project safety studies

Abbott Risk Consulting Limited

ARC-579-002-R01 Issue 02 April 2015

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Woodfibre PMC Project Safety Studies

HAZID Study Report

Prepared for:

Woodfibre PMC

111 Dunsmuir Street

Vancouver, B.C.

Canada, V5B 5W3



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APPROVAL AND REVISION RECORD

Issue

No.

Date Prepared Reviewed Approved Revision Notes

01

02

October 2014

April 2015

S Cowie

S Cowie

C Rettie

C Rettie

M O’Flaherty

M O’Flaherty

First Issue

Minor editorial comments addressed

Abbott Risk Consulting Ltd.

11 Albyn Place

Edinburgh

Scotland

EH2 4NG

United Kingdom

Phone: +44 (0) 131 220 0164

www.consultarc.com



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Executive Summary

Abbott Risk Consulting Ltd. (ARC) was contracted by Woodfibre PMC to conduct a HAZID (HAZard IDentification) study of the Woodfibre LNG project. The workshop was held from the 6th October to the 9th October 2014 at the AMEC Offices in Vancouver, B.C.

The HAZID covers the Woodfibre LNG facility site as a whole and was conducted in accordance with BC OGC Liquefied Natural Gas Facility Permit Application and Operations Manual [Ref 1], CSA Standards Liquefied Natural Gas Production, Storage and Handling Z276-11 [Ref 2] and the associated Z276-11 update 01 [Ref 3].

The HAZID forms part of a series of Safety Studies which have been performed in order to reduce risk to a level as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) and to demonstrate compliance with the above requirements.

The HAZID consisted of a review and update of the previous HAZID/ ENVID study of the process areas (conducted for previous the Woodfibre facility FLNG-based design), which was carried out in April 2014 [Ref 4], with additional nodes considered, in order to extend the HAZID to cover the site as a whole.

A total of 98 recommendations were made during the HAZID study, provided in Appendix B.

Completed worksheets for the HAZID study are provided in Appendix A.



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Abbreviations

ALARP - As Low As Reasonably Practicable

AFP / PFP - Active Fire Protection / Passive Fire Protection

AR - Approval Required

ARC - Abbott Risk Consulting Ltd.

BC - British Columbia

BOG - Boil Off Gas

BOP - Balance Of Plant

BLEVE - Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion

COC - Certificate Of Compliance

CR - Confirmation Required

DAL - Design Accidental Load

EA - Environmental Assessment

EIA - Environmental Impact Assessment

EERA - Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Assessment

ENVID - Environmental [hazard] Identification

ESD / EDP - Emergency Shut Down / Emergency Depressurisation

ESDV - Emergency Shut Down Valve

FERA - Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment

FLNG - Floating Liquefied Natural Gas vessel

FSO - Floating Storage and Offloading vessel

HAZID - Hazard Identification

HAZOP - Hazard and Operability

IGG - Inert Gas Generator

KO - Knock Out

LE - Linde Engineering

LER - Local Equipment Room

LNG - Liquefied Natural Gas

LP / HP - Low Pressure / High Pressure

OGC - [BC] Oil and Gas Commission

OSBL - Outside Battery Limit

PMC - Project Management Company

PMT - Project Management Team



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Abbreviations (Continued)

PPE - Personnel Protective Equipment

PSV - Pressure Safety Valve

QRA - Quantified Risk Assessment

RPT - Rapid Phase Transition

SCE - Safety Critical Element

SIS - Safety Instrumented System

TERMPOL - Technical Review Process of Marine Terminal Systems

and Transhipment Sites

VCE - Vapour Cloud Explosion

WLNG - Woodfibre LNG



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Contents

1.0 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 7

1.1 Overview ................................................................................................................... 7

1.2 Objective of the Study ................................................................................................ 7

1.3 Scope of the Study .................................................................................................... 7

2.0 HAZID Study Methodology ........................................................................................ 9

2.1 Purpose ..................................................................................................................... 9

2.2 Methodology .............................................................................................................. 9

2.3 Guidewords ............................................................................................................. 10

2.4 Recording and Reporting ......................................................................................... 11

3.0 Study Team ............................................................................................................. 12

4.0 Nodes ...................................................................................................................... 13

5.0 Drawings ................................................................................................................. 15

6.0 Results ....................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.

7.0 References .............................................................................................................. 16

Appendices

Appendix A – HAZID Worksheets

Appendix B – HAZID Recommendations



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1.0 Introduction

1.1 Overview

Abbott Risk Consulting Ltd. (ARC) was contracted by Woodfibre PMC to conduct a HAZID (HAZard IDentification) study of the Woodfibre LNG project. The workshop was held from the 6th October to the 9th October 2014 at the AMEC Offices in Vancouver, B.C.

The HAZID study consisted of a multi-disciplined team review of the Woodfibre LNG facility phase 1 design. The study used a step-by-step methodology and a checklist of guide words to identify hazards and assess the influence these hazards may have on the project development strategy.

The relevant causes of the accidental events leading to hazardous situations were analysed and recorded in the HAZID Worksheets, provided in Appendix A.

1.2 Objective of the Study

The objective of the Study was to review all elements of the engineering design of the Woodfibre LNG facility. The HAZID covered safety and environmental hazards.

Where improvements could be made to mitigate or eliminate these hazards or to improve the level of risk reduction provided by safety functions, recommendations were outlined and assigned to relevant departments in order to reduce risk to a level as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). A full list of recommendations is provided in Appendix B.

1.3 Scope of the Study

The HAZID study reviewed the engineering design of the Woodfibre LNG project, as represented on the project drawings listed in Table 5.1.

The HAZID covers the Woodfibre site as a whole and was conducted in accordance with BC OGC Liquefied Natural Gas Facility Permit Application and Operations Manual [Ref 1], CSA Standards Liquefied Natural Gas Production, Storage and Handling Z276-11 [Ref 2] and the associated Z276-11 update 01 [Ref 3].

The HAZID forms part of a series of Safety Studies which have been performed in order to reduce risk to a level as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) and to demonstrate compliance with the above requirements, and has raised specific recommendations, where required, in order to address any issues that the team identified.

The HAZID consisted of a review and update of the previous HAZID/ ENVID study of the process areas (conducted for the previous FLNG-based design of the Woodfibre facility), which was carried out in April 2014 [Ref 4], with additional nodes considered, in order to extend the HAZID to cover the site as a whole.

The following nodes were reviewed as part of the HAZID study:

General node ( to record hazards that are ubiquitous throughout the facility);

LNG train, updated from previous HAZID/ ENVID study:

o Inlet Facilities;

o Liquefaction and Refrigeration;

o Refrigerant Make-up and Fractionation Area;



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o LP Compression, End Flash and Fuel Gas System; and

o Substation.

Additional nodes considered, in order to extend the HAZID to cover the site as a whole.

o BOP (Balance of Plant);

o Flare Systems;

o FSO (Rundown and Storage Mode); and

o LNG Offloading.

Complete node listings and information on what each node covers are shown in Table 4.1.

The HAZID considered only the operational phase of the site. Construction and commissioning activities will be considered separately.

It is also noted that marine operations, including the berthing of LNG carriers at the FSO, will be assessed in a TERMPOL study. The HAZID did not consider marine operations.



