthropological individual) is what onebecomes when one gives expression to, whatwe have called, “one’s human need to belong”.One’s anchor-points or fixities in one’s lifeaccordingly determine one’s identity.

CONCLUSIONThe right to these fixities and the subsequentright to culture as a specific manifestation ofgroupism, is of extreme importance. The alter-native is a society filled with schizophrenicswhere the only difference between you andyour neighbour is the level of schizophrenia.

The state, however, is also of extreme impor-tance, and here I have to underline ThomasHobbes’ claim that outside of political societythe life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutishand short. Aside from the importance of thestate keeping itself intact, is the state’s obliga-tion to uphold, protect and forward the liberaldemocratic dispensation.

In danger of running the gauntlet, I take upthe gauntlet. I therefore submit the followingfor further discussion:• Any cultural grouping in a liberal democratic

dispensation must be allowed to exist, recog-nised and supported.

• An exclusive cultural grouping that contra-venes liberal principles must also be allowedto exist, and be recognised and supported.

• The elements in the exclusive grouping thatare illiberal should be gradually neutralisedthrough democratic means.

• The responsible party for this type of neutral-isation is one’s provincial government.

• The way to go about it is to, among others:– Pull the exclusive culture into the liber-al democratic dispensation through smalltokens of recognition and appreciation –giving, for example, paramount dutiesand responsibilities to the culture – offer-ing it the perks of the system.– Increasingly introduce capitalism, avail-able education, and the right of freedomto conduct a personalised religion.

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1) Hence also the preamble to “The Res-ponsive Communitarian Platform: Rightsand Responsibilities” – a document signedby over 50 proselytes united in their beliefthat “(n)either human existence nor indi-vidual liberty can be sustained for long out-side the interdependent and overlappingcommunities to which they belong”.(Published in Responsive Community,Winter 1991/2, No. 4).

2) Rustow, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 4, p.75.

3) Daly, Communitarianism, 1994, p. xix.4) Ketab, Social Research, Vol. 61, No. 3,

p. 511.5) Von Beyme, West European Politics, Vol.

11, No. 2, pp. 1-18.6) See Huntington’s The Third Wave: democ-

ratisation in the late twentieth century(1991).

7) Huntington, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No.3, pp. 22-49. According to this: “…(T)hefundamental source of conflict in this newworld will not be primarily ideological orprimarily economic. The great divisionsamong humankind and the dominatingsource of conflict will be cultural. … Theclash of civilisations will dominate globalpolitics” (p. 22).

8) Holmes, Social Research, Vol. 61, No.3,pp. 601-602.

9) Further examples of “thinking” (next to a“relative interpretation of the absolute” andan “absolute interpretation of the relative”),are the “absolute interpretation of theabsolute” which is impossible and thusamounts to sinlosism, and the “relativeinterpretation of the relative” which is anexample of not thinking at all (hence theinverted commas accompanying thinkingin the beginning of the sentence).

10) Take for instance the way in which organ-ised crime is threatening the survival ofnewly founded democracies – a supremeexample of factionalism and xenophobiawhich follows of course in the footsteps ofits predecessor “the Mob” where the extend-ed family justifies the misplaced loyalty.

11) See Margalit and Halbertal, SocialResearch, Vol. 61, No.3, pp. 491-510.

12) Ibid., p. 497.

13) Ibid., p. 491.14) See Chiefdom politics and alien law: Basu-

toland under Cape rule, 1871–1884 (1981).15) Ibid., p. 61.16) Ibid., p. 69. Noticeable is the fact that these

newly recruited “government employees”were still allowed to speak at pitsos (publicmeetings) as chiefs rather than as govern-ment employees – an exception aimed atkeeping the loyalty of their followers intact.

17) Ibid., p. 75. “Carefully calculated” i.e.“without too greatly annoying the chiefs”.Ibid., p.77.

18) Ibid., p. 185-191.19) Margalit and Halbertal, Social Research,

Vol. 61, No.3, p. 491.20) Holmes, Social Research, Vol. 61, No.3,

p. 605.21) Taken to the extreme a weak state will have

to surrender to anti-democratic forces – areverse wave of democratisation. Unhealthystatehood therefore opens up the door for anoppressive regime. The citizenry of ademocracy expect the state to deliver thevirtue promised by that democracy andeven though the virtue of individual rightsis not for the sake of the individual (but forthe sake of diffusing irrational group loyal-ties), it serves as a definite incentive forthem to uphold the rules of that democracy.With the goods not being delivered andindividual rights not being protected, thecitizenry will in all likelihood reach foranother messiah, in which case an oppres-sive alternative will gladly comply.

22) See Holmes, Social Research, Vol. 61,No.3, p. 605-609.

23) This birthright includes (pp. 498-499):• “the right to maintain a comprehensiveway of life within the larger society with-out interference, and with only the limita-tion of the harm principle• the right to recognition of the communi-ty’s way of life by the general society• the right to support for the way of life bythe state’s institutions so that the culturecan flourish.”

24) Margalit and Halbertal, Social Research,Vol. 61, No.3, p. 491-492.

25) Ibid., p.502.

ENDNOTES

ABSTRACTEach state demonstrates its constitutional andphilosophical approach in its system of govern-ment. It is extremely difficult to conceive anystate that demonstrates its fundamental consti-tutional principles outside its system of government.

The overriding principles of the constitution-al system in South Africa since the adoption ofthe 1909 and 1983 constitutions was a frag-mented system of government. This paperseeks to venture and discuss the constitutionaldevelopment that engulfed the country sincethe establishment of the Union in 1910, untilthe period when a democratic interim constitu-tion was adopted in 1993. Furthermore, thepaper discusses the underpinnings and pro-found implications of such pieces of legislationto the broader South African society.

The South African constitutional dispensa-tion of the 1990s and beyond therefore articu-lates democratisation and transformation ofstructures or institutions of governance. Thetwo phenomena have become common clichédconcepts. Nevertheless, constitutional reformsare inevitable. It is therefore a process that isunfolding, i.e., a means to realise the desiredoutcomes.

With all the constitutional endeavours, SouthAfrica needed a constitution that wouldembrace a basic human rights philosophy. Butadoption of a democratic constitution does notguarantee effective functioning of public insti-tutions and realisation of national ideals.Rather it is just one recurring process thatwould enhance institutional transformation. Aconstitution should therefore be viewed as a

guiding principle to a new socio-political, cul-tural and economic discourse.

INTRODUCTIONThe Republic of South Africa is a constitution-al democracy, henceforth the Constitution isviewed as a liberal piece of legislation. Further-more, the Constitution is regarded as a hybridpiece of legislation based on principles ofinclusiveness, representativeness, democracy,accountability and transparent government,aimed at promoting the general well being ofthe populace. The Constitution is indeed anacceptable final product of a collected negotiat-ed settlement. The world views the SouthAfrican Constitution as most liberal in thesense that it encapsulates the fundamental prin-ciples of human rights as enshrined in theUnited Nations Charter.

The Constitution also incorporates the socio-political and economic factors that characterisethe South African system of government. Itmust also be stressed that the Constitution isfundamentally based on extensive researchcomparisons of several pieces of legislationfrom various countries. It is also the result ofbroad consultation with all stakeholders envis-aged to be affected by the Constitution, includ-ing local and international interest groups(Msaseni, 1998).

The concept of hybrid emanates from thecharacteristics of the Constitution. In the con-text of the South African Constitution, hybridentails that the Constitution has strong featuresof both federal and unitary systems of govern-ment. The concept of a quasi federal-unitarysystem of government was, of course, a com-

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The Impact of Constitutional RelationshipsBetween the Three Spheres of Government:

The South African Perspective

Sitembe Msaseni

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promise during the negotiation process, whichnegotiators were obliged to acknowledge andobserve, based on the concept of “sharing ofpower” – as articulated by the late Joe Slovo.Prominent political scientists argued against theconcept of power sharing and instead proposeda new phenomenon, which they termed “jointexercising of power”.

The distinction between the two concepts isfluid if there is any difference at all, becausethe two terms were used interchangeably duringand after the negotiation process. The underpin-nings of these phenomena could be observed inthe previous Government of National Unity(GNU), adopted after the 1994 general elec-tions.

In the post-Mandela era – popularly termed“The Madiba Magic” – the two concepts arestill by and large in operation in the Mbekiadministration. The “final product” of the nego-tiation process culminated in the adoption ofthe Interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993. Theinterim legislation made provision for the creation of the GNU with various governmentstructures, for example, nine provincial admin-istrations and the establishment of transitionallocal councils, to mention just a few.

It is extremely difficult to conceptualise inpractical terms the system of government thatSouth Africa practices. Most people regard it asa tripartite alliance or relationship betweenbusiness, government and labour. This paperseeks to address the following:• The process of devolution of constitutional

power between the national, provincial andlocal government spheres.

• The nature and extent of power disseminatedto provincial and local administrations.

• The constitutional mandate of the threespheres of government to render public ser-vices to the local people.

• The type of power decentralised by thenational government to lower governmentstructures.

• A clear distinction between relative andabsolute power is brought to the fore.

1. SYNOPSIS ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DISPENSATIONIt is imperative to provide a brief synopsis ofthe several constitutional dispensation andpolitical arrangements in South Africa since1909. This is the period when the country

adopted Act 1909, which later established whatwas to become a Union of South Africa.Furthermore, the Act created a framework ofgovernment. It was not, however, an absoluteconstitutional code for the country, rather it wasa temporary provision. Since crucial matterswere still being decided according to theStatute of Westminster, foreign and diplomaticrelations were, for example, referred to theBritish governor-general, who was responsiblefor the administration of the colony (Maraisand Driekerk, 1981:31).

Act 1909 made provision for the establish-ment of four major provinces, inter alia, twoBoer Republics – the Transvaal and OrangeFree State – and two British colonies – theCape Province and Natal. The Act was incon-sistent as far as its application was concerned tothe four provinces. For example, citizens at theCape were obliged to register as voters, irre-spective of race, colour and/or ethnicity (Ibid.,1981:32).

This principle was applied differently in theother three provinces whereby non-white citi-zens were not allowed to exercise their democ-ratic vote. In terms of the Act, article 137makes a provision for equal protection of thetwo official languages – Dutch and English –which were entrenched in terms of article 152of the 1909 Constitution.

This was one of the common constitutionalprinciples applicable to all four provinces.Article 152 states that if Parliament intends toamend clauses 35 and 137, a two-thirds majori-ty of both houses of Parliament was required,i.e. the House of Assembly and the Senate(Ibid., 1981:32). The adoption of the SouthAfrican Constitution Act 1909 was not the endof constitutional reforms. Subsequent to Act1909, the country once again adopted a “new”Constitution Act (Act 32 of 1961).

The Act brought significant changes. Forexample, the position of the governor-generalwas transformed to that of president, whichadvocated republicanism (Ibid., 1981:38).South Africa became a complete sovereignstate but the concept of “distant rule” or“remote authority” remained intact evenbeyond the establishment of the republic (Act1961).

The 1961 Constitution was not without itsshortcomings – based on racial constitutionalprinciples – because the majority of citizens

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were excluded from participating in constitu-tional negotiations. This exclusion created dis-comfort among the excluded groups, and there-fore the Constitution was declared illegitimate.In a sense, the legitimacy of the 1961 Act waschallenged from many fronts. From these chal-lenges another constitutional transformationwas imminent.

Henceforth, the South African ConstitutionAct 110 of 1983 was adopted. The 1983 Actwas a response to the exclusion of the majorityfrom contributing constructively to the socio-political and economic transformation of thecountry. The major change advocated by theAct was the introduction of a tricameral parlia-mentary system.

Three houses of Parliament were establishedfor the different ethnic groups, namely: theHouse of Representatives for coloured people,the House of Commons for whites and theHouse of Delegates for the Indian population.The constitutional transformation process thatextended from 1909 to 1983 was regarded to beundemocratic and illegitimate because theprocess was not representative or inclusive,hence it was essential for the country to ventureto another round of constitutional talks whichcommenced in 1990 (Marais, 1991:253).

The Republic of South Africa had eventuallyadopted its first democratic Interim Constitu-tion Act 200 of 1993, after a long history ofracial segregation and discrimination. TheInterim Legislation, 1993 made provision foran opportunity for the country to hold its firstnon-racial democratic election in 1994, inwhich the majority of South Africans weregranted an opportunity to exercise their votesand express their political will for the first time(Ibid., 1991:253).

The Independent Electoral Commission(IEC) and international observers declared the1994 general elections free and fair. Subse-quent to the general elections, the GNU wasestablished under the leadership of Mandela, asthe first black president. Several political par-ties that participated in the elections charac-terised the GNU, and their representation in allstate apparatus was determined to a large extentby the number of votes obtained in the 1994elections. The concept of proportional represen-tation (PR) was advocated as an attempt toapply the concept of power sharing amongpolitical parties, irrespective of their size.

But there were two essential conditions orrequirements to PR: a political party must haveparticipated in the 1994 general elections andshould obtain a minimum of five per cent of thevote. It is worth noting that the GNU was inter-im until the Constitutional Assembly – a struc-ture which was tasked with the responsibility toframe the final constitution – adopted theConstitution Act 108 of 1996. Act 200 of 1993made provision for the GNU to exist for a peri-od of five years and thereafter it should cease toexist (Constitutional Talks, 1994/5).

The GNU comprised seven political partiesthat had participated in the 1994 elections.Furthermore, the government introduced twohouses of Parliament, namely, the NationalAssembly and the Senate – the latter was laterchanged to the National Council of Provinces(NCOP). The South African system of govern-ment is not different from western democracies,because its Constitution acknowledges the sep-aration of powers between the executive, judi-ciary and legislature. It therefore has a strongtriad-politika ensuring checks and balances ofthe functions of each state branch. In terms ofthe Constitution the president is the head of thestate, but the Constitution is the supreme law ofthe state (Constitution, 1996).

2. PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATIONSBefore the 1994 general election, South Africawas constituted of four major provinces: theCape Province, Natal, Orange Free State andTransvaal. After the 1994 elections, the countrywas demarcated into nine major provinces,which incorporated the former “black home-lands and self-governing states” to a strong uni-tary and democratic system of government.

The jurisdictions of the various provinces aredelineated in Part 1 of schedule 1 of theConstitution of the Republic of South Africa,1993. The legislative authority of a provinceonly applies within the territorial boundaries ofthe province concerned. Each of the nineprovinces is constitutionally obliged to elect itsown premier and executive council, which areresponsible for the effective and efficientsmooth running of the provincial administration(Constitution, 1993).

Finally, the provincial Legislative Assemblyis a law-making authority for the province andit should not consist of fewer that 30 and notmore than 100 members elected in accordance

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with the principle of PR. A provincial legisla-ture is elected for a period of five years (VanDer Waldt and Helmbold, 1995:84).

However, a provincial legislature cannot actultra-vires. That is, it should act within theambit of the law. Furthermore, it should func-tion within the constitutional guidelines orparameters prescribed by the central govern-ment. Provincial laws therefore cannot contra-dict an act of Parliament. The provincial admin-istrations operate in terms of delegated poweror authority.

In terms of the national Constitution section147, the provincial legislative authority isexpected to uphold, observe and promote thenational Constitution (Mckenzie, 2000:14).

The national Constitution makes provisionfor the establishment of a provincial constitu-tion which may not be in conflict with an act ofParliament. As yet, only the Western Cape hasadopted a provincial constitution. One thereforewonders as to the effectiveness of provincialconstitutions in relation to the powers ofprovinces. As provincial and local governmentspheres do not have an absolute constitutionalmandate or political will, they are thereforegoverned in accordance to the principles pre-scribed by the national Constitution.

Subsequent to the provision of the establish-ment of provincial constitution(s), the SenateHouse was abolished and substituted with theNCOP. The latter was created on the assump-tion that it would improve coordination of pub-lic functions and bring the government closer tothe people. The NCOP consists of ten electedmembers from each province and the electionof provincial delegates is based on PR (Ibid.,2000:7&14).

It should be noted that the NCOP has beencriticised for being a mere rubber stamp of theNational Assembly. Put differently, it hasbecome a “gate keeper” or merely an extensionof central government’s constitutional obliga-tions.

Complementary to this criticism, theConstitution has been amended to give execu-tive powers to the Members of the ExecutiveCouncil (MECs) at provincial spheres.

For instance, MECs have the authority to hireand fire public employees in their respectivedepartments. This might be a stepping-stone toa spoil system practised in the American feder-al government (Business Day, 2000).

3. UNITARY VERSUS FEDERAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT The South African government system is fun-damentally based on the principles of consen-sus and negotiated settlement, seeking agree-ment on several contested issues, namely: polit-ical participation, representation, integration,good governance, transformation and democra-tisation, as well as many topical or unresolvedissues that still confront the Mbeki administra-tion in the 21st century.

All these topical issues are enshrined in theInterim Constitution Act 200 of 1993 that wasadopted as a building block to a system of gov-ernment which the country adopted six yearsago. The 1993 Constitution created a platformfor further deliberations and negotiations on thepreceding contested issues. The end product ofsuch negotiation was the adoption of the finalConstitution Act 108 of 1996. It has alreadybeen alluded to that the final Constitution isregarded by many international constitutionalexperts as the most liberal constitution in theworld.

The aforementioned synopsis can be attrib-uted to a profound assumption. During the for-mal negotiation that commenced at the begin-ning of 1990, a team of experts in constitutionalmatters as well as delegates from the NationalParty (NP) government and African NationalCongress (ANC) visited several countries as aconscious effort to compare their constitutions.Henceforth, the South African Constitution hasboth features of a unitary and federal system ofgovernment (Act 108, 1996). But it should bestressed that the final Constitution has estab-lished prominent unitary powers vested to thecentral government. Furthermore, it also creat-ed two other spheres of government – provin-cial and local government. In terms of chaptersix of the Constitution, which deals withprovincial matters and chapter seven whichdeals with local government issues, the lattertwo spheres of government are supposedlyautonomous or independent entities.

The breakaway from the hierarchical rela-tionship between the three spheres was basedon levels or tiers of government, because theywere not regarded as a self-reliant administra-tion in their own right – they operated withinthe national broad policy directives formulatedat the central government sphere. The paradigmshift from levels to the new functional concept

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of spheres, denotes that the three spheres ofgovernment are equal partners in terms of theConstitution (Ibid., 1995:2).

Therefore, neither the central sphere nor theprovincial government sphere should interferein the domestic affairs of the local governmentsphere. The three spheres in the real conceptualframework of autonomy, have equal status sofar as their administration is concerned. But onewonders how much autonomy or power hasbeen devolved to local and provincial spheres,because the Constitution is silent on the issue ofpower distribution. There has been minimumdevolution of power to both provincial andlocal government spheres.

Prominent scholars in the fields of PublicAdministration and Management as well asPolitical Studies have made an interestingobservation that provincial and local govern-ment spheres in terms of the South African con-stitutional relationship, have what is referred toas relative political power as opposed toabsolute power. The former entails that the twospheres of government cannot take decision(s)on a policy issue that will affect the country.

With relative political power the central gov-ernment still has some control over provincialor local government administrations. In termsof relative political power, the central govern-ment has the right to intervene, particularly ifprovincial and local administrations are dys-functional and do not provide the requiredcapacity. There have been several instanceswhereby the central government was forced tointervene in various levels of administration atprovincial and local level.

The concept of absolute political autonomyas espoused by many is a direct contrast to rela-tive political power (Ibid., 1995:3). Absolutepolitical power means complete or total controlof local administration, without interference bythe central government. With the foregoingsynopsis of the constitutional relationshipbetween the three spheres of government, onecan infer that the relationship is that of centralpolitical control with minimum discretionarypowers granted to provincial and local spheres.

The assumption of a constitutional relation-ship can be articulated from two essential theo-ries, namely, political and financial relation-ships between the three spheres of government.The debate on the two theories is a dauntingand unfolding one as it is embedded in the

Constitution and it cannot be changedovernight, unless certain constitutional clausesare changed. Provincial and local spheres there-fore cannot even begin to advocate or open dis-cussions on financial powers if the debate onpolitical power has not been resolved (Pierre,1995:215).

Central government is reluctant to yieldpower to other spheres of government withoutit being in control of such spheres. The stancetaken by the national government to centraliseits power can be attributed to several factors:the legacy of the previous government, deeplyrooted divisions within government structuresand political and socio-economic considera-tions (Ibid., 1995:215).

Concerning the relationship between thethree spheres of government, metaphoricallyspeaking, one sphere cannot serve two mastersat the same time, and therefore it shouldbecome responsive to the public and be accord-ed the autonomy it deserves to take policy deci-sions on pertinent issues (Idem, 1995:216).

It has already been said that the 1909 Actmade provision for the establishment of fourformer colonies, which later became provinces.That system of provincial administrationremained basically the same except with limit-ed powers devolved by the central government.With the adoption of the Constitution Act 108of 1996, both local and provincial spheresunderwent drastic transformation, for example,the provincial administration was granted moreconstitutional obligations and competenciesthan was the case with the previous constitu-tional dispensation.

But the constitutional relationship betweencentral and provincial government is fluid.Although the national Constitution sets guide-lines and a list of provincial powers or compe-tencies, there is lack of absolute clarity as towhere the powers and functions of nationalgovernment stop and where those of provincesbegin (World Bank Report, 1999/2000:6).

This lack of a clear mandate has culminatedin litigation or legal wrangling in which provin-cial authorities have taken up the matter withthe Constitutional Court to resolve the impasse.It should be indicated that the ConstitutionalCourt has been the upholder of the rights of theprovinces and in its certification of the newConstitution it made it clear that provinces arehere to stay (Ibid., 2000:7).

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4. RETHINKING PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTPublic institutions around the world seekgreater self-determination or self-reliance inorder to influence central decisions. Thisdemand has been conceptualised as localisationor, put simply, decentralisation. Approximately95% of democracies have established sub-national governments where devolution ofpolitical, fiscal and administrative power tospheres of government has been the order of theday. Decentralisation of such powers is, howev-er, often haphazardly executed and decisionmakers fail to fully comprehend the dynamicexegesis of the transformation process (Idem,1999/2000:107).

Furthermore, decentralisation models are fre-quently exported from one country to anotherwithout due regard to local circumstances,which are unique and peculiar. The phenome-non of decentralisation is neither good nor bad,rather it is a means to an end, often imposed bypolitical and socio-economic realities. The pos-itive aspects of decentralisation are immense: itimproves efficiency, responsiveness of govern-ment to local demands and it also accommo-dates divergent political forces to have syner-gist mutual relationships to accomplish the pre-determined government objectives. On theother hand, negative aspects of abortive decen-tralisation impose threats to macroeconomicdevelopment and growth, as well as politicalstability and disrupt service delivery, perfor-mance and equity (Ibid., 1999/2000:111).

5. BENEFITS OF DECENTRALISATIONThe primary purpose of decentralisation is tobring together opposition parties into a formalrule-bound bargaining process. It also unites adeeply divided country, especially along racialand ethnic lines. Thus decentralisation illus-trates a concrete mechanism to national recon-ciliation and unity. A classic argument in sup-port of decentralisation is that it increaseseffective and responsive government becauselocally elected representatives know their elec-torates better than the central government. Itgoes without saying that geographical proximi-ty makes it easier for local people to hold polit-ical representatives accountable for their per-formance (Smith, 1991:1-2).

What provincial administrations can achievedepends really on the resources and responsibil-ities granted, and on the power of central gov-

ernment to override their decisions. But con-ceding power to local authorities is no guaran-tee that local needs and interests would bereflected in local politics (Idem., 1999/2000:112).

Elcock summed up the aforementioned bene-fits of decentralisation in terms of a mutualrelationship between the three spheres of gov-ernment and the purpose of public organisa-tions:

“…(t)o develop a new kind of organisation-al culture which is capable of being moreopen, democratic and self critical andorganisational culture which is anxious tolearn and eager to appraise its own perfor-mance. Such an organisation is very differ-ent from the service provision we havelabelled bureaucratic paternalism” (Elcock,1991:39).

6. DECENTRALISATION AND DEVOLUTION OFPOWERSA fixed and essential relationship existsbetween observation as a mode of knowledgeand decentralisation. The concept decentralisa-tion is indeed a misnomer – it appears to havebeen derived from centralisation. Furthermore,a decentralised constitutional system wouldindeed be decentralised in an original manner –it would be decentralised simply because itconsists of autonomous entities. This type ofindependence is authentic, it is not derivedfrom the centre or unity as is the case withSouth African constitutional relationshipsbetween the three spheres of government(Marais, 1991 5).

According to the World Bank DevelopmentReport 1999/2000, decentralisation means thetransfer of political, fiscal and administrativepowers to subnational units of government. Thereport states further that the central governmenthas not decentralised unless the country encour-ages “autonomous elected local authoritiescapable of taking binding decisions in at leastsome policy area”.

Decentralisation could therefore bring togeth-er existing local authorities or expand theirresources and responsibilities. In short, decen-tralisation shifts the focus of accountabilityfrom central government to elected local con-stituencies.

In this respect decentralisation in the SouthAfrican context will leave aside a fluid political

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discourse that surrounds the phenomenon andother measures that reduce political autonomyof provincial and local government spheres andthe relationships between bureaucracy and soci-ety. Decentralisation is therefore both a causeand effect of the changing relationship betweenthree spheres of government (Idem, 1999/2000).

Elcock observed that decentralisation andareas of management embrace a wide spectrumof mutual relationships which public institu-tions have developed within their jurisdictionsto make public services more accessible andaffordable to local inhabitants, in order toenhance responsiveness to their needs andwants.

The spectrum of mutual relationship, whichElcock talks about, presupposes to encourageconcerted and collaborative efforts to all stake-holders responsible for service delivery. He fur-ther accentuates his interpretation of mutualrelationship by introducing the concept of cor-porate management “from below” as opposedto “from above. The corporate managementconcept encourages cross-departmental work-ing relations among relatively junior staff, whatElcock called “street bureaucrats” (Ibid., 1991:56).

CONCLUSIONThe constitutional relationship in South Africabetween the three spheres of governmentemanates from three successive comparativeconstitutional dispensations. The three constitu-tional dispensations are compared in terms ofsocio-political, economic and cultural factors,

which enhance meaningful participation andthe contribution of all South Africans to acoherent transformation and democratisation ofstructures of governance.

The system of government in South Africa istherefore influenced by and large by threeprominent constitutional developments thatshape the nature and extent of powers devolvedto provincial administrations by the centralgovernment sphere. The South African systemis regarded as semi-federal with strong centralpowers vested in the National Assembly. TheConstitution itself is a hybrid type, that is, it hasprominent characteristics of both federalismand unionism. The Constitutional relationshipestablishes guiding principles for effective andefficient execution of public policies by statedepartments or institutions that are responsiblefor the rendering of services. From a SouthAfrican perspective, Constitution Act 108 of1996 is the supreme law for the state. Theadoption of the Interim Constitution Act 108resulted in the introduction of the GNU, basedon the principle of “sharing of power” or “jointexercising of power”.

