Felicidad Javier vs. Regino Veridiano and Reino Rosete

G.R. No. L-48050. October 10, 1994

Bellosillo, J.

Doctrine: A judgment in forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other

issue than possession and declares only who has the right of possession, but by

no means constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who has the right

or title of ownership.

Facts: On January 1963, Javier filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application for Lot

No. 1641, Ts 308 of Olongapo Townsite Subdivision in Olongapo City. On

December 1970, Javier filed Civil Case no. 926 (CC 926) for forcible entry

against Ben Babol for entering a portion of the southwestern part of Lot 1641,

Ts 308. The case was dismissed since the court considered the portion outside

Lot 1461. The case became final and executory on April 1973. Subsequently,

Javier was granted Miscellaneous Sales Patent and an Original Certificate of

Title was issued in her favor. Meanwhile, Babol who was the defendant in CC

926 had sold the portion he was occupying to Rosete. 4 years after the finality of

CC 926, Javier instituted a Civil Case No. 2203-0 (CC 2203-0) for quieting of

title and recovery of possession. Rosete moved to dismiss on the ground of res

judicata. The CFI of Zambales dismissed the case.

Issue: Whether res judicata is applicable in the case.

Held: No. The following are the requisites of res judicata: a) there is final

judgment or order; b) the court have jurisdiction over the subject matter; c)

former judgment is a judgment on merits; and d) identity of parties, of subject

matter, and of causes of action. The first three are present. There is identity of

parties in the case. What is required is not absolute but substantial identity of

parties. In the case, Rosete is a successor in interest of Babol by title.

Nevertheless, there is no identity of cause of action. CC 926 is a complaint of

forcible entry or accion interdictal where the issue is physical or material

possession of real property. In this case, Javier merely claimed a better right or

prior possession over the land without asserting title. CC 2203-0 is an action to

recover a parcel of land or accion reivindicatori. In this case, Javier expressly

alleged ownership (by virtue of the Original Certificate of Title issued) and

specifically prayed that she be declared the rightful owner and be given

possession of the disputed portion. A judgement in forcible entry or detainer

case disposes of no other issue than possession and declares only who has the

right of possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an action for

determination of who has the right or title of ownership.

Javier v. Veridiano IIG.R. No. L-48050, October 10, 1994, 237 SCRA 565Bellosillo, J.FACTS:Javier filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application for lot 1641. She later instituted a complaint for forcible entry against Babol, alleging that she was forcibly dispossessed of a portion of said land. The case for forcibly entry was however dismissed as it was found by the court that the occupied portion was outside Lot 1641. The same was dismissed on appeal. Javier was eventually granted a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and issued an OCT for lot 1641. Babol, however had sold the property he was occupying, including a portion of 200 square meters to Rosete. Javier demanded the surrender of the same area from Rosete who repeatedly refused to comply. After 4 years, Javier instituted a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages against Babol and Rosete. Rosete moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata. The CFI sustained the argument of Rosete and granted his motion to dismiss. Javier contends thatres judicata cannot apply in the instant case since there is no identity of parties and causes of action between her complaint for forcible entry, which had long become final and executory, and her subsequent petition for quieting of title. Javier maintains that there is no identity of causes of action since the first case was for forcible entry, which is merely concerned with the possession of the property, whereas the subsequent case was for quieting of title, which looks into the ownership of the disputed land.ISSUE:Whether or not there are really different causes of action between the forcible entry case and the later quieting of title case.HELD:Yes. For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action the following requisites must concur: (1) There must be a final judgment or order; (2) The court rendering the judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter; (3) The former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and, (4) There is between the first and second actions identity of

(4a) parties, (4b) of subject matter and (4c) of causes of action.

Javier's argument that there is no identity of parties between the two actions is without merit. We have repeatedly ruled that for res judicata to apply, what is required is not absolute but only substantial identity of parties. But, there is merit in Javier's argument that there is no identity of causes of action. "The only issue in an action for forcible entry is the physical or material possession of real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure. The philosophy underlying this remedy is that irrespective of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror." A judgment rendered in a case for recovery of possession is conclusive only on the question of possession and not on the ownership. It does not in any way

bind the title or affects the ownership of the land or building. On the other hand, Civil Case No. 2203-0 is in reality an action to recover a parcel of land or anaccion reivindicatoria under Art. 434 of the Civil Code, and should be distinguished from Civil Case No. 926, which is an accion interdictal. Accion interdictal, which is the summary action for forcible entry (detentacion) where the defendant's possession of the property is illegal ab initio, or the summary action for unlawful detainer (desahuico) where the defendant's possession was originally lawful but ceased to be so by the expiration of his right to possess, both of which must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer, in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court; accion publiciana which is a plenary action for recovery of the right to possess and which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and, accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of ownership and includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi brought in the proper regional trial court. Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacionis thus an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. It is different from accion interdictal or accion publiciana where plaintiff merely alleges proof of a better right to possess without claim of title. In Civil Case No. 926 Javier merely claimed a better right or prior possession over the disputed area without asserting title thereto. It should be distinguished from Civil Case No. 2203-0 where she expressly alleged ownership.

Bustos vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. Nos. 120784-85. January 24, 2001

Pardo, J.:

Doctrine: One of the essential attributes of ownership is possession. It follows

that as owners of the subject property, petitioners are entitled to possession of

the same. “An owner who cannot exercise the seven (7) “juses” or attributes of

ownership–the right to possess, to use and enjoy, to abuse or consume, to

accessories, to dispose or alienate, to recover or vindicate and to the fruits–is a

crippled owner.”

