property regime of unions without marriage.docx

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DIGESTED CASES

in

Articles 147 and 148of the Family Code of the Philippines

Property Regime of Unions without Marriage

1. Valdes v. RTC (260 SCRA 221)

2. Mallilin v. Castro (G.R. No. 136803, 16 June 2000)

3. Francisco v. Master Iron Works Construction Corp. (G.R. No.

151967, 16 February 2005)

4. Agapay v. Palang (276 SCRA 341)

5.

Juaniza v. Jose (89 SCRA 306)

6. Tumlos v. Fernandez (G.R. No. 137650, 12 April 2000)

Prepared by:

JONA ADDATU-CAMBRI

LLB - 1



SUMMARY OF THE PROVISIONS ON ARTICLES 147 AND 148

Article 147 Article 148

Applicability

1. No legal impediment to marry;

2. Void marriage on the ground of

psychological incapacity.

Presence of legal impediment:

1. Adulterous relationships

2. Bigamous/polygamous marriages

3. Incestuous void marriages under Art37

4. Void marriages by reason of public

policy (Art. 38)

Salaries & wages Owned in equal shares Separately owned by the parties. If any is

married, his/her salary pertains to the

CPG of the legitimate marriage.

Property exclusively acquired

Belongs to party upon proof of

acquisition through exclusive funds

Belongs to such party

Property acquired by both through their work or industry

Governed by rules of co-ownership Owned in common in proportion to their

respective contributions

Presumption Property acquired while living together

presumed obtained by their joint efforts,

work or industry and owned by them in

equal shares.

If one party did not participate in

acquisition: presumed to have

contributed through care and

maintenance of family and household.

No presumption of joint acquisition.

Actual joint contribution of money,

property or industry shall be owned by

them in common proportion.

However, their contributions are

presumed equal, in the absence of proof

to the contrary

Forfeiture

When only one is in GF, share of party inBF in the co-ownership be forfeited in

favor of:

1. their common children

2. innocent party in default of / waiver

by any/all common children, or by their

descendants

If one of the parties is validly married toanother, his/her share in the co-

ownership shall accrue to the ACP or

CPG existing in the marriage.

If the party who acted in BF is not validly

married to another or if both parties are

in BF, such share be forfeited in manner

provided in last par of Art. 147

Proof of actual contribution

Not necessary Necessary



MALLILIN JR. vs CASTILLO

G.R. No. 136803 June 16, 2000

EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN, JR., petitioner, vs.

MA. ELVIRA CASTILLO, respondent.

FACTS:

Mallilin and Castillo cohabited together while their respective marriage still

subsisted. During their union, they set up Superfreight Customs BrokerageCorporation. The business flourished and the couple acquired real and personal

properties which were registered solely in Castillo's name. Due to irreconcilable

differences, the couple separated. Mallilin filed a complaint for partition and/or

payment of Co-ownership share, accounting and damages against Castillo.

Castillo, in her answer, alleged that co-ownership could not exist between thembecause according to Article 144 of the Civil Code, rules on co-ownership shall

govern the properties acquired by a man and a woman living together as

husband and wife but not married, they are not capacitated to marry each

other because of their valid subsisting marriage. She claimed to be the exclusive

owner of all real and personal properties involved in Mallilin's action of partitionon the ground that they were acquired entirely out of her own money and

registered solely in her name.

ISSUE:

Whether or not co-ownership exists between them.

RULING:

Yes. Co-ownership exists between Mallilin and Castillo even though they areincapacitated to marry each other. Article 144 of the Civil Code does not cover

parties living in an adulterous relationship. Their property regime falls under Article

148 of the Family Code where co-ownership is limited, properties acquired by

them through their joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be

owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the

absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal.

http://skinnycases.blogspot.com/2013/09/mallilin-jr-v-castillo.html

http://skinnycases.blogspot.com/2013/09/mallilin-jr-v-castillo.html



VALDEZ vs. RTC

260 SCRA 221

ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner, vs REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDEZ, respondents.

FACTS:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5

children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their

marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which was granted hence,

marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological

incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their motherwhile the other 3 siblings are free to choose whom they prefer.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the

procedure for the liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage”.

During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing

desire to stay with their father.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof,

the property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership.

Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been

obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the

acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto

jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.



FRANCISCO vs. MASTER IRON WORKS CONSTRUCTION CORP.

G.R. No. 151967, 16 February 2005

JOSEFINA C. FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs.