In the final analysis, the constitutional rela-tionship between the three spheres of govern-ment is more or less relative as opposed toabsolute socio-political and economic relations.Furthermore, the Constitution is not elucidativein respect of how much power should bedevolved to both provincial and local spheresof government. By the latter point, it isassumed that it would create mistrust betweenthe three spheres of government as far asdecentralisation of powers are concerned.

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BUSINESS DAY. 2000. Thursday, August 10,2000.

THE WORLD BANK. 1999. Entering the 21stCentury – World Development Report1999/2000. The World Bank: OxfordUniversity Press.

ELCOCK, H. 1991. Change and Decay? PublicAdministration in the 1990s. New York:Longman Group Ltd.

MARAIS. D. AND RIEKERK. D. 1981. Constitu-tional Development of South Africa. SouthAfrica: Macmillan South Africa (Pty) Ltd.

MARAIS, D. 1991. South Africa: ConstitutionalDevelopment – A Multi-DisciplinaryApproach. South Africa: Southern BookPublishers (Pty) Ltd..

MCKENZIE, K. 2000. Provincial Pocketbook –Pims 2000 Guide to Politics in the Province.Cape Town: Idasa.

ROSENBLOM, D.H. GOLDMAN, D.D. ANDINGRAHAM, P.W. 1994. Contemporary PublicAdministration. New York: McGraw-Hill,Inc.

SMITH, B. 1991. Progress in DevelopmentAdministration: Selected Papers from PublicAdministration and Development.Chichester: John Wiley and Son.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTHAFRICA ACT 108 OF 1996.

THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OFSOUTH AFRICA ACT 200 OF 1993.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNION OF SOUTHAFRICA, ACT 1909.

VAN DER WALDT, G. AND HELMBOLD, R. 1995.The Constitution and the New PublicAdministration. Juta & Co. Ltd. 1995.

REFERENCES

INTRODUCTIONCodesa’s constitutional debates in the early1990s centred on whether South Africa shouldhave a unitary or federal form of government.The advocates of a unitary state were probablyconcerned about the fragmentation of our soci-ety into racial and ethnic entities, which hadbeen characterised and formed the basis ofapartheid’s separate development governance.They would naturally see the advent of a feder-al form of government as one that perpetuates afractured socio-political order.

Federalists had always argued against thecentralisation of power in a central governmentand the diminishing of political responsibilityat regional and local level because this had allthe ingredients to erode democratic participa-tion at local level, leading to the centralisationof power in the hands of the executive at cen-tral government level.

This view is reinforced by the authoritariannature of the apartheid state that was beingnegotiated out of power. The apartheid govern-ment was one of the worst manifestations of aunitary state. It does not follow, however, thata unitary form of government need necessarilybe undemocratic.

For the purposes of this discussion we nowlook at the form of provincial governmentestablished under South Africa’s Constitution.It is safe to say that this country’s constitution-al structure is a compromise between cen-tralised and federal government. Our provincialstructures enjoy a measure of autonomy. Thiscan be seen by the existence of provincial leg-islatures that have a mandate to matters of aprovincial nature, where these matters do not

trespass on central government’s sphere of leg-islation and governance. The increased mea-sure of participation should under normal cir-cumstances facilitate better delivery of ser-vices.

South Africa has been characterised byuneven development – in a typical colonialdevelopment sense – where a modern infra-structure and developed first world economyexist alongside with an Iron Age substructureof underdevelopment. Attempts by theapartheid regime to reverse this trend by creat-ing development points and providing incen-tives to attract industries to rural communities,had minimal success because these measureswere based on an economy that had relied onthe migratory cheap labour system – whichdrew that labour from rural labour reserves.There was little incentive for major industriesto relocate to rural areas where there was noinfrastructure for development.

Our provincial government under a democra-tic government has the mammoth task of cor-recting that historical imbalance. At present,there is little evidence that provincial govern-ment is tackling this problem, nor is there anyreal understanding of the nature of the problemor any real commitment from central govern-ment to see development and delivery of ser-vices at provincial and local government level.

However, a constitutional framework existsfor government to assert itself at provinciallevel to ensure that budgets are allocated to itto improve roads, provide appropriate andquality education, adequate health services aswell as to see that social benefits are properlyutilised for that purpose. Good performance by

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Transformational Challenges in Provincial Administration

Masilo Mabeta

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provincial government would ensure an em-powering environment for local governmentstructures to whom the responsibility for ser-vice delivery at grassroots level would be fil-tered.

The perception that the Bantustan apartheidstructure did more for the people on the groundin the provinces is a serious indictment of theperformance of central and provincial govern-ment. The deterioration of health and social ser-vices and the collapse of the education systemtestify to uncaring provincial governments thatare tarnished by corruption, nepotism and inef-ficiency. The situation is aggravated by ram-pant unemployment resulting from economicstagnation.

1. GOOD, CLEAN GOVERNANCEThe core issue in United DemocraticMovement (UDM) policy on provincial admin-istration and local government is that of goodand clean governance. To realise this objectiveour society must address the issue that centreson the power of provinces and their capacity tofunction in a manner that is efficient andaccountable.

The current structure of the provincial admin-istrations and their relationship with centralgovernment militate against the creation of effi-cient and accountable management systems.The prevalent culture in the present administra-tions is that of inefficiency and corruption,which emanates from poor training, lack ofadequate resources, institutional fragility, dupli-cation of services, conflicting power betweenprovincial and central government, partisan ori-entation of managers and the total neglect ofcodes of conduct in various aspects of servicedelivery administrations.

This is very important because institutionalchaos and non-accountability in various areasof the public sector derives from the subordina-tion of standard administrative norms and prac-tices to the interests served by a corrupt andunofficial network of operations, at the expenseof ordinary citizens whose interests are neglect-ed and disregarded.

The distribution of resources between theurban and rural communities is inequitable. Thegovernment still seems to adhere to apartheid’suneven developmental patterns which concen-trated resources in urban communities whilerelegating rural areas to the economic back

waters of neglect, impoverishment and unem-ployment.

In the housing sector these is a clear unequaldistribution of resources because the housingpolicy and its subsidy schemes focus on urbandwellers and excludes other taxpayers who arethe rural dwellers.

Although we appreciate that annexed ruralareas by urban municipalities will benefit in theshort-term, it must be pointed out that thenational government has no long-term nationalstrategy for development in rural areas. Thepresent approach creates the impression thatunannexed rural communities will not benefitfrom local government resource allocation andservice deliveries. The truth of the matter is,however, that people in rural communities needwater, roads, sewerage systems, electricity, etc.

Government has not been able to provideanswers to all the questions arising from theproposed annexation of rural communities tothe municipalities to which they are adjacent.The questions are:• Will government provide the necessary infra-

structure in the annexed territories, whichwill be comparable to the existing one in themunicipal area to which they are annexed?

• How does government address the perceptionof the people in the proposed annexed territo-ries that they will be used to beef up the ail-ing finances of the villages’ boards which areresponsible for the general decline and rot inthese small, rural towns?

• How does government respond, on the otherhand, to the fears of the urban municipaldwellers, who believe that they will be taxedto provide financial resources for the upgrad-ing of annexed undeveloped territories?

All these questions give credence to the con-tention that central government makes far-reaching decisions unilaterally in the corridorsof power without proper consultation with rele-vant stakeholders at the lowest levels of civicsociety. The poor continue to suffer in povertyand general neglect by a government that hascome to be seen as uncaring and non-respon-sive to the needs of those who put it in power.

2. TRANSFORMATIONAL PROBLEMS FACINGPROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICASouth Africa has a history of racial division andserious inequalities that coincides with these

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racial divisions. The past policies have exploit-ed tribal and ethnic diversity to reinforce theracial policies and the apartheid ground plan.

South Africa is a society with diverse groupsand corresponding interests and concerns.These cannot be wished away by the Constitut-ion that highlights non-racialism and unity.Antagonism and mutual suspicion will continueto mar our society for some time yet. We needa government that will seriously address thenegative impact of these divisions. This needsto be done by pursuing policies that begin toerode these divisions rather than reinforce themby legitimising them.

It is not within the scope of this paper toexpand on all the difficult issues facing thetransformation agenda in our provincial admin-istration. However, two critical problems, oftenoverlooked if not reluctantly acknowledged, areworth mentioning.

First, is the difficulty in dismantling andreassembling the various apartheid era, localgovernment structures, so meticulously craftedthrough the Group Areas Act and its numerousenabling regulations. Second, is the failure ofour legislation to take into account such factorsas financial constraints, party political influ-ence, intergovernmental relations and tradition-al institutions in the establishment of spheres ofauthority between central and provincial gov-ernments. The result of this tendency is thedemise of meaningful legislative and executiveautonomy which provinces or regions wouldrequire in order to satisfy the most critical andimmediate needs of the people in their jurisdic-tions.

The way in which power is defined in boththe Interim and final constitutions – giving bothlevels legislative jurisdiction over the samefunctions – not only causes confusion as to theaccountable level of government responsibilityfor a particular function, it also encourages thesolving of disputes by means of intergovern-mental agreements, which in turn could reducetransparency and increase public uncertainty asto the allocation of particular functions.

3. SPECIFIC TRANSFORMATIONAL INNOVATIONSSpecific transformational innovations need tobe implemented. They are as follows:• Decentralisation of central government so

that more power is given to the provinces. • Provinces should develop their own sources

of revenue through taxation.• Taxes should be centralised or decentralised

in line with subsidiary principles, effectiveexecution and management capacity.

• Viable local government infrastructures andlocal institutions should be established.

• Capacity building points for local peopleshould be established.

• Soft economic borders should be reconciledwith hard political borders based on what iseconomically and socially viable.

• National consultation should take place deal-ing with the desirability of fewer provincesbased on a costed norms approach in whichthe distribution of resources is based onfinances available for basic social needs.

CONCLUSIONSouth Africa is a highly heterogeneous society.Provincial strategies for administration anddevelopment should therefore mobilise localhuman and institutional resources in an integra-tive manner. As the local focus of administra-tion and development is strengthened, so willthe gap be closed between rural and urban cen-tres, the rich and the poor, the landed and thelandless. This will be done through the full par-ticipation of local stakeholders in what are localissues in the first place. Such an approach willmake a meaningful contribution to nationalunity and integration. This will reduce the ten-sion between democratic expectations of themajority of citizens and politico-administrativecontrol of state organs at both national andprovincial levels. Namibia and Botswana areappropriate African examples in this respect.

The necessary formula for these transforma-tive innovations is, in short, strong provincialgovernments with meaningful powers and ade-quate financial resource bases.

INTRODUCTIONI welcome the opportunity to participate in thisinternational conference on provincial govern-ment, knowing that in South Africa there existsan exceptional case study for the ever presentconflict between the provinces and the nationalgovernment around the issue of decentralisa-tion and the devolution of powers. The InkathaFreedom Party (IFP) strongly believes in, andconstantly advocates, greater local autonomy.

South Africa has been the battleground ofcentralistic autonomy for almost a century.Since before the Act of Union, the forces ofcentralisation have fought those of local auton-omy in an ongoing battle, the outcome ofwhich will determine the future success of ourcountry. In this context, diverse political agen-das have assumed various sides of this conflictthroughout the different stages of history. Onemay trace the origins of this conflict to before1910, and follow its path running parallel to thedevelopment of South Africa.

Apartheid was a complex system of constitu-tional engineering, using a carefully craftedand specifically designed local autonomy forthe purposes of racial oppression. The maincomponents of this system were territorial seg-regation of populations, the division of the pop-ulation into racial groups, segregation by terri-tory and the prohibition of movement from onepart of the territory to another without the nec-essary authorisation. The apartheid system wasformally equal for all, but substantially unequaldue to the obvious and strictly maintained dif-ferences of affluence and economic power.This divide would make it unlikely for whitepeople to want to settle in black townships,

while black people were blatantly barred fromentering white areas after dark, without a per-mit to do so.

Apartheid was characterised by self-adminis-tration and different governments for each sub-ject matter. With the living memory of this ter-rible abuse of local autonomy for uses of racialoppression, when the question was posed ofmoving beyond apartheid to enable democracyto rule South Africa, the pendulum swung inthe opposite direction. The perception was thatlocal autonomy was bad and centralism good.

At the outset, the African National Congress(ANC) was the dominating factor in the libera-tion movement. Both the ANC and the PanAfricanist Congress (PAC) operated under thesuggestions of the communist and Marxist ideology of the time and were trapped in theconflict and dynamics of the Cold War. Bothsubscribed to a centralistic model. The notionwas that it was necessary to redress the legacyof the past, which was one of perverted localautonomy. It was believed that this could onlybe done by virtue of a strong central govern-ment. The other consideration was that, obvi-ously, much had to be done in order to achievethe call for social justice, which remains theunfinished agenda of South Africa after libera-tion, and that this too could only be done by astrong government.

The premise was that we need to have astrong government to perform a monumentaljob. The perception persisted that a strong gov-ernment necessarily meant a central govern-ment. Indeed, it was unquestioningly believedthat the stronger the central government, thegreater the possibility of successfully complet-

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The IFP Perspective on Provincial Government

Narend Singh

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ing the daunting task confronting us. Thatwhich the IFP always knew, was finally provenonly once confronted with the real issues. Since1972, the leader of the IFP, Prince MangosuthuButhelezi, put forward his vision for federalismand pluralism which contradicted the estab-lished beliefs. Dr Buthelezi proposed that inorder to fulfil such a task as faced South Africa,one would need to rely on the forces andstrength of all.

