promotion exam part „ d mil history 2015€¦ · 1. syllabus i ii indo-pak war : 1971 2. chapter...
TRANSCRIPT
PROMOTION EXAM PART „D‟
MIL HISTORY
2015
COMPILED &PUBLISHED BY THE DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF MILITARY TRAINING
(MT-2) INTEGRATED HEADQUARTERS OF MoD (ARMY)
The information given in this document is not to be communicated
either directly or indirectly to the press or to any person not holding an
official position in the service of the Government of India/ State
Government of the Union of India.
INDEX
Ser No
Chapter Page
From To
1. Syllabus i ii
INDO-PAK WAR : 1971
2. Chapter - 1 Genesis. 01 01
(a) Part-I Historical Background 02 06
(b) Part-II Political and Diplomatic Efforts 07 09
(c) Part-III Prep and Plg 10 16
3. Chapter - 2 Ops in the Western Sect
(a) Part-I Trn Analysis 17 19
(b) Part-II Force Levels, Options and Tasking 20 21
(c) Part-III Battles in J & K (Northern Sect) 22 31
(d) Part-IV Ops in the Plains of Punjab Incl Shakargarh Bulge
32 36
(e) Part-V Ops of 11 Corps (Holiday) 37 39
(f) Part-VI Ops in Rajasthan – Sindh 40 45
(g) Part-VII Overview of Ops in the Western Sect
46 47
4. Chapter - 3 Ops in Eastern Theatre
(a) Part-I Trn 48 50
(b) Part-II Division of Area of Resp 51 52
(c) Part-III Ops in the Eastern Theatre 53 53`
(d) Part-IV Mukti Bahini 54 55
(e) Part-V Ops of 2 Corps for Capture of Jessore and Khulna
56 58
(f) Part-VI Ops of 4 Corps 59 62
(g) Part-VII Ops by 33 Corps 63 67
(h) Part-VIII Ops of 101 Comn Zone and Capture of DACCA
68 71
(j) Part-IX Surrender 72 74
5. Chapter - 4 Naval Aspects 75 75
(a) Part-I Western Theatre 76 78
(b) Part-II Eastern Theatre 79 79
(c) Part-III Events as they Unfolded 80 81
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6. Chapter - 5 Air Aspects 82 82
(a) Part-I The IAF Prep and Plg 83 84
(b) Part-II Air Ops in Eastern Sect 85 90
(c) Part-III Ops in the West 91 92
(d) Part-IV Summary and Lessons 93 94
7. Chapter - 6 Post War Efforts 95 97
(a) Part-I Shimla Agreement 98 99
(b) Part-II Delineation of Border 100 101
(c) Part-III Repatriation of POWs 102 103
8. Chapter - 7 Lessons Learnt 104 108
BIOGARAPHY : FD MARSHAL SHFJ MANEKSHAW
9. (a) Part-I Intro 109 110
(b) Part-II Early Yrs and Mil Trg 111 113
(c) Part-III Professional Career Till Independence.
114 116
(d) Part-IV Career Post Indepencence 117 124
(e) Part-V As Chief of Army Staff 125 137
(f) Part-VI Prelude to War 1971 138 148
(g) Part-VII Liberation of Bangladesh 149 154
(h) Part-VIII Post 1971 155 158
(j) Part IX Post Army days 159 161
(k) Part-X Manekshaw as a ldr & Mil Cdr 162 171
(l) Part-XI Conclusion 172 189
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SYALLABI FOR PROMOTION EXAMINATION PART 'D' : MILITARY HISTORY (WRITTEN)
Ser No
Subject Total Marks
Pass Marks
Time Allowed
Syllabus Remarks/ Recommended Study
1. Military
History
500 200 3 hr Aim. The aim of Military History paper is to test the candidates‟ ability to draw lessons from the prescribed campaigns and biographical studies and apply these to contemporary and future war situations.
DETAILS OF SYLLABUS
1. Military Campaign. The study should including the following :- (a) Broad study of strategy. (b) Military Geography of the area. (c) Military Combat Analysis. Force levels of the belligerents, their political and military aims. (d) Battle / Campaign Analysis. Application of principles of war including analysis of the following issues:- (i) Doctrine and tactics at tactical / operational level. (ii) Analysis of adopted tactics. (iii) Application of art of war at tactical level. (iv) Application of new technology (concepts,weapons, ammunition and equipment) and its effect onthe outcome of the tactical battles / campaign. (v) Lessons learnt and their applicability in today‟scontext and military environment. (vi) Unconventional and Out of box thinking. (vii) Application of force multipliers. (e) Administration and Operational Logistics. (i) Administration and logistics aspects of thecampaign and battles that influenced plans and courses of events. (ii) Ingenuity in administration & logistics and itsapplication in today‟s context. (f) Human Element. Leadership traits and techniques of tactical commanders that affected the outcome of the tactical battles including amplification of the following issues:- (i) Junior Leadership. (ii) Personal courage and sacrifice. (iii) Espirit-de-Corps. (iv) Morale. (v) Training. (vi) Human elements.
1. The topics for Military History paper would be promulgated by DGMT (MT-2) in a block of four years. This would also including the books to be read for each topic. The topics to be changed each year. The topics of Military History would be revised after every four years. 2. Philosophyof Selection. The philosophy of selecting the topic would be as under :- (a) The topic selected should be commensurate to the knowledge level and service maturity and there should be progressive introductionto operations at each succeeding level. (b) Lessons. Officers at each level should draw lessons which they can apply immediate or in the immediate future, in their respective service levels. 3. Selection of Topic. One campaign (Indian Scenario) and one related biography. 4. Reference materialissued by DGMT (MT-2).
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Ser
No
Subject Total
Marks
Pass
Marks
Time
Allowed
Syllabus Remarks/ Recommended Study
2. Biographical Study. To include the following :- (a) Personality traits and leadership qualities and how these affected the outcome of campaign fought by them. (b) Leadership traits and techniques displayed as junior leader and tactical commander (Company Commander, Battalion Commander and Brigade Commander) that affected the tactical battles. (c) Application of leadership traits in our present conditions /context. (d) Comparison with opposing commanders / other leaders of prescribed campaign. (e) Assessment / Analysis of the contribution of the personalities to the successful outcome of campaign. (f) Unconventional / Out of the box thinking. (g) Doctrine, concepts and tactics propagated. (h) Command and battle management techniques at unit / tactics level and their relevance in today‟s context.
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INDO-PAK WAR-1971
CHAPTER I : GENESIS
Introduction
1. The Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 was the direct military confrontation between India and Pakistan, which was a fallout of the the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971. The Bangladesh Liberation war was ignited after the 1970 Pakistan election, in which the East Pakistani, Awami League won 167 out of 199 seats in East Pakistan and secured a simple majority in the 313-seat lower house of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament of Pakistan), therby making the political supremacy of West Pak redundant. The aftermath of the elections, reacted West Pak to use mil force inorder to reign in the dissent in East Pak, leading to widespread genocide against the Bengali population of East Pakistan. As a result of the conflict, it is estimated that between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000 civilians were killed in Bangladesh, and a further eight to ten million people fled the country at the time to seek refuge in neighbouring India.As the influx of refugees incr, overburdening the already fragile economy, military force remained the only optionfor India, after both political and diplomatic overtures failed to break the impasse.
2. The conflict commenced when Pakistan launched pre-emptive air strikes on 11 Indian airbases on 3 December 1971, leading to India's entry into the war of independence in East Pakistan on the side of Bangladeshi nationalist forces, and the commencement of hostilities with West Pakistan.Lasting just 13 days, it is considered to be one of the shortest wars in history. During the course of war, Indian and Pakistani forces clashed on the eastern and western fronts. The war effectively came to an end after the Eastern Command of the Pakistan Armed Forces signed the Instrument of Surrender,on 16 December 1971 in Dhaka, marking the liberation of the new nation of Bangladesh. Between 90,000 and 93,000 members of the Pakistan Armed Forces including paramilitary personnel were taken as Prisoners of War by the Indian Army.
3. The war, finally, was successful in carving out an indep and sovereign state of Bangladesh by a finely orchestrated performance by India in which the political, diplomatic and the mil constituted distinctive components, each making its own contribution to the ultimate harmonious whole. It brought honour and glory to our Armed Forces and resurrected its pride after the Himalayan blunder of 1962 and the not so decisive 1965 war. This war was not only won by the IA on numerical superiority alone, but exhibited superior tac, strat and emp of Mvre warfare, that played an imp role in the miraculous collapse of the Pak war fighting machine.This conflict enriched India‟s freedom, secularism and democracy- the core values of the Nation and laid the foundation stone for emergence of India as the dominant power of the region.
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PART I : HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Indo-Pak Relations 4. Among the internal values that the Union of India has to safeguard is its desire to achieve and maintain a sense of national integration based on secularism, and to preserve the democratic character of its political and social fabric. Both of these were threatened, in the aftermath of Pakistan‟s campaign of deliberate genocide in Bangla Desh and with the continuing influx of refugees evicted by the Pakistani forces. It was becoming increasingly evident that if there was to be no political and military reaction from India to support the uprising in Bangladesh, the nature of the insurgency, which had so far been entirely nationalistic, would become more and more extremist orientedand this have long term repercussions on the situation in West Bengal and elsewhere. The mass eviction of refugees was a deliberate act of demographic aggression. It constituted a clear threat to our national security. 5. Understandably, there was reluctance on the part of the Indian government to solve the problem by recourse to military action. Such a course, even at a controlled level-would carry with it dangers of escalation to all out war with Pakistan and, consequently, the possibility of Chinese intervention as well as military support by the United States. In order fully to understand the government‟s dilemma in this respect it is necessary to preview the strategic situation in India during the early part of 1971 as also the state of preparedness of the India armed forces. 6. After the experience of the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, during which the Chinese had threatened India with military action, it became obvious that in any future confrontation with either Pakistan or China, the other could be expected to pose a simultaneous threat in support of its ally. The defence policy of India had therefore to be re-adjusted to one of maintaining a capability to conduct a two front war simultaneously. Another factor that was highlighted both during the 1962 and the 1965 operations was that when actually faced with war India found herself too dependent upon aid procurement from Western powers and that she should not depend on continuation of such aid if the Western powers concerned were unsympathetic to India aims. 7. Causes of Discord. The conflict sit between the two states is the result of both objective and subjective factors. The objective factors are where interests of both the countries are opposed and the goals are incompatible due to conflicting national interests, power struggle between the two countries, the role they have played in international politics and various territorial disputes (including Kashmir). On the other hand, the subjective factors are both psychological and sociological, such as legacy, difference in religion, race, objectives of ideology and perception of each other. The maj factors however, have been the perception of each others‟ motives and of themselves. After partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947, the period witnessed incr trust deficit between the two countires. Pak had fought two major conflicts with India in 1948 and 1965, witnessed a political turmoil within its state and had covertly sp China, during the Sino-India war in 1962 over the issue of Tibet and Border dispute. These underlying factors contributed exponentially to the discord between the two countries. The Bangladesh Crisis 8. Background. The mov for Bangladesh started taking its root from 1948 and gained popularity in the course of time, owing mainly to the neglect of East Pak and the Bengalis. The
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mov gathered momentum during Marshal Ayub Khan‟s regime, particularly after the 1965 war and took a formidable shape during the period 1966-70. From autonomy to a secessionist mov, the mishandling of the sit by the Govt acted as a catalyst.
9. Racial Supremacy. The structural imbalances of cultural and religious influences in East Pak, were compounded by the neglect of Bengalis and the feeling superiority in West Pak, especially among its elite, right from the inception stage. As time elapsed, the gulf between the two wgs continued to widen and with time became difficult to bridge. 10. Linguistic & Cultural Expl. Initially it was felt that there was only one way of holding together two wgs ie, by having one language and one culture between them. As Pak govt tried to impose Urdu on the people of East Pak, Bengalis reacted violently and riots over the issue left many dead/wounded. It further alienated the Bengal intelligentsia, the professionals and the students. 11. Pol Expl. Politically, the predominantly resident Bengalis of East Pak were never allowed to come to the centre stg, while majority of Punjabis in West Pak, always wielded power in all spheres. Bengalis were thus, never part of the decision making process. 12. Eco Expl. For the average Annual Budget, East Pak contributed 60% of the total revenue as against 40% by the West, however, it received only 25% of the revenue generated, for its expenditure, while West Pak got the major share of 75%. There were also maj anomalies in the import-export trade, est of industry, devp of infrastructure and devp projects equations with a conspicuous bias favouring the West.
13. Neglect in Edn & Emp. Within a rg of 20 yrs (1947-48/1968-69), the No of primary schools decreased through a deliberate policy of neglect in East Pak, whereas in West they incr by 4-1/2 times. The govt policy was aimed at keeping East Pak intellectually inferior. The govt also adopted various techniques of depriving Bengalis from getting jobs. All the main offices of the govt as well as Armed Forces were loc in the West. Most of the vacancies were either not advertised in the East or they had to face the prac difficulty of being interviewed in West Pak. Bureaucracy, be it mil or civil, was overwhelmingly drawn from the West. 14. Neglect of Defs in East Pak. East Pak became particularly more vulnerable, after the second Indo-Pak conflict of 1965. East Pak was left defenceless, on the assumption, that Chinese intervention and deterrence would assist them, incase East Pak was attacked. Since the entire security of East Pak was put at stake for Pak‟s desire to annex a distant Kashmir, whose population was a fraction of the population of East Pak, it triggered off a deep sense of resentment and anger amongst the hearts and minds of Bengalis. Devps Post 1965 Indo-Pak Conflict 15. Six-Pt Pgme. A movement was launched by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, an Awami League ldr, in East Pak, after the 1965 Indo-Pak conflict, that aimed at according full autonomy to East Pak and to make it self sufficient to defend its territorial integrity. The six pt pgme, as proposed by Awami League, primarily articulated that ltd powers be given to East Pak, in the central govt in the areas of def and foreign affairs and a different currency for East Pak. The movement gathered momentum and Sheikh Mujib was arrested and put in jail for two years. This widely known programme, first announced by the Sheikh in 1966, was a working paper to alleviate the economic disparities between the two states of Pakistan and to stem the growing discontent amongst the eastern wing, and encompassed the following:-
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(a) The constitution should provide for a federated Pakistan in the true sense on the basis of the Lahore resolution and for a parliamentary form of Government based on the supremacy of a duly elected legislature on the basis of universal adult franchise. (b) The federal Government shall deal with only two subjects i.e. defence and foreign affairs, with all residuary subjects vested in the federating states. (c) There should be either two separate freely convertible currencies for the two separate Reserve Banks to prevent inter-wing flight of capital. (d) The power of taxation and revenue collection shall be vested in the federating units. The federal Government will receive a share to meet its financial obligations. (e) Economic disparities between the two wings shall disappear through a series of economic, fiscal and legal reforms. (g) A militia or Para-military force must be created in East Pakistan, which at present has no defence of its own.
16. Cyclone in East Pak. On 13 Nov 1970, East Pak was hit by a mighty cyclone, resulting in huge loss of life and property. Lakhs of people were killed and an epidemic broke out in the devastated areas. The Govt of India offered help on humanitarian grnds to East Pak, but govt of Pak refused to accept the same. At the same time, Pak Govt fell woefully short of providing adequate relief to the calamity stricken population of East Pak, which reinforced the perception of inequality and injustice being metted out to the people of East Pak, by West Pak.
17. Assy Elections. The final results of the elections conducted were declared on 19 Jan 1971. The Awami League (AL) bagged 167 out of 199 seats in East Pak and recd 74.59 percent of the popular vote. On the other hand, Pak Peoples Party won only eighty one seats, which too were alleged to have been won with the blessings of President Yahya Khan and the ruling military junta. Faced with these reverses and having recognised that the primacy of the mil and the West wg were in jeopardy, Bhutto made all efforts to stall the convening of the Assy. Bhutto declared that no constitution could be framed, nor any govt at the centre be run w/o the consent of PPP, which was unwilling to spend the next five yrs on the oppositon benches. The mutual distrust between the two main parties widened and Bhutto, with the sp of some Generals, prevailed upon Yahya Khan to resort to force in the event of Sheikh Mujib and Awami leauge failing to give in to Bhutto's demand.
18. Pol Unrest. As Yahya Khan colluded with Bhutto to thwart passage of power to the Bengalis, the distrust and turmoil grew exponentially. The seed of secession from Pak had been sown. 19. Martial Law. On 23 Feb 71, Yahya Khan dissolved his civ cabinet and replaced it with a Mil Governor. He decided to postpone the convening of National Assy and in his broadcast to the nation on 01 Mar 71, attributed the delay to India for having complicated the sit. Yahya Khan wanted to expl the sit for pol gains by blaming India. After the President‟s announcement, Awami League launched a civ disobedience mov. Strikes paralysed the entire East Pak. To cont the sit, Lt Gen Tikka Khan was appointed as Governor of East Pak. A facade of negotiations was kept up to buy time for mil plans under „OP BLITZ‟ and pump in enough tps in East Pak.
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20. Mil Crackdown. On the fateful ni of 25/26 Mar, the Pak Armed Forces cracked down in Dacca and Yahya denounced Sheikh Mujib‟s non cooperation as an act of treason and arrested him. Entire East Pak was turned into a battlefd between the mil regime of Yahya Khan and loyalists of freedom. The Army committed widespread killings, rape and arson. 21. Genocide by Pak Army. Tikka Khan unleashed a reign of terror through a systematic genocide and carried out killings of intelligentsia. This triggered off a large scale influx of refugees to India. The first wave of refugees, were the leading cadres of Awami League, followed by an overwhelmingly populace of Hindu composition. These were followed by non-Bengali Muslims and later even Bengali Muslims. 22. Civ War in East Pak. On 26 Mar, a day after mil crackdown, a clandestine radio Bangladesh announced the independence of Bangladesh. The Govt was reportedly formed with Sheikh Mujibur Rehman as President, Nazrul Islam as Vice President and Tajjudin Ahmed as Prime Minister along with other members of the cabinet. The Mukti Bahini and the common people of East Pak rose in revolt. The East Bengal Regt, East Pak Rifles and the entire Bengali Force rallied behind Sheikh Mujib and fought unequal battles with Pak soldiers. Subsequently the resistance ldrs decided to seek sancturies in India to carry on guerrilla ops. Pak Army suffered hy losses as the opposition to West Pak dominance had amalgamated into demands of secession. 23. The Refugee Problem. By end Oct, a volatile element comprising of 10 million desperate, hungry and mentally unhinged refugees had moved into India accompanied by maj socio-economic problems. India‟s fervent plea on behalf of the Bengali struggle for liberation from the West Pak‟s colonial yoke failed to strike a sympathetic chord in the world chancelleries. 24. Hijacking of IA Ac. On 31 Jan 71, a Fokker Friendship ac of the IA, on its way to to Lahore, was hijacked by Kashmiris, and burnt on 02 Feb 71. The Govt of India demanded full compensation and requested Pak to hand over the two hijackers. When the Indian demands were out rightly rejected by Pak, India banned flight of Pak ac over its air space, which further deteriorated relations. 25. Mukti Bahini. The hit-run sabotage tactics of the Mukti Bahini made it necessary for the Pak troops to occupy all vulnerable points, guard communication centres, patrol the countryside constantly, besides guarding the entire border, which stretched their capacity to the limit. Border incidents multiplied and instances occurred when Pakistani troops made forays into Indian territory in pursuit of Mukti Bahini infiltrators and refugees, which resulted in clashes with Indian men at the border posts. As these incident incr in frequency and intensity, the border posts, initially held by the police and the Border Security Force, were taken over by the army or strengthened by army contingents and this brought the Pakistan Army into head-on clashes with the Indian Army. 26. Soon after Pakistan launched its repressive campaign in East Bengal, it became clear that the political and strategic implications would not remain confined to that country alone but would inevitably engulf the whole sub continent. Quite apart from the question of the threat to security, the events in East Bengal since mid-February had resulted in creating a widespread sense of political commitment in India. Resolutions in the Lok Sabha and the State Legislatures, the formation of a Bangla Desh government-in-exile on Indian territory, the sanctuary given to members of the Mukti Fouj and political leaders, all these developments had created a sense of
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national commitment that could no longer be ignored. The deepest concern was the threat to India‟s national security in its wider and long-term sense that involved factors beyond those of immediate threats. Anticipating a possible mil intervention by India, a coord effort was set into motion to plan and prepare for the ensuing conflict. The entire Indian state worked in harmony and stood united to thwart Pak attempts at the pol, diplomatic and mil level. SUGGESTED QUESTIONS 1. What is the genesis of the Indo-Pak war 1971? 2. Enumerate the causes that led to the 1971 conflict? 3. What was the six point programme proposed by East Pak, post 1965 Indo-Pak conflict? 4. What were the underlying issues for discontentment among the East Pakistanis?
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PART II : POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS
Indian Stance 27. India had always followed the principle of non interference in the internal affairs of its neighbours. Mrs Indira Gandhi, then PM, of India remained neutral in the face of massive bloodshed and lawlessness which had swept East Pak. However, the influx of refugees, the hy cost of their resettlement and large no of killings of innocents forced India to act. It is the utter disregard to human rights violations by Pak Army which made India to initiate political and diplomatic efforts and draw the world attn to the gravity of the sit. 28. Scenario in West Bengal and Assam. The refugees from East Pak were piling up on the borders of West Bengal and Assam. This led to an opportunity for infilt of Pak agents into the Indian Territory. Further, for reasons of security, foreign relief agencies that were being used by Pak agents, had to be prohibited from entry, refusing a great deal of valuable med and financial aid. Mrs Indira Gandhi utilised Indian Red Cross under the leadership of Padmaja Naidu, once Governor of West Bengal, who was well accepted by the people. Funds were allocated from the central exchequer for relief wk. However, India at that time was not an affluent nation to sp such a large surge of the people, who belonged to a neighbouring domicile. 29. Political and Diplomatic Efforts. At the end of Mar 1971, Mrs Indira Gandhi appealed to the UN Secy Gen, Mr U Thant, to intervene and advise Pak to ex restraint and stop the slaughter of East Pak. In reply, Pak informed the UN not to interfere in its internal affairs as it was not within the scope of UN. Mrs Gandhi made an all out effort to enlist the sp of world powers to persuade Pak to re-est peace and harmony in East Pak. 30. The Indian Parliament Resolution of 31 Mar 1971. Six days after the crackdown in Dacca , the Indian Parliament unanimously demanded imdt cease-fire and cessation of the use of force and the massacre of defenseless people of East Pak. The resolution assured the people of East Pak that their struggle would receive the whole-hearted sp of India.
31. The Refugee Influx. By end Apr 71, the refugee influx had reached a rate of 60,000 per day. It was computed that the fig would reach 10 million by Oct 71.
32. Sino-Pak Nexus. Mr Chow-En-Lai served notice on India that China would sp Pak, if India attacked Pak.
33. Indian Compassionate Apch. In Jun 1971, Siddhartha Ray, Minister of Edn at the centre was made in charge of relief wk to the refugees. Throughout the entire period of the East Pak affair, Mrs Gandhi without losing her composure acted with strength and restraint as a true ldr.
34. Indo Soviet Treaty. The Indo–Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, was a treaty signed between India and the Soviet Union in August 1971 that specified mutual strategic cooperation. The treaty was a significant deviation from India's previous position of non-alignment in the Cold War and in the prelude to the Bangladesh war; it was a key development in a situation of increasing Sino-American ties and American pressure. The treaty was later adopted into the Indo-Bangladesh Treaty of Friendship and cooperation in 1972. As a counter to Sino-US axis in sp of Pak, India decided to sign the historic Indo-Soviet Treaty to eff counter the threat of Chinese as well as American intervention.
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35. Sp From USSR. The Soviet Union played a totally supportive role during the conflict. Initially the USSR kept a low key however, due to diplomatic efforts it decided to sp India in several fds as under :-
(a) At the UNO Front. USSR along with the Eastern Bloc countries blamed Pak squarely for genocide in East Pak. (b) Mil Aid. Mil hardware was provided according to the reqmt prior to the start of the conflict. (c) Counter to Sino-US Axis. With incr US sp to Pak and pronounced Sino-US axis more threatening, USSR‟s stance grew harder. It advocated open sp to India and signed the Indo-Soviet Treaty. (d) Promise to Recognise Bangladesh at an Opportune Moment. Although it was reluctant to recognize Bangladesh imdt, it promised that as soon as suitable opportunity arose, Bangladesh would be recognised.
36. India‟s Mature Stand.
(a) Pak forces had committed about 600 mil intrusions or border incidents along Indo-East Pak border during the period from 25 Mar to 15 Nov, and lodged 1980 complaints against cease-fire violations in the Kashmir sect during the same period. (b) Despite requests by the actg President and Prime Minister on 15 Oct and 23 Nov 71 for India‟s sp for formal recognition of the Govt of East Pak, India did not wish to contribute to the deteriorating mil sit and hoped for negotiated settlement between West Pak and East Pak. (c) India ignored the Pak President Yahya Khan‟s statement on 12 Oct 71 that she was helping in the arming of Mukti Bahini.
37. Visit by Mr Swaran Singh. In pursuance of its apch India sent its Foreign Minister Mr Swaran Singh in Sep 71 to various countries of the world including USSR, West Germany, Canada, France, UK and USA to explain the problem of refugees and how it originated in the mil repression in East Pak. It was difficult to understand why the peaceful democratic aspirations of the people of East Pak within the countries structure were not receiving sp from the protagonists of democracy. 38. Visits by Mrs Indira Gandhi. Between 16 Oct and 13 Nov 71, Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi herself undertook tours of Belgium, Austria, UK, USA, France and West Germany to apprise these govts of the tremendous burden imposed by the refugees on India and to impress upon them the need to persuade West Pak to initiate negotiations with the elected representatives of East Pak. Though, her visit did evoke sympathetic response from various countries it did not change the grnd sit. 39. Thus, during the entire period, India kept counseling Pak and showed patience and restraint. Its pol and diplomatic efforts, however, recd only partial sympathetic sp to its problems.
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SUGGESTED QUESTIONS 1. List out the various political and diplomatic efforts made by India to restrain Pak and to stop the genocide in East Pakistan. 2. Write a short note on the international stance of US, USSR and China that led to the build up of the conflict. 3. What was the sp rendered by USSR to India, in the run up of the conflict?
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PART III : PREP AND PLG
Gen 40. A war on two fronts with a possible threat on the third front, necessitated extensive and detailed prep and plg. The prep and plg carried out on diplomatic, mil, economic and political planes, was profound and well deliberated, which set the stg for a decisive victory in the 1971 conflict. Decisive Factors of the Conflict 41. Op Prep of Armd Forces. The Army‟s balance of forces was upset, caused primarily by demand for internal security. Two divisions had been deployed in West Bengal, and though they were physically close to the Bangla Desh Border, the formations, in accordance with requirement for IS duties, had left behind their heavy equipment in their permt locations. In the extreme east, besides the division usually located in the Naga Hills, another division had had to be deployed for internal security operations in the Mizo Hills. Thus the two-front deployment envisaged in the defence plan had already been extended to a two and a half front commitment. A Bangla Desh involvement at this stage would have meant, addition of yet another front, involving several extra divisions and a new operational and logistical infrastructure. 42. The air power was also handicapped at this stage because air bases had not been developed for operations in Bangla Desh. Kummbigram airfield at Silchar, which would have to be used for operations over the Comilla sector, was not operationally adequate. 43. Cease Fire Agreement of Kashmir. As per the terms of the Cease-Fire Agreement of 1948, India had not deployed any addl troops within the territory of Jammu and Kashmir There was a diplomatic inhibition regarding deployment of troops in Kashmir, since any attempt to enforce a policy of even a limited military action in Bangla Desh, could carry a risk of Pak reaction in the West, with the most obvious course open of launching an attack on Kashmir. The lines of communication from Pathankot to Jammu and from Jammu forward to the Rajouri-Poonch sector thus lay open to disruption by a surprise Pakistani offensive. Before adopting a course of military acation in the east, IA would have to induct at least one more division to safeguard its lines of communication. 44. Weather & Trn Considerations. The strategic met disadvantage of April-May accrued due to the onset of monsoons over the eastern part of the sub-continent, would render the ground as well as the air over it unsuitable for full scale operations, defensive or offensive. At the same time, the passes along the northern borders would open with the approach of summer, thus facilitating Chinese intervention. 45. Three conditions had to be fulfilled before India could assume influence over Bangla Desh policy by recourse to military action with its implicit risk of all-out war:
(a) She would have to complete her expansion and re-equipment programme as well as re-group her armed forces and re-plan deployment. (b) She would have to wait until the Mukti Bahini had acquired a degreeof operational capability;
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(c) She would have to wait until such time as the Chinese threat of intervention was minimized both by diplomatic action and by choosing the most favourable season.
46. Prep for War. Gen Manekshaw, in the process of making the army battleworthy, had addressed the army's shortfall in prep for war and started to remedy them straight away by :-
(a) Gearing up production. (b) Making up res. (c) Make units and fmns fit for war. (d) Rationalisation of eqpt. (e) Placement of amn at the right place. (f) Repairs of wpns and eqpt. (g) Change over pgme. (h) Making up of manpower shortages. (j) Embodiment of TA. (k) Constr of rds and trs. (l) Build up of adm infrastructure. (m) Conc of strike / holding fmns. (n) Upliftment of morale.
Options for Mil Action 47. Many options were available to India for taking mil action:-
(a) Options with Regard to Time of Offensive. The option to launch the offensive in Dec was considered most viable because of the following reasons:-
(i) There would be enough time available for build up of the shortfall in men, mtrl and eqpt. (ii) The chances of getting bogged down in the riverine trn during monsoon in East Pak would be nullified. (iii) All the passes to China will be closed in Dec, thereby negating the threat from China.
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(iv) There cannot be any threat along the CFL (Cease Fire Line) in J & K during the winter months.
(b) Choice of Theatre for Maj Offensive. Various options with regard to choice of theatres for maj offensive were eval and it was finally decided to carry out a holding action in the West and attack in the East to sp the Mukti Bahini ops in East Pak.
Raising of Mukti Bahini 48. The Mukti Bahini was a Liberation Army, which was formed by the Bengali resistance that fought against the Pakistan Army during the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971. In response, to Pak Army‟s mil geonocide, Bangladesh declared independence and Bengali military and paramilitary personnel, as well as civilians, started spontaneous resistance against the aggression. A large number of Bengali members of the East Bengal Regiments (EBR), East Pakistan Rifles (EPR, later BDR, BGB), police, other paramilitary forces, students and other civilians formed part of the resistance against the Pakistan Army. This was the formation of the Mukti Bahini. The total number of armed East Bengal personnel in East Bengal was about 70,000, composed of approximately 6,000 regulars in the six battalions of East Bengal Regiment located in the eastern wing, about 12000-15,000 members of the East Pakistanis Rifles and about 45000-50,000 in the Razakar organization, who were trained as home guards. In addition to these military and Para-military forces, there were about 45,000 police memebers in the country 49. Mukti Bahini was raised under the Eastern Comd at Calcutta. A cont HQ was established with three sector HQs, one each at Agartala, Coochbehar and Balurghat. The task of these sector HQs was to raise and train the Mukti Fauj coys and to plan and coord the activities of the guerrillas. The East Bengal govt in exile and its cdr, Col Osmani played a significant role in this. By the end of Oct 71, the Bangladeshi forces were able to raise eight reg bns and one arty regt which were grouped into three bdes called Zulu, Kilo and Sierra forces, each consisting of two to three inf bns and one bty of arty consisting of 105mm Italian pack Howitzers. They raised Naval and Air Force components also, although in comparatively reduced str. 50. The guerrilla war fought by the Mukti Bahini is a saga of bravery, courage and sacrifice. Mukti Bahini fought against Pakistan army in various battlegrounds throughout the country and also performed guerrilla operations in different army camps and establishments. Most of them did not have any professional military training nor had they any time for it. They were trained during the war wherein sector commanders directed the guerrilla attacks and also trained the Mukti Bahini. The training camps were mostly situated near border areas with the direct assistance of India. The Plan 51. Ops in the Western Theatre. A strat decision was taken to carry out only a holding action in the West, and carry out ltd offensive actions to improve def posture thereby removing the threat to the L of C. However, it was essential that some offensive action be carried out to deter Pak and engage their res and, it was thus decided to undertake one offensive each by the Western and Southern Comds.
(a) Options for Offensive by Western Comd. In Western Theatre, all fmns were committed to grnd, incl the Strike Corps, which was holding grnd in the Gurdaspur sect.
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With some readjustments however, 1 Corps and 10 Inf Div could be spared for the offensive, but this meant that maj offensive would be directed against those objs that could be reached from the existing locs of these fmns in time and space. This restricted the choices for any maj offensive. It was therefore decided to launch 1 Corps in Shakargarh salient with three inf divs spearheaded by two armd bdes and 20 Inf Div to strike South towards Gujrat in Pak. This plan had the advantage that it would automatically ensure the security of the Pathankot base and the airfd, as also the corridor, for it was through this strip that all the sups in J&K and all the reqmts of the civ population was routed. The other advantage was that as 1 Corps advanced, it released tps holding the river line in North Punjab. The proximity of a No of airfds for air sp was also another factor in its favour. (b) Options for Offensive by Southern Comd. Southern Comd could muster only two fmns for an offensive, 11 and 12 Inf Divs. The capability of both these fmns was ltd. It was decided to launch ltd offensive to force Pak to commit her strat res in this sect. There were few options available for this and the objs of Rahim Yar Khan and Naya Chor- Umarkot were chosen.
52. Ops in The Eastern Sect. The plans for East, were a result of the grand strat concieved in the liberation of Bangla Desh. It was felt that relative str ratio would not lend itself for a war of attrition. To achieve quick success, an audacious plan which brought into play superiority of mvre and psy warfare, would achieve success. The plan was as follows:--
(a) The capture or blockading of the maj ports of Chittagong, Chalna and Khulna so as to stop Pak build up in the region/prevent any third party despatch of tps by sea for East Pak, as well as to isolate the tps, so as to create a state of psy ascendancy. (b) Securing objs which prevented inter-sect mov. The br at Feni connected Chittagong with the rest of the sect. Certain ferry sites along the rivers which facilitated trans-sect mov along the inland waterways were to be rendered unsv. Airfds were to be secured and rendered unfit for use to prevent lifting of en tps and eqpt. (c) To further split and disorg the Pak fmns into penny packets which would be easy tgt for piece meal destruction. The comn centres were to be secured which would further incapacitate Pak Army‟s capability to fight in str. (d) Dacca, the geographical heart of East Pak was the prime obj of the campaign. Once the en was defeated in detail by this mvre, Dacca would captured by any fmn in a posn to do so.
Higher Directions of War: India 53. Pol Directions.
(a) Liberate as much territory as possible in the East to set up a provincial Bangladesh govt. (b) Swift campaign of short duration as there was a chance of UN intervention. (c) Defend Bhutan at all cost in case of Chinese intrusion.
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(d) Ensure conditions in liberated portions of Bangladesh are conducive for the return of 10 million refugees.
54. COSC Directions.
(a) Fight a holding, offensive-defensive ops in the West, while in the East, drive at max speed to force Pak to hand over the country to Bengalis. (b) Capture Khulna and Chittagong at the earliest. (c) Launch ops in winters and ensure China is unable to aid Pak.
55. COAS Directions.
(a) East Pak.
(i) Launch multi pronged attacks in East Pak to deny Pak mil leadership any reaction or readjustment capability. (ii) Select thrust lines to isolate fortress based defs of East Pak to reach the final obj at the earliest. (iii) Secure comn centres and destroy en's comd and control capabilities as subdy obj. (iv) Prelim ops aimed at drawing Pak forces to the border leaving key areas in the interior lightly defended. (v) Avoid damage to local civ property and loss of life.
(b) West Pak.
(i) Offensive defensive ops- maint def posture but resort to local offensive actions to gain tac advantage. (ii) Capture Shakargarh salient to deny en launch pad to Pathankot sector as pre-emptive strike. (iii) Ltd offensive in Southern Comd area of resp in Rajasthan with the intention to force en to commit his strat res.
56. Air Force Directives.
(a) Est Adv Air HQ alongwith Army Eastern Comd. (b) Ensure adequate CAS to grnd forces. (c) Sp Navy in its interdic of ports in West Pak and in East Pak by interdic en forces in fwd tier.
15
(d) In West Pak , sp own ltd offensive and cripple Pak AF by CAO.
57. Naval Directives.
(a) Seal coast of East Pak from West Pak and rest of the world. (b) Sp grnd ops in East Pak by Naval guns and carrier based aircrafts.
Higher Directions of War: Pak 58. Political Directives.
(a) Turn Western Theatre into main theatre of ops. (b) Deny any land territory to Indian forces in the East. (c) Capture state of J&K in a swift offensive. (d) Ensure Indian tps are delayed so that its allies, China and US, could come to its aid.
59. Mil Directives.
(a) Launch a swift offensive in Chamb to cut off the state of J&K from the rest of India. (b) Constr fortress type defs in East Pak in imp border towns and comn centres to deny any land territory to India.
(c) Plan raids on Farrakka Barrage, offensive action in Malda and dovetail these in overall plans for def of East Pak. (d) Carry out pre-emptive strikes at Indian air bases to liquidate their air superiority. (e) Pak Navy to ensure SLOCs between East and West Pak remain open.
60. Force Levels (Pak).
(a) Army (West). (i) Inf Divs 10 (incl two being raised) (ii) Armd Divs 02 (iii) Indep Armd Bdes 02
(iv) Indep Arty Bdes 02
(v) Indep Inf Bdes 02 (vi) Armd Regts 02
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(b) Army (East). (i) Inf Divs 04 (incl two being raised) (ii) Armd Regt 01 (iii) Indep Sqns 02 (iv) Para Mil 07 wgs. (c) Air. 13 Sqns. (d) Navy. Comparatively lesser than India.
61. Force Levels (India) (e) Army (West). (i) Inf Div 12 (ii) Armd Divs 01 (iii) Indep Armd Bdes 02 (iv) Indep Inf Bdes 03 (v) Para Bde 01 (b) Army (East). (i) Inf Divs 07 (incl two being raised) (ii) Armd Regt 03 (iii) Indep Sqns 02 (iv) APC Bn 01 (c) Air. 45 Sqns. (d) Navy. Edge over Pak. QUESTIONS 1. What were the sits in the West and East? 2. Explain the options for mil action. 3. Write a short note on the Raising of Mukti Bahini. 4. Describe the prep and plg for the war by India. 5. Enumerate the higher dirns of war for India and Pakistan.
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CHAPTER 2
OPS IN THE WESTERN SECTOR
PART I : TRN ANALYSIS
1. India's Western border with Pak runs for approx 3400 km along the states of J&K, Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat. This entire area can be divided into four distinct regions:- (a) Northern Mtnous Region. (b) The Plains of Indus R. (c) Cholistan-Rohri Desert. (d) Rann of Kutch. Northern Mountainous Region 2. This region encompasses the state of J&K and is characterised by features as under:-
(a) It has mtns/hills varying from foothills to hts over 3000m. (b) The maj rivers flowing through the region are Indus, Jhelum and Chenab. (c) The area around Karakorams is bounded by a No of glaciers. 3. Implications of Trn.
(a) Makes direct physical sp from China possible.
(b) Mil ops in Tortuk and Kargil Sects would be restd to valleys.
(c) Enhances imp of air maint notwithstanding restd and unreliable air ops. (d) Provides No of infilt routes.
(e) Banihal pass acts like a choke pt which may be interdicted. Plains of J&K and Punjab 4. It extends from Chenab R to Fazilka/Sulaimanke HW. The area is well devp, rich in agriculture and has well laid out comn network. It is characterised by presence of a large No of towns, industrial complexes and politically sensitive areas with high population densities. There are flat alluvial plains with no maj obsts execpt for rivers and man made features like cnls, bunds and DCBs.
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5. The imp river corridors in the area are:-
(a) Indus - Jhelum - Chenab Corridor (IJC Corridor). It was used by Pak to launch an offensive towards Akhnoor Sect with the aim of cutting off J&K from the rest of India.
(b) Chenab - Ravi Corridor. It encompasses the Shakargarh bulge which was expl by India in both 1965 and 1971.
(c) Ravi - Sutlej Corridor. It bridles the imp areas of Lahore, Amritsar and Khemkaran.
(d) Corridor South of Sutlej. The imp towns in this area are Ferozpur and Fazilka in India and Kasur in Pak.
6. Implications of Trn. (a) Susceptibility of Pathankot-Jammu NH 1A to interruption.
(b) Suitability for armr/mech ops, however difficulty in switching forces in Sialkot-Shakargarh Sects.
(c) Suitability of own offensive from NE to SW.
(d) Presence of large No of towns and highways close to IB discounts any loss of territory due to pol compulsions.
(e) Stg mgt of br eqpt critical. Cholistan-Rohri Desert 7. The area is characterised by semi-desert trn in the region commencing South of Fazilka-Suleimanke HWs and merging with the desert along line Fort Abbas-Ahmadpur East in Pak and South of Suratgarh in India. The semi-desert trn also incl cnl irrigated networks near the IB. The Cholistan desert lies to the North with Rohri desert further to the South. These deserts are an extn of the Thar desert in Western India. 8. Implications of Trn.
(a) Susceptibility of own towns of Fazilka, Abohar and Ganganagar to en attacks due to proximity to IB. (b) Availability of high value obj within 50-90 km from IB. (c) Availability of Rahim Yar Khan and Naya Chor as launch pads for Pak. (d) Jaisalmer and Barmer sect provide suiatable launch pads for thrust into Pak.
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Rann of Kutch 9. The area lies between Thatta and Rahim Ka Bazaar. It is a vast wasteland and a marshy coastal strip consisting of salt plains almost flush with the sea level. A few elevated patches called Bets exist and the area is characterised by acute shortage of drinking water. 10. Implications of Trn.
(a) Good going for A and B vehs from Nov to Jun. (b) Bets provide good obsn and fds of fire. (c) Maj thrust by either side unlikely in the area, however, a ltd offensive sp by amph ops is feasible.
Division of Area of Ops
11. The Western theatre consisted of Western and Southern Comd. There was no Northern Comd at that time .Western Comd embraced the states of J&K, HP, Punjab, Haryana, Delhi and Ganganagar District of Rajasthan. Southern Comd comprised remaining part of Rajasthan and Gujarat . 12. The area under Western Comd can be divided into six geographical regions:-
(a) The Ladakh Sect bordering Tibet. (b) The Kashmir Sect North of the Pir Panjals. (c) Chamb Sect. (d) Punjab Sect. (e) The semi-desert region of Ganganagar district.
13. The areas under Southern Comd were:-
(a) The sandy deserts of Rajasthan. (b) The marshes and salt pans of Rann of Kutch.
QUESTIONS
1. Enumerate the various geographical sects of Western and Southern Comd. 2. Describe the various trn implications of ops in the following:- (a) Northern Mtnous regions of J&K. (b) Plains of J&K and Punjab. (c) Deserts of Rjasthan. (d) Rann of Kutchh.
20
PART II : FORCE LEVELS, OPTIONS AND TASKING
14. The opposing force levels in Western Comd theatre were:-
Pak India Remarks (a) Armd Div 2 1 (b) Armd Bde 2 2 (c) Inf Div 9 10# #Excl Inf Div dply in Ladakh and
two Inf Div in Southern Comd. (d) Inf Bde 7@ - @POK Bdes 15. Broadly, Pak had a slight superiority in armr and arty while India had a slight edge in Inf. Options 16. Options Available to Pak. Two strike fmns were available to Pak in South and North of Ravi R i.e. 1 and 11 Corps with one armd and one inf div with one addl inf div as GHQ res. Options available were:-
(a) Option 1 An offensive across the CFL in J & K with a Div, probably 7 Inf Div , together with the induction of about 10,000 infiltrators. This attack was possible on Chamb combined with or without an attack on Poonch, Naushera or Jhangar. (b) Option 2. Isolate J & K by attacking and severing our comns between Pathankot and Jammu using one of her res corps. She should combine this attack with another on Chamb, Poonch or other areas in J&K or in the South with her 11 Corps. (c) Option 3. An offensive in the Dera Baba Nanak (DBN)/Gill Ferry Sect, ith an aim to capture Amritsar or Beas br. (d) Option 4. An offensive against Amritsar or Ferozepur or between the two to capture Harike or Beas br and thus cut off Ferozpur and Amritsar. (e) Option 5. An offensive in the South with 11 Corps in the Fazilka region, to cut off own forces in Punjab.
17. Pak Strat. Pak had planned to carry out prelim ops in areas Poonch, Munnawar Tawi and Chamb to tie down res fmns of India. Also, she planned simultaneous elimination of Indian enclave North of Ravi R to draw in our 1 Corps to Shakargarh Bulge. The main offensive was to be launched in areas of Ganganagar, Anupgarh towards Faridkot/Malaut with their strike forces South of Ravi R. 18. Indian Strat. India‟s overall aim was aimed at seeking a decision in the East. In the West the strat was to prevent any maj ingress by Pak. Pol decision on 30 Nov was taken not to launch an offensive unless provoked by an offensive launched by Pak and that too after receiving a green sig from Army HQ. Further, to cover a large gap between Gurdaspur and Jammu own strike fmn was dply in holding grnd. Options for its emp were hence ltd.
21
19. Selected Option. One offensive each launched by Western and Southern Comds was decided to engage Pak res and improve bargaining posture. Simultaneously, ltd offensive action all along CFL and IB were to be carried out to remove threats to L of C and improve def posture. The plan evolved thus was:- (a) Hold and improve our posns along CFL in J & K.
(b) Offensive to be launched by 10 Inf Div and 26 Inf Div North and South of Chenab R respectively.
(c) Offensive by 1 Corps from Samba-Pathankot S after securing the lightly held area from Samba to Gurdaspur and DBN.
(d) Ltd offensive westwards from Gill Ferry in area Gurdaspur.
(e) Ltd offensive in Southern Comd with objs of Rahimyar Khan and Naya Chor/Umarkot to force Pak to commit strat res.
20. Tasks Given to Western Comd. (a) Prevent Pak annexing J & K. (b) Def Punjab.
(c) Launch a ltd offensive into West Pak timed with offensive in the East with a view to force Pak to commit her res. Areas indicated were:- (i) North of Chenab R with 10 Inf Div.
(ii) South of Chenab R with 26 Inf Div. (iii) North and South of Ujh Nadi by 1 Corps. (d) Launch Army HQ res i.e. 1 Armd Div and 14 Inf Div in Punjab on certain
conditionalities. QUESTIONS 1. List out the Force Levels of Pak & IA avlbl in the Western Sects. 2. What were the options avlb for Pak to launch offn ops in Western Sect? 3. What were the options by IA for launch of ops in the Western Sect? 4. Enumerate the tasks given to Western Comd for launching ops in Pak.
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PART III : BATTLES IN J & K (NORTHERN SECT)
Intro 21. For the purpose of mil ops the state of J&K was divided into six main sects–The Ladakh sect lying in the East, bordering Tibet and lying South of Fotula Pass; the Kargil sect lying between the Zojila and Fotula pass; the Kashmir Valley Sect bounded in the East by the Zojila pass and North of Pir Panjal pass; the Rajouri sect comprising Poonch, Rajouri and Naushera or, generally speaking, the territory lying South of the Pir Panjal rg and West of Chenab; the Chhamb sect; and lastly, the Jammu sect. 22. The resp for the conduct of mil ops in the vast mtnous region where comns were largely undeveloped was that of 15 Corps which was commanded by Lt Gen Sartaj Singh with his HQ at Udhampur. Partapur Sect 23. Gen. Partapur is loc at the confluence of Shyok and Nubra rivers and it dominates the Shyok valley. It was connected to Leh by a pony tr xg Khardung La pass. The hts in the area are ranging from 18,000 to 22,000 ft. The area is completely isolated in winters with temp between minus 20 and minus 40 deg centigrade. 24. Opposing Forces. (a) India. (i) HQ Partapur Sect under 3 Inf Div. (ii) Three coys of Ladakh Scouts. (iii) 500 Nubra Guards. (b) Pak. No 3 Wg of Karakoram Scouts with its HQ at Skardu. 25. Ops. In the ops lasting 14 days, from 04 Dec to 17 Dec 1971, the Indian tps adv 22 km and captured approx 804 km. The ops were carried out in four phases and had to be halted because the tps outran the adm back up. The en posts captured were as follows:- (a) Phase I. V Piquet, Pt18,402 and Oli. (b) Phase II. Chulunk complex. (c) Phase III. OP I, OP II and CP. (d) Phase IV. Turtuk and Thang. 26. The ops were imp not so much for the application of force but for the determination, motivation and physical toughness of our tps in carrying out ops in such high altitudes rugged trn and extreme cold climate. The ops also assume imp in the lt of present conflict between the two countries.
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Kargil Sector 27. Gen. Kargil is a strat imp town loc on the South of Shingo R, a tributary of Indus R. It lies on the route from Srinagar to Leh. The heights in the area vary from 11,000 to 16,000 ft. 28. Importance. Pak was occupying hts in the area, which dominated the town of Kargil as well as rd Srinagar-Leh by obsn and fire. Therefore, it was decided to capture these hts in order to remove Pak domination over the rd as well as the town. Here it is worth mentioning that one of the imp hts, Pt 13,620 was captured by 4 RAJPUT on 17 May 1965 and again in Aug 1965 but was returned first by UN intervention in June 65 and then in Jan 66 after Tashkent declaration.
18 Punjab
7 Guards
5/3 GR 2/11
GR 9
JAKM
1213
29. Force Levels: Indian Forces. 121 Inf Bde Gp comprising of the following bns was tasked forthe offensive:-
(a) 18 PUNJAB. (b) 2/11 GR. (c) 7 GUARDS. (d) 9 J & K Militia.
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30. HQ 3 Inf Div was moved from Leh to Kargil for the conduct of ops. 31. Plan.
(a) Phase I. 18 PUNJAB less two companies, to capture Brachil Post. 2/11 GR to capture Camels Back, Hill, Post 12 and Black Rock. (b) Phase II. 7 GUARDS to pass through Brachil Pass and est firm base by D plus 1. Two coys of 18 PUNJAB to capture posts 19, 20 and 43 and clear en on West bank of Shingo R upto Gangam. (c) Phase III. 2/11 GR less one company to capture Posts 16,17 and 18, clear the East bank of Shingo R up to Breilman by 0800 hr D plus 1. (d) Phase IV.18 PUNJAB less one company to capture Posts 21 to 26. 7 GUARDS to pass through and capture Olthinglhang .
(e) Phase V . 2/11 GR to secure South bank of Indus R and capture Posts 7 to 10
by fist lt D plus 4. (f) Phase VI. 9 J & K Militia less two companies and one company of 2/11GR to capture Pt 13,620 by D plus 8.
(g) Phase VII. One company of 9 J& K Milita to capture Post 11. (h) Phase VIII . Capture of all en posts on Zanskar Ridge by first lt D plus 9.
32. Conduct. The ops commenced on 07 Dec by attack on Post 12 and by 17 Dec the bde had cleared all dominating hts along rd Srinagar-Leh. Both banks of Shingo R had been captured and the crust of the en defs had been broken. The route to Olthingthang was open, however, declaration of cease fire forced the bde to abandon adv to Ohingthang.