MASTER IRON WORKS & CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS:

Josefina Castillo, married to Eduardo Francisco, bought two parcels of residential

land and a house thereon. The Register of Deeds issued TCTs in the name of“Josefina Castillo Francisco married to Eduardo G. Francisco.” Eduardo had

written an Affidavit of Waiver stating that before his marriage to Josefina, the

latter purchased two parcels of land, including the house constructed thereon,

with her own savings and that he was waiving whatever claims he had over the

property. The property was mortgaged to Leonila Cando with marital conformityof Eduardo.

When Eduardo failed to pay for the 7,500 bags of cement worth P768,750.00 from

Master Iron Works, the court issued a writ of execution levying the two parcels of

land owned by Josefina. Before Josefina could commence presenting her

evidence against MIWCC, Josefina filed a petition to annul her marriage toEduardo on the ground that the latter had a subsisting marriage to one

Carmelita Carpio when the two were married. Said annulment was granted by

the RTC.

ISSUE:

WON the subject property is the conjugal property of Josefina and Eduardo.

RULING:

The Court ruled that petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property

with her personal funds before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she was

the sole owner. The Deed of Absolute Sale on record showed it was issued after

her marriage. Their case fall under Article 148 and since they got married before

the Family Code, the provision, pursuant to Art 256, can be applied retroactively

if it does not prejudice vested rights. Petitioner likewise failed that she had anyvested right.

Where the parties are in a void marriage due to a legal impediment that

invalidates such marriage, Art 148 should be applied. In the absence of proofthat the wife/husband has actually contributed money, property, or industry to

the properties acquired during such union the presumption of co-ownership will

not arise.

The petition was denied for lack of merit. The decision of CA that the property

was conjugal was affirmed.



AGAPAY vs. PALANG

276 SCRA 341

G.R. No. 116668. July 28, 1997

ERLINDA A. AGAPAY, petitioner, vs. CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. PALANG and HERMINIA P. DELA CRUZ, respondents.

FACTS:

Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan on 1949. He leftto work in Hawaii a few months after the wedding. Their only child Herminia was

born in May 1950. The trial court found evident that as early as 1957, Miguel

attempted to Divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good in 1972, he

refused to lived with Carlina and stayed alone in a house in Pozzorubio

Pangasinan.

The 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19 year old

Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. 2 months earlier, they jointly purchased a

parcel of agricultural land located at Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in

the same place was likewise purchased. On the other hand, Miguel and Carlina

executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement and agreedto donate their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their child

Herminia.

Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher. In 1979,

they were convicted of concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint. 2 years later,Miguel died. Carlina and her daughter instituted this case for recovery of

ownership and possession with damages against petitioner. They sought to get

back the land and the house and lot located at Binalonan allegedly purchase

by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. The lower court dismissed thecomplaint but CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded in favor

of Erlinda Agapay.

RULING:

The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and

Erlinda. However, their marriage is void because of the subsisting marriage withCarlina. Only the properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint

contribution shall be owned by them in proportion to their respective

contributions. It is required that there be an actual contribution. If actual

contribution is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of

equal shares.

Erlinda established in her testimony that she was engaged in the business of buyand sell and had a sari-sari store. However, she failed to persuade the court that



she actually contributed money to buy the subjected riceland. When the land

was acquired, she was only around 20 years old compared to Miguel who was

already 64 years old and a pensioner of the US Government. Considering his

youthfulness, it’s unrealistic how she could have contributed the P3,750 as her

share. Thus, the court finds no basis to justify the co-ownership with Miguel over

the same. Hence, the Riceland should, as correctly held by CA, revert to theconjugal partnership property of the deceased and Carlina.

It is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their

conjugal property in favor of Herminia. Separation of property between spouses

during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or without

judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage

settlements. The judgment resulted from the compromise was not specifically for

separation of property and should not be so inferred.

With respect to the house and lot, Atty Sagun, notary public who prepared the

deed of conveyance for the property revealed the falsehood of Erlinda’s claimthat she bought such property for P20,000 when she was 22 years old. The lawyer

testified that Miguel provided the money for the purchase price and directed

Erlinda’s name alone be placed as the vendee.

The transaction made by Miguel to Erlinda was properly a donation and which

was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of the law because it was

made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the

donation. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code, expressly provides that the

prohibition against donation between spouses now applies to donations

between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid

marriage,

for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn outto be better than those in legal union.