1. DEVOLUTION OF POWER AND LOCAL AUTONOMYThe IFP believes that only the devolution ofpowers and local autonomy could muster theforces of every South African towards a collec-tive effort of changing society. Society wouldneed to be changed from the bottom up, and notfrom the top down. We believe in empoweringthe lower levels of government and in devolu-tion of powers. We are not interested in talkingdown to the people, but are committed toenabling the people to speak up and makethemselves heard, which we believe can onlybe done by allowing the people in the provinceto determine how the province should beadministered. This system would encouragepolicy differentiation and competition amongprovinces and would be best suited to servingthe needs of their citizens. Such an approachwould maximise our capacity. The IFP provid-ed this input in the negotiation process. In ret-rospect it is clear that the negotiation processreally concerned the form of state. Thisremained the fundamental issue which set theANC and the IFP apart, to the point of almostcollapsing negotiations. The impending col-lapse was averted through international media-tion at the last moment, and by the promise thatinternational mediation would carry over afterthe 1994 elections.

Devolution of power, federalism and policydifferentiation leads to healthy competition,which can and should develop among provinceson how to best serve the needs of their respec-tive citizens. Provinces should pursue their ownpath towards institutional excellence in aneffort which motivates them to excel, ratherthan assuming the present uniformity as the single yard-stick upon which performance ismeasured.

In addition, the IFP favours a justiciabledivide between government and civil society,

also based on the notion of subsidiarity, so as toensure the pre-eminence of civil society overgovernment. Civil society, including families,traditional communities, trade unions, universi-ties and professional associations should beempowered to exercise individual autonomyand to regulate their own interests wheneverthere is no compelling reason for governmentto interfere.

International mediation was likewise con-cerned with the form of state. The dominatingquestion on the table was whether South Africashould be a unitary, a regional or a federalstate, and the degree of autonomy to be given toprovinces. The form of state is defined not onlyby the existence of provinces, nor by their type,but also particularly by the level of autonomybestowed upon each province. We see federal-ism as the fastest way of building capacity atthe lower level of government to enhance deliv-ery, reconstruction and development. We alsounderstand the dangers of a centralisation ofpower and advocate devolution of powers tothe provincial and local level. After years ofoppression, we seek to place the power to gov-ern as close to the people as possible. Genuinedemocracy would require a federal system.There is no point in bestowing powers whenprovinces remain under the constant control of“Big Brother” and lack the autonomy to exer-cise those powers. The end result is a systemwhich has been denounced both by the Premierof KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) and by the leader ofthe IFP, who now sits in government.

The present system, developing out of theestablished and misguided belief in a centralistgovernment, has been denounced as a systemwhich is neither fish nor fowl. It has all thecosts of a federal system, with few of its bene-fits. The IFP has called for the inadequacies ofthis system to be overcome, posing the chal-lenge of either abolishing provinces or makingthem work. Provinces have become a section ina conveyor belt which emanates from the centretowards the periphery. There is unity of policyformulation, unity of legislation and unity ofaction.

What were originally the minimum standardsin the Constitution that made provision for min-imum standards across the territory, havebecome the only standards which govern all thematters of provincial competence, as set out inschedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution.

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2. PROVINCIAL COMPETENCESchedule 4 of the Constitution lists areas whereprovinces have concurrent legislative compe-tence with the central government, while sched-ule 5 lists areas which are exclusive compe-tences of provinces. These latter matters ofexclusive competence are quite marginal andfor purposes of our discussions it may suffice tofocus on those functional areas in which thelegislative powers of provinces and the nationalgovernment are concurrent.

2.1 Functional areasSome of the most important functional areasare quite broad and include:• agriculture • airports (international and national) • consumer protection• cultural matters• disaster management• education at all levels (excluding tertiary

education)• environment• health services• housing• industrial promotion• language policy• libraries• museums• nature conservation• population development• provincial public enterprises• public transport• regional planning and development• tourism• trade• welfare services. In spite of the constitutional provisions, theselisted functional areas of provincial competenceare in fact regulated by national legislation andnational policies alone. National legislationcontrols housing and education, which is thesame across the board whether in KZN or theWestern Cape or the Northern Cape. Eventhough people speak different languages andhave different needs, cultures and aspirations,there is no space for policy differentiation.There is likewise no space for policies to testand attempt different ideas or different models,to discover what works better. Similarly, thereis no space for provinces to compete with oneanother on how best to serve the interests of thecountry and their own constituencies. Provinces

have effectively become implementers of poli-cies developed at the central level. They are lit-tle more than administrators.

Furthermore, the eradication of persistentpoverty, and the reduction of the extremeinequalities of the apartheid era, remain theIFP’s fundamental challenge and the coreobjective of the overall policy for reconstruc-tion and development. Sound governance anddecentralised decision making and managementhave been recognised as being essential foreffective and accountable delivery of essentialpublic services, promoting partnerships forlocal empowerment and local economic devel-opment. Racial divisions were maintained at alllevels of government in the past, and werereflected in vast inequities in service deliveryand access to opportunities for development.

These new structures are faced with hugechallenges, including capacity building, trans-formation, delivery and consolidation of demo-cratic forms of government. The decentralisa-tion to provincial government of the deliveryresponsibility for the bulk of priority services,is the key to translating policies for povertyeradication and inequality reduction into specif-ic action programmes.

In spite of their administrative nature,provinces have established premiers and a leg-islature which is expensive and cumbersome. Inthe end, the acid test of what a province doesand how much it produces is in its legislation.Considering the past six years and comparinglegislation on so-called provincial matterspassed at national level with that passed byprovinces, it is not difficult to determine thatbasically all legislation is national andprovinces have failed to perform. The questionI wish to put forward is one we are asking our-selves in many circles of our provinces: Whatwent wrong? In answering this question, wewill expose the lesson which must be learnedfrom South Africa’s experience.

3. WHAT WENT WRONG?In South Africa, we have adopted a notion offull concurrent legislative powers. The powersof provinces and of the national government inmatters of provincial competence are equal.Both have the full measure of legislative pow-ers. It was understood that provincial powerswould overcome national powers, except wherean override could be invoked. In the absence of

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an override, the provincial powers would pre-vail. Instances of overrides were set down inthe Constitution, but are so broad, vague andgeneralised that no one could definitively statewhere and when they would apply. The endresult has been that central government has leg-islated on everything, and provincial govern-ment on almost nothing.

It is significant that after almost six years, inspite of our having had an enormous amount ofconstitutional litigation on almost anything andeverything, not one single case has beenbrought before the Constitutional Court on theadjudication of overrides. This would seem toindicate that there has been no conflict betweennational and provincial legislation, in spite ofthe fact that this should have been the case. Itmay be seen, however, that full concurrentpowers in the Constitution failed to create aconflict simply because provinces are not legis-lating. The lesson that emerges can be capturedin the comment of a Constitutional Court judgewho, when looking at the system of full concur-rence, likened it to forcing the lamb to liebeside the lion.

It is true that cooperative governance asshaped in our Constitution is, to a certainextent, the lamb being forced to lie beside thelion. The South African Constitution requiresprovinces to work very closely with the centralgovernment. Provinces cannot move unlesscentral government consents, and vice versa.But we are not equal. The centre of governmentis provided with a far greater capacity. More-over, a mechanism has been set in place toensure that cooperative governance is exercisedthroughout. As the provincial Minister ofAgriculture, I am called along with my col-leagues into a joint meeting of Ministers andMembers of the Executive Council (Minmec).

Provincial ministers, such as myself, areexpected to meet with respective provincial andnational colleagues and to discuss any policymatter. Usually the agenda is held by the cen-tral government.

Through the Minmec, Ministers andMembers of the Executive Council (MECs)create an input for the formulation of nationalpolicy. Such input is, however, not alwaystaken aboard. Nevertheless, the Minmec createsan input which travels up toward the centralgovernment, rather than enabling provinces toreceive capacity and ideas through which we

could develop our own action at a provinciallevel. An identical problem developed aroundthe National Council of Provinces (NCOP).The NCOP consists of 90 members, each drawnfrom and representing the nine provincial legis-latures. Members of the NCOP participate inthe formulation and adoption of laws of thenational government in respect of provincialand other matters. In respect of provincial mat-ters, they naturally have greater influence. Billsaffecting provinces are regulated by section 76of the Constitution, while other matters are reg-ulated by section 75.

Each delegation from each of the provincesconsists of ten members, five of which are per-manent and five are selected by the provinciallegislature on an ad hoc basis. Depending onwhether it is a provincial or non-provincialmatter, the NCOP operates on the basis of man-dates it receives from the provincial legislature.Effectively, the provincial legislature spendsmost of its time involved in the adoption of leg-islation not within its precincts, but rather at anational level in Cape Town. Provinces arerequired to prepare a mandate and send dele-gates across the country with the purpose ofholding lengthy discussions. The focus of theprovincial legislature is that of contributing tothe formulation of national legislation whichcan only apply uniformly across the country.Once again, a conveyor belt system is in placewhere little is developed at the bottom for thebottom.

The entire system demands reconsideration. Ibelieve that South Africa is an exceptionalcountry. For more than 100 years it has excell-ed in constitutional engineering. However, inthe past, such engineering has been applied forpurposes of oppression. Today, constitutionalengineering must be applied for the full libera-tion of our people. We believe that constitution-making must continue. An awareness of thisneed exists because our Constitution has apeculiarity which is not found in many otherconstitutions. In South Africa, we have the con-stitutional obligation to review the Constitutionannually, to which end a Constitutional ReviewCommittee has been established by theConstitution itself.

The Constitutional Review Committee hasnot met as frequently as required, but is never-theless operating and deliberating. It is in thisforum that the issue of the form of state contin-

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ues to be tabled and debated. There remain out-standing amendments designed to rethink oursystem of institutional government across theissue of local autonomy and decentralisation,many of which the IFP has promoted. There isa further problem in our system of government,which is common to many other countries butis particularly sensitive in our own, given thefeatures of centralisation which I described ear-lier. This is the problem of unfunded mandates.

4. UNFUNDED MANDATESUnable to determine for ourselves what isrequired, and unable to pursue such require-ments, provinces are forced to pursue the goalsof central government. Furthermore, this is tobe done with the money allocated for that pur-pose. Thus the process of determining needsand that of allocating money to fulfil themsomehow lacks a common policy frameworkand a common decision-making centre.Funding is received as ex post facto, as a distri-bution of what is available through the constitu-tional mechanism of the fiscal and financialcommission determining the share of nationalrevenues to be given to provinces. In basicterms, this commission takes the entire cakeand determines what slice of the cake needs togo to provinces.

From this point, provinces have the powerand discretion to allocate such funding amongsttheir functions and various mandates, but it isan ex post arrangement which does not featurein the determination of obligations and respon-sibilities. Obligations and responsibilities aredetermined centrally through the mandatesgiven to provinces. Hence, the problem ofunfunded mandates becomes unusually promi-nent.

5. TRADITIONAL COMMUNITIESIn respect of local government, there is a per-ception which I, for one, share: that the pendu-lum has swung from one extreme to the other ina country which has the most diverse popula-tion and variety of forms of societal organisa-tion. South Africa is home to traditional com-munities, which exist and operate on the basisof communal principles and customary law, butalso to highly industrialised segments of urbanareas. Given this context, it seems almostabsurd that we could impose a uniform systemof local government, based on a unified notion

of municipalities, which is determined at thecentral level, although this is indeed what weare doing.

The possibility provided for in the InterimConstitution – which is no longer given toprovinces – is for provinces to design their ownmodel of local government to accommodate ourdiversity. In the province of KZN, one of themost relevant issues is the existence of a strongand very valuable group of traditional leaders,who are important not only because of the posi-tion of relevance they exercise, but becausethey reflect a specific model of societal organi-sation. They are the symbol of communitieswhich operate on the basis of communal landand a distinct legal system, and which shareservices.

Our commitment is to enable these communi-ties to take full advantage of the developmentalopportunities made available by our govern-ment, and transition them toward modernityand greater levels of progress. However, webelieve that they should be entitled to do sowhile respecting the features of their estab-lished societal organisation. We wish to trans-form traditional communities into modernity,not out of existence. We believe that they arecapable of becoming part of an advanced soci-ety while preserving some of the communalisticfeatures of their societal organisation.

Obviously, this cannot be done unless weadjust the present model of local governanceand provide a more relevant role for traditionalleadership. Under the present legislation, how-ever, we are bound by a unified model whichwas never designed to take traditional leader-ship into account.

The IFP strongly believes in the recognitionof the autonomy of traditional communities,and the protection of traditional leadershipwithin the overall system of pluralism.

Traditional communities should be recog-nised as a form of self-governance at communi-ty level which consequently entitles participa-tion in other levels of government. In local government there should be ex officio positionsfor traditional leaders in the category ‘‘C’’municipal councils. In the provincial govern-ment, the House of Traditional Leaders shouldadvise on all bills placed before the legislature,and exercise executive functions with respect totraditional communities. At a national govern-ment level the IFP favours a Council of Tradi-

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tional Leaders (COTL) which would relate tothe Houses in much the same way as the NCOPdoes with respect to the provincial legislatures.The COTL should advise on all bills passedbefore Parliament, and should work closelywith the NCOP.

By accommodating the role of traditionalcommunities within the system of governance,there are certain advantages to be gained. Forinstance, the delivery of housing could bespeeded up by delegating traditional authoritiesto address needs in their own communal prop-erty structures.

The accountability of traditional leaders totheir communities can be preserved by limitingcentral government remuneration.

This one example could be duplicated inrespect of many other contexts throughoutSouth Africa. Cognisant of these truths, one ofthe messages I would wish to convey is that, ifattention must be given in terms of maximisingthe benefits of local governance, it must bedone at the local government level. Local gov-ernment must be designed by local government.