33. In Partapur Sect, we had pushed the Pakis back by about 22 km thereby capturing an area of aprox 804 sq km. In Kargil Sect our imdt obj of expelling the en from hts dominating the rd Srinagar-Leh had been achieved.
Tangdhar Sect 34. Gen. 104 Inf Bde was resp for Tangdhar sect. It was given the resp of guarding the apchs along Kishanganga R and prevent infilt/ingress through Tutmari Gali from the Lipa valley. 35. Prog of Ops. (a) 8 RAJRIF. The bn captured the features of Gasla Top and Ring Contour by 04
Dec after fierce fighting with Coy of Tochi Scouts and two pls of reservists. The Bn also cleared another en post called Brown Patch.
(b) 3 BIHAR. The Bn was tasked to capture Wanjil Post. The Bn successfully
destroyed a No of bunkers and captured the Post on ni 10/11 Dec. The en CA from Shishabledi was successfully beaten back.
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(c) 9 SIKH. The Bn was conc at Tutmari Gali for capture of en post of Tandapani. The bn est a stop behind Tandapani at 0200 hr 05 Dec. The en fled w/o offering any opposition. The Bn subsequently also captured the imp posts of Kaiyam and Nankot after hy fighting on 15 Dec.
36. By these actions, the en threat to Tangdhar through the Sudpura Gap was minimised.
Ops in Rest of J & K
37. Gen. The ops in rest of J & K comprised primarily of Pak offensive in Poonch – Rajouri and Chamb Sects and own Chicken Neck action.
Poonch – Rajouri Sect
38. 25 Inf Div was resp for def of area West of Pir Panjal Rg,Chenab R and South of Hajipir Bulge.This area can be divided into three sub sects:-
(a) Poonch Sub Sect - 93 Inf Bde. (b) Rajouri Sub Sect – 120 Inf Bde .
(c) Naushera Sub Sect – 80 Inf Bde . (d) 33 Inf Bde of 39 Inf Div was also moved into this area on receipt of int inputs of
mov of Pak GHQ res 7 Inf Div opposite this sect. 39. Pak overall plan was to isolate and capture Poonch with a Div and isolate the sect with a bde sized force through Mendhar gap. 40. Dply Own Forces. Our 93 Inf Bde was responsible for def of Poonch. The dply of bns was as under:- (a) 1 / 4 GR- North of Betar N. (b) 11 JAKRIF – South of Poonch in Doda Sect. (c) 6 SIKH- NE of Poonch holding VG.
(d) 8 JAT- SE of Poonch.
(e) 13 MAHAR- Div res, loc SW of Poonch.
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POONCH
6 SIKH
93
14 GREN
9 RAJRIF
21 PUNJAB
4/11 GR
1/4 GR 8 JAT
11 JAKRIF
41. En Plan For Offensive. The task of capture of Poonch was entrusted to 7 Inf Div, his strat res. The ops were to be completed in three phs as under :-
(a) Ph 1. 9 POK Bn to isolate Poonch by infilt and to seize Kalai br. Simultaneously 2 POK Bn was to attack and capture the hts NE of Poonch.
(b) Ph 2 . One Bn was to link up with 9 POK Bn and 3 POK Bde to capture Gurian and Thanpir ridge. (c) Ph 3 . 26 Inf Bde was to capture bal of Poonch and expl upto Poonch R.
42. Prog of Ops. The ops commenced on ni 3/4 Dec and progressed as follows:-
(a) 9 POK Bn successfully infilt by morning of 04 Dec. 2 POK Bde attacked picquets 405 & 406 held by 6 SIKH, which were repulsed and en had to withdraw. 13 MAHAR was tasked to dislodge 9 POK BN occupying Thanpir ridge, which it did and en had to withdraw. Attack on Gurian and Shahpur posts held by 11 JAKRIF were also repulsed. Similar condition was prevalent on all other posts.
(b) On 04 Dec, en again pressed home the attack preceded by arty fire. They captured Helipad by 1030 hrs. En tried to est block between pickets 405 & 406 but since both of them had been reinforced no success was achieved.
(c) On ni 04 / 05 Dec en again attempted to capture picquets 504 & 506 but to no avail. Two pls of 8 JAT reinforced 6 SIKH.
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(d) En utilised 05 & 06 Dec to regroup and recoup. In the meantime, 6 SIKH attacked and disloged en from helipad and recaptured it.
(e) Attack on 11JAK RIF and 1/4 GR were also repulsed.
(f) Pak attempts to capture PT 468 in Mendhar Valley were foiled by 9 RAJRIF. 43. Own Ops. It was evident by evening of 06 Dec that the en force had petered out. At this stg, it was decided to improve def posture and Nangi Tekri and Jungle Tekri were attacked and captured. Efforts to capture Daruchian post were not successful. However, in Naushera Sect some success was achieved by 80 Inf Bde. 44. For sheer defiance and steadfastness displayed in def of Poonch S, Brig Natu, Cdr 93 Inf Bde was awarded the MVC. 45. Another highlight in this sect was successful raid on en gun area at Mandhol by a team of 9 PARA CDO destroying six 122 mm guns and large stks of Amn. Jammu Sect
46. 26 Inf Div with four bdes was dply opposite Sialkot for def of Jammu with one bde between Pathankot and Jammu, one bde at R S Pura and bal div at Jammu. Chickens Neck was an imp salient into India lying between two branches of Chenab R that could be used by Pak to pose a threat to Akhnur. Also, the imp br over Chenab R if captured could jeopardise own posns West of Chenab R. 47. To provide security to the flks of 10 and 26 Inf Div, it was decided to launch 19 Inf Bde of 26 Inf Div assisted by a team of 9 PARA CDO to wring the Chickens Neck. This was carried out between 03 and 07 Dec by infilt own tps bypassing main posns and attacking from the rear. 48. PAF reacted strongly bombing and strafing own tps but was unable to cause any damage. Infact one Mig 19 ac was brought down by 7/11 GR with an LMG.
49. Rest of Jammu Sect. There was little activity in this sect except recapture of Nawa Pind Post vacated by BSF and some other successful raids.
The Chhamb Sect
50. Trn. 10 Inf Div was resp for def of all area West of Chenab R up to the bdy of 25 Inf Div. It consisted of the „hills sect‟ in the north held by 28 Inf Bde and „plains sect‟ held by the rest of the div ie, 191 Inf bde and 52 Inf Bde. 68 Inf Bde was in res at Akhnur.In the South ran the IB with Pak which turned into a CFL and moved Northwards. In the East, Chandrabhaga R or Chenab‟s tributaries Munnawar-Tawi cut the „plains sect‟ into two. The area was strat imp, for its capture and control over bridge at Akhnur would cut off 25 Inf Div. An offensive from here for us provided an apch straight to Pak‟s heartland.
Own Plan and Dply
51. Our plan was to undertake a ltd offensive and put the en on the defensive and upset its plans for any offensive.The area to the West of Munnawar-Tawi was to be held by two lt forces acting as covering tps as follows:-
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(a) Papa Force. Comprising of 5 SIKH and a sqn of 9 HORSE.
(b) Quebec Force. 9 HORSE less two sqn and two coys of Inf.
TO SUNDERBANI
AKHNUR
CFL
SOUTHERN CHENAB
KALIDHAR RIDGE
MARALA HW
DEWA
JAURIAN
TO JAMMU
TAROTI
KALITH
28 INF BDE
191 INF BDE
5 SIKH
9 H
NADALA
10 INF DIV
52
68
10
52. Change in Dply. The COAS Gen Manekshaw, on his vis to posns in Oct 71 changed the dply and asked for tps to be stg fwd so as not to lose territory. 191 Inf Bde was then tasked to occupy defs West of Munnawar-Tawi.
53. Dply 191 Inf Bde. The Bde was dply as follows:-
(a) 5 SIKH in North.
(b) 4/1 GR in Centre.
(c) 5 ASSAM and 10 GARH RIF in South.
(d) 39 Med Reft, 12 Fd Regt less two bty, bty of 18 Fd Regt were in sp.
(e) 9 HORSE less two tps and tp ATGM in loc.
En Plan
54. Pak had tasked 23 Inf Div for capture of Akhnur and isolating all tps West of Chamb. 23 Inf Div comprised of:-
(a) 7 POK Bde.
(b) 20 Inf Bde.
(c) 4 POK Bde.
29
(d) 66 Inf Bde.
(e) 111 Inf Bde.
(f) 2 Armd Bde in sp.
(g) 17 Inf Div Arty Bde and a med regt in sp.
55. Their plan was in three phs as under:-
(a) Ph 1. To attack all along the front and secure all grnd up to Munawar Tawi with four bdes.
(b) Ph 2. To secure a br H across Munawar Tawi.
(c) Ph 3. Breakout through our defs along the gen line Kalit–Troti and Dhon Chak and invest Akhnur.
(d) Flk Protection. 7 POK Bde was given the task of attacking hill features held by own 28 Inf Bde thus protecting the left flk of 23 Inf Div.
56. Prog of Ops.
(a) Ni 03 / 04 Dec. At 2050 hr the Pak arty opened up on all our fwd posns and after an hr long prep bombardment the main attacks commenced. Pir Jamal fell but attacks on Moel and Jhanda were repulsed by 5 ASSAM RIF and 4/1 GR respectively. 5 SIKH posns were also attacked by about 2130 hr. However, all these attacks were beaten back.
(b) 04 Dec. The Pak superiority in str and relentless pressure began to have an effect on the progress of ops. One by one posts began to be captured and by about 1200 hr en had captured Parur, Bujeral, Dalla and Mandiala North. 5 SIKH held on to Mandiala South. On ni 4/5 Dec 13 POK and 47 PUNJAB infilt across Munawar Tawi.
(c) 05 Dec. Mandiala br was captured by 13 POK early in the morning however, 9 HORSE foiled Pak attempts to induct tks across Munawar Tawi and shot up nine T-69s in the process. A coln of 13 POK hit the gun posns of 39 and 216 Med Regts. Even though two btys of 39 Med Regt and wagon line of 216 Med Regt were over run , the gunners engaged the en over open sights inflicting hy cas and forced them to withdraw. At 1030 hr, 5 SIKH and a coy of 5/8 GR counter attacked the Mandiala br and captured it. 68 Inf Bde then mov 8 JAT to the river line to cover the Chhamb and Darh xgs and we then held the Eastern bank in str.
(d) 06 Dec. In the morning the en launched a series of attacks on the bal posns held by us on the Western bank of the river and managed to capture Mandiala South. Due to the relentless pressure and considerable superiority of the en it was decided to withdraw 191 Inf Bde from the West bank of the river. Therefore, the bde was withdrawn from the West bank of the river between 0830 and 1130 hr and the Mandiala br blown up. 10 Inf Div was then redeployed with 52 and 68 inf Bdes holding the river line and 191 Inf bde dply in depth.
30
(e) 07 Dec. En did not follow up the withdrawal of 191 Inf Bde on the seventh giving us a much needed respite.
(f) 08 and 09 Dec. At 0130 hr, en attacked all along the river on defs held by 5/8 GR, 10 GARH RIF and 9 JAT, but the attacks did not make any headway. They managed to get a lodgement on the Eastern bank in the defs of 10 GARH RIF but they were dislodged in a matter of two hr. The en carried out a No of probing attacks on these two days to f ind out our weak spots and decided to effect a crossing over the Dhar and Raipur ferries.
(g) 10 Dec. At 1000 hr, the en launched an attack with two bns on 9 JAT posns but failed. At 0630 hr, 10 BALUCH sp by two sqns of 28 CAV put in another attack on the Jats and managed to over run one fwd coy. An imdt CA was launched by 9 JAT but this met with ltd success. The en then started to enlarge the br H. By persistent attacks the en managed to dislodge one depth coy of 9 JAT, another coy over looking the Raipur xg and two pls of 10 GARH RIF. It was imperative to liquidate this br H, so mustering all str, a coy each of 7 KUMAON, 5/8 GR with a sqn of 72 Armd Regt attacked the Darh xg from the North and captured it by about 1930 hr. Meanwhile 10 GARH RIF attacked the Raipur xg from the South, while another coy of 3/4 GR attacked the same crossing from the North. The en lost his nerve and melted away. By about 0100 hr on 11 Dec the crossing had been secured.
(h) The hy attrition caused by us had the reqd effect on the en and there after the en didn‟t make any further efforts to cross the Munawar-Tawi. This change in his attitude can be partly attributed to the fact that the 1 Corps had by then gone in and en had diverted certain effort there.
DHAR
RAIPUR
NATHUAN TIBBA
CHAKLA BUCHOHE MANDI
KACHRIAL
PALANWALACHHAMB
PHAGLA
PHAGLA N
BARSALA
BOKAN
DALLA
BUREJAL
BHUSA
MOELKOIL
PIR JAMAL
JAIMALKOT
308
HANJ 294
MANDIALA
DEWA
CHAK PANDIT
MANAWARCHHATTI TAHLI
LALEALI
DO
AR
A R
MATTEWALA
CFL (A
PP
RO
XIM
ATE)
322
575694
JHANDA
LINE OF CONTROL
END RESULT
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57. Lessons Learnt.The reverses we suffered in Chhamb can be attributed to the fact that Maj Gen Jaswant Singh, the GOC, was too preoccupied in the initial stages with plans for an offensive by us in this sect, with the result that the defs West of Munawar-Tawi were not as well prepared as they should have been. These posns were looked upon merely as a screen through which he would attack. So when the orders came on the first of Dec to remain on the defensive, he was caught unprepared. The lack of str also contributed to the failure. QUESTIONS 1. Give out broadly, the maj ops conducted in the Northern Sect?
2. Write a brief on the ops conducted in the u/m sects:-
(a) Kargil Sect.
(b) Tangdhar Sect.
(c) Poonch-Rajouri Sect.
(d) Jammu Sect
3. Write a short note on the imp of Kargil wrt the ops in Northern Sect.
4. Enumerate the plans of 3 Inf Div.
5. What was en‟s plan for offn in the Poonch Sect?
6. What were the maj lessons learnt of the ops in the Northern Sect.
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PART IV : OPS IN THE PLAINS OF PUNJAB INCL SHAKARGARH BULGE
Gen 58. The border between Pak and India in Punjab is as determined by the Radcliffe Award. The distance along the border from Pathankot in the North to Border Pillar 403 in Rajasthan in the South is just over 700 kilometres. Trn 59. This area divides itself naturally into four different parts:- (a) Along river Ravi facing North from Pathankot to near Ranian. (b) Along river Sutlej facing West from Ranian to Hussainiwala. (c) From South of river Sutlej to Sulaimanke. (d) From Su laimanke to Border Pillar 403. 60. The main routes from Pak into India were from:- (a) Shakargarh to Gurdaspur. (b) Narowal to Dera Baba Nanak (DBN). (c) Along Grand Trunk Road from Lahore to Amritsar via Attari. (d) Along the rd from Kasur to Ferozpur via Hussainiwala. 61. In the whole of the Southern sect (South of Sutlej), the greatest threat was in the area of Fazilka. An important aspect of the trn in Punjab is the riverine nature of the border. The rivers often change their course during floods leading to formation of a number of enclaves or salients on the wrong side of the river. These salients are difficult to defend and at the same time can be used as launch pads for any offensive depending on their size.Hussainiwala was the most important of all such enclaves across the river Sutlej. Pak similarly had an enclave in the area of Dera Baba Nanak. India‟s Plans in Punjab 62. It was made clear that the overall framework of operations in Punjab would be defensive. Notwithstanding this, certain plans of limited offensive were made so as to enable effective defence. These were as follows:-
(a) Offensive by two inf div, one along either side of Chenab towards Sialkot. (b) Offensive by 1 Corps from Samba-Pathankot sectors after securing the lightly held area from Samba to Gurdaspur and Dera Baba Nanak (DBN).
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(c) Ltd offensive Westwards from Gill Ferry in the area of Gurdaspur. (d) Chenab and Gill ferry offensives were expected to draw the Strike Force North, thus reducing the opposition to own 1 Corps. The success of this offensive would ensure the committal of Pak Strike Force South into the Shakargarh Bulge. Operation of own reserve could then develop across Sutlej river.
Pak‟s Game Plan in Punjab 63. Pak on her part had planned for offensive South of Chenab river by their Strike Force North which had one armd and one inf div on its orbat .In order to prevent move of any res against this offensive, all Indian enclaves North of river Ravi were to be eliminated so as to draw our 1 Corps into the Shakargarh Bulge. Once this was accomplished, the main offensive was to be launched with Strike Force South in the area of Ganganagar-Anupgarh towards Bhatinda and Faridkot. Major Battles 64. Maj battles in Punjab were fought in the Shakargarh Bulge, at Dera Baba Nanak, Hussainiwala and Fazilka, though skirmishes and lower level actions were fought at several places in the Ajnala, Khem Karan and Atari - Ranian sub - sects. These were limited to capture of border outposts and small enclaves formed by the rivers. Ops of 1 Corps 65. In the words of the then Western Army Cdr, one of the first things that he did when he learnt about the outbreak of war was to give the go ahead for the offensive to GOC 1 Corps. Ops began with capture of BOPs on ni 05/06 Dec by 54 and 36 Inf Divs. 36 Inf Div was launched on ni 08/09 Dec in order to achieve surprise and also due to non availability of adequate tps. It may be noted that the Inf fmns tasked for the offensive also had def sects to hold and extensive regrouping had been resorted to for the offensive. 66. Hard battles were doggedly fought on multi layered minefds and strong pts. 54 Inf Div adv and captured area upto Baswal after crossing two minefds. By last lt 15 Dec, the tps were dominating the rd Zafarwal - Shakargarh. 39 Inf Div offensives made slow progress and by Ni 10/11 Dec was only able to secure line upto Harar Kalan. A decision was then taken by the corps cdr to thin out tps from this offensive in sp of 36 Inf Div ops. The eastern bank of Bein river had been secured by 36 Inf Div on 12 Dec. 36 Inf Div was thereafter tasked to capture Shakargarh instead of Nurkot. Addl tps were placed under comd this fmn. Crossing on Bein R was achieved by inf on ni 12/13 Dec after initial attempts by armour failed. However, tps had to fall back due to determined CA by en sp by armr before own armr could be inducted. Attacks South of Shakargarh were launched on ni 14/15 Dec but were beaten back with hy cas. Pak was really very sensitive about Shakargarh and the defs withstood the heaviest of attacks. The most notable battle in the area was fought at Basantar and came to be known as „The Battle of Basantar‟.
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Battle of Shakargarh 67. Gen. Shakargarh Bulge was to be a major battle grnd in Punjab. Indian 1 Corps was assigned the task of breaking into the Bulge and capturing Zafarwal - Dhamtal - Narowal at the earliest. Thereafter, it was to adv and capture area upto Marala -Ravi link canal - Degh Nadi and also capture Pasrur. Pak‟s def layout comprised one inf div holding the area with its defs based on strongly fortified A- tk ditches and concrete fortifications which were reinforced with several layers of minefds. Further, there were four armd regts under the 2 (I) Armd Bde in support of the div as was one recce and support bn. In fact, the defs were so strong and aggressive that the Indian side had to rethink about str of its own defs. The def layout was readjusted and another adhoc sect was created called the X-Ray sect which was placed under comd 1 Corps. Offensive Plan 68. 1 Corps had two inf divs and two indep armd bdes. One reconstituted inf div was to sp its ops after the initial attacks .Besides, 1 Armd Div, the Army HQ res was also loc at Kot Kapura in a countervailing posture. The outline plan was as under:-
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(a) Launch 39 and 54 Inf Div between Righ Nadi and Bein river with and Qila Shobha Singh with a view to force the deployment of his reserve formation, i.e 6 Armd Div and 17 Inf Div, South of Degh Nadi.
(b) After enemy‟s res fmn, 39 Inf Div along with 16 CAV and 4 (I) Arty Bde was to break out from Nandpur-Ramgarh sect towards the rear of the en to capture Sabispura, Rungre and Pasrur. However, in the event of the en committing his res, 39 Inf Div less one bde was to hold defs in the area of Samba West of Degh Nadi. (c) 36 Inf Div to be launched either from area Londi or from Lasian bulge to capture Nurkot.
Battle of Basantar 69. The “Battle of Basantar” was a massive effort put in by both the sides and is an example of the opposing sides not really prepared to give ground to the other. Every inch of the ground was bitterly fought for and it was here that some of the greatest military heroes of both sides were discovered, of which some perished as well.
70. This battle was the Phase 5 of 54 Infantry Division‟s battle which was to establish a bridgehead across the Basantar River. Pak‟s 24 Infantry Brigade was pitched against 47 Infantry Brigade sp by 17 HORSE and 4 HORSE of ours. The flow of operations was as under:-
(a) In Phase 1, 16 MADRAS captured the Northern portion of Lalial Reserve Forest by 2145 hr on 15 Dec and also beat back a local counter attack.
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(b) In Phase 2, 3 GRENADIERS captured Jarpal and Lohal by 0300 hr on 16 Dec. It was during this battle that Maj Hoshiar Singh of 3 GRENADIERS personally led the assault and occupied a position in a low lying ground some 200 metres short of a village. For his courage and exemplary conduct under fire he was given the Param Vir Chakra.
(c) In Phase 3, the brigade was able to establish a bridgehead which included the area North of Lalial Reserve Forest, Jarpal, and Lohal on night 15/16 Dec. By first light, 17 HORSE was inducted into the Br H. Pak‟s 31 CAV and 13 LANCERS led the counter attack against our tenuous positions across the Basantar. By 0800 hr three CA were launched onto the br H but were beaten back. The br H was consolidated on the 16 Dec. The next CA by the enemy was launched at 0500 hr on 17 Dec with two inf bns but these too were repulsed. Enemy launched his next CA with 35 FF with an engr coy sp by arty and armr at 1800 hr on 17 Dec in which the en was badly mauled leaving behind many dead and wounded, incl their Commanding Officer Lt Col Akram Raja who was later awarded the highest gallantry award of Pak, the “Sitar-E-Haider”. Second Lieutenant Arun Khetrapal of the 17 HORSE made the supreme sacrifice in the face of heavy odds after he had taught some of the greatest lessons of valour to all men on that battlefield. He was also awarded the Param Vir Chakra.
QUESTIONS
1. Describe the gen, The IA‟s plans in the plains of Punjab/plains sect. 2. What were ops of 1Corps in the plains Sect? 3. With the help of a sketch, enumerate the Battle of Shakargarh. 4. With the help of sketch, enumerate the Battle of Basantar.
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PART V : OPS OF 11 CORPS (HOLDING)
Dera Baba Nanak
71. 86 Inf Bde was deployed for the def of Dera Baba Nanak (DBN). Pak had an enclave on our side of the Ravi R with a br. This br linked the enclave with good rd comn from Pak which could be utilised for developing major ops towards Amritsar. It was, therefore, natural that this br be denied to Pak at all costs. The task of eliminating the enclave was entrusted to Cdr.
72. A two pronged attack was launched with 1/9 GR and 10 DOGRA sp by armr. The attack did see some anxious moments when leading tks got bogged down during the attack. However, the element of surprise enabled success. The en attention was focused on the anti flood bund which was attacked by 1/9 GR while the DOGRAs were able to mov undetected from the rear. A silent attack was put in at 0315 hr on 06 Dec. En though surprised, put in a very fierce fight. Success came after hard fighting from bunker to bunker by the determined DOGRA tps. However, the en was able to blow the br which had been prep as a res dem. Determined CAs were launched subsequently by the en but all came to a naught. To this day the blown br at DBN stands mute testimony to the fierce fighting that had gone in for it more than quarter of a century ago.
Southern Punjab Sect
73. Fazilka dominates the apch to Ferozpur from the South .Its capture would enable swift ops towards Ferozpur from Sulaimanke .Pak‟s territory opposite Fazilka was not as well developed as ours and this was the only maj axis available for ops into the interiors in this sect .
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74. Battle of Fazilka. 67 Inf Bde was deployed for the def of Fazilka with 3 ASSAM in covering tps role and 4 JAT holding the defs around the town of Fazilka. The en attacked on ni 03/04 Dec. The direction of attack which was aimed at the Beriwala br surprised the tps. The br fell and despite a number of CAs launched by 4 JAT on subsequent ni, it could not be recaptured. 4 JAT distinguished itself in the battle with one offr, four JCOs and 66 OR killed and seven offrs, six JCOs and 164 OR wounded during the CAs.
Battle of Hussainiwala
75. We had a small enclave at Hussainiwala West of Sutlej R and the br was on one of the two most imp routes from India to Pak, the other being along the GT rd from Lahore to Amritsar. The enclave is of socio-cultural significance also because it has the cremation site of the three famous freedom fighters Bhagat Singh, Rajguru and Sukhdev.
39
76. 15 PUNJAB was deployed for the def of the enclave and the br. There could be no surprise in the def as the rd was open to international tfc right upto the time the en attacked. The attack was launched by 106 Inf Bde of Pak sp by armr and recce and sp bn. The PUNJABIs fought very bravely but could not hold their own against the overwhelming str. The br was also destroyed in the melee of the battle in which own armr could not effectively sp the tps in their defs.
77. The cas on both sides speak for the fierceness of the battle. We suffered 02 offrs, 51 OR and 02 NCsE killed while Pakis had 04 offrs killed and about 300 all rks killed/wounded. The bn was ordered to withdraw on the ni 04/05 Dec, thus leaving the enclave in the hands of Pak. QUESTIONS 1. Describe the fwg battles, with the help of a sketch:- (a) Battle of Fazilka. (b) Battle of Hussainiwala. 2. Write a short note on the imp of Dera Baba Nanak (DBN).
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PART VI : OPS IN RAJASTHAN-SINDH
Gen 78. While Lt Gen KP Candeth‟s Western Army was engaged in a grim struggle in the Punjab sector, further South along the Rajasthan-Gujarat border, the Southern Army led by the intrepid Lt Gen G G Bewoor was making history. Here India‟s aim was to force Pak to commit its strat res. Southern Comd had 11 and 12 Inf Divs in addn to the BSF. Its Adv HQ was est at Jodhpur. 79. The ops in Rajasthan-Sindh collected for India, 3,500 sq. miles of Sindh territory in West Pak as against some 50 sq. miles gained by Pak in the Chhamb Sect. India‟s thrust in the underbelly of West Pak was a master stroke carried out with courage and speed by a relatively small force. 80. The tasks assigned to the forces were:-
(a) 11 Inf Div. To advance along Barmer-Hyderabad axis and threaten Hyderabad by capturing Nayachor and Umarkot. (b) 12 Inf Div. To advance along Jaisalmer-Rahim Yar Khan axis and capture the strat rly line connecting Karachi with NW Pak.
(c) BSF Sector. To op in the Bikaner-Kutch area and capture max territory. 81. However, within two days of out break of hostilities, Pak pre-empted India‟s plans and initiated a powerful thrust towards Jaisalmer and captured Ramgarh. The Pak forces available for this sect were 1 Corps at Multan and Hyderabad. Pak 1 Corps consisted of 7 Inf Div, 33 Inf Div, 25 Inf Bde and an Armd Div at Multan. 18 Inf Div, under Maj Gen BM Mustafa, with two armd regts – one of T-59s and one of Shermans, was loc at Hyderabad. An Overview of the Ops 82. The ops in Rajasthan-Sindh were played over three main areas:-
(a) Jaisalmer Sect. Pak launched its offensive with two bdes sp by a regt of armour on 05 Dec 71. Meanwhile the planned Indian offensive also went in with 3 RAJ RIF capturing Islamgarh. The Pak offensive to capture Ramgarh and push on to Jaisalmer was stalled at Longewala. 12 Inf Div could not pursue the success at Islamgarh with the same force levels planned. However, Bhaikhanwala Khuller approx 12 km North of Islamgarh was captured by 10 Dec. (b) Barmer Sect. 11 Inf Div launched its offensive on 04 Dec. The offensive followed the old Munabao-Khokropar rly line, starting from Gadra, 43 km west of Barmer. A subdy axis was opened to the South along Gadra-Kilnor (Khinsar) – Chachro. The ops of 11 Inf Div and raid by 10 Para Cdo on Chachro.
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(c) Bikaner-Kutch Sector. This area was allotted to the BSF and they played havoc on the isolated en posts in the bleak desert and salt pans. One BSF unit crossed the border at Nagar-Parkar and captured Virawah, an important rd junc beyond Nagar Parkar. The bulge of Nagar-Parkar, approx 570 sq miles was thus captured. Another BSF unit moved from Khavda and captured Khalibeg and Jalali posts in Chad Bet. A third BSF unit struck East in the Bikaner area and secured territory upto Chachro capturing Rukhanpur, Ranhal and Bajanot posts. The BSF actions in the South linked up at Chachro with 11 Inf Div offensive and added approx 1200 sq miles of Pak territory.
83. The ops in Rajastan–Sindh consisted of numerous battles and raids. However, the following are being covered in detail:-
(a) Battle of Longewala. (b) Ops of 11 Inf Div. (c) Raid on Chachro. The Battle of Longewala
84. Trn and Events Leading up to the Battle. Longewala or Longanwala was a post on the road Gabbar (Pak) – Ramgarh. It was defended by A Coy of 23 PUNJAB and a det of BSF. Maj Kuldip Singh Chandpuri was the post cdr while Nk Bhairon Singh headed the BSF det. A few days before the attack, sr offrs of the Div conferred at Longewala and discussed en‟s approaches and options in the area. Maj Gen Khambatta was GOC 12 Inf Div, Lt Col Hussain was CO 23 PUNJAB, Lt Col Jai Singh the BSF Sect Cdr and Maj Chandpuri. They appre that en
42
would adopt routes in following order of priority-Via BP 638, BP 636 and BP 650, considering their guides, the water sources and en habits. The en would use migrants of vill Longewala who had migrated to Pak in 65 as guides. They were aware that no wells existed after Gabbar except at Kharotar, an old deserted vill with three wells. It was further appre that en would occupy the high dominating ridge 1000 yds from Longewala after xg Kharotar and cut off the rd Longewala-Ghotaru. From here, they would control the WPs as also all rds leading to Longewala. The area around BP 638 was favourable to us as the road was soft and not able to take hy tfc, also sound would carry clearly on this route. Kharotar WP was filled to prevent its use. 85. However, when the attack did come, the en achieved full surprise. 12 Inf Div was preparing for its offensive and defs were few and lightly held. The en marshalled his 51 Inf Bde and 22 CAV with med arty SP between Gabbar and BP 638 on ni 3/4 Dec. 86. The Attack.
(a) The moment Pak tps crossed the IB at 0100 hr, on 05 Dec 71, our ptl spotted the mov and reported to the Longewala post cdr. The Coy Cdr informed his CO and soon the Bde and Div HQ were appraised. The ptl was asked to shadow the slow moving en coln closely. The post was well prep by the time the en contacted it. (b) The post was shelled heavily by arty to cover the noise of tks. At about 0430hr the first en tks carrying a sec each of 38 BALUCH and spare FOL brls came in sight of the post. The en rolled down from Ghotaru rd, SW of Longewala. The broken ground 1000 to 2000m from the post favoured the en. Our RCLs went into action as soon as en tks were in rg and soon one tk was knocked out. The en tks imdt took cover of the large sand dunes and encircled the post form the South and east getting within 300 – 400m of the post. Some tks mov towards the post was halted by the presence of a barbed wire all around the post to depict a mine fd. The en tks still laden with inf, dispersed the tps who took a long time to assemble. (c) The first en aslt went in at about 0430 hrs and the med guns and tk fire provided effective covering fire to 38 BALUCH. The en reached up to 50m from the post but the defenders put up a sterling display of cool courage and determination to die but not vacate the post. Cas piled up on both sides as both tried to beat the onset of day lt. (d) 17 RAJ RIF adv towards Rahim Yar Khan was ordered to reinforce Longewala post. Own arty was built up to def the post while tks were diverted to check the en advance. As day lt dawned our air sp came into play. (e) Wg Cdr MS Bawa was waiting eagerly to join the fray and at 0700 hrs two Hunters struck at the T 59 tks, destroying many on the open sands of the Thar, to the overwhelming relief of the Punjabis. The en formed up again at about 0900 hrs. The en aslt came in at 0930 hrs and the fighting continued for over an hr. By 1030 hr, two coys of RAJRIF with a tp of tks reached the post. The en was lacking in air sp and our ac picked off the tks one by one. The en attack was once again repulsed with hy losses on both sides. (f) Meanwhile, the en colns were mov towards Ramgarh and Ghotaru along the rds. A strong BSF ptl checked the advancing en on the rd to Ghotaru and captured two PW of the BALUCH bn. These PW provided valuable info of the en plans. As a result, localities
43
along the rd to Ramgarh were sited and units dply to thwart en‟s plans. (g) Final Attempt at Longewala. The en taking Longewala for a maj posn once again formed up for attack. At 1530 hrs, they made a full aslt with tks but the defenders now reinforced stood out and the AF continued to strike at will making Longewala the graveyard of Pak tks. The greatest slaughter took place on the route Longewala – Kharotar and BP 638. A long line of tks, jeeps, tractors, one tons and 3 tons were to be seen facing in different directions. Some tried to reverse their vehs and had got stuck in the loose sand. About 250 vehs were left behind by the retreating en. A total of 37 tks were destroyed. (h) Once the en aslt failed, he withdrew across the IB and our tps gave chase. Through the ni of 05/06 Dec, we pursued the en towards Gabbar. Manitwala post was captured 10 km inside Pak territory and en abandoned a No of posts along the axis. The ceasefire saved Pak further losses.
87. Lessons Learnt. (a) Int. Pak preemptive offensive forced 12 Inf Div to abandon their offensive. Int
failed to iden Pak plans and conc. (b) Bal. Own defs were unbal and thinly held. (c) The battle highlights the importance of continuous svl and patrolling for EW. (d) Air Sp played a key role in saving the post, but only after day break. There was a
need for ni air sp capability. The fact that Pak air was not involved must be a borne in mind.
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(e) Correct appre of en‟s apchs and siting of defs accordingly assisted in the successful def of Longewala.
(f) The Pak 18 Inf Div did not get air sp because the PAF was waiting for the special
request to activate Jacobabad airfield which never went. Further, all comn of the Div broke down soon after the attack commenced on Dec 06.
Ops of 11 Inf Div 88. In the Barmer Sect, 11 Inf Div made a deep thrust into Sind following the Munabao-Khokrapar rly line towards Nayachor and the subdy axis of Gadra-Khinsar-Chachro. The launch pad was Gadra, 43 km west of Barmer. On 04 Dec, 11 Inf Div commenced its advance and a string of towns incl Gadra and Relnur were captured against lt opposition along with a large no of wpns and vehs. The adv forces mov 16 km inside en territory from where they pushed forward towards Khokrapar. 15 Kumaon was emp for the capture of Gadra city. 89. On 04 Dec, 2 Mahar Bn Gp with 18 tks of 3 (I) Armd Sqn, infilt behind Pak defs at Gazi camp and Khokrapar and captured Bhitala thereby cutting off en defs at Khokrapar by first lt 05 Dec. 85 Inf Bde with the other two bns, 10 SIKH and 10 SIKHLI linked up with 2 MAHAR taking Khokrapar by 06 Dec. 85 Inf Bde resumed its adv along the rly line clearing Parche-Je-Veri by 07 Dec. 90. Meanwhile, 20 RAJPUT was leading the adv along the Subdy axis and captured Khinsar by 05 Dec. So, while the en offensive at Longewala was petering out, our offensive in Barmer Sect had already secured 1000 sq km . The en rapidly restored the rly line Munabao-Khokrapar by 07 Dec. The rd beyond Khokrapar which was reported to be cl 9 turned out to be a dirt tr. The 11 Inf Div push was slowed down considerably on this count. 91. On 08 Dec, 85 Inf Bde, arr opposite Parbat Ali – an en screen posn of the Nayachor defs. Parbat Ali – Nayachor is a massive dunal feature, stretching upto the plains of Pak Hyderabad. 2 MAHAR and 10 SIKH launched a classic setpiece attack on ni 12/13 Dec. Each bn had a tp of armr in sp while the sqn less two tps of 3(1) Armd Regt provided the fire sp. 92. The Bde captured the features after fierce battles with an FF bn which fought tenaciously to the end. The ceasefire saved Pak further loss of territory even as 11 Inf Div spurred by the spectacular successes made ready to push fwd towards Mirpur Khas with the res bde which had arr by 11 Dec. The prong from Gadra was meant for acquiring max Pak territory, than for any strat or tac reasons. However this push could well have turned into a maj thrust if the war had lasted longer and threatened even Hyderabad.
Raid on Chachro
93. 10 PARA CDO commanded by Lt Col Bhawani Singh, was tasked to carry out a series of raids on en posns in depth by HQ Southern Comd. The aim was to assist ops of 11 Inf div and the BSF. The raid on Chachro was the most significant amongst these raids. 94. Chachro was an en posn loc 50 km inside Pak territory opposite Barmer Sect. On 05 Dec, 10 PARA CDO mov up to Sarup Ka Tala, SW of Barmer, close to the IB. Two gps, A and C, were tasked for the op. „A‟ Gp was to raid Umarkot and destroy a br on the Thar Cnl while „C‟ Gp was to carry out the actual raids at Chachro, Virwah and Nagar Parkar. Both gps crossed the IB in the evening of 05 Dec. The trs shown on the maps were not existing on the grnd and
45
both gps could cover merely six km by next morning when they went into their hides. At approx 1100 hr orders were recd from HQ Southern Cond cancelling A Gps msn. Now in the renewed msn both A and C Gps were to marry up and raid Chachro jointly. An RV was arranged and both the gps married up at Kita at 2300 hr on 06 Dec. 95. Then the gps mov up to Chachro where coy cdr, ie Maj BD Dogra, MVC (who was the „C‟ GP Cdr) carried out a quick recce. The two cut off parties were est and a sp det was positioned to cover the initial adv of the raid party. The en opened fire the moment he discovered the raid party. The sp det was able to silence most of the wpns, however sporadic firing continued. When the raid party reached the out skirts of the town, it came under fire from sand dunes West of the town. This was also dealt with imdtly and efficiently and by first lt the raid party had cleared the en from Chachro. During the mopping up, 17 PW and a large qty of arms and amn were captured. Thereafter the gp mov to a vill called Patia. Again the coy cdr carried out a quick recce and another raid was launched. The task was accomplished by 0200 hr 07 Dec. Then the gp mov to Nagar Parkar, a vill few miles to the South. There hardly any resistence was encountered since the en had withdrawn from the post. 96. By ni 16/17 Dec ,10 PARA CDO had reached Islam Kot. But then the ceasefire was ordered. The force withdrew via Rathi, Shivlo, Harroh, Bhakhasar and on to IB where it drew fire from BSF post at Bhakhasar since no info was passed regarding their come back. The entire op helped capturing large areas of territory and lowering the morale of the en tps. Lt Col Bhawani Singh was awarded MVC for his daring op plg and exec. 97. Lessons Learnt.
(a) A small dedicated and specially trained force with initiative, ingenuity and innovation can achieve results out of proportion to its size.
(b) Surprise, speed and bold action have no substitute. (c) The gains of SF action must be speedily consolidated and expl by the recce forces.
(d) One draw back of the op was non integration of Para Cdos ops with other grnd forces ops. QUESTIONS 1. Discuss the ops in Rajasthan-Sindh Region. 2. Discuss the trn and events leading upto the Battle of Longewala. 3. Explain the plg, conduct and lessons learnt from the Battle of Longewala. 4. Write a note on the Raid on Chachro by 10 PARA CDO, which was carried out to
assist the ops of 11 Inf Div.
46
PART VII : OVERVIEW OF OPS IN THE WESTERN SECT 98. North J&K Sect. The Indian army took the initiative and sealed infilt routes and thus eliminated threat of infilt in the Leh-Ladakh area. In Partapur Sect the Ladakh Scouts pushed the en approx 15 Km back. In Kargil region, Indian troops bagged 36 posts including 15 posts on the CFL overlooking the Srinagar-Leh highway and some ltd gains were achieved in Tithwal Sect. In North J&K Sect, Indian troops adv 22 Km and captured approx 804 sq Km. 99. Rest of J&K and Jammu Sect.
(a) The maj thrust that was planned by Pak 7 Inf Div to eliminate the Poonch bulge was decisively aborted. Pak attacks were beaten back and she suffered hy cas and in the follow up India captured some posts and gained better tac posn. (b) Pak made ltd gains in Chhamb-Jaurian capturing areas on Munawar-Tawi, preceded by air attacks on 7 air fds with a view to capture large chunks of territory and to compensate the losses in the East. In Chamb Sect by 12 Dec, there were Pak losses of 3000 cas and 50 tps knocked out. (c) 26 Inf Div having been caught off balance subsequently cleared the Chicken Neck Salient, East of Akhnur - thereby stalling the Pak offensive.
100. Punjab Sect.
(a) In Punjab 1 Corps led the adv into Shakargarh bulge with 54 and 39 Inf Divs following from Samba-Kathua and Gurdaspur Axes respectively to reduce the line Zafral-Dhamtal-Narowal in the Sialkot Sect. (b) Pak had strong defs based on a series of mine fds, A tk ditches and they also used Degh and Ujh rivers effectively. Our prog was slow but 1 Corps managed to cross the Basantar R and poised to attack Shakargah when the cease-fire was called. (c) The Pak 1 Corps had lost the Pulkhian salient, an area of tac imp and Indians could be stopped only 15 yds short of the head-wks. Pak also lost 95 tks in the battle of Shakargarh. (d) The IA occupied 830 sq Miles in Shakargark Sect and but for the cease-fire enforced on 17 Dec, Shakargarh would have fallen in their lap like a ripe apple. (e) In the rest of Punjab, 11 Corps fought local actions in bulges and enclaves. We had seen success in DBN and Shejra while our reverses came at Hussaniwala and Fazilka. We also gained 30 sq Miles of Khemkaran enclave on the Punjab border.
101. Southern Comd Area of Ops. 11 and 12 Inf Divs were tasked to carry out ltd thrust with a view to draw out en reserves. The area was comparatively lightly held by Pak 18 Inf Div. The offensive was pre-empted by a counter offensive by Pak at Longewala. However, in the pursuit following the battle of Longewala, Pak had to surrender a stretch of 7 to 10 miles of territory on their side of the border to our 12 Inf Div.
47
102. 11 Inf Div had remarkable success in its thrust towards Naya Chor - Umarkot and threatened Hyderabad in Pak. The BSF Sect in South also enjoyed success in the Rann of Kutch and got possession of a 570 sq Miles bulge by capturing an imp rd junc of Virawah. Also in the Kutch Sect, the Indians got the entire enclave of Chad Bet covering 280 sq Miles. BSF colns also carved off another 1200 sq Miles north of Chachro. 103. The Bal Sheet in the West showed that India was in occupation of 3000 sq Miles of West Pak territory as against some 50 sq Miles of Indian territory occupied by Pak in Chhamb Sect and Hussainiwala enclave in Ferozepur.
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CHAPTER 3
OPS IN EASTERN THEATRE
PART I : TRN Gen 1. Erstwhile East Pak, now Bangladesh, is surrounded by the Indian states of West Bengal in the West, Meghalaya to the North, and Cachar Districts of Assam and State of Tripura to the East. In the South East, the Chittagong Hill area has a common border with Burma and in the South lies the Bay of Bengal. 2. With the exception of the low ranges in the Chittagong Hill Tract and plateau North of Dacca, the trn is mainly riverine, low lying and water logged. The vast plains of Bangladesh are interspersed with numerous tributaries. The Ganga, or Padma as it is known in Bangladesh, the Jamuna (Brahmaputra) and the Meghna are the three major rivers that generally run N to S. These rivers are wide and deep and navigable for most of the part but tend to become tidal in the lower reaches. 3. The southern side of the country where the rivers flow into the Bay of Bengal constitutes vast marshy areas with mangrove forests with numerous channels and creeks. The only hilly region in the country is the Chittagong Hill Tract which has three ranges running in a North to South alignment at a height of approx 1200 feet above sea level. 4. Dacca, the geo-political and geo-strategic heart of the then East Pak, was the most important communication hub of the country. Life therefore revolved around Dacca, with the other cities and towns assuming satellite status. Comn Sys 5. Road communications in the erstwhile East Pak at the time of war were under developed. The important road arteries were:
(a) Road Rajshahi – Pabna – Kushtia – Jessore – Khulna. (b) Road Dinjapur – Bogra – Kushtia – Faridpur. (c) Road Durgapur – Mymensingh – Tangail – Dacca – Comilla – Chittagong. (d) Road Sylhet – Akhura – Comilla.
6. The railway system was also under developed. A broad gauge line linked Jalpaiguri with Hilli, Hardinge Bridge and Calcutta. Other important towns like Sylhet, Comilla and Akhura were linked with the railways starting from Chittagong which ran nearly parallel to the IB at a number of places. Dacca was also linked with Chittagong and Mymensingh by rail. 7. Inland water transport played a crucial role in the Sundarbans to the South and was also relied upon in other parts of the country for the movement of goods.
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8. Airfields existed at Jessore, Ishurdi, Sylhet, Shamsher Nagar, Comilla, Chittagong and Dacca. However, some of these airfields needed improvement for sustained ops. Geographical Sectors 9. The country is naturally divided into four parts by the three major rivers Padma, Jamuna and Meghna.
(a) South Western Sector. Area lying to the South West of River Padma. It has the important townships of Khulna, Jessore, Faridpur and Magura. Area North of Jessore is open plain country and suitable for manoeuvre in winter months. The area South of Jessore, particularly Khulna is deltaic. Hardinge Bridge connected this sector with the North Western Sector. (b) North Western Sector. The area lying between the Padma and Jamuna Rivers. The important towns and communication centres in this sector were Rangpur and Bogra. The northern most portion of this sector projects itself towards the narrow Siliguri corridor. This area is relatively less punctuated with rivers and water channels than other sectors. (c) Central Sector. The area lying between Jamuna and Meghna rivers. Apart from Dacca, the capital city, other important towns were Mymensingh, Tangail, and Tungi. The terrain was open, plain and suitable for mobile operations. The Tangail area was however ,forested. Apart from the local Brahmaputra R there were no major obstacles to movement in this sector. (d) Eastern Sector. Area lying to the East of Meghna R, this sect had varying terrain. The area around Sylhet and to the East of it, was either undulating or hilly. South of Sylhet to Comilla it was open plain area and in the South Eastern part of the Chittagong Hills it was hilly and forested. The important towns in this sector were Sylhet, Comilla, Chittagong, Daudkandi and Maulavi Bazar.
PADMA R
JAMUNA R
MEGHNA R
EAST PAKISTAN
NW SECT
SW SECTEASTERN SECT
CENTRAL SECT
50
Comns on the Indian Side 10. The communications on the Indian side were more developed, especially along the Western border of East Pak where a good road and rail communication network provided a number of approaches to the North Western and South Western sectors. Calcutta and Silliguri were well developed communications centres which facilitated the control of movement. The road and rail communications on the periphery of the Central and Eastern Sectors was however, not well developed. The Tripura sector was the remotest and least developed for military operations from the Indian point of view. However India had a developed complex of modern airfields around Calcutta, Siliguri and Gauhati which could support offensive air operations in East Pak. Mil Implications 11. The trn had the following implications:-
(a) Dacca though linked with all important towns, could not be reached by rd from any direction without crossing a major water obstacle. (b) East West movement of large forces across water obstacles would be difficult. Maj military operations would therefore have to be conducted in the North South direction. (c) Large number of water obstacles precluded the use of armour. Operations, therefore, would have to be infantry oriented. (d) The obstacle ridden terrain made it imperative to capture bridges intact, cater for large quantity of bridging equipment and utilise the IWT for carriage of troops and stores. (e) Dacca, being the communication hub, was the key to the conduct of ops, hence the key objective. The Eastern sector provided the shortest approach to Dacca, followed by the SW Sector. (f) The country was surrounded by India on three sides, thereby affording flexibility in conduct of operations.
Suggested Questions 1. Give a brief on the trn in East Pak and its mil implications.
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PART II : DIVISION OF AREA OF RESP Pak Strat 12. In her def plans, Pak never gave much importance to the defence of East Pak. However, the task given to Gen Niazi was „to prevent internal subversion and defend East Pak against external aggression‟.But the Paki strategic thinking never envisaged that India would launch an all out war to liberate the whole of East Pak. Therefore, the effective defence of the Dacca Bowl, the political and military heartland of East Pak, never formed the basis for evolution of the strategy for defence of East Pak. 13. Niazi apparently felt that he had to defend the territory as far forward as possible and prevent any area of consequence falling into Indian hands. He, therefore, opted for the „fortress concept‟ of defence. This concept envisaged important communication centres ahead of the major rivers, being held in strength as fortresses thereby preventing the advancing forces from getting through into the interior areas. Accordingly, he selected Jessore, Jhenida, Bogra, Rangpur, Jamalpur, Mymensingh, Sylhet, Bhairab Bazar, Comilla and Chittagong as Theatre Fortresses. No depth was provided for, ie strong positions in the rear, from where reserves could be employed to deal with any strong infiltrating forces. No defence of the major obstacles ahead of Dacca was thought of, leave alone the deliberate physical defence of Dacca. Areas of Resp 14. Keeping the above strategy in view, Niazi assessed the threat to different sectors and organised his defence as under:-
(a) South Western Sect. 9 Infantry Div under Maj Gen Ansari with its HQ at Jessore was deployed for the defence of this sector. 57 Inf Bde and 107 Inf Bde were given the responsibility of defence of Jhenida and Jessore respectively. (b) North Western Sect. 16 Inf Div under Maj Gen Nazar Hussian Shah, with its HQ at Bogra was deployed for the defence of this sector. The Div further deployed 23 Inf Bde for the defence of Rangpur Sector, 205 Inf Bde for defence of Bogra Sector and 34 Inf Bde for the defence of Natore sector. (c) Central Sect. Gen Niazi gave the resp for the def of this sect to 36 Inf Div under Maj Gen Jamshed Khan, with HQ at Dacca. It did not have the formal components of a Div and was allotted limited troops. 93 Infantry Brigade was given the responsibilty for the defence of the Mymensingh– Jamalpur Sector. (d) Easter Sect. Gen Niazi deployed 14 Infantry Division under Maj Gen KA Mazid for the defence of Sylhet – Brahman Baria Sector and 39 Infantry Disvision under Maj Gen Rahim Khan for the defence of Comilla –Feni Sector.
(i) 14 Inf Div. (aa) HQ - Ashuganj.
(ab) 202 Inf Bde - Sylhet Sector.
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(ac) 313 Inf Bde - Maulvi Bazar Sector.
(ad) 27 Inf Bde - Brahman Baria and Akhura Sectors. (ii) 39 Inf Div.
(aa) HQ - Chandpur.
(ab) 117 Inf Bde - Mynamati-Laksham Sector.
(ac) 53 Inf Bde - Feni Sector.
(ad) Adhoc Bde - Chittagong Sector. Analysis 15. General Niazi appreciated that the Indians would launch a major effort in order to secure the South Western Sector due to the availability of suitable approaches. 16. The importance of the North Western Sector was well appreciated as the Indians would try to secure this sector to eliminate the threat to the Siliguri Corridor. 17. As India would have had to launch operations from the hilly terrain of Meghalaya, no major thrusts were expected in the central sector. 18. Inspite of the logistic problems, Niazi anticipated that India would undertake major operations in the Eastern Sector due to its inherent advantages. 19. No troops were specifically earmarked for the defence of Dacca as such, nor were any defence works constructed.