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2.0 HAZID Study Methodology

2.1 Purpose

The overall purpose of HAZID study is to focus the attention of the Project team on:

The impact of the operations on surroundings;

The impact of the surroundings on the operations;

The interferences between the main items;

The general hazards and particular aspects of the project which require special development in order to contain any hazards identified; and

Any further analysis required to produce an effective design (separation distances, toxicity of materials, flammability limits, etc.).

A HAZID study provides a structured and analytical approach to hazard identification. It is a brainstorming exercise, guided by a typical set of guidewords, and taking benefit from the previous experience of the HAZID study team members.

The HAZID study is used to identify hazards associated with the project operations and recommend improvements, modifications, or further studies where preventative / mitigative safety measures are required.

Conducting the HAZID study allows inherently safe features to be adopted as the design evolves. Hazards can then be eliminated or, if this is not possible, have their consequences reduced and taken into account in early design, rather than later in the project lifecycle, in order to reduce risk to a level as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).

The concept of ALARP is defined by BC OGC [Ref 1] as follows:

“The concept of ALARP defines how the Commission measures risk mitigation and gives a goal to the risk management process. Demonstrating ALARP is a critical element to satisfying the Commission that all safety and environmental risks have been appropriately managed. A design that can demonstrate ALARP will have reduced the risk until the incremental sacrifice (in terms of time, effort, cost, or other expenditure of resources) is grossly disproportionate to the value of incremental risk reduction achieved.”

It is to be noted that a HAZID study is not an audit. Also, a HAZID study does not preclude the need for further hazard assessment; instead, it is a precursor to subsequent hazard analyses and risk assessments.

2.2 Methodology

HAZID studies are systematic, multi-disciplinary reviews carried out on a process design to identify major hazards (and thereby potential major accident events – safety or environmental related) associated with the site or operation of the process. The technique exhaustively considers each review area, by reference to an agreed set of guidewords.

This HAZID study applied the “Guideword Method”, where the operation was broken down into manageable sections (nodes), and a set of standard guidewords was



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applied. The structure of the HAZID was to only consider events / concerns that arise within the node being reviewed at the time.

Once all the events had been identified then the ultimate consequences of each event / concern was identified – irrespective of any safeguards that may be in place. The HAZID team then considered the risk, taking into account existing safeguards, and, where necessary, recommended additional safeguards as actions.

The HAZID methodology can be summarised by the following sequential steps:

Select a Sub-operation (referred to as a node);

Apply a guideword to act as a prompt;

Identify the events relevant to that guideword;

Identify the ultimate consequences associated with the events irrespective of safeguards;

Identify the existing safeguards;

Decide on any actions to eliminate or mitigate the identified problem if necessary;

Repeat for other guidewords as relevant; and

Repeat for all sub-systems.

2.3 Guidewords

The HAZID study methodology followed a set of standard guidewords.

It is noted that these guidewords are not necessarily exhaustive and are intended to prompt the team to consider as broad a range of potential scenarios as possible. The team were encouraged to ‘think outside the box’ and challenge the design in any way they could, regardless of whether a challenge falls under one of the specific guidewords.

Two sets of generic guide words were selected for use in this HAZID study; one set for the general node to record any hazards that are ubiquitous throughout the facility and another set which was applied for each specific node. These are shown in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2, respectively.

Table 2.1 – HAZID General Node Guidewords

Guidewords

Pressure and Temperature Safeguarding Concept

Concept for Safety Instrumented System (SIS)

Explosion Protection Concept

Fire & Gas Detection Concept

Fire Protection Concept

Concept for Block-in and Depressurising System

Flare Concept



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Guidewords

Concepts for Occupational Health and Safety

e.g.

- Escape Route and Rescue Concept

- Eye and Emergency Shower Concept

- PPE Concept

- Safe Location Concept

- Safety Sign Concept

Concepts for Environmental Protection

e.g.

- Noise Control Concept (including noise control - marine)

- Emission Control Concept

- Drainage & Effluent Treatment Concept

- Waste Management Concept

Impact of the site on the human environment

Communication links with the facility

Effects on the plant of environmental constraints

Table 2.2 HAZID Specific Node Guidewords

Guidewords

External Fire

Internal Fire

External Explosion

Internal Explosion

Exposure to harmful substances (acute/chronic)

Noise

Environmental Pollution

HAZARD from OSBL

Continuous / frequent plant discharges to air

Continuous / frequent plant discharges to water

Continuous / frequent plant discharges to soil

Emergency / upset discharges

2.4 Recording and Reporting

During the study each hazard identified by the Team, together with the potential consequences, designed safeguards and required actions, were recorded in a



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HAZID worksheet, using the process hazard analysis software package PHA-Pro version 8.3.2.0.

The HAZID worksheets were displayed at all times via a data projector, to enable the entire team to view the study documentation in real-time. This allowed any corrections to be made as and when required, and an overall consensus to be achieved from the participants, and hence the HAZID record is considered to be a direct representation of the views of all personnel present during the workshop discussions.

3.0 Study Team

A list of personnel that participated in the HAZID study and their attendance is listed in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 – HAZID Study Team

Team Members Sessions

Full Name Department Company 06/10/2014 07/10/2014 08/10/2014 09/10/2014

Penny Armitage Eng Manager PMC Present Present Present

Paul Baluch Civil Project Engineer PMC Present

Peter Barry Structural Lead PMC Present

Charles Casgrain Project Engineer BOP Present Present Present

Gurprit Chahal Water Treatment BOP Partial

Steve Cowie Scribe ARC Present Present Present Present

Sepidah Dalil Process BOP Present Present

Frank Hamilton Technical Manager PMT Partial Present Present Present

Meetal Khanderia

Project Engineer BOP Partial Partial

Ken Leong Process Engineer Solaris - Flare

Partial

Michelle Ng Project Engineer M&N Partial Partial

Colin Rettie Chairman ARC Present Present Present Present

Paul Robinson Integration manager PMC Present Present Present

Dietrich Roeben Operations and Start-up Manager

PMC Partial

Cristian Ruilova Prject Manager PMT Partial Partial

Jim Ryan Tech Safety Lead PMC Present Present Present Present

Farhad Shushtarian

Project Manager M&N Partial Partial

Alex Taimuri BOP Engineering BOP Partial Present Present

Mario Tancredi Project Manager Solaris - Flare

Partial



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Team Members Sessions

Full Name Department Company 06/10/2014 07/10/2014 08/10/2014 09/10/2014

Joan Wang Process PMC Present Present Present

Yan Zhang Engineering Manager PMT Present Present Partial

Amanda Zinter Regulatory Compliance

PMT Present Partial Partial

4.0 Nodes

The HAZID study was broken down into nodes, as described in Table 4.1.

It is noted that nodes 1 to 6 are nodes were carried out by a review and update of the previous HAZID/ ENVID study of the process areas (conducted for an FLNG-based design), which was carried out between the 23rd April and the the 25th April 2014 at the Linde Engineering offices in Pullach, Munich, Germany [Ref 4]. Nodes 7 to 10 are additional nodes considered, in order to extend the HAZID to cover the site as a whole.

Table 4.1 – HAZID Node List

Nodes Comment

1. General Node

This node addresses external hazards affecting the whole site area in general, and general site philosophies which apply to multiple areas.

2. Inlet Facilities

Streams: Feed gas, amine, CO2, waste water.

Feed gas is treated by mercury removal bed, then acid gas removal by amine system, finally dehydrated by molsieves.