Facts: Paulino Fajardo died intestate in April 2, 1957. He had four children,

Manuela, Trinidad, Beatriz and Marcial. Subsequently, they instituted an extra-

judicial partition of the estate of the deceased. On the same day, Manuela sold

her share to Moses G. Mendoza, husband of Beatriz, by way of Deed of Absolute

Sale.

At the time of the sale, there was no cadastral survey in Masantol, Pampanga.

Later, the cadastre was conducted, and the property involved in the partition

case were specified as Lots 280, 283, 284, 1000-A and 1000-B. The share of

Manuela, which was sold to Moses, includes Lot 284 of the Masantol Cadastre

and Lot 284 was subdivided into Lots 284-A and 284-B.

Trinidad was in physical possession of the land. She refused to surrender the

land to her brother-in-law Moses G. Mendoza, despite several demands.

Mendoza then filed a complaint.

During the hearing, Trinidad died, and her heirs parted with her estate,

including the lot claiming by Mendoza. Lot 284-B was then sold to Spouses

Viray, herein private respondents.

The trial court ruled in favor of Mendoza. He then sold the subject land to

Spouses Bustos, herein petitioners, who were actually lessees of the husband of

Trinidad on the land in question. Since Spouses Bustos were in actual

possession of the land, Spouses Viray filed an action for unlawful detainer

against the Spouses Bustos.

Issue: Whether petitioners could be ejected from what is now their own land.

Held: No. Petitioners cannot be ejected from the subject land. The stay of

execution is warranted by the fact that petitioners are now legal owners of the

land in question and are occupants thereof. To execute the judgment by ejecting

petitioners from the land that they owned would certainly result in grave

injustice. The issue of possession was rendered moot when the court

adjudicated ownership to the Spouses Bustos by virtue of a valid deed of sale.

Placing petitioners in possession of the land in question is the necessary and

logical consequence of the decision declaring them as the rightful owners of the

property.

Heirs of Roman Soriano vs. Hon. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 93401 June 26, 1991

Medialdea, J.:

Doctrine: There is ownership when a thing pertaining to one person is

consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the

owner, among which are the right to enjoy the thing owned and the right to

exclude other persons from possession thereof. On the other hand, possession is

defined as the holding of a thing or enjoyment of a right.

Facts: The object of the dispute in this case is a parcel of land originally owned

by Adriano Soriano who died intestate in 1947. On June 30, 1967, his heirs

leased the property to spouses David de Vera and Consuelo Villasista for a

period of fifteen (15) years beginning July 1, 1967. Paragraph 5 of the contract

of lease, provided that Roman Soriano, one of the children of the late Adriano,

will be the caretaker of the property during the period of the lease.

During the effectivity of the lease contract, the heirs of Adriano Soriano entered

into an extrajudicial settlement of his estate. The property subject of this case

was adjudicated to seven (7) of his rune (9) children pro-indiviso.

On January 11, 1968, the property was divided into two (2) lots, Lot No. 60052

and Lot No. 8459. The former lot was assigned to Lourdes, Candido and the

heirs of Dionisia while the latter lot was assigned to Francisco, Librada,

Elcocadio and Roman. The new owners of Lot No. 60052 sold the portions

assigned to them to spouses Braulio and Aquilina Abalos. Likewise, the new

owners of Lot 8459, except Roman, sold their shares to the Abalos spouses.

On March 14, 1968, the de Vera spouses ousted Roman as caretaker and

appointed Isidro Versoza and Vidal Versoza as his substitutes. Thereafter,

Roman filed a case for reinstatement and reliquidation against the de Vera

spouses. On September 30, 1969, the Agrarian Court rendered a decision

authorizing the ejectment of Roman. On appeal, the decision was reversed by

the Court of Appeals. However, before it was executed, the parties entered into

a post-decisional agreement wherein the de Vera spouses allowed Roman

Soriano to sub-lease the property until the termination of the original lease on

June 30 1982. This agreement was approved by the CAR court in an order dated

December 22, 1972.

On August 16, 1976, the Abalos spouses filed with the then Court of First

Instance of Pangasinan at Lingayen an application for registration of title. The

application claimed ownership of the entire lot No. 60052 and 3/4 pro-indiviso of

Lot No. 8459. The Director of Lands and Roman Soriano filed separate

oppositions to the application. The latter’s opposition alleged that the two (2)

lots subject of the application have not yet been subdivided and remained as one

parcel; that he is the co-owner pro-indiviso of the combined area of the two (2)

lots and not just to one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 8459 as alleged in the application;

and that the applicant’s source of ownership is voidable.

The Republic subsequently conceded that the land applied for was private and

disposable. The RTC, acting as a Land Registration Court, granted the

application for Registration.

Meanwhile, on April 13, 1983, after the expiration of the original lease and the

sub-lease in favor of Roman Soriano, the Abalos spouses filed a case for

unlawful detainer against Roman Soriano. This case, however, was dismissed on

motion of the complainants, Abalos spouses.

For their part, Elcocadio, Librada, Roman, Francisco, Lourdes, Candido and the

heirs of Dionisia, filed a complaint to annul the deeds of sale they executed in

favor of the Abalos spouses or should the deeds be not annulled, to allow

Roman, Elcocadio and Librada to redeem those shares sold by Candido,

Lourdes, Francisca and the heirs of Dionisia and to uphold Roman Soriano’s

possession of the fishpond portion of the property as a tenant-caretaker. After

the dismissal of the case for unlawful detainer, the Abalos spouses a motion for

execution of the post-decisional order embodying the agreement of Roman

Soriano and the de Vera spouses allowing the former to sublease the property.