53
PART III : OVERVIEW OF OPS IN THE EASTERN THEATRE
20. In this campaign, as never before, India's strat as well as objs were clear cut and its armed forces thoroughly prepared. The Joint Chief's of Staff Committee had plenty of time to reflect and cross the t's and dot the i's of their contingency plans. As far as East Pak was concerned, it was surrounded by the Indian Territory in the West, North and East, while in the South it had Bay of Bengal. It was desirous that if a war had to be waged to liberate it, the entire territory had to be ultimately captured. While it was necessary to keep in mind the Dacca bowl as the ultimate objective, any detailed planning could only be carried out, depending on the progress of ops upto the major river lines. It was felt that land ops should be launched from all the three sides, while Naval ops should be launched from the South. 21. Eastern Command was tasked to undertake the destruction of Paki forces and occupy the major portion of East Pak. The Command in turn planned to carry out the ops as under :-
(a) South Western Sect. 2 Corps comprising of 4 Mtn Div and 9 Inf Div to capture Jessore and Jhenida and subsequently secure Hardinge Bridge, Goalundo Ghat and Faridpur ferries and Khulna. (b) North Western Sect. 33 Corps comprising of 20 Mtn Div and 71 Mtn Bde to cut the line Hilli-Gaibanda and capture Bogra/Rangapur. (c) Central Sect. 101 Comn Zone comprising 95 Mtn Bde and FJ Sector to capture Jamalpur and Mymensingh and subsequently Tangail. A para drop of one Bn was to take place at Tangail. (d) Eastern Sect. 4 Corps comprising 8, 57 and 23 Mtn Div, to capture Maulvi Bazaar-Sylhet, Daudkandi-Mayanmati and Lalmai hills (South)- Laksham and subsequently Chandpur respectively. 311 Bde with Kilo Force to capture Chittagong.
22. Moving into East Pak in multi pronged drive from five directions General Aurora's Army, raised before the Paki's missions of an overwhelmingly superior force, descended upon them from all directions. The Indians had only seven and a half divs that constituted only a marginal superiority over Pak's four and a half divs plus thousands of para-military groups. Yet another surprise for the Pak was that they expected the major thrust to come from the West and expected little or no activity on the Tripura front, which was considered impossible for India, logistically speaking. On the other hand, it turned out that the main thrust aimed at Dacca came from the East, while the Pak troops were all facing West.
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PART IV: MUKTI BAHINI
23. Foreign observers and diplomats who continued to reside in Dacca during the critical months preceding the out break of war on 03 Dec, throw light on the state of jitters induced among the rulers in Dacca by the activities of the Bengali guerrillas. 24. The tension between the Bengali and the West Pakis was visibly growing and it had spread to the armed forces. Many incidents including the sudden transfer of Bengali officers and men roused suspicion in the minds of officers of the Bengal Regiments. It was also indicative of the fact that the threshold of the Paki Government‟s endurance was waning. The crackdown finally came on 25 March 1971, and only three out of the eight Bengal Regiments survived the holocaust. During the final weeks of terror and confusion, patriotic officers of the Bengal Regiment could offer only local resistance. After some time these desperate groups managed to contact each other and organise themselves into a body which could offer a cohesive resistance. Org 25. The recruitment and control operations of the Mukti Bahini were set up on a regional basis with their HQ at „Majibnagar‟ in Calcutta. It was headed by Col MG Osamani. Apart from this regular force, self styled guerrilla leaders like „Tiger‟ Siddiqui, Noorul Kadar and Toha elected to operate in their own areas of influence. 26. The Mukti Bahini was divided into two formations:- (a) Regulars. The hard core of the regulars of Mukti Bahini was Bengali Officers
and Jawar Cadre of the Old Bengal Regiment, the East Pak Rifles and Armed Bengali Police. Around this nucleus were speedily built up eight battalions of the Bangladesh Regiment. These eight battalions were organised into three brigades whose role was to sit behind the enemy, to cut off their retreat, destroy their communications and also carry out envelopment and guerrilla action to destroy them.
(b) Guerrilla (Gona Bahini). Under the umbrella of the Gona Bahini were the
extreme ideological groups as :-
(i) National Awami Party.
(ii) CPI (Moni Singh).
(iii) Majib Bahini led by Sheikh Moni.
(iv) Qadir Bahini led by „Tiger‟ Siddiqi. 27. The Mukti Bahini had its own Naval and Air wings. The Naval wing comprised trained frogmen and tow gun boats while the Air wing comprised two heptrs one Otter fitted with rockets and one Dakota.
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Role of Mukti Bahini 28. Before the outbreak of war, the task before the Mukti Bahini was to deny communications and cause maximum attrition to the enemy. However, after 03 Dec, when the war broke out their role enlarged to include:- (a) Activate the flanks of the enemy.
(b) To act as vangd of the Indian troops. (c) To stoke local hostility against the enemy. (d) Operate under common command of Indian Army. 29. Thus, when the Indian Army launched its offensive at mid night of Dec 3, the Mukti Bahini were prepared and ready to welcome the Indian troops at various points at the border and guide them to the interior along the shortest routes and help them with transportation. They also provided valuable intelligence about enemy movements besides ambushing the enemy troops and cutting off their communications lines. 29. In the first week of Dec the Mukti Bahini in conjunction with the Indian Army captured a series of positions in Saldanadi area. In the second week they launched operations in Sylhet sector and were successful in cutting off the fleeing enemy‟s retreat to the port of Chittagong. The Mukti Bahini intelligence set up ensured that every decision, plan and move by Dacca promptly reached the Indian Army authorities. The Naval wing in its operations destroyed approx 100,000 tons of shipping besides sinking/damaging 25 Paki ships. Conclusion 30. The Pak forces, scattered in penny packets along the border were completely cut off by the Mukti Bahini. This largely contributed to the demoralisation of the Pak troops, „Marooned‟ in their respective positions without knowledge of what exactly was happening around them. 31. Without the support of the Mukti Bahini, the war in all likelihood would have prolonged and the political and military objectives which the Indian Government had set for itself, would have slipped out of its hands.
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PART V : OPS OF 2 CORPS FOR CAPTURE OF JESSORE AND KHULNA
Gen 32. The SW Sect has the IB with India running along Kaliganj, Sakhira and Krishna Nagar, River Padma flows to the North with Bay of Bengal to the south. River Padma also defined the eastern limit of this sector. The border with India is almost 560 km long and almost parallel to the IB , 50 to 60 kms from the border runs the important road Khulna-Jessore-Jhenida-Kushtia. Madhumati River flows through this sector from North to south and is approx 500 to 600 m wide. 33. This sector provided the second shortest approach to Dhaka along Magura, which controlled all the rd links to Dhaka. Jessore, Jhenida and Magura were the important comcens of this sector. The old route from Calcutta to Dhaka via Goalunda Ghat runs through this sector. Hardinge Br was the main link between this sector and NW sector. 34. General Niazi gave the responsibility of defending this sector to the Pak 9 Inf Div under Maj Gen Ansari. The Div consisted of two bdes. 57 Inf Bde under Brig Manzoor was responsible for Rajapur to Darsana with its HQ at Jhenida and 107 Inf Bde under Brig Mekhmad Hayat was responsible for Jibba Nagar to Bay of Bengal with its HQ at Jessore. The adhoc bde which consisted of some EPCAF pers and the Razakars was centered at Khulna. The Div had its peacetime HQ at Jessore but on the very first day of the war it moved to Magura. 35. Own 2 corps under Lt Gen TN Raina was tasked to launch an offensive in this sector with 9 Inf Div under Maj Gen Dalbir Singh and 4 Mtn Div under Maj Gen MS Brar. Plans 36. Pak 9 Div. Maj Gen Ansari planned to delay the Indian forces at Benipol-Darsana-Rajapur line. Then trading space for time his troops were to fall back on Jessore and Jhenida - the two fortresses of the area. He is likely to have apprehended that the enemy would not be able to strike deep without neutralising at least one or both of these fortresses. If the enemy decided to invest these fortresses he would have to employ a div each which would not leave him with adequate tps to achieve a further breakthrough. The three main areas of enemy's advance were appreciated which in order of priority were as follows:- (a) Calcutta-Benapol-Jessore.
(b) Krishna Nagar-Darsana-Chaudanga.
(c) Murshidabad-Rajapur-Kushtia.
37. Own 2 Corps Plans. Lt Gen Raina planned to send his two divs towards Madhumati River with the aim of liberating territory West of Padma River. The plan was to contain the Pak strongholds near the border while fast moving columns bypassed them and headed for Madhumati River to prevent bulk of Pak forces from withdrawing across the river. The corps offensive was basically in 3 columns:-
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(a) Jibba Nagar to Darsana. (b) Straight East from Bayra to Jessore town.
(c) Bansirhal-Satkhira-Khulna.
Conduct of Ops 38. 9 Inf Div. The Div contacted Jessore defences by advancing along Bayra salient from first light 04 Dec to 06 Dec. Jessore was pounded and a series of attacks were launched to achieve a breakthrough. Jessore had well prepared defences including wire obsts and mine fields. However ,the grn gave up practically without a fight when Maj Gen Ansari decided to vacate Jessore by dawn of 06 Dec, an act which could not be explained. After the 3rd day of probing, a hole was punched North of Jessore Dist, however, Jessore was not occupied until late on 07 Dec. 9 Inf Div continued to adv towards Khulna with 32 Inf Bde. The Indian adv was however, delayed by skilful execution of ops by Pak troops. A series of tactically sited delaying posns and demolitions were employed by Pak troops in the marshy trn. Indian tps cleared delaying posns step by step through deliberate attacks. As a result, it took the entire div four days to cover thirty miles against an opposition of approx an inf bn. Own advances were again stalled at Daulatpur on 11 Dec and we continued to stay there till 15 Dec. On night 15/16 Dec, an attempt was made by 42 Inf Bde to resume the adv but by then the cease-fire had come into effect.
JESSORE SECT
JESSORE
42
350
32 BAYRA
DURGABAKATI
ARPARA
BURINDA
9
GARIBPUR
39. 4 Mtn Div. Jibbanagar was captured by 27 Nov and Darsana by 02 Dec. Jhenida was captured by 06 Dec which was facilitated by a rd block successfully established by an inf bn and armd sqn between Jhenida and Chaudanga. At Jhenida, the Engrs built a 20 mile rd using duck boards for inducting inf , arty and tanks of 41 Mtn Bde. These ops probably triggered the evac of Jessore. 62 Mtn Bde captured Magura on 08 Dec. By now the Pak 9 Inf Div had split into three with 107 Bde at Khulna in the south, 57 Bde at Kushtia in the north and remnants of the Div with its HQ at Faridpur. Gen Ansari had lost control over his fmns. 7 Mtn Bde resumed adv towards Kushtia and was held up by the rear elements of Pak 57 Bde. Lt Gen Raina over reacted and diverted the whole div towards Khustia leaving a bn holding the West bank of Madhumati. On 10 Dec, two thirds of Pak 57 Bde had crossed over almost intact and demolished the Hardinge Br. This move wasted three days. It is a matter of intrigue as to why
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Lt Gen Raina made Maj Gen Brar divert his effort as rd to Faridpur and Dhaka lay almost bare. Thus, they had a god sent opportunity to lead the first Indian tps to Dacca. Faridpur was captured by own tps on 16 Dec alongwith Maj Gen Ansari with the remnants of his div in total disarray.
Conclusion
40. 2 Corps during the ops captured/destroyed 500 pers arms, 18 Chaffe tanks, 13 guns and four mortars. Pak cas were likely to be around 600 to 700, with Indians suffering 367 killed. Lt Gen Raina's victory lay in Lt Gen Niazi's surrender in the overall context of Bangladesh ops. Only a part of his 9 Inf Div fell into his hands while a major portion escaped. Decision to surrender by Niazi was not affected by ops in the SW Sector. The ops could have been speeded up considerably to make an impact while the escape routes could have been blocked across the Padma river at Hardinge bridge and securing the Br at Khulna. In this context, the Corps ops do not seem to have achieved the results commensurate with the effort.
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PART VI : OPS OF 4 CORPS
41. The area of ops for 4 Corps comprised of three maj sects:
(a) Sylhet Sect. (b) Ashuganj Sect. (c) Chandpur.
Pak Dply 42. Prior to hostilities, one infantry brigade, located at Comilla, looked after the entire Eastern Sector. It had battalions located at Sylhet and Chittagong. General Niazi‟s perception was that there was minimal threat from the East due to inadequate Indian infrastructure to support operations. Niazi‟s concept, therefore, was to hold the border forward in strength. The deployments were subsequently changed to deal with the growing sponsored insurgency and the threat of imminent operations by India in erstwhile East Pak. 43. As a consequence, the following newly raised brigades were placed under command HQ 14 Infantry Division under Maj Gen Abdul Majid.
(a) 202 Infantry Brigade at Sylhet. (b) 313 Infantry Brigade at Maulvi Bazar. (c) 27 Infantry Brigade at Brahmanbaria and Akhura.
44. 39 Infantry Division was raised under command of Maj Gen Rahim Khan, with 117 Infantry Brigade located at Comilla, 53 Infantry Brigade located at Laksham and the newly raised 97 Infantry Brigade at Chittagong. Of note, none of these infantry brigades had full combat power as they consisted of one or two regular battalions and one „Azad Kashmir‟ unit, and a battalion of para mlitary forces. For some time Indian intelligence agencies were deceived as to the designation of these units and some non regular battalions were designated as regular. Op Plan of 4 Corps 45. General Sagat Singh envisaged that greater dividends would accrue if the Paki forces were unbalanced by a swift and vigorous offensive to capture Chandpur and Daudkandi and to isolate all troops deployed East of Meghna and South of Brahmanbaria by bypassing the strongly held Comilla–Maynamati Fortress. In order to do this he had 53 Infantry Brigade located at Laksham. A deception plan was devised to depict operations along the Shatir Bazar– Belonia axis. This task was allocated to 53 Mountain Bde. 46. 57 Mtn Div was to capture Akhaura, and thereafter build up North of Maynamati, and subsequently capture Daudkandi. Akhaura defences were occupied by the Pak 27 Inf Div. 47. 8 Mountain Division was ordered to capture the intermediate objectives of Shamshernagar and Kaluva and terminal objective of Sylhet from the North.
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48. An adhoc force called KILO Force, comprising of two Indian battalions, two converted Bangladeshi battalions and one battalion each from the BSF and CRPF along with certain artillery units, was to advance towards Chittagong and assist 88 Mountain Division in its subsequent operation. Ops in Sylhet Sect 49. Ops of 8 Mtn Div. 8 Mtn Div under Maj Gen K V Krishna Rao was resp for ops in Sylhet Sect. It was appreciated that Maulvi Bazar was the key to the capture of Sylhet and hence should be secured earliest. Accordingly 81 Mtn Bde under Brig Apte was tasked to adv along Kaulashabar – Shamshernagar – Maulvi Bazar axis. 59 Inf Bde under Brig Quinn was tasked to adv along axis Dharmanagar – Brahmanbaria – Maulvi Bazar. Both the bdes made steady progress. By 6 Dec 71, Brahmanbaria was captured and 81 Mtn Bde contacted Maulvi Bazar. To prevent the withdrawing en from reinforcing Sylhet. 4/ 5 GR was helilifted to SE of Sylhet . Maulvi Bazar was captured by 81 Mtn Bde on 9 Dec 71. 59 Inf Bde captured Fenchuganj on 11 Dec and linked up with 4/ 5 GR. Sylhet was now under siege from all directions and finally surrendered on 17 Dec. 105 offrs, 191 JCOs and 6124 OR surrendered.
59 INF BDE
81 MTN BDE
MAULVI BAZAR
SYLHET
SYLHET SECTOR
BHAIRABBAZAR
Ops in Ashuganj Sect 50. 57 Mtn Div under Maj Gen B F Gonsalves was responsible for ops in this sect. The tasks were:
(a) To capture Akhaura area, build up in Maynamati by D Plus 5 for the capture of Daudkandi. (b) To capture Daudkandi by D Plus 8. (c) Contain Brahmanbaria. (d) Div less a bde to capture Chittagong along with KILO Force, subsequently.
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(e) 61 Mtn Bde to isolate Comilla from the North and West, and est a firm base in the Myanmati area for the capture of Daudkhandi. (f) As the ops prog, the tasks of the div underwent some changes.
51. Ops of 57 Mtn Div
(a) Akhaura was captured on 5 Dec 71 by an out manoeuvring move executed at night, tackling the defences from the rear, while a deception plan depicting tank noises from the NE was enacted using 5 tonne trks. (b) Brahmanbaria, which was identified as a bottleneck was expected to be held in strength. There was no intelligence about the road linking Brahmanbaria to Ashuganj. When more info became available, Maj Gen Sagat Singh changed the thrust line of 57 Mtn Div towards Brahmanbaria – Ashuganj. Instead of going South he reached Ashuganon on 09 Dec, where the rail bridge had already been destroyed.
Ops in the Chandpur Sect 52. 23 Mtn Div under Maj Gen R D Hira, MVC, was responsible for ops in this sect. 53. The Div Plan To secure the Southern part of the Lalmai Hills and thereafter capture Chandpur.
(a) 61 Mtn Bde under Brig Pande was to contain the Maynamati position from the North, and was to op directly under Corps HQ. (b) 301 Mtn Bde under Brig Sodhi was to infiltrate along axis Himmatpur – Bhushchi – Bhora. (c) 181 Mtn Bde under Brig Bakshi was to follow on the same axis and adv to Laksham and isolate it from the North and West. (d) KILO Force was to capture Feni and subsequently Chittagong depending on the sit.
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Chandpur
301
181
54. Ops of 23 Mtn Bde
(a) 23 Mtn Div carried out a prelim op in the Belonia Bulge to evict Paki 53 Inf Bde loc at Laksham. The op was successful but did not manage to trap the en and they mov back with min cas. (b) 61 Mtn Bde under Brig Pande was directed to close on Mayanamati from the West. Daudkandi fell on 09 Dec triggering a general collapse and Comilla was subsequently vacated and captured. 1500 all ranks surrendered. (c) 301 Mtn Bde infiltrated between the Lamlai Hills and Laksham on the ni of 13 Dec and secured Mada Haragani by 06 Dec. Chandpur was captured without opposition on 08 Dec. (d) 181 Mtn Bde followed 301 Mtn Bde and est a road block West and North of Laksham. The garrison troops escaped but left all equipment and heavy weapons behind. Laksham was occupied and the Div was now poised for the crossing of the Meghna, focussing attention on Chittagong and Narayanganj. 61 and 181 Bdes were tasked to capture Maynamati but despite attempts the fortress held out until hostilities ended on 16 Dec. (e) KILO Force captured Feni on 6 Dec and Kaberhat and Zocarganj on 8 Dec. 83 Mtn Bde and KILO Force married up at Sitakund and reached the outskirts of Chittagong by 15 Dec. The garrison surrendered after the ceasefire on 16 Dec and nearly 9000 all ranks surrendered.
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PART VII : OPERATIONS BY 33 CORPS
Background
55. As per the broad strategy for the offensive ops in the North Western Sector Bogra was identified as the key to unbalancing the entire Paki forces op in the sect. The other large town in this sect, Rangpur, was also an imp tgt. The broad plan was to adv along the Hilli – Gaibanda areas onto Bogra while Paki forces to the North in Dinajpur – Rangpur area were to be pinned down by subsidiary actions. The thrust to Bogra was to be via Ghoraghat – Gobindgaij. The thrust on Ghoraghat was from Hilli and Pirganj. 56. 33 Corps was given the resp for conducting ops in this area. 6 Mtn Div less a bde was moved from UP – Tibet border into holding role in place of 20 Mtn Div. They were made to adopt the tac sign of 20 Mtn Div as a deception measure. Trn 57. The NW sect is divided into two like an hour glass. It is bounded by Tiesta and its tributaries to the North, Jamuna to the West and Ganga to the South. Many rivulets running NW to SE cut through the entire area. Rd and rail comms follow the grain of the country. The main comn centres to the North are Thakurgaon, Dinajpur and Rangpur, while in the South are Bogra and Rajshahi. The Balurghat salient protruded like a sword at the waist along the line Hilli – Ghoraghat. Pak Dply 58. Gen Niazi had correctly assessed the imp of this sect. The resp of def was given to 16 Inf Div under Maj Gen Nazar Hussein Shah. Thakurgaon, Dinajpur and Rangpur was held with a bde, Hilli and Ghoraghat with second bde and Rajshahi, Ishurdi and Naogaon with the third bde. Indian Force 59. 33 Corps commanded by Lt Gen KL Thapar had 20 Mtn Div, and two independent Bde Gps 70 and 340. Indian Offensive Plan 60. As per the initial plan, one bde was to hold the Balurghat salient for gen security of the area and provide firm base for the attack. One bde gp was to adv along Islampur – Ruhea – Thakurgaon axis to secure the br across Ganga. The second bde was to adv towards Dinajpur from south and link up with the first bde by D plus three and then adv towards Palasbari. The third bde gp was to capture Hilli and then adv and capture Palasbari in conjunc with sec bde. After the attack, the forces were to cut the Rd Dinajpur – Gaibanda and then capture either Bogra or Rangpur. The maj drawback in the plan was lack of mut sp between the two axes being far apart and piecemeal emp of forces.
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61. The final plan for the offensive as approved by the Army Cdr was as follows:-
(a) 71 Mtn Bde to adv along Mirgarh – Thakurgaon to secure Pachagarh and Thakurgaon by D plus 5.
(b) Bde from 20 Mtn Div to adv from South along Dinajpur – Kantanagar to link up with 71 Mtn Bde near br over Atrai on rd to Saidpur by D plus 5.
(c) 20 Mtn Div with two bdes up was to adv along Samjia – Phulbari – Palasbari and Hilli –Gaibanda axes.
NW SECTXXXIII
20
340
BIRGANJ
PHULBARI PIRGANJ
BOGRA
HILLI
205
71
Exec of Ops 62. 71 Mtn Bde under Brig Kathpalia had a spectacular adv of 60 km from Mirgarh to Thakurgaon and by 04 Dec captured the towns of Pachagarh and Boda without maj opposition. After capturing Birganj on 05 Dec ,the bde was halted at Kantanagar br which was demolished and faced hy en resistance. The action of this bde had tied down the en garrisons at Dinajpur, Saidpur and Rangpur, thus preventing a pull out of tps to reinforce threatened areas further south. 63. Further South, 202 Mtn Bde under Brig Bhatti was given the task of capturing Hilli complex. This was the only battle Indian forces fought to capture a Paki fortress in entire Bangladesh ops and it proved very costly in terms of cas and time. It has been covered in detail later. The 20 Mtn Div offensive was now modified to adv on single axis along Phulbari – Charkhai – Pirganj Rd and 66 and 202 Mtn Bde with an addl bn each from 165 and 340 Mtn Bdes were to invest Dinajpur from South. Phulbari was contacted and captured by 66 Mtn Bde
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while 340 Mtn Bde was tasked to capture Pirganj which it did on 07 Dec and cut off Rangpur from Bogra. The attn was now diverted to Bogra which was captured on 16 Dec. 64. The entire action by 33 Corps saw some 450 Pak offrs, 670 JCOs and 16800 OR surrender after ceasefire with 3000 para mil forces. The Indian cas were 16 offrs, 11 JCOs and 344 OR killed and 54 offrs, 33 JCOs and 874 OR wounded. Most of these were suffered at Hilli by 202 Mtn Bde. 340 Mtn Bde which bore the maj brunt in this sect suffered only 46 all rks killed proving that mvre warfare is economical in both cas and time compared to attrition warfare.
BATTLE OF HILLI
Trn 65. The IB divides Hilli town into two parts. The town as such is on the Indian side while the Paki side was sparsely populated and consisted of a No of villages with open paddy fields. Vills of Basudebpur, Chandipur, Morapara and Noapara were loc around Hilli. Pak had created a safe belt along the border by destroying the vills close to IB and evac the population, so that Mukti Bahini did not get any shelter. The fds had not been attended since April and had become marshy with waist deep water at places. The abandoned vills had been fortified to create formidable obsts. Each house was fortified into a strong pt and bunkers had two layers of OHP in many cases. Morapana was linked to Chandipur and Basudeopur with comm trenches for mov of rfts. The Battle 66. Plan. Initial plan was to capture Hilli with 202 Mtn Bde. The obj was scaled down by Army Cdr to capture of Noapara, Morapara and Basudeopur by one bn and tks only if en used tks in CA. 22 Nov was fixed as D Day. 8 GUARDS was to lead the attack with 5 GARHWAL as res. 67. Morapara was 500m from IB while Basudeopur was 300m from a BOP of ours. Attack was sp by a Med Regt less bty, two mtn regts and a lt bty. „A‟ Sqn 63 CAV was in sp. 68. B Coy est firm base at Ghaswia by 1800 h on 22 Nov. D Coy secured FUP 800 m North of Noapara. C Coy attacked Noapara with stealth and captured it in two hrs. The Paki managed to slip away. A and B Coy formed up in marshy fds and H Hour was fixed at 0130 h. On xg the SL both coys came under hy MG and arty fire from Basudebpur BOP, Morapara, Biragram and rly embankment 500 m East of Morapara. The threatened flk had been reinforced and both coys faced stiff resistance while clearing bunkers and had hy cas. The fighting degenerated into indl and isolated action at team/sec level where they held onto captured pockets without knowing what was going on around them. The aslt coys had penetrated but could not clear the obj.
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69. D Coy was launched from the same direction and it too faced hy resistance. In the morning it was clear that except for a small pocket under D Coy, Pak retained its hold on bulk of Morapana. Both sides suffered very hy cas. In the morning a coy of 5 GARH RIF captured Basudeopur BOP and secured Western flk of 8 GUARDS. By 0800 h the sit had further deteriorated due to en CA and depletion of amn. Efforts to resup amn failed and large No of 8 GUARDS pers withdrew. Use of T-55 tks to ferry amn failed as they got bogged down. Finally PT-76 tks were used to sp the bn. 70. A daylight attack on Morapana by 5 GARH was dropped. A radio broadcast by Radio Pak gave an indication that the en may have left the obj. Aggressive patrolling was ordered and by first lt the two bns had linked up. The success was reinforced and maj portion of Morapana was occupied. Paki CA attempt was foiled by accurate arty and armr fire. No further offensive plans were made. 8 GUARDS held Morapara, 22 MLI held Naopara and 5 GARH held Basudebpur. Hy cas suffered in Hilli forced the higher HQ to abandon any more attacks on fortified posns. Mod plans were:- (a) 202 Mtn Bde. Hold Hilli. Adv North and link up with 66 Mtn Bde at Charkhai. Subsequently adv to Goraghat – Gobindganj.
(b) 66 Mtn Bde. Adv from Phulbari to Chakai. Capture Pirganj and Gaibanda.
(c) 165 Mtn Bde. To take over Hilli from 202 Mtn Bde after they link up with 66 Mtn Bde.
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(d) 340 Mtn Bde. Contain Dinajpur. (e) The armd regts were regrouped into comp Regt gps of T-55 and PT-76 due to trn constraints.
71. With the mod plans, 20 Mtn Div captured Durra, Bisapara, Dangapara and Hilli by 11 Dec. The rd to Ghoraghat was open.
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PART VIII- OPS OF 101 COMN ZONE AND CAPTURE OF DACCA Gen
72. The offensive in this sector was the first to reach the „Dacca bowl‟ and is hence very significant. 73. The Northern sector comprised the „U‟ shaped territory between the mighty Jamuna in the West and Meghna in the East, with Ganga forming the base. The Brahmaputra ran diagonally from the North West to the South East dividing the sector into two, with about one third North of the river. A large number of routes led into the sector from India, but all these arteries led to the two focal communication centres of Jamalpur and Mymensingh towns, lying across Brahmaputra, an obstacle about 1000 feet wide. Roads and tracks ran from there and led to Dacca. Terrain wise, except for Madhopur forest in Tangail district, the area was covered with paddy fields, marshes and lakes. Numerous streams criss crossing the area made the movement of wheeled and tracked vehicles off the main roads difficult, except in dry season. This sector afforded the most direct, though longer route to Dacca. Pak Plans of Def 74. Gen Niazi had given very low priority to the Northern sector. There was only an adhoc brigade, 93 Infantry Brigade raised under the local Martial Law Administrator, Brig A Qadir which was located at Mymensingh to defend the sector with two regular battalions and paramilitary forces. The main defensive battle was planned to be fought behind the Brahmaputra at Jamalpur and Mymensingh with delaying positions located right up to the border. There were no tanks or medium guns available in the sector to support the operations. Gen Niazi had probably anticipated the formation to delay the Indian advance as long as possible, and then make them fall back into Dacca. 75. In the Central Sector containing Dacca, Gen Niazi expected no major thrusts, and thus gave the responsibility for the defence of the sector to 36 Inf Div. This Div had no formal components of a div and had been allotted very limited troops. It had its HQ in Dacca. Indian Offensive Plans 76. Maj Gen Gurbux Gill GOC 101 Communication Zone, based at Shillong was made operationally responsible for this sector. The Area Commander, basically confined with duties of logistic support of troops deployed in North Eastern States, was appointed to this operational command basically because the underdeveloped communications infrastructure in this sector restricted the size of force which could be employed in this sector. Troops allocated to this sector consisted of 95 Mountain Brigade Group which was moved from Nagaland under Brig Hardev Singh Kler and one infantry bn brought from 23 Inf Div. 77. In addition to the offensive tasks, 101 Communication Zone was also tasked with destruction of Paki forces deployed in Tangail and Mymensingh districts within 14 days of the outbreak of the hostilities, in conjunction with the active Mukti Bahini elements operating in the area. 78. The elements of the offensive plans of 101 Comn Zone were as under:
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(a) 101 Comn Zone comprising 95 Mtn Bde and FJ Sect to capture Jamalpur and Mymensingh and subsequently Tangail. (b) Establish contact with Dacca. (c) This task was in addition to their task of providing lgs sp to the fmn in the region. (d) 167 Mtn Bde was also allotted at a later stage. (e) Tasks given to the bde were:
(i) 95 Mtn Bde to capture Jamalpur by D Plus 6/ 7. (ii) FJ Sect was to capture Mymensingh after the capture of Jamalpur (iii) Tangail to be captured by D Plus 8 by one inf bn AB ops. (iv) An Inland Water Transport Task Force (IWTTF) was to move down from Dhubri to Jamalpur down the Brahmaputra River, to provide lgs sp for the forces.
Conduct of Ops 79. Plan of the formation involved exploiting the deployment of Paki 93 Brigade Group based at Jamalpur and Mymensingh thereby dividing Pak forces. Gen Gill decided to develop his main thrust along Kamalpur – Bakshigonj – Jamalpur axis with 95 Mountain Brigade while simulating brigade group advances along Dalu – Haluaghat – Phulpur – Mymensingh axis with an infantry battalion and Mukti Bahini forces. Progress on this axis was delayed intentionally to enable fall of Jamalpur earlier than Mymensingh, though a withdrawal from Mymensingh could not be ruled out, so Gen Gill decided to head for Tangail on the fall of Jamalpur to prevent falling back of forces to Dacca. 80. Meanwhile, Gen Gill who was injured in a mine blast was replaced by Maj Gen Nagra. 81. On 05 Dec, Bakshiganj was captured after it was found abandoned. 95 Mtn Bde resumed its advance towards the Brahmaputra River in bullock carts to the south by 1730 hr on 6 Dec. Move to the riverline saw the lack of initiative and training between infantry bdes, with one battalion taking six hours to cover 22 km, while another battalion took 48 hr to cover 20 km after fighting not more than one platoon action enroute. Brig Kler, at one stage, had to personally prod the battalion to move faster. 82. Jamalpur garrison was now under siege with two infantry battalions. Requiring additional troops to capture the position, 167 Inf Bde was released to Maj Gen Nagra on 9 Dec, and the two companies of its leading infantry battalions reached Jamalpur on 11 Dec. On night 10 Dec, forces from Jamalpur attempted to break out and move to Dacca. This attempt was thwarted with heavy casualties to the Pakis. The garrison finally surrendered on 11 Dec. 83. The total forces surrendered included two offrs, 9 JCOs and 365 OR. It was later revealed that the garrison had surrendered on orders from higher authorities. Had they continued to hold out, the course of battle may well have been very different in this sector. Meanwhile Mymensingh was also vacated by a retreating enemy and captured on 11 Dec. The fall of Jamalpur and Mymensingh on the Northern sect acted as a spur to the plans for the advance to Dacca.
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KALIKAR
Ops for Capture of Dacca 84. Maj Gen Nagra ordered the advance to Dacca, with two bdes, 95Mtn Bde Gp with 11 MARATHA LI, 6 SIKH LI and 2 PARA, and 167 Mtn Bde. 95 Mtn Bde was tasked to capture Tangail, while 167 Infantry Brigade was to capture Jaydebpur. Depending on the progress of operations, the entire force under Maj Gen Nagra was to then invest Dacca. 85. Paradrop at Tangail. 2 Para battalion was paradropped at about 1600h on 11 Dec in Tangail, with the aim of capturing the bridge over Johajang at Poongli and interrupting and destroying Pak troops retreating from Jamalpur and Mymensingh. The battalion was successful in capturing the bridge, however, the main column of Mymensingh and Jamalpur garrison had passed through Tangail, before the para road block became effective. Details of this special operation have been covered separately. 86. The „Dacca bowl‟ was now isolated. 87. 95 Mtn Bde linked up with 2 PARA at the Poongli br at around 1600 h on 12 Dec and by 1800 h Tangail was secure. This was a historic occasion for the Indian Army. Gen Nagra‟s forces however, found themselves out of the logistic support range from their bases. Though they had vehicles there was no petrol. Air maintenance was resorted to for 95 Mountain Brigade, when an abandoned air strip was discovered close to Tangail on 13 Dec. Since 167 Infantry Brigade had not fetched up till then, Gen Nagra ordered 95 Mountain Brigade to resume operations. 88. Further advance of the brigade was delayed by strong delaying actions fought by the retreating troops on the Turag riverline. Gen Nagra employed 167 Infantry Brigade on Chandpur – Sabhar – Mirpur axis while 95 Mountain Brigade attempted to cross the Turag river
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south of Tangail. 2 PARA ,the only infantry battalion with four 106 mm RCL guns and RPG, were sent ahead to deal with the armour at 2200 h on 15 Dec and contacted Mirpur defences at about 0200 h on 16 Dec. The bridge though armed for demolition could not be destroyed since 2 PARA totally dominated the area. The bridge, which was a gateway to Dacca was captured intact. 89. The declaration of cease fire by Pak forces under Gen Niazi in East Pak was rather confusing with Brig Kler being a Signals officer, picking up a radio intercept from Niazis HQ at Dacca advising his troops to observe a ceasefire from 0500 h to 0900 h on 16 Dec. The Indian operational commander, Gen Nagra waiting at the gateway of Dacca, at Mirpur Bridge, had no information whatsoever about the ceasefire. He on his own despatched two officers of 2 PARA to Gen Niazi with a message offering ceasefire on surrender. This was accepted and Gen Nagra, Brig Kler, Brig Sant Singh and Lt Col Siddiqi of 2 PARA drove to Pak 36 Infantry Div HQ from where they contacted Gen Niazi‟s HQ. At 1100 h on 16 Dec , they were received outside Gen Naizi‟s office to meet the GOC-in-C, Pak Eastern Army. Later, Gen Aurora, accompanied by Air Marshal Dewan,(AOC-in-C East), Vice Admiral Krishnan (FOC-in-C East) and Group Captain Khondakar, Chief of Staff of Mukti Bahini ,flew to Dacca to receive the surrender. 90. The instrument of surrender was finally signed at 1631 hr at the Dacca Racecourse, bringing an end to the war. 91. In all, 1606 officers, 2345 JCOs, 64, 109 other ranks, 1022 non combatants of the regular army, 79 officers, 488 JCOs and 11, 665 other ranks of the para military forces, 91 officers, 30 petty officers and 1292 ratings of the Paki Navy, 61 officers, 31 warrant officers and 1049 airmen of the Paki Air Force, 166 all ranks of Paki Police and 7555 civilians surrendered in various garrisons all over East Pak. Indian losses in the campaign were 1421 killed including 68 officers, 60 JCOs, and 1293 other ranks, and 4061 wounded comprising 211 Officers, 160 JCOs and 3690 other ranks, and 56 missing.
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PART IX : SURRENDER
92. The 1971 Indo-pak War ended with the surrender of Paki forces in East Pak. The magnitude of the Indian victory is evident from the scale of PW and equipment that was captured. 93. The precision strike by the Indian Air Force MiG-21s on the Governor‟s residence in Dacca, to coincide with a high level meeting that was in progress, played a major part in the undermining of the enemy‟s resolve. 94. Yahya Khan had instructed General Niazi to obtain a ceasefire. General Niazi had, in turn, approached the United States Consul General to arrange a ceasefire on 15 December 1971. The United States approached the Indian Government for a ceasefire on the same day. 95. That same day, General Manekshaw conveyed to the Paki High Command that a ceasefire would be acceptable if the Paki Army in East Pak were to surrender to the Indian Forces. 96. Early on the morning of 16 December 1971, a message from General Niazi to his commanders was intercepted. This message instructed them to ceasefire. Nagra exploited the situation by sending a message to General Niazi to surrender. General Niazi accepted this proposal and instructed Jamshed to take the actions necessary to arrange an immediate ceasefire. 97. As per the agreement reached between the two sides, Indian troops entered Dacca in the early afternoon. Major General J F R Jacob, COS of the Eastern High Command, reached Dacca and conveyed the terms of the ceasefire to General Niazi. The terms were accepted. 98. The instrument of surrender was signed by General Niazi at 1639 hr on 16 December 1971 at the Dacca Racecourse. With his signature came the end of the Indo-Pak War of 1971. A total of 90,000 troops with large quantities of weapons and equipment surrendered to the Indian Army. This was by far the largest single surrender of regular troops and served to highlight the magnitude of the swift Indian victory. The achievement was all the greater, considering the difficult riverine terrain in erstwhile Pak.
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QUESTIONS 1. Describe the trn in Eastern Sect and its mil implications. 2. What are the different sects as per area of resp in Eastern Pakistan? 3. Enumerate the plans of Eastern Comd for the war in Eastern Sect. 4. Explain the org and role of Mukti Bahini. 6. Discuss the plan and conduct of 2 Corps for capture of Jessore & Khulna. 7. What were the tasks given to 57 Mtn Div for the ops in Ashuganj Sect? 8. Explain in brief the Indian offn plan for the ops of 33 Corps. 9. Explain the plan and conduct of Battle of Hilli. 10. Describe the ops for capture of Dacca.
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CHAPTER 4
NAVAL ASPECTS
Pak Prep 1. The build up to the war was slow and deliberate. The likelihood of the outbreak of hostilities with Pak had been apparent for a long time due to peculiar political situation existing in Pak at that time. The alarming part of all intelligence reports was that the Paki Navy was planning and training for a lightening strike in a surprise attack that could turn Bombay into a Pearl harbour. The cadre of elite sailors were being trained as frogmen to be let loose inside our harbour to carry out underwater strike against our ships. In addition Pak navy was modernising its sea denial capability in the form of new French submarines, midgets and chariots. The loaning of Ghazi to the Paki Navy by US was another shot in the arm to boost their subsurface capability.
Own Concepts 2. The Indian Navy was determined to employ a bold and offensive posture. Since the surprise would be with the enemy in the form of preemptive strikes, there was a need to mould and train the Navy which would have the capability to withstand the first strike from the enemy. The concept of Naval Operations catered for: -
(a) Destruction of Pak‟s maritime force.
(b) Choking Pak economically by imposing Naval Blockade of East and West Pak. (c) Protection of Indian merchant fleet. (d) Protection of Indian coasts and ports.
3. On 10 Jun 1971, the entity of Eastern Fleet was conceived with the allocation of Vikrant, two Brahmaputra class ships, two ships of Petya class and one submarine (Khanderi). 4. The Indian Navy had ample time to work up its forces, plan deployments, and redefine procedures and logistics plans. India had taken all defensive measures for protection of her maritime assets as far back as Jun 1971, when the Naval Control of Shipping had been instituted and harbour defence organisations were activated.
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PART I : WESTERN THEATRE
Concept of Ops – Pak Navy 5. On the Western seaboard, the Pak Naval deployment of assets was on an offensive defence.
(a) Submarines.Three Daphne were deployed on focal points off Mumbai and Kathiawar coast for offensive operations against the Indian units. Two midgets were deployed off Okha and Diu on interdiction mission in shallow coastal waters. (b) Surface Forces. The Pak Navy‟s surface ships in the Western theatre were mainly deployed for the defence of Karachi and two Patrol lines were established off the port. A group of minesweepers were to operate on the approaches to Karachi to keep the channel clear. (c) Air Eles. After the Pak Air Force had indicated their inability to provide any surveillance efforts, PIA Fokker ac had been utilised for maritime surveillance over their area of interest.
Ops – Indian Navy 6. In the West, the Flagship, INS Mysore headed the surface action group, which comprised Trishul, Talwar, Khukri, Kirpan, Kuthar, Cauvery, Krishna, Tir and Ranjit and two missile boats under tow. A special Task Force consisting of two Petyas and four missile boats were retained in Bombay to undertake the first attack on Karachi and any subsequent attacks which during the course of the war became possible and desirable. These units were operating off Okha when Pak commenced the war at 1835h on 03 Dec 71. All smaller patrol crafts, seaward defence boats and larger dhows, taken over from trade were used for harbour patrols and some limited seaward patrols. On a comparative basis, the Paki surface units were no more modern than ours except that their Daphne class submarines were the most modern conventional ones with far superior sensors and armaments. 7. The Western Fleet was given a broad directive to seek and destroy enemy warships, protect our merchant shipping, deny sealanes to enemy shipping and render ineffective the maritime line of communications between West Pak and the then East Pak to prevent any reinforcements from reaching the beleaguered Paki forces at that end. A blockade off Karachi was to be instituted to prevent petroleum and petroleum products and other essential supplies needed in war from reaching Karachi. A submarine patrol was to be instituted off Karachi to sink their warships and merchant ships proceeding to Karachi. This would give our submarine the much-needed involvement in the war and they would help to destroy such units as came their way. 8. The threat from the Paki midget submarines and chariots had exercised our minds and elaborate plans were made to deal with them. They could be carried on board merchant ships or warships or large dhows and be released in the vicinity of Bombay harbour. Therefore, the water around ships in harbour was floodlit to enable sentries onboard to see any approaching underwater craft carrying limpet mines. Special 2 pound charges were dropped frequently by
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the harbour patrol boats and craft. Liaison with police, fishermen and port authorities was also established. 9. Three Super Constellations would be available for maritime reconnaissance. Two IL-14 aircraft operating from Santa Cruz would carry out the coastal belt surveillance. The Navy using Alize aircraft,augmented by IL-14 aircraft deployed for coastal surveillance would carry out the medium range surveillance. Org for the Attack
10. It was decided that units would take different routes to Karachi and will RV 60 miles South of Karachi before the attack so as to provide mutual security and protection on the way back. As the whole fleet would be at sea and operate not very far from Karachi, it was decided to establish an imaginary line beyond which the fleet would not move. This would prevent any unfortunate incident.
11. The Missile boats and Petyas would use all their missiles and ammunition and during their return journey they would be most vulnerable. Hence it was decided that only 3 missile boats would go to Karachi and the fourth would patrol off Okha to cover the withdrawal of our forces.
12. After arrival at a certain point South of Karachi, the task group commander in the Petya would release the missile boats to proceed at maximum speed to Karachi. The squadron commander would allocate targets and they would act independently. NHQ and HQ WNC would listen in on wireless circuits and pass relevant instructions to the force.
The Attack
13. The complete force sailed from Bombay on 03 Dec at 2200h for advance base at Diu, where a small tanker was placed to provide fuel. The boats embarked their full fuel loads there and sped to Dwarka keeping well inshore to evade detection and submarine attack. At 1700h on 04 Dec, the force was 150 miles from Karachi and the orders for commencement of OPERATION TRIDENT were given. The force raced to Karachi by the direct route. Of the four boats, one was left to operate off Dwarka to provide cover to the force on its way back.
14. Initial battle was fought about 30 miles off the coast of Karachi. At 2200h, two radar contacts were picked up at 40-mile range by Nipat. Nipat and Nirghat were ordered by K25 to prosecute them. Nipat carried out first attack using two missiles and sank the target. Nirghat engaged the other target with two missiles, which burst into flames and could be seen from far. Captain K25 then ordered Nipat and Veer to proceed further to Karachi. Veer fired one missile on a shore target and Nipat fired one missile on an oil refinery on shore causing tremendous flash which could be seen from miles away. All missiles were expended and the missile boats were ordered to withdraw just past midnight. It was necessary to clear the enemy coast and withdraw beyond the range of enemies strike ac by dawn. At about 1000 h, all the ships sighted each other except for Veer which too joined them by evening. Refuelling on the way back was done off the coast of Mangrol. 15. The damage at Karachi was as follows: -
(a) Destroyer PNS Khyber – sunk. (b) Destroyer PNS Shahjahan – damaged.
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(c) Two Minesweepers – sunk. (d) One Merchant ship – sunk. (e) Considerable damage to harbour and oil installation.
Loss of Khukri 16. It was appreciated that the Pak navy would have deployed at least two Daphne class submarines to cover focal points on the likely sealanes used by Indian ships for passage to and from Bombay port, or any attacking force transiting Bombay and Karachi. There were sonar contacts and reports of occasional sightings of periscopes by Indian ships and maritime reconnaissance aircraft. There were subsequently confirmed sighting reports of an enemy submarine in the area West of Diu head. D/F bearings obtained of submarine that had transmitted a wireless message to Karachi also confirmed the position. This submarine was a potential threat to our shipping and it was decided by WNC to eliminate this threat. The 14th A/S squadron comprising Khukri, Kirpan and Kuthar was the only force available for the task together with some Seaking aircrafts. 17. While in the process of hunting, the enemy submarine, with her superior sonar facility, obtained contact of Khukri before her own detection by the ship and struck Khukri by a salvo of three torpedoes in quick succession. The ship sank in a matter of minutes at 2055h on 09 Dec 71 taking down with her 18 officers and 176 sailors including the commanding officer Capt MN Mulla. A massive hunt was launched for the killer submarine with all-available A/S ships, Seaking and Alize aircrafts. The Alizes laid a barrier of sonobuoys and the Seakings continued to operate until the passage became so long that time on the job was much reduced.
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PART II : EASTERN THEATRE
18. The Paki Options in the Eastern theatre could be summarised as: -
(a) To remain concentrated with the existing maritime forces in Chittagong. This would be totally defensive approach and would entail their building up shore defences, mining of approaches to harbours and Anti aircraft defence of important port installations.
(b) If Pak decided to fight it out, she would have to reinforce her maritime forces prior to commencement of hostilities. This task would be compounded after breakout of hostilities due to risk of interception by own units. However, this reinforcement would have been at the cost of their Western forces, which they could ill afford.
(c) The third course of action open to the enemy would be hit and run tactics against our coastal targets at Visakhapatnam, Madras, Port Blair, Paradip, Haldia and other minor ports.
Most Probable Course 19. After weighing the pros and cons of various courses open to them it was evident that in order to sustain their war effort on land in East Pak, it would be important for them to sustain their life line namely , ports of Chittagong, Chalna, Khulna, Mogla and Cox‟s Bazar open to traffic. 20. After a detailed review of the situation and factors affecting selection of aim, the final aim for the Eastern Command was: - “To destroy enemy’s maritime forces deployed in support of his military operations in East Pak and to deny all sustenance from reaching the enemy.” 21. Since our aim was an all embracing one, our plan-required flexibility and the ingredients wherein several options would be individually or collectively implemented. Accordingly, an omnibus plan was evolved with the courses of action as: - (a) Attack from the sea on Chittagong harbour. (b) Attack from the sea on Cox‟s Bazar, Chalna, Khulna and Mongla. (c) Destruction of enemy shipping off the ports and on the seas. (d) Offensive actions on opportunity targets. (e) Diversionary or real amphibious landings.
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PART III : EVENTS AS THEY UNFOLDED 21. INS Rajput sailed on the night of 3 / 4 Dec and on clearing harbour proceeded along a narrow swept channel. The commanding officer spotted some disturbance about half a mile ahead. He rightly assumed it to be the effect of submarine diving. Rajput closed it at maximum speed and dropped two depth charges. It had been subsequently established that the place where these depth charges were dropped was so close to the position of sunken submarine PNS Ghazi that some damage to it would certainly have been effected by these charges. At about 0015 on 04 Dec, a very loud explosion was heard. This was within minutes of Rajput having dropped the depth charges. 22. The sinking of Ghazi signalled the entry of Eastern Naval Command into the thick of action. Tigers were again airborne ex – Vikrant in the afternoon on a strike mission – this time the target was heavily fortified i.e. Chittagong airfield. Despite the hot reception, they struck with devastating effects. The damages were: -
(a) One harbour and control tower damaged. (b) One fuel dump set ablaze. (c) Two gunboats and two Paki merchant ships sunk.
(d) All our aircraft returned safely except minor damages to one aircraft. 23. On 5 Dec, Paki Merchant vessel Anwar Baksh was captured along with large quantities of arms and ammunition. The day wise damages inflicted were as follows:-
(a) 6 Dec - Air raids on Mongla, Khulna, Chalna from INS Vikrant.
- Two gunboats damaged at Mongla. - A number of tugs, power boats and one
merchant ship damaged at Khulna. - Airstrip at Chittagong was rendered non-operational for
considerable period.
(b) 7 Dec - Five 1000 tonners under charter to Pak Govt were captured and escorted to nearest Indian Port for safe custody.
(c) 8-12 Dec - Continuous air strikes from Vikrant on
targets inEast Pak.
- Commando operations by force Alpha consisting of INS Palval, MV Chitrangada and Muktibahini gun boats,Palash and Padma on Mongla and Khulna harbours.
(d) 15-16 Dec - Eastern Fleet made history by undertaking the
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first combined ops since World War II namely, the landing of tps.
Landing Ops 24. The Landing force arrived at Cox‟s Bazar area on the morning of 16 Dec 71. A total of 600 troops along with arms, ammunition and equipments were landed by sunset including brigade headquarters staff. The same day Paki forces stationed at East Pak surrendered. The navy was involved in the valiant role of choking Paki forces in East Pak of logistic support, prevention of breakout of Paki forces to West Pak by sea in support of own airforce by way of neutralizing air strips spread along the east and last but not the least landing of own troops. The Eastern Fleet not only established its supremacy in Bay of Bengal but also effectively blockaded all ports of East Pak.
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CHAPTER 5
AIR ASPECTS 1. Whereas in 1962, the Indian leadership was hesitant to use its Air Force against China, and in 1965, the second Indo Pak round, it was more of a learning process, in 1971, the IAF played a decisive role in shaping the outcome of the war. There was more than adequate time to prepare(from 27 Mar 71 to 3 Dec 71), plan and execute a splendid14 day campaign. In fact, the „preemptive PAF raid‟ on the ni of 3 Dec was no great surprise for the IAF as Gen Yahya Khan stuck to his promise made on 22 Nov 71 “ In 10 days time, we would be at War with India”. The PAF raid only served as a green signal for commencement of an open war. The IAF action, strictly speaking, started on 22 Nov when three of the four intruding Sabres were shot down by the four scrambled Gnat ac at Boyra, East of Calcutta, close to the IB.