JUANIZA vs. JOSE

89 SCRA 306GR. No. L50127-28, March 30, 1979

VICTOR JUANIZA, Heirs of Josefa P. Leus etc., et al., plaintiffs and appellees,vs.

EUGENIO JOSE, THE ECONOMIC INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., and ROSALIA

ARROYO, defendants and appellants.

FACTS:

Eugenio Jose, a registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney

involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of the PNR that took place

in November 1969 resulted in the 7 deaths and 5 physical injuries of its

passengers. That time, Eugenio was married to Socorro but had been cohabitingwith Rosalia Arroyo, defendant-appellant for 16 years as husband and wife. Trial

court decision rendered them jointly and severally liable to pay damages to the

heir of the deceased, Victor Juaniza. A motion was prayed for by Rosalia for the

decision to be reconsidered.

ISSUE:

WON Eugenio and Rosalia are co-owners of the jeepney.

RULING:

The co-ownership provided in Article 147 applied only when the parties are not

incapacitated to marry. Hence, the jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership

with the lawful wife. The common-law wife not being the registered owner

cannot be held liable for the damages caused by its operation. There is

therefore no basis for her liability in the damages arising from the death of and

physical injuries suffered by the passengers.



TUMLOS vs. FERNANDEZ

G.R. No. 137650, 12 April 2000

GUILLERMA TUMLOS, petitioner, vs.

SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES FERNANDEZ, respondents.

FACTS:

Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were plaintiffs in an action for ejectment filed

against Guillerma, Gina and Toto Tumlos. In the complaint, spouses Fernandez

alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment building that through

their tolerance they allowed the Tumlos’ to occupy the apartment for the last 7

years without payment of any rent. It was agreed that Guillerma will pay 1,600 a

month while the other defendants promised to pay 1,000 a month which was not

complied with. Demand was made several times for the defendants to vacatethe premises as they are in need of the property for the construction of a new

building.

Defendants appealed to RTC that Mario and Guillerma had an amorous

relationship and that they acquired the property in question as their love nest. It

was likewise alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building with

their 2 children for about 10 years and that Gullerma administered the property

by collecting rentals from the lessees until she discovered that Mario deceivedher as to the annulment of their marriage.

ISSUE:

WON Guillerma is a co-owner of the said apartment under Article 148.

RULING:

SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were co-owners of the subject

property. The claim was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma since there wereno other evidence presented to validate it except for the said affidavit. Even if

the allegations of having cohabited with Mario and that she bore him two

children were true, the claim of co-ownership still cannot be accepted. Mario is

validly married with Lourdes hence Guillerma and Mario are not capacitated tomarry each other. The property relation governing their supposed cohabitation is

under Article 148 of the Family Code. Actual contribution is required by the said

provision in contrast to Art 147 which states that efforts in the care and

maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the

acquisitions of common property by one who has no salary, income, work or

industry. Such is not included in Art 148. If actual contribution is not proven thenthere can be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.



ELNA MERCADO-FEHR vs. BRUNO FEHR

[G.R. No. 152716. October 23, 2003]

FACTS:

A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychologicalincapacity for inability to comply with the essential marital obligations under

Article 36 of the Family Code was filed by petitioner Elna Mercado-Fehr against

respondent Bruno Fehr before the RTC. The RTC declared the marriage between

petitioner and respondent void ab initio and ordered the dissolution of their

conjugal partnership of property and in lieu thereof established a regime of

complete separation of property between the said spouses in accordance with

the pertinent provisions of the Family Code. As a consequence of which, an

order was issued declaring a condominium unit as the exclusive property of the

respondent considering that the same was purchased by respondent with his

exclusive funds prior to his marriage. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration

of said order alleging that the condominium unit was purchased on installmentbasis at the time when petitioner and respondent were living exclusively with

each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, hence the rules

on co-ownership should apply in accordance with Article 147 of the Family

Code. Resolving said motion, the RTC held that since the marriage between

petitioner and respondent was declared void ab initio, the rules on co-ownership

should apply in the liquidation and partition of the properties they owned in

common pursuant to Article 147 of the Family Code. The court, however, noted

that the parties have already agreed in principle to divide the properties and/or

proceeds from the sale thereof proportionately among them and their children

as follows: 1/3 for petitioner, 1/3 for respondent and 1/3 for the children. It also

affirmed its previous ruling that the condominium unit was acquired prior to thecouple's cohabitation and therefore pertained solely to respondent. The CA

dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner for lack of merit. Hence, this

petition.