6. NATIONAL SUPERVISION OF PROVINCIALADMINISTRATIONIn addition to the centralised system of powers,our institutional system of government main-tains some convincing means of deterring localautonomy. For instance, Section 100 of theConstitution enables central government tointervene in the exercise of provincial functionswhenever it feels that a task is not being ade-quately fulfilled.

Section 100 reads:(1) “When a province cannot or does notfulfil an executive obligation in terms oflegislation or the Constitution, the nationalexecutive may intervene by taking anyappropriate steps to ensure fulfilment of thatobligation, including –

(a) “issuing a directive to the provincialexecutive, describing the extent of thefailure to fulfil its obligations and statingany steps required to meet its obligations;and(b) assuming responsibility for the rele-vant obligation in that province to theextent necessary to –

(i) maintain essential national standardsor meet established minimum standardsfor the rendering of a service;

(ii) maintain economic unity;(iii) maintain national security; or(iv) preventing that province from tak-ing unreasonable action that is prejudi-cial to the interests of another provinceor to the country as a whole.

(2) If the national executive intervenes in aprovince in terms of subsection (1)(b) –

(a) notice of the intervention must betabled in the National Council ofProvinces within 14 days of its first sit-ting after the intervention began;(b) the intervention must end unless it isapproved by the Council within 30 daysof its first sitting after the interventionbegan; and(c) the Council must review the interven-tion regularly and make any appropriaterecommendations to the national execu-tive.

(3) National legislation may regulate theprocess established by this section.”

Naturally, this section will rarely be invoked.Yet it plays in the subconscious mind ofprovinces. Indeed, this is the chilling effect thata section of this nature may have. We are awareof how often such a section has been applied ina country such as India, where it had a tremen-dous affect on the development of India’s localautonomy. Moreover, there are similar provi-sions in respect of local government whichenable the central government – and, at times,the provincial government – to intervene ifthere is a concern.

Furthermore, over and above what is alreadyexpressed in the Constitution, the system isbecoming increasingly more centralised and thepresence of the central government is increas-ingly felt by virtue of ad hoc arrangementsestablished within the system of so-called coop-erative governance. In this respect, referencemust be made to the President’s CoordinatingCouncil (PCC) in which the President has con-vened all premiers of provinces. In constitu-tional terms, premiers are accountable to themembers of our Parliament and to the people.They are not accountable to the President.

But, effectively, through the PCC the percep-tion is created that premiers are indeed account-able to the President. The premiers of ourprovinces are convened by the President, whoasks questions and creates situations whereeach premier feels accountable to the President

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and his own colleagues. Once again, this is anelement of distortion of the system which runsdeep in the collective institutional psyche.

One may also mention the relationship whichhas developed between the provincial govern-ment administration and national administra-tion. One of the most peculiar aspects of theSouth African system, which is entirelyunknown in most other federal systems, is thatwe have a unified civil service. In terms of theConstitution, the civil service employed inprovinces is part of the national civil service,with the consequence that the central govern-ment has control over how our civil service isorganised, the conditions of employment, struc-ture, positions and organisation. A centralisedcivil service commission has been establishedwhich creates an additional element of continu-ity from the provincial civil service to thenational civil service.

This makes it increasingly difficult for some-one in my position to develop policies for myown department which divert from the path orthe pathos of the national Department ofAgriculture, as my own civil servants are inconstant working relationships with nationalcivil servants. The centralisation of the civilservice is also increased at the higher levels ofgovernment by the fact that, for instance, alldirector-generals are appointed by thePresident, and not by the relevant minister.Director-generals are responsible for the finaladministration of their departments and are thefinal accounting officers. They are accountableto the President of the Republic and not to theminister of the department.

This effectively creates the perception thatthe President can reach into any department andcontrol his own ministers through the director-general. In provincial departments it is the pre-mier who appoints the heads of departments.The relationship between each of the director-generals at the national and provincial level isconstant, as there are special venues at whichthey regularly meet to strengthen the constitu-tional reality of a unified civil service. The finalauthority in such meetings eventually lies withthe President. There must be strong provincialPublic Service Commission (PSC) structures tofacilitate a proper devolution of public serviceand administration.

As in the case of federal systems, labour rela-tions should be dealt with at a provincial rather

than national level. In a federal system, evencentralised bargaining often devolves down toregional forums. The PSC cannot assume therole of representing the employer while thebiggest employers, i.e. the provinces, are notincluded in the collective bargaining process.Labour laws should be administered by the var-ious provincial ministers and departments oflabour.

In keeping with the IFP federal approach, theprovision and management of education shouldbe a provincial competence. All schools andcolleges should be regulated in terms of provin-cial legislation. The role of the nationalDepartment of Education should be to monitorcompliance with essential norms and standards.Teachers should be employed by provincialadministrations on the recommendations ofprincipals and governing bodies.

Apart from legislative competence over pri-mary and secondary schools, the IFP takes theview that provinces should also enjoy legisla-tive and executive power over tertiary educa-tion, including teacher-training colleges. TheIFP supports the autonomy of tertiary institu-tions.

Each province should have its own depart-ment of justice, courts and prosecution machin-ery. In addition, each province should alsodevelop its own body of substantive law, withevery province enjoying equal status. Provincesshould exercise judicial functions in all areas inwhich they govern. In each province, wheresuch do not already exist, a single division ofthe High Court, whose jurisdiction will corre-spond with provincial boundaries, should beestablished. All necessary administrative andprofessional support (Master, State Attorney,Registrar and Attorney-General) should bedecentralised. Provincial constitutional courtsshould determine issues of constitutionality inthe provinces, as is universal practice in otherfederations.

The IFP opposes the establishment of thepost of National Director of Public Prosecu-tions. The provincial attorney-generals shouldbe charged with the administration of justice intheir areas. In addition, the IFP does not sup-port the creation of a super-ministry to fightcrime. It sees merit in maintaining and strength-ening the existing specialised provincial min-istries and promoting cooperation among them.

To complete the picture, the peculiarity must

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be mentioned of the national government hav-ing much greater responsibility in respect oflocal government than provinces do. The IFPbelieves that the South African Constitutionwas deliberately drafted to emasculateprovinces and this is particularly pronouncedwith respect to local government. Moreover,the IFP is concerned that local governmentsometimes competes with, undermines andattempts, at times, to supplant the role ofprovincial government. Provinces have beenentirely bypassed and are only titularly respon-sible for the establishment of local government.However, the legislation relating to the estab-lishment of local government, their types, size,structure, systems and operational proceduresare all determined by national legislation andnational legislation alone. Provinces have nolegislative powers. Even legislation determin-ing the position of town clerks, who effectivelyrun the municipalities from an administrativeviewpoint, is determined by the national levelof government. Budgetary allocation to localgovernments can be done directly from the cen-tral government to the local government con-cerned, bypassing the provincial government.

The concern expressed in our context, as it isalways expressed by those who do not believein local autonomy, is the fear that somethingwill go wrong. We are apprehensive about theexercise of autonomy and devolving power, forfear that it will be abused. The concern is validand the possibility does indeed exist, but thedebate ought to focus on how one intervenes in

this eventuality. One cannot refuse to sell pre-scription drugs in case they are abused. Since inmany respects, local government requireshands-on coordination, the IFP believes theConstitution should be amended to grantprovinces – which are far closer to the prob-lems of local government than the national gov-ernment – far more discretion than presentlyexists with respect to policy formulation on,and executive oversight of, local government.

CONCLUSIONWe will continue to promote the agenda ofdevolution of powers to strengthen the role ofprovinces and local governments. Since theopening of negotiations in 1992, we urged theANC to consider how the challenges of libera-tion are closely related to the type of gover-nance to be chosen for South Africa. We want-ed to have a preliminary determination on theissue of governance to decide up-front whetherit should be top-down or bottom-up. We calledfor a preliminary determination of the form ofstate and urged the ANC to adopt the philoso-phy of maximum devolution of powers. Wewere not heard then, but we hope that withinthe parameters of a renewed spirit of reconcilia-tion, we may be heard now. There must berecognition that the devolution of powers toprovinces and local governments and theirempowerment with real autonomy of policyformulation, is not an issue which affects theIFP, but it is indeed about the people of SouthAfrica and their future.

INTRODUCTIONProvincial government in South Africa hasbeen the source of much criticism over the pastfew years and, at times, there has even beenmention made of abolishing the provincialstructures. It is against this background that itis imperative to analyse critically the right toexistence of provincial government and there-after explore the prospects for productivity andgood governance in the provinces. This paperwill aim to address these pertinent issues byfocusing on:• provincial government as a distinct sphere of

government• the advantages of decentralising authority to

provincial government• the problems experienced by provincial gov-

ernment, particularly in a South African con-text

• various measures whereby the productivityof provincial government can be improved.

In this respect, it is necessary to provide a briefoverview of the constitutional status of provin-cial government as a distinct sphere of govern-ment.

1. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT AS A DISTINCTSPHERE OF GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH AFRICAChapter 6 of the Constitution of the Republicof South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996) makesprovision for the establishment of nine pro-vinces, each with its own legislative and execu-tive authority. Furthermore, section 40(1) ofthe Constitution stipulates that government inSouth Africa is constituted as national, provin-cial and local spheres of government, which aredistinctive, interdependent and interrelated.

It is thus apparent that provincial governmentin South Africa constitutes a distinct sphere ofgovernment with the authority to make deci-sions on matters listed in schedules 4 and 5 ofthe Constitution. In this respect, provincialgovernment in South Africa resembles regionalinstitutions in countries such as Italy, Franceand Spain in that it is distinct from local gov-ernment in terms of area, functions and thedegree of autonomy envisaged for it. However,it is furthermore distinguishable from federal-ism in that the provinces do not share sover-eignty with the national state and their powersare handed down to them from national gov-ernment.

Decentralisation reflects the institutionalrelationship between central government andsubnational spheres of government. Provincescannot become autonomous federal entitiescompeting with the power of central govern-ment. Rather, they are regarded as decen-tralised entities supporting the functioning ofthe state and sharing the power and authority ofthe central government. The reference to coop-erative governance in Chapter 3 of the Consti-tution denotes supportive and complementaryroles among the three spheres of government.Thus, decentralisation as it applies to the creation and right of existence of provincialgovernment, needs to be understood in a SouthAfrican context as a process that should con-tribute to:• national integration and unity• redressing historical wrongs and empowering

people in the sense of enhancing cooperation,co-responsibility and the involvement of citi-zens in the governance of the country

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• a unified approach and solutions equally sup-ported by central, provincial and local gov-ernments to the diverse problems and chal-lenges facing the country.

From the above, it can be deduced that provin-cial government in South Africa enjoys the sta-tus of a sphere, as opposed to a level or tier, ofgovernment. This terminology connotes a shiftaway from a hierarchical relationship towards avision of non-hierarchical government in whicheach government sphere has equivalent status,is self-reliant and possesses the constitutionallatitude within which to define and express itsunique character.

In this respect, it may prove to be enlighten-ing to explore the right of existence of provin-cial government in South Africa.

2. RIGHT OF EXISTENCE OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH AFRICAAccording to Mawhood (1993:1) most govern-ments favour the concept of decentralisationsince it implies a transference of legislative,administrative and judicial authority “awayfrom the centre” to subnational levels of gov-ernment. This transfer of authority to, in thiscase, provincial and local governments isfavoured for various reasons, inter alia, it:• can become an effective mechanism for over-

coming the serious limitations of centrallycontrolled national planning and ensuringthat local needs are more effectivelyaddressed

• will serve to curb the tendency of an all-pow-erful central government by building thecapacity of provincial/local officials in termsof management and technical skills

• would ensure greater representivity for diver-gent political, religious, ethnic and tribalgroups in development decisions

• could promote more flexible, innovative andcreative management by allowing for experi-mentation in respect of policy and pro-gramme implementation

• enables government to locate services moreeffectively within communities and to moni-tor the implementation of development pro-jects more carefully

• can further the efficiency of service deliveryby reducing the diseconomies of scale inher-ent in overconcentration in the national capi-tal.

Kliksberg (2000:252) supports the above and

writes that one of the main opportunities formaking positive changes in the state socialsphere in developing countries is provided bydecentralising service delivery to regions andmunicipalities. He argues that such decentrali-sation enhances effectiveness by ensuring thatprogrammes are matched more closely to thereal needs of the target population.

From a managerial standpoint, decentralisa-tion will heighten efficiency by offering greateropportunities for a dynamic, flexible and rapidresponse. Decentralisation can furthermoreenhance the medium- and long-term sustain-ability of programmes in that it encouragesrecipient populations to articulate their needs.Kendall (1991:22) concurs by pointing out thatproblems such as poverty, homelessness, crime,and a crippled public education system do notlend themselves to top-down solutions imposedfrom above. Rather, solutions require the bot-tom-up participation of those affected, as wellas a redistribution of functions and powers tosubnational governments to ensure the highestpossible level of initiative and independence.

Keating (1995:185–186) adds that provincialor regional government has been sought bydecentralists seeking to transform the state andshift power from the centre in the interests ofdemocracy and pluralism. With larger areas,populations and resource bases, provinces areseen as having a greater capacity for autono-mous action over a wider range of functionsthan the traditional units of local government.In particular, provincial government is seen asbeing essential if economic and industrial pow-ers were to be decentralised, since local govern-ment is at too small a scale to address theseissues.

Despite the various arguments in favour ofdecentralising authority to provincial govern-ments, close attention needs to be paid to pastexperience in this respect in order to be awareof the difficulties and risks that may arise andto devise strategies for tackling and resolvingthem. For this reason, the next section of thispaper will focus on the problems experiencedby provincial government, particularly withinSouth Africa.