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PART I : THE IAF PREP AND PLG 2. The Aim was very clearly specified by the PM through the RM to the COSC, which enabled the IAF to chalk out its war strat accurately. The COSC, the inter service committes, the Service Headquarters and the MOD worked in a smooth coordinated manner. 3. The shortcomings of 1965 ops were studied in great detail and the following areas were rectified:-
(a) Jointmanship. Lack of jointmanship was one of the serious limitations of 65 ops. There was a serious effort to rectify this at all levels of the military machinery. While Advance HQs were established at each Army Comd HQs, comprising of their respective TACs and ACTs, MORs were established at each of the Cmd HQ OF Navy. There was also a specific allotment of ac/sqns to particular TACs with complete freedom of employment with the TAC Cdrs. Communications of the entire Air support network were vastly improved which paid rich dividends. This was all too evident from the prompt and meaningful CAS that the Army received at all stages of the war. As regards IAF-Naval coordination, more could have been achieved than what was, at various stages. (b) AD. Apart from induction of the Mig 21 in 1964 to beef up the AD, adequate blast pens were constructed at all front line bases. The tpt ac were withdrawn to depth airfds and assets within each base were well dispersed. All efforts were taken to camouflage the airfd, including the runways. While medium level radar cover was just about adequate, the LL radar cover was still poor. Apart from this, IAF did not possess LL missile systems to counter the LL threats. This shortcoming was planned to be offset by increased CAP, MOPs, LLAD Guns, and coordinated CAO. TACDE made significant contribution in enhancing the Air combat tactics of the IAF. (c) Bases in Rajasthan. A serious shortcoming of 65 ops was the shortage of ops bases at Rajasthan. This was made good by the construction of the same at Barmer and Jaisalmer. The trg base of Jodhpur was converted to a full fledged ops base.
4. The Air Strat. The then CAS of IAF Air Chief Marshal PC Lal, in his book “My years with the IAF” lists the Air strat in the following order of priorities:- (a) AD. AD of homeland and bases was priority one. (b) CAS The next most important task was support of the Army and the Navy, the
Army taking precedence over Navy. (c) CAO. Offensive counter air ops came third in the list of priorities. (d) Interdiction This was to include strat strikes on en energy resources aiding the
war, mainly oil, and his transportation. (e) Misc Ops. This included transportation, Airborne ops etc. (f) Comd WiseTasking. CAC, under Air Mshl Maurice Barker was given the task of
looking after the bomber ops, Air transportation and support to Navy. The WAC, under Air
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Mshl MM Engineer MVC, DFC and EAC under Air Mshl HC Dewan were responsible for AD, CAS and CAO in their respective theatres.
5. Disparity . The sheer disparity in numbers was all too obvious, inspite of the difference in figures amongst various authors. This was more so in the East than in the West. Though Air power does not depend solely on numbers, they do however matter, especially when the technology levels, performance and tactics are comparable. The figures quoted in PC Lal‟s “My years with the IAF indicates 22 combat sqns with PAF.
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PART II : AIR OPS IN EASTERN SECTOR IAF 6. The Air war in the East was brief and intense. The IAF‟S EAC flew a total of 1978 sorties, of which 1178 (60%) or about 80 sorties per day were in direct sp of the Army, of which the OAS totaled 409 according to the then CAS Air Mshl Lal. Whereas the first three days of the war consumed a fair effort towards Counter Air and CAP msns, the subsequent effort was biased towards CAS, interdiction and Air transported ops. The high marks of the IAF campaign are undoubtedly the prompt CAO against the three airfds, virtually grounding the PAF in the first 48 hours of the war and its intimate support of the Army. This enabled near uninhibited air action, though the losses to en grnd fire was substantial. 7. CAO. Attacks were mounted on the ni of 3 Dec by Canberras against Kurmitola, Chittagong and Tezgaon. These results were, however, indecisive as they were found to be repaired/intact the next day. To obviate the vulnerability of the slower Canberras by day, Hunters and Migs attacked these airfds, by day, on the 4th, 5th and 6th. Thereafter, PAF had given up its effort to repair these runways. This action also resulted in the destruction of 7 sabres and 3 Heptrs on grnd. Recce of runway damage was well carried out by Canberras and Sukhois. While on 5 Dec, PAF was unable to put up any sorties, surprisingly, it could fly on 7th, two sabres being spotted over Tripura. On 8 Dec, IAF launched yet another 32 attacks against these bases, while the Army took Comilla and the last two Sabres were destroyed. 8. AD. The Gnats and Migs were initially executing CAP and escort msns. However, when the success of CAO was total, even this effort was diverted towards CAS and interdiction. 9. Close Air Support. The CAS was prompt and adequate with no complaint from Army whatsoever. Not a single request for CAS was turned down at any stage of the war. The demands of 4 Corps came to EAC HQ at Shillong which were passed on to Guwahati, while the 2 Corps demands were actioned by the Adv Hq at Calcutta. GOC 4 Corps, Gen Sagat Singh had only two observations at the end. Firstly, he felt that the trg of army formations did not take into account the resources of air power that would be available during the war. They considered any air support as a bonus rather than as an integral offensive asset, which had to change. Secondly, he was critical of IAF‟s policy of posting people other than fighter pilots to TACs like Signalers and Navigators. PC Lal concedes this point in spite of the fact that that there were no shortcomings in this regard. A different way of looking at the issue perhaps would be to give the best salute to those TAC cdrs, who pulled off an excellent show despite being Signalers/ Navigators. Brig Atri, the Paki Cdr in the area of Laksham and Chandpur confirmed after surrender that the constant presence of IAF over the area dropping Napalm and firing rockets and guns caused Pak troops to ask what their AF was doing to protect them. A few details of CAS, ac wise, are listed below:-
(a) Hunter. On 6 Dec, two Hunters of 37 Sqn destroyed 3 en tanks near Hilli. While it was initially thought to be an own goal by the GLO, a midnight congratulatory message from HQ 33 Corps confirmed the kills. On 11 Dec, a significant contribution was made by attacks on Chafee tanks near Comilla, that were poised for a counter attack. Air Mshl Lal has also reported on the use of Napalm canisters against dug in troops, which did not ignite on impact and that the pilots had to straff the contents to detonate them, thus wasting their gun Ammunition
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(b) Gnats. 22 Sqn was intimately involved in CAS from 6th onwards, in areas of Jessore, Ishurdi, Barisal, Golando ghat, Hardinge bridge and Sathkira. 24 Sqn ac,carried out a spectacular neutralization of en Arty Op on a grain silo in Bhairab Bazar. These were called in when own arms and Mortars were unable to neutralise it from own side of the Meghna river and en Arty was pounding the tps effectively.The Gnats also carried out regular attacks on country boats in the numerous rivers, based on reports by Mukti Bahini as well as by visual spotting. There was a case of own goal however, due to poor AF-Naval coordination. The Navy had instructed its boats to display a 4‟x 4‟ yellow bunting cloth to prevent being straffed by IAF and Sea Hawks. This was however not known to the sqn at Kalaikunda. Lt Roy Choudhury‟s boat, a part of a well camouflaged 4 boat group operating in a tributary of R Ganges near Khulna, was repeatedly straffed by a formation of 4 Gnats, resulting in its destruction and death of a few Indian sailors. (c) Sukhois. Operating under 9 TAC, in sp of 2 Corps, they provided CAS at Jessore and Jhendia, on 5th, 6th and 7th. The spectacular bombing of Hardinge br on 11 Dec prevented en retreat. The routine attacks against en positions in Kushtia area on 9th, 10th, and 11th helped soften the en resistance to advancing Indian Army. (d) Mig 21. This effectively started from 11th onwards in areas around Comilla, Sonamura, Maulvi Bazar Lalmai and Mainamati. Their rocket attacks proved extremely effective against tps and gun positions. When 95 Mtn bde under Brig Kler laid a veritable seige around Jamalpur, repeated rocket attacks were carried out on en positions between 5th and 10th Dec. The Brigadier‟s message to Jamalpur Fortress commander suggesting him to surrender, and his spirited reply, at least confirm the quantum of air effort if nothing else. “40 sorties a day are nothing. Do ask for more..” The heaviest attack was on the 10th. On the ni of 10/11, when the main column attempted to flee to Dhaka, due to the combined result of air attacks and the seige, they were literally massacred by Kler‟s Army. The climax of their action was undoubtedly the 4-ac rocket attack on Governor Malik‟s residence in Dacca on 14th. This had a tremendous psychological effect on the top brass. It not only led to the instant resignation by the governor, but also hastened Gen Niazi‟s surrender which materialized on 16 Dec.
10. Interdiction. While all fighter ac carried out interdiction, the most note worthy action was the effective neutralization of river transportation by Gnat ac. The destruction of Hardinge br by Su-7s and the numerous small brs by Migs deserves credit. 11. Helicopter Ops. Two Sqns of MI-4, capable of mustering 11 ac at a time, and two addl ac from 111 HU were available to 4 Corps. These were operating from Kailashahar. Lt Gen Sagat Singh made great use of this Heptr force at various stages. The airlift of a Bn size force from Kailashahar to a point North of Surma river on 7, 8 and 9 Dec served as a feint, and forced the Bns at Sylhet to hold the town, the Indian attack on which never materialized. After the Bn lift at Sylhet, the Heptrs moved to Agartala. The next major operation was the crossing of R Meghna, to Narsinghdi on the 10th and 11th Dec. Carrying 23 tps per ac, a total of 650 tps and some light eqpt was successfully lifted to Narsinghdi. Thereafter, the Heptrs were moved to Daudkandi, where they were employed from 11 Dec, to move a Bn across the R Meghna to Baidya Bazar, barely 7 miles from the outskirts of Dhaka. From the time the Heptr ops into Narsinghdi began on the evening of 10th Dec, till the landing of a Bn at Baidya Bazar, the Crew had flown for 36 hours continuously doing a total of 409 sorties. All three Heli lifts were accomplished without a single casualty. A total of over 5000 men and about 51 tonnes of eqpt was ferried. By bold and imaginative use of the AF available to 4 Corps, Lt Gen Sagat Singh
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had presented a most convincing demonstration of how well the two Services could work together. 12. Tangail Paradrop. By Nov 71, Lt Gen Aurora had an earmarked contingency plan for employment of Airborne forces in East Pak. With the fall of Jessore on 7Dec, the only obstacle towards the race towards Dacca was the mighty R Brahmaputra. To overcome this, an airdrop of 2 Para Bn to the East of the river, near Tangail was planned on 11 Dec commencing at 1600 hrs. The planned drop was a well guarded secret and the element of surprise was not lost. Even when the drop took place, very few people could make out the strength of the drop. For the record, the BBC had reported that a whole Brigade was paradropped while in reality, only 784 men were. The Tpt force comprised of 6AN-12s, 22 Dakotas, 20 Packets, and 2 Caribous, all under the command of Gp Capt Gurdeep Singh. Lt Col Kulwant Singh Pannu was the Airborne force commander.The mounting bases were Kalaikunda for the Dakotas and Calcutta for the rest.The entire drop took 55 minutes to complete, with a planned TOT of one minute interval. The DZ was five miles NE of Tangail town. The Caribous carried out a diversionary, dropping dummies a little distance away from the DZ. The drop went smoothly except for a few minor mishaps. There was one case of a hang-up from Packet ac (Sep Madhav Gaurav) though not resulting in death. One JCO and 11 tps were dropped 11 miles N of DZ. Four jeeps landed in a pond, which luckily was not too deep. One Packet with one officer and 39 men developed engine trouble and had to land back at Calcutta and were dropped the next day. In the entire operation, one AN-12 was hit by grnd fire. All in all, the para drop was a great success and a tremendous morale booster for both the IAF and Army.
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PAF 13. Apart from being vastly out numbered, PAF had ignored a few fundamental concepts. There were no protected blast pens and the plans for dispersal of bases was not effected, resulting in there being effectively only three bases for IAF to concentrate on. The AD system was devoid of missiles and the radar system not very effective against LL threats. A P-35 radar was shifted to West Pak in Nov71. According to Pushpinder Singh‟s “Fizaya”, the entire set up in the East was so badly arranged that two senior officers handed in their resignations in protest, before the war started. The Air effort was negligible on 4th, nil on 5th, few CAP msns on 6th, two msns on 7th and nil thereafter. Losses 14. PAF. The overall losses of PAF were 16 Sabres, three RT-33s, three Auster AOP ac, and an old Bristol-170 freighter which was probably on civil service as this ac was phased out in 1965. There is another theory that PAF intentionally destroyed 11 Sabres and 3 RT-33 ac on grnd to prevent it from falling into Indian hands. This is discounted in “Fizaya” as improbable. 15. IAF. The IAF lost 15 combat ac in the East; with no Heptr loss and only one AN-12 damaged by grnd fire. Of the15 fighters, 12 were due to AAA, and the rest to PAF Sabres. The heavy losses were primarily during the CAS msns. (2 Migs, 2 Canberras,1 Su-7, 10 Hunters)
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PART III : OPS IN THE WEST
The PAF Preemptive Strike 16. In the space of five minutes, between 5.40 and 5.45 PM on 3 Dec 71, PAF ac mounted a simultaneous attack on seven IAF bases of Srinagar, Awantipur, Pathankot, Ambala, Uttarlai, Jodhpur and Agra. Later at night, more strikes followed on Halwara, Amritsar, Sirsa, Adampur, Sirsa, Nal, Jamnagar, Agra, Jodhpur, Srinagar, Ambala and Pathankot. The overall damage was negligible. Runway at Amritsar was cratered which was repaired by next morning. A radar at Amritsar was partly damaged. Damage to ac was almost nil due to the dispersed locs and blast protection, apart from bombing inaccuracies and limited weight of attack at each base.
IAF ACTION Air Defence 17. The shortage of LL radars remained even by the commencement of war. This was to an extent offset by the various MOPs deployed close to the IB, continuous CAPs over VAs and VPs and reduced scramble times. The Gnats and Mig 21s were dedicated for this task, including the escort role. What IAF followed was the BADC concept, with engagements planned close to overhead. Apart from not picking up the PAF preemptive strike, there were very few successful intercepts, either as CAP or as escorts. There was a case of own goal when a Mig 21 from Adampur shot down another Mig by night due to faulty identification, killing Flt Lt Dhavle. Apart from this “kill” by K-13, almost all the rest had missed their targets and guns were used to achieve the kills. The IAF‟s effort of trying to draw out the PAF interceptors for a fight by flying Medium level intrusions did not yield any positive response from PAF either, as per ACM Lal. In the entire ops, there were less than 6 engagements leading to classical air combat, as per “Fizaya”. This is in spite of 2074 (46%) AD sorties flown a few success stories, however, include the following:-
(a) Shooting down of a Sabre by Sqn Ldr KK Bakshi in his Marut on 7 Dec near Naya Chor. (b) A Mig 21 escort Shooting down a Mig 19 with K-13 near Naya Chor on 15 Dec.
(c) On 17 Dec, Sqn Ldr IS Bindra and Flt Lt AK Datta shot down a Star Fighter each over Uttarlai in their Mig 21s. The K-13s missed and they were gun kills. (d) On 17 Dec, two Maruts on their way to Hyderabad Air Base, spotted a Sabre, which by chance ended up in front of Sqn Ldr Joe‟s ac. Joe shot down the Sabre with his guns.
(e) Over Jamnagar, Flt Lt Soni and Flt Lt Saigal shot down a StarFighter each from their Mig 21s with K-13 missiles.
Counter Air Ops 18. The retaliatory strikes were mounted a little over six hours later , with 24 Canberras, one AN-12, and six Su-7s. The targets were PAF airfds at Rafiqy, Sargodha, Murid, Chander and
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Masrur. Hunters, Su-7s and Canberras followed up these strikes with waves of counter air strikes in the next two days. They included all the main airfds , including Chaklala, Peshawar, Mianwali, Chakjhumra and Kohat.The sustained effort was maintained for the first week of ops. Thereafter, the CAO reduced for two resons: The losses to en grnd fire were mounting and secondly, the PAF strike effort noticeably dropped by the second week though their CAS effort continued. The exact efficacy of IAF CAO is debatable. Logically, if this campaign was successful as in the East, the PAF effort in all areas would have shown a decline. Interdiction 19. While battlefield interdiction were fewer compared to CAS, some did materialize on occasions. The ni bombing by 6 AN-12s of 44 Sqn, dropping a total of 40t of bombs over Kahuta, in Poonch sector, caused heavy land slides. These blocked the only road that served the area. General Candeth confirmed to ACM Lal thereafter that there was no further trouble with the barrage of en Arty, thus stabilizing the situation in Poonch. There were no losses in the msn and the CO of this unit, Wg Cdr VB Vashist was awarded the MVC. Successful preplanned interdiction msns include the following:-
(a) Successful Attacks on the Oil Refinery at Attock.On 6th and 8th Dec by Hunters of 20 sqn fromPathankot rendered it non operational for the rest of the war. The CO, Wg Cdr CV Parker was awarded the MVC. The other successful raids by the three Hunter Sqns of Pathankot include Rly Marshalling yards in Lahore- Rawalpindi, Montgomery-Raiwind-Lahore and Sialkot sectors. (b) Sulaimanke Headworks. The sukhois from Halwara and Mysteres from Sirsa were used to effectively interdict Pak Army reinforcements, especially armour towards Sulaimanke Headworks. Mysteres destroyed a train with about 50 tanks, between Okara and Montgomery. A Train carrying fuel was destroyed at Chistian Mandi. Attacks on Changa Manga forest by Sukhois and Mysteres set fuel dumps ablaze. 6 AN-12s were used to bomb the forest by night on 3rd, 4th and 5th. Armour along Eastern Siddiqia canal was attacked and disrupted before it came to battle.The rly yards at Pak Pattan and Dunga Bunga were also attacked
(c) Sukkur- Sialkot Rly line. This rly line, running practically along the border, was the main feeder to the battle field. IAF Hunters, Sukhois and Mysteres routinely attacked train trafic and choke points along this stretch, thus restricting reinforcements to the front and movements along the front. (d) Karachi Oil Installations. The bombing of the oil installations was undertaken by 35 Sqn, commanded by Wg Cdr KK Bhadwar,on the ni of 9 Dec. It was coincidental that these attacks coincided with those of the missile boat attacks of the Navy. The broad tasks of his sqn were to carry out interdiction in sp of the Navy, and the other was to bomb the airfds of Karachi. While Masroor and Drigh road were attacked on the 4th, 5th, 6th and 8th Dec, the naval sp msns were not called for till then. His earlier request to strike the oil tanks was turned down by AOC as well as Command. On 9th Dec, he was cleared to engage the Harbour. He took the initiative to task 4 ac for oil strikes, in addition to the 4ac tasked for Drigh Rd with each ac carrying 6x1000 lb bombs. This attack on the oil field was a success, as confirmed by his crewmembers, the residents of Karachi port as well as the AOC Pune. But sadly, for some unknown reason, the CAC had not formalized the target tasking of the oil storage tanks. Hence the aura of mystery remains as to
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whether the Navy was the sole igniter of Karachi or if Bhadwar‟s 4-ac also contributed. Pak almost immediately felt the effect of these raids. An IAF recce ac that penetrated as far as Qatar reported that large-scale road tanker movement was seen, bringing oil from Iran to Pak.
Close Air Support 20. The IAF response to CAS requests was prompt at all times. As in the East, the TACs had dedicated Sqns under them, close enough to undertake tasks in the respective Corps zones. Fighter ac, mostly Hunters, Mysteres, Sukhois and Maruts took on these msns. In a few cases, Mig 21, Gnat, Vampires and Harvards were used. The non-fighter class ac, which most vigourously carried out this task, was the AN-12 and without any casualty. Majority of the IAF fighter ac losses was during the CAS msns, from grnd fire. While the effort on the first day was only 23 sorties, it rose to 81 sorties the next day, still perhaps lower than what was possible. Most of the CAS demands were however made due to a state of urgency on the grnd rather than to project integrated firepower of air-land war. Hence, most of the effort was immediate than pre planned. A fairly good account exists of the CAS effort rendered in Chhamb, Poonch, Shakargarh, Kasur-Hussaniwala, Fazilka – Sulaimanke and Longewala, the one at Longewala being the most interesting. 21. Longewala. On the ni of 4 Dec, a regt of en armour and supporting infantry from Pak 18 Div made a dash for the Ghotaru-Ramgarh road, by passing the small Indian post at Longewala, manned by a coy of 23-Punjab, under the comd of Maj Kuldeep Chandpuri. While this was reported to HQ 12 Div, they did not initially believe it as they were expecting an offensive from N and not west. The Pak Armr halted short of Ramgarh and turned back aparently to facilitate the join up of follow on tps. This led to another warning from Longewala. When the IAF was asked to investigate the next morning,a recce by two Hunters and an AOP Krishak ac confirmed the presence of Pak T-59 tanks. The four Hunters from Jaisalmer launched 17 sorties and destroyed /damaged 40 tanks exposed in the desert, with their 68-mm Rockets and 30 mm Guns. The gun rounds presumably worked well against the fuel barrels that most of the tanks were carrying. Fortunately, there were no Hunter casualities, and the maint staff at jaisalmer turned round these 4 ac at record speed. 22. Chhamb. In this sector, the grnd forces of 10 Inf div were caught in the wrong foot, since they were switched to defence from offence at a late stage. The army had to make a retreat to the east of R Munnawar Tawi, on 6 Dec, where they had their secure defences. The demands made on the AF were will below the 45 per day available in that sector. A total of 78 sorties were flown in the first three days. It was only after the front had stabilized on 7 Dec, with the river serving as the bomb line that the CAS effort was stepped up to around 40 sorties a day. En armour and tps were attacked, sheltered in nearby mango groves. Canberras undertook a ni raid and managed to neutralize a fuel/amn dump behind the front at Chhamb. By 9 Dec, the pressure on the grnd forces eased and no Pak thrust materialized. In retrospect, the air action was responsible in stabilizing the situation. Had the grnd plans not been changed and had the full compliment of air power been employed, perhaps the territory would not have been lost. 23. Poonch. Simultaneous with the Chamb thrust, Pak‟s 12 Div made a probing attack with a view to cut off the Indian territory S of Pir Panjal. Air sp was promptly asked for and IAF initially tasked the Vampires at Srinagar. These were not effective due to the hilly terrain. Subsequently, Four Harvards, also from Srinagar were tasked, which proved to be more effective than the Vampires. The real punch in Poonch was delivered by the six AN-12s which
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dropped 40t of bombs by night, to cut off a feeder road in Pak territory, and promptly stabilized the situation. 24. Hussainiwala Br. Pak 106 Bde Gp launched an attack on the ni of 3 Dec to capture the br. Own Armr that was sent to assist was caught west of the river when Pak shelling accidentally destroyed the br. IAF flew a total of 24 sorties mainly Su-7s, that assisted in the safe withdrawal of own armour and tps to East bank by night fall. 25. Shakargarh Bulge. A major off by Western Command was planned, mainly to relieve pressure on the North. All the three divs ran into extensive mine fields and well prepared Pak defences. AF was called upon to detonate the minefields by bombardment. This proved counterproductive since it created huge crators and made the unexploded mines more sensitive. The only achievement of the air action was to deter PAF from attacking our bogged down tps. 26. Sulaimanke Headworks. Pak 105 Bde gp attacked Indian positions on 4 Dec and captured the Br over Sabana drain, east of Sulaimanke head works. Determined stand was made by the Army to check further advance and regain lost grnd. The IAF played its part by carrying out both CAS and BAI. It was the BAI that paid better dividents in preventing any further advance.
PAF ACTION 27. The analysis of war in the West in “Fizaya” calls the entire exercise a strategic blunder. The force inequality was heavily weighed against PAF; the preemptive strike by 28 ac was an exercise in futility, as the basic concentration of force was not applied on any airfd. Thereafter, the CAO effort was not sustained with seriousness. The emphasis shifted to CAS without ensuring even local FAS. Air effort was not optimally utilized in any particular campaign. The “Bengali factor” which refers to the large scale exit of Bengali workmen, is also quoted as a reason for poor serviceability, thus adding to the reduced air effort.
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PART IV : SUMMARY AND LESSONS OF AIR WAR
IAF 28. The IAF flew a total of 7346 sorties in all, averaging more than 500 sorties per day. Of these, 5400 were by combat ac. The CAS effort was nearly 60% of the combat effort. Gnats, totaling 1275 flew the highest number of sorties, followed by Mig21s. While the CAO was a resounding success in the East, the same is not true in the West.CAO msns claimed the highest attrition, followed by CAS. CAS did yield beneficial results but the attrition was high, not only due to the inherent risk from grnd fire, but also due to the numerous attacks carried out by each msn. CAS with Navy was inadequate, both in terms of anti shipping strikes, as well as MR. The interdiction campaign was very successful. In the West, 50 trains were successfully destroyed/damaged and an addl 20 locomotives and 400 wagons. Nine rly jns were attacked and neutralised. In the East, about 180 river craft were either destroyed or damaged. 29. Inadequacies and Mistakes made. Some glaring inadequacies /mistakes by IAF deserve mention:- (a) Debris Damage. 40% of ac on strike msn suffered debris damage according to
ACM PC Lal. A review of sound fusing policy, as well as delivery techniques was needed. (b) Repeat Attacks. Majority of the losses during CAS msns was due to very many
repeat attacks, while carrying gun/rocket attacks. This is true even in the more famous attacks at Longewala, Governors‟ residence and the riverboats. While these three did not result in a single casualty, those in the TBA were not so lucky.
(c) Target Weapon Matching. The Migs and Hunters carried out attacks
against runways with rockets (57/68mm). It took two days to realise that bombs were more effective! It surely points towards the need for better trg in peace.
(d) Lack of LL Radar Cover. This was a serious limitation in the AD network. This
resulted in wasteful CAP msns and failed intercepts. This was compounded by the lack of suitable AA missiles, except in case of Mig 21
(e) Trg in Missile Handling. Majority of the K-13s missed their targets during that
“once in a lifetime opportunity” The Russians pointed towards inadequate trg in radar and missile handling. Of the three success stories of the K-13, one was sadly an own goal.
(f) Lack of Ni Stk Capitulatory. This was a serious limitatiom with IAF. The only
ac with this cap was the Canberra. The ni stk by AN-12s in Poonch sector was an expected bonus.
(g) Photo Recce Cap. Though the Canberras had this capability, it could not be
employed prior to war since it did not have oblique cap. Also, it was vulnerable to grnd fire/ en CAP in the tac PR role. Though SU-7 had the cap to carry a photo pod, it was at the expense of a weapon stn.
(h) Air Combat Tactics. In whatever intercepts that materialized, the IAF pilots
tended to protract the combat, not always to their advantage. There were a few cases of ejection due low fuel, resulting from this very reason.
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QUESTIONS 1. What were the shortcomings faced by the IAF? 2. Explain the air strat of the IAF. 3. Enumerate the interdictions carried out by the IAF in the western front and their successes. 4. Bring out the inadequacies and mistakes made by the IAF.
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CHAPTER 6
POST WAR EFFORTS
Rd to Shimla Agreement 1. After the 1971 war and the liberation of Bangladesh, the process of normalization between the two countries of the sub- continent was very painful and slow. The reasons for this slow and cumbersome process lay in the deadweight of past history as well as the time-consuming process of psychological readjustment, particularly on part of Pak, to the new realities. 2. In fact, Bhutto in his very first message to the nation on 20 Dec. 1971, after taking over as President of Pak spoke of „revenge` to undo „the temporary humiliation` that Pak had suffered. Bhutto declared: “We will fight and we will continue to fight for the integrity of Pak, the choice before Indians was to either accept laws of justice and equity or to face implacable enemy for all times because the people of Pak, their spirit, their determination, can never be compromised, no matter what happens in temporary affairs. So we will fight for one Pak”. 3. Bhutto had recognized that balance of power in the sub-continent had undergone a fundamental change. There were a number of factors, internal and external, which tended to militate against a fast and smooth return to normalcy in the sub-continent. The path towards reconciliation, if one could say, was strewn with thorns. 4. The immediate question which occupied the decision-makers in the three countries India, Pak and Bangladesh related to the clearing of debris-political and human-of the war of Dec1971, which were:
(a) Pak was concerned about the return of PsW and also return of territory occupied by India in the Western Theatre in Punjab and Sindh (b) For Bangladesh it meant recognition by Islamabad as a separate entity, repatriation of so called Biharis (Non-Bengalis in Bangladesh) who had opted for Pak and repatriation of Bengalis stranded in Pak (c) India was interested in the question of durable peace in the sub-continent- normalization of economic and political relations between India, Pak and Bangladesh. This obviously meant New Delhi gave top priority to Pak‟s recognition of Bangladesh. The only major issue which India expected to gain advantage was that of Kashmir. India was interested in getting Pak to accept a solution of Kashmir as a part of package arrangement for normalization of relations. However on realizing that this objective could not be attained in the short run, it wanted to freeze the Kashmir issue and make Pak accept a new line of control in Kashmir distinct from the UN imposed cease fire line in 1949 which had survived the war of 1965.
5. It is therefore evident that the priorities of Pak on one hand and India and Bangladesh on the other were very different. While Islamabad was primarily interested in the return of PsW and the lost territory, New Delhi and Dacca insisted that these problems could not tackled without Pak's prior recognition of Bangladesh. This was essential because Dacca would have to be a party to any agreement with Pak, as technically Gen Niazi had surrendered to the joint
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command of India and Bangladesh forces on 16 Dec 1971. Hence, any matter pertaining to the Eastern Sector had to be tripartite negotiations between these three countries. This effectively meant that unless Pak recognized Bangladesh there were no early prospects of return of PsW. To this, there was another ticklish problem-the war crimes trial of some PsW by Bangladesh. In certain ways, this was the thorniest problem of all. Pak insisted that the return of territory and repatriation of PsW be sorted out bilaterally and that the participation of Bangladesh was not necessary. This stand was based on the argument, that Indo-Bangladesh joint command was fictitious since Bangladesh had not even come to exist at the time of surrender. It was only with utmost difficulty that the wide gaps between the negotiating postures of the concerned parties were bridged and acceptable solutions were found for the problems. 6. One basic issue on which both India and Pak agreed was that Indo-Pak talks had to be on bilateral basis without the interference of any third party. This was a positive gain for India, since she was advocating a policy of bilateralism so as to keep the super power influence to the minimum. The acceptance of the concept of bilateral talks indicated two major aspects:
(a) Pak disenchantment, with its alliance with great power and third party friends for their inability to intervene to save Pak from disastrous defeat. (b) It reflected a degree of understanding within Pak of the changed power realities in the sub-continent and that India was not ready to talk about the problems of war except on bilateral terms.
7. The first official initiative between the two countries came on 14 Feb 1972 in a letter addressed to UN Secretary General, Dr Kurt Waldheim, by Samar Sen, India‟s permanent member at UN. In that letter India told UN that it was ready to have talks with Pak at any time, at any level and without any pre-conditions. 8. The Pak government‟s efforts to bring international pressure to bear on India and to start negotiations with Bangladesh did not bear fruit. In early Mar 1972, Bhutto called for immediate summit talks with India to deal with the questions left over by the war of Dec 1971. A preliminary meeting at the official level to pave the way for summit talks was held at Muree on 26 April. The Paki team was led by Mr. Aziz Ahmed, then secretary General OF Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Indian team was led by Mr. D P Dhar, then Chairman of Policy Planning Committee in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They „settled the modalities‟ for the forthcoming summit negotiations.
9. The Indo-Pak summit talks, scheduled for late May or early June, had to be postponed till the end of June because President Bhutto suddenly decided to undertake a 13-day tour of 14 African and West Asian countries (29 May to 10 June, 1972). Three major reasons, which seem to have prompted Bhutto to undertake this trip and thereby postpone the summit negotiations by a month.
(a) He wanted to strengthen his hands during negotiations with Mrs. Gandhi by getting several Afro-Asian countries endorse Pak‟s stand, particularly on PsW and return of territory.
(b) He probably wanted to impress upon his domestic constituents of his standing in the international arena and his considerable talents as a diplomat.
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(c) Bhutto may have wanted time to ponder over the issue of recognition and negotiations with Bangladesh. This had become important because both New Delhi and Dacca had made it clear that no decision could be reached on the issue of PsW without the participation of Bangladesh.
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PART I : SHIMLA AGREEMENT
10. The Indo-Pak summit meeting was held at Shimla on 28th June 1972, and the Shimla Agreement hammered out and signed during the early hours of 3 July 1972. The significance of the Shimla Summit lay in the fact that unlike the earlier attempts at Indo-Paki summitry, this meeting was aimed, at least from the Indian point of view, at formalizing a fresh structure of peace in the sub-continent based upon the new and demonstrated power realities in South Asia The discussions at the Summit could be broadly divided into two categories
(a) Those arising out of the war of 1971. This category included issues like resumption of diplomatic ties, overflights and communications, etc. But the most important issues in this category related to the question of withdrawal of forces from occupied territory and the return of PsWs and civilian internees. (b) The more basic issues, which had all these years, obstructed normalization of relations between India and Pak. The more basic issues related to the problem of Kashmir and an agreement between the two countries to renounce the use of force in settling disputes with each other.
11. This situation in 1971 when India won a decisive victory on the battlefield and held a number of trump cards, including over 90,000 POWs and over 5,000 sq. miles of Paki territory. These, New Delhi felt, were adequate bargaining counters to get Pak around to accepting the status quo in Kashmir and formalizing it as part of the Indo-Paki agreement. It was with this end in view that the Indian strategy of a „package deal‟ was evolved which was to include a settlement on Kashmir on the one hand and a settlement of the PsW and withdrawal of forces issue on the other thus satisfying both parties. New Delhi believed, and with some justification, that its strategy had a good chance of success since India had also made significant strategic gains across the old cease-fire line in Kashmir.
12. The very divergent objectives of India and Pak and their respective strategies that one can fully comprehend the magnitude of the difficult task that faced the negotiators at Simla in June 1972. It was no wonder, therefore, that at one stage the negotiations, conducted primarily by officials in spite of the fact that the two heads of government were present, seemed to be hopelessly deadlocked. In fact, on 2nd July President Bhutto announced at a crowded press conference that there was as “unfortunate deadlock”. It was a ding-dong game till the last hour of the five-day talks. A dramatic turn was given to the developments when Bhutto made a farewell call on Mrs. Gandhi at 5.30 p.m. on 2nd July 72. It was only at 11p.m that the two leaders could end the stalemate.
13. The Shimla agreement was a limited triumph for both Pak and India. As far as Pak was concerned, its immediate objective was partially achieved. Para IV (I) of the agreement declared that “Indian and Paki forces shall be withdrawn to their side of the international border”. This meant primarily an Indian withdrawal from large tracts of Paki territory, particularly in Sind, occupied during December 1971. India made its point regarding Kashmir in Para IV (ii) of the Agreement which declared: “In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the cease-fire of 17 December, 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this line”.
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14. India was also able to achieve two objectives, which were very dear to it, viz., an agreement renouncing the use of force and adherence to bilateralism in solving Indo-Paki problems. 15. In addition, India achieved the objectives viz., the exclusion of the UN observers from supervision of the new line of control and retention of control over the strategic posts occupied by India during the last war. Moreover, India also made the point that since New Delhi did not accept any area of Kashmir as part of Pak, it would be illogical for it to withdraw from the territory that was legally Indian as a result of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to the Indian Union. Thus New Delhi was successful in incorporating into the Agreement the statement in Para IV (ii) which declared: “In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the cease-fire of December 1971 shall be respected by both sides. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations”.
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PART II : DELINEATION OF BORDER
16. Steps following the Simla Agreement related to two sets of things, firstly, withdrawal of troops from occupied territory, and secondly, expected recognition of Bangladesh in order to speed up the process of normalization in the sub-continent. However, progress of both these issues was delayed, since the ratification of the Simla Agreement and the exchange of instruments of ratification were completed on 04 Aug 1972. It was expected that that the troop withdrawals of troops from the occupied territory would be completed by 03 Sep 1972 17. However, withdrawal of troops from occupied areas, which meant primarily Indian withdrawal from the 5,139 sq. miles of Paki territory occupied in December 1971, was held up because of lack of agreement on the delineation of the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir. New Delhi took the stand that these two processes were inseparable and one could not take place without the other. 18. The major hitch seemed to be the Paki occupation in May 1972 of two posts in the Lipa Valley in the Tithwal sector of Kashmir long after the cease-fire. Paki occupation of these posts were in contradiction of the Simla Agreement, which had defined the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir not as the one which had existed on 2 July, 1972 (when the agreement was signed) but the one which had resulted from the cease fire of 17 Dec 1971. Pak had altered the post war line of control by capturing two posts five months after the cease-fire. 19. India insisted that the delineation of the entire line of control in Jammu & Kashmir be
called for as the old CFL had disappeared because of the hostilities in 1971 and the one established on 17 Dec 1971 had to be properly demarcated. The task of delineation had become important because of Pak‟s violation of the line of control in the Tithwal sector. India as of 17 Dec 1971 held 479.96 sq. miles of territory across old CFL in Kashmir and Pak held 52.57 sq. miles in Chhamb sector.
20. Military delegations led by Lt. Gen. PS Bhagat on the Indian side and Lt. Gen Abdul
Hamid Khan on Paki side met from 10 Aug to 12 Aug 1972, at Suchetgarh and agreed upon the method and procedure for the delineation of the line of control in Jammu & Kashmir.
21. The hitch in the delineation process was more of a political nature than a military one.
The two governments agreed that their representatives meet to exchange views regarding the developments, which had taken place since the signing of Simla Agreement and to resolve differences, if any. The two sides met at New Delhi from 25 Aug 72 to 29 Aug 72. The two sides agreed that the line of control in Jammu & Kashmir had to be delineated along its entire length and respected by both sides without any to the recognized positions of either side. It was agreed that the delineation should be completed by 04 Sep 1972 and the withdrawals of troops across IB by 15 Sep 1972.
22. The delineation talks ran into a deadlock over a small area called Thako Chak with an area of 1.8 sq. km. When the senior military leaders were unable to work out a solution the two Chiefs of Army Staff, Gen Manekshaw and Gen Tikka Khan met in Lahore on 28 Nov 1972 to solve the problem. The delineation was completed on 11 Dec 1972 and the maps were initialed. Thako Chak was returned to India but in exchange Pak received 1.2 sq. miles in Uri sector.
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From the Indian point of view the major gain was the recognition by Pak that the line of control ended at Chhamb and that the line between the rest of Jammu and Pak was the IB. The importance of Thako Chak was that though it was situated in Jammu & Kashmir, Pak captured it not as a result of an incursion across the old CFL, but an attack across the IB between Jammu and Pak. The point involved was not that of a small piece of territory but of a major principle, that the border between any part of Jammu & Kashmir and Pak which was not disturbed by the fighting in 1947-48 should be considered as IB since the state if Jammu & Kashmir had legally acceded to the Indian Union.
23. Thus on 17 Dec 1972 Indian and Paki troops took up their new positions on the
readjusted line of control and the old CFL ceased to exist. The delineation of line of control in Jammu & Kashmir resulted in net accretion of 354 sq. mile territory to India. Major gains made by India were in Tithwal and Kargil sectors.
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PART III: REPATRIATION OF POWs
24. The withdrawal of troops and the delineation of line of control in Jammu & Kashmir constituted important steps towards a return of normalcy in the sub-continent, some major hurdles still remained to be tackled. Among them were the repatriation of PsW held in India and mutual exchange between Pak and Bangladesh of each other‟s nationals. The key to all these problems was the recognition of Bangladesh by Pak and negotiations between the two countries on the basis of sovereign equality.
25. The break up of Pak PsW held were as follows:
(a) Armed forces regular 56998 (b) Para Mil Forces 18287 (c) Civs 23376
26. Bhutto had linked the recognition of Bangladesh with the repatriation of PsW. However, there were domestic pressures regarding recognition of Bangladesh and also there was a Chinese angle to the whole affair, as it had exercised its veto in the UN security council to stop Dacca‟s entry into the world body. In fact Bhutto delayed hoping to gain political advantage
27. The Indo-Pak talks on the joint offer were held in Rawalpindi from 24 to 31 July1973. The talks were inconclusive, and it was agreed that the talks would be resumed after considerations in New Delhi. The second round of talks were held in Delhi from 18 to 28 August 1973. At the end of the talks an agreement was signed between India and Pak. The agreement worked between India and Pak, with the concurrence of Bangladesh, there was to be a simultaneous three-way repatriation of all Pak PsW and civilian internees held in India, all Bengalis in Pak and a substantial number of non-Bengalis who had opted for repatriation to Pak from Bangladesh. The implementation of the Delhi accord in the shape of three-way repatriation process began on 19 Sep 1973. In addition to the three governments concerned, the international agencies like UN High Commissioner for Refugees and ICRC were also involved in this humanitarian task.
28. The forthcoming Islamic Summit, with Pak as host country in Feb 74, provided Pak with
an ideal setting where it could make a magnanimous gesture of recognizing Bangladesh for the sake of Islamic Unity. This was a calculated step to attain three objectives: (a) To silence domestic right wing opposition which was opposed to Pak‟s recognition of Bangladesh. (b) To impress upon the Muslim states, particularly the Arabs, for whose benefit the Summit was apparently being staged, that Pak was making a vital concession in order to make the representative and add to its credibility. (c) The economic compulsions to be on the right side of the oil rich Arabs was expected to count as much with Dacca as it would with Islamabad.
29. A delegation of seven members consisting of the Foreign Ministers of Muslim states flew to Dacca to promote reconciliation between Pak and Bangladesh and to persuade her to attend
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the Summit. The members returned on 22 Feb morning and the same evening Bhutto announced Pak‟s recognition of Bangladesh. 30. A tripartite agreement was signed on 9 April 1974. The agreement primarily related to two issues: (a) The PsW held in India for trial by Bangladesh. (b) The number of non-Bengalis to be repatriated to Pak. 31. The tripartite agreement signed by India, Pak, and Bangladesh on 9 April 1974 formed an important milestone in the history of sub-continent relations. Its major significance lay in fact that the problems of the Dec 1971 war were settled QUESTIONS 1. What were the discussions in the Shimla Agreement? 2. State the benefits of the agreement to each country. 3. What were the implications of the agreement as far as delineation of border was concerned?
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CHAPTER 7
LESSONS LEARNT
Gen 1. The campaign that was conducted for the liberation of Bangladesh in the East and containing our adversary in the West was a great achievement by any standards. While recounting the prog of ops through the 14 day long Indo-Pak war of 1971, one comes across a series of imp lessons for the posterity. Some of these lessons are enumerated in succeeding paragraphs. Selection and Maint of Aim 2 For any campaign to be successful it is imperative that the aim be spelt out clearly. There was a clear political, aim - something that the Service Chiefs had not received in the past. 3. The political aims given to the Chiefs of Staff were:-
(a) To liberate Bangladesh at the earliest. (b) To fight a holding action in the West and in the North if attacked . (c) To make ltd gains in the West as a bargaining pt in case a Pak surprise attack succeeded in capturing any part of Indian territory.
4. Selection of Dhaka as the final obj to meet the political aim in the East was maint throughout and all the ops were directed towards that end. Security and Int 5. In the Western Sect Indian int was inferior to that of Pak. However in the Eastern Sect we had developed an efficient int network with the help of Mukti Bahini and local population which was unfriendly to Pak Forces. Therefore, the drawback of insufficient int from which India had suffered in the past had been overcome this time. 6. Unlike on the previous two occasions this time the nature of security threat and the countermeasures needed to neutr it were clearly discernible to our political and mil planners months in adv. Morale 7. This was a maj battle winning factor. The morale of Indian tps was very high from the word go and continued to be same throughout. This was attributed to excellent leadership of Mrs Gandhi, Mr Jagjivan Ram, the leadership in the Services and of course our dramatic victories on various fronts. 8. On the other hand, Pak had a poor state of morale due to weak leadership, inconsistent policies and lack of faith in the cause of War.
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Surprise 9. Surprise as an imp principle of war was singularly missing specially at the strat level . There were strong indications and incidents, 6 to 8 months preceding the war, which were bound to lead to an open confrontation. However at the tac level both sides expl this principle to gain tac victories. A few examples which stand out are :-
(a) Naval msl attack on Karachi Harbour. (b) Pak submarine torpedoing INS Khukri off the Kandla Coast. (c) Para aslt in Tangail . (d) Use of AN-32 ac for carpet bombing in the Western Sect. (e) Air attacks in sp of 26 Punjab against en armd thrust in Longewala.
Conc of Force 10. The principle of conc of force by all the three services was commendably expl in the East. We conc on liberating Bangladesh at the earliest possible and refused to attack in the West till tps could mov from East to West. Pak, on the contrary, flouted this principle and had to suffer reversals. Cooperation 11. This was a maj contributory factor to our victory in 1971. Apart from the excellent inter services cooperation, coord between the govt and the war machinery was commendable. We were found wanting in this aspect during our previous engagements. At the same time, this aspect was dismal on the Pak side as was borne out by the statements made by some of their Generals. Unity of Comd 12. Despite our excellent rapport among the three services during the war, there is still the reqmt of Chief of Def Staff for strat plg during peacetime and direction of ops. Higher Direction of War 13. Their was an excellent understanding among the then Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi and the three Service Chiefs. This facilitated quick decision making and clear cut directions for the services. Offensive Actions 14. Some of our attacks failed due to incorrect appre of en str and lack of deliberation in plg and mounting such attacks. Calculated risks may be taken while attacking hastily prep defs however deliberate plg and stg management would be essential while dealing with deliberate defs. Interrogation of some of the PW bore testimony that the Indian Army had underestimated
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their str in particular areas and locs. 15. Frontal attacks against en deliberate defs will always prove costly. Therefore, attempts must be made to surprise the en by devp attack from an unexpected direction. 16. Ops in Bangladesh brought out the necessity to master the techniques of clearance of BUAs and well coord emp of all arms. 17. Bold and imaginative emp of heptrs contributed considerably in maint the momentum of our offensive in Bangladesh. Though our resources in terms of heptrs were ltd their emp in a trn ridden with obsts in terms of cnls and rivers often paid handsome dividends. 18. In 1962 and 1965, our objs were mainly def . As a result the initiative wrested with our adversary. However in 1971 except in Chhamb Sect, Indian Army retained the initiative throughout. Dividends Through Mvre Warfare 19. The ops in Bangladesh amply proved the success of mvre warfare. The speed and mob would pay rich dividends in future ops. Emp of Various Arms 20. Mech Forces. Due to reasons of economy certain infantry divs were denied their integral armd regts and instead, were provided armd regts by breaking up cohesive armd bdes. It led to loss of eff of these forces. Therefore it is imperative that inf fmns have their own integral regts and armd bdes are utilised conc as far as possible for better dividends. Moreover with rapid advancement in mechanisation there is a reqmt of having self contained mech forces in terms of SP arty, AD arty and AHs. 21. Arty. There was a reqmt of heavier cal and long rg arty for the Indian Army as against Pak capability. In addn a need was also felt for a suitable SP gun system for mech forces. 22. Engrs. The reqmt of cnl xg eqpt in the Eastern Sect, clearance of gaps in the extensive minefds in the West and tr laying eqpt in the deserts was more than highlighted. Integration of PMF 23. The fighting in J&K sect proves the imp of PMF when integrated with regular forces. The emp of these forces in holding role is strongly recommended to relieve the regular tps for offensive ops. For future ops, these forces should be adequately trained and equipped to fight in synchronisation with regular forces. Contingencies and Res 24. There was a pronounced inclination to conserve forces for some vague distant contingencies instead of committing them on decisive actions of immediate tac imp. For eg. 33 Corps had six inf bdes in its op sect after 07 Dec. However only one bde was emp eff for the offensive. The full combat potential of the fmns was thus not fully utilised
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Indian Navy 25. The IN made tremendous contribution to ops in both the sects however there is reqmt for large ocean going subs in our navy. Emp of IAF 26. One of the maj lessons of 1971 ops is the full expl of the characteristics of air power ie mobility, flexibility and conc of force. However there is a trade off between the grnd forces and the AF and characteristics of both need to be integrated and coord in future ops.
QUESTIONNAIRE Q1. Write a short note on OP BLITZ? What were its obj? Q2. Why did India consider the spring of 1971 as unsuitable for mil ops in the east ? Q3. Give out the strategic options available to Pak and give out the advantages/disadvantages?
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Q4. What were the options with India and what was our assessment of Chinese sp to Pak? Q5. What were the reasons for initial failure of Mukti Bahini? How were they re org ? How did they contribute to overall success? Q6. What was Pak strategy for def of East Pak ? Q7. Why was Indian Army keen on a „Lightneing Campaign‟? Q8. What was the final strategy of Eastern Army Comd in East Pak? Q9. Bring out the lessons on Battle of Hilli? Q10. The SW sect had the shortest apch to Dhaka. Yet the sequence of events that followed indicate some drawbacks. What were the salient pts of the offn in SW sect and bring out the lessons? Q11. Write short note on emp of HB Ops in East Pak and how it contributed to the overall campaign? Q12. In the Western front, mov of I Corps was delayed. What were the factors that led to this decision? Q13. Rann of Kutch was a low priority sect for Pak. What were the trn implications that led to the low priority? Q14. What were the principal reasons for Pak‟s limited success in Akhnoor sect?. Q15. I Corps had undertaken a maj offn in Shakargarh Bulge. What were the imp lessons learnt in the Ops of I Corps? Q16. Ops in Hussainiwala and Fazilka sub sect brought out many imp lessons Elucidate? Q17. Write short note on the lessons learnt in Battle of Longewala from perspective of india & Pak? Q18 . The Para Cdo raid on Chachro was regarded as a huge success. What was the outcome and drawbacks of the op?
Q 19. Write short note on „Op Trident‟? Q20. Write short note on Tangail Air drop and its contribution to overall success? Q21. What were the inadequacies of IAF in Eastern Theatre? Q22. PMF played a steller role in 1971 ops. Give instance of their performances in Western Theatre? Q23. Write short note on the Amph landing in Cox‟s Bazar?
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BIOGRAPHY: FD MARSHAL MANEKSHAW
PART I : INTRO
24. India‟s first Field Marshal Sam Hormusji Framji Jamshedi Manekshaw, MC, popularly and fondly known as Sam, was an epitome of chivalry, leadership and thorough gentleman. Throughout his career, he displayed exemplary moral courage and stood up to his seniors in position of authority to come into his own without any patronage. 25. His ability to relate to human beings of all ages is revealing and worth emulating especially where it pertains to dealing with officers and men in uniform. He was a very person to be approached and get on with, especially if his trust is gained. Possessed of an incisive mind and phenomenal memory, his compassion for his people came from his heart. Always ready and willing to help those who need it, he laid no store by rk or posn to address problems that concern human beings. One of his qualities that endeared him to all was his ready wit and sense of humour which also provided him that extraordinary ability of relating to people. The one lesson that stands out from his career spanning more than four decades is that what is pre -ordained cannot be changed. Thus validating his belief that “Ldrs must also be lucky”. 26. Sam Manekshaw exhibited leadership qualities of high sense of values, total loyalty to the service and the country, firm will to win, far reaching vision, realistic application of the principles of war, originality, decisiveness, conspicuous moral courage, deep concern for the essential reqmts and moral of the tps, rptd stress on noble character qualities and emphasis on a proper org for National Security based on own experiences of other that war experienced and advanced nations.