Acid gas stream is treated in catalytic oxidiser and vented to atmosphere.

System located in modules 1 and 2.

3. liquefaction and

Refrigeration.

Two identical trains in modules 4 and 6.

Inventories: Feed gas producing LNG, mixed refrigerant cycle with gas and liquid phases (methane, ethane, N2, butane, traces of propane).

Electrical drive compressors.

4. Refrigerant Make-up and

Fractionation Area.

Located in module 5.

Inventories: Butane and ethane/ ethylene storage in LP tanks - ethane at low temperature.



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Nodes Comment

Fractionation produces required refrigerants from feed gas and removes heavier condensate.

Flare KO drums are also located in the module.

5. LP Compression, End

Flash and Fuel Gas

System.

Located in module 3.

BOG from storage and flash gas from end flash drum are compressed and returned to the main process.

End flash drum for LNG product and LNG transfer pumps are also in this area.

6. Substation

Includes substation and electrical equipment, within a building.

Note: Originally considered utility area on the FLNG. Apart from hot oil, these have been relocated into the utility area - See BOP node. Hazards relating to the hot oil heater are now considered in node 2.

7. BOP

Includes:

-Utilities (instrument air / plant air, N2, plant water, tempered cooling water, sea water cooling system)

-Chemical storage

-Effluent / waste water treatment

-Substations (x3)

-Condensate storage and truck loading

-Utility gas supply to building heating and flare

-Diesel storage and truck filling

-Emergency generation

-Non-process buildings (warehouse and storage areas, maintenance building, admin building, control room and lab, temporary construction and engineering building, canteen)

-firewater tank and water supply, including water source from Henriette dam

-Landfill and leachate treatment

-Access to site (small craft and material jetties)

It is noted that flares/ LNG rundown system/ feed gas pipeline, although part of BOP scope, are considered in relevant specific nodes (flare node 8 / LNG offloading 10).

8. Flare Systems

4 x elevated flares- HP warm and cold, LP warm and cold, located on a common support structure.

Currently KO drums etc. are located in the LNG train.

Flares are air-assisted, smokeless flares, with N2 purge and continuous pilots.

9. FSO (Rundown and

Storage Mode)

Two existing LNG carriers will be converted into a single floating storage and offloading unit. The hulls will be welded into a single structure and manifolds will be combined in a single system.



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Nodes Comment

Storage consists of 10 Moss-type tanks, each with two offloading pumps and associated manifold systems. New boil off gas recovery compressors and inert gas generator / dry air system will be provided.

Utilities are primarily provided from shore via hoses on the utility bridge, but backup N2 generation/ emergency power will be onboard.

Existing ships fire water system will be retained and upgraded.

The FSO will be controlled by a common control system with the plant. Local control will also be provided onboard.

The FSO is permanently moored by vertical piles and LNG rundown, BOG and other process connections are connected via permanently connected flexible loading arms.

Personnel access points are provided at fore and aft ends. The aft access is also suitable for small mechanical handling (2.5 T)

10. LNG Offloading

This node considers the FSO during the operation to offload LNG into an adjacent LNG Carrier.

5.0 Drawings

Table 5.1 lists all drawings referred to during this study.

Table 5.1 – Drawings Used in the HAZID Study

Drawing Description Place(s) Used

3861-MM-PD-101-001 Rev 03 FSO Layout Drawing Nodes: 9, 10

176258-0000-DD10-LYD-1201 Rev A Civil - Plan -Site Layout Nodes: 1

176258-0300-DD00-BLD1001.001 Rev C Block Flow Diagram Nodes: All

176258-0300-DD10-LYD-1501 Rev D Site Layout Drawing Nodes: All

&AA-05-P-FF 01 Rev C1 Inlet Facilities - Inlet Facilities Nodes: 2

&AA-12-P-FF 01 Rev C1 Sour Gas Removal/ Mercury Removal - Sour Gas Removal/ Mercury Removal

Nodes: 2

&AA-12-P-FF 02 Rev C1 Sour Gas Removal/ Mercury Removal - Solvent Removal

Nodes: 2

&AA-16-P-FF 01 Rev C1 Dehydration - Gas Dehydration Nodes: 2

&AA-16-P-FF 02 Rev C1 Dehydration - Regeneration Cycle Nodes: 2

&AA-23-P-FF 01 Rev C1 liquefaction - Main Cryogenic Heat Exchanger 1 Nodes: 3

&AA-23-P-FF 02 Rev C1 liquefaction - Main Cryogenic Heat Exchanger 2 Nodes: 3

&AA-23-P-FF 03 Rev C1 liquefaction - HHC Removal Column 1 Nodes: 3



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Drawing Description Place(s) Used

&AA-23-P-FF 04 Rev C1 liquefaction - HHC Removal Column 2 Nodes: 3

&AA-23-P-FF 05 Rev C1 liquefaction - End Flash Nodes: 5

&AA-41-P-FF 01 Rev C1 Refrigeration -Refrigerant Cycle Compression 1 Nodes: 3

&AA-41-P-FF 02 Rev C1 Refrigeration -Refrigerant Cycle Compression 2 Nodes: 3

&AA-47-P-FF 01 Rev C1 Refrigerant Make Up System - Refrigerant Make Up Tanks 1

Nodes: 4

&AA-47-P-FF 02 Rev C1 Refrigerant Make Up System - Refrigerant Make Up Tanks 2

Nodes: 4

&AA-50-P-FF 01 Rev C1 Fractionation System - Deethanizer Nodes: 4

&AA-50-P-FF 02 Rev C1 Fractionation System - Debutanizer Nodes: 4

&AA-78-P-FF 01 Rev C1 Tank Return Gas System - LP Tank Return Gas Compression

Nodes: 5

&AA-78-P-FF 02 Rev C1 Tank Return Gas System - HP Tank Return Gas Compression

Nodes: 5

&AA-84-P-FF 01 Rev C1 Fuel Gas System - Fuel Gas Distribution Nodes: 4

&AA-90-P-FF 01 Rev C1 Flare Gas and Vent System - Warm Flare System Nodes: 4

&AA-91-P-FF 01 Rev C1 Flare Gas and Vent System - Flare Package Nodes: 4

6.0 Conclusions and Recommendations

The complete HAZOP worksheets are provided in Appendix A.

A total of 98 recommendations were made during the course of the HAZID study. The complete list of recommendations, along with the responsible party are provided in Appendix B.

It is concluded that a comprehensive HAZID review has been conducted appropriate to the current stage of design, and that major accident hazards have been identified and will be managed by addressing the recommendations.

7.0 References

BC Oil & Gas Commission: Liquefied Natural Gas Facility Permit Application and Operations Manual, July 2014, Version 1.0

CSA Standard Z276-11: Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) - Production, Storage, and Handling, December 2011

CSA Standard Z276-11: Update 1, February 2014

Woodfibre FLNG HAZID/ ENVID Study Report, ARC-027-103, Abbott Risk Consulting, April 2014 Issue-01.



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Appendix A

HAZID Worksheets



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Node: 1. General Node

Guide Word/Deviation

Causes Consequences Safeguards Recommendations Resp Category

Pressure and Temperature Safeguarding Concept

1.1. Exceeding design conditions in process upset.

1.1.1. Loss of containment leading to fire/ explosion hazard.

1.1.1.1. &AA S-PC 1001 - Pressure and temperature process safeguarding philosophy for LNG train, has been prepared and aligned with CSA Z276.