3. PROBLEMS EXPERIENCED BY DECENTRALISINGAUTHORITY TO PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTReddy (1999:19–20) argues that decentralisa-tion cannot be seen as a panacea for all govern-

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mental problems. Several of the problems asso-ciated with decentralising authority to theprovinces in South Africa could be summarisedas follows:• Central–provincial intergovernmental rela-

tions are often marked by tension in thatnationally based administrators and politi-cians may fear that provincial governmentswould demand independence from the centreand undermine national policies. On the otherhand, since their inception, provincial gov-ernments have continued to demandincreased powers which would ensure signifi-cant provincial autonomy.

• Inefficiency is prevalent since provincialauthorities cannot command sufficientresources to provide adequate services.Rapoo (1995:7) highlights the fact that thepredominance of central government on fis-cal matters is regarded by some provinces asan area of deficiency in the relationshipbetween central and provincial government.De Bruyn (1997:6) supports this and writesthat a vertical fiscal imbalance exists where-by central government raises the vast majori-ty of revenues, yet its expenditure responsi-bilities are relatively lower than the pro-vinces. It is thus apparent that provincial gov-ernments in South Africa are expected to ful-fil a vital role in meeting basic needs andreducing inequalities in respect of serviceprovision, despite the fact that their revenuebase to do so is restricted.

• Decentralisation can serve to increase region-al disparities as the more developed andaffluent provinces are in a better position toutilise their devolved powers. Such regionalinequalities can lead to social problemswhereby young, economically active peoplemigrate to the more developed regions insearch of well-paid employment and a higherstandard of living. This leads to a breakdownof especially rural communities and the taskof enhancing economic development in theless developed regions becomes much moredifficult.

• Decentralisation measures have to be imple-mented under severe economic constraintsand such reforms are costly due to additionalexpenses for qualified personnel, transport,buildings, maintenance, etc. Linked to this isthe important aspect of the institutional andmanagerial capacity of provincial govern-

ments. Kliksberg (2000:253) correctly pointsout that if their capacities are weak and if nosustained effort is made to strengthen them,then service delivery will be seriously threat-ened.

• Decentralisation can encourage separatisttendencies particularly among minoritygroups who desire complete sovereignty.Based on field studies conducted in Argen-tina and, in part, Brazil it has been noted byRaczynski (1995) that the pressures and prac-tices of special interest groups are often farmore intense at the provincial and local levelsthan at the national level. In this way, elitepower groups in regions and municipalitiesmay seek to steer decentralised resourcestowards their economic or political interests.

• Corruption in the provinces remains a criticalproblem which will only serve to furtherweaken the capacity of provincial authoritiesin terms of service delivery if it is not dealtwith seriously.

The problems mentioned above do not invali-date the opportunities offered by decentralisa-tion. It is vital, however, that provincial govern-ments take stock of their current strengths andweaknesses and plan strategically for concertedefforts to boost their productivity and buildtheir internal capacity. In this respect, it is nec-essary to provide an overview of those aspectswhich require attention in order to enhance theprospects for good governance and productivityin the provinces.

4. ENHANCING THE PROSPECTS FOR GOODGOVERNANCE AND PRODUCTIVITY IN PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTAny organisation must be productive to surviveand government is no exception. The contem-porary pressures of scarcity, inflation, globali-sation and taxpayer discontent have furtherenhanced the demand for increased attention toproductivity by elected politicians and publicmanagers.

4.1 Defining productivity and good governanceCrane, Lentz and Shafritz (1976:1–3) refer toproductivity improvement as organised effortsto obtain a greater yield from the resourcesallocated to government functions. Productivityimprovement efforts have a more specificmeaning than better management in that they

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feature a technical core centred around the rela-tionships of input to output and to standards ofperformance. This implies that productivity hasto do with something called the productionprocess. All organisations, including those ingovernment, can be seen as convertingresources from one form into another. Systemsanalysts call this the input-through-outputcycle. When it is said that an operation is pro-ductive, it means that it is getting a satisfactoryyield out of the production process. Quantity issatisfactory in terms of the relationship of out-put to input. In other words, the operation isefficient. At the same time, being productiveimplies that the quality of the product is satis-factory in that the output meets previouslyagreed upon standards of performance; in otherwords, the operation is effective. This dual def-inition of productivity has critical implications:first, any continued improvement of productivi-ty is highly dependent upon the ability to defineinput, output and standards of performance; andsecond, individuals will understand these crite-ria in a common way.

Improving productivity requires acting innew and different ways. People change theirways of doing things; they change the directionand persistence of their actions because the newway is more rewarding than the old. They aremotivated to change because the new way willsatisfy some basic wants for material needssuch as money or socio-emotional needs suchas self respect. If people are anxious enoughabout these wants and if their job is seen as avehicle for satisfying one or several of theseneeds, then they will change their patterns ofwork. Once people are engaged in more pro-ductive action, this behaviour must be consis-tently rewarded.

The problem of productivity motivation,using the above assumptions, is twofold. First,there is the technical aspect – knowing the spe-cific agency production process well enough inorder to determine what changes should bemade in the physical tasks of production.Second, there is the personnel managementproblem of influencing the members of thatagency to move in favourable directions in apersistent way.

Finally, emerging productivity improvementprogrammes often possess the following uniquefeatures:• Investment of significant resources in careful

development of measures of efficiency andeffectiveness on a programme-by-pro-gramme, agency-by-agency basis.

• A focus on better resource utilisation withinan established organisation, with given objec-tives. Careful differentiation of informationneeds depending on varying roles and levelswithin government.

• A concern with the interplay of motivation,incentives and the role of participation indecisions by various levels in the organisa-tion.

• Relating the assessment of the performanceof individuals and groups to the assessmentof programme efficiency and effectiveness.

• Substitution of processes for reconciling mul-tiple and conflicting views on objectives forexclusively centralised and hierarchical ones.

• Emphasis on the need to assess performanceof a programme or operation in terms of bothefficiency and effectiveness as the two majordimensions of assessing resource utilisation.

• Differentiation of analytic and managementtechniques that are appropriate by the natureof tasks or objectives involved rather thanrigid application of one uniform approach toall activities of government.

Visser (1996: 241) supports the above concep-tion of productivity and writes that productivityimprovement programmes need to start with ananalysis of the effectiveness of provincial gov-ernment. In other words, critical questions needto be asked such as:• Does provincial government do the right

things?• Is the output of provincial government truly

acceptable to the recipients of that output?• Does the output have value?The starting point is thus whether provincialgovernment is doing the right things and thenthe next step is to measure whether those thingsare being done correctly. Here the focus is onefficiency, but it is important not to think ofproductivity mechanistically in that attentionmust also be devoted to the willingness ordesire of people to be productive. Above all,productivity can be regarded as a state of mind.It is the spirit of progress and of continuousimprovement on what exists today. It further-more denotes the sustained effort to apply newtechniques and methods to improve on the cur-rent situation regardless of how good it mayseem.

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Muthien (1996:256) elaborates by assertingthat, although objective performance measure-ment is an invaluable management tool, it can-not replace dedicated public officials who arethoroughly socialised in the ideals and ethos ofpublic service. Their critical judgement com-bined with proper performance measurementcan contribute significantly to the improvementof the ends-means equation in government.

Related to productivity improvement inprovincial government, is the concept of goodgovernance. The use of the term “governance”instead of “government” implies a shift inemphasis away from a top-down approach togovernment to an approach that seeks the activeparticipation of citizens in public policy deci-sions which affect their daily lives.

The principles of good governance enshrinedby the Constitution are listed in Section 195 as,inter alia:• A high standard of professional ethics must

be promoted and maintained.• Efficient, economic and effective use of

resources must be promoted.• Services must be provided impartially, fairly,

equitably and without bias.• The public must be encouraged to participate

in policy making and their needs must beresponded to.

• Accountability and transparency must be fos-tered.

• Human potential must be maximised bymeans of sound human resource managementand career development practices.

With these principles in mind, it is necessary tohighlight certain key areas where provincialgovernments in South Africa can focus theirenergies in an effort to enhance productivityand good governance. The first of these is pro-moting a sense of professionalism amongprovincial officials.

4.2 Promoting a professional ethosAs pointed out previously, the problem of cor-ruption and maladministration is widespread inthe South African public service. This serves toundermine the effectiveness of public institu-tions and directly contradicts the principlesunderlying the spirit of Batho Pele or “peoplefirst”. In this respect, citizens must be madeaware of mechanisms such as the anti-corrup-tion arm within the Public Service Commis-sion, the Public Protector and the Auditor-

General, which have been established to tacklethis problem. In the interests of democraticaccountability, citizens must be able to reportinstances of corruption or unethical behaviouron the part of public servants without fear ofvictimisation or reprisal.

In addition to the above, a code of conductfor public servants is a vital tool in reinforcinga professional ethos. The Public ServiceRegulations, 1997 (Notice No. R825) makeprovision for this by including a Code ofConduct for Public Servants. This Code ofConduct stipulates that public servants must notuse their official positions for personal gain, butshould always act in the interests of the publicbeing served. It is further indicated that in theperformance of their duties, public servantsmust, inter alia:• execute their duties in a professional and

competent manner• be honest and accountable in dealing with

public funds• strive to achieve the objectives of their insti-

tutions and the interests of the public• promote sound, efficient, effective, transpar-

ent and accountable administration.Clapper (1999:386–389) furthermore providesa breakdown of an ethics infrastructure which,in essence, can be regarded as a conceptualframework composed of mutually reinforcingfunctions and elements designed to achieve therequisite coherence and synergy that will sup-port a public sector environment where highstandards of right-doing can be encouraged andrewarded. This ethics infrastructure compriseseight elements, namely:• Attempts to improve public sector ethics

which need to be sponsored and supported bypolitical and administrative leadership.

• An effective legal framework needs to be inplace to enforce constitutional documents,such as codes of ethics and other regulatorycodes and legislation.

• Efficient accountability mechanisms arerequired to facilitate the early detection ofany violations so that corrective action can betaken timeously.

• Workable codes of conduct will serve tochannel the personal morality of public offi-cials towards public service aims, but willonly be truly effective if punitive measuresexist for non-compliance.

• Professional socialisation mechanisms, such

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as ethics training and exemplary rolemodelsin the workplace, can further ensure that pub-lic officials are conscientised as to what isexpected and what is acceptable in terms oforganisational behaviour.

• Public service right-doing is also facilitatedby ideal supporting public service conditionssuch as competitive salaries, positive organi-sational hygiene factors, as well as measuresthat contribute towards security, growth andmotivation.

• A coordinating ethics body or bodies wouldserve as watchdogs, counsellors and promot-ers of ethics and right-doing.

• An active civil society can also fulfil awatchdog role provided citizens are informedand enabled by government structures, legis-lation and regulations to perform their civicduties.

In respect of an active civil society, it can benoted that provincial governments are requiredby legislation to provide full, accurate and up-to-date information about the services they pro-vide. The mechanism for achieving this will bean Annual Report to Citizens published bynational and provincial departments. The pur-pose of this report is to set out, in plain lan-guage:• staff numbers employed• names and responsibilities of senior officials• performance targets in respect of service

delivery, financial savings and increased effi-ciency

• resources consumed• sources of income• targets for the following year• a name and contact number for further infor-

mation.The aim of these reports is to provide the publicwith key information which they are entitled toknow and which will assist them in holdingpublic servants accountable. To fulfil this aimadequately, these reports should be publicisedas widely as possible and should also be sub-mitted to national and provincial legislatures toassist in legislative oversight and scrutiny ofdepartmental activities.

It is thus apparent that while there are no easysolutions in the fight against corruption, it isimperative that provincial governments employany means possible to curb unethical behaviourand to promote a professional work ethos.

Related to this is the spirit of Batho Pele.

This implies that all actions undertaken byprovincial governments need to be guided anddriven by the needs of the citizens. In thisrespect, the prospects for productivity in pro-vincial government can be further enhanced bypromoting democracy and citizen participation.

4.3 Promoting democracy and citizen participationDemocratisation goes beyond the right to voteand requires a comprehensive approach to thedevelopment of a democratic and accountablepublic service. In this respect, attention needsto be devoted to:• internal democracy whereby mechanisms are

in place within a particular department tofacilitate a participatory approach to decisionmaking on the part of both workers and man-agement

• external democracy whereby the public isable to influence and evaluate policy, bothindirectly, through elected representatives, aswell as directly.

In accordance with the Batho Pele principle ofconsultation, it is also necessary that all provin-cial departments consult the public regularlyand systematically, about:• services currently provided• the provision of new basic services to those

who lack them.There are many ways to consult users of ser-vices including surveys, interviews, citizenforums, or meetings with non-governmental orcommunity-based organisations. However,whatever method is chosen, consultation mustcover the entire range of existing and potentialcustomers, with particular emphasis on includ-ing the view of those previously denied accessto public services. Consultation must be con-ducted intelligently and the outcome thereofshould be a balance between what the citizenswant and what provincial departments can real-istically afford.

Related to this, it is necessary for provincialdepartments to treat citizens as customers. Thisimplies that provincial officials and politiciansneed to:• listen to the view of the citizens and take

these into account when making decisionspertaining to service delivery

• treat citizens with consideration and respect• ensure that the promised level and quality of

service is always of the highest standard

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• respond quickly and effectively when servicestandards are not being maintained.

The Premier of the Eastern Cape, ReverendStofile, remarked in a speech made to promotethe Batho Pele White Paper (1998) that provin-cial employees need to be committed to:• creating a corporate culture whereby every-

one belonging to the same organisation com-mits themselves to fulfiling the objectives ofthe White Paper

• instilling a strong work discipline and senseof self-responsibility

• understanding and being able to express thekind of service their organisation provides

• ensuring a greater visibility of the vision andmission of each provincial department.