Issue: Whether or not a motion for execution of a post decisional agreement

approved by the court in 1972 may still be filed eleven (11) years after.

Held: No. It should be noted that the meat of the post decisional agreement

sought to be executed was the creation of a sub- lessor and sub-lessee

relationship between the de Veras and Roman Soriano. While it appears from

the above resolution of the trial court that there was a basis for private

respondents’ demand for reasonable compensation for the use of the premises

and for joint possession as a co-owner, the filing of a motion for execution of the

post decisional agreement between the de Vera spouses and the petitioners

predecessor, Roman Soriano, was not the proper remedy. The pleading filed

with the trial court was captioned “Motion for Execution.” However, it was very

clear that, under the circumstances they were in, the relief demanded by the

private respondents can properly be asked for in an unlawful detainer case or in

other proper proceedings. A case for unlawful detainer was already brought by

the private respondents against the petitioner but the former sought its

dismissal for reasons not known. Be that as it may, there is still a pending civil

action between the parties (Civil Case No. 15958) where possession is one of

the issues to be resolved.

The agrarian court erred in not dismissing outright the motion for execution

filed by private respondents. Said court, acting on the motion for execution had

no jurisdiction to entertain propositions outside of the scope of the agreement

sought to be executed. Further, the agreement sought to be enforced was

approved by the court on December 22, 1972, eleven (11) years and eight (8)

months from the time the motion for execution was filed on August 22, 1984. It

is settled that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution of a

judgment (or a final order) may be made by motion within five (5) years from the

date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is

barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced only by an

ordinary action. Actions upon a judgment or a final order of the court must be

brought within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues [(Article

1144 (3)] or within ten years counted from the time the judgment became final.

Furthermore, it is indubitable that the agreement sought to be executed had

already been executed by the parties. The obligations of spouses De Vera, the

original lessees, and of Roman Soriano, under sub-lease agreement had already

been complied with. Possession and rentals under the contracts were already

delivered. In fact, at the time the motion for execution was filed the sub-lease

contract had already expired. Hence, there was nothing more to execute.

Petition granted. Motion for execution denied.

Garcia vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 133140, August 10, 1999

Puno, J.

Doctrine: Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Ownership

exists when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will

in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others.

Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is the right to

dispose of the thing by way of sale.

Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or

without right. Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the

concept of an owner and possession of a holder. A possessor in the concept of

an owner may be the owner himself or one who claims to be so. On the other

hand, one who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior

right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong.

Facts: Atty. Pedro V. Garcia, in whose name TCT No. S-31269 covering a parcel

of land identified as Lot 17 situated at Bel Air II Village, Makati, was registered,

sold with the consent of his wife Remedios T. Garcia, the same to their daughter

Ma. Luisa Magpayo and her husband Luisito Magpayo (the Magpayos). On

March 5, 1981, the Magpayos mortgaged the land to the Philippine Bank of

Communications (PBCom) to secure a loan. On March 9, 1981, Atty. Garcia’s

Title was cancelled and in its stead Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-

108412/545 was issued in the name of the Magpayos. The Deed of Real Estate

Mortgage was registered at the Makati Register of Deeds and annotated on the

Magpayos title. The redemption period of the foreclosed mortgage expired

without the Magpayos redeeming the same, hence, title over the land was

consolidated in favor of PBCom which cancelled the Magpayo’s title and

Transfer Certificate of Title No. 138233 was issued in its name. The Magpayos

failed to pay their loan upon its maturity, hence, the mortgage was

extrajudicially foreclosed and at the public auction sale, PBCom which was the

highest bidder bought the land. On October 4, 1985, the Magpayos filed at the

RTC of Makati a complaint seeking the nullification of the extrajudicial

foreclosure of mortgage, public auction sale, and PBCom’s title docketed as

Civil Case No. 11891. This complaint was dismissed for failure to prosecute. On

October 15, 1985, PBCom filed at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a

petition for the issuance of a writ of possession over the land which was

granted. Upon service of the writ of possession, Mrs. Magpayo’s brother, Jose

Ma. T. Garcia (Garcia), who was in possession of the land, refused to honor it

and filed a motion for Intervention in the above-said PBCom petition, which

motion was denied.

Garcia thereupon filed against PBCom, the Magpayos, and the RTC Sheriff the

instant suit for recovery of realty and damages wherein he alleged, inter alia,

that he inherited the land as one of the heirs of his mother Remedios T. Garcia,

and that PBCom acquired no right thereover. In its summary judgment, the

lower court held that the mortgage executed by the Magpayo spouses in favor of

PBCom was void. The Magpayo spouses could not have acquired the said

property merely by the execution of the Deed of Sale because the property was

in the possession of the plaintiff. The vendor, Pedro V. Garcia, was not in

possession and hence could not deliver the property merely by the execution of

the document.

On appeal, CA held that Garcia’s assertion that ownership over the disputed

property was not transmitted to his sister and her husband-Magpayo spouses at

the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale as he was still in actual and

adverse possession thereof does not lie. Since the execution of the deed of sale

by Atty. Pedro V. Garcia in favor of the Magpayos took place earlier or on

August 1, 1980, then contrary to his claim, Garcia was not in possession of the

property at the time of the execution of said public instrument. Furthermore, it

appearing that the vendor Atty. Garcia had control of the property which was

registered in his name and that the deed of sale was likewise registered, then

the sale was consummated and the Magpayos were free to exercise the

attributes of ownership including the right to mortgage the land.