67. Confirm that consistent pressure and temperature safeguarding philosophies are developed for BOP, flare and FSO scopes, and cover interfaces with the LNG train.

PMC - Process

CR

1.1.1.2. HAZOP study at later design stages.

Concept for Safety Instrumented System (SIS)

2.1. Incompatible safety systems.

2.1.1. Loss of safety functions.

2.1.1.1. &AA S-PC 1002 - Safety Instrumented Systems philosophy for LNG train.

1. Ensure that Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) philosophies for all areas are compatible, as these form part of a single plant SIS.

Previous HAZID Recommendation 1

PMC CR

Explosion Protection Concept

3.1. Ignited gas release on LNG train

3.1.1. Escalation to SCEs (Safety Critical Elements), risk to personnel.

3.1.1.1. Low-manned facility.

68. Confirm that consistent fire and explosion protection philosophies are developed for BOP, flare and FSO scopes, and cover interfaces with the LNG train.

PMC - Fire Protection

CR

3.1.1.2. Manned buildings remote from LNG.

3.1.1.3. Siting study to be carried out, including separation of equipment.

3.1.1.4. &AA S-PC 1008 - Explosion protection philosophy defines requirements for ignition prevention for LNG train.

Fire & Gas Detection Concept

4.1. Hydrocarbon release

4.1.1. Fire/ explosion hazard.

4.1.1.1. &AA S-PC 1009 - Fire and gas detection philosophy, specifies detector coverage requirements (number, location, setpoints, types, actions.) for LNG train.

69. Confirm that consistent fire and gas detection philosophies are developed for BOP, flare and FSO scopes, and cover interfaces with the LNG train.

PMC - Fire Protection

CR



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Fire Protection Concept

5.1. Loss of containment and fire.

5.1.1. Hazard to personnel, damage to equipment, escalation to other inventories (including BLEVE of liquids).

5.1.1.1. Fire zones.

2. Conduct AFP and PFP study to identify the benefits and hazards of deluge in each area.


PMC - Linde

AR

5.1.1.2. Potential to blowdown entire plant in sequences.

70. Confirm that consistent PFP and AFP philosophies are developed for BOP, flare and FSO scopes, and cover interfaces with the LNG train.

PMC - HSE

CR

5.1.1.3. PFP on equipment supports/ structure, as required to meet DAL (Design Accidental Load) conditions.

5.1.1.4. Drainage system to minimise pool fire potential. Very limited warm liquid inventory.

5.1.1.5. Cryogenic liquid spill containment system routes spillages to a spill basin.

5.1.1.6. &AA S-PC 1007 - Active and passive fire protection (AFP / PFP) philosophy for the LNG train.

Concept for Block-in and Depressurising System

6.1. Loss of containment.

6.1.1. Loss of multiple inventories

6.1.1.1. Each module is an ESD zone.

71. Confirm that blowdown philosophy has been updated to the latest LNG train configuration, and blowdown study remains valid.

PMC - Linde

CR

6.1.1.2. Liquid inventories are not removed, but fire case relief loads are considered and inventories can be depressurised.

72. Confirm that consistent ESD and EDP philosophies are developed for BOP, flare and FSO scopes, and cover interfaces with the LNG train.

PMC - Process

CR

6.1.1.3. &AA S-PC 1010 - Process safeguarding ESD isolation and depressurising systems philosophy for the LNG train.



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Flare Concept 7.1. Routine and emergency flaring - See flare node

Concepts for Occupational Health and Safety

- Escape Route and Rescue Concept

- Eye and Emergency Shower Concept

- PPE (Personal Protective Equipment) Concept

- Safe Location Concept

- Safety Sign Concept

8.1. Working environment.

8.1.1. Health and safety risks to workers.

8.1.1.1. &AA S-PC 1031 - Working Environment Philosophy for the LNG train.

3. Ensure that BC Work Safe BC OHS regulations are complied with in &AA S-PC 1031 - Working Environment Philosophy.


PMC - Linde

CR

73. Confirm that consistent working environment philosophies are developed for BOP, flare and FSO scopes, and cover interfaces with the LNG train.

PMC CR

8.1.2. Inability to escape in a fire scenario.

8.1.2.1. Multiple escape routes - at least 2 from each area.

74. Consider the philosophy for evacuation and mustering of whole site area, including remote locations such as metering station, flare area, fire water tank, etc.

PMC - HSE

AR

8.1.2.2. EERA (Escape and Evacuation Risk Analysis) will be conducted for LNG train.

8.1.2.3. Facility has at least two escape routes from each main plant area, including means to evacuate trapped personnel from the north end and to evacuate the main manned area at the south end.

Concepts for Environmental Protection

- Noise Control Concept (including noise control - marine)

- Emission Control Concept

9.1. Environmental considerations.

9.1.1. Atmospheric discharges and flue gasses.

9.1.1.1. Plant power is external electric source, to minimise combustion exhausts.

9.1.1.2. Burners selected for low emissions.

9.1.1.3. Thermal oxidiser on acid gas removal discharge.

9.1.1.4. No flaring concept.



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- Drainage & Effluent Treatment Concept

- Waste Management Concept

9.1.1.5. Waste Discharge Permit to be prepared to meet BC Air Quality Objective (expected discharges are well below allowable). Includes dispersion modeling assessment.

9.1.2. Water discharges of hydrocarbon contamination.

9.1.2.1. See BOP node for water treatment systems.

9.1.3. Water discharges of cooling water with biocide and increased temperature can harm marine species (See, also, BOP node).

9.1.3.1. Discharge consent to meet BC requirements.

9.1.3.2. Deep intake to minimise biocide demand.

9.1.3.3. Continuous online monitoring for temperature and biocide residue.

9.1.3.4. Outfall location design and depth to minimise impact to marine life.

9.1.4. Water-borne noise, potentially leading to disturbance to marine life.

9.1.4.1. Equipment designed to control noise and vibration.

9.1.4.2. Water-borne noise modelling has been carried out and results submitted with the EIA.

9.1.5. Air-borne noise - Hazard to personnel/ disturbance to environment.

9.1.5.1. &AA S-PC 1501 - Noise control philosophy to meet requirements of BC OHS and BC noise control best practice guideline for LNG train.

75. Confirm that noise control philosophies are developed for BOP, flare and FSO scopes, and cover interfaces with the LNG train and that this meets the requirements of the site noise limits.

PMC CR

9.1.5.2. Initial noise study has been conducted for the site

9.1.6. Light pollution

9.1.6.1. Preliminary light pollution impact assessment has been carried out for all continuous plant light sources.

86. Confirm that requirements for the EIA are incorporated in the basis of design. Note this applies to all environmental issues, not just lighting.

PMT CR

9.1.7. Waste generation and transport.

9.1.7.1. Maintenance waste to be collected for disposal.



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9.1.7.2. Minimal routine waste - no routine solid process waste generated by LNG train.