27. The FM‟s career spanned many illustrious milestones and is entwined with the history of this country. He belonged to the first batch of IA offrs who were trained in India and commissioned into the Army prior to India‟s independence. As Army Chief and Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, he played a significant role in changing the geographical face of the sub-continent & in the process gave to the army, a little more dignity & pride then it possessed when he became its Chief. Post retirement he was on the Bd of Dirs of numerous corporate coys and continued to remain very active till the end.
28. Undoubtedly, the high pt of the Fd Marshal‟s army career was the decisive mil victory over Pakistan in 1971 Indo-Pak war that not only resulted in the emergence of Bangladesh but also more importantly, irrevocably wiped out the bitter memories of the national humiliation of 1962.
29. The personality of Manekshaw was a formidable combination reqd for eff ldrship; a prodigious capacity for wk, a fascinating raconteur with charm and persistence, an irreverence towards red tape, an iron determination, an eye for details plus a strat mind that embraced all, yet imbibed the essence and above all, a shrewd, sympathetic and sincere ability in man mgt that came naturally.
30. The services of this inimitable mil ldr were duly ack by the country, by bestowing him with the award of Padam Bhusan in 1968 and Padam Vibhusan in 1972. The country rewarded him with the exalted rk of Fd Marshal, the first one in the post independence Indian Army. Fd Marshal Sam Manekshaw also had unique distinction of being decorated by USA with the
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„Legion of Merit‟ and is one of the two luminaries to be honoured with the “Trishakti Patra‟, by the king of Nepal. The only other recipient of this award was late Fd Marshal Slim of the Burma fame. He was also the recipient of many other civ decorations which incl the Maharana Pratap Bravery award conferred by the Rajasthan Govt in 1990.
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PART- II EARLY YRS AND MIL TRG
Childhood
31. Fd Marshal Sam Hormusji Framji Jamshedi Manekshaw eventually destined to be free India‟s first Fd Marshal was born on 03 Apr 1914 at Amritsar. His grandfather was known as the Motabava (Grand Man) of Valsad. In 1899, Sam‟s father, Hormusji, qualified as a doctor & got married to Heerabai at Bombay. He could make no professional headway in Bombay and was advised to try his luck at Lahore in the Punjab. The long dusty & hot journey took five days by the end of it, his young wife was in hysterics and cried to go back. On arr at Amritasr, her spirits were dampened by the sight of the more boisterous Punjabi and Sikhs, vis-a-vis; the suave Bombaites & she refused to go further. So they left the train at Amritsar, and there they stayed for forty-five years. Here Hormusji started a medical prac and a chemist shop/pharmacy. In the “First Great war” Capt Hormusji saw service with the Royal British Army in the 2nd Bn, The Royal Ludhiana Sikhs as a “Medical Offr” in the Middle Eastern region of Mesopotamia. 32. The Manekshaw„s had six children, four boys and two girls, and Sam was the fifth child. The Manekshaw children imbibed a very strong sense of honour and integrity from their father. The Mankeshaw home was full of fun and frolic especially when the family got together at Amritsar during their vacations. Sam inherited his love for music & gardening from his father. He got his jolly spirit and forthrightness from his mother.
Schooling
33. Sam had his schooling at Sherwood College, Nainital. His elder brother Jan and younger brother Jemi also studied at the same school, while the two elder sisters studied at the Jesus St Mary‟s Convent at Murree (now in Pakistan) Jemi was a Doctor & retired as an Air Marshal and played a vital role in devp the “Institute of Aviation Medicine” in Bangalore. During his stay at Sherwood, Sam took part in all school activities incl trekking in the Kumaon Hills. He had a penchant for games and was fond of Tennis. 34. Sam learnt a lot from his school days which he commented about in his speech as Chief Guest in the centenary yr, 1969 at Sherwood. He said “Sherwood has taken me to my present posn. First and foremost, I learned to live alone and indep. I learned to fight – from the time I got up in the morning till the time I went to bed. When I went down to wash I could not find my towel, and while I was looking for my towel somebody pinched my soap. This, my young gentleman, happened for eight yrs. I am rather disappointed as I look at you carefully to see so few scared faces. In my time, the guest speaker saw nothing but black eyes. I fought, and it stood me in good stead during the war in Burma, where we came up against the Japanese. What else did I learn from Sherwood? During the war in Burma I went without food for many days. I was hungry. I withstood this and said to myself, “After all I went through 8 yrs of hunger in Sherwood” I was hungry in the morning; I was hungry in the afternoon, hungry when I went to bed at night. Does a similar sit prevail now? I learnt in school to hate my enemies. How?..... Thanks to St. Joseph‟s next door and when we played them on the flats. From the corner of my eye I see His Grace, the Metropolitan, and the Bishop frowning “You should love your neighbor”, is what they say. So we should, though I can almost hear the boys say, except St Joseph‟s”. 35. Sam Manekshaw finished his schooling by standing first in the school and securing Distinction in eight subjects in the Sr Cambridge exam. He was fifteen at that time and wanted to follow his two elder brothers to study in England. However, his father Dr Manekshaw felt that
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he should go to England only once he was eighteen. He was therefore, admitted to Hindu Sabha College, Amritsar.
Joining the Army
36. In a fit of sulks having been denied the promised future, in 1931, when the practice of trg Indian Offr at “The Royal Mil Academy” at Sandhurst in England came to an end & India had its own Mil Academy set up in Dehradun, Sam was amongst the first of Indians to qualify in the exam to gain admission and enroll intro the “Indian Militray Academy” at Dehradun. The first course nicknamed “Pioneers” gave three chiefs to three armies. They were Gen Sam Manekshaw – Indian Army, Gen Mohammed Musa – Pakistan Army and Gen Smith Dun – Burmese Army. 37. San Manekshaw joined B Coy at IMA on 30 Sep 1932. A keen student of English and Maths, he was originally picked up for trg for “Technical” arm. He was therefore enrolled into the “Woolwich” wing for academics, which was created to train offr for tech arms. As Sam failed to acquire the requiste std reqd in Mathematics, he was tfr to the “Sandhurst” Wg meant to train offr for “Non-Tech” arms like Inf, Armd, Arty etc. during trg at IMA, he took part in all professional and extra-curricular activities. He became the Capt of Academy Tennis Team and was awarded the “tennis Blue” on 12 Oct 1933. While he was good at games, he remained “Below Avg” in riding. Dec 1933 ,on reorg of the coys at the Academy, Sam was transferred to D Coy.
38. In accordance with the records held at the IMA. Sam was the „First Gentelman Cadet‟ to seek an outpass to go to Mussorie. During his time in the Academy, Sam was frequently in trouble with the rules and laws of the Academy. Having been promoted as “Cpl” on 19 Jun 1933, he was reverted to the rk of “Gentleman Cdt” on 12 Oct 1933 by the Comdt Brig L P Collins, DSO, OBE on the charge of being absent from parade. He failed to return to the academy in time for the first parade on completion of his liberty to Mussorie. In order to avoid punishment, he had reported sick. Therefore, while he was deprived of his rk of Cpl for feigning sickness he was awarded 21 days confinement to barracks known as “Gaited in Bks” for absenting himself from the parade. He finally passed out as “Gentleman Cdt” from the Academy and was commissioned into the Indian Army. His Coy Cdr, Maj Cowan while writing Sam‟s eport when he was mov to D Coy, wrote, “He can maintain a stiff upper lip in adversity and does not lose heart, and he possesses power of comd, drive and a cheerful personality. He is popular with his fellow cdts. He has taken a prominent part in social & athletic activities and he will be missed by all rks”. The Comdt LP Collins, endorsed in his prog report for summer half 1934 “If he can acquire resp and sense of duty, he has it in him to do well”. Highlights Of Childhood & Mil Trg 39. Sam displayed the fwg qualities during the pd of his early life and mil trg :-
(a) Sense of Honour and Integrity. Sam Imbibed a very strong sense of honour and integrity from his father. (b) Forthrightness. Sam inherited his mother‟s sense of being forthright. He was amongst the very few who could “call a spade a spade”.
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(c) Decisiveness and Pursuance. His decision to enroll into the IMA, on being denied opportunity to go abroad for studies and later excel in the profession of arms highlights his pursuance & decisiveness which manifested during his entire career. (d) Sense of Humour. His sense of humour which had been a hallmark at all stg of his career and had helped him to tackle difficult sit and people with a smile on his face was evident in his conduct in the Academy. As a GC at the IMA he wrote an article for the Journal, titled a “Letter from Manekshaw” published in Jun 1933 issue of the IMA Journal which put his humour and prankster in him, on display. In this article Sam had given a number of tips to a newcomer about to join the Academy on how to conduct himself as also what to expect from life in the first few weeks. In the article, he wrote “I advise you on arr to info the adjt that you are going up to Mussorie and won‟t be back till evening. Till him to have your bath ready on your return. People like myself are termed as srs. The best way for you to show your independence, a characteristic which is admired‟ is to ignore srs, especially those with stripes on their sleeves. When the latter talk to you just put your hands in your pockets and turn your back on them; they will appre you all the more”. (e) Discp. His tryst with discp in the academy shaped his outlook for the future. Having learnt it the hard way, he followed the correct path in the rest of his career. (f) Indep. Sherwood Colloge hostel taught him to live indep. This helped him to handle pressure sit throughout his life most noticeably during the Burma war.
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PART III_- PROFESSIONAL CAREER TILL INDEPENDENCE
Commissioning 40. Fd Marshal Manekshaw was commissioned into the British Indian Army as a 2nd Lt on 04 Feb 1934 in “The Frontier Force Regt”. On completion of his att, as was customary then, with a British Inf Bn the 2nd Royal Scots at Lahore, Manekshaw joined the 4th Bn, 12 Frontier Force Regt also known as the 54th Sikh. 41. A keen sportsman, he was made the capt of the athletics team of his Bn. When inter-coy sports were being conducted in the unit; his coy had no athlete participating in the “High Jump” event. He volunteered to participate and during the competition he not only won but set a new record in high jump for his unit. 42. In 1937, at a social gathering in Lahore he met his future wife, Silloo Bode; they fell in love and were married on 22 Apr 1939. Silloo was a graduate of Bombay‟s renowned Elphinstone College and also studied at the JJ School of Arts. A voracious reader, a gifted painter and an extremely int and interesting conversationalist, she made an admirableable wife and a wonderful mother. 43. Once he joined his unit in the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP), he was put through the normal familiarization, trg & promotion cadres for NCOs in the unit for improving his professional competence in the handling of wpns and tac and taking his rightful place in the Bn. He had to undergo rigorous wpn trg under the watchful eye of a Sikh NCO, Hav Mitha Singh, whom Sam always ack as his “Ustad” (teacher). The Bn was involved in ops with the tribals in the NWFP. Those days this theatre was hyper active and service in the region was part of the „Blooding in‟ of inf bns. This area was considered the best trg grnd in India. Sam went through the paces of carrying out picquetting along hts, ptls, encounters with the Pathans and life under fd conditions. This contributed in laying a solid professional foundation. During his stint with the bn, one incident had a profound impact on his service career. The incident pertained to the annual confd report rendered upon every offr annually. His first report written by his CO summed up his whole year‟s performance in one line where it was written”. This offr, I beg his pardon, this man, may one day become an offr”. He with his resolute determination and hard work proved the contrary by rising to the highest posn in the army. World War II
44. During world War II, Japan entered the fray and swept through East and South Asia. In 1942, 4/12 Frontier Force Regt was moved to Burma, when the Japanese were adv there. Due to Sam‟s ability to speak fluent Punjabi, he was appt the Offg Cdr of a Rif Coy. The bn was part of famous 17 Inf Div. 45. On 22 Feb 1942, his coy was dply on the en side of the famous Sittang Br across the Chindwin. Sam was wounded while gallantly leading his coy in an attk on the Sittang Br to capture this vital en posn. During this aslt, he took the impact of a burst fired from a Japanese machine gun in his stomach & body. Refusing to be evac so that his coy was not left leaderless, Sam continued fighting till he collapsed. His coy won the day. Soon after the action, Maj Gen DT Cowan, MC, GOC 17 Inf Div arr at the scene to congratulate the tps. Seeing his condition, the Gen took off his own MC & pinned it on Manekshaw‟s chest.
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46. Manekshaw suffered nine bullet injuries in the lung, liver and kidneys and was evac to the RAP by his orderly, Sep Sher Singh. The mil surgeon at Pegu, an Australian, was reluctant to operate seeing the hopeless condition. However the orderly would not take no for an answer, while this was going on, Sam regained consciousness and the surgeon asked what had happened to him. Sam replied, “I was kicked by a bloody mule!” The surgeon was so impressed with the tenacity of this soldier and his sense of humour in such a critical hr, that he decided to operate him and Manekshaw survived. At Rangoon where he was convalescing and was put on a strict diet with no alcohol allowed, the British Governor of the territory while on a vis to the hosp asked him if there was anything that he could do, prompt came the request for two pegs of scotch daily before dinner. From Rangoon, he sailed for India in one of the last ships to lve that port before it fell to the Japanese. 47. Once dish from hosp, Sam was detailed to attend the “8th Staff Course”, at the staff College Quetta from 23 Aug 1943 to 22 Dec 1943. On successful completion of the same, he was posted as the Bde Maj of the Razmak Bde in Jan 1944 in Waziristan close to the North West Frontier Province (now in Pakistan). After that, he was posted to another bn, the 9/12Frontier Force Regt (FFR) in Burma which was tasked to adv astride the Mandalay-Rangoon rd as a part of the victorious 14th Army under Gen WJ Slim where he was wounded for the sec time. 48. During the closing days of the war in Sep 1945, Sam was selected as a staff offr to Gen Daisey to Indo-China, where, after the Japanese surrender, he helped in the rehabilitation of over 10,000 Japanese PoW. He was then posted to the Staff College Quetta as GSO-2. Before he could take up this assignment; he was selected by then C-in-C India, Fd Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck to go on a lecture tour to Australia for a pd of six months in 1946. The main purpose of this tour was to bring home to the Australians, India‟s war efforts and the achievement of its Armed Forces as the same was not perceived too well in that region. 49. On return to India, he was promoted to the rk of a local Lt Col & was posted to the prestigious Mil Ops Dte at Army HQ as GSO 1 in MO-3, till then the sole preserve of British Offr. He was the first Indian posted to the MO Dte. 50. In Dec 1946, when the div of assets and Regts between Pakistan and India took place, it became clear that the Sam‟s Frontier Force Regt would remain with Pakistan. Sam was empanelled on the panel of 16th Bn of the Punjab Regt and was posted as GSO-1 Mil Ops -1. Here he served from 01 Jan 47 to 21 Jul 47. On 15 August 1947, Sam was tfr to the panel of 5th Royal Gorkha Rif (FF) and was posted to comd the 3rd Bn of 5th Gorkha Rif but before he could proceed to take over the unit, Pakistan tribals with the help of the Pak Army had attacked part of Kashmir & managed to reach close to Srinagar. This posting was cancelled & he continued to serve at Army HQ. It was thus that the future & first Fd Marshal of Indian Army was denied a chance to comd a bn in the army which was always disappointing for him. Analysis 51. Professional Foundation. Once he joined his unit in the North Western frontier Province (NWFP), Sam was put through trg & promotion cadres for NCOs. He went through rigorous wpn trg for improving his professional competence in the handling of wpns. He was put through the life under hard fd conditions.
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52. Resoluteness. He displayed a great resolve to do well in his career. He imbibed the qualities of standing by his jrs, being a sincere and truthful soldier. He matured as ldr who was self assured, knowledgeable and acted courageously. 53. Lead From the Front. Sam Manekshaw led his men from the front and set personal example whether it was the battlefield or the sports fd. He displayed exemplary courage in the face of the en by taking nine bullets and yet not getting evac lest his coy was left without their coy cdr. 54. Sense of Humour. Sam‟s sense of humour in every walk of life has been a subject of constant appre in the army. The spontaneity of his remarks as with the Australian doctor in Burma when he was fatally wounded won heart of the doctor who instantly operated upon him and saved his life. Such spontaneous repartee with his jrs as well as srs is indicative of his alertness and total attention to the wk at hand. This sense of humour gave him the extraordinary ability to relate to people of all ages.
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PART IV : CAREER POST INDEPENDENCE
55. When the Indo-Pak war broke out in 1947, Manekshaw accompanied VP Menon on his historic msn to Kashmir, to have that state accede to the Indian Union, by getting the then ruler of the state of J&K, Maharaja Hari Singh to sign the “Instrument of Accession”. In Nov 1947, he was promoted to the rk of Col and took over as Offg Dir of Mil Ops. Throughout this critical pd of history, when the princely states were joining the Indian Union, Sam interacted closely with Sardar Patel, key pol ldrs and other imp personalities. In Mar 1948, Sam was promoted to the rk of a Brig and appt the first Indian Dir of Mil Ops (DMO). When the UN brokered cease fire came into effect on 01 Jan 1949, it was under his direct supervision when the cease fire was declared, and there Cease Fire Line (CFL) was drawn. He held this appt during the complete duration of Jammu and Kashmir Ops till 10th March 1952. Considering that both the armies at this pt had British Gen as their Cdr-in-Chief, the DMO had a crucial role to play. He used to brief the PM & Home Minister reg on the op sit, prevailing then. It was as a result of these interactions that greater resp was shouldered by the DMO & this allowed a smoother takeover of the army from the British by the first Indian C-in-C, Gen KM Cariappa. It can be rightly said that the foundation of the Dte of Mil Ops was laid firmly by Sam Manekshaw. In 1949, Sam and KS Thimayya were part of the Indian Delegation to the UN as mil advisors. It was here that he first met Mrs Indira Gandhi, who was on bd the same ship alongwith her father Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru, sailing to Paris. Cdr 167 Inf Bde 56. In Mar 1952 Manekshaw took over the comd of 167 Inf Bde at Ferozpur. It was his first comd assignment after the war. During his comd he displayed the traits of a good & caring Cdr. In an ex with tps , when he was pitched against the 42 Lorried Bde, commanded by his very good friend but an arch professional rival, Brig Hari Budhwar of the cavalry, his bde came out a clear winner. It was here that his dynamic leadership & sensitive handling of his comd earned him the respect of one and all, who came in contact with him. The men & the offrs saw the human face of mil auth in him. This helped in welding them into an integrated cohesive fighting team. The offrs under him were proud of the professionalism instilled by the Bde Cdr & in the manner he conducted himself. While there was informality off the parade grnd, any unprofessional act was unacceptable at all levels. The Manekshaw‟s were avid socialites & were seen at all function in the stn. In 1953, he was appt Col of the 8th Gorkha Rif and he continued to be the Honary Col of the 8th GR till the end of his life. Having finished his comd of the bde, he was posted to the Army HQ as “Offg Dir of Mil Trg” (DMT) from Apr 1954 to Jan 1955. Comdt Inf School, Mhow 57. In May 1955, Brig Sam manekshaw was posted as Comdt to the Inf School, Mhow. He was the first Indian to be posted to that institution. Brig Bertie Stewart, the last British offr to comd that institution had left notes on his assessment of the Sr offr on the staff of the school as a part of his handing over notes for the new comdt in a sealed envelope. Manekshaw tore up the envelope with its contents & decided to make his own assessments. He was an energetic comdt who participated in all activities from sand model dscns to map ex & exs with or without tps. He was equally fond of the sports fd & the club apart from the Mess. Mtg his comd socially & informally, allowed him access to info & the goings on in his comd. Having assessed the wk to be done he assigned tasks to various wg cdrs of the school & commenced monitoring the
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prog. This quality of giving a free hand to his staff ensured that he had enough time to devote to thinking on other imp issues. As a cdr, he made sure that having given out the broad guidelines he left the intricate details to the staff. He rewrote the trg publications for the Indian Army with a team created from amongst his DS by taking into acct the changed circumstances & to suit the obtaining conditions in India. Considering the fact that the DSs were already very busy recasting various exs and dscns, this revision of war office pubs placed an immense burden on them. However, Sam used to sit with his team on all days, in the evenings incl Sundays and would carry on with this work late into the ni. His presence and his conduct was so inspiring that none of DSs ever felt that they were being overworked. He would encourage YO‟s to think indep and boldly. Brig (Retd) Adi K Sahukar recollects his first interaction with Sam as the Comdt, Inf School and had this to say “he addsd us in a vibrant voice, emphasising imp issue of reg attendance, submission of timely home wk, cordial relationship, openness & respectful behaviour”. GOC 26 Inf Div 58. In Nov 1956, he was selected for course at the Imperial Def College, London. On return to India in Dec 1957, he was posted on promotion to take over 26 Inf Div at Jammu. This was very imp comd since it was guarding the axes into Rajouri, Poonch & Srinagar Sects. Here, a spat took place with Mr Krishna Menon, the Def Minister when he vis Jammu. Krishna Menon asked as to what Sam thought about Gen Thimayya, the then COAS. Sam said “Mr Minister, I am not allowed to think about my chief. Today you are asking a Gen Offr what he thinks about his Chief. Tomorrow you will be asking my jrs what they think about me. It is the surest way to ruin discp of the army. Do not do this kind of a thing”. 5. Sam was very humble and always displayed the simple attitude even when he was the GOC of the Div. One afternoon, when GOC was vis the Transit Offrs Mess at Jammu, he saw a young Capt lugging three of his bags and barely managing to cope up. Sam offered to help. When they reached the embussing pt, all present saluted his porter. On inquiring, Sam replied that the gen hangs around here helping people & in spare time, comd this div. Comdt DSSC, Wellington 59. After comd of 26 Inf Div Sam was posted as Comdt to the Def Service Staff College at Wellington to replace Gen PP Kumaramangalam, DSO. All students yearned for his presence to give a brilliant, brief summing up of any dscn on tac and the mil art. In a few humorous words he could explain the crux of hrs of debate and explanations by other DS. While comdg the Staff College, he was cleared for his next rk. Before he could be promoted, Krishna Menon, the Def Minister and Gen BM Kaul, a Kashimri offr with his lineage rooted in the Nehru clan, ordered an inquiry against Sam, charging him to be anti-national. Gen Kaul, with his eyes on the top slot of the army, despite having served for a long pd of service in the ASC was bent upon eliminating all in competition with him. He felt threatened by the professional competence & popularity of Manekshaw with all rks of the army. Gen Kaul & his cohorts actively indulged in encouraging offrs at the Staff College to give evidence against Sam in C of I. Like any other human being, many fell prey to the inducement offered by them. The charges leveled against Manekshaw were, he was westernizing the Staff College through dinner & dances org at the Offrs Mess reg, he was pro British, in that he had the photographs of many British Gens displayed in the offrs mess at the Staff College and one of his DS was not taken to task by the comdt where he referred to a national hero in derogatory terms. The inquiry was conducted by Lt Gen Daulat Singh, Western Army cdr and Col HS Yadav, the principal prosecution witness in the case
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cooked up against him in 1961. Gen Daulat Singh in his final report on the enquiry was extremely scathing about the trumped up charges against Sam Manekshaw. He even indicated that he had been apch by Mr Menon with instrs to ensure that Manekshaw was found guilty. In the end the C of I composed of three Gens of high integrity and commendable force of character dismissed the charges and exonerated Sam. It also recom that those who gave evidence be asked to answer for their conduct. However, before it could promulgate its finding formally, the Chinese intervened by attk in NEFA across India‟s north eastern bdy. Menon was sacked & the Army Chief resigned. During this trying pd of his „Inquisition‟, at no time did he express his disgust or annoyance with anybody. He conducted himself with dignity & grace. He remained calm & composed. That he was saddened by the happenings was incontrovertible. That he did not allow this to interfere in his duties or influence his decisions was certainly a quality of greatness. True greatness of a man reflects in adversity. Those who can continue to remain poised & dignified in difficult times are truly great. GOC 4 Corps 60. Sam was posted to 4 Corps as the GOC on promotion to the rk of Lt Gen from the Staff College. He took over 4 Corps at Tezpur on 02 Dec 1962. He assumed comd at a time when Indian Army had been humiliatingly defeated in NEFA (now Arunchal Pradesh) against China & the morale of the tps was low. The Indian Army came as runner up in this confrontation and the already low morale of the force due to Krishna Menon‟s interference & impetuosity suffered yet another setback. The same day after assuming comd, he addsd a conf of a very shaken gp of staff offr. He entered the room with his usual jaunty step, “Gentleman, I have arr, there will be no more withdrawals in 4 Corps, thank you” and walked out. The charisma that surrounds the man had preceded him & soldier & offr alike knew that the „chosen one‟ had arr. It was as if the dark & oppressive atmosphere had suddenly been lighted & Sam was the bearer of the lt. The soldiers showed faith in their new cdr and successfully checked further ingress by the Chinese. In 4 Corps, new fmn had to be raised to man the border eff. The eqpt was antiquated & of world war vintage. The army was not adequately clothed to fight in the higher altitude of the northern borders. Unacclimatised & lacking basic amenities for survival, the cas due to these factors amongst the tps engaged in fighting were considerable. Lack of suitable rds for quick mov of lgs & other needs were as good as non-existent. Given these circumstances, the task of getting the Corps back into shape was a daunting one. The efforts made by Sam are as follows :-
(a) Given his style of informality & his ability to reach out to all in his comd, Sam was able to restore their confidence, in a very short time, both in themselves & in their cdrs.
(b) He put together a team of offrs to study various issues that led to this sit, he ensured that recce for occu of grnd of significance is carried out by cdr at all levels, recast the plans, war gamed them & issued directives to his subordinate cdrs on the future conduct of war in that zone. (c) The plans of GOC 4 Corps for holding posn on grnd in that sect were guided by principal, that posns held fwd should be sp administratively & held or necessary to hold operationally. (d) At the national level, lgs shortcomings were addsd & tasking & emp of border rd bldg org to construct new rds all along the borders was assigned priority.
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(e) Induction of new fmns was preceded by, positioning their lgs needs on grnd close to them, their acclimatization for ops on high alt & ensuring adequate nutrition to tps op there. (f) The war effort was synergized with other agencies involving indigenous scientific database for better plg. (g) To sustain morale, facilities for transit of tps coupled with adequate handling facilities were put in place. Rly Bd incr the quota of res seats & Indian Airforce instituted weekly courier service for carriage of tps. (h) Local sources were mob and for long term effect, a plan for trg of offrs and men in learning the Chinese language was implemented. (j) Mtn Divs & Mtn Bdes designed & equipped to fight in mountainous country were created. (k) To enable tps to fight on high alt trn, High Alt warfare school (HAWS) was created in Gulmarg. (l) The doctrine & tac adopted by the Chinese was studied in detail. (m) Int gathering against the new en was structured and put into place.
61. He was humane and approachable and had time for all. He took great pain to ensure that no one in his comd was harassed. He firmly believed that lve was a rt and every man must have it as a matter of rt. If this was denied, it would impact morale adversely, apart from forcing indls to adopt unfair means to get their rt. In his thinking, nobody was indispensable yet everyone was resp and would not want lve unless it was really needed. Trusting offrs and men was essential for better camaraderie. In one of the incidents as a Corps Cdr, request for lve of a jr offr on his staff was turned down by the offr‟s deptt head. GOC came to know the cause of his looking so morose. Same called the man‟s imdt superior the next day and told him that he had a letter from the concerned offr‟s home seeking grant of lve to enable him to be present to resolve some problem. The offr got his lve, no feathers were ruffled and everyone was happy. His ability to run a very happy & contented team was legendary. His professional qualities ensured that the team was also a competent one. He was believed to finish his own work in an hour and spend the remainder of the time walking from one office to another, sitting down with the harried jr staff and helping them sort out the problems they were wkg on. GOC-in-C Western Comd 62. Gen Manekshaw was appt GOC-in-C Western Comd with its HQ‟s at Shimla after the tragic death of Gen Daulat Singh in a heptr crash in Poonch in J&K in Nov 1963. He assumed comd of Western Comd on 4th December 1963. Sam reviewed the existing strat against Pakisatan and changed the rigid def start. He recom raising of a new Div for Akhnoor, redefining an offn role for 26 Inf Div at Jammu and raising of an Armed Bde to threaten Pakistan‟s heartland from a new front. At that time, no manual of instr on Mtn Warfare was in existence, GOC-in-C Western Comd, designed an ex with tps to validate the concept of def in mtns.
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63. One imp incident that shows the character of Sam was while attending a party in Srinagar as the Western Army Cdr, an offr commented about the presence of Brig HS Yadav, the man who had been the principal prosecution witness in the case cooked up against Sam in 1961 at DSSC Wellington. He was under the comd of Sam now. On hearing this Sam remarked, “Look Chaps, professionally Kim Yadav is head and shoulders above most of you so forget about trying to catch him out. He just lacks character & there is nothing anyone of you can do about that”. 64. In May 1964, Pt Nehru was critically ill. The than Chief of Army Staff, gen Chaudhari before leaving for Wellington wrote a letter to Manekshaw & left it in a sealed envelope to Gen Wadalia the VCOAS with the instrs that should something happen to pt Nehru, this letter was to be delivered to Manekshaw. On 27 May 1964, Pt Nehru, died. Gen Wadalia read the letter to Manekshaw. The Chief in his wisdom had felt that should Pt Nehru pass away it might lead to sit of strife in the capital & this should entail emp of army to bring the sit under cont. Since, there were no tps loc at Delhi, he had dir Manekshaw to move to Delhi with his adv HQ along with 4 Inf Div from Ambala & 50 Para Bde from Agra. Manekshaw objected vehemently & felt that it could send wrong signals to the polity of country. The state of telecomn being quite primitive thus Sam put down his objections in writing & sent them to Chief while carrying out the orders of the Chief. Once, the new PM assumed office & everything settled down the Govt asked the chief as to why tps were mov in this manner to Delhi. Gen Chaudhary told them that Sam did this on his own intiative. As a consequence, Gen Manekshaw was mov as GOC-in-C Eastern Comd. But later in 1966, when Mrs Gandhi met Sam & questioned him on the episode, he apprised her of his corres on the subject with the Chief. In govt parlance, the case was closed. GOC-in-C Eastern Comd 65. Sam was posted as GOC-in-C Eastern Comd with its HQ at Calcutta on 26 Nov 1964 replacing Gen Kumaramangalam, DSO. Sam considered Eastern Comd as most imp, challenging & threatened because it had to keep one wary eye directed North on the Chinese, another eye had to be kept on erstwhile East Pak which lay in its gut, it had to fight insur in Nagaland which later spread to the Mizo hills and finally it had to watch over the pol volatile states of Assam & West Bengal. As the Army Cdr, he personally used to come on the tele every now and then and „grilling‟ staff offr and cdrs with endless questions about detail. When he vis Sikkim to 17 Inf Div, he went to Nathu la across which Chinese had est a post. Though Nathu la was occupied by some tps from Indian army also, certain trn features on the flanks remained unoccupied. He sent his recom to chief for permanent occu of Nathu la & Jelep la in force. It was thus that the Indian Army adopted a more aggressive fwd posture along Sikkim. His mastery of details was fantastic & he could quote an answer given verbally or in writing months previously, to correct someone who was saying something else. 66. Nagaland. Eastern Comd towards the end 1968 witnessed intense unrest in Nagaland where insur was rife & insur were reg returning after trg in China & bringing in small arms & other wpns to sustain their mov. The insur ldrs would gather their cadres in small gps to exfiltrate from India into Burma & areas bordering with China to undergo trg in „Guerilla Warfare‟. Many innovations were tried out & all these collectively allied to the remarkable endurance, bravery & perseverance of the tps dply gave the local populace more confidence in the security forces. Int flowed in & the culmination was the capture of Mowu Angami, the self Styled Cdr-in-Chief of the insur army in Nagaland and his band who had just returned from China.
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67. Mizoram. In Mizo hills, the problem had erupted sometime in 1967. The insur had a wide base & were reg collecting taxes from population that was spread far & wide in small hamlets. This dispersion, allowed the insur to operate freely and at will. The villagers therefore had a “Hobson‟s Choice”. If they did not cooperate with the insur, the insur would take revenge and if they did not coop with the SF, they would be acted against. This sit pushed the villagers into a deeper crisis and demoralized them. In order to secure the vill against harassment by the insur while at the same denying them their sanctuaries info and so on, and securing the axis of maint of the SF, a plan to regroup many small hamlets lying close to the axis into larger gps was conceived by Sam. Such a plan would face stiff resistance because of the dislocation that it would bring in its wake. It was decided to take the Church into bigger vill or smaller townships and the population shifted into these. This regrouping was carried out once the basic infrastructure was in place for procurement, rxn and distr of food, bldg mtrls and other necessities promised by the army. 68. This was a bold experiment by Eastern Comd and was tried out successfully for the first time. The villagers under this scheme would go out in gps early in the morning for sowing and harvesting crops and “Jhooming” activity, and return before sunset when curfew would be imposed to enable the tps to gd these habitats and prevent extortion. Army offr from nearby units were posted to these regrouping vill as GCC (Gp Centre Cdrs) to oversee the rehabilitation and distr of mtrls and rations to these regrouped vill provided by army and the govt. Since the Civ Adm had virtually collapsed in this area, it was the resp of the GCC to ensure successful implementation of this scheme suitably backed by Assam Rif bns and reg army tps. Medical teams were also positioned in these centers. VVG(Vill Volunteer Gds) were armed with Rif. Trg on these wpns was imparted by a team under the GCC. This helped in making these vill self-reliant, to a degree, for their imdt security needs. 69. Informer nw were put into place by the int agencies. This provided a reg flow of info on the various activities of the insur. Another bold idea that was experimented with was infiltrating vill where these sources op and maint a reg inflow of int. As the tps inducted into Mizoram gen came from peace stns, the need to train tps in “Jungle W and Counter Insur Op” was felt acutely. A div Battle School for this purpose was set up at Vairangte. This school continues there and has upgraded to Class „A‟ Army Est. Because of the radical changes that Sam brought about in the op environment, the MNA (Mizo National Army), the mil wing of the rebels, started targeting him during his vis to Mizo Hills. 70. Manekshaw‟s apch to the insur in Nagaland and Mizoram was very mature and realistic. To him, these were pol problems and the mil could only create conditions in which pol solns could be found by holding talks and so on. Task of the army to achieve ascendancy over the armed insur, measures to win the hearts and minds of the people were put into place simultaneously. Army had to ensure that their dealing with the public were transparent and fair and min hardships were caused to the local population during conduct of ops. No one was above the law and where it was proved that malice was involved in the dealings, severe punishment was meted out to the culprits. 71. He was offg as Army Chief in 1967 when Chinese had their first clash with the Indian Army since 1962. This occurred at the 14,000 ft high Nathu La Pass, in Sikkim. Chinese tps opened fire on Indian tps at Nathu La. The incident escalated over the next five days to an exch of hy arty and mor fire. He was summoned to a mtg of the Cabinet, where everyone present was trying to impress the PM with his suggestion on tackling the crisis. After hearing most of
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the speakers, the Prime Minster enquired whether the Offg Army Chief, until then a silent spectator, had something to say. “I am afraid they are enacting Hamlet without the Prince” he said. “I will now tell you the exact posn and how I intend to deal with the sit”. The timely action and success of the engagement can be directly attributed to the foresight of the Army Cdr Eastern Comd because of which the army was already in situ to deal with any such emergency. The Chinese hierarchy learnt to have greater respect for the Indian Army. The 1962 syndrome had finally been kicked. For his dexterous handling of all the difficult and diverse problems that the eastern army faced and so successfully overcame, he was awarded the Padma Bhushan in 1968. Analysis 72. Perceptive. Sam displayed foresight and indepth understanding of sit while handling issues related to the partition and later put to use his battle skills during the 1947 to 1948 J&K ops and in tackling the insur in Nagaland and Mizoram. 73. Straight fwd. Sam was straight forward and blunt in his apch. A famous incident involving bn emp in the Mizo Hills, who paying perhaps a little more attn to the welfare of its tps and, in the process, a little less than desirable to the op side received a rude reminder that „someone up there‟ was watching, very keenly every move that was made. A parcel of bangles was delivered to the CO with the compliments of the Army Cdr with cryptic note. “If you are avoiding contact with the hostiles give these to your men to wear”. Needless to say, the next few weeks saw a flurry of activity by this bn resulting in another, more soothing msg: “send the bangles back”. 74. Open Mindedness. Sam was one person who did not relate rk to personal int. This singular quality of his enabled him to be a good listener imbibing good advice, factoring it into his decision making & making up his mind. Manekshaw was Col of the Regt of 8 GR. His JCO ADC was to retire shortly. Col RS Pathania, posted on the staff of Comd HQ wanted JCO from his bn to take over. But Sam decided to take his next JCO ADC from the First, Third or the Fifth Bn of the Regt, from whom he never had anybody on his personal staff. 75. Offn Spirit. Sam displayed his offn spirit by changing the role of western Comd and was instrumental in raising of an Inf Div and an Armd Bde in Jammu Sect. 76. Ability to Handle Adverse Sit. When he was made the 4 Corps Cdr during the 1962 debacle, he was able to stabilize the precarious sit. This was also displayed when he was able to handle the Nagaland problem with foresight and maturity. Manekshaw‟s apch to the insur in Nagaland and Mizoram was very mature and realistic. 77. Vision. Now, the Indian Army has changed the role of holding corps to pivot corps. Sam had this vision in 1965 when he changed the role of 26 Inf Div and recom the raising of an armd bde to give an offn content to def fmn. 78. Concern for Subordinates. He got a No of md qtrs built for all rks in the East. This mitigated the problem of long separation of md pers. He also actively encouraged the concept of Central Schools. He planned constr of multi- storeyed complexes. He turned down the suggestion of naming one of the KLP as “Manekshaw” flats. Personal glorification was never his strong pt. To ensure before h/o that all pts that needed rectification or attn could be attended to by the constructing agency, Brig IC Adm was ordered to stay in one of these flats
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with his wife for one week before they were actually allotted to offr. It bring out the deep and genuine concern of Sam for his jrs and indeed the urge to make their life as comfortable as possible. 79. Forgiveness. Sam could forgive any person and he never kept any personal grudge against anybody. This was clearly evident in Brig HS Yadav incident during his tenure as the Western Army Cdr. While Sam was by nature, a forgiving man, he accepted no compromise on professional integrity & competence especially where lives of men were concerned. 80. Pol Handing. Once announcement was made in Mar 1969 that Sam Manekshaw could be the next COAS, appt of MS at Army HQ was also falling vacant. The ongoing Chief Kumaramangalam in dscn with Sam fwd name of Maj Gen BN Sarkar. The Def Minister Sardar Swaran Singh was keen on getting someone else. Sam & Kumaramangalam had a mtg with Def Minister . Sam didn‟t allow Kumaramangalam to wear headgear as this action will lose half the battle. The Def Secy said that Army HQ was reqd to fwd a panel of 3 names from which one had to be selected. Sam imdt gave three names, the minister had little choice but to accept Sarkar as the new MS. Sam was well conversed with the ways of the bureaucracy and always remained a step ahead of them. 81. Strat Perception. As Eastern Army Cdr, Sam had to attend the bi-annual „Army Cdrs Conf‟ in Delhi in Nov 1968. He enclosed his war plan written on a sheet & a half of DO letter paper. He was clear in his strat perception & had the gift to reflect these on paper most succinctly & vividly. He used to say „The Higher the Cdr, further away from the map, must he stand. If this is not done, you will get embroiled in some other man‟s job‟. 82. Unorthodox. Sam enjoyed being playful & unorthodox in his behavior with his personal staff. Once he went for a haircut as a pillion rider on his ADC‟s scooter. 83. Calmness. Another great quality of his was his ability to realize the finality of a sit. Once while vis NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh), someone at staff missed conveying reqmt of a heptr for his return flt to Calcutta from Jorhat. He just smiled and told staff to arng for an Air force aircraft. On arr at Calcutta Airport, since the time of arr had changed, AMS got delayed. Sam sat in a one ton truck of the Army Postal Service. Sam was a very polite & courteous Gen. He never raised his voice but was able to convey his displeasure through dialogue. 84. Integrity. When he was bldg his house in Coonoor, the GOC Madras Area offered to make available one Engr Pl from the Madras Sappers Centre in Bangalore but Sam refused. 85. He was a veritable „one man emp exch‟ & the No of ex-serviceman, offrs & men he managed to fix up in jobs with industrialists friends was legion.
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PART V – AS CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF
86. Gen SHFJ Manekshaw, MC took over the reins of the Chief on 8th Jun 1969 from Gen PK Kumaramangalam, DSO. On being asked for his views on qualities a chief should possess and how should a Chief disch his duties, he replied, “Chief must be popular. He should be genuinely interested in the welfare of his men, should not seek job after retirement, must have his finger on the pulse of his service, must set the pace, must have a vision and direct his energies to realize the vision”. 87. Sam led the Indian Army through one of its most decisive wars. The highlight of his pd as the Chief was the transformation of the army into a competent and modern org and the subsequent war of Bangladesh. On the day of assuming the new role he cut down the flowery language written in the special order of the day and wrote, “I have today taken over as the Chief of the Army Staff. I only expect everyone to do his duty”. This indicated his resolute apch towards his aim of leading the Indian Army into a new era. 88. Consequently, knowing the existing shortcomings, the new Chief‟s imdt pre-occu on assuming the mantle can be cl under two headings. First, the reqmt to better the lot of all rks by constr new and more comfortable accn, improving existing amenities and intro new ones and, to quote his words, to instill in the offr cadre that quality so lacking now – dignity. Second: re-org, re-equipping and regrouping of the army to make it more responsive to the threats the country faced. 89. Decision Making and Change Mgt. Sam as Chief intro many new things and change in the army. However, all these were intro only after views of comds had been obtained. In case where opinion of experts was called for, there was no hesitation in obtaining inputs from them before taking decision. Since this involved a change in the procedure or deviation from it, Sam had a consensus on the matter. He always maint that if changes were not made through a consensus betn fmns and the Army HQ, these changes would not be permt and the next man too would be committed to this change and it would be permt. However, once a decision had been taken, rt, wrong or indifferent, it had to be implemented. At that stage it was beyond questioning. However if changes were needed, than that had to be initiated with reasons to convince him. 90. During his tenure as the chief, Sam brought out the fwg changes :- (a) Ops.
(i) Op Instr. On assumption of the office of COAS, one of Sam‟s first action was to order the revision of all op instr issued to Comd HQs by Army HQ. OP instrs were revised by the middle of 1970 & reissued to the comds.
(ii) Mob. On taking over as COAS, the first change he brought was that in the event of another war with Pakistan, and this would always be a war of Pakistan‟s seeking, the ripostes would not be confined to the West; it would also make its effect felt in the East. To meet this reqmt and also to counter the great advantage Pakistan had always enjoyed because its peacetime cantts are loc near the intl border, whereas ours are loc well in the hinterland, plans were rehashed and fmns were re-loc. Thus it was ensured that the time taken by Indian Army to
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mob for war was considerably reduced and the geographical advantage hitherto enjoyed by Pakistan minimised. This was due to new Chief‟s mental make up and his determination to have everything neat and tidy and meticulously planned so that the mistake made in 1962 and 1965 were not rptd. „I am a simple infanteer and a Gorkha at that‟ he used to say, „and I want everything cut and dried. Complicated stuff is for the intellectuals‟. (iii) Comd & Cont. The next step was the review of op reqmts which also revealed a shortage of fmn HQ without which, in the past, excessive last min regrouping was necessary involving mov of units to a fmn HQ, or for a fmn HQ to assume comd of a new sect and the units loc there. This in turn, resulted in units and the HQ being unfamiliar with each other and with allotted op tasks. So, as the tail started to shorten, new fmn HQ began to rise. (iv) Int. Until 1969, int services were their own masters, pseudo-professional whose incompetence was amply proved during the two conflicts in 1962 and 1965. Imdt after he took over army, he started questioning their org and function. The armed forces were the biggest user of int yet, strangely, they were not represented in the various agencies that had mushroomed over the yrs to collect and collate int. He put fwd proposal wherein he reasoned that service offr should be posted to three diverse agencies. His argument recd a favourable rxn and the proposal was accepted. The excellent assessments the Def Services recd during the 1971 war with Pakistan bear eloquent testimony both to the wisdom of this step and the efficient work of these offr although posted in a domain that hitherto had remained a mystery to friend and foe.
(b) Trg.
(i) Trg Dir. Sam had a clear understanding that instrs or dir issued by him or in his name should reflect his thinking and personality. He felt that his job was to outline his vision in his dir. Thereafter, translation into details to suit the reqmts of various fmns was the job of the Army or Corps Cdr and their staff. On assuming the appt of COAS at Army HQ, he dir that MT Dte to put up his draft „Trg Dir‟ for issue to all concerned. After going through the dir issued in the past, he felt that far too much of details had been incl which was really not necessary. Incl of such details did not allow subordinate cdrs to influence their trg and lve a distinct mark. (ii) Restructuring Trg. Sam had been Comdt of Inf School and was of the view that for Jr Cdrs (JC) & Sr Cdr (SC) Course, greater integration from all arms was necessary to provide value addn to the trg as at that time predominantly instrs from inf were posted there. He therefore bifurcated the Inf School and created a new institution called the College of Combat. The JC and SC Course were to be run by the new college while all other courses pertaining to the inf were to be conducted at the Inf School. Later, after the 1971war, a new course called the Higher Comd (HC) was also added to the curriculums of the College of Combat. At the Inf School, which used to run a Pl Cdrs Course for JCOs of the army it was felt that Jr Ldrs Course was necessary to impart trg to young offrs of the Inf. Initially this was termed as the Jr Ldrs Course and subsequently was modified to be run as the Young Offrs (YOs) Course for the Inf.
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(iii) Mgt of Trg Amn According to „Audit Regs‟ in force at the time, every unit was auth a certain amt of amn of trg. This was issued half yearly and the unit had to expend this before the end of the fiscal yr. Expdr was not related to availability of firings rgs, time to the unit, op commitments of the unit and so on. Once drawn, the amn had to be shown as expended before close of accts for that yr. This was, no doubt based on the logic that this made prod and provn easier. However to streamline this procedure, the main purpose for auth this amn was lost. If the amn was left over, an audit objn would be raised and the unit adm would be shown in bad lt. This gave rise to a No of undesirable prac within the army. In order to obviate the malprac, it was decided that henceforth, unexpended trg amn would be carried fwd to the next trg yr and the unit would demand its next yr‟s auth after taking this into acct. The insp offrs were instr to consider all circumstances, like availability and allotment of rgs after taking into acct the op commitments, before commenting on the judicious use of trg amn by the unit. The Insp Manual which guides insp and staff offrs in carrying out insps, was duly amended and enforced. (iv) Modernisation of RET to Rg CI Firing. Rg Efficiency Tests (RET) replaced Rg CI firing for all units. The erstwhile shooting prac, firing at the anl rg cl, had been designed before the 2nd World War. Considering the fact that warfare or tech of warfare had undergone a sea change, this was very welcome mov. The need for such a change was discussed at the Inf Cdrs Conf, an anl event in the army. The task of redesigning this was assigned to the Inf School Mhow, who designed the new RET and having done extensive user trials intro these into the army. Considering that manpower for new raising had to be found, these RET coupled with electrification of firing rgs, contributed significantly towards this. Not only this, the reqmt of trg amn was also considerably scaled down, thus contributing to lower costs. This apart, the firing prac were so designed that they made firing more realistic and efficient.
(c) Modernisation.
(i) Computerisation. Intro of high tech was a priority with the COAS. It was during this tenture as the Chief that computerisation was intro into the army. A cmptr was first installed in the MS Br where they were asked to process detls of all offrs and pgme their data into the cmptr. Not only this, it was meant to simplify the career progression and posting of offrs. (ii) Armr & Mech. The army needed modernization. First in priority, were the armd regts. While every inf div was auth an integral armd regt, most of them did not have one while Pak was busy importing armr and refurbishing its old stks. The COAS undertook the fwg steps :-
(aa) Vijayant Tks. The prod of Vijaayant tks was incr and Maj Gen Kini of the EME, who had served as his Brig EME in Eastern Comd, was posted to the factory to oversee this. Increment in tk regts also was accompanied by a suitable incr in sp eqpt like ARFV, BLT and other eles. (ab) Tk Trawl. The COAS on his vis to the USSR had witnessed emp of „Trawl Tks‟ which help clear mines with significant speed. The Armd
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Corps was quite taken in by this and was also keen to induct this eqpt. Sam facilitated the induction of these into the IA.
(iii) Mech Bns.
(aa) The armd div and bdes had inf bns op on Mod L auth to them. This mod entitled inf bns incr tps to keep up with mvre of the tks. This notwithstanding, these bns were sadly lacking in matching mob with that of tks. It therefore became imperative to provide this capability to the inf to allow them to perform their task better in sp of the armr. The COAS ruled that as most of the „First‟ or the sr most bns of inf regts had served with the lorried bde, they would be most suitable for conversion to Mech Inf. (ab) He dir procurement of ATGM so that new eqpt was inducted into the army and later the same could be indigenously devp by DRDO. Thus, he looked ahead with a vision that made him an outstanding ldr. (ac) As far as eqpt was concerned, both wheeled and tracked APC were imported again from the Eastern Block Countries. While tracked APC „Topaz‟ were provided to the inf bns of the armd divs while the wheeled APC „BTR‟ and „SKOT‟ were given to the inf bns of armd bdes.
(iv) Sp Arms & Service.
(aa) The other sp arms and services of the army recd new and improved eqpt to make up for defi and to replace antiquated eqpt which army had been making do with for ages. The Sigs Corps had better radio sets and other comn eqpt. The Corps of Engrs recd better bridging eqpt, mine laying and mine breaching eqpt. The Research and Devp Org was dir to prod a spl shoe for an inf man when negotiating a mine-fd to min, if not obviate altogether, the deg of injury if he stepped upon a mine. (ab) The EME had much needed replacements of rec vehs. Now, with these, it was possible to rec damaged vehs where, on the spot repair was not possible during battle, so that they could be evac to wksp in the battle area, repaired quickly and returned to the user.