From the above, it is clear that a public serviceethos is one of the key ingredients of a produc-tive provincial government system in SouthAfrica. It is essential that provincial govern-ments be viewed as responsive to the needs ofthe public and that the scarce resources avail-able to provincial departments to provide ser-vices are being utilised in the most effectiveand efficient manner. This requirement can fur-ther be met through sound financial manage-ment.

4.4 Promoting sound financial managementInternational experience, particularly in devel-oping countries, has shown that while fiscaldecentralisation can offer significant gainsunder the right conditions, it also carries therisk of accentuating regional inequities andcompromising macroeconomic stability. Thus,establishing strong foundations and correctlysequencing the devolution of responsibilities iscritical to attaining good governance.

National government in South Africa recog-nises that there are sometimes vast differencesbetween provinces in terms of levels of devel-opment, economic prosperity and social wel-fare. For this reason, the national allocations ofrevenue to the provinces are based on a redis-tributive formula which takes into account thedemographic and economic profiles of theprovinces. It is furthermore acknowledged thatthe levels of wealth or income in a province areimportant determinants of demand for socialservices. The equitable share formula is accord-ingly redistributive, to assist poorer provincesin providing a basic level of services for theircitizens.

Despite this, it is noted in the Medium TermBudget Policy Statement by Trevor Manual(1999:64) that provincial own revenue has beensteadily decreasing, falling from R4.3 billion in1995–1996 to an estimated R3.4 billion in1998–1999. Provincial own revenue sources arelimited, mainly comprising fees for motor vehi-cle licences, gambling licences and hospitalservices.

In line with the above, Moodley and Sing (inReddy, 1996:187) write that there is a need forforesight and planning in provincial govern-ment financing, ensuring a balance betweenjustifiable expectations and available financialresources for delivering services. It is addedthat, in bringing about efficient, viable or adequate financing on a rational basis, consid-eration of certain factors is necessary. Thesefactors include, inter alia, the:• nature and scope of functions and services to

be performed by provincial authorities• current and potential sources of funding and

other available resources• level of infrastructural base and development

of beneficiary communities.This need for foresight and planning in respectof provincial government financing is somewhataddressed by the Medium Term ExpenditureFramework (MTEF) which serves as a tool tohelp reprioritise expenditure and make informedpolicy choices that are affordable in the mediumterm. National government is, however, placinggreater emphasis on the delivery of quality andefficient services to people. This implies thatprovincial governments are required to makebudgetary decisions which take cognisance ofwhat money will buy, with particular emphasisbeing placed on spending which will have thegreatest impact on the quality of life of the ben-eficiaries (Manual, 1999: 51).

The prospects for productivity and good gov-ernance in the provinces will therefore not onlybe determined by merely increasing the nation-al allocation of revenue to provincial govern-ment. Rather, it is imperative that the provincesexplore possibilities for expanding their ownrevenue bases and that they implement soundfinancial management principles. This willensure that provincial revenue is spent in themost efficient and effective way, with the endresult being the provision of quality serviceswhich respond to the expressed needs of the cit-izens.

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CONCLUSIONThis paper served to explore the prospects forproductivity and good governance in the nineprovinces of South Africa. Although it waspointed out that provincial governments areconfronted with many problems and challenges,there are several advantages attached to decen-tralising authority to subnational units such as provinces.

It was furthermore asserted, however, that theopportunities provided by decentralisation canonly be fully maximised if provincial govern-ments recognise their responsibility in terms ofproductivity improvement and good gover-nance.

In this respect, it was recommended that

provincial governments in South Africa committhemselves, inter alia, to :• promoting a professional ethos and adopting

an ethics infrastructure to ensure public ser-vice right-doing

• enhancing democracy and citizen participa-tion in respect of service delivery by devotingattention to the principles of Batho Pele

• ensuring sound financial management princi-ples in an effort to curb financial maladminis-tration and to enhance the delivery of qualityservices to citizens.

Should these and other principles be imple-mented by committed provincial leadership, theprospects for productivity and good governancein the South African provinces are good.

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BARRINGTON, T.J. From big government tolocal government: The road to decentralisa-tion. Dublin, Institute of Public Adminis-tration.

CLAPPER, V. 1999. On seeing the promisedland: Prospects for public sector right-doing.Journal of Public Administration, vol. 34, no4. December 1999.

CRANE, E.G., LENTZ, B.F. AND SHAFRITZ, J.M.1976. State government productivity: Theenvironment for productivity improvement.New York: Praeger Publishers.

DE BRUYN, J. 1997. FFC: No bite but a lot ofbark, Budget Watch, vol. 3, no 2, June 1997.

KEATING, M. 1995. Does regional governmentwork? The experience of Italy, France andSpain, in Pierre, J. Urban and regionalpolicy. Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing.

KENDALL, F. 1991. The heart of the nation:Regional and community government in thenew South Africa. Norwood: Amagi Books.

KLIKSBERG, B. 2000. Rebuilding the state forsocial development: Towards “smart govern-ment”. International Review of Administra-tive Sciences. vol. 66, no 2, June 2000.

MANUAL, T. 1999. Medium term budget policystatement, 29 October 1999.

MAWHOOD, P. 1993. Local government in theThird World: Experience of decentralisationin tropical Africa. Pretoria: Africa Institute.

MOODLEY, S. AND SING, D. 1996. Local govern-

ment financing in South Africa, in Reddy,P.S. (ed.), Readings in local governmentmanagement and development: A SouthernAfrican perspective. Kenwyn: Juta.

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REFERENCES

INTRODUCTIONIn 1995, prior to the adoption of the final Con-stitution, President Thabo Mbeki stated:

“The African National Congress (ANC) iscommitted to a constitutional frameworkwhich balances constitutional powersbetween the national, provincial and localgovernments in such a way that the unityand integrity of the state is not impaired.”

He cautioned that the failure to secure anappropriate constitutional framework mayresult in “provincial and ethnic conflict whichin turn could lead to balkanisation of theprovinces”. President Mbeki also indicated thatwe should deal with the issue of diversity withsensitivity.

At the same time, the then ANC Secretary-General and Chairperson of the ConstitutionalAssembly, on behalf of the ANC, stated thatthe final Constitution would “empowerprovinces within a framework of cooperativegovernance and not as a constitution of com-peting fiefdoms”. These remarks reflected aconstellation of four elements within the ANCin terms of political perspective on provincialgovernment, which shaped the framework ofcooperative governance and the three spheresof government.

1. THE FOUR ELEMENTSThe first element is the commitment of theANC to a united democratic sovereign statewhich – as eloquently stated in the Preamble ofthe Constitution and based on the ANC’sFreedom Charter – “belongs to all who live init, united in our diversity”. This must be under-stood in the context of the oppression and

repression that the black majority were subject-ed to over some three centuries of colonial ruleand almost half a century of apartheid. It mustalso be understood in light of the attempt bythe apartheid state to create surrogate states inthe former Bantustans based on ethnic division,supported by the myth that those homelandswould contribute to the effective developmentof the black people of South Africa.

A constitution must reflect the ethos andaspirations of a nation. Our Constitution hasbeen described as the birth certificate of thenation, as it represents a transition from apolarised racially divided and authoritarianstate to a non-racial and democratic state. Itwas a transition from a closed society whichregarded any opposition to its ideology as sub-versive, to an open and transparent democracy.It is for this reason that the Constitution in itsfounding provision, describes South Africa asone, sovereign, democratic state founded on thevalues of human dignity, the achievement ofequality and the advancement of human rightsand equality. It also commits itself uncondi-tionally to non-racialism and non-sexism. Ishall reflect on this aspect further on.

The second element emphasises the perspec-tive of cooperative government. With this inmind it set the tone of the relationshipsbetween the different spheres of government byadopting principles of cooperative governmentand intergovernmental relations. While recog-nising the integrity and distinctiveness of thethree spheres, the Constitution emphasises theirinterdependent and interrelated nature.

Among the principles worth mentioning, arethat all organs of state within each unit must:

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• preserve the peace, the national unity and theindivisibility of the Republic

• secure the well-being of the people of theRepublic

• cooperate with one another in mutual trustand good faith by:

– fostering friendly relations– assisting and supporting one another– coordinating their actions and legislation– informing and consulting one another.

The third element within the ANC perspectiveis that the provinces should not be seen as com-peting fiefdoms, but as a constellation of geo-graphic entities in a diverse society committedto the constitutional values.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL VALUESI now turn to these values. We are a nationdivided along racial lines. Blacks were subject-ed to the indignity of inferior education,unequal resources, deprivation of job opportu-nities, access to the economy, the franchise and– through the creation of homelands – their citi-zenship. In fact, whether at work, at home or atplay, the dignity of blacks was violated.

Blacks were disadvantaged to such an extentthat we had what our President referred to astwo nations, in one country: the white one priv-ileged, skilled, educated, resourced; and theblack one lacking resources, education, skillsand amenities. The achievement of equalitywas therefore also a pre-eminent value in theConstitution.

The cornerstone of any democracy is a bill ofrights that is universally acknowledged. Theserights, both civil and socio-economic, had to beentrenched in the supreme law to ensure thatthey become the “touchstones” of our newdemocracy.

The fourth and final element, alluded to earli-er, is the recognition of the diversity of our peo-ple and the sensitivity required here. This diver-sity – be it linguistic, cultural or religious – canbe best managed through a cooperative systemof government, which while emphasising acommon South Africa and African identity,does not seek to diminish but rather protect thelinguistic, cultural and religious diversity of itspeoples. The Bill of Rights and the provisionsrelating to languages are a reflection of this.

3. STRATEGIC CHALLENGESWhat I have reflected on thus far are the ideo-

logical and political bases on which a system ofgovernment has been established. What mustnow be addressed are the strategic challengesthat face government in general, and, in thecontext of this conference, provincial govern-ment.

The government through the President’saddress at the opening of Parliament on 25 June1999, set its development agenda along the fol-lowing principles:• A better life for all.• A government at work.• Advancing human dignity.• Construction of a people-centred society.• Building a winning nation.• Coordination of government activities.• Intergovernmental cooperation.• Ensuring an integrated approach to service its

delivery.• Regional cooperation.• The African Renaissance.• Accommodation of traditional leadership.• Crime prevention.This programme unleashes certain strategicissues for consideration by the spheres of gov-ernment. They are, among others:• The need to integrate government activities

with a view to enhancing service delivery.• The need for national and provincial govern-

ment to support local government as animportant sphere, or site, of service delivery.

• The need for improved coordination andcooperation between national and provincialgovernment through an integrated, properlysequenced and efficient intergovernmentalsystem.

• The need for a monitoring framework both inrespect of performance and service delivery.

• The need for championing development with-in a province including rural development.

• Strategic planning.The Demarcation Board has established new,different council boundaries. The support ofprovinces in making district councils effective,coordination nodal points cannot be overemphasised. Rural development strategies byprovinces must be integrated with national ini-tiatives to have a coherent and integrated strate-gy for the country as a whole.

The provinces are obliged to provide capacityto local government and to make use of appro-priate technology and managerial systems toachieve operational efficiency in their budgets.

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The issue of unfunded mandates, while tran-sient, is a matter that must be addressed.

Provincial government should ensure thatmunicipal IDPs combine to form a viabledevelopment framework and are vertically inte-grated within the Provincial Growth andDevelopment Strategy. Provincial governmentsare also responsible for processing grants tomunicipalities for bulk infrastructure, such ashousing and public works. Provincial govern-ment should ensure that municipalities give pri-ority to basic needs and promote social andeconomic development.

The provincial government must also ensurethere is effective institutional development andcapacity building. It must monitor the financialstatus of municipalities and must put in placeappropriate fiscal controls.

It must also monitor local government in aconstructive way by empowering local govern-ment councillors within local government. Itmust, when appropriate, intervene where themunicipality is not fulfilling its executive oblig-

ations – this should be a last resort. Provincesmust work in unison with the various local gov-ernment associations.

Provincial taxation has already been the sub-ject of a commission. The matter was debatedin the National Council of Provinces and thegeneral view of premiers is that, at the currentstage of our development, it may be inappropri-ate.

CONCLUSIONProvincial government and all entities of gov-ernment including Parliament and all legislatorsmust reflect on our strengths, weaknesses andchallenges, and may have to realign or refinetheir method to deal with the pressing prioritiesof reconstruction and development and the cur-rent trends of globalisation.

The Constitution sets out the framework, andit is the ability to manage institutions efficientlyand effectively that will in the end reflect thesatisfaction or dissatisfaction of the perfor-mance of government by the electorate.

INTRODUCTIONCorruption is found to some degree in everysociety. It is becoming a pervasive phenome-non and is a sign that something has gonewrong in the relationship between society andstate. Indeed, if one is to adopt the more com-prehensive approach to corruption beingdemanded and adopted, for example, byTransparency International’s (TI’s) SouthAfrican chapter, then corruption is also a signthat something has gone wrong between theindividual and the community.

President Thabo Mbeki, in a speech to markthe official opening of the Ninth InternationalAnti-Corruption Conference held in Durban in1999, decried the fact that material values havegained a greater worth in the eyes of many peo-ple at the expense of spiritual values:

“Corruption is a social phenomenon; therecan be no doubt that all of us need to doeverything in our power to give corruptionin both the public and the private sector noquarter whatsoever.”

1. CONCEPTUALISING CORRUPTIONThere are many definitions of corruption, and adetailed examination would go beyond thebounds of this discussion.