9.1.7.3. All solid waste from BOP areas (e.g. waste water treatments and domestic buildings) is transported off site.

9.1.7.4. EIA has identified all waste streams and means of disposal. This will be controlled by waste management plan.

9.1.8. Hazardous maintenance waste (e.g. molsieve materials).

9.1.8.1. Transfer to competent contractor off-site for disposal, under specific procedure.

87. Ensure the operations philosophy complies with the requirements of the EA, for the handling of hazardous materials.

PMT CR

Impact of the site on the human environment

10.1. Operation of facility

10.1.1. Impact on other users of the area, e.g. leisure, tourism, fishing, agriculture.

10.1.1.1. Human health impact assessment and assessment of other impacts will be included in EA.

Communication links with the facility

11.1. Ferries

11.1.1. Possible lack of access due to weather conditions

11.1.1.1. Sheltered location.

4. Consider operation for scenario where site access is not available (due to weather conditions, boat failure, etc.) Ensure that safe operation can be maintained, with personnel on site.


PMT AR

11.1.1.2. Marine travel procedure.

11.1.2. Any attendant vessel accident (e.g. personnel vehicle ferries, supply deliveries, etc.)

11.1.2.1. TERMPOL study, including marine operation safety in the area.

11.2. Helicopters

11.2.1. Helicopter crash on equipment.

11.2.1.1. Canadian Aviation Regulations requirements

5. Confirm that the helipad locations are suitable and meet regulations.


BOP CR

11.2.1.2. Presence of facility and flare notified to NAV Canada to inform aviation.



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Effects on the plant of environmental constraints

12.1. Dangerous wildlife (e.g. bears)

12.1.1. Personnel hazard.

12.1.1.1. Site fence.

76. Confirm location, extent and specification of site perimeter fence and control of access at road crossings and river crossing.

BOP CR

12.1.1.2. Waste management to avoid attracting wildlife.

77. Develop wildlife management plan (including bear hazards).

PMT CR

12.2. Sea birds.

12.2.1. Build up of guano - personnel health hazard.

12.2.1.1. Routine cleaning.

12.3. Sabotage

12.3.1. Damage to plant - fire and explosion hazard.

12.3.1.1. Site fence - no land access, all personnel are under access control.


BOP CR

12.3.1.2. Exclusion zone, monitored by patrol vessel.

78. Develop project safety and security plan, including potential for public protest.

PMT CR

12.3.2. Public protest affecting site or site personnel.


PMT CR

Extreme Wind/ Wave

13.1. Extreme weather conditions

13.1.1. Risk of damage to marine mooring and transfer system - See FSO node.

13.1.2. Risk of damage to structures and buildings on site.

13.1.2.1. Structures designed for 1/100 year wind load combinations.

79. Confirm that structural/ marine/ civil design criteria are consistent with the basis of design requirements, for all areas of the site.

PMC - Structural

CR

13.1.2.2. Shore protection for the 1/100 year wave conditions

Extreme Temperature

14.1. Ambient conditions.

14.1.1. High ambient temperature - possible process disturbance but no hazardous consequence.

14.1.1.1. Design basis covers expected extreme conditions.

14.1.2. Low ambient temperature - Risk of freezing in liquid systems. Potential process hazards.

14.1.2.1. Winterisation philosophy to address low temperature hazards.

Seismic 15.1. Earthquake.

15.1.1. Damage to structures. Potential loss of containment.

15.1.1.1. Stored inventory on the FSO is floating and largely isolated - See FSO node.



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15.1.1.2. Design criteria comply with national building code, with appropriate importance factor for LNG.

15.1.1.3. Soil study has been conducted. LNG train sited in a preferred zone.

Earthquake

Landslip 17.1. Ground liquefaction due to earthquake.

17.1.1. Loss of foundations and damage to the LNG train, loss of containment.

17.1.1.1. Soil study has been conducted. LNG train sited in a preferred zone.

17.1.1.2. Ground improvement incorporated in to design to meet building code.

17.1.2. Damage to existing landfill leading to possible impact on the plant area.

17.1.2.1. Landfill has been assessed to current seismic standards and show to withstand liquefaction, with the addition of a berm.

17.2. Landslip above the site.

17.2.1. Damage to buildings and equipment on site. Loss of containment in process.

17.2.1.1. Geotechnical terrain hazard assessment has been conducted and found rockfall hazards to be low.

17.2.1.2. New cut slopes designed to geotechnical recommendations, including anchoring where required.

17.3. Subsea landslip in the foreshore area.

17.3.1. Damage to waterfront structures. Loss of process equipment.

17.3.1.1. LNG train is far enough from the foreshore not to be affected by credible subsea landslip.

17.3.2. Damage to cooling water inlet and diffusers.

17.3.2.1. Major marine structures, including sea water intake are located in a lower risk area.

81. Conduct additional study into the likelihood and consequences of marine landslip, and identify additional design protection if practicable.

BOP AR

17.3.2.2. FSO moorings are rock socketed and designed for lateral spreading of soil.



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Tsunami 18.1. Submarine earthquake or landslip.

18.1.1. Wave damage to site.

18.1.1.1. Tsunami study has been conducted and shown that the credible wave is not significant compared with the extreme wind and wave conditions.

Other extreme weather

19.1. Drought.

19.1.1. Dust generation leading to reduced visibility. Hazard to personnel.

82. Ensure that civil design includes requirements to control dust from external areas.

PMC - Civil

CR

83. Ensure that operational management plan includes dust control measures.

PMT CR

19.1.2. Loss of water in Mill creek leading to loss of supply to plant and firewater.

19.1.2.1. Design to retain minimum firewater volume in the raw water tank (as required by code).

85. Review if raw water supply from Mill creek is sufficiently reliable to avoid operational upsets in the event of drought, considering the buffer volume available in the raw water tank.

BOP AR

Flooding 20.1. Failure of Henriette dam.

20.1.1. Flood down Woodfibre creek valley. Possible damage to south-end of the site.

20.1.1.1. Dam inspection and maintenance will be undertaken by WLNG, to meet BC dam safety regulations.

80. Review the consequences of failure of the Henriette dam, and identify any additional safeguards required.

PMT AR

20.2. Flooding of Mill creek, e.g. high rainfall or temporary debris flow.

20.2.1. Potential flooding of plant area and damage to pipebridges and equipment.

20.2.1.1. Flood protection measures incorporated at Mill creek.

84. Study potential flooding of Mill creek and confirm that flood protection measures are appropriate for the hazard.

PMT CR

Ice/Snow 21.1. Weather conditions.

21.1.1. Build up of load on structures.

21.1.1.1. Will be covered by winterisation philosophy.

21.1.2. Falling ice hazard to personnel.

21.1.2.1. Will be covered by winterisation philosophy.

21.2. Avalanche from uphill

21.2.1. Hazard to personnel and equipment.

98. Conduct avalanche hazard assessment, as required by Worksafe BC, and comply with requirements.

BOP CR

Fog/ Visibility 22.1. Fog, smoke, snow storm.

22.1.1. Interference with LNGC marine operations.

22.1.1.1. Marine operation procedures to be confirmed by TERMPOL.



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22.1.2. Interference with transport to and from site.

22.1.2.1. Ferries designed for all weather operation, including poor visibility.

22.1.2.2. Helicopter is an unusual operation and would not be operated in unsuitable operation.



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Node: 2. Inlet Facilities



External Fire 1.1. Other inventories in train.

1.1.1. Exposure to fire, risk of overpressure leading to escalation.

1.1.1.1. PSVs sized for fire case in the area.

1.1.1.2. Fire and gas detection.

1.1.1.3. ESD and EDP of the feed gas inventory.

1.1.1.4. Active and passive fire protection - see general node.

1.1.1.5. FERA to be carried out.

1.2. Leak from hot oil system within the unit.

1.2.1. Pool fire.

1.2.1.1. Vents and relief from hot oil to closed system to prevent hot oil relief feeding a fire.

6. Check if hot oil is always below its flash point, and therefore is non-hazardous in case of leak. If not practicable, review area classification for hot oil system area.