ISSUES:

1. Is the condominium unit an exclusive property of respondent?

2. Will Article 147 of the Family Code applying the rules on co-ownership apply?

RULINGS:

1. NO. It appears from the facts, as found by the RTC, after two years of long-distance courtship, petitioner moved in with respondent in the latter's residence

in Metro Manila. Their relations bore fruit and their first child, Michael Bruno Fehr,was born on December 3, 1983. The couple got married on March 14, 1985. Prior

to their marriage, they purchased on installment the condominium unit, as

evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983. Petitioner also signed the

contract as witness and upon completion of payment, the title to the

condominium unit was issued in the name of petitioner. In light of these facts, we

give more credence to petitioner's submission that the condominium unit wasacquired during the parties' cohabitation.

2. YES. Under Article 147 of the Family Code, the property regime of the partiesshould be governed by the rules on co-ownership.



Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not

barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is

nonetheless void, as in the case at bar. This provision creates a co-ownership with

respect to the properties they acquire during their cohabitation.

Thus, for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must becapacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband

and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is

void. All these elements are present in the case at bar. It has not been shown

that petitioner and respondent suffered any impediment to marry each other.

They lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife when petitioner

moved in with respondent in his residence and were later united in marriage.

Their marriage, however, was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family

Code because of respondent's psychological incapacity to comply with

essential marital obligations.

There is nothing in the records that support the pronouncement of the trial courtthat the parties have agreed to divide the properties into three — 1/3 share each

to the petitioner, the respondent and their children. Petitioner, in fact, alleges in

her petition before this Court that the parties have agreed on a four-way division

of the properties — 1/4 share each to the petitioner and the respondent, and 1/4

share each to their two children. Moreover, respondent's argument that the

three-way partition is in accordance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code

does not hold water as said provisions relate only to voidable marriages and

exceptionally to void marriages under Article 40 of the Family Code, i.e., the

declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior

void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void.



VALDES v. RTC

260 SCRA 221. July 31, 1996

ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner,REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-

VALDEZ, respondents.

Petition on a pure question of law

Facts:

1. Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on January 5, 1971 and later

had 5 kids.

2. On June 22, 1992, Antonio sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage

pursuant to Art. 36 of the FC.3. The RTC of Quezon City rendered judgment and declared the marriage null and

void under Art. 36 of the FC on the ground of their mutual psychological

incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations and ordered the

liquidation of their common properties as defined by Art. 147 of the FC and tocomply with the provisions of Art. 50, 51 and 52 of the FC

4. Consuelo sought a clarification of the order of the court and asserted that the FC

did not have provisions for the liquidation of common property in “unions without

marriage”

5. The court explained in an order dated May 5, 1995 that the property including

the family home acquired during their union are presumed to have been

obtained through joined efforts and the property would be owned by them inequal shares and the liquidation and partition of property would be governed by

the regime of co-ownership

6. The court also explained that Art 102 does not apply since it refers to the

procedure for liquidation of conjugal partnership property. Art 129 also does notapply because it refers to procedures for liquidation of the absolute community

of property

7. Antonio moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied.

Issues:

WON Art 147 is the correct law governing the disposition of property in the case at

barWON Art 147 applies to marriages declared null and void pursuant to Art. 36



Ruling:

WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the

trial court are AFFIRMED

Ratio:1. In void marriages, the property relations of the parties during the cohabitation

period is governed by the provisions of Art. 147 or Art. 148

2. In the case at bar, Art. 147 applies because there was no legal impediment to

their marriage and they were capacitated wherein the word capacitated refers

to legal capacity of a party to contract marriage

Notes:

Potential conflict between Art. 129 and Art. 147

Trial court’s decision

o The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdes and respondent Consuelo

Gomez-Valdes is hereby declared null and void under Article 36 of theFamily Code on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to

comply with their essential marital obligations;

o The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela

Rosario shall choose which parent they would want to stay with.

o "Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their

mother, herein respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes.

o "The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children

who are in the custody of the other.

o The petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the

liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the

Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 ofthe same code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.

Alleged Errors:

o "Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties

are psychological incapacitated.

o "Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family

Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a

marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by

reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses.

o

"Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared

void ab initio on the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse,

the same may be read consistently with Article 129.o "It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children

wish to stay."

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