In its simplest terms, it is the abuse of power,most often for personal gain or for the benefitof a group to which one owes allegiance. It canbe motivated by greed, by the desire to retainor increase one’s power or – perversely enough– by the belief in a supposed greater good.*The definition long used at TI was, “the abuseof public power for private gain”. However, thedefinition which now holds sway is, “ the

abuse of entrusted power for private gain”. It isin keeping with the advance of globalisationand privatisation and the already-mentionedconcern for a comprehensive advance againstcorruption, which does not demonise one party.

Corruption is most decidedly not the pre-serve of developing countries, as media reportsof scandals in Europe show.

What is true, however, is that corruptioncauses the greatest damage in developing coun-tries and destroys the life chances of the poor-est of the poor. The evils of corruption havebeen amply demonstrated elsewhere and I willnot address them in detail here, except to saythat it is accepted that corruption underminesgood government and distorts public policy. Itleads to the misallocation of resources, harmsthe private sector and private sector develop-ment. It, above all, hurts those who can affordit least.

In its most extreme state, corruption can leadto the implosion of entire polities, as seen bythe descent into chaos of the former Zaire, nowDemocratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

2.TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONALTI is the only international global non-profitand politically non-partisan movement with anexclusive focus on corruption. It is an interna-tional non-governmental organisation (NGO)dedicated to curbing both international andnational corruption and increasing accountabil-ity in all spheres of public life, particularly, butnot only, in government. As such, the concernsand strategies of TI are of relevance to ourdeliberations here on the shape, structure ofgovernment and the relations between its dif-

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ferent levels and, in particular, of provincialgovernment.

TI was founded in 1993, by a small group ofpeople led by Peter Eigen, now chairperson ofTI. From humble beginnings it has grown to bea respected and sought after interlocutor at bothnational and international levels.

3. STRUCTURENational chapters (NCs) in more than 77 coun-tries worldwide – with more in formation – areat the heart of the global anti-corruption move-ment.

The Board of Directors is the central govern-ing body of TI. It is democratically elected atthe Annual General Meeting. An AdvisoryCouncil, consisting of prominent individuals ofinternational standing, advises our movementand assists in developing our programmes. TheCouncil on Governance Research, consisting ofprominent academics and practitioners in thefields of corruption and governance, contributeto research projects and proposals supported byTI. The International Secretariat supports NCsand implements our international agenda.

The TI mission statement provides a frame-work for programmes and policies. Internally,TI is governed by its Charter, its Code ofConduct for TI office holders and the NCGuidelines which govern the relationshipbetween NCs and the international movement.

Detailed information about current financesis given in the financial report as an incomestatement, in the list of our donors and in theannual report.

As stated above, TI is active at both interna-tional and national level.

4. INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVESAt the international level, TI has successfullykept the issue of corruption on the internationalagenda. An important instrument in this effort,and one which I am sure many of you are awareof, is the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).

4.1 Corruption Perceptions IndexThe last CPI – the largest yet – was publishedin October 1999. It ranked 99 countries withDenmark at the top and Cameroon again at thebottom. The CPI is a “poll of polls”, reflectingthe perceived degree of public sector corruptionin the surveyed countries. The 1999 surveydrew on 17 different polls and surveys from 10

independent institutions, carried out amongbusiness people and country analysts. Theimpact of the CPI now reaches far beyond theoriginal awareness-raising goals it had hoped toachieve at its inception. In many countries ofthe South, the CPI has served the constructivepurpose of stimulating public debate on corrup-tion, acting as a catalyst for meaningfulreforms.

Intense concern for the controversial impactof the CPI has motivated efforts to widen itsscope and increase the number of countries sur-veyed. As a result of this concern – and withthe aim of answering the critics in the Southwho complained that the CPI was unfairly tar-geting developing countries – the new BribePayer’s Index (BPI) was published.

4.2 The Bribe Payers IndexThe BPI was published in tandem with the CPIin October 1999, for the first time. The BPI,based on data collected by Gallup Internationalon commission to TI, surveyed perceptions ofbusiness leaders in 14 major emerging marketswith respect to the use of bribes by companiesfrom the 19 leading exporting states to winbusinesses. The data reflected a disturbing lackof awareness of the Organisation for EconomicCooperation and Development (OECD) con-vention in the corporate sector.

A more detailed Bribe Payers Survey waspublished at the beginning of this year.

Apart from bribery, diplomatic or politicalpressures were identified as the leading unfairbusiness practice.

4.3 The OECD Convention CombatingBribery of Foreign Public OfficialsThe entry into force of the OECD Conventionagainst the Bribery of Foreign Public Officials,which criminalises the bribery of foreign publicofficials to win or retain business, was a majorsuccess for TI chapters, particularly in Europeand the United States (US). The conventiondoes have limitations but it is a positive signthat more countries are adhering to it andimplementing the enabling legislation at nation-al level. South Africa has declared its intentionof belonging to the convention. TI plays anactive role in the monitoring process which isunfolding at the OECD and will continue topress for strict and coherent application. But thesuccess of the convention will not be achieved

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without the adherence of major internationalplayers and the active support of the corporatesector. Recognition is growing in the corporatesector of its social responsibility, and dialoguewith the sector may lead to the development ofan internationally accepted integrity standardwhich would be used as a benchmark for aninternational ISO-type certification.

5. ACTIVITIES AT NATIONAL LEVELAs already stated, NCs form the core of theinternational movement. It is from this interna-tional network of NCs that TI derives its legiti-macy as an international representative of civilsociety. The phenomenal growth in the numberof NCs, points to the inroads that TI has madein bringing the issue of corruption to the fore ofthe international agenda.

An NC, when it adheres to TI, subscribes to abasic set of principles which govern its actionsand interactions with other groups and sectors.An NC must agree to be politically non-parti-san and independent from government andcommercial interests. It should refrain frominvestigation of individual cases and “namingand shaming” of individuals, rather concentrat-ing its efforts on the improvement of systemswhich make it more difficult for corruption toentrench itself. NCs practise coalition buildingand bringing together people from the privatesector, government and civil society.

6. WHAT IS THE ROLE OF NATIONAL CHAPTERS?TI’s NCs lie at very the core of its strategybecause TI strongly believes that informed anti-corruption initiatives that are homegrown, havethe best chance of lasting success. The chaptersare independent institutionally and financiallyfrom the Secretariat while observing the guid-ing principles. The NCs, embedded in theirvarying contexts, can far better judge the localcontext and adopt appropriate strategies than TIever could. In deciding their national strategies,there is an exchange of information and experi-ences in the international movement, facilitatedby the Secretariat. However, the TI chapters areautonomous; they are independent as long asthey adhere to the basic principles already men-tioned.

One of TI’s highest priorities is the strength-ening of its NCs and its contribution to thehumanitarian and anti-corruption endeavours ofcivil society worldwide.

7. STRATEGYTI focuses on building awareness that simplystrengthening prosecution and judicial powerscannot by itself curtail corruption. IbrahimSeushi of TI Tanzania originated the concept ofa National Integrity System (NIS) – an edificebuilt on what were termed pillars such as politi-cal will, administrative reforms, watchdogagencies, parliaments, media, the private sectorand the foundation of the whole structurenamely, public awareness and involvement.The totality of institutions or pillars whichmake up an NIS are interdependent: if one ormore are weakened, the structure is thrown offbalance and an increased load is thrown on theothers. This concept underlines the necessityfor a holistic approach to combating corruption.While “quick wins” are desirable in mobilisingand motivating the public, an undue reliance onone pillar of the integrity system, e.g. the judi-ciary, will not appreciably reduce corruption.

8. STRENGTHENING CAPACITY FOR THE FIGHTAGAINST CORRUPTIONReflecting TI’s own meteoric growth, civilsociety organisations (CSOs) are mushroomingacross the globe. They are growing in terms ofmembership, while becoming more structured,articulate and effective. New communicationtechnologies are enabling CSOs such as TI tonetwork across national borders thus strength-ening their knowledge and influence.

I single out civil society because it has a par-ticularly crucial role to play in the fight againstcorruption. Governments are often part of theproblem and lack credibility even when pro-moting anti-corruption strategies. Similarly,business is very often as much the perpetratorof corrupt practices as it is sometimes the vic-tim.

While in many countries there are strongchapters waging a struggle against corruptionand sometimes even winning a battle or two,many other chapters are located in countrieswhere recently won democracy is still youngand fragile and civil society is not stronglydeveloped. TI places particular importance onthe necessity to strengthen the capacity of itsNCs to undertake the task they have set them-selves. To this end limited funds have beensourced for training.

To maximise the potential for change, theanti-corruption agendas of civil society must be

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empowered by knowledge and public supportas they feed off each other. The greater theresearch, the more convinced the publicbecomes of the need for action. The greater thepublic support, the greater is the influence ofCSOs.

9. PROGRESS IN SOUTH AFRICAAs a whole, in comparison to many other gov-ernments, the South African government can beproud of the advances it has made in the strug-gle against corruption and for accountability.This, however, does not mean it can rest on itslaurels. While a multiplicity of institutions havebeen put in place to address the issue – e.g. theSpecial Investigation Unit headed by JudgeWillem Heath and here in the Eastern Cape, thePublic Protector’s Office – an important indica-tor of commitment to watchdog bodies is theextent of their independence from the govern-ment of the day and their resourcing in order toadequately perform the job that they are man-dated to do.

The promulgation of laws such as thePromotion of Access to Information Act – giv-ing effect to the constitutional right of access tostate or private information that is required forexercising or protecting one’s rights, containedin Section 32 of the Constitution – with certainjustifiable limitations was a further advance.Access to information is a fundamental necessi-ty if citizens are to be empowered to press foraccountable government.

However, continuing reports of corruption ona grand scale point to the need for further vigi-lance.

The development of a national anti-corrup-tion strategy (NACS) and a coordinating struc-ture has been moving ahead at a steady paceduring the past two years. The national anti-corruption summit held in April 1999, was theculmination of a process which had started theyear before with a public sector anti-corruptionconference. In 1999, representatives from thepublic sector, the private sector and organsfrom civil society looked at problems related toeach sector and came up with a set of recom-mendations. An important decision was to“rapidly establish a cross-sectoral task team tolook into the establishment of a national coordi-nating structure with the authority to effectivelylead, coordinate, monitor and manage thenational anti-corruption programme”, which

was one under the guidance of the PublicService Commission and its chief directorate ofethics. The envisaged coordinating structure iscurrently under development. TI South Africais part of the National Cross-Sectoral TaskTeam established to take recommendations tofurther transparency. South Africa is playing acentral part in the process of developing a morecoherent and coordinated input into the NACS.Several meetings at national and regional levelwill culminate in a national anti-corruption civilsociety summit to be held in November 2000.

The Ninth International Anti-CorruptionConference was hosted in Durban in October1999 and it brought together delegates fromaround the world to exchange experiences andideas.

10. ACTIONS BY CHAPTERS – SOME EXAMPLESTo provide a more concrete idea of the ways inwhich civil society around the world is takingaction against corruption, here are a few exam-ples.

The chapter in Argentina has been success-fully endeavouring to compensate for weaknational disclosure requirements in the area ofpolitical party funding. Political parties inArgentina are not required by law to disclosethe amount of private funding they receive. Bymonitoring total political party spending abovepublicly disclosed levels of government financ-ing, our chapter was able to estimate theamount of private funding the parties werereceiving. Once released to the media, thesefigures became a potent trigger for change. Inthe latest election campaign, corruption issueshave made headlines and the three leading par-ties were expected to sign an agreement where-by they would disclose the full amount of pri-vate funding.

In nearby Malawi, the NC has conductedawareness raising seminars for religious andeducational leaders to conscientise them on theissue of corruption. A drama competition hasmobilised the youth to come up with playsagainst corruption. TI Kenya has been a centralplayer in the development of an NACS, and hasalso assisted Parliament in closed-door deliber-ations on the finalisation of an anti-corruptionand economic crimes bill to be presented toParliament this year.

TI India, and another NGO, after years ofempty promises took the bold step of establish-

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ing an Independent People’s OmbudsmanCommission in response to the Indian govern-ment’s lack of will to establish institutions vest-ed with the power to investigate the charges ofcorruption levelled against elected public offi-cials.

A committee of three senior retired judgeswill be backed by a Citizen’s VigilanceCommittee composed of seven lawyers, whowill seek to file a public interest petition beforethe High Court and the Supreme Court for fur-ther criminal investigation on allegations whichthe Ombudsman Commission has found to havesubstance.

Barely beyond its first anniversary, our chap-ter in Bulgaria is playing a key role in monitor-ing a flagship privatisation for the Bulgarianeconomy. An expert group formed by TIBulgaria has been monitoring the sale of astrategic holding in the Bulgarian Telecom-munication Company, thus ensuring that theprocess has been taking place in accordancewith the relevant laws and regulations in all dueprobity. Members of the expert group weregiven the opportunity to sit in as observers on

most meetings with interested companies andobserve the submission and opening of the bids.Such monitoring on the part of civil society isthe key in confirming compliance to the rulesand ultimately, in the case of Bulgaria, it willpoint to the success of reforms and the potentialfor integration into international economicstructures.

CONCLUSIONCorruption at the local level touches ordinarypeople in their daily lives. It undermines thedelivery of basic services and weakens effortsto entrench democracy in countries in transi-tion. Local level involvement is an ideal start-ing point for civil society in the pursuit of openand responsive government. It is for this reasonthat TI’s NCs have become increasingly inter-ested in corruption issues relating to local gov-ernment. Our chapters in Central and EasternEurope are now involved in a major initiativefocusing on corruption in local government.These local level initiatives will focus onimproved service delivery as well as on diag-nosing and rooting out corruption.

ENDNOTE* Cf. Stapenhhurst and Kpundeh, Curbing

Corruption, EDI Development Studies, 1999,Washington DC.