When the land is registered in the vendor’s name, and the public instrument of

sale is also registered, the sale may be considered consummated and the buyer

may exercise the actions of an owner. That the Magpayos’ title, TCT No. S-

108412, was issued four (4) days following the execution of the deed of real

estate mortgage is of no moment, for registration under the Torrens system

does not vest ownership but is intended merely to confirm and register the title

which one may already have on the land.

Issue: Whether Garcia’s possession is in a concept of an owner.

Held: No. Garcia’s possession which started only in 1986 could not ripen into

ownership. He has no valid title thereto. His possession in fact was that of an

intruder, one done in bad faith (to defeat PBCom’s Writ of Possession). His

possession is certainly not in the concept of an owner. This is so because as

early as 1981, title thereto was registered in the name of the Magpayo Spouses

which title was subsequently cancelled when the property was purchased by

PBCom in a public auction sale resulting in the issuance of title in favor of the

latter in 1985.

The Court stressed that possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts.

Ownership exists when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected

to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of

others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is the right

to dispose of the thing by way of sale. Atty. Pedro Garcia and his wife Remedios

exercised their right to dispose of what they owned when they sold the subject

property to the Magpayo spouses. On the other hand, possession is defined as

the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to

actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may be

had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of

a holder. A possessor in the concept of an owner may be the owner himself or

one who claims to be so. On the other hand, one who possesses as a mere

holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be

ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong.

The records show that petitioner occupied the property not in the concept of an

owner for his stay was merely tolerated by his parents. Consequently, it is of no

moment that petitioner was in possession of the property at the time of the sale

to the Magpayo spouses. It was not a hindrance to a valid transfer of ownership.

On the other hand, petitioner’s subsequent claim of ownership as successor to

his mother’s share in the conjugal asset is belied by the fact that the property

was not included in the inventory of the estate submitted by his father to the

intestate court. This buttresses the ruling that indeed the property was no

longer considered owned by petitioner’s parents.

The Court upheld the Court of Appeals in holding that the mortgage to PBCom

by the Magpayo spouses is valid notwithstanding that the transfer certificate of

title over the property was issued to them after the mortgage contract was

entered into. Registration does not confer ownership, it is merely evidence of

such ownership over a particular property. The deed of sale operates as a

formal or symbolic delivery of the property sold and authorizes the buyer to use

the document as proof of ownership. All said, the Magpayo spouses were

already the owners when they mortgaged the property to PBCom.

Rodil Enterprises vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 129609, November 29, 2001.

Bellosillo, J.

Doctrine: The owner has a right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other

limitations than those established by law. Every owner has the freedom of

disposition over his property. This is an attribute of ownership.

In an action for unlawful detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior

physical possession.

Facts: Petitioner Rodil Enterprises is the lessee of the Ides O’Racca building

(ORACCA) since 1959. It was a former alien property over which the Republic

acquired ownership by virtue of RA 477. Rodil entered into a sublease contract

with respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footware and Chua Huay

Soon, members of Oracca Building Tenants Association, Inc. (ASSOCIAION). On

January 8, 1987, Rodil offered to purchase the property. On July 22, 1998, the

Association also offered to lease the same building through DGSREPM. Pending

action on the purchase offer of Rodil, the Republic granted Rodil’s request for

the renewal of the lease contract on Sept. 23, 1987 for 5 more years. The

renewal contract however was disapproved by the DGSREPM secretary.

On October 1987, Rodil filed an action to enjoin the Association from collecting

rentals from the occupants of Oracca. This was granted by the trial court and

upheld by CA. On May 18, 1992 Rodil signed a renewal contract for 10 more

years of lease , which was approved by the DENR Secretary. The Association

filed a case to set aside the renewal contract, but the same was denied by the

trial court.

Rodil then filed an action for unlawful detainer against herein respondents. The

MTC upheld Rodil’s right to eject, which was then upheld by the RTC. While the

consolidated appeals were pending, the CA 2nd Division declared the renewal

contract between Rodil and the Republic as null and void. Rodil moved for

reconsideration but the same was denied which prompted it to file an action for

certiorari. The CA 4th division likewise se aside the MTC and the RTC’s decision

and dismissed the action of Rodil for unlawful detainer.

Issues:

Whether the renewal contract between Rodil and the Republic is valid.

Whether Rodil may validly eject herein respondents even though the former is

not in actual possession of the property.

Held:

Yes. The Owner has a right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other

limitations than those established by law. Every owner has the freedom of

disposition over his property. This is an attribute of ownership. The Republic

being the owner of the disputed property enjoys the prerogative to enter into a

lease contract with Rodil in the exercise of its jus disponendi.

Yes. In an action for unlawful detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior

physical possession. Respondents have admitted that they have not entered into

any lease contract with the Republic and that their continued occupation of the

subject property was merely by virtue of acquiescence. Since the occupation of

respondents was merely tolerated by the Republic, the right of possession of the

latter remained uninterrupted. It could therefore alienate the same to anyone it

choose. Unfortunately for respondents, the Republic chose to alienate the

subject premises to Rodil by virtue of a contract of lease entered into on May

18, 1992. Resultantly, the petitioner had the right to file the action for unlawful

detainer against respondents as one from whom possession of property has

been unlawfully withheld

Cornelio M. Isaguirre vs. Felicitas De Lara

G.R. No. 138053, May 31, 2000

Gonzaga-Reyes, J.