(v) Spares. In the past, while importing eqpt, a maj shortcoming in the plg had been that the problem of spares was not envisaged. Consequently, after some time the eqpt would become a white elephant, needing constant attn and maint, but unusable for lack of spares. Sam knew about this and always insisted on the requisite spare being procured with the imported eqpt. Being a switch from past prac ,this was resented, but accepted eventually. The advantage of this step became apparent during the 1971 war and its aftermath. (vi) Mgt of Rk Profile of Armr. One of the more significant fallouts of the incr in armd regts was the hastening of promotions in the Armd Corps. Till then, these offr were 2-3 yrs behind their compatriots in other arms for promotion. Sam, having analysed their promotion avenues, wrote to some 20/25 offrs to convert to
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the inf so that they could earn their comd rk earliest. Most of them accepted his proposal and joined various Inf Regt. Before they joined, letters had already been written to the Cols of these regts to give these bright offr a chance and help them in making a mark for themselves in these regts. (vii) Preserving Affilation and Making Up Manpower for New Raising. It was made clear that Inf Bn on Mod „L‟ would continue to be part of their parent regts. One good thing that came out of this was, that these bns who thus far had four rif coys could shed one of these to be compatible with the org of the armr regts who op with three sqns. This would help in better affiliation and sp apart form addl manpower that was thus rel for other raisings. (viii) Preserving „In Service Life‟ of Eqpt. In mech unts, tr mileage used up by units forms an imp determinant of the „In Service Life‟ and fitness for war of the eqpt or that unit. Considering that this eqpt had to be tptd for fd firing, maint, ceremonial displays and so on, a lot of mileage got taken up in these activities. In the past, tk regts used to mov for fd firing with their complete eqpt. The rgs availability being restd to a few rgs only, meant their having to travel from all over country to the specified area for firing. Two imp changes were brought into effect. First, iden of suitable As as addl firing rgs was ordered and more land acqd to improve rg availability. Secondly, as this was a consequent of Sam‟s vis to the erstwhile USSR, procedures were formulated to nominate one third of the eqpt held by these units to be earmarked as trg eqpt. Thus, whenever the unit had to carry out trg, only the „Trg Eqpt‟ mov out as opposed to the whole rgts proceeding as was the prac hither-to-force. (ix) Arty Modernisation. The lt regts of the arty, which were equipped with hy mors were re-org and extra manpower that they held was shed to carry out new raising. Newer caliber guns with longer rgs and heavier wt were intro. The SP arty in the armd div was upgraded by providing matching mob to them to keep pace and provide intimate sp to the tks in battle. This apart, mtn guns prod was enhanced to redress shortages in the mtn fmns. (x) AD Modernisation. Newer rdrs with better capabilities and newer more lethal guns were brought in. For mob ops AD gun mtg on tr APC chassis were auth. Better gun cont rdrs and fire cont sys were imported to provide eff arty sp.
(d) MS Matters.
(i) Str of Offr Cadre. (aa) It was becoming increasingly apparent in 1969 that army was not attracting the best mtrl for offrs or other rks. This was for a variety of reasons, the principal one being lack of sufficient attraction in the terms the service had to offer. Also other services incl the corporate world, offered far better terms and conditions.
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(ab) Furthermore, the world was becoming incr materialistic. Who wanted to join a service where the pay was a pittance and you were subject not only to the laws of the land, but also the Army Act. (ac) Hardest hit was the offr cadre. Existing defi were being further accentuated by the fact that a large No of offrs were seeking premature retirement to enable rehabilitation outside while the going was good. The Govt had sought to solve the impass by lowering entrance std so that plenty of entrants could qualify and premature retirement was rarely gtd. More or less the same solns were applied in the case of other rks. To Sam, the answer lay not in lowering std as this meant accepting inferior mtrl, but in improving terms and conditions so that better mtrl, hitherto reluctant to enroll, would be attracted. This view was proj to the Govt very quickly. (ad) The new Chief‟s conviction that he was not willing to accept dissatisfied or unwilling workers in the army was mooted. These must be permitted to go when they soasked as it was better to wk shorthanded rather than carry passengers. On this matter, there was considerable opp from the govt whose views were that this would mean that we were encouraging further defi in an area where considerable shortage already existed. The second objn was that the Govt spent huge sums of money on the trg of offrs and if someone could just get up and go whenever he wanted to, meant waste of expenses. There were, of course, valid reasons, but Sam insisted on having his own way for the overriding reason that he refused to retain people who were unwilling to serve.
(ii) Stress on Performance. Whenever he vis fmns and units and whenever he addsd offrs he would tell them quite bluntly, without mincing his words, about all that was wrong with the offr cadre. Undesirable qualities that were creeping in, like telling lies, career consciousness resulting in a tendency to put self before the service, undue sensitiveness resulting in an inability to take a rebuke or advice, subservience, and so on. „if it is in your kismet to go high, no one can stop it‟, he would say, implying that everyone should do his job and not worry about the impression he created. (iii) Postings. Posting of offrs was another irritant that reqd imdt cure. There were three main objns. First: not enough warning betn an offr getting his posting order and actually moving. Second: a feeling that not everything was above board in the matter of choice posting. Third: there was considerable ignorance among the offr cl about the guiding rules and principles upon which posting were gen based. All these matters were settled very quickly. In one of the first conf he chaired in Army HQ as Chief, he directed the MS to give betn one and three month‟s notice to offrs prior to a mov. At the same time, knowing the underlying reason which had earlier forced the MS to reduce the warning pd (the pulling of string to get changes made), he also dir that once a posting order was issued it would not be changed without ref to him. (iv) Delhi Belt Posting. When he took over as COAS, there were many offrs who had been in Delhi for as long as 8-10 yrs continuously on one pretext or the other. He dir the MS that list of all such offrs who had been in Delhi for more than
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3 yrs was to be drawn up Dte wise and put up to him alongwith their last tenure in a fd area. All such offrs were to be mov out within the next 2 months and no dispensation was to be provided to them. Dispensation would only be provided by COAS on the merits of the case. All PSO would submit the prog report to him in the conf. once these orders were issued, there was pandemonium amongst the rks of these offrs who started seeking pol, bureaucratic and influential patronage to enable them to continue in Delhi. When this was brought to the notice of the chief, he ordered the AG and the MS to initiate discp action against such offrs who were seeking patronage from unauth channels. Once this msg went out to the environment there was drastic reduction in such requests and most of the offrs were forced to lve the „Cushy Jobs‟ that they held in Delhi. (v) Retirement Sys for Offrs. The retirement sys for offrs ensured retirement of offrs at a relatively young age. While Majs and Lt Cols retired at 48 yrs of age, Col could carry on till 50 yrs of age. Brigs serving in the arms and sp arms, retired on attaining the age of 50 yrs. While Maj Gen were allotted to serve for two tenures each of two yrs extendable by one more at the discretion of the Bd or 52 yrs of age whichever was earlier, Lt Gen were on similar terms as Maj Gen except that they retd at 54 yrs of age. In the case of Army Cdrs, the sys was the same as for other Gen Offrs except that they retd at 56 yrs of age. The Chief would serve for 3 yrs or till the age of 58 whichever was earlier. This sys ensured that leadership in the army remained young. Sam felt that the sys was quite unfair especially since no second career option was available thereafter. He therefore proj a case to have a sys in place where age and not tenures should be the criterion for retirement. Thus offrs upto the rk of Col would serve till 50 yrs of age and Brigs were to retire at the age of 52. Similarly, Maj Gen could now serve till 54 yrs of age while Lt Gens retd at the age of 56 yrs. No change were made for the Chief‟s tenure. (vi) Int Appln of Auto/Cmptrs. To make computerisation/ auto eff, numerical values had to be assigned to various qualities that would be judged in the writings of the confd reports. A new ACR form was designed that incorporated all these qualities that were to be reported upon. However Sam opined these numerical values should stop at the rk of Lt Col, which at that time also used to be the rk of comd of a bn and not be applicable to gen offr incl brigs. If numerical values are assigned to Gens, the Govt will say where is the need for a selection bd. This advice was strictly followed and remained so till mid 80s.
(e) Constr Wks.
(i) Prior to the end of the fin yr 1968-69 the army was allotted, on an avg, Rs 50 cr of constr wks. Each yr approx seven to eight cr was surrendered as unexpended bal. Sam dir that henceforth not only would the army not surrender any allotted amount but would continually ask for more money. During the course of the next few yrs, while he remained Chief, he never let the QMG and E-in-C forget this and in the process, the army expdr on constr jumped to 95 cr and new cantts mushroomed in places hitherto considered fd areas. (ii) Realizing the growing scarcity of land for constr purpose, Sam had issued instrs as soon as he had taken over that henceforth all constr would be of the multi
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storey type rather than the bungalow type of house the army had been used to in the past. Apart from better utilizing the ltd land that was available, multi-storeyed flats provided added advantages of security and also less expdr on maint by servants, gardeners and the like. (iii) On his insistence, each new cantt was planned as a self contained colony with its own shopping centre, play grnds and parks, cinemas, hosps and schools. He would insist on broad rds with proper lighting.
(f) Welfare.
(i) Uniforms. (aa) The nursing offrs who were wearing outfits designed during the Second World War were given new uniforms, which gave them a smarter and a distinctive look. He emp the services of a foreign fashion designer for the same. (ab) He intro terrycot uniforms for the army. Till then, uniforms made of OG cellular cloth for shirts and OG drill cloth for trousers were worn. They were very difficult to maintain and uncomfortable. (ac) The steel helmets were cumbersome and unwieldy hence they were redesigned. (ad) He also changed the full sleeves to half sleeves to incr the smartness.
(ii) Hiring of Civ Accn. In Delhi, the wait for md qrs was long & suitable accn was not available on rent. He sought govt approval for hiring of accn and that to at rates higher than those admissible at that time to the central govt employees. He thus ensured that his offrs and men lived in comfort. (iii) Med Facilities. He improved the med facilities in the army and Army HQ Camp in particular. He opined that the med staff be provided with all modern amenities and must work in congenial and comfortable environment. Not only this, the patients who sit in the waiting rooms must also have same comforts. (iv) Fostering Equality in Rk and File. In the rk and file of the army, there were two cat of pers. One was the combatant and the other were the non –combatants who were primarily tdn like blacksmiths, carpenters, tailors, sweepers and so on. While in war this distinction became indistinguishable since all pers contributed on equal terms. In peace time there were differences and disparity in pay and perquisites. While combatants in the inf bn drew scale of pay auth to Gp F, noncombatants figured in lower Gp for pay and pension. Manekshaw felt that this was gross inequity to their service conditions. He therefore, recom the abolition of this sys and that was done by the 3rd Pay Commission. All were now combatants.
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(v) Ex-Servicemen. The Ex-Servicemen also recd their share of attn. Sam attended a large no of rallies. Med treatment was liberalised, a min pension scale was announced, and cells were created in states to provide better job opportunities by providing vocational trg to the retired pers. (vi) Incl of Army in Central Pay Commission. It is at Sam‟s behest that the Armed Forces were considered as a part of Central Pay Commission. Hither-to-fore, once the recom for the Central Pay Commission came into force, the same were then applied to the armed forces. This meant a lapse of sometime before the benefits would accrue to the forces. This apart, provn for addl DA was not auth for the Armed Forces. Their concerns were always addsd last. Being a part of the central commission, it ensured that all benefits would auto accrue to the Armed Forces. (vii) Resettlement Course and Second Careers . Being the „Chairman of the Gorkha Bde‟, the Gorkhas were very close to Sam. Their rehabilitation was a maj concern specially since Nepal had very little to offer them on the retirement. He, in consultation with the Cols of other Gorkha Regts est a „Gorkha Rehabilitation Trg Unit‟ (GRTU) at Raiwala near Dehradun. In this unit, trg was imparted to pers proceeding on pension in various crafts and skills incl Dairy Farming, Poultry Farming, Tailoring, Carpentry, Blacksmith, Mushroom Farming, Motor Driving and Mech skills. The logic primarily was since the men of the IA retired very young, avg age being 34-35, imparting of these skills would help them in setting up their own business after retirement and allow them to live a life of dignity. He also put up a proposal, that was accepted by the Govt, to earmark a quota for soldiers of army who retired very young to find a second career with police and para-mil org in the country. (viii) Status of JCOs. Since the 1962 and 1965 ops had showed the JCOs in a very poor lt there was a school of thought which felt that this cl must go. Gen Manekshaw, however felt that removal of this cl would result in a maj incentive being lost for the men and therefore laid emphasis on giving more resp to the JCOs.
91. Nomination for Staff College. (a) Selection Criteria. Sam Manekshaw believed that the sys of nomination to attend the Staff College Course at Wellington was flawed. It allowed people who were posted to peace stns to prep unhindered while their compatriots in the fd did not have this advantage. This apart, service with the regt did not carry any wt. He therefore issued instrs to the MS Br that a criterion for nomination keeping these factors in mind should be worked out and due wt be given to all forces. Since the cmptr had been installed working this out would not be too much of a problem. The sys, which is continuously subject to scrutiny, is now applicable. (b) Flexibility for War Prep. When it became clear that the army would go to war in 1971, it was recom to the Chief that the entrance exam to the DSSC for the yr be done away with and selection should be made on the basis of the overall performance of offrs, who had applied for this exam as it had been after the war in 1962. The suggestion was accepted and the DCOAS was tasked to wk out the parameters for selection. It was thus
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that offrs who had applied did not have to prep for the exam but could, instead, devote their time and attn to the prep for war.
92. Second Career for Overlooked Offrs. The Chief had foreseen the changes taking place in the socio-economic climate of the country and made a beginning in addressing some of these problems. Army being a pyramidic org many good and deserving offrs were passed over for promotion to the next rk. While these offrs were good, there were better people in the army, at least on paper, to man higher appts. He initiated a dialogue with the public sect enterprises and pvt coys in the corporate world to absorb some of these offrs. The corporate world responded by absorbing some who were offered to them in their coys. This was a beginning that was reqd and assisted the army in overcoming its problems of supersession to some extent. 93. Plain Speaking. While comdg Eastern Comd, Lt Col DS Sidhu of the Armd Corps, popularly known as David, was one of the staff offrs on the staff of HQ Eastern Comd. This offrs was comdg a bde in 1965 and was demoted to his substantive rk of Lt Col and removed from comd. Col Sidhu was an upright soldier and a very fine offr and Sam had felt that he had been dealt with unfairly.He has thus promised him that should he become the Chief, he would set right the wrong done to him. In Jun 1969 when Manekshaw was appt COAS. Sam went through his case and sent for David to meet him. When the mtg took place, David was told, “David‟ I have been through your file and I know you have been wronged. However, when I promised you, I was the Army Cdr. Today, I am the Chief and I am afraid, there is very little that I can do. Nevertheless, I will second you to the RAW where you can get a longer tenure and serve till the age of 58‟. Another such instance was in the promotion of the QMG who had come up for his next rk, that of an Army Cdr. The Chief and the Bd felt that he would have a very short tenure. Sam was not in favour of promoting him. On receiving his consent for another job, Sam spoke to his friend LN Mishra, then the Minister for Foreign Trade and had him appt as Chairman of „Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation‟. As an offr, Sam had always believed that one should be fair and honest while dealing with anyone. Above all he felt, that people must be told the truth to maint credibility of both the sys and yourself. 94. Duty First. Every Republic Day or a near about time the JCOs were invited to the Army House. They would be served liquor and snacks befitting the status of the Chief. During the 1971 party for the JCOs, Sam recd the news of the death of his mother in Bombay on the morning of the day the party was to be held at the Army House. When advised to cancel the party, he said „At this level there are no personal matters which will prevent me from carrying out my official duties. Now that my mother is no more, she cannot be brought back if the party is cancelled. These JCOs however, had been keenly looking fwd to this and I cannot disappoint them‟. Instr were issued to all concerned that the bereavement was not to be made public till the next morning when the Chief and Mrs Manekshaw left for Bombay for the last rites of his mother. 95. Tackling Bureaucracy and Politics.
(a) Mgt of Bureaucracy. (i) Sam was very particular on being thoroughly briefed on cases before going to a mtg with the Cabinet Ministers of Secretaries of the Govt. His reason was simple. He believed that the continuity provided to the bureaucrats because of long undisturbed tenures of posting with the various ministries gives them an edge over the service offrs whose longest tenure would be 2-3 yrs. Their knowledge
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about the case under dscn, coupled with the „Rule of Business‟ of the Govt, allowed them the leeway in putting up cases or dscn to their advantage. This apart, the bureaucracy was in a posn to present facts in a manner that it suited their own. Often the holistic picture of the case was given the go by to propound what they wanted to ensure. Being close to the minister who depends hy on the advice of the bureaucracy, the reasoning of case put up by service HQ does tend to be sometimes marginalised. In such cases there was a tendency to lean hy on precedence with scant attn to its relevance. Thus many proposals send up by Chiefs who are the „Professional‟ Heads of their service, were scuttled on some ground or the other. This did cause unnecessary delay thereby affecting the op preparedness of the army adversely. Seeing the sit that was devp with the then Secretary, Ministry of Def, Mr HC Sarin who had been in the Ministry for a very long time, Sam had to seek the intervention of the Prime Minister to have a reshuffle amongst the Secy. In this reshuffle, Mr Sarin was posted to the Ministry of Heavy Industry as Secy while Mr KB Lal replaced him in the Ministry of Def. (ii) For the rts and privileges of the COAS as well as the army, the incident of first class privilege for the COAS and the lady and separation allces for tps serving in fd are a few of them.
(b) Dealing with Politicians. (i) Focus. In 1969, the politics and politicians were in a bit of turmoil and ridden with suspicion of each other. During that time, rumours were many that an „Army Take Over‟ of the country was a great possibility and that Sam Manekshaw was well placed to implement this. One day, in Aug 1969, Sam was called to a mtg with the Prime Minister in her office. To confront Sam with the rumours that had been doing the rounds in Delhi. She said to Sam „They tell me that you are the greatest threat to me‟? Sam replied „Prime Minister, you have nothing to fear from the army or me. You do your job and let me do mine‟. In fact he always cited examples of the neighbors where mil take overs had ruined the fabric of society. Not only this, he steadfastly believed that the army‟s role was to fight external aggression and assist the govt in law and order when called upon to do so and not rule and govern the country . (ii) Accn. Once when summoned to a mtg to a Cabinet Committee chaired by the Prime Minister on the subject of „Expdr on Accn for the Army‟ the Prime Minister said, „Chief, I have been info that you have spent funds in excess of the allocation made to you. What are your reasons‟? to this Sam replied “Prime Minister, I am carrying out your orders. In 1966, you had dir that there will be no waiting pd for almt of md accn to soldiers when posted to peace stn and that we would have our full complement of auth accn by 1972. We are into 1970 and my offrs and men continue to wait for accn and living in sub-std houses provided to them in the rent that is auth to them. If there has been a change in your policy, I am not aware and I can only apologize‟. When the Prime Minister raised this query with the concerned minister, it was brought out that the policy was in force and plg for accn was continuing based on this dir of the PM. (iii) Lve. Once Mr Jagjivan Ram, the Def Minister told Sam that in his opinion the Armed Forces were entitled to too much lve and that measures must be taken
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to curtail this. Sam imdt replied that his soldiers and the bulk of his army was emp in op areas where families were not allowed. The children lacked continuity in edn and missed out on enduring friendship unlike their civ counter parts who hardly left big cities and town. Considering the hardship the solider undergo due to their frequent posting to non-family areas and given the fact that they had to run multiple ests, he was of the opinion that lve entitlement was far too restd. He, therefore, told the Def Minister that he was in fact considering moving a case to enhance this entitlement further. The subject was dropped and never heard of again.
96. Empathy. Gen Manekshaw was the most courteous offr and a gentleman that one could meet. He was very conscious of being respectful to offrs and other people irrespective of their appt. He believed that the dignity of human beings must be maint and respected. When he used to arr at his office in the morning many ex-servicemen and others would be waiting to meet him and put up their problems to him. One day when the ADC saw some people trying to get close to him and in the process were pushing him. The ADC imdt shoved the main culprit to a side. As soon as he did this, Sam tapped him with his „Swagger Stick‟ on his Gorkha Hat and angrily told him, „Don‟t ever do this to the Ex-servicemen, Do you not realize that one day you and I will also be in this plight? Will you then like being treated the way you have manhandled this man?” Human dignity was uppermost in his mind and he could not stand anybody degrading human beings. 97. Humility. An incident occurred while returning from Palam Airport where he had gone to see off the PM who was proceeding on an overseas vis. When his car was on Sardar Patel Marg, another flag car belonging to Maj Gen was ahead of him. The Chief‟s dvr thinking that he was driving a four-star Gen and therefore had automatic rt of way and blew his horn to seek a pass. As soon as he did this, Sam picked up his Swagger stick and tapped the driver gently on his head and said „Khani Ram‟ badtameezi mat karo. Dekhta nahi ki wo bhi ek flag car hai. Wo bhi Gen sahib hai, Jab unka dvr dekhega ki hamari garhi aa rahi hai to apne aap pass dega‟. Sure enough when the Gen in front saw the Chief‟s car following his, he gave way to the four stars. 98. Justice. Gen Manekshaw was a fanatic for „Justice‟. He believed, that being just to the men under your comd, was the only resp that all offrs must fulfill with zeal. Equally, if any injustice had been done, it was the duty of the sr offrs reviewing the case to undo it. Not only this, crime should be punished in an exemplary manner. Sometime in early 1970, a gentleman dressed in an „Achkan and Churidar” with turban on his head come to meet with the Chief from his vill in Haryana. He stated that he wanted to see the chief, because his son, who was serving in an Engr Regt in 4 Corps, had been tried by a SCM and punished for something that he had not done. Sam having heard his story felt disturbed and told this gentlemen that he would have the case investigated. The AG, who deals with discp cases in the army, was ordered to find out the details. On enquiry it was revealed that the soldier was not guilty. Imdt, he was rel from prison, reinstated into service and the CO posted out from the unit after being suitably reprimanded for not being fair to his subordinates. The GOC 4 Corps also suitably reprimanded other jr Offrs and JCOs who had helped in the framing of this solider. While he believed in standing by his offrs, he was ruthless when lack of character was displayed. 99. Foresight and Vision. Sam clearly outlined the devp plan for the army to meet the future challenges for times to come :-
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(a) Threat Perception. Sam Manekshaw had strong views on how the army should devp to meet the expected challenges of the coming yrs, how it should be dply to meet imdt and foreseeable threats, and how it should be armed and equipped. He did not hesitate to put these views across to pol bosses. As far as the distant threat was concerned, he was, quite clear that it was from China and it would come through North Burma into Assam preceded by internal security problems. Based on this premise, a case was taken up with govt to pt out this threat and the army‟s reasons for it, the paper then went on to suggest how we should prep ourselves to meet the threat. It concluded by tabulating the infrastructure that would be reqd and the addl tps and fmns that were necessary for the task. (b) Integration. While speaking to the National Def College on the subject of „The Army in the Eighties‟ Sam made two significant pts. The first pertained to emp the rapidly growing BSF to man the border after grouping it under the army and possibly calling it the Border comd. With this he felt, rightly, that the army, dply as it is all along our borders, could be withdrawn to concentrate on intensive trg and so become better prep for its prime function of striking at any en xg our borders. A start to this was made by Sam in one sect, and it paid handsome dividends during the 1971 War with Pakistan. The second pt he made was in answer to a question about integration of the three services; the Army, Navy and Air Force, specifically the comd aspect. He was of the view that this innovation should not be intro just then because the army was much older and larger service and at all Sr levels the corresponding offrs in the Navy and AF were far jr in commissioned service. This would have meant that whenever overall cdr was appt he would have to be from the army. As the other two services were still devp, the soldier cdr might inadvertently put a brake on this activity which would be detrimental to the country. So he reasoned that present was not an opportune time to intro this sys and in answering the question, suggested that its coming was inevitable as economy and the conduct of modern W demanded inter-services integration. (c) Modernisation. As a Chief, he was aware that modern warfare demanded msls, heptr, more sophisticated eqpt and above all, highly educated offrs and other rks. Intro of modern eqpt was undertaken at his insistence by incr prod at home and by importing to hasten the changeover and to make up for shortfalls in indigenous prod. (d) Improving Edn Std. To realise his dream of a more highly educated army, he ordered putting the case to the govt for affiliating the def services edn institutions with the Jawaharlal Nehru University, to equate exams the servicemen passes with university equivalents. The proposal was to equate gradation at the National Def Academy with a Bachelor‟s degree, of the graduation at the DSSC with a Master‟s degree; and successful completion of the National Def College with a Ph.D. Likewise, lower exams could also be equated with corresponding school certs. The chief also envisioned giving selected offrs study lve so that they could during this pd, seek admission to colleges and universities to obtain higher edn, to benefit both the service and the indl. (e) fwd Policy. His view on the posn to be adopted at borders were simple. He advocated the fwd policy as it gave tremendous tac advantage. As an example, he decided to locate a bde at Tangkar La in North Sikkim. With this force it was possible to pose a threat to the Chinese Ls of C in the Chumbi Valley and thus remove the existing threat to South Sikkim and the Siliguri corridor forever.
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PART VI-PRELUDE TO WAR OF 1971
Pol Turmoil in East Pakistan 100. Discontent had been simmering in East Pak for many yrs because of the repressive tac of the West Pakistanis & ruthless exploitation of the Eastern Wg by the Western. When elections were held in 1970, the “Awami League” party promoted by Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman, won all but 2 of the 160 seats in East Pak. His party however was unable to win any of the seats that it contested in West Pak where Bhutto‟s PPP (Pakistan Peoples Party) won 81 of the 138 seats. Yayha Khan tried to work out a mutually acceptable solution in Jan 1971 between East and West Pakistan, but he was unable to come to an agreement. On 23rd Mar 1971, on „Pakistan Day‟ independence of Bangladesh was proclaimed by the Awami League. On 25 Mar 1971 the infamous mil crackdown was put into actions by Gen Tikka Khan in East Pak. Though it came as no surprise, the severity with which the army struck certainly did. 101. With the mil action, the sit worsened rapidly & many refugee started pouring in & seeking sanctuary in the neighbouring states of Bengal, Tripura and Assam all of whom already had their own ethnic tensions. The millions that entered India started to upset the social fabric here and the problem would certainly impact India‟s Security adversely. With their coming, they brought sordid & macabre tales of atrocities that were being committed by the Pak Army on the people of East Pak. The Indian polity having passed various resolutions in the Parliaments & having emp all means at their comd incl asking Pak to resolve the problems & take back these refugees, had to now take action to safe gd its own interests. Decision For War 102. In Apr 1971, the Cabinet Committee on Pol affairs met under the prime Minster Indira Gandhi and the COAS who was also Chairmen, Chiefs of Staff Committee was also in attendance. The PM was terribly angry & upset over the issue of the mass influx of migrants into the states of West Bengal, Assam & Tripura. The incident underwent as follows :-
PM – Look at this – so many are coming in – here is a telegram from the Chief Minister of Assam, a telegram from .....What are you doing about it? Chief – Nothing. What has it got to do with me? PM - Can‟t you do something? Why don‟t you do something? Chief – What do you want me to do ? PM – I want you to march in. Chief – That means war. PM – I don‟t mind if it is war. Chief – Have you read the Bible. PM - What has the Bible got to do with it.
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Chief - In the first book, the first chapter, the first paragraph of the Bible, God said, „let there be lt and there was it‟ – so you feel that „ Let there be war and there is war‟. Are you ready? I certainly am not ready.” I will tell you what is happening. It‟s now the end of Apr. In a few day time, 15-20 days time, the monsoon will break and in East Pakistan when it rains the rivers become like oceans. If you stand on one side you can‟t see the other. I would be confined to the rds. The airforce would not be able to sp me and the Pakistanis would thrash me – that‟s one. Secondly, my armd div is in the Babina area; another div, I can‟t remember which, is in the Secunderabad area. We are now harvesting. I will require every veh, every truck, all the rd space, all the rly space to mov my soldier and you will not be able to move your crops. Sam turned to Mr Fakruddin-Ali Ahmed, the Agriculture Minster and said – if there is a famine in India they will blame you. I won‟t be there to take the blame. Then Sam turned around and said – My armd div which is supposed to be my strike force has got 12 tks which are op out of the whole lot. YB Chavan – Sam, why only twelve? Chief said to YB Chavan – Sir because you are the Finance Minster. I have been asking, pleading for months. You said you have got no money, that‟s why. Then Chief turned to PM – Prime Minster, if in 1962, your father had asked me as the Army Chief and not Gen Thapar and your father had said, „Throw the Chinese out‟, I would have turned around and told him, „Look these are the problems,‟ Now I am telling you what the problems are. If you still want me to go ahead, Prime Minster, I guarantee you 100 per cent defeat. Now you give me your orders”. Then Jagjivan Ram said – Sam maan jau na. Chief said – I have given my professional view, now the government must take a decision. The PM did not say anything. She was red in the face and said, „Achcha, cabinet char baje milenge‟. Everybody walked out. I, being the jr-most, was the last to lve and I smiled at her. PM said – Chief, sit down. Chief said – Prime Minister, before you open your mouth, do you want me to send in my resignation on the grnds of mental health, or phy ? PM said – Oh, sit down Sam. Everything you told me, is it true?. Cheif said – Yes, look it‟s my job to fight. It is my job to fight to win. Are you ready? I certainly am not ready ? Have you internally got everything ready? Internationally have you got everything ready? I don‟t think so. I know what you want ,but I want to make it quite clear. There must be one cdr. I don‟t mind, I will work under the BSF, under CRPF, under anybody you like. But I will not have a Soviet telling me what to do and I must
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have one pol master who will give me instrs. I don‟t want the refugee ministry, Home ministry, def ministry all telling me. Now, make up your mind. She said – All rt Sam, nobody will interfere, you will be in one comd. Sam said – Thank you, I guarantee you accomplishment.
103. This was typical of the Fd Marshal to firmly & unambiguously state his opinion to protect the interests of the country and the service of which he was chief. It was his honesty, professional integrity & firmness of the Fd Marshal in which he handled the PM & cross offered to resign should his advice not be accepted that saved the day for the Indian Army & a repeat of 1962 was averted. Prep for the War 104. Gen Manekshaw had acquired a stature that none of his predecessors except Thimmayya had. He possessed rare professional acumen and was extremely popular with offrs as well as tps. His greatest asset was that he could stand up to pressure. This quality stood him in good stead when the Indian public, agitated over the mass killings and other excesses of the Pakistani Army in Bangladesh, began to urge the govt that the Indian Army should imdt march in to liberate that oppressed land so that the Bengali refugee could go back to their homes. 105. Pressure increased when the revolt by Bangladesh Army failed. Some retired Gens and several cabinet ministers also joined in the cry for imdt liberation. But Manekshaw was not the man who could be stampeded into action. Govt had dir him to assess the sit and draw up cgy plans and his experts were on this job. Critics accused Gen SHFJ Manekshaw, Chief of Army Satff, developing cold feet during the war. It was rumoured that Def Minster Jagjivan Ram, backed by Finance Minster YB Chavan, had urged Mrs Gandhi to resort to armed action imdt, adding that if Manekshaw had any misgivings he should be replaced. Justification : Strat Reasoning 106. Gen SHFJ Manekshaw had his own justifiable res about instant action. He was the rt Chief for this time of national crisis. He was the only Sr Gen of his generation who combined mil know how with acute pol and strat sense. Having risen in stature with growth of the Indian Army, he knew and understood India‟s mil capability so well that he was not prep to fumble in a sit which he could not dominate in full measure. He was against half baked, inconclusive involvements and he had the moral standing to withstand pressures against his convictions. He wanted to lead a victorious army and not a hastily committed rabble, and there he stuck, and for very valid reasons :-
(a) Imdt intervention was inadvisable for many reasons. A nation cannot make war successfully and win without proper prep. That needs time. Mil planners have cgy plans, but these have to be updated to meet the changing sit. Many questions faced them. For e.g., What is the en‟s str? and how is it disposed? What are the options open to him? Who are going to be our allies and who will side with en? What is the time frame? What is the state of comns? and what is the trn in the area of ops? What is the state of our own forces and their eqpt? Have we got the necessary superiority? If not, how can we arrange to tilt the bal in our favour in the strike area? There are many other factors such
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as wx conditions and the attitude of local people that have to be taken into consideration by the planners.
(b) He assessed that India‟s strat plg always envisaged the decisions to be obtained in any Indo-Pakistani conflict in the western wing, while cgy plg in the east catered only for the security of the Siliguri-Cooch Behar corridor and the city of Calcutta. For this ltd task in the east, only one inf div plus was earmarked on the presumption that Pakistan would not reinforce this region. In the event, Pakistan had built up its eastern forces to about three or move divs, counting the comn tps and para mil forces. Although because of the hurried airlift to men and mtrl the normal complement of armd and arty had not fetched up yet, the combined war potential of such a force level was nonetheless considerable in relation to India‟s earmarked resources, besides the eastern region of Tripura lacked the necessary adm and comn infrastructure to sp worthwhile ops. Manekshaw felt and quite rightly too that the Indian Army was not well attuned to reorient op plans rapidly at such short notice, nor had it the wherewithal to conduct ops without the necessary adm infrastructural backing. (c) The quantum of force he needed to launch this op would require time to collect, especially when the imdt available fmns though fairly substantial in Nos were tied up with the West Bengal Elections. All hy wpns and most of the eqpts of these fmns had been left behind in peace time cantts. Hence, addl forces had to be found from op committed tps engaged in counter-insur and other holding roles in far-flung areas. By the time this force was likely to be collected the monsoon would be on its way, thus leaving a very tight schedule for the op. Recalling his Burma Campaign days, Manekshaw did not want his army to get stuck in the quagmire of the monsoon. Moreover, this would give China, a sympathiser of Pakistan and a foe of India, a chance to retaliate on India‟s northern borders. China would have about eight months of campaigning, till the Himalayan passes close sometime in Nov, to annex the max Indian territory. Manekshaw preferred to fight one en at a time and the weaker one first. He proposed to time his mil action for Nov, when the possibility of Chinese participation was considerably reduced because the Himalayan passes would then be closed. (d) A reason he kept to himself was the shortage in stockpiled res of essential specialised and armd vehs and of br eqpt which would need some time to make up and recoup. In addition, raising new units and fmns and the intro of newly acquired eqpt was in prog, and this needed time to assimilate. Even with crash programming these task could not be completed before the onset of the monsoon, and then it would be too late.
Pol Factor 107. But pol compulsions clinched the issue. What was the invasion of East Pakistan based on, what ostensibly was its internal problem to be justified in intl circles? If the creation of an indep Bangladesh was achieved by Indian Mil action, how was its domestic and external viability to be assured without its recog by the intl forum, the United Nations ? The magnitude of the crisis created in India by the refugee influx was yet to be understood by rest of world. If India intervened without clearly justifying this action in foreign eyes, the charge that it was engineering the breakup of Pakistan would be established and Bangladesh would be refused recog by the majority of nations. After considering the issue carefully, the Prime Minster accepted the postponement of intervention to an opportune moment in the future and sp Manekshaw in his stand.
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Timing 108. The ideal time for hostilities from the Indian pt of view would be Dec 1971. The pd from the time of this appre in Apr to Dec may be conveniently divided into pre-monsoon and post-monsoon. Mil, the pre-monsoon pd – Apr to mid Jun 1971 – was perhaps the most favourable to both countries provided the campaign could be successfully concluded well before the monsoon set in. India was however strat unbalanced at that time because of the peacetime loc of its res fmns in the hinterland, as a result of which they would have taken considerable time to be conc on the battle-fd. Moreover, maj reorg, equipping and repair pgme was afoot in this pd, and at that juncture would have meant committing ill-equipped and half trained units hastily to battle. 109. Gen Manekshaw also functioned as Chairmen of the Chiefs of Staff Committee since 1969. Until Apr 1971, the Chiefs of Staff Committee functioned in the manner in which its composn intended, namely, in compartmentalised sections, each Service Chief minding his own business and refraining from treading on the sensitive toes of others. It reqd a man with the personality, character and driving charm of Sam Manekshaw to assert in the Committee the posn of Chairman and, at govt level, the posn of the Chiefs of Staff Committee itself. He had been Chief for about two yrs. In the process of making the army battle worthy, he had become aware of its strong pts as well as its shortcomings. 110. Fresh plans were now reqd to be drawn up to meet new sit. The threat was four fold. In the west, was the main bulk of the Pakistan Armed Forces, all along the northern bdr stretching from Ladakh to Arunchal Pradesh were the Chinese in Tibet, in the east was East Pak and finally the continuing threat of insur in Nagaland & Mizoram. One of the reasons for his recom against imdt mil action was the army‟s shortfalls in prep for war, and he started to remedy them straightway. 111. India‟s planners proposed to neutralise the Chinese threat to some extent with a winter campaign, when the passes connecting India and Tibet would be snowbound . Indian planners also had to provide for containing a Pakistani offn in the west. There had to be decision before the peace makers could come in or any possible allies of the en could sway the issue. It had therefore to be a short war and a time frame of three weeks was laid down. 112. The army commenced updating their war plans & tuning them to meet the current realities. This entailed drafting of plan at various levels, dscn & war gaming, refining & fine tuning, stk & provn of reqmts of fd forces at suitable loc, Then, each Army Cdr was invited to Delhi, the plans discussed with him, and his views sought on their feasibility. These views naturally recd the utmost consideration, and then after due deliberation the Chief would give his decision. One pt he was emphatic about was the almt of tps. He absolutely refused to accept any suggestion which would have a fmn with one comd until a certain time when it would revert to another comd on the devp of a particular sit. „I want no horse trading‟, he would say „and I want everyone to know exactly what he is to get or not get‟. The unsaid fact was that, in the fog of war, with every cdr crying himself hoarse to emphasise how great the threat opp him was, it becomes extremely difficult to decide on the fresh almt of tps. 113. The PM gave a free hand to COAS & chairman, chief of staff committee & directed other ministries to render all the asst. The Fd Marshal was thus in a posn to closely coordinate & integrate plans of all three services. There were long mtgs & consensus arr at, which helped in
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engendering greater inter service confidence, where each service was willing to assist the other with all that was available. 114. Having considered the circumstances, the strat that evolved was, that India would destabilise Pakistan by installing a new „Govt of Bangladesh‟ through a multi pronged swift offn in the East while maint a „Strat Def Posture‟ in the West in line with its strat needs and thinking. Plans were thus reformulated with this in mind. While prep these plans, two issues were foremost in the mind of the Army Chief. They were, first, the summary removal of fd cdrs in war. During the 1965 war with Pakistan, as many as nearly 30 cdrs of fmns and units, had been removed from comd‟ during the war. Sam felt that this was not the rt way of fighting a war. He felt that the axe should have also fallen on higher cdrs who were resp for trg them. Not only this it reflected not only on the readiness of the army but also on poor doctrine and trg. Such actions merely instilled caution amongst cdrs who would hesitate to take tough decision apart from undermining the morale of the fighting force. The second was the fact that in the past wars that the army has fought, the bulk of the army fmns remained restd to the def of the sect that they were assigned to defend and made no attempt to improve their posture. Thus this time to help in the overall plan, fmns were charged with the task of drawing up of offn plans from within their resources and not bank upon incremental force being made available for this purpose. Each comd had to come up with plans for ltd offn action to improve their def posture. These plans were made to be exec from the „Desert Sect‟, in the South to „Kashmir Valley‟ in the North. 115. At this time there was disparity in the holding of armr regt vis-a-vis Pakistan. Ingenious ways of mtg this imperative had to be put into place. Indep armr sqns which existed then, were re-grouped into regts and allotted to fmns. In this manner, three regts were raised to meet op reqmts. 116. In Apr 1971 the army‟s res holding were gen low, enough for approx 60 days in common-run items and considerably lower in those which were critical and in short supply. One of the first acts of Manekshaw was to see that the res were made up expeditiously. 117. The next action was to make units and fmns fit for war, and he, applied himself energetically to this task. Making up their defi in manpower, eqpt and amn became difficult as a maj reorg and reequipping of the Indian Army was then in prog, especially in the Armd Corps and Arty. Some units were under raising, others were converting to newly intro eqpt, and yet others were getting familiar with specialised eqpt. 118. The army had been equipped with heterogeneous mix of the eqpt and amn. Urgent rationalisation of eqpt holding, first theatre wise and then fmn wise was essential to facilitate adm and repair backing. Rationalisation was ordered in good time and was over by the end of Aug. 119. Arty, Engr and Sig resources were gen in short supply and there was a critical shortage of wpns and eqpt. Solns were found by rationalisation and judicious denuding of fmns and units of lower priority. Some new units/sub units, especially of sig, had to be created on an adhoc basic by milking other fmns for both eqpt and manpower. This was necessary as the new units being formed took time to materialise. 120. Replenishment was to be cont by planned expdr. The redistribution was completed surreptitiously by the middle of Oct under cover monsoon and winter stocking, and it served the war well. In wpns and other eqpt there were critical shortages in the unit holding, and
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considerable backlog in their repair because spare parts were short. 70 to 80 percent of tks needed repair after an armd fmn ex. Manufacture and the repair org made a coord effort to make the dmgd and defective tks battle worthy. This was achieved in good time, and Manekshaw personally, presided over mtg of the coord committee to give it an extra fillip. 121. The Chief did not want the anl turnover to affect the conduct of ops he was plg. Accordingly, the changeover pgme for 1971-72 was suspended on the grnd of “rly tpt constrains imposed by civ priorities” not to cause despondency among the tps in op area. They were info that their tenure in family stns would be suitably extended to compensate them for the extra time spend in the Fd. 122. Manpower shortage was another problem confronting the Chief. Units were under str, having been milked for new raising and because of normal wastage through retirement and release. This was tackled by a crash pgme of trg rects at the Regtl trg Centres and reducing the trg pd by some wks. Fresh intake was surreptitiously incr. Reservists were called for trg during the monsoon and were kept on till well after the conflict. 123. During the pd of prep, it was essential that units should maint a battle-worthy level of manpower. Lve was therefore restd to 10 percent of unit str and that too only on extreme compassionate grnds. This meant foregoing lve for most of the rk and file. To avoid discontent on this acct, Govt was pressured upon to extend the privilege of availing of lve entitlement for 1971 upto 1973. This was later extended to 1974. 124. The offr sit was more serious. It was estimated that 30 to 35 percent of the auth offr str in a unit was away at any given time on lve, course of instr and other duties. To remedy this, the chief ordered that staff at Army HQ and the HQ of other fmn to be drastically pruned to spare offrs for posting to Fd fmns. He also ordered the cancellation of course of instr involving the absence of essential comd elements from their units on the ostensible grnd that imp trg institutions were to be reorg. 125. Plans were also made to use the instr staff of the Trg institutions and student of National Def College in WE of fd fmn on mob. The Chief was also keen that continuity in the comd and cont of fighting units and fmns should not be upset on eve of war. To implement these schemes all changes already planned in comd and staff of fmns and unit were suspended. 126. An aspect of TA that worried the Chief was the alarm that the very announcement of its embodiment would create in the country. It would imply war was in the offing and this always affected commerce adversely. Internationally, it would afford Pakistan an opportunity to accuse India in World forums of aggressive intensions. To circumvent this, the Chief announced a change in its mode of trg. It was decided that as an experimental measure all TA units should hold their anl trg camps for three weeks from 01 Sep 71. This was ostensibly done to try out the contemplated change in policy. The Dir of TA issued a dir on the new procedure for trial and comment. There were a few representation from those charged with implementing it, but nevertheless the changed policy was pushed through. To cover the pd form 22 Sep to the day of embodiment, the trg camps were extended to overcome the shortcomings noticed. Thus, when war broke out a fully eff Territorial Army was already in the fd. The units were gradually mov closer to their respective areas of resp from the trg camps and were in battle posn‟s when Yahiya Khan Struck.
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127. To give flexibility to op plans and provide options in their exec, it is essential that a nw of rds, with adequate laterals for a quick buildup and switchover, should be available near the intended lines of thrust. Work was started on new Nws as well as to improve existing rds in that region. The border Road Task Force, assisted where possible by central and state road bldg agencies, was put on the job. Built under a crash pgme, essential rds were ready in time. But this was not the case with forward airfds. 128. The Eastern theatre lacked the requisite adm infrastructure in the way of accn and comn facilities. No meaningful stk could proceed without covered accn. A pgme for the constr of huts was pushed through and these were ready to store mtrl when the stocking pgme got under way. New telegraph routes were laid, some old ones rerouted and others taken over from civ auth so that before the start of hostilities the comn nw was fully op. Mob 129. A maj task in the prep stg was mov of strike forces from the hinterland to their respective As of resp. Apart from the holding tps, most of the res fmn, incl 1 Armd Div, were loc in the interior in far-flung places. The constraints on their mov were threefold :-
(a) Firstly, there was the question of security. Once word of their mov leaked out and it was difficult to conceal such a large scale op – this would not only alert Pakistan and invite intl pressures but would also spread a war scare among our people. It would have been preferable to mov our tps as late as possible. But then Yahya Khan was almost daily threatening India with war in his drunken bouts and the chances of his making a pre-emptive attk could not be ruled out. (b) The second constraint was the phy mov itself. It was cal that if normal passenger and commercial tfc was not to be distributed it would take a good six to eight weeks to complete our conc. This process could be accelerated by suspending civ tfc. But this was not acceptable for reasons of security and public morale. Then there was the limitation of loading and unloading facilities at the entraining and detraining stns. At most places no more than four or five trains could be served at a time. (c) Last, but not least, were the pol compulsions. The Indian Govt continued to solicit the help of the big powers in exerting pol and economic pressure on Yahya Khan to seek a peaceful soln in Bangladesh. This process of pol negotiations and diplomacy ran on well into the end of Nov 1971. While this negotiation were on, it was considered inexpedient to make any ostensible warlike mov which would convey impression contrary to our public declarations.
130. Sam held his hand till the beginning of Oct 1971, but thereafter he considered it militarily imprudent to accept the risk of likely Pakistan pre emptive move any further. Orders were issued for the start of tps conc in their area of resp in a steady trickle. The mov started in the first week of Oct and continued till well after the middle of Nov. But the tac imbalance which existed because of the improper loc of tps was redressed by the third week of Oct. 131. To conceal the layout of the Indian def posture, especially the positioning of its res fmns to the very end, it was proposed to move them to the depth trg areas for the ostensible purpose of running exs with tps and then move them to the op area only when war was imminent. To this proposal , the Chief did not agree. He said: „I don‟t like this fancy stuff. You would realize that
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my fmns are not the German Panzer Divs. They take their own time to move.‟ How well Manekshaw knew his army. 132. The fmns were accordingly mov straight to their conc As in board daylight, fully accepting the breach of security for the sake of orderly exec. Several other possible measures were however adopted to hide their destinations, such as cutting down various reports and returns, choosing wayside halts, confusing the wearing of fmns signs and adopting altogether new tac Nos for signposting. Morale & Motivation 133. Gen Manekshaw paid great attn to bldg up the jawan‟s morale, especially to stren his motivation to accept greater phy risks in the face of fire. He wanted the grievances of soldiers redressed to ensure that soldier would go into the oncoming war with the assurance that should he get killed his family would be looked after for life and his children educated in a manner befitting his rk and status and should he get wounded he would not have to fend for himself. Even those missing in war or taken prisoner would receive the same consideration because, so far as the families were concerned, the bread-winner was lost. 134. On Manekshaw‟s orders, a study for the problems confronting battle cas was carried out in depth and rational solns sought to alleviate the hardships of their families in a practical manner. His broad recom in the form of various allces and pension benefits were accepted by Govt with very slight mod. This was a significant contribution to build up the moral in Indian Army which only a man of Manekshaw calibre could achieve despite bureaucratic red tape. 135. A No of new medals were intro to cover the coming campaign. A Silver Jubilee Medal to commemorate a quarter century of Independence was also instituted. The most coveted among the new medals was the Wound Medal, which has a broad scarlet ribbon and could be worn ahead of other campaign medals with some pride. Entitlement for this award was backdated to cover all the campaigns after independence. Displayed on the chests of veterans, this medal instilled a sense of pride in having sustained wounds in the service of their country. 136. Steps were also taken to look after the families of soldiers suddenly mov to op areas. These families were allowed to retain the accn they occu. Those who wanted to shift their stns for reasons of personal convenience were allowed to do so and “ separated family qtrs” were allotted to them at the stn of their choice. 137. Thus, by painstaking care and great consideration for his men, Manekshaw built that psy backgrnd which motivates soldiers to risk their live. Never before did the Indian soldier go to war with so much assurance regarding his and his family‟s well being should misfortune befall him. Vision for National Effort 138. Manekshaw was a soldier of vision. He realized that maj questions of def policy could not be dealt with in purely mil terms. They needed to be coord with foreign, economic and internal polices and in the wider context they embraced the body politic of the entire nation. As Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff committee, he pressed for the pol involvement of Govt in evolving a broad strat and lying down clear-cut dir to achieve the aims. This was done through his dir contact with Prime Minister and through her with the Pol Affairs Committee.
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139. In fact, this dir access and the conviction with which he made his recom antagonized quite a few of his colleagues and superiors and was the main causes of his difficulties with Def Minister Jagjivan Ram later. For the first time a pol rep in the person of DP Dhar, designated Chairman of the Plg Committee of the Min of External Affairs was inducted into the war councils. Dhar worked closely with Manekshaw throughout the war and thereafter to settle its aftermath. There could not have been a better combination for the conduct of war. Their understanding of the combined potential of pol and mil means and their eff use of it was superb. Int and Synergy 140. On the mil side, Manekshaw activated the old Jt service organ and created some new ones. A Jt Int Committee, consisting of reps of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the Int Bureau and the Dirs of Int of the three services, was formed under the chairmanship of the VCOAS. This ensured coord at the top. Similarly, the Jt Plg Committee dealt with the inter-service coord of op plans, and work started on establishing a Combined Service Op HQ. Thus, South Block and Vayu Bhavan became a well-knit team. 141. It is to Manekshaw‟s credit that with his charm and tact, he got the unreserved involvement of other service in formulating the op plans and subsequently in their implementation. Throughout, he never let the other services feel that they were not equal partners in the undertaking. In fact, he made it a pt to magnify their contribution and was always lavish in his praise of them. Whenever there was setback, as at a few places in the west, he gracefully accepted the whole blames. 142. The Dirs Gen of the BSF and Civ Def and other heads of para mil forces and allied war org were brought in at aprop stages of plg. The apex of dirn, coord and supervision remained with Manekshaw and Dhar. 143. The decision making process were never allowed to get tangled in the maze of bureaucratic red-tape. The Chief brooked no delay. He was on the spot if a holdup occurred, whether at HQs or in the fd. Mukti Bahini 144. The refugee influx was at an alarming proportions. Ways and means were devised to gainfully emp them as “force multiplier”. Manekshaw viewed the problem of Mukti Bahini both from the short term and long-term angles and concluded that if the Bangladeshi forces were to participate as equal partners of the Indian armed forces in combined offn to liberate the territory, this force should be org promptly on a planned growth schedule. 145. The level proposed for these forces was about there bds gps org to function indep. Five bns, below str, were imdt available and they were to be brought up to str with the inclusion of EPR pers and equipped at par with Indian Army est. It was also planned to raise another four bns according to a phased pgme. In the event, only three additional bns could be made eff before the war began. 146. Trg camps to train these pers where set up and Bengali – speaking offrs and staff were posted to these camps so that trg time could be reduced. All army pers posted to these camps also had to dress in civ dress akin to the clothes worn by these trainees. This was so because India was not accepting that it is trg the “Mukti Bahini”. The Mukti Bahini which was emp to
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disrupt, Pak lines of comns apart from harassment caused through inflicting cas on their forces, had acquitted themselves with distinction. The asst rendered by them to the Indian Forces was by no means insignificant. Analysis 147. During the build-up towards the 1971 war, the Chief displayed a persona of an extremely focused, clear minded and highly experienced soldier. Fwg are a few sit which highlighted his personality :-
(a) Handling Pressure. Although the time decided for the offn was some time in Oct 1971, yet there was no easing of pressure from either the pol circle along with the conc of the Pakistani Army on the bdrs. Throughout these conditions the Chief maint his pose and carried on with the same prep with intricate details. The int staff, the cdrs at all levels and his staff at the Army HQ bore the max flak by the Chief. Int reports were read by the Chief with utmost care and as he asked innumerable questions, the authors of these reports had to ensure the correctness and plausibility. (b) Straight Fwd. On one of the occasions, the Pak High Commissioner asked the Chief as to why was India being so bellicose and warlike, to which he replied, “If there was going to be war it would be purely the doing of Pak and that I guarantee, that you will lose East Pakistan.” (c) During the 1971 war, whenever he spoke to his tps & the offrs, he made sure that they were put at ease & were well conversed with his instrs. To the offrs, an assurance was given that despite their best, should things not wk out & they were unable to achieve their obj, they should rest assured that there would be no sacking as long as they had made a conscious effort to carry out their task. (d) Use of Experience. During the prep for the war, Chief decided to utilize adequate services of the sr offrs. The courses at DSSC and MHOW were terminated early and instrs at these institutions were posted to the fmn HQ as addl offrs. (e) Manekshaw was a very enlightened ldr who believed that competence is not the prerogative of higher rks but comes with resp & trust imposed on offrs by their srs. He also believed that where the jr offr was taking initiative to exec the job, rightly or wrongly, he had to be given full sp. If necessary he could be guided but could not be dismissed because of his lack of experience, rk or auth. This apart, he maint that trg of jr offrs was an essential features of their relationship with the srs. (f) If moral turpitude in any form was involved, he would not hesitate in ensuring that they lost not only their job but also their rk.