PMC - Linde

AR

1.3. Leak of feed gas within the unit.

1.3.1. Jet fire, flammable cloud, flash fire.






1.4. Leak from upstream pipeline.



34. Review the detection and isolation of leaks at the inlet startup heater area, which is upstream of the ESDV.

PMC - Linde

AR




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1.4.1.3. ESD of the feed gas inventory and EDP

1.4.1.4. ESD of feed gas at plant boundary, downstream of metering station.



Internal Fire 2.1. Malfunction of catalytic oxidiser

2.1.1. Loss of burner control, risk of fire and overheating in oxidiser, possible ignition source.

2.1.1.1. Burner management system.

2.1.1.2. Oxidiser located outside hazardous area.

External Explosion 3.1. Gas leak.

3.1.1. Overpressure, hazard to personnel, damage to equipment, potential hazard to other facilities and buildings on site.


3.1.1.2. Hazardous area classification.

3.1.1.3. ESD and EDP to reduce duration and extent of clouds.


Internal Explosion 4.1. Malfunction of catalytic oxidiser - See above.


5.1. Harmful substances for desalination.

5.1.1. Risk to personnel, risk of spill.

5.2. Contact with amine.

5.2.1. Health hazard to personnel.

5.2.1.1. Procedures for handling.

7. Review the open drains from the amine area, consider means to prevent amine spills contaminating the general water treatment system.


PMC - BOP

AR

5.2.1.2. Segregated amine drain system for draining.

5.3. Sour gas discharge.


5.3.1.1. Release point located to safe location, to be confirmed by gas dispersion study.

8. Check if credible leak from stripping column overhead system discharge

PMC - Linde

AR



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5.3.1.2. Primary discharge is through catalytic oxidiser, to oxidise any residual hydrocarbon and H2S.

could lead to a health hazard, if so consider detection requirements.


5.3.1.3. Secondary discharge is to flare.

5.3.2. Environmental discharge.

5.3.2.1. Discharge permit.

Noise 6.1. See general node.


7.1. See general node and cases above.

HAZARD from OSBL

8.1. Landslip/ earthquake.

8.1.1. See general node.

8.2. Sea level change (e.g. storm surge, tsunami effects).


8.3. Extreme wind and wave.


8.4. Lightning.

8.4.1. Standard design consideration. No additional hazard identified.

8.5. Ice storm / freezing rain.

8.5.1. Build up of ice falling and causing structural damage or direct overload.

9. Establish criteria for ice build up to be considered in design and concept for dealing with ice build up, including potential dropped object during thaw.


PMC AR


9.1. No new scenarios identified.







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12.1. All discharges to flare system - see general node.

12.2. Hot oil spill or leak.

12.2.1. Release to environment and hazard to personnel.

12.2.1.1. Area containment and drainage system to a sump and pumped to treatment system.

39. Ensure that liquid hydrocarbon entering the surface drains in each of the train areas is separated before the water is discharged.

BOP CR

12.3. Spill or leak of pentane fuel for hot oil heater.

12.3.1. Release to environment.

12.3.1.1. Area containment and drainage system to a sump and pumped to treatment system.


BOP CR

40. Conduct drainage philosophy review, to ensure that the safety and environmental hazards for hydrocarbon into the drain system are addressed.

It is noted that an LNG train philosophy is available from Linde, but has not been integrated into the plant water treatment philosophy.

PMC CR

12.3.2. Pool fire hazard. Vapour generation and fire / explosion hazard.

35. Review the hazard from pentane fuel in module 2, near the fired equipment.

PMC - Linde

AR

12.4. PSV relief from hot oil system or tempered water (e.g. heat exchanger leak from the process).

12.4.1. Potential hydrocarbon vapour release to atmosphere.

16. Route hot oil and tempered water expansion vapour vent and PSVs to flare system (LP warm flare), to avoid hydrocarbon release to atmosphere.


PMC - Linde

CR



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Node: 3. Liquefaction and Refrigeration.



External Fire 1.1. Other inventories on the train.

1.1.1. Exposure to fire, risk of overpressure leading to escalation. Potential for BLEVE (in particular mixed refrigerant buffer vessels).



1.1.1.3. ESD.

EDP of the gas inventories.


1.1.1.5. Liquid leaks routed away from process area by bunding arrangement, to minimise pool fire potential.









1.3. Leak of cryogenic liquid.







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1.3.1.4. Active and passive fire protection - see general node. PFP for cryogenic area designed for cold shock and fire case.


1.3.2. Direct hazard to personnel from temperature.

1.3.2.1. Spray protection e.g. flange shields to control likely leak sources.

1.3.3. Damage to structures and equipment, risk of escalation.

1.3.3.1. PFP designed to protect steel against low temperature in areas with cryogenic liquid.

1.3.4. Evaporating pool at spill basin, leading to flammable cloud.

10. Provide means to limit evaporation from LNG spill pit, e.g. high expansion foam or floating block systems. Assess the impact of the resulting cloud in a spill event when the pit location is defined.


PMC AR

1.3.5. Spill in to water leading to RPT.

1.3.5.1. All drains lead to a sump with a low water level to minimise evaporation and ensure the volume is available.

41. Confirm the design of LNG catchments and the means to prevent LNG ingress to the drain system. Select a passive means if practicable.

BOP CR

Internal Fire 2.1. No new scenarios identified.

External Explosion 3.1. Gas leak or flashing liquid leak.



11. Check the requirements for rotating equipment in hazardous areas as potential ignition source (e.g. bearing temperature monitoring). Concern is that the only known standard is EN-13463, which may not be applicable in BC.


PMC - Linde

CR






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Internal Explosion 4.1. No new scenarios identified.


5.1. Contact with water / glycol.

5.1.1. Hazard to personnel health.

5.1.1.1. Low hazard fluid.

5.1.1.2. Handling procedures.



7.1. Spill of tempered cooling water.

7.1.1. Potential release of glycol to the environment.

7.1.1.1. Glycol will not be added to tempered water. System is water only.

HAZARD from OSBL







8.4. Lightning.






PMC AR

8.6. Lifting operations for maintenance.

8.6.1. Dropped load on plant, leading to loss of containment.

8.6.1.1. Material handling philosophy (including Dropped object study ) to be prepared.

12. Establish position of cranes/ lifting equipment for plant maintenance, consider minimising requirements for lifting over live plant (e.g. maintenance of one liquefaction train with the other in operation).


PMC AR



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Node: 4. Refrigerant Make-up and Fractionation Area.




1.1.1. Exposure to fire, risk of overpressure leading to escalation. Potential for BLEVE.

Potential to impair flare system and prevent safe disposal from FSO and other inventories.


36. Review the segregation of refrigerant storage and flare system from plant hazards.

PMC AR


1.1.1.3. ESD.

EDP of the HP gas inventories.


















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1.3.3. Damage to structures and equipment due to embrittlement or thermal stress and bowing, risk of escalation.


1.3.3.2. HAZOP to consider thermal stress cases.




PMC AR

1.3.5. Spill in to water leading to RPT.



BOP CR

1.4. Leak of hydrocarbon condensate.

1.4.1. Build up of hydrocarbon condensate in drain system and effluent treatment, risk of flammable vapour, fire and explosion.