Doctrine: As a general rule, the mortgagor retains possession of the mortgaged

property since a mortgage is merely a lien and title to the property does not

pass to the mortgagee. However, even though a mortgagee does not have

possession of the property, there is no impairment of his security since the

mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is

imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for

whose security it was constituted. If the debtor is unable to pay his debt, the

mortgage creditor may institute an action to foreclose the mortgage, whether

judicially or extra judicially, whereby the mortgaged property will then be sold

at a public auction and the proceeds there from given to the creditor to the

extent necessary to discharge the mortgage loan.

Facts: Alejandro de Lara was the original applicant-claimant for a

Miscellaneous Sales Application over a parcel of land identified as portion of Lot

502, Guianga Cadastre, filed with the Bureau of Lands with an area of 2,342

square meters. Upon his death, his wife – respondent Felicitas de Lara, as

claimant, succeeded Alejandro de Lara. The Undersecretary of Agriculture and

Natural Resources amended the sales application to cover only 1,600 square

meters. By virtue of a decision rendered by the Secretary of Agriculture and

Natural Resources, a subdivision survey was made and the area was further

reduced to 1,000 square meters. On this lot stands a two-story residential-

commercial apartment declared for taxation purposes in the name of

respondent’s sons – Apolonio and Rodolfo, both surnamed de Lara.

Respondent obtained several loans from the Philippine National Bank. When she

encountered financial difficulties, respondent approached petitioner Cornelio M.

Isaguirre, who was married to her niece, for assistance. A document

denominated as “Deed of Sale and Special Cession of Rights and Interests” was

executed by respondent and petitioner, whereby the former sold a 250 square

meter portion of Lot No. 502, together with the two-story commercial and

residential structure standing thereon, in favor of petitioner, for and in

consideration of the sum of P5,000.

Apolonio and Rodolfo de Lara filed a complaint against petitioner for recovery of

ownership and possession of the two-story building. However, the case was

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner filed a sales application over the

subject property on the basis of the deed of sale. His application was approved,

resulting in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title, in the name of

petitioner. Meanwhile, the sales application of respondent over the entire 1,000

square meters of subject property (including the 250 square meter portion

claimed by petitioner) was also given due course, resulting in the issuance of

Original Certificate of Title, in the name of respondent.

Due to the overlapping of titles, petitioner filed an action for quieting of title and

damages with the RTC of Davao City against respondent. After trial on the

merits, the trial court rendered judgment, in favor of petitioner, declaring him

to be the lawful owner of the disputed property. However, the Court of Appeals

reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the transaction entered into by

the parties, as evidenced by their contract, was an equitable mortgage, not a

sale. The appellate court’s decision was based on the inadequacy of the

consideration agreed upon by the parties, on its finding that the payment of a

large portion of the “purchase price” was made after the execution of the deed

of sale in several installments of minimal amounts; and finally, on the fact that

petitioner did not take steps to confirm his rights or to obtain title over the

property for several years after the execution of the deed of sale. As a

consequence of its decision, the appellate court also declared Original

Certificate issued in favor of petitioner to be null and void. This Court affirmed

the decision of the Court of Appeals, we denied petitioner’s motion for

reconsideration.

Respondent filed a motion for execution with the trial court, praying for the

immediate delivery of possession of the subject property, which motion was

granted. Respondent moved for a writ of possession. Petitioner opposed the

motion, asserting that he had the right of retention over the property until

payment of the loan and the value of the improvements he had introduced on

the property. The trial court granted respondent’s motion for writ of possession.

The trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Consequently, a

writ of possession, together with the Sheriff’s Notice to Vacate, was served upon

petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not the mortgagee in an equitable mortgage has the right to

retain possession of the property pending actual payment to him of the amount

of indebtedness by the mortgagor.

Held: A mortgage is a contract entered into in order to secure the fulfillment of

a principal obligation. Recording the document, in which it appears with the

proper Registry of Property, although, even if it is not recorded, the mortgage is

nevertheless binding between the parties, constitutes it. Thus, the only right

granted by law in favor of the mortgagee is to demand the execution and the

recording of the document in which the mortgage is formalized. As a general

rule, the mortgagor retains possession of the mortgaged property since a

mortgage is merely a lien and title to the property does not pass to the

mortgagee. However, even though a mortgagee does not have possession of the

property, there is no impairment of his security since the mortgage directly and

immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the

possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was

constituted. If the debtor is unable to pay his debt, the mortgage creditor may

institute an action to foreclose the mortgage, whether judicially or

extrajudicially, whereby the mortgaged property will then be sold at a public

auction and the proceeds there from given to the creditor to the extent

necessary to discharge the mortgage loan. Apparently, petitioner’s contention

that “to require him to deliver possession of the Property to respondent prior to

the full payment of the latter’s mortgage loan would be equivalent to the

cancellation of the mortgage is without basis. Regardless of its possessor, the

mortgaged property may still be sold, with the prescribed formalities, in the

event of the debtor’s default in the payment of his loan obligation.

A simple mortgage does not give the mortgagee a right to the possession of the

property unless the mortgage should contain some special provision to that

effect. Regrettably for petitioner, he has not presented any evidence, other than

his own gratuitous statements, to prove that the real intention of the parties was

to allow him to enjoy possession of the mortgaged property until full payment of

the loan.

The trial court correctly issued the writ of possession in favor of respondent.

Such writ was but a necessary consequence of affirming the validity of the

original certificate of title in the name of respondent Felicitas de Lara, while at

the same time nullifying the original certificate of title in the name of petitioner

Cornelio Isaguirre. Possession is an essential attribute of ownership; thus, it

would be redundant for respondent to go back to court simply to establish her

right to possess subject property.