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PART VII- LIBERATION OF BANGLADESH 148. The strat evolved was that India would destabilise Pak by installing a new “Govt of Bangladesh” through a multi pronged swift offn in the East while maintaining a “strat defensive posture” in the west in line with India‟s strat needs & thinking. The strat was for simultaneous thrust form the west, north & east, all converged on Dacca. 149. In the West, it was the overall strat of a “strat def” posture. It postulated loss of none or as little as possible, of Indian territory combined with gain of as much as possible of the en territory. Linked with this, min loss or dmg to own forces and max to the en. Strat def in the Indian context & circumstances meant offn def. 150. The plan that finally evolved from the war games at all levels was that Pakistani Army in Bangladesh should be drawn out by keeping the bdr alive through continues and vigorous skirmishes in all sect under cover of Mukti Bahini action. At the same time, every effort was to be made to create the impression that India was interested only in the capture of a niche where the Bangladesh govt could be installed, and no more. It was expected that this would induce Gen Niazi to strengthen his bdr def at the cost of the interior and in the process dissipate his res. 151. When the crunch came, thrust line would aim at securing the key comn centres in the interior so as to disrupt the en‟s comd and cont completely and paralyze the capability of his forces to fall back on posn of depth. Pak fmns and unit would be cut off from each other and would become incapable of giving a concerted battle. Scattered in penny packets, they would be easy to mop up. Should the opportunity arise, any of the thrust line across the Meghna, the Jamuna and the Padma could be rapidly devp in conjunction with the northern thrust along the Jamalpur-Tangail route to capture Dhaka. 152. As a result of this appraisal, the final objs of each fmn were spelt out to enable them to work out various permutations and combination to finalise the plan. A careful watch was kept throughout on the day to day pol and mil devp in Bangladesh so as to modify the op plan were necessary. 153. Manekshaw personally briefed Lt Gen JS Aurora, GOC-in-C Eastern Comd, covering the pol backgrnd, aims, his forecast of the shape of things to come, the outline op plan, with reasoning of the choice and str of thrust lines and emphasis on the vigor and determination reqd for its exce. Written op instrs were later handed over to Gen Aurora and the machinery started moving for prep for the war to liberate Bangladesh. 154. The IN was reqd to block the sea lines to the south & also provide fire sp to army fmns within rg. The IAF was charged with decimating whatever air elements Pak had in its Eastern Wg. The priorities for air were planned to be reversed in 1971. The highest priority was accorded to close air sp to the land battle by way of short interdiction and taking on tgts directly interfering with grnd ops. In addn, such air ops were to be undertaken as helped in achieving an air sit which was locally favorable in the tac area. For this, integration of air def, arty, civ def and air force effort was essential and their plans accordingly provided for it. 155. During the plg stage earlier, the Chief had noticed two weaknesses that had not, for some peculiar reason, received the attn they deserved. Poonch in Kashmir was the first. It was apparent from the en bulid-up opp this sect that a blow would descend there. Western Army,
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either through lack of tps or an incorrect assessment (more likely the former), were content to secure it with the tps it had always had. The Chief, however thought otherwise and ordered another bde into that area. This not only strengthened the Poonch defs, but also made for a much neater def-one bde on either side on the Poonch River. Thus strengthened, poonch did receive a battering but it weathered the storm and, later, even went over to the offn and secured some territory. 156. The other place was Dera Baba Nanak. Only a Bde was dply there and its task was to cross over and secure the br over the River Sutlej, one half of which lay in Indian territory and the other half in Pakistan. A Pakistan counter-offensive was not envisaged but had it come, the bde, lacking depth, would have found itself unbalanced. Again, the chief had intervened & within three days the Fourth Eighth Gorkha Rif was sent. Now at Dera Baba Nanak, it was India‟s turn to preempt Pak, as it was learnt after the attk went in & br was secured the Pak had planned an attk at this very spot to secure Indian side of the br. 157. On 3rd Dec 1971 at about 0445hrs. Pak Air Force jets attk some fwd airfds in Indian territory, incl Amritsar, Pathankot, Srinagar, Avantipura, Uttarlai, Jodhpur, Ambala & Agra. The significance of 3rd Dec 1971 being the 1st Friday after the Muslim festival of Id and therefore, an auspicious day. So the war broke out. Manekshaw‟s Idiosyncrasies 158. Despite all advice to the contrary, the chief had not given up his pet idea of an amphibious op as a part of his overall plan for liberating East Pakistan. Watching the rapid collapse of org resistance in the province, he ordered a bn group to be send by sea to Cox‟s Bazzar to prevent Pakistani tps from escaping through that pt to Burma. A group comprising 1/3 GR, two coy of 11 Bihar and some mor was hastily collected, named Rome force, placed under Cdr Arty, 8 Mtn Div and put on a merchant ship to sail to a rendezvous off Cox‟s Bazar. MV Vishav Viajay (The Merchant Ship) set off with the force in the early hrs of 12 Dec. A naval Contingent of 50 which was to accompany the force did not arrive before the ship sailed. 159. Reaching the rendezvous on 14th Dec, the force was tfr to two LSTs, INS Guldar and Gharial. As the op had been planned on the basis of maps, the actual survey of the landing coast was carried out on nearing the beach. To everybody‟s horror, the place was not suitable for beaching LSTs and no other landing craft were available with the force. There was no option but to beach somehow and one of the LSTs beached on a runnel. Only 12 men could disembark, and two of them drowned. 160. With another effort, some 30 more were put ashore. The cdr of the force was in a predicament when the men already ashore flashed back the news that there were no Pakistani tps in the area. Instead, they had contacted a gp of freedom fighters. With their help the remainder of the force was trf to shore in local boats between 16 & 18 Dec. These country craft could carry very little heavy eqpt, vehs, guns and amn. This was one instance where the chief overruled his advisors and pushed through a pet op. It was undertaken without suitable craft and eqpt and combined ops trg, but for the coast being devoid of the Pakistanis and aid from Mukti Bahini, this adventure would have ended in a fiasco.
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Surprises in War 161. Chhamb in Kashmir & Longewala in Rajasthan are the two places where Indian tps were momentarily surprised but rec fast enough. Chhamb in Kashmir was one of the place where things did not go the planned way. This was so because an offn was planned here to threaten the Marala Headworks in Pakistan: the intention being that Pakistan would react to this threat and in this process, weaken itself in the area of Sialkot, facilitating ops in that sect. The area of Chhamb, however, presented an equally attractive obj to Pakistan, as through it, their attk coln could capture Akhnoor, thus severing the road lines of comn running north into both Srinagar and Poonch and also posing a threat to Jammu, The Pakistan preempted and therefore, from an attk posture, the India Army was abruptly forced into a defensive one. As such changes inevitably cause confusion, considerable grnd was lost and for some time, the sit there was very delicately poised. During the initial Pakistani attk, they overran some of posns which was not, really, too much of a disaster as troops fell back to new posns loc in depth. Some guns that had been mov fwd to „reach‟ longer, however in sp of the offn planned had to be abandoned and this proved a serious loss. Through the gallantry of tps there, two extremely courageous and spirited counter-attks, the sit was finally restored. 162. The Coprs Cdr in Kashmir, Lt Gen Sartaj Singh, when reporting this mini disaster was asked how the local bde and div cdrs were bearing up under the strain. After replying that both are shaken, he was ordered to go there. To this credit, he brought the awkward sit under cont in a remarkably effi manner. 163. Though the chief had re-assured the offr cadre prior to commencement of ops that, this time, there would be no sacking, at the urging of 15 Corps and Western Comd, the Bde Cdr at Chhamb and the GOC 10 Inf Div were mov out to innocuos appts. After the war was over, when the war reports on these two offrs were received, they were found to be extremely complimentary. The COAS, very upset at this change of heart, inquired why, if the offrs had performed that well, their removal had been recom. Not receiving a sat reply, the MS was ordered to re-habilitate the two: this was done and to their credit, both distinguished themselves and rose to high rk. 164. The second place involved was Longewala in Rajasthan. Here also, a ltd offn had been planned to threaten Pakistan‟s rail comns running within their territory but parallel to the border. Pak pre-empted here also with Inf Bde, sp by an armd regt with some arty, drove into Indian territory in a very daring thrust to pose a threat to adm installations that were raised to sp offn. The thrust had very little air cover, and very little trn recce had been carried out so most vehs were bogged down in the sand; it had very little fire sp, and finally, to crown all, it was insufficiently supplied as far as lgs were concerned. The Indian Air Force spotted this en move on the very first day after a coy of the Punjab Regt had been contacted by it and held it at bay. After that, it was pigeon shooting as far as the air force was concerned, and within two days, this force was more or less decimated. 165. 1 Corps op between Pathankot and Jammu with the task of thrusting towards Sialkot. Pakistani thrusts against Chhamb and Poonch suggested a weaker (comparatively) centre opp the 1 Corps. However, 1 Corps adv was painfully slow and despite prodding by the Western Army Cdr, Lt Gen KP Candeth, and the Chief when no prog was evident by 13th or 14th Dec 1971, the Army Cdr sent a confd note to the Chief through an offr courier expressing his concern at the slow rate of adv, intimating that if the Corps Cdr failed to comply with the latest warning issued to him, he would be constrained to remove him from comd. The Corps Cdr, Lt
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Gen KK Singh, was outstanding staff offr who had served with the Chief as an instr in the Def Service Staff College, as Brig Gen Staff in 4 Corps, and lately as Director of Mil Ops in Army HQ. This was a most disquieting devp but fortunately, the ceasefire intervened. Psy Warfare 166. The Indians stepped up their psy warfare. A personal msg from Manekshaw was repeatedly beamed by All India Radio to the beleaguered Pakistanis. Leaflets bearing the msg were also dropped over the Pakistan def. The msg was addsd to the offrs and jawans‟s of Pakistan Army and invited them to lay arms before it was too late. It warned; “The Indian forces have reached all round you. Your air force is destroyed. You have no hope of help from them. Chittagong, Chalna and Mangla ports are blocked. Nobody can reach you from the sea. Your fate is sealed. The Mukti Bahini and the people are all prep to take revenge for the atrocities and cruelties you have committed. Why waste lives? Do you want to go home and be with your children? Do not waste time. There is no disgrace in laying down your arms to soldier. We will give you the treatment befitting a soldier”. To demonstrate the futility of resistance, the air attks on the Pakistani defs were intensified, especially on the apch to Dhaka within 20 miles of the city. 167. On 15 Dec, AIR repeatedly broadcast a msg form Manekshaw to Niazi at short intervals. Quoting Niazi‟s signal, the msg read:”Since you have indicated your desire to stop fighting, I expect you to issue orders to all forces under your comd in Bangladesh to ceasefire imdtly and surrender to my advancing forces wherever they are located”. Manekshaw gave his solemn assurance that armed Pakistani pers who surrendered would be treated with dignity and respect soldiers were entitled to be cared for, the dead given a respectable burial. 168. He added: “No one need fear for their safety, no matter where they come from. Nor shall there be any reprisal by forces op under my comd” as soon as he recd a positive responses, he said he would direct Gen Aurora to refrain from all air and grnd action against the Pakistani forces to demonstrate his good faith. He ordered stoppage of all air action over Dhaka and its neighborhood from 1700 hrs on 15 Dec to 0900 hrs the next day and emphasized that India had no desire to inflict cas on Niazi‟s tps and then he warned: “However, should you not comply with that I have stated, you will lve me with no alternative but to resume my offn with the utmost vigour at 0900 hrs at 16 Dec. Surrender 169. Radio links ware activated on listening watch to pick up Niazi‟s response to Manekshaw‟s msg. But the whole ni passed in silence. Manekshaw was getting exasperated at what seemed an endless wait. Next morning arr without any response. At 0800 hrs on 16 Dec, when Manekshaw was in the process of giving dir for the day‟s ops, the radio link became suddenly active, conveying Niazi‟s request for an extension of the moratorium by six hrs and for an Indian Army rep to come down to Dhaka to negotiate the terms of surrender. The extension was at once granted and this time the moratorium was extended to the Grnd forces as well. A couple of hrs later Maj Gen Gandharv Nagra, accompanied by his bde cdrs, walked into Niazi‟s HQ. The cease-fire was agreed from 3:00 PM 16 Dec 1971. The instrument of surrender was signed by Gen JS Arora and Lt Gen Niazi and Bangladesh was liberated.
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Press Bfgs 170. At the first mtg of the Jt Chiefs the Chairman had directed that all press reporting must be timely, accurate and truthful. The Chairman also insisted that, within the constraints of security, nothing must be hidden from the media; also that no incorrect figure or claim was to be given out. It is a truth that our reporting throughout this pd was objective, accurate, prompt and truthful. Analysis 171. Certain traits that Sam displayed during this pd are:-
(a) Clarity of Thought. Throughout during prep for the war till it was complete and the armed forces were ready for the offn, Sam was clear about the pol and final mil aim and maint his focus throughout. (b) Trust and Confidence. Once the war broke out the chief walked to his office, calmly and in a pace no brisker that his usual one and informed each of the Army Cdrs with the permission to them to put their op plans into effect. This he did despite the PM or the Def Minister being informed as both could not be contacted. Such was the level of confidence existing between the Chief and polity. (c) Meticulous Plg. The Battle proceeded as planned primarily due to detailed and immaculate plg over months. (d) Motivation and Confidence Bldg. The Chief had assured the offr cadre prior to the commencement of the op that this time there would be no sackings. This kept their motivation high. The case of bde cdr and GOC 10 Inf Div bears a testimony to the fact. (e) Offn Spirit. In an incident at Hussainniwala, the en attk 15th Bn the PUNJAB Regt with a bde size force supported by an armd regt. Initial reports stated hy losses suffered by the bn which prompted the GOC to ask the COAS for permission to withdraw the unit. Sam refused as he felt that first reports are always darker than the actual happening. This proved correct subsequently. In a similar incident at Chhamb once asked for permission to withdraw, Sam refused the withdrawl of tps which proved rt. (f) Calm Poise. He never showed the strain or even a touch of anxiety in any of testing times or during the temporary reversals the forces suffered. (g) Magnanimity. On 16th Dec 1971 when guns fell silent on the eastern front, he was congratulated for the victory. He was pressurized to mov to Dacca for the surrender ceremony to which he replied, “It was Jagjit Arora‟s show and he must bask in the limelight”. (h) Truthfulness. All media bfg were carried out precisely & honestly. Facts were reported accurately & uncorroborated or doubtful figs were not to be put out to media. The reporting of cas both to eqpt & pers were realistic.
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(j) Psy W. Gen Manekshaw had printed leaflets dropped over Bangladesh asking Pak forces to surrender & conserve lives while assuring them complete security & dignity under the „Geneva Convention‟. (k) Vision. Transformation of the armed forces from the decade of two maj miserable wars to a victorious unit with futuristic vision was due to Sam‟s vision. (l) Pragmatic. The Chief was well aware of the repercussions of his denial of launching an offn in Apr- Jun. However, in addn to being straight fwd, he was also pragmatic and minced no words in conveying the real picture.
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PART VIII – POST 1971
Treatment of PsOW 172. Capt Ahsan Malik, the Kamalpur post cdr, came out with a white flag at about 1900 hrs and offered the surrender of his grn. He said he was doing so on the instrs of his superiors and not on acct of the notes sent by the opposing cdr. He had put up a courageous stand throughout the siege and had surrendered after holding a bde of besiegers for 21 days with a coy str of a mixture of regulars, rangers and razakars totalling about 140 men. Hardly any cas had been suffered as a result of Indian arty bombardment and air strike. The brave stand by the courageous Baluchi capt was recog by his adversaries. Manekshaw sent a personal congratulatory msg to Malik, comdg his defiant stand. He instructed the concerned fmn cdr to treat the kamalpur prisoners of war with respect and kindness, due to brave soldiers. 173. The problem after taking charge of the prisoners of war was to move them out of Bangladesh almost overnight as their presence in that country was both fraught with danger and an irritant to Bengali sensibilities. Consequently, POW camps were improvised. As tps were in the posns they had occu during the war it was decided to make use of peace-time cantts for this purpose. Accordingly, the prisoners were mov to selected cantts which had to have security fencing and spl lighting arngs rigged up overnight: gds had to be found as the borders were still active and available tps were all committed. Again the pressure mounted and, with a superhuman effort from the railways and all other agencies that were concerned, the prisoners were transported to the camps they were to occupy for the next twenty-one long, weary months. 174. Pak media unleashed vicious propaganda attributing lack of facilities & mal treatment of prisoners under the Indian Army. The truth was somewhat different. The prisoners were taken good care of & given all facilities that they were entitled to. In fact, the same scales of ration were auth to them that were to the Indian soldier. On festive occasion‟s ie muslim festivals, extra rations were provided to them. As far as clothing was concerned, all needs were adequately catered to. Vis by Red Cross were permitted to ascertain & verify the living conditions of these prisoners. One of the offrs of the Pak Army who was in captivity was so impressed that he told the chief that they had heard a lot about him & it is as pity that he was not leading them. This was perhaps the biggest compliment the en could have paid to an army. Help to Bangladesh Govt 175. The Govt of Bangladesh reqd immense help from the Indian Army to enable eff reconstruction and functional infrastructure. During the few months that the Indian Army spent in Bangladesh, the Army “Sappers” (Engrs) helped the adm to re-build br, air-fds, jetties, rds and rly lines in record time apart clearing mine-fds left behind by Pakistan Army. Spec “Bomb Disposal Squads” of the army helped in removing and detonating unexploded bombs all over the countryside. The telecomn people “Corps of Signals” of the Indian Army asst in re-est of telecomn and radio links from Bangladesh to the outside world. On completion of these tasks, the last of the Indian tps left Banlgadesh on 13 Mar 1972. Re-Grouping & Re-equipping 176. Very high priority, and something which commenced almost as soon as the war ended, was regrouping and re-equipping of units and fmns. Because of timely stocking, expdr was
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replenished almost within the first two weeks or so. Considering that this involved making up defi that exist as a result of usage, wear and tear, en action and incl manpower and other items as diverse as all the different types of amn, firearms, food, even water, vehicles of all sorts, radio eqpt, clo and so on, one can imagine the magnitude of this formidable task and, the meticulous plg that was reqd to ensure that this entire action took place within the shortest possible time. Concurrent with, was the matter of reorg and reviewing of op plans. Op Changes 177. The span of cont of Western Comd from Ladakh to Bikaner had become quite unmanageable. Taking this into acct, a new Comd HQ‟s the “Northern Comd” HQ was raised at Udhampur . From Udhampur HQ‟s 15 Corps was shifted to Srinagar & a new Corps HQ was raised at Nagrota, to look after the LC. Once Bangladesh ops were over, 2 Corps HQ was reloc at Chandimandir. Subsequently it was redesignated as the 2nd Strike Corps of the India Army. Another consequence was coming into the existence of second armd div, the new 31 Armd Div. Raising of addl HQs of armd bdes & armd regts was ordered. Some of these regts were raised in the fd itself by gp indep sqns into a regt. The trg of army fmns & units was reviewed & streamlined. Greater emphasis was laid on „army air co-op‟ & co-ord improved through jt exs. An integrated plan for modern mobile comn was mooted to offer a more reliable & flexible nw of comn to the fmns. Such a sys would also allow the freedom of exploiting mob in a given theatre of ops. Def plans were reviewed. This apch permitted re-orientation in devp & prod/procurement of long-term reqmts of the def service apart from an integrated apch to def plg. Rehabilitation 178. Enhanced pension for war widows was intro. Not only this, Fd Marshal was able to convince the govt to earmark suitable jobs for these widows if they met the criterion. State govts notified res of seats in professional colleges for children of all rks killed/ missing in action. Suitable scholarships were also made available for deserving cases. Payment of money as “Ex-Gratia” to battle cas, was considerably enhanced by the chief. The railways intro concessional fares for war widows & their wards as also offrs decorated during action. Five new medals were instituted for the armd forces & Para mil forces. Donations 179. “Funds Raising” for the „Welfare of Jawans‟ and for war widows/wounded became a high priority task. Mrs Manekshaw was continuously working at it and was travelling all the time between the MH, Army HQ, offices of the Ministers in the govt and many industrialists who were in Delhi. Various events like welfare fetes, sales and other fund raising activities were in full swing in all the metro centers of the country. Her personal rapport with many industrialists in Bombay helped her in mobilizing very large sums of money as the Chairperson of the Army Wives‟ Welfare Association. By the end of 1972, she had collected a monumental amount of money from these activities. Companies like Bombay Dyeing made their contribution in kind by donating large No of bed sheets and towels to MHs. The woolen fabric coys contributed blankets for hospitals while many industrialists opened their doors to deserving widows and children of those killed in battle and offered them jobs to rehabilitate them. Given the amount of money what was coming to the AWWA as also the propensity of people to donate large sums of money, giving them rebate on income tax on all these donations was a legitimate question. However, the existing rules did not permit sums beyond a certain amount donated to the Army
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Welfare exemption from income tax. In order to overcome this problem the COAS wrote to the Finance Minister, Mr YB Chawan. He suggested that since he was unable to overrule existing policy on the subject, one way of circumventing the rules was that all donations larger than the amount entitled to tax exemption, be made out to the „Prime Minster‟s Relief Fund‟ which accorded 100 per cent relief from taxation. Once recd there, under a covering note saying that this was for „Army Welfare‟, these could then be tfr to the army. This simple expedient worked extremely well and the people manning this fund were very coop in effecting the necessary tfr of amounts meant for the army. 180. War Memorial. Having won the war, it was decided to build a memorial for the Indian Soldiers. It was recom that BSF flag also be placed next to the flag of the “Def Services”. However Army Chief stated quite unequivocally that the world over, the “Tomb of the unknown soldier” was a memorial dedicated to the soldiers of the armed forces of the country, killed in battle in the service of their country. BSF was a police force and by no stretch of imagination could they be equated with armed forces of the country. On 26 Jan 1972 war memorial “Amar Jawan Jyoti” was inaugurated by PM & „Eternal Flame‟ was lit. 181. On 28 Jan 1972, Sam Manekshaw was honoured with the award of “Padma Vibhushan”. 182. Jointmanship. A need to run a course for Lt Col to assume appts in higher comd & staff jobs was felt; a course called HC course was conceived. Offrs attending this course not to be reported upon so that they can speak their mind freely. Actual plans of all Fd Fmns were discussed. The Air Force & Navy also formed a part so that “ Jointmanship” could be further honed & streamlined. Extn as COAS 183. The Chief was due to complete 58 yrs on 04 Apr 1972. Existing orders stipulated that an offr of the rk of Gen could serve upto 58 yrs of age or do a three-yr term in office whichever came first. In this case, although the three yrs were to expire in Jun, the age restn came into effect beforehand. The govt would not let him go for two reasons. One : disengagement had still not taken place and the borders continued to be active, and two : age notwithstanding, it was inconceivable that a man of his talents would be allowed to retire just after he had been instrumental in winning such a decisive victory. 184. In mid Mar 1972, he was summoned to the first of many mtgs with the Prime Minster. During these, she attempted to get him to agree to „carry on” after 04 Apr. He refused for the simple reason that „my officers are all retd on the date of superannuation: how can I face them by agreeing to carry on in service ?” he would not budge from this stand despite much pressure and one can imagine the magnitude of this when one realizes the tremendous respect he had always borne for the Prime Minister. All his friends and family were also trying their best to persuade him to agree, but he stuck to his resolve. 185. On 01 Apr at about 1100h a handwritten envelope marked „Personal” and addsd to the Chief was handed to him from the Prime Minster‟s Secretariat. There was an investiture Ceremony in Rashtrapati Bhawan on 01 Apr 1972. Instead of announcing the retirement, the announcer stated that it had been decreed that Gen Manekshaw will continue in office at the President‟s pleasure, until further orders.
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186. Shimla Agreement. In the Shimla agreement of Jul 1972, the CFL was re-designated as Line of Cont or (LOC) at the behest of COAS. This renaming of the CFL rendered the task of the UNMOGIP more or less redundant since cont of the line had been „ipso-facto‟ est. 187. On 2nd Jan 1973, SHFJ Manekshaw was promoted to the rk of Fd Marshal. He relinquished the office of COAS on 15 Jan 1973. 188. The Prime Minster, in a bid to circumvent the earlier impasses created by the news of his being appt Chief of Def Staff, had suggested to the Fd Marshal that he accept a new job under creation, namely Member Def in the Planning Commission with Minister of State status. He had accepted the offer and it was for this reason that he remained in Delhi after relinquishing office : had it not been so, he would have mov down to Coonoor imdt after he relinquished office as his advice had always been “After retirement, get away from the scene of action as your remaining there can mean embarrassment to both parties”.
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PART – IX POST ARMY DAYS
189. Post retirement Days. Once it was decided that fd Marshal Manekshaw would relinquish office on 15 Jan 1973, various problems started to rear at the heads of people who mattered in the govt. First was the actual time of relinquishment as Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal PC Lal, who was also scheduled to retire on 15 Jan 1973. The govt desired the Army Chief to relinquish office first so that his successor could take over as the Chairman of Chief of Staff Committee by virtue of his seniority in office. This was resolved by timing the succession so that the new Army Chief took over in the morning and the new Air Chief was appt in the afternoon. The Fd Marshal was granted the six months lve he was entitled to & permitted, during the pd of this lve, to occupy a govt house. No house offered was fit for occupation, so Manekshaw mov to the MES IB in Delhi Cantt. 190. Pay and Privileges. In the British sys, a Fd Marshal is tech put on half pay on relinquishing office, but this was not acceptable in India, since half pay would have amt to Rs 2250/- which was more than the pension of a rtd president or retd chief justice. If the amt the govt finally decided on, was called „Pay‟, then neither was commutation of pension possible nor tech at least, could provident fund account be closed. The amt could not be called pension as the Fd Marshal never retires. This impasse was finally resolved by naming it the monthly pension of Gen, of Rs 1200/- plus and honorarium of Rs 400/- spl to the rk of Fd Marshal. 191. A case was presented to the Govt by Army HQ suggesting that the Fd Marshal be auth a small secretariat, a ceremonial gd at his residence to pay proper compliments to the residential flag, a staff and a house in Delhi. Initially all these were turned down, however later when Mr Bansi Lal, was appt the Def Minister, among his first orders were the dir to provide a small staff to the Fd Marshal, proper reception, tpt and accn arngs whenever he vis any mil stn. Stay in Coonoor 192. Manekshaw‟s finally settled down in Coonoor in the Nilgiris, next to Wellington Mil Cantt. The house was named as „Stavka‟, in memory of his vis to Soviet Union. The house was designed to accommodate all bric-a-barc Mrs Manekshaw had accumulated over the yrs. Fd Marshal had also constr a house along with „Stavka‟ to accommodate all his faithful aides who had served him all along the yrs. 193. Once the Fd Marshal was requested to flag off the Delhi Vintage Car Rally in 1973, he not only consented to attend the rally but also to record an interview for five min for Delhi Television. The interview could not proceed beyond first question as the interviewer couldn‟t stop laughing. The question was, “Fd Marshal, you must be interested in vintage cars which explains your presence here, but tell me, are you thinking of acquiring a vintage car?”. The Fd Marshal replied – “Oh yes, indeed. I am most interested in vintage cars. As far as acquiring one is concerned I don‟t have to go very far as the Def Ministry has been kind enough to give me a vintage car for my use which I am running these days.” Controversy 194. In late jan 1973, Sam had been interviewed by Dateline, a New Delhi wkly. While he answered many questions, two of these became cause of a huge controversy in the national press & the parliament. The questions were quite innocuous. It was the manner in which they
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were reported that became the cause of disquiet. The remarks attributed to him were; first,” London is my favourite city as I feel at home there”. Second, “Jinnah had asked me to join the Pakistan Army in 1947. If I had, you would have had a defeated India”. In fact the journalist who had interviewed the Fd Marshal had not reproduced the conversation „verbatum‟. She perhaps was looking for sensationalizing the whole interview. A correct response would have seen the end of this avoidable incident. While the interview took place in late Jan 1973 & was published then, the whole controversy erupted only when Sam was in the UK vis the British Army. Life in Pvt Sect 196. The pvt sect, ever in a hurry, were not once to ignore a man of his stature. Consequently, the Fd Marshal was flooded with the offers of directorship and chairmanship. He accepted whatever he could not refuse. This made him very busy and he could only manage 5-8 days in a month at his home, the rest of the days were spent in hotel attending board mtg, selecting/screening pers for various jobs. As director of the JK Bank, he was one dir who made it a pt to attend all their meetings. 197. In 1977, Mr Morarji Desai, the PM asked Sam to head the Sports Auth of India. Nothing of note occurred during this tenure. Later, in 1996, Prime Minister Mr PV Narshima Rao, asked him to join the bd of Indian Red Cross. He was Dir with Escorts when Mr Swaraj Paul made his famous takeover bid. Alarmed, govt stepped in and changed the complete board leading to the famous remark by the Fd Marshal. “This is the first time in the history when a Naik has displaced a Fd Marshal”. (Naik was the man who replaced him; Naik is also corporal in the Indian Army).” 198. One of his fellow bd members said, “The fd Marshal‟s org skills and means to max the use of human resources, is invaluable”. 199. This aspect of his character is best illustrated by an incident that occurred while he vis TISCO steel mills, at Jamshedpur. The Fd Marshal was impeccably dressed in a light suit. Prior to entering the mill, he was advised to wear an overall, but he refused. He went throughout the mill incl the blast furnaces, mtg with the workers. By the time he ended his rounds, the suit was full of grime. At one of the furnaces he stooped to chat with a huge Sikh. He shook hands with him, spoke to him in Punjabi and enquired abt his family and his vill. This worker could not believe his ears. “Banta Singh will never ever forget me. I am sure he will tell his family that he shook hands with a fd Marshal. Moreover, what did it cost me? Nothing!”. He had made an imp pt in man mgmt and what is now called „Human Resource Mgt‟. 200. In 1979, Sam was invited to vis Nepal, by the Royal Nepalese Army. During his vis, His Majesty, the late King mahendra of Nepal, awarded the “Tri Shakti Patra” to the Fd Marshal in recog of all that he had done for the Gorkha soliders & pensioners from the Indian Army. 201. The creation of Gen Cariappa as an “Honorary fd Marshal” by the govt was something that had not been realized in the official circles. This aberration was pt out by Sam & the govt speedly dropped the prefix of Honorary. Sam had told them that Fd Marshal is created not appt. If they are created they cannot be “Honorary”. 202. While the Fd Marshal did not accept ambassadorial or gubernatorial assignments from the govt, PM at different times used his experience in matters related to nation security.
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Consequent to “Op Blue Star” at the Golden Temple in Armitsar, some actions by the govt agencies did not augur well for communal relations. The SGPC invited Sam to vis Amritsar and discuss their problems. Sam vis the SGPC & heard their problems & suggestions. On his return, he briefed the PM. One of the problems that they had raised was that very few Sikh offrs in the armed forces were being posted to Punjab. The problem was suitable redressed. Other issues were also discussed with PM who had these taken care of. The trust placed by the highest Sikh body in the Fd Marshal was vindicated. In Sep 1993, the Fd Marshal accompanied Sardar Swaran Singh to Srinagar to meet the governor & make an assessment of the obtaining sit. In Nov 1997, the Rajasthan govt conferred the “Rana Pratap Award” on the Fd Marshal. Lecture on Leadership 203. Throughout the post army days, the Fd Marshal kept himself busy with the corporate world & through extensive touring to different parts of the country & the world to deliver lecture to educational & professional instt. He was invited by many reputed professional colleges to talk to their members on a variety of subjects. In Nov 1998 Sam was invited to Def Service Staff College to deliver a lecture on „Leadership and Discp”. The lecture delivered by him is one of the finest lectures ever delivered on the subject. The lecture can serve as a lesson to anyone who aspires to become a successful ldr in his or her walk of life. It was based on the enormous experience of his long stint as Chief of the Army Staff of one of the largest standing armies in the world, from 1969 to 1973 and 39 odd yrs of the active army life. 204. On 27 Feb 2004, the “Honorary Doctor of Letters” was conferred upon him. Final Days 205. He died of complications from pneumonia at MH in Wellington at 0030 hours, June 27, 2008 at the age of 94. Reportedly, his last words were “I am okay‟. Analysis 205. Even as the govt dithered in deciding the pay & perks, the Fd Marshal maint his dignity and humility by refusing to get involved in petty controversies and left it to the govt‟s direction to decide the emoluments for a Fd Marshal. 206. It is indeed astounding that the life and works of Fd Marshal would find such resonance in the corporate world. It is worthwhile to note that the Fd Marshal elicted such respect and admiration from often unexpected qtrs. The fact that his tech is so relevant to the corporate world is testimony to the stature of the Fd Marshal. 207. Fd Marshal remained committed to the armd forces while leading his sceond innings. He made himself available to various mil est, forums & school of instrs to share his thoughts & experiences with present generation of offrs. His talk on Leadership is perhaps the most comprehensive ever and most relevant. 208. Even in death the fd Marshal retained his calm and characteristic humility, courage, resolute determination and empathy. Fd Marshal endeared himself to all those who came in his contact. In spite of his iconic stature he remained humble to the core and left a lasting impact on all.
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PART X : MANEKSHAW AS A LDR & MIL CDR
“There are three marks of a superior man : being virtous, he is free from anxiety, being wise, he is free from perplexity, being brave, he is free from fear”. Confucius 209. Leadership is about values, principles, belief, truth, honesty and integrity. Leadership is this display of confidence and selflessness. 210. What shines through his life is a splendid portrait of a man with vision, competence, compassion and courage. Sam has over the yrs, gathered around himself an aura of greatness, a charisma. He often used to say that one must learn to grow in grace as one grows in rk. Manekshaw‟s candid style helped him devp an instant rapport with his tps, thus those under his comd always remained in a state of high morale. The saga of his life will continue to motivate and inspire untold generations of Indians. Sam, as the Fd Marshal is affectionately known to all rks of the armed forces was also reputed to be a very unconventional & informal cdr who endeared every person who came into contact with him. A man known for his sense of humour, sharp & incisive mind, a very highly developed sense of professionalism & integrity, compassion of human attitude, he was equally at home with the high and mighty and lowest of the low. One ldr who with his sense of fair play and justice ensured that the prestige of the service was upheld at all times. Very trusting of people, he was very helpful to all who sought his help. Leadership Traits 211. Professional Competence. His professional qualities ensured that the team he led was a competent one. He was believed to finish his own wk in an hour and spend the remainder of the time walking from one office to another, sitting down with his harried jr staff and helping them sort out the problems they were working on. He was one of the first Indian offr to be nominated for staff course and also to be posted as DS at Staff College. The concept of changing the role of holding corps to pivot corps was conceived by Sam as early as 1965, when he recom the raising of an inf div and an armd bde. Above all handling of the 1971 war speaks volumes about his professional competence. He detested embellishment and demanded the essence. Consequently, long winded explanation bored him & he would become restless. 212. Professional Honesty. “There is a very thin line between a Fd Marshal and dismissal”. This one line conveys the essence of professional honesty as shown by Manekshaw when he resisted intense pol pressure to go to war in Apr 1971 when India was faced with the influx of millions of Bangladeshi refugees due the genocide unleashed by Gen Tikka Khan in erstwhile East Pak on 25 Mar 1971. Manekshaw strongly recom that he be given adequate time to go to war in the winter of 1971. 213. Man With a Vision. Sam maintained that in order to be “two jumps ahead” of the others, one had to thoroughly do his homework. Not only this, one had to look ahead all the time to ensure that decisions taken were in the „long term‟ Interests of the Service. The ability to do this lay in ones cap to be a good listener to accept sound advice since one could not examine a problem from all angles by himself. His advice to the PM on the mounting of ops was guided by his conviction about the prevailing conditions. His remarks in the mtg on md accn that resulted in the enhancement of CILQ to offr, the matter of computerization coupled with
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figurative assessment on confd reports of Brig and above, the Pay Commission and the readiness with which he was able to sort out advice given to him and accept or implement sound ideas speak for themselves. While being a cdr is one side of the coin, being a ldr completes this cycle. If a cdr has to function as a ldr, he must have an understanding of the problem by confronting facts. If he knows the facts, inference will be from his thinking and mind. Sam at all times pressed for info on facts, issues, factors involved and their magnitude. This also involved freedom to his subordinates to disagree so that the dissension could throw up alternatives to be factored into the decisions. He firmly believed that when facts are obtained first hand, all plg and work is expedited. 214. Org bldg and strat plans must be synchronized. While deferring the East Pakistan campaign by three months despite pol pressure, Sam assembled his force and supplied them with strat guidance while demanding op targets and exec plans from the fd cdrs. This bal is what ldrs need. While strat initiatives are imp, grassroots implementation is equally vital. In the aftermath of the debacle of 1962, the Indian Army was carrying out review of all its op plans. In Dec 1963, Lt Gen Manekshaw as Army Cdr, Western Comd recom raising of a new div for Akhnoor, redefining an offn role for 26 Inf Div at Jammu and raising of an armd bde to threaten Pakistan‟s heartland, from a new front. In addition, he tried to change the def mentality of defending every inch of territory that had set in by instilling offn content in all defs. 215. Phy Courage. The WW-II incident in which Sam was wounded critically by taking the impact of a burst from a Japanese machine gun with nine bullets. He was decorated with MC for gallantry while personally leading tps in combat, this brings out raw phy courage he possessed. 216. Moral Courage. Moral courage is the ability to put ethics into action. Sam displayed this quality at numerous occasions. Few of them are :-
(a) He had absorbed the lessons of the war in 1962 when the Indian Army went into ops, with Gens being removed from comd and brigs losing their jobs. He stood his grnd with courage of conviction in his mill judgment, against the advice to go to war at short notice.
(b) Res in the Army. The Indian Army still does not have any res courtesy Manekshaw who defied the then Def Minister Babu Jagjivan Ram‟s diktat for res for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the offr cadre. Sam felt that recruitment to the offr cadre should be solely on the basis of merit, by res we would be compromising on efficiency and national security. When threatened by Jagjivan Ram as to why action should not be taken against those responsible for not properly implementing govt policy on recruitment, Manekshaw sent a strong reply demanding that action should be taken against him as he believed that ensuring national security was more imp than any ill-conceived notion of social justice. (c) While putting across his views on the problems of undertaking imdt action in East Pak as dir by PM in Apr 1971, the COAS also sought clear dirns on the “Chain of Comd” for these ops. Wars and battles are lost by a nation when its ldrs or Cdrs have not been too conscious about this chain of Comd. The debacle of 1962 is an outstanding example of the breach of this rule.
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217. Man of Principles. The mark of man of principles is when he stands firm after making a decision. In a famous incident Sam is reported to have given only two options to an offr found prima facie involved in corruption: either resign or shoot himself. Sam‟s greatness lay in living the principles with wit, wisdom and humility. He taught the world how ldrs must learn to dilute their self-imp while sticking to the values necessary for Leadership. Manekshaw believed in absolute honesty and impartiality. He accepted that every ldr would have his likes and dislikes, but he must never allow them to influence his professional judgment. He linked honesty to moral and phy courage as prerequisites for a mil ldr. As per him, a „Yes man‟ was dangerous man and could qualify to become a minister, a secretary or even a Fd Marshal, but he could never become a ldr nor hope to ever be respected. In 1969, rumours were of army takeover & the best man to give quality Leadership to the country was the COAS. He steadfastly believed that the army‟s role was to fight external aggression & assist the govt in law & order when called upon to do so and not to rule & govern the country. 218. Courage of Conviction. Once a Def Secy made an obsn on the note written by Manekshaw for the PM and the Def Minister. He walked straight into Mrs Indira Gandhi‟s office. He politely told her that if she found the Def Secy more competent than him on mil matters, then she did not have a need for him. 219. Loyalty. Being faithful and loyal to country, the army subordinates, peers and superiors constitutes loyalty. His loyalty is a highly celebrated quality. Certain examples are:-
(a) Once while comdg the div at Jammu, in his conversations with the then Def Minister, Mr VP Menon he refused to comment on certain decisions taken by his superior, Lt Gen Thimayya. On being persistently provoked by Mr Menon, who also hinted, that any negative reports about his superior would be viewed favourably and would prove beneficial for his career, he said that, if today Mr. Menon was seeking info of his superior, then tomorrow he was likely to adopt similar means against him from his subordinates. (b) His CSO (civ staff offr) could accompany him whenever he went on tour to their home town. During flt, it was common prac to meet the crew in the cockpit. Manekshaw‟s concerns for the welfare of his offrs & men came from his heart & was a very genuine concern. Having landed at the destination, at the first opportunity that he had, Sam would vis the qtrs or accn where his staff had been put up. (c) His assurance to the PM coupled with his steadfast refusal to do anything unconstitutional in 1969 when the rumours of his taking over the country were doing rounds, is the most commendable instance of his loyalty to the country. (d) When Gen Chaudhari wanted tps mov to Delhi, Sam objected to this and even wrote to him about the pitfalls of such a move. He had given his views to Gen Chaudhary and thereafter carried out the decision that had been taken by the chief. Upholding the dignity of his Sr and other offrs apart from doing what was best for the army was a display of his deep att to the org that he belonged to.
220. Initiative. Manekshaw, understood the truth of the maxim that, “a purely professional environment is extremely dangerous, and the higher the rk of the cdr and the longer his length of service the greater the danger”. He was equally aware of the fallacy that by his very elevation to a higher rk an offr is supposedly imbued with profound knowledge Releasing the gap in trg from Majs to Brigs, i.e “Sr Comd Course” and “National Def College Course,” he intro a course
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for Colonels, the “Higher Comd Course,” This is a tread mark of ldrship at its‟ best. One of the prime resp of ldrs is to ensure the grinding of their comd to able them to hold posns of higher resp. If that is to happen, then some of them need to be trained in this art. Expecting everybody to meet to qualitative reqmt of this would be too much. Therefore it as an inescapable need that filters are in place to separate the more deserving from those who are less deserving. These systems have to take cognizance of the overall performance if the best are to be selected. This is exactly what Sam intro so that only the best would hold posns of higher resp. This apart, he ensured that trg was formalized and there was transparency in the system. Having been Comdt at the Inf School and Staff College, he was fully aware of the negative impact that rendition of reports on students undergoing course has. It was thus, that he forbade reports in HC being written to allow all attendees to express their view uninhibitedly and freely. This initiative sets him apart as a mil ldr. 221. Forthright. He was very forthright when writing reports on offrs who were in the zone for higher comd. This magnificent quality of Leadership made him bold and outspoken. Being virtuous himself, he was free from anxiety. Only those ldrs can do best for his comd who are not looking for rewards for their action. At the same time, they cannot be bought over with false promises. If that has to be practiced then it is fundamental that they do not look for post retirement benefits. Comdg respect from your subordinates or your comd makes it imperative that you do not compromise your posn by seeking favours form the govt to rehabilitate you on superannuation. This was the advice that he gave to Gen Kumaramangalam also when he was making his farewell vis to Calcutta. In his own case, it has been more than proved by his stand on his appt to Embassies and Raj Bhawans. Many will argue that he did accept the Chairmanship of “Sports Authority of India.” They will do well to remember that it was the then Prime Minister, Morarji Desai who insisted on utilizing his experience in this Fd. There was no salary att to the appt, which was made on the terms demanded by the Fd Marshal. 222. Foresight and Plg. Manekshaw showed acumen for plg and adm while handling the issues related to Partition in 1947, and later put to use his battle skills during the 1947 - 48 J&K Ops. Sam emphasized the necessity to plan to the highest degree. The most visible example was Sam‟s plg for the East Pakistan campaign wherein the campaign inexplicitly was planned to the last detail. This plg paid rich dividends in the exec. This trait of Sam is evident from the forethought he had about the campaigning season and the logistical compulsions that he envisaged. 223. Coop. Coop is basically teamwork at every level from the govt, betn the services, within the services and right down to the coys and bns or regts. Coop is improved by ensuring that unity of comd is est by the designation of a cdr for each force. This coop especially in the war of 1971 has been the subject of appre at nearly all levels. While as the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, Sam had the auth and backing to enforce decisions, it was through consensus and rationale that he chose to implement policies. Even within his own service he preferred to devp a consensual apch to problem solving thus allowing other members of his staff to participate and own resp. 224. Eff Man Mgt. Sam always maint that all ldrs must build an ability to spot and utilize talent. Many observers are unanimous that the real genius of Sam lay in his choice of fd cdrs. Identifying the rt person for a particular assignment, a person with the skill set and mindscape that guarantees delivery can spell the difference between success and failure. He always selected the rt man for the rt job. He appt Maj Gen Shabegh Singh, then a Brig, an expert in guerrilla ops, to train and org the Mukti Bahini. However later he turned down this offr‟s appt as
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an area cdr by saying “I can‟t give that Badmash this kind of authority” This ability can only come about if the ldr has an intimate knowledge of the capabilities of his men. For that he has to devp close relationships across the org. That is a skill that every ldr must build. 225. Dir Style of Comd. This style of comd has become an absolute necessity especially in context of fighting ltd wars and fourth generation warfare which are more likely to take place than conventional conflicts. Sam chose his team carefully and then trusted them fully. During the Bangladesh campaign he handpicked the team and backed them to the hilt even going to the extent of announcing that there would be no sackings. Ldrs need to choose their subordinates carefully and then sp the team totally. Every member should know for certain that if things go wrong, the ldr will back them fully. Sam would never pull rk when his jrs tried to tell him something that was very different from his own ideas. Debate and dscns are used by all great ldrs to clarify their own thought process to facilitate decision making. The best ideas may be embedded deep within the org. He actively defined the goals to be achieved and left the exec to the cdrs. Sam very often used to say “The higher the cdr, further away from the map, must he stand”. This was borne by his trust in his offrs and giving them a freedom of action. His ability to delegate to the subordinates had left him adequate time to think and plan. It enabled him to look far ahead while processing solns to problems. While in the army, he never interfered with what was being done once he gave out his dir, he applied the same to the corporate world when he joined them. The letter of Mr. Keshub Mahindra saying that; “On the many Boards that he served he took the trouble to vis many sites and plants to familiarize himself with the actual ops done by these coys. He is not interested in the nuts and bolts of the business and always sees a much broader and bigger picture in keeping with his trg, his nature and his ability,” is testimony to this pt of view. At the same time, he was fully aware of the “goings on!” He did not close his channels of comn. 226. Motivation of Comd. The cdr who leads his men into battle is the ldr of men who motivates the men he comds to do the most difficult things under the most adverse circumstance and even risking life and limb. Manekshaw was a great motivator of men. During the 1962 War Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru rushed Manekshaw to NEFA to comd the retreating Indian forces. This had an electrifying effect on the demoralized offrs. His first order of the day said, “There will be no withdrawal without written orders”. The soldiers showed faith in their new cdr and successfully checked further ingress by the Chinese. He often dropped in on harried jrs and eagerly helped them with their tasks. Those who served with him said that he never raised his voice. But even a mild rebuke accompanied by “Sweetheart, this will not do”, was enough to tame the wildest of soldiery egos. In bns, speaking to men and offr. He shared with team not only his strat vision but transmitted his confidence to the tps. Speaking to men in his down to earth way, he promised them a fair chance to win, but reminded them that victory still remained in their hands. He warned them against looting in the war zone and on treating en prisoners with dignity. 227. Humility. It is essential that all ldrs have humbleness and humility as integral part of their behaviour and actions. Despite rising to the highest rk possible in the Indian Army Sam never lost the humility in his heart. His dealings with the ex servicemen, war widows and even the treatment meted out to the prisoners of war are enough evidence of his humility. As new age ldrs we must imbibe this quality. His wpn trg instr during the Second World War days, Hav Mitha Singh came to meet Manekshaw when he was Army Cdr of Eastern Comd. Manekshaw was in a hurry to meet the Governor of West Bengal but he made an effort to meet him. Manekshaw helped him by getting his nephew emp as accountant and gave money to buy train tickets to return to his village.
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228. Sense of Humour. Sam‟s sense of humour and the spontaneity of his remarks which were always aprop to the occasion have drawn applause from all qtrs. Such spontaneous repartee is indicative of his alertness and total attn to the subject at hand. At the same time, he is sensitive to people‟s feelings and does not use any occasion to mock any one person or gp of people as a tgt of his humour. His ability to laugh at his own self allows him the liberty that he takes in cracking jokes. 229. Humour is vital towards cheering up and changing gloomy looking environment into brighter ones within seconds. It also helps ldrs to connect to their men well. The Fd Marshal‟s wit was legendary. Once on a vis to a unit he asked what action was taken against a man who contracted venereal disease and when he was told that man‟s head was shaved off, he roared. “Shaved off? Dammit. He didn‟t do it with his head”. Sam had this ability to lighten the mood by his humour even under extreme conditions. His reply to the surgeon when he was critically wounded is an evidence of the same. 230. Justice. Justice for all is his “Sine Qua Non”. The Chief was a fanatic for justice. He believed that being just to the men under your comd, was the only resp that all offrs must fulfill with zeal.
(a) The case of a soldier serving in engr regt being wrongly punished. Sam got him rel from prison, reinstated into service and CO posted out and reprimanded.
(b) The case of David Sidhu is a good example, where Sam provided an alternative to the offr without loss of dignity or face to both parties.
231. Concern for Subordinates. Welfare is an imp aspect of a ldr‟s duties that keeps the mind of his men free from personal worries and puts them in the right frame of mind to carry out their tasks effi and cheerfully. Sam believed that welfare links offr and men together in a bond of mutual friendship and respect which will stand the rigours of war. Being a pyramid structure many good and deserving offrs were passed over for promotion to the next rk. He Initiated a dialogue with the public sect enterprises & pvt coys of the corporate world to absorb some of these offrs.