13. Ensure that effluent drainage and treatment is designed for the possibility of hydrocarbon condensate leakage (low flashpoint hydrocarbon) from any condensate handling areas in the LNG train.


AMEC AR




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PMC - Linde

CR






5.1. Contact with water / glycol.

5.1.1. Hazard to personnel health.

5.1.1.1. Low hazard fluid.

5.1.1.2. Handling procedures.



7.1. See general node.

HAZARD from OSBL







8.4. Lightning.






PMC AR



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8.6.1.1. Material handling philosophy (including Dropped object study) to be prepared.



PMC AR

8.7. Filling of refrigerants (e.g. for startup)

8.7.1. Potential for spill of refrigerant, leading to fire / explosion risk and hazard to personnel.

37. Establish the means for refrigerant supply to site and filling of refrigerant makeup storage.

PMT AR

38. When refrigerant delivery method is defined (refer to recommendation 37), review the hazards and controls required.

PMC - BOP

AR











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Node: 5. LP Compression, End Flash and Fuel Gas System.




1.1.1. Exposure to fire, risk of overpressure leading to escalation. Potential for BLEVE in end flash drum.



1.1.1.3. ESD.

EDP of the gas inventories.


















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1.3.3. Damage to structures and equipment, risk of escalation.





PMC AR

1.3.5. Spill in to water leading to RPT (Rapid Phase Transition).



BOP CR







PMC - Linde

CR


3.1.1.3. ESD.

3.1.1.4. Low pressure of systems. Limited compressed gas inventory.




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HAZARD from OSBL







8.4. Lightning.






PMC AR






PMC AR



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8.7. Shutdown on storage unit.

8.7.1. Possibility of surge in LNG transfer line, leading to overpressure.

42. Conduct transient analysis of flow in the rundown line from LNG train to FSO, including surge and other upset conditions.

PMT CR

8.8. Starting or stopping LNG flow.

8.8.1. Potential for exceeding cool down limits, leading to damage and possible loss of containment from transfer line.

8.8.1.1. Continuous cool down using dedicated liquid return line.

14. Confirm isolations on LNG transfer lines to limit LNG spill in the case of leakage, particularly for flexible joints at the moorings.


PMC CR

8.8.1.2. cool down procedures.











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Node: 6. Substation



External Fire 1.1. Fire in adjacent process area.

1.1.1. Impairment of substation. damage to equipment. Potential loss of emergency power and control to the plant.

1.1.1.1. Fire and gas and ESD from process area.

43. Confirm that fire and explosion protection of substation in the train area is adequate to mitigate against common cause loss of power and control to train and equipment.

PMC CR

1.1.1.2. Fixed fire fighting system for the plant area.

1.2. Electrical fault.

1.2.1. Risk of fire in, or close to, substation leading to loss of power and control, risk to personnel.

1.2.1.1. Fire detection and fire fighting system.

1.2.2. Potential for transformer explosion, causing impact damage to process plant and loss of containment.

15. Review potential for transformer failure leading to a hazard to the process plant. If required, consider additional safeguards.


PMC AR


External Explosion 3.1. No new scenarios identified.







HAZARD from OSBL

8.1. See process nodes.



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10.1. All routed to effluent treatment - see general node.






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Node: 7. BOP



External Fire 1.1. Condensate spill at tank.

1.1.1. Pool fire at condensate tank. Damage to tank. Risk of escalation to LNG area.

1.1.1.1. Containment bund designed for 110% tank volume.

17. Review fire fighting means for pool fires at the condensate tank or diesel storage, e.g. foam or dry powder system.

PMC - BOP

CR

1.1.1.2. Process causes to be addressed through HAZOP.

18. Review segregation distance between condensate tank and LNG area. Confirm that code requirements are met.

PMC - BOP

AR

1.1.1.3. AFP and PFP in LNG area.

1.1.2. Potential gas cloud and VCE hazard in LNG area.

1.1.2.1. Gas detection area.

1.1.2.2. Control of ignition sources.

1.2. Overpressure of condensate tank.

1.2.1. Release of condensate, flammable atmosphere. Risk of fire.

1.2.1.1. Tank relief protection, discharging to flare.

52. Check overpressure protection of the condensate tank. If routed into the LP flare system, this has a design pressure greater than the tank, but if routed to atmosphere, there may be a flammable hazard in the area of the train.

PMC - Interface

AR

1.2.1.2. N2 blanketing.

1.3. Spill during truck loading of condensate.

1.3.1. Pool fire at loading area. Damage to tank. Risk of escalation to LNG area.

1.3.1.1. Designated loading area with containment.


PMC - BOP

CR

1.3.1.2. Process causes to be addressed through HAZOP.

1.3.1.3. AFP and PFP in LNG area.

1.3.2. Potential gas cloud and VCE hazard in LNG area.

1.3.2.1. Gas detection area.

1.3.2.2. Control of ignition sources.

1.4. Utility gas supply leak.

1.4.1. Potential gas cloud and fire / explosion hazard.

1.4.1.1. All utility gas installed in accordance with BC Natural Gas Code.



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1.4.1.2. Utility gas is reduced to normal supply pressure at Fortis station, and includes mercaptan as leak indication.

1.5. Diesel tank leak or diesel loading spill.

1.5.1. Pool fire at diesel storage. Damage to tank.

1.5.1.1. Containment bund designed for 110% tank volume.


PMC - BOP

CR

1.6. Forest fire.

1.6.1. Fire spread to plant area. Risk of escalation.

1.6.1.1. Emergency response, including fire water / fire fighting equipment to protect essential areas (e.g. LNG train).

19. Consider safeguards against external forest fire (e.g. fire break at plant boundary and/or perimeter boundary and vegetation control around plant area).

PMC - BOP

AR

1.6.1.2. Ability to shutdown and depressurise plant.

1.7. Electrical fire.

1.7.1. Potential ignition of hazardous inventories.

1.7.1.1. In BOP area, electrical equipment is segregated from hazardous inventories, except at piperack area.

20. Select equipment for piperack area as minimum of Zone 2, or equivalent.

PMC - BOP

CR

1.8. Fire on road truck.

1.8.1. Risk of escalation to plant. Potential ignition source for gas leaks.

1.8.1.1. Control of vehicles on site - only diesel vehicles associated with the plant.

21. Develop standards for external vehicles (e.g. condensate trucks) within the safety management plan.

PMT - BOP

CR

1.9. Fire on attendant vessel.

1.9.1. Hazard to personnel on vessel.

1.9.1.1. Dedicated ferry vessels, meeting Transport Canada requirements.

1.9.1.2. Selection of suitable vessels for infrequent operations (e.g. material transport), meeting Transport Canada requirements.

1.9.2. Potential hazard to FSO and carrier, and exposed inventories.

1.9.2.1. All routine marine transport is remote from FSO and process area.

Internal Fire 2.1. Warehouse fire.

2.1.1. Damage to equipment. Risk to personnel in the area. Risk of escalation to adjacent buildings and vegetation.

2.1.1.1. Fire protection design criteria.

2.1.1.2. Static and mobile fire fighting equipment and water supply available.



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2.1.1.3. Evacuation plans in the safety management plan.

2.2. Chemical storage fire.





2.2.2. Potential health risk to personnel fighting the fire.

22. Review hazards from stored chemicals in the case of fire, and include mitigation requirements in the building basis of design.