Spouses Cristino and Brigida Custodio and Spouses Lito and Maria

Cristina Santos vs. Court of Appeals, Heirs of Pacifico C. Mabasa

G.R. No. 116100, February 9, 1996

Regalado, J.:

Doctrine: Every owner has an absolute right over his property and his act of

fencing and enclosing the same was an act which he may lawfully perform in the

employment and exercise of said right. Whatever injury or damage that may

have been sustained by others by reason of the rightful use of the said land by

the owner is damnum absque injuria.

Facts: The respondent (Pacifico Mabasa) owns a parcel of land with a two-door

apartment erected thereon situated at Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas,

Tagig, Metro Manila. Said property may be described to be surrounded by other

immovables pertaining to respondents herein.

As an access to P. Burgos Street from respondent’s property, there are two

possible passageways. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide

and is about 20 meters distan(t) from Mabasa’s residence to P. Burgos Street.

Such path is passing in between the previously mentioned row of houses of the

petitioners The second passageway is about 3 meters in width and length from

Mabasa’s residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing thru

said passageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with

5-6 meters in length, has to be traversed.

When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants occupying

the remises and who were acknowledged by Mabasa as tenants. However,

sometime in February, 1982, one of said tenants vacated the apartment and

when Mabasa went to see the premises, he saw that there had been built an

adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in width. Said adobe

fence was first constructed by Petitioners Santoses along their property which is

also along the first passageway. Petitioner Morato constructed her adobe fence

and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was

enclosed. And it was then that the remaining tenants of said apartment vacated

the area.

Petitioner Ma. Cristina Santos testified that she constructed said fence because

of some other inconveniences of having (at) the front of her house a pathway

such as when some of the tenants were drunk and would bang their doors and

windows.

Trial court rendered a decision ordering the Petitioners Custodios and Santoses

to give Respondent Mabasa permanent access ingress and egress, to the public

street and Mabasa to pay the Custodios and Santoses the sum of Eight

Thousand Pesos (P8,000) as indemnity for the permanent use of the

passageway.

Respondent Mabasa went to the CA raising the sole issue of whether or not the

lower court erred in not awarding damages in their favor. The CA rendered its

decision affirming the judgment of the trial court with modification only insofar

as the. grant of damages to Mabasa The motion for reconsideration filed by the

petitioners was denied.

Issues:

Whether the grant of right of way to herein private respondent Mabasa is

proper.

Whether the award of damages is in order.

Held:

No. Herein petitioners are already barred from raising the same. Petitioners did

not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the

right of way, hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication

therein. With the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners, the

issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest.

No. A reading of the decision of the CA will show that the award of damages

was based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred

losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased

premises by reason of the closure of the passageway.However, the mere fact

that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages.

There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal

invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from

the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the

damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances

in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty.

(damnum absque injuria). In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the

injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted

from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a concurrence

of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it

(damnum et injuria.)

In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. The

act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of

their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public

policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing,

without other limitations than those established by law. It is within the right of

petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the

Civil Code provides that “(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or

tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other

means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.”

At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any

servitudes. There was no easement of way existing in favor of private

respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact that private respondents had

no existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision of

the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their favor after payment of

just compensation.

Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their

property and their act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they

may lawfully perform in the employment and exercise of said right. To repeat,

whatever injury or damage may have been sustained by private respondents by

reason of the rightful use of the said land by petitioners is damnum absque

injuria.

Abejaron vs. Nabasa

G.R. No. 84831, June 20, 2001

Puno, J.

Doctrine: For an action for reconveyance based on fraud to prosper, it is

essential for the party seeking reconveyance to prove by clear and convincing

evidence his title to the property and the fact of fraud.

Facts: Petitioner Abejaron avers that he is the actual and lawful possessor and

claimant of a 118-square meter portion of a 175-square meter residential lot in

Silway, General Santos City. In 1945, petitioner Abejaron and his family started

occupying the 118-square meter land. At that time, the land had not yet been

surveyed. They fenced the area and built thereon a family home with nipa

roofing and a small store. In 1949, petitioner improved their abode to become a

two-storey house made of round wood and nipa roofing. Abejaron also

introduced several improvements on the land including a store, 5 coconut trees

on the property of controversy, and avocado and banana trees. All this time that

the Abejarons introduced these improvements on the land in controversy,

respondent Nabasa did not oppose or complain about the improvements.

Knowing that the disputed land was public in character, petitioner declared only

his house, and not the disputed land, for taxation purposes.

Petitioner stated that beginning 1955, respondent Nabasa resided on the

remaining 57-square meter portion of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953. Nabasa built

his house about four (4) meters away from petitioner Abejaron’s house.

Before 1974, employees of the Bureau of Lands surveyed the area in

controversy. Abejaron merely watched them do the survey and did not

thereafter apply for title of the land on the belief that he could not secure title

over it as it was government property. Without his (Abejaron) knowledge and

consent, however, Nabasa “clandestinely, willfully, fraudulently, and unlawfully

applied for and caused the titling in his name” of the entire Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-

154953, including petitioner Abejaron’s 118-square meter portion. Petitioner

imputes bad faith and fraud on the part of Nabasa because in applying for and

causing the titling in his name of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953, Nabasa

represented himself to be the actual and lawful possessor of the entire Lot 1,

Block 5, including petitioner Abejaron’s 118-square meter portion despite

knowledge of Abejaron’s actual occupation and possession of said portion.