(a) Pay Commission. It was on Sam‟s insistence, that the services were permitted for the first time, to submit their respective recom for the revision of pay scales/allces, directly to the „Third Pay Commission‟. On the aspect of separation allowance for the army Manekshaw while answering the queries of the Pay Commission stated “After my marriage, I went off to war and didn‟t see my wife for three long yrs, and when I returned I found I had a brand-new daughter and the only reason I am sure the child is mine is because she looks just like me”. Needless to say, the Pay Commission broke up in laughter, but went away convinced. The separation allowance continued. (b) Ex-Servicemen. The Chief had genuine concern for the ex servicemen as it was a common site to see every morning, a large No of ex servicemen and widows waiting patiently with their petitions at his office. He would listen to them patiently and issue suitable dir to the Adjt Gen, to comprehensively address their concerns and issues. This care of the ex-servicemen was formalized by setting up a spec section in AG‟s Br that compiles and takes follow up action on the dirn given by the COAS on indl petitions.
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(c) Misc Activities. It is to the credit of the Fd Marshall that a large No of welfare schemes were formalized during his tenure. These include setting up of the Army Group Insurance and a Gorkha Resettlement unit at Raiwala. Prior to the ops in 1971, Sam ordered a study of the problem confronting „battle cas‟. This resulted in intro of the „wound medal‟, incr pension for the war widows and for those wounded in battle, education allces for the children of the deceased and provision of „separated accn‟ for the families of all rks and sanction of travel allce for such a move. Thus by painstaking care and great consideration for his men, Sam built the psy background which motivates soldiers to risk their lives. (d) Maint of Morale. The constitution of the “Third Pay Commission” and the benefits that accrued to the army is a good example. The post 1971 War measures, especially terms offered to the families of those killed in action, is an excellent example of maintenance of morale. His ability to get the rate of CILQ enhanced for army offr is an outstanding instance. He displayed knowledge, alertness and tacts so imp as qualities of Leadership to ensure maint of morale.
232. Offn Action. Manekshaw displayed this quality and tasked the fmns to undertake ltd offn tasks. In previous wars, the Indian Army was merely reacting to an offn launched by Pak. In an incident at Hussainiwala & Chhamb, Sam refused to withdraw which proved rt. Another example is creating of an armd bde in 26 Div. 233. Decisiveness. Being decisive is the hallmark of superior cdrs. In the army it is often said that capacity to comd lies in a cdr‟s ability to take a decision, “Right, Wrong or Indifferent!” Taking of such “Comd Decisions” may have the benefit of staff inputs or not. What is implicit in this term, “Comd Decisions”is that a mil cdr faced with a difficult choice assumes the resp for a risk on the basis of his assessment of a given sit. While in his career spanning nearly forty yrs in the army there are innumerable examples of this, it can be best illustrated by his refusal to the Prime Minster, to undertake imdt ops against Pakistan in the East in end of April in 1971. 234. Integrity. Integrity of Fd Marshal is legendary. His personal conduct reflected his integrity in his actions.
(a) When asked for his recom about his successor, Gen Chaudhari named Sam Manekshaw. However, Sam bluntly told that claim of Gen PP Kumaramangalam, who was sr to him, could not be overlooked. He was not willing to adopt methods that were not the accepted norms to adv his own career.
(b) It was this str of his character that enabled him to be seen as the victim in the dark hrs of his inquisition by Krishna Menon and Kaul. Despite so many offrs giving false evidence and showing lack of character, Sam never held it against them.
(c) Running of the “Army House” and expenses therein are yet another example of personal integrity. (d) Manekshaw was aware of the state of preparedness of the army apart from the fact that undertaking of ops at that time would be disastrous as it was in violation of nearly all the “Principles of War.” This demonstrates the high degree of “Moral Courage, Integrity, knowledge and Truthfulness” displayed by the Fd Marshal.
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234. Esprit-de-Corps. At the higher level of ldrship in the army, while regt ties are imp they cannot replace the sense of duty and justice that higher leadership must inculcate. Whereas Sam looked after the interest of the Regt, he never subordinated the interests of the army to the regt. While speaking up for the offrs of his regt in promotion bds, he ensured that no undue favours was shown to the detriment of others. Award of VSM to Guha Roy over an offr of his own regt is yet another example of this understanding. Personality Traits 235. Comn Skills. Sam taught us the imp of simple, dir and many times, earthy comn. Known for his wit and informality, he could get straight to the heart of the matter. Ldrs must imbibe this in full measure. He possessed extraordinary comn skills be it talking to the tps, ex servicemen, his Generals or the pol bosses. He communicated always without mincing his words and in a most eff manner. On one occasion, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi asked him whether he was plg to take over the country. Pointing to his long nose, the Gen replied: “My nose may be longer than yours but I don‟t use it to poke into other‟s affairs”. Sam‟s Comd over the English language was very good. He could express so much by saying so little. While reporting on a Gen Offr he wrote, “This offr has no respect for age, except where it comes in bottle”. 236. Dignity. His ability to remain dignified with his head held high is the hallmark of superior men. Given, that people inimical to him at the Staff College were undermining his reputation, lesser men would have been less restrained to air their views. To maint continued poise and dignity of his rk and office, he displayed the traits of good ldrs. Ldrship style of Manekshaw can perhaps be compared to the Chinese Gen “Lao Tze.” This great Gen is said to have stated “I have three precious things which I hold fast and prize. The first is gentleness, the second is frugality and third is humility, which keeps me from putting myself before others. Be gentle and you can behold, be frugal and you can be liberal, avoid putting yourself before other and you can be a ldr among men.” If there is one lesson that has emerged from the life of Sam Manekshaw, it is that cdr can inspire their comd through gentleness, unselfishness and without being pompous. The true value of a cdr is judged in adversity. If in hard times he is able to hold his own without rancor or spite, he will always be able to beat the challenge that lies ahead of him. The conduct of Sam when he was being subjected to the “inquisition” arranged by his detractors provides adequate evidence to the abundance of this quality in the character of Sam Manekshaw. 237. Alertness and Focus. Remaining alert and focused is something that the Fd Marshal has preached continuously. He prac what he preached. There cannot be a better example of this than the return of „Thakochak‟ to India. In Mar 1972, the chances of detent between India and Pak hinged on whether a small enclave which Pak had occu called Thakochak should be returned or stay with Pak. The legal experts on both sides put up cases justifying the stand taken by their respective reps and so ticklish was the issue that both sides appeared to be correct. Finally, the cabinet decided that the two Army Chief‟s should meet to sort out this problem. Both Gens, Tikka Khan & Manekshaw met at Lahore. After lunch, while having coffee, talk veered to the construction of Married offrs‟ accn. The chief was advocating the constr of multi- storeyed accn to conserve space while Tikka Khan preferred „Indep bungalows‟, Sam in his inimitable style told him, that the reason why he was for high-rise bldgs was because there was not enough land available to the army. The fact that Tikka Khan preferred bungalow kind of accn meant that there was no dearth of land for the Pakistan Army. If that was right, then why was he showing such thriftiness on parting with “Thakochak,” an area of a few
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square kilometers? Once the importance of this remark was realized, they all had a good laugh and “Thakochak” was returned to India. To get it however, India parted with a small area surrounded by Pakistan on three sides in “Kaiyan” in „Lipa Valley‟ near Srinagar. This process called for the extreme alertness and remaining focused on dealing with the problem on hand. 238. Magnanimity. Magnanimity is a virtue respected by all and must remain essential for all ldrs. Sam was always magnanimous in his dealings especially with subordinates. When Mrs Indira Gandhi asked him to go to Dhaka and accept the surrender of Pakistan forces, Manekshaw declined, magnanimously saying that honour should go to his Army Cdr in the East (Lt Gen Jagjit Singh Aurora). Manekshaw said he would only go if it were to accept the surrender of the entire Pakistani Army. After the 1971 war, Manekshaw insisted that the bodies of Pakistani offr be returned in proper coffins and with mil citation if they had gone down fighting bravely. He lauded the bravery of even his enemies. Such magnanimity is rare in mil history. 239. Frankness and Openness. His frankness & openness are sterling qualities that endeared him to all. He always felt that people must be told the truth to maintain credibility of both the sys & yourself. Sam clearly told Col David Sidhu who was wrongly sacked in 1965 that as Chief he can do very little but recom him to the RAW from where he retired in the rk of a Dir at the age of 58. Another instance was in the promotion of the QMG who had come up for his next rk, that of an Army Cdr. Instead of having a short tenure he was recom to another job where he could be able to serve for a longer time. 240. Receptive to ldeas. Once while attending a ex-servicemen‟s rally, his MA suggested that soldiers from non-tech arms needed to be provided vocational trg prior to retirement to better equip them for the post-retirement pd. He agreed & gave dir for the commencement of the vocational trg. 241. Courtesy. Gen Manekshaw was the most courteous offr & a gentleman to the core. He was very conscious of being respectful to offrs & other people irrespective of their status in life. He believed that the dignity of human being must be maintained & respected. He was very averse to flattery. He used to be visibly agitated where he saw Sr offrs & bureaucrats indulging in this sport. 242. Intensely Prac & Down-to Earth. Once, the Dir of MI, complained to the Chief that despite existing orders, many jr offrs were mtg foreign nationals. Chief quoted an example that if his ADC is invited by the US Def attache & get drunk. Attache will attempt to extract whatever info he can. But what will the attaché do next. He will spend that rest of the ni, pulling out his hair trying to decipher what the Aide had told him. The soln lay in maint security of info on a need to know basis. 243. Gracious. He always said that one must learn to grow in grace as one grows in rk. He displayed this grace while dealing with an offr from the Assam Rif who told him a white lie to get a posting. He told the MS that if this offr could lie to his own chief he must be desperate. Post him wherever he wanted to go. Comd calls for the ability to show compassion in one occasion and ruthlessness on another. 244. Simple Living. Life at the “Army House” was very simple & good. The electric bill of the Army House was paid from the pocket of the COAS. Another event, which took once every three months in the Army House, was a party for the orderlies, dhobi, drivers, the cook
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Gardeners & their family who maintained the Army House. The Chief with his wife would preside over the function where food & rum was served to all by the chief. 245. Lucky. Sam always said that brilliance and qualification apart, a soldier needed to be lucky. In support of this he gave his own example:-
(a) In the “Second Great War” when he was critically wounded in the jungles of Burma, his unit managed to evac him to the nearest centre where he was op upon and saved because a surgeon was present at that time.
(b) In 1962 when his professional integrity was being questioned and he was being subjected to a humiliating inquisition, the Chinese attk India. His chief detractor in the whole episode who was then comdg a corps against the Chinese, was unceremoniously removed, the Chief resigned and Gen JN Chaudhri was appt the Chief. Sam Manekshaw was elevated to the rk of Lt Gen and this oppurtunity got him further promotions.
(c) In 1964 when Pt. Nehru was ill and was not expected to survive; Gen Chaudhri wrote letter to Sam Manekshaw who was then Army Cdr, Western Comd to mov to Delhi with his adv HQ and some other fmns in case of Nehru‟ death. Manekshaw while obeying his orders, put his objn in writing to the chief. When things settled down, the govt asked the chief his reason for this mov. Gen Chaudhari instead of protecting him blamed Sam. Gen Manekshaw was mov to Calcutta as GOC-in-C Eastern Comd to replace Gen Kumaramangalam who was brought to Delhi as the Vice Chief. Subsequently when questioned by Mrs Gandhi personally in Calcutta, Sam showed her his letter that he had written to the Chief, which convinced her of his intent.
(d) Finally, he also attributes his becoming a Fd Marshal, despite his refusal to mount ops against East Pakistan in April 1971 to luck. When describing his conversation with the Prime Minister to the interviewer in „Quarter Deck‟ Sam himself has stated that “So there is a very thin line between becoming a Fd Marshal and being dismissed. It could have happened.”
246. Popular with the Fair sex. Reasons were as under:-
(a) He was very handsome man who was tall & well built. Always immaculately dressed in very well-tailored & cut suits.
(b) He was always well groomed & immensely presentable at all times.
(c) At parties, he made it a pt to talk to as many people as it was possible.
(d) Women were invariably given a smile & often narrated an interesting anecdote aprop to the occasion.
(e) Listening to their problems & sympathising with them. (f) He was quick in his repartee & had the knack of putting everyone at ease.
(g) A very polished gentleman who was suave & of excellent manners, he was an outstanding conversationalist. (h) He maint the dignity of his persona & did not impose himself.
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PART XI- CONCLUSION
247. Manekshaw was of the conviction that the attributes of Leadership are constant and does not change, but circumstances influence the pre dominance of some of them. As per him the cardinal attributes of Leadership were professional knowledge and professional competence and this had to be acquired the hard way. He articulated that “unless you know the men you comd, and the men know that you know your job, you will never be accepted as a ldr”. Apart from the essential qualities of ldrs mentioned in GS Publications, Sam added two more. First a ldr must be “lucky”, second he must be “a bit of a lad”. 248. Manekshaw was an extraordinary soldier, a dynamic ldr and a through bred gentleman. He personified humility, courage, resolute determination, empathy, vision and integrity – virtues that stand a person in good stead in times of crisis. 249. Ldrship has and will call for continued efforts to train and educate cdrs and their comd to look beyond the imdt to scan the horizons of probability in war that shall put them ahead of their time. This notwithstanding, the tenures of Leadership will call for courage, character, virtues and knowledge to tackle battles of the future. While tech advancement may perceptibly change the mode of warfare, doctrines on ldrship will continue to emphasise on the basic human virtues. There will be no earth shaking changes in that. The environment that has existed for centuries in human relations will continue. There will be people who will stand upright even in the face of adversity. There will still be people who will continue to think of themselves before others. A certain number will still thrive by being sycophantic in behavior and there will be men who will come to believe in all that their followers and sycophants say. There will be self proclaimed Gods amongst men. It is here that the true test of ldrship will lie. Men like Manekshaw understand their limitations and follow the dictates of truth than be guided by self-serving policies, will lend realism to sit and hopefully survive the nemesis. Luck will, at the end of it all, play a determining role in the fate of ldrs. The philosopher „Confucius‟ had seen and envisioned devp of such scenarios for him to observe:- “Ah these servile people. How is it possible to serve ones‟ prince along with them. When they are not in a posn, they are in anxiety to obtain it. When they have it, they are in anxiety lest they lose it. And men, who are in anxiety of losing their pos, there is no length to which they will not go.”
QUESTIONNAIRE
1. What qualities did Sam Manekshaw imbibe from his parents ? 2. How did the activities at Sherwood College, Nainital helped Sam to groom him for the
army life ? 3. Under what circumstance Sam joined the IMA at Dehradun ? 4. What are the highlights of his trg at IMA, Dehradun and how was his performance ? 5. How did Sam perform during his early unit life ? 6. Give a brief acct of the event in which Sam was awarded MC ?
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7. As DMO, what was Sam‟s contribution to the Def Service ? 8. Illustrate Sam‟s tenure as Cdr 167 Inf Bde ? 9. What changes did Sam brought out as Comdt, Inf School, Mhow ? 10. Discuss the events between Sam and Mr Krishna Menon, the Def Minister when Sam
was Comdt, DSSC Wellington which led to the ordering of C of I ? 11. As GOC 4 Corps, how did Sam reinstore confidence and bring the morale of the Indian
tps high? 12. Discuss the events, which led to the posting of Sam Manekshaw as GOC-in-C Eastern
Comd 13. How was the insur problem in Nagaland and Mizoram tackled by Sam? 14. What are the changes brought about by Manekshaw as COAS? 15. How did Sam carry out Re-org and Re-equipping of the Indian Army ? 16. Discuss in brief the pol sit in Pak before the war of 1971? 17. What are the reasons given by Gen Manekshaw for not going for war in Apr 1971 ? 18. What all preparations were carried out before the war of Dec 1971 with Pak ? 19. Write a short note on Mukti Bahini ? 20. What were the qualities Sam displayed during the build-up towards the 1971 War ? 21. Discuss the force level & strategy adopted by Sam Manekshaw for the 1971 War ? 22. Despite winning the war, there are places where the war did not go as planned.
Comment? 23. What psy warfare measures were adopted by Sam Manekshaw during the last days of
war ? 24. What leadership traits Sam displayed during the 1971 War with Pak ? 25. How was the issue of PsOW tackled by Sam as COAS ? 26. What all action were taken by Sam as COAS after the war was over? 27. Discuss the controversy in which Sam was involved after retirement ?
28. How was the life in the private sector after retirement form army ?
29. What are the leadership qualities and personality traits displayed by Sam Manekshaw during his career?
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Appendix C
ADDRESS BY GEN SHFJ MANEKSHAW, MC, COAS TO THE PASSING OUT GCsON 30 MAR 1972
Gentlemen, 1. I am delighted to be here this morning to take the salute at your Passing Out Parade. I have seen your turnout, I have noticed your drill, I have watched your marching. I commend you on it. In fact, your std is comparable to the one I saw here 40 yrs ago when I was a GC. You have my congratulations. 2. At moments like this, it is customary for the Reviewing Offr to utter words of great wisdom, to propound thoughts, to make forecasts of world events and to dish out masses and lashings of advice. That, Gentlemen, is not my fault. You are leaving here this morning as offrs, as ldrs. You will be going from here to your units which are dply on the bdr. They are facing an en whom they have but recently fought and vanquished. You are going to be given comd of tps in an op area. You are indeed fortunate. 3. Your tasks will be to administer to their needs and to lead them in battle. What sort of men will you be leading? You will be leading veterans, men who have fought, men who have won, men who are used to good ldrship. Make sure you give it to them. In the yrs to come some of you will fall by the wayside. It is inevitable. Other will keep their heads just above water and there will be a few of you, like me, who will get to the top rks of the mil hierarchy. Given your fair share of luck, equal opportunity, it will depend on you whether you fall by the wayside, keep your head above water or rise to giddy hts. 4. There is no comfort for you when you leave here. The luxury and the cosiness that you have experienced at Kharakvasla and at IMA, ceases to exist from this morning. Today you become soldiers. You have in front of you a life of hardship, a life of great adventure. Make the most of it. 5. May the winds of fortune blow kindly on you wherever you go. May you have your fair share of luck. You have great opportunities and lifetime of adventure. I envy you. 6. Thank you, Gentlemen.
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Appendix D
FD MARSHAL SAM MANEKSHAW‟S LEC AT DSSC, WELLINGTON ON LDRSHIP AND DISCP ON 11 NOV 1998
1. Comdt, ladies and gentlemen, I am fully conscious of the privilege, which is mine to have been invited here to address the college. A while ago I was invited to a seminar where the subject was youth, and people said that the youth of this country was not pulling its wt, that society gen was not satisfied with how the young were functioning. When I was asked what I thought about it I said that the youngsters of this country are disappointed, disturbed and confused. They cannot understand why all these untoward things are happening in this country. They want to know who is to blame. Not them. If they want to study at ni and there is no power, they want to know who is to blame. Not them. If they want to have a bath and there is no water, they want to know who is to blame. Not them. They want to go to college and university and they are told there are not any vac; they want to know who is to blame. Not them. They say-here is a country which was considered the brightest jewel in the British crown. What has happened to this bright jewel? 2. No longer are there excuses with the old pol masters saying that the reason why we are in this state is because we were under colonial rule for 250 yrs. They turn around and say that the British left us almost fifty yrs ago. What have you done? They pt to Singapore, they pt to Malaysia, they pt to Indonesia, they pt to Hongkong. They say they were also under colonial rule and look at the prog those countries have made. 3. They pt to Germany and to Japan who fought a war for four and half years- whose youth was decimated and industry was destroyed. They were occu and they had to pay reparations; Look at the prog those countries have made. The youngsters want an answer. So, ladies and gentlemen, I thought I should give you the answer. 4. The problem with us is lack of ldrship. 5. Comdt , Ladies and gentlemen, do not misunderstand me when I say a lack of ldrship. I do not mean just pol ldrship. Of course, there is a lack of pol ldrship, but also a lack of ldrship in every walk of life, whether it is pol, adm in our edn instrs, or whether it is in our sports orgs. Wherever you look, there is a lack of ldrship. I do not know whether ldrs are born or made. There is a school of thought that thinks that ldrs are born. Ladies and Gentlemen, we have a population of 960 million people and we procreate at the rate of seventeen million – equaling the total population of Australia- each yr and yet there is a dearth of ldrship so, those of you who still contribute to the fact that ldrs are born, may I suggest you throw away all your family plg, throw away the pill, throw away every inhibiting factor and make it free for all. Then perhaps some day a leader may be born. 6. So, if ldrs are not born, can ldrs be made? My answer is yes. Give me a man or a woman with common sense and decency, and I can make a ldr out of him or her. That is the subject which I am going to discuss with you this morning. 7. What are the attributes of ldrship? The first, the primary, indeed that cardinal attribute of ldrship is professional knowledge and professional competence. Now you will agree with me that you cannot be born with professional knowledge and professional competence even if you
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are the child of the Prime Minister or the son of an industrialist or the progeny of a Fd Marshal. Professional knowledge and professional competence have to be acquired by hard wk and by constant study. In this fast-moving technologically developing world you can never acquire sufficient professional knowledge. 8. You have to keep at it, and at it, and at it. Can those of our pol masters who are resp for the security and def of this country cross their hearts and say they have ever read a book on mil history, on strat, on wpn devps? Can they distinguish a mor from a motor, a gun from a howitzer, a guerrilla from gorilla, though a vast majority of them resemble the later. 9. Ladies and Gentlemen, professional knowledge and professional competence are a sine qua non of ldrship. Unless you know what you are talking about, unless you understand your profession, you can never be a ldr. Now some of you must be wondering why the Fd Marshal is saying this. Every time you go round somewhere, you see one of our ldrs waking around, rds being blockade, tpt being provided for them, security being provided for them. Those Ladies and Gentlemen are not ldrs. They are just men and women going about disguised as leaders- and they ought to be ashamed of themselves. 10. What is the next thing you need for ldrship? It is the ability to make up your mind to make a decision and accept full resp for that decision. Have you ever wondered why people do not make a decision? The answer is quite simple. It is because they lack professional knowledge and professional competence, or they are worried that their decision may be wrong and they will have to carry the can. Ladies and Gentlemen, according to the law of avgs, if you have professional knowledge and professional competence, nine out of 10 decisions will be rt and the one that might not be correct will probably be put rt by a subordinate offr, or colleague. But if you do not take a decision you are doing something wrong. An act of omission is much worse than an act of commission. An act of commission can be put right. An act of omission cannot. Take the example of the time when the Babri Masjid was about to be destr. If the Prime Minister, at the state, had taken a decision to stop it, the whole community-180 milion people would not have been harmed. But, because he did not take a decision, you have at least 180 million people in this country alone who do not like us. 11. When I was the Army Chief, I would go along to a fmn, ask the fellow what you have done about this and I normally got an answer, “Sir, I have been thinking…… I have yet not made up my mind,” and I coined a Manekshawism. If the girls will excuse my language, it was “if you must be a bloody fool be one quickly”. So remembet that you are the ones who are going to be the future sr staff offrs, the future cdrs. Make a decision and having made it , accept full resp for it. Do not pass it on to a colleague or subordinate. 12. So, what comes next for ldrship? Absolute honesty, fairness and justice-we are dealing with people. Those of us who have had the good fortune of comdg hundreds and thousands of men know this. No man likes to be punished and yet a man will accept punishment stoically if he knows that the punishment meted out to him will be identical to the punishment meted out to another person who has some godfather somewhere. This is very, very important. No man likes to be superseded and yet men will accept supersession if they know that they are being superseded, under the rules by somebody who is better than they are but not just somebody who happens to be related to the Comdt of the Staff College or to a Cabinet Minister or by the Fd Marshal‟s wife‟s current boyfriend. This is extremely imp, Ladies and Gentleman.
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13. We in India have tremendous pressure – pressures from the govt, pressures from superior offrs, pressures from families, pressures from wives, uncles, aunts, nieces, nephews and girlfriends and we lack the courage to withstand those pressures. That takes me to the next attribute of ldrship – moral and phy courage. 14. Ladies and Gentlemen, I do not know which of these is more imp. When I am talking to YOs and young soldiers, I should place emphasis on phy courage. But since I am talking to this gathering, I will lay emphasis on moral courage. What is moral courage? Moral courage is the ability to distinguish rt from wrong and having done so, say so when asked, irrespective of what your superiors might think or what your colleagues or your subordinates might want. A „yes man‟ is a dangerous man. He may rise very high, he might even become the managing dir of a coy. He may do anything but he can never make a ldr because he will be used by his superiors, disliked by his colleagues and despised by his subordinates. So shallow- the „yes man‟. 15. I am going to illustrate from my own life an example of moral courage. In 1971, when Pakistan clamped down on its province, East Pakistan, hundreds and thousands of refugees started pouring into India. The prime Minister, Mrs Gandhi had a cabinet mtg at 10 „O Clock in the morning. The fwg attended : The Foreign Minister, Sardar Swaran Singh, The Def Minister, Mr Jagjivan Ram, The Agriculture Minister, Mr Fakruddin Ali Ahmed, The Finance Minister, Mr Yashwant Rao Chavan and I was also ordered to be present. 16. Ladies and Gentlemen, There is a very thin line between becoming a Fd Marshal and being dismissed. A very angry Prime Minister read out msgs from Chief Ministers of West Bengal, Assam and Tripura. All of them saying that hundreds and thousands of refugees had poured into their states and they did not know what to do. So the Prime Minister turned round to me and said, “ I want you to do something”. I Said, “ What do you want me to do?” She said, “ I want you to enter East Pakistan.” I said, “ Do you know that means war?” She said, “ I do not mind if it is war.” 17. I, in my usual stupid way said, “ Prime Minister, have your read the Bible?” and the Foreign Minister, Sardar Swaran Singh (a Punjabi Sikh) in his Punjabi accent said, “What has Bible got to do with this?”, and I said, “ The first book, the first chapter, the first paragraph, the first sentence, God said,”let there be lt” and there was it. You turn this rd and say „let there be war‟ and there will be war. What do you think? Are you ready for a war ? Let me tell you- its the 28 Apr, the Himalayan passes are opening now, and if the Chinese give us an ultimatum I will have to fight on two fronts. 18. Again, Sardar Swaran Singh turned round and in his Punjabi English said, “Will China give ultimatum”. 19. I Said,” You are the Foreign Minister. You tell me.”
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20. Then I turned to the Prime Minister and said, “Prime Minister, last yr you wanted elections in West Bengal and you did not want the communists to win, so you asked me to dply my soldiers in penny pockets in every vill, in every little township in West Bengal. I have two divs thus dply in sections and Pls w/o their hy wpns. It will take me at least a month to get them back to their units and to their fmns. Further, I have a div in the Assam area, another div in Andhra Pradesh and the armd div in the Jhansi – Babina area. It will take me at least a month to get them back and put them in their correct posns. I will require every rd, every rly train, every truck and every wagon to move them. We are harvesting in the Punjab and we are harvesting in Haryana; we are also harvesting in Uttar Pardesh. And you will not be able to move your harvest”. 21. I turned to the Agriculture Minister, Mr Fakruddin Ali Ahmed. “If there is a famine in the country afterwards, it will be you to blame, not me.” Then I said, “My armd div has only got thirteen tks which are functioning.” 22. The Finance Minister, Mr. Chawan, a friend of mine, said, “Sam, why only thirteen?” 23. “Because you are the finance Minister. I have been asking for money for the last yr and a half and you keeping saying there is no money. That is why”. Then I turned to the Prime Minister and said, “Prime Minister, it is the end of Apr. By the time I am ready to op, the monsoon will have broken in the East Pakistan area. When it rains, it does not just rain, it pours. Rivers become like oceans. If you stand on one bank, you cannot see the other and the whole countryside is flooded. My mov will be confined to rds, the Air Force will not be able to sp me and if you wish me to enter East Pakistan, I guarantee you a hundred percent defeat.” 24. “You are the govt”, I said turning to the Prime Minister, “now will you give me your orders?”. 25. Ladies and gentleman, I have seldom seen a woman so angry and I am incl my wife in that. She was red in the face and I said, “Let us see what happens.” She turned rd and said, “The cabinet will meet this evening at 4 „O‟ Clock”. 26. Everybody walked out, I being the jr most man was the last to lve. As I was leaving, she said, “Chief, please will you stay behind?” I looked at her. I said “ Prime Minister , before you open your mouth, would you like me to send in my resignation on grnds of health, mental or phy?” 27. “No. Sit down, Sam. Was everything you told me the truth?” 28. “Yes. It is my job to tell you the truth. It is my job to fight and win, not to lose.” 29. She smiled at me and said, “All rt, Sam. You know what I want. When will you be ready? 30. “I Can‟t tell you now, Prime Minister”, I said, “but let me guarantee you this that, if you lve me alone, allow me to plan, make my arngs and fix a dt, I guarantee you hundred percent victory. 31. So, Ladies and Gentleman, as I told you, there is a very thin line betn becoming a Fd Marshal and being dismissed. Just an example of moral courage. Now, those of you who remember what happened in 1962, when the Chinese occu the Thag-la-ridge and Mr. Nehru,
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the Prime Minister, sent for the Army Chief, in the month of Dec and said, “I want you to throw the Chinese out.” That Army Chief did not have the moral courage to stand up to him and say, “I am not ready, my tps are not acclimatised, I haven‟t got the amn or indeed anything.” But he accepted the Prime Minister‟s instrs, with the result the Army was beaten and the country humiliated. 32. Remember, moral courage. You, the future sr staff offrs and cdrs will be faced with many problems. People will want all sorts of things. You have got to have the moral courage to stand up and tell them the facts. Again, as I told you before, a „yes man‟ is a despicable man. 33. This takes me to the next attribute: Phy courage. Fear, like hunger and sex, is a natural phenomenon. Any man who says he is not frightened is a liar or a Gorkha. It is one thing to be frightened. It is quite another to show fear. If you once show fear in front of your men, you will never be able to comd. It is when your teeth are chattering, your knees are knocking and you are about to make your own geography that is when the true ldr comes out! 34. I am sorry but I am going to illustrate this with another example from my own life. I am not a brave man. I fact, I am terribly frightened man, My wife and I do not share the same bedroom “Why?” you will ask. Because she says I snore. Although I have told her, “No, I don‟t, no other woman has ever complained.” 35. I am not a brave man. If I am frightened, I am frightened of wild animals, I am frightened of ghosts and spirits and so on. If my wife tells me a ghost story after dinner, I cannot sleep in my room and I have to go to her room. I have often wondered why she tells me these ghost stories periodically. 36. In World War II, my bn which is now in Pakistan, was fighting the Japanese. We had a great many cas. I was comdg C Coy which was a Sikh Coy. The Frontier Force Regt in those days had Pathan coys, Punjabi Musalamaan coy and Sikh coys. I was comdg the Sikh Coy, young Maj Manekshaw. As we were having too many cas, we had pulled back to re-org, re-gp, make up our cas, our promotions. 37. The CO had a promotion conf. He turned to me and said, “Sam, we have to make lots of promotions. In your Sikh Coy, you have had a lot of cas. Surat Singh is a sr man. Should we promote him to the rk of Nk? Now, Surat singh was the biggest badmaash in my coy. He had been promoted twice or three times and each time he had to be marched up in front of the Col for his stripes to be taken off. So I said, “No use, Sir, promoting Surat Singh. You promote him today and the day after tomorrow I will have to march him in front of you to take his stripes off.” So, Surat Singh was passed over. The promotion conf got over, I had lunch in the mess and I came back to my coy lines. Now, those of you who have served with Sikh will know that they are a very cheerful lot-always laughing and joking and doing something. When I arr at my coy lines that day, it was quite different, everybody was quite. When my 2IC Sub Balwant Singh, met me I asked him, “What has happened Sub Sahib? He said, “Sahib, something terrible has happened Surat Singh felt slighted and has told everybody that he is going to shoot you today.” 38. Surat Singh was a lt machine gnr and was armed with a pistol. His pistol had been taken away and Surat Singh had been put under close arrest. I said, “All rt, Sahib, put up a table, a soap box. March Surat Singh in front of me,” so he was marched up. The charge was readout-„threatening to shoot his CO whilst on active service in the theatre of war‟. That carries the death penalty. The witness gave their evidence. I asked for Surat Singh‟s pistol which was handed to
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me. I loaded it, rose from my soap box, walked up to Surat Singh, handed the pistol to him then turned round and told him, “You said you will shoot me.” I spoke to him in Punjabi naturally. I told him, “Have you got the guts to shoot me? Here shoot me.” He looked at me stupidly and said “Nahin, Sahib, galtee ho gaya.” I gave him a tight slap and said, “Go out. Case dismissed.” 39. I went around the coy lines, the whole coy watching what was happening. I walked around, chatted to the people, went to the mess in the evening to have a drink, and have my dinner, but when I came back again Sardar balwant Singh said , “Nahin Sahib, you have made a great mistake. Surat Singh wil shoot you tonight.” 40. I said, “Bulao Surat Singh ko.” 41. He came along, I said, “Surat Singh, ajj raat ko mere tambu par tu pahera dega, aur kal subha 6 baje, mere liye ek mug chai aur ek mug shaving water Lana. “Then I walked into my little tent. 42. Ladies and Gentleman, I did not sleep the whole night. Next morning, at 6 „O‟ clock, Surat Singh brought me a mug of tea and a mug of shaving water. Thereafter, throughout war, Surat Singh followed me around like a puppy. If I had shown fear in front of my men, I should never have been able to comd. I was frightened, but I dared not show fear in front of them. Those of you who are going to comd soldiers, remember that, you must never show fear. So much for phy courage, but, please believe me, I am still a very frightened man. I am not a brave man. 43. What comes next? The next attribute of ldrship is loyalty. Ladies and Gentleman, you all expect loyalty? Do we give loyalty? Do we give loyalty to our subordinates to our colleagues? Loyalty is a three way thing. You expect loyalty, you must therefore, give loyalty to your colleagues and to your subordinates. Men and women in large Nos can be very difficult, they can cause many problems and a ldr must deal with them imdt and firmly. Do not allow any nonsense, but remember that men and women have many problems. They get easily despondent, they have problems of debt, they have problems of infidelity – wives have run away or somebody is having an affair with somebody. They get easily crestfallen, and a ldr must have the gift of the gab with a sense of humour to shake them out of their despondence. Our ldrs, unfortunately, our “so-called‟ ldrs, definitely have the gift of the gab, but they have no sense of humour. So, remember that. 44. Finally, for ldrship; men and woman like their ldr to be a man, with all the manly qualities or virtues. The man who says „I do not smoke, do not drink, I do not (No, I will not say it)‟ does not make a ldr, Let me illustrate this from examples from the past. You will agree that Julius Caesar was a great ldr – he had his Calphurnia, he had his Antonia, he also had an affair with Cleopatra and when Caesar used to come to Rome, the senators locked up their wives. And you will agree that he was a great ldr. He was known in Rome as every woman‟s husband and he was a great ldr. Take Napoleon, he had his Josephine, he had his Marier Walewska, he had his Antoinette and Georgettes and Paulettes. And you will agree he was a great ldr. Take the Duke of Wellington – do you know that the ni before the battle of Waterloo, there were more Countesses, Marchionesses and other women in his ante-chamber than staff offrs and cdrs. And you will agree he was a great ldr. Do you know, Ladies and gentleman, a thought has just struck me. All these ldrs Caesar, Napolen and the Duke of Wellington – they had one facial feature in common, all had long noses.
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45. So much, Ladies and Gentleman, for ldrship, but no amount of ldrship will do this country much good. Yes, it will improve things, but what this country needs is discp. We are the most ill-discp people in the world. You see what is happening – you go down the rd and you see people relieving themselves by the roadside. You go into town and people are walking up and down the highway, while vehs are disch all sorts of muck. Every time you pick up a newspaper, you read of a scam or you read of some other silly thing. As we are the most ill – discp people in the world, we must do something about discp. 46. What is discp ? Pl, when I talk of discp, do not think of mil discp. That is quite different. Discp can be defined as conduct and behavior for living decently with one another in society. Who lays down the code of conduct for that? Not the PM, not the Cabinet, nor the superior offrs. It is enshrined in our holy books; it is in the Bible, the Torah and in the Vedas. It has come down to us from time immemorial from father to son, from mother to child. Nowhere is it laid down, except in the armd forces, that lack of punctuality is conduct prejudicial to discp and decent living. 47. I will again tell you a story about that. Some yrs ago, my wife and I were invited to a convocation at a university. I was asked to be there at 4 „O‟ clock. I got into the staff car with my wife, having chased her from about 11 „O‟ clock in the morning – „Don‟t‟ forget, darling, you have got to be on time. Get properly dressed. You have to lve at such and such time‟. Eventually , I got her into the car. I told the dvr, “Thoda aayisthe, thoda jaldi,” but we got to the university and the convocation address place at exactly 4 „O‟ clock. We were taken into the convocation hall, and VC asked me to get on the platform, asking my wife to do so, too. She gracefully declined and said she must rather sit down below as she seldom had opportunity of looking up to her husband. 48. Anyway, on the platform, the Vice Chancellor sang my praises. As usual, there were 2000 boys and girls who had come for the convocation, there were deans of university and professors and lecturers. Then he asked me to go to the lectern and address the gathering. I rose to do so and he said (sotto voce), “Fd Marshal, a fortnight ago we invited a VIP from Delhi for the self same function. He was allowed to stand on the lectern for exactly 20 seconds. I wish you luck.” I said to myself, had the Vice Chancellor mentioned this in his letter of invitation, I wonder if I should have accepted. 49. Anyway, I reached the lectern and I addsd the gathering for my allotted time of 40 mins. I was heard in pin-drop silence and at the end of my talk, was given a terrific ovation. The Vice Chancellor and his lady, the dean, the professors and lecturers, the boys and girls, and even my own wife, standing up and giving me an ovation. After the convocation was over, we walked into the gardens to have refreshments. And I, having an eye for pretty girls walked up to a pert little thing wearing a pair of tight-fitting jean and a body-hugging blouse and I started a conversation with her. I said, “My dear, why were you so kind to me, I not being an orator nor having the looks of Amitabh Bachhan, when only the other day you treated a VIP from Delhi so shamefully,” This pert little thing had no inhibitions. She turned rd and said and I quote, “Oh, that dreadful man! We asked him to come at 4 „O‟ clock. He came later and that too accompanied with a boy and a girl, probably his grand children. He was recd by the Vice Chancellor and his lady and taken to the platform. He was garlanded by the Student Union President and he demanded garlands for those brats too. So, the Union President diverged with garland that was meant for the Vice Chancellor and gave it to the brats. Then the Vice Chancellor start signing the worthy‟s praises. Whilst he was doing so, this man hitched up his dhoti, exposing his dirty things and scratched away. Then the Vice Chancellor said, “ This man has done so much for the country, he has
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even been to jail,” And I nearly shouted out, „He should be there now.‟ Anyway, when the Vice Chancellor asked him to come to the lectern and address the convocation, he got up, walked to the lectern and addsd us thus, „ Boys and girls, I am a very busy man. I have not had time to prep my speech but, I will now read out the speech my secy has written. “We did not let him stand there. Without exception, the whole lot of us stood and booed him off the stage.” 50. Now you see, ladies and gentleman, what I mean by discp. Had this man as his posn warranted come on time at 4 „O‟ clock, fully prep and properly turned out, can you imagine the good it would have done to these 2000 young girls and boys? Instead of that, his act of indiscipline engendered further indiscipline. I thanked my lucky stars, having been in the Army for so many yrs, that I arr there on time that I had come properly dressed, that I didn‟t wear a dhoti to show my lovely legs that I didn‟t exacerbate an itch or eczema, to hurt the susceptibilities of my audience by indulging in the scratching of the unmentionables. 51. Now, ladies and gentlemen, you understand what I mean by discp. We are the most ill-disciplined people in the world. So far, all of you have been very, very disciplined. Will you bear with me for another two minutes? Having talked about leadership, having talked about discp, I want to mention something about character. We Indians also lack character. Do not misunderstand me. When I talk of character I don‟t mean just being honest, truthful, and religious, I mean something more. Knowing yourself, knowing your own faults, knowing your own weaknesses and what little character that we have, our friends, our fans, the‟ yes-men‟ around us and the sycophants, help us reduce that character as well. Let me illustrate this by an example. 52. Some yrs ago, Hollywood decided to put up the picture of the great violinist and composer, Paganini. The part of the Paganini was given to a young actor who was conversant, somewhat, with the violin. He was drilled and tutored to such an extent that when the little piece, the Cadenza, was filmed. It was perfect. When the film was shown, the papers raved about it and the critics raved about it. And this man‟s fan‟s „yes-men‟, sycophants, kept on telling him that he was as good a violinist as Heifetz or Menuhin. And do you know that it took eight months in a psychiatric home to rid him of this delusion? 53. Do you know, Comdt that the very same thing happened to me? After the 1971 conflict with Pakistan, which ended in 13 days and I took 93,000 prisoners, my fans, the „yes-men‟ around me, the sycophants, kept on comparing me to Rommel, to Fd Marshal Alexander to Fd Marshal Auchinleck and, just as I was beginning to believe it, the Prime Minister created me a Fd Marshal and sent me packing to the Niligiris. A hard-headed, no –nonsense wife deprived a psychiatric home (what we in India call in lunatic asylum) of one more inmate. 54. I thank you very much indeed. Thank you. Question : In 1962 war, what was your appt, were you in a posn to do something about the sit. FM: In the 1962 war, I was in disgrace. I was a comdt of this Instn. 55. Mr Krishna Menon, the Def Minister disliked me intensely. Gen Kaul who was Chief of Gen Staff at the time, and the budding man for the next higher appt, disliked me intensely. So, I was in disgrace at the Staff College. There were charges against me – I will enumerate some of them – all engineered by Mr Krishna Menon.
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56. I do not know if you remember that in 1961 or 1960, Gen Thimayya was the Army Chief. He had fallen out with Mr Krishna Menon and had sent him his resignation. The Prime Minsiter, Mr. Nehru, persuaded Gen Thimayya to withdraw and they went hammer and tongs for the Prime Minister in Parilament. 57. The Prime Minister made the fwg statement. “ I cannot understand why Gen Thimayya is saying that the Def Ministry interferes with the working of the Army. Take the case of Gen Manekshaw. The Selection Board has approved his promotion to Lt Gen over the heads of 23 other offrs. The Govt has accented that”. 58. I was the Comdt of the Staff College. I had been approved for promotion to Lt Gen. Instead of making me the Lt Gen, Mr. Krishna Menon levied charges against me. There were 10 charges, I will enumerate only one or two of them-that I am more loyal to the Queen of England than to the President of India, that I am more British than Indian. That I have been alleged to have said that I will have no instr in the Staff College whose wife looks like an ayah. These were the sort of charges against me. 59. For 18 months my promotion was held back. An enquiry was made. Three Lt Gens incl an Army Cdr, sat at that enquiry. I was exonerated on every ch. The file went up to PM who sent it up to the Cabinet Secy, Who wrote on the file, „if anything will down as the Dreyfus case,‟ So the file came back to the PM. He wrote on it, „orders may now be issued”. Meaning I will now become a Lt Gen. Instead of that, ladies and gentlemen, I recd a letter from the AG saying the Def Minister, Mr Krishna Menon has sent his severe displeasure to Gen Manekshaw, to be recorded. I had it in the office where the comdt now sits. I sent that letter back to the AG saying what Mr Krishna Menon could do with his displeasure, very vulgarly stated. It is still in my dossier. 60. Then the Chinese came to my help. Krishan Menon was sacked, Kaul was sacked and Nehru sent for me. He said, “Gen I have a vigorous enemy. I find out that you are a vigorous Gen. Will you go and take over?” 61. I said, “ I have been waiting 18 months for this opportunity,” and I went and took over. 62. So your question was 1962, and what part did ! play, none whatsoever, none whatsoever. 63. I was here for 18 months, persecuted, inquisitions against me but we survive… I rather like the Chinese. Question : The Army has changed and prog. Do you find any difference in the mental makeup of the YOs compared to your times? FM: Over the yrs, things have changed… there is a lot of difference, dear. In my time, my father used to sp me until I became a Lt Col. I used to get an allowance to be able to live. Today, the YO has not only to keep himself but has to send money home. 64. In my time, we did not have all these courses. The only course I ever did, (of course, we had the four rds of courses that every offr had to do), but we had mules there so I had to do a course in trg mtn mules. Today the YO hardly stays in his regt. He is sent from one place to another to do this course and that course and he does not get a chance of knowing his men. We knew our men. Also there wasn‟t so much wk in those days. We got up in the mornings, did PT
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for half an hr, came back, dressed, had breakfast, then went to our coy lines and spent all our time avoiding the CO. 65. Those Cos were nasty chaps. They did not give a damn for anybody. I will give an example of the CO. I was made QM of my bn. The CO sent for the adjt and myself. He said, “I want to take the bn out tomorrow morning for an ex.” We did not have motor cars, we had to indent for mules so I as QM indented for a coy of mules. He said we were going to lve for the ex at 6.30, so l ordered coy of mules to arr at six. At 11 o‟, clock at night, the Commanding Officer changed his mind. He said, “ I will not go at 6.30, we will go at nine o‟clock. “There was nothing I could do. I got on my bicycle, went off to the lines, where the mules had arrived. I told them to unsaddle, and go into the shade when who should arrive on a horse but the Cavalry Officer with his daughter! 66. I touched my hat. He said, “ What are those animals doing here, young man?” I said that we were going out on an exercise. 67. “When are you going?” 68. “9 „O‟ clock”. 69. He tore strips off me – „ going at nine o‟clock and you have the animals waiting here at 6 „O‟clock‟. He was riding with his daughter on a horse. What could I say to a general officer, I had two pips on my shoulder. Suddenly, who should be coming on a bicycle, but the Col. He touched his hat, said, “Morning, Gen.” 70. Turning to me, he said, “What is the matter, Sam? 71. I said, “Sir, the General is angry with me because we are going out at nine o‟clock and the mules are here at six.” 72. He turned round to face the General, and said, “I will thank you Gen to know who comds this regt. Me and not this young man. I will not have you ticking him off in front of your daughter.” 73. He turned back to me and said, “Have you had your Breakfast, Sam?” 74. “No” 75. “Go along. Have your breakfast.” 76. I was delighted to go off. But when we came back from the ex at about eight o‟clock in the evening, in my letter rack, was a letter from the General‟s wife, inviting me to tea the next day. But that‟s the sort of thing that happened. 77. When I became the Fd Marshal, I was the guest of Her Majesty in England. I had given a reception at India House where the CO with his wife were also invited. He came in, shake hands with my wife, shake hands with me and walked off. Everybody was drinking. After about half an hour, when everybody has arr, I walked up to him with a glass of whisky in my hand, and he turned round to me, “May I call you Sam?”
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78. “Please do, Sir. You used to call me bloody fool, before. I thought that was my Christian name!” 79. The difference between the offr now and then – my first confd report written by him. Before you went in to sign your confd report, you had to go in front of the adjt, beautifully turned out. We did not have any medals in those days. We had to have a sword to go into the CO‟s office then. I walked in there, saluted the Adjutant, he looked me up and down and said, “You are going to see the Colonel now? Look at you! Your bloody strap is filthy dirty, look at your belt, it is disgusting. Go on, go and get dressed. “I walked out, waited for five minutes and came back. 80. He looked me up and down, “Much better.” 81. Then he said, “You are going in there. Do you have a fountain pen?” 82. I said, “Yes.” 83. “The CO will read your report. You will initial on the left hand corner. Is that understood?” 84. “Yes.” 85. I walked in there, saluted the Colonel, “Mr Manekshaw reporting, sir.” 86. He looked me up and down, thrust the report on me – one line. “This Officer, I beg his pardon, this man, may someday become an offr.” 87. I initialled it and walked out. 88. Khaled Sheikh, another offr form my regt who become the Foreign Minister of Pakistan and Governor there, came out. “Khaled, what report have you got?” I said. He said, “One line – this offr tends to be irresponsible. “I said, “That‟s a bad report Khaled.” He said “Uh! Last yr the bugger said I was irresponsible. 89. But we did not mind. Today, if the CO writes and says this offr is irresponsible, the offr wants to appeal to the President of India saying he is more resp than the CO. 90. That was the difference, dear. We simply did not give a cuss. 91. Anything else? 92. Thank you Gentleman, thank you for your kindness. Thank you for your patience and your discp. I am delighted to see you all here.
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Appx E
DATE SHEET – FD MARSHAL SHFJ MANEKSHAW
Early Yrs & Mil Trg 03 Apr 1914 - SHFJ Manekshaw born at Amritsar, Punjab. - Early schooling at Amritsar 1929 - Successfully completed his schooling from Sherwood College, Nainital. 30 Sep 1932 - Joined Indian Military Academy at Dehradun. Professional Career Till Independence 04 Feb 1934 - Passed out as Gentleman Cdt from the Academy& was commissioned into the British Indian Armyas a 2 ndLt in “The Frontier Force Regt”. 1934 - Did one yr att with British Inf Bn, the 2nd RoyalScots at
Lahore. 1935 - Joined 4th Bn, 12 Froniter Force Regt also know asthe
54th SIKHS. 22 Apr 1939 - Married to Siloo Manekshaw. 22 Feb 1942 - Severely wounded while gallantly leading his coyin anattack
on the „Sittang Br‟ in Burma againstJapanese.Awarded MC(Military Cross)by GOC17 Div.
23 Aug 1943 - Detailed to attend 8th Staff Course at the StaffCollege Quetta(in Pakistan). 13 Jan – 22 Oct 1944 - BM to the Razmak Bde in Waziristan in Pak. 23 Oct 1944 - Aug 1945 - Posted to 9/12 Frontier Force Rifle (FFR) inBurma. Profesional Career Post Independence Sep 1945 - Selected as a Staff Offr to Gen Daisey in Indo- China. Jan 1946 - Selected to go on a lecture tour to Australia for apd of six months. Aug 1946 - Promoted to the rank of local Lt Col & posted asGSO-1 in MO-3 in Army HQ.
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01 Jan 1947- - Empanelled on the Panel of 16th Bn of the Punjab 21 Jul 1947 Regt & Posted as GSO-1, MO-1 15 Aug 1947 - Tfr to the Panel of 5th Royal Gorkha Rifle (FF) &posted to
comd the 3/5 GR but he could notproceed due to Pak‟s attk. Nov 1947 - Promoted to the rank of Col & took over as OffgDir of MO. Mar 1948 - Promoted to the rank of Brig & appt the first IndianDir of MO. Mar 1951 - Took over the comd of 167 Inf Bde at Ferozepur. 1953 - Appointed Col of the Regt of the 8th Gorkha Rifles. 1954 to Jan 1955 - Posted to the Army HQ as Offg Dir of Mil Trg(DMT). May 1955 - Posted as Comdt to Inf School. First Indian to beposted. Nov 1956 - Selected for course at the Imperial Def College,London. Dec 1957 - Posted as GOC 26 Inf Div at Jammu. 1959 - Comdt of DSSC, Wellington. 02 Dec 1962 - Posted as GOC 4 Corps. 04 Dec 1963 - GOC-in-C Western Comd. 26 Nov 1964 - GOC-in-C Eastern Comd. 1968 - Awarded Padam Bhushan. As COAS & Thereafter 8th Jun 1969 - Took over as COAS. 03 Dec 1971 - War of 1971 with Pakistan. 28 Jan 1972 - Awarded Padam Vibhushan. 2nd Jan 1973 - Promoted to the rk of Fd Marshal. 1979 - Awarded „Tri Shakti Patra‟ by King of Nepal. 1990 - Maharana Pratap Bravery Award by Rajasthan Govt. 27 Feb 2004 - “HONORARY Doctor of Letters” was conferred. 27 Jun 08 - Died of Pneumonia.