PMC - BOP

AR

2.3. Substation fire.




2.3.2. Internal explosion (e.g. batteries, transformers, etc.)

2.3.3. Risk of escalation to rundown piperack from north substation.

2.3.4. Loss of supply to the plant. Potential hazards from loss of power and control.

24. Review common cause loss of normal and emergency power, particularly to process plant, and the required system integrity.

PMC AR

2.4. BC hydro substation fire.

2.4.1. Loss of power supply.

2.4.1.1. Two segregated transformers and supply routes.

2.4.1.2. Emergency power from the site does not pass through the same switch gear.



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2.5. Fire at interim substation.

2.5.1. Loss of power supply.

58. Review scenario of prolonged loss of power if the interim substation transformer fails. In this case, the plant could require to be maintained in a safe condition without external power for a period of months. Consider if offloading remaining stored inventory is possible without external power.

BOP AR

2.6. Non-process building (i.e. admin building, workshop, guard house building, emergency response building, canteen) fire.





2.7. Process building (i.e. utility building, cooling water pumps building, effluent and water treatment shelter) fire.





2.7.2. Risk of escalation to rundown piperack from cooling water system buildings,

23. Review hazards from fire in BOP systems and buildings adjacent to the rundown piperack and provide separation where required.

PMC - BOP

AR

2.7.3. Loss of supply to the plant. Potential hazards.

2.7.3.1. Utility failures to be addressed in HAZOP.

2.8. Control room fire.

2.8.1. Loss of control and management functions, if evacuated.

2.8.1.1. Fire and smoke detection.

59. Review the alternative means of control and shutdown, in the event that the control room has to be evacuated due to internal hazard.

PMC - BOP

AR

2.8.1.2. Fire suppression / protection systems.

2.8.1.3. Designated emergency response room, outside the control room.



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External Explosion 3.1. See relevant process area nodes.

Internal Explosion 4.1. Vapour cloud from process area.

4.1.1. Flammable atmosphere in buildings and confined spaces in the utility areas. Risk of explosion.

4.1.1.1. Electrical rooms and substations are ventilated with positive pressure and ventilation shutdown on gas detection.

55. Review requirement for enclosed buildings in the utility and cooling water areas. Eliminate, where possible, to minimise the potential for vapour clouds inside buildings.

BOP AR

4.1.1.2. Separation distance between process area and manned buildings. To be confirmed by siting study.

56. Review the hazard from temporary substation as a source of ignition, or a fire hazard which might affect process equipment.

BOP AR

Loss of Containment 5.1. Chemical leak.


54. Identify the hazards from chemicals to be stored, when they are selected, and ensure that handling and storage arrangements are suitable to protect personnel and releases to the environment.

BOP CR

5.1.2. Environmental hazard.


BOP CR

5.2. N2 leak inside building.

5.2.1. Personnel asphyxiation hazard.

53. Review the hazard of N2 in utility building, and ensure that asphyxiation hazard is addressed.

BOP CR

Cryogenic Hazard 6.1. Not applicable.

Impact/Mechanical Damage

7.1. Vehicle movements on site.

7.1.1. Risk of collision with and damage to structures and process equipment.

60. Confirm that physical protection is provided around process areas and structures (e.g. pipe and cable bridges), to protect against accidental impacts from vehicles and handling operations.

BOP CR

7.2. Vessel collision with personnel and material access jetties.

7.2.1. See general node



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8.1. Contamination from existing asbestos disposal site.

8.1.1. Hazard to personnel.

8.1.1.1. Site to be capped to meet the requirements of COC (Certificate Of Compliance), before handover to Woodfibre.

Noise 9.1. Noisy equipment (e.g. emergency generators, utility pumps, compressors, etc.)

9.1.1. Exposure of personnel.

9.1.1.1. Equipment and noise attenuation (where required) to be designed to meet Worksafe BC requirements for noise.

9.1.2. Noise nuisance in area.

9.1.2.1. BOP equipment noise included in noise model for off-site noise (to meet OGC requirements).


10.1. Spill of diesel or condensate.

10.1.1. Release to water or soil.

10.1.1.1. Tanks and loading areas are in bunded areas.

10.1.2. Vapour from condensate release to air.

10.1.2.1. No routine handling of condensate in the open. Tank is blanketed and connected to flare system.

10.2. Runoff from plant areas.

10.2.1. Possible contaminated water running to surrounding environment.

10.2.1.1. Runoff within BOP area is collected and passed through oily water separation.

30. Identify any chemicals handled in the BOP area which may pass through oily water separation. If any are identified, provide separate containment to prevent drainage into the surface water system.

PMC - BOP

AR

10.2.1.2. Spill response procedures and local drip trays and catchments around equipment.

31. Review the disposal of lab drains to ensure that they are correctly treated.

PMC - BOP

AR

HAZARD from OSBL

11.1. See general node for external hazards.


12.1. HVAC unit refrigerant leak (fugitive emissions).

12.1.1. Release of refrigerant to environment.

12.1.1.1. Maintenance and integrity.

12.1.1.2. Considered in EIA.

12.2. Landfill gas.


12.2.1.1. Considered in EIA.

12.2.2. Potential build up of flammable gas.

32. Review if flammable gas hazard from landfill is credible.

PMC - BOP

AR



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12.3. Sea water chlorination hydrogen/ chlorine discharge.

12.3.1. Local hazard at the release point.

33. Review the potential hazards from venting from chlorination system when the technology has been chosen.

Also consider the environmental implications of any routine venting to atmosphere from the process.

BOP AR




BOP AR

12.4. Vapour displaced during condensate truck filling operation.

12.4.1. Release of flammable hydrocarbon vapour.

12.4.1.1. Closed vapour return to the tank vapour space from the truck.

12.5. Oxygen-rich offgas from N2 generation.

12.5.1. Increased fire hazard in the area.

57. Ensure that oxygen-rich gas from N2 generation is dispersed safely.

BOP CR


13.1. Closed process drains (produced water).

13.1.1. Potential discharge of hydrocarbons to the environment.

13.1.1.1. All oily water drains from process are treated in biological treatment.

61. Consider if a buffer storage is required for off-spec produced water, to enable plant operation to continue in an upset case at the treatment plant.

BOP AR

13.1.1.2. Discharge monitoring system.

13.2. Surface runoff.


13.2.1.1. All surface drains from open plant contacted area are collected in a surface runoff pond, with sufficient capacity for maximum rainfall event.

62. Check the basis for the maximum rainfall event used in sizing the surface runoff retention pond.

BOP CR

13.2.1.2. Liquid from the pond and drains from buildings with potential hydrocarbon are treated in biological treatment.

13.2.1.3. Discharge monitoring system.



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13.3. Contamination of non-process area runoff (e.g. diesel from vehicles, chemical spill during transport, etc.)


13.3.1.1. Hydrocarbon containing areas (e.g. transformers, diesel equipment) are locally bunded and can be drained to the contacted area drainage treatment system.

63. Consider if discharge points for runoff to sea should be provided with valves to stop the runoff in the case of a spill, e.g. on a roadway.

BOP AR

13.3.1.2. Oily water separator at each discharge point to intercept hydrocarbon spills.

13.4. Discharge of domestic sewage from buildings and FSO.

13.4.1. Discharge to the environment.

13.4.1.1. All sewage collected and routed to sewage treatment plant