On September 24, 1974, Nabasa was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-

4140 pursuant to Free Patent No. (XI-4) 2877 covering Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-

154953 including therein the lot occupied by the petitioner.

On March 12, 1982 an action for reconveyance with damages against

respondent Nabasa before Branch 22, Regional Trial Court of General Santos

City.

Issue: Whether the allegation of fraud has been proven for the action for

reconveyance to prosper.

Held: No. An action for reconveyance of a property is the sole remedy of a

landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in

another’s name after one year from the date of the decree so long as the

property has not passed to an innocent purchaser for value. The action does not

seek to reopen the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of

registration but only purports to show that the person who secured the

registration of the property in controversy is not the real owner thereof. Fraud

is a ground for reconveyance. For an action for reconveyance based on fraud to

prosper, it is essential for the party seeking reconveyance to prove by clear and

convincing evidence his title to the property and the fact of fraud. Such was not

performed by the petitioner.

Abejaron’s 30-year period of possession and occupation required by the Public

Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942 ran from 1945 to 1975, prior to the

effectivity of P.D. No. 1073 in 1977, the requirement of said P.D. that

occupation and possession should have started on June 12, 1945 or earlier, does

not apply to him. Petitioner claims that he started occupying the disputed land

in 1945. At that time, he built a nipa house, a small store, and a fence made of

wood to delineate his area. This nipa house was improved in 1949 into a two-

storey house. The small store was also made bigger in 1950. The wooden fence

was also changed to a fence made of hollow blocks. The two-storey house,

bigger store, and hollow-block fence all stand to this day. In 1951, petitioner

planted coconut trees near his house. While the petitioner has shown continued

existence of these improvements on the disputed land, they were introduced

later than January 24, 1947. He has failed to establish the portion of the

disputed land that his original nipa house, small store and wooden fence

actually occupied as of January 24, 1947. In the absence of this proof, we cannot

determine the land he actually possessed and occupied for thirty years which he

may acquire under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Worthy of notice is the fact

that the disputed land was surveyed, subdivided into and identified by lots only

in the 1970′s. Therefore, prior to the survey, it would be difficult to determine

the metes and bounds of the land petitioner claims to have occupied since 1947

in the absence of specific and incontrovertible proof.

Also, as admitted by the petitioner, he has never declared the disputed land for

taxation purposes. While tax receipts and tax declarations are not

incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of

ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual

possession of the property or supported by other effective proof. Even the tax

declarations and receipts covering his house do not bolster his case as the

earliest of these was dated 1950.

Petitioner’s evidence does not constitute the “well-nigh incontrovertible”

evidence necessary to acquire title through possession and occupation of the

disputed land at least since January 24, 1947 as required by Sec. 48(b) of the

Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942. The basic presumption is that lands

of whatever classification belong to the State and evidence of a land grant must

be “well-nigh incontrovertible.” As petitioner Abejaron has not adduced any

evidence of title to the land in controversy, whether by judicial confirmation of

title, or homestead, sale, or free patent, he cannot maintain an action for

reconveyance.

German Management & Services, Inc. v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 76216 and 76217, September 14, 1989, 177 SCRA 495Fernan, J.FACTS:Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of 232,942 sq. M. The land was originally registered on 5 August 1948 in the Office of the Register of Deeds Rizal as OCT 19, pursuant to a Homestead Patent granted by the President of the Philippines on 27 July 1948. On 26 February 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing German Management Services to develop their property into a residential subdivision. Consequently, the German Management obtained Development Permit 00424 from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission for said development. Finding that part of the property was occupied by Gernale and Villeza and20 other persons, German Management advised the occupants to vacate

the premises but the latter refused. Nevertheless, German Management proceeded with the development of the subject property which included the portions occupied and cultivated by Gernale, et.al. Gernale, et.al. filed an action for forcible entry against German Management before the MTC Antipolo, Rizal, alleging that they are mountainside farmers of Sitio Inarawan who have occupied and tilled their farm holdings some 12 to15 years prior to the promulgation of PD 27, and that they were deprived of their property without due process of law when German Management forcibly removed and destroyed the barbed wire fence enclosing their farm holdings without notice and bulldozing the rice, corn, fruit bearing trees and other crops that they planted by means of force, violence and intimidation The MTC dismissed Gernale et.al.'s complaint for forcible entry. On appeal, the RTC sustained the dismissal by the MTC. Gernale then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Said court gave due course to their petition and reversed the decisions of the MTC and the RTC. The Appellate Court held that since Gernale, et.al. were in actual possession of the property at the time they were forcibly ejected by German Management, they have a right to commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of possession. German Management moved to reconsider but the same was denied by the Appellate Court. Hence, here is the present recourse.ISSUE:Whether the doctrine of self-help may be availed of when respondents refused to vacate the premises.HELD:No. The justification that the drastic action of bulldozing and destroying the crops of the prior possessor on the basis of the doctrine of self help (enunciated in Article 429 NCC) is unavailing because the such doctrine can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession, which is absent in the present case. When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property. This is clear from Article 536 New Civil Code which provides that "in no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He, who believes that he has an action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing."

Felix Caisip vs. People of the Philippines 

G.R. No. L-28716, November 18, 1970

Concepcion, C.J.

Facts: The complainant Gloria Cabalag is the wife of Marcelino Guevarra who

cultivated a parcel of land known as Lot 105-A of Hacienda Palico situated in

sitio Bote-bote, barrio Tampisao, Nasugbu, Batangas. The said parcel of land

used to be tenanted by the deceased father of the complainant. Hacienda Palico

is owned by Roxas y Cia. and administered by Antonio Chuidian. The overseer of

the said hacienda is Felix Caisip, one of the accused herein.

On May 17, 1958 Roxas y Cia filed a forcible entry case against Guevarra. The

court decided in favour of Roxas y Cia and issued a writ of execution. The return

of the writ showed that possession of Lot 105-A was turned over to the owner

thru Caisip and that Guevarra and Cabalag were given 20 days from June 6,

1959 to vacate the premises. It also appears in the record that due to the

tenacious attitude of Cabalag, Caisip sought the help of policemen Federico

Villadelrey and Ignacio Rojales.

On June 17, 1959, Cabalag was seen weeding the portion of Lot 105-A which

was a ricefield. Caisip approached her and bade her to leave but Cabalag

refused to do so claiming that she and her husband has a right over the

property. She having stuck to this attitude, even when he threatened to call the

police, Caisip went to his co-defendants, Sgt. Rojales and Cpl. Villadelrey, both

of the local police, who were some distance away, and brought them with him.

Rojales told Gloria, who was then in a squatting position, to stop weeding. As

Gloria insisted on her right to stay in said lot, Rojales grabbed her right hand

and, twisting the same, wrested therefrom the trowel she was holding.

Thereupon, Villadelrey held her left hand and, together with Rojales, forcibly

dragged her. The appellants maintain that the Court of Appeals erred in not

finding that their acts are justified under Article 429 of the Civil Code.

Issue: Whether Article 429 of the Civil Code applies in the present case.

Held: Article 429 is inapplicable, Cabalag was given 20 days from June 6, 1959

within which to vacate the premises. Cabalag did not, on June 17, 1959 — or

within said period — invade or usurp said lot. She had merely remained in

possession thereof, even though the hacienda owner may have become its co-

possessor. Appellants did not “repel or prevent in actual or threatened . . .

physical invasion or usurpation.” They expelled Gloria from a property of which

she and her husband were in possession.

It is urged, that, by weeding and refusing to leave Lot 105-A, Gloria had

committed a crime in the presence of the policemen, despite the aforementioned

20-day period, which, appellants claim, the sheriff had no authority to grant.

This contention is manifestly untenable, because: (1) said period was granted in

the presence of the hacienda owner’s representative, appellant Caisip, who, by

not objecting thereto, had impliedly consented to or ratified the act performed

by the sheriff; 2) Gloria and her husband were thereby allowed to remain, and

had, in fact, remained, in possession of the premises, perhaps together with the

owner of the hacienda or his representative, Caisip; (3) the act of removing

weeds from the ricefield was beneficial to its owner and to whomsoever the

crops belonged, and, even if they had not authorized it, does not constitute a

criminal offense; and (4) although Gloria and her husband had been sentenced

to vacate the land, the judgment against them did not necessarily imply that

they, as the parties who had tilled it and planted thereon, had no rights, of any

kind whatsoever, in or to the standing crops, inasmuch as “necessary expenses

shall be refunded to every possessor,” and the cost of cultivation, production

and upkeep has been held to partake of the nature of necessary expenses.

It is, accordingly, clear that appellants herein had, by means of violence, and

without legal authority therefor, prevented the complainant from “doing

something not prohibited by law,” (weeding and being in Lot 105-A), and

compelled her “to do something against” her will (stopping the weeding and

leaving said lot), “whether it be right or wrong,” thereby taking the law into

their hands, in violation of Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code.

People of the Philippines vs. Pletcha

G.R. No.19029. June 27, 1977.

Bison, J.

Doctrine: The use of such necessary force to protect proprietary or possessory

rights constitutes a justifying circumstance under our penal laws.

Facts: Tito Pletcha is a farmer who owns a land which he has been cultivating

for 19years. A private corporation sought to take over the aforementioned land

by fencing 4 hectares of his property. Such fencing was without authority or

court order. Because of this, Pletcha foughjt-off any the take over and resisted

the company. This forced the company to file a case for grave coercion against

Pletcha in the Municipal Court of Murcia, Negros Occidental.

Pletcha invokes the protective mantle of Article 429 of the Civil Code which

gives him the right to use reasonable force to exclude any person threatening

his exclusive ownership over the land.

The People asks for affirmance on the ground that the appellant should not have

taken the law into his own hands but rather have the courts decide the case.

Issue: Whether or not Pletcha can properly invoked Article 429.

Held: Yes. The principle of self-help authorizes the lawful possessor to use force

not only to prevent a threatened unlawful invasion or usurpation thereof; it is

sort of self-defense. It is lawful to repel force by force. He who merely uses

force to defend his possession does not possess by force. The use of such

necessary force to protect proprietary or possessory rights constitutes a

justifying circumstance under our penal laws.

The appellant need not rush to court to seek redress before reasonably resisting

the invasion of property. The situation required immediate action and Article

429 gave him the self-executory mechanics of self-defense and self-reliance.

Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate CourtG.R. No. 74761, November 6, 1990, 191 SCRA 195Fernan, C.J.FACTS:Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation. Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction. Petitioners instituted a criminal action against the officers and directors of respondent corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code. Subsequently, petitioners filed a civil action against respondent corporation for damages. The trial court dismissed the civil case for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. The appellate court affirmed the order of the trial court. The motion for reconsideration was also denied.ISSUE:Whether a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages.HELD:Yes. Petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation. It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUOUT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others.

Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered. Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act or omission constituting fault or negligence. However, responsibility for fault or negligence under the said article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. The plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. The decision is reversed and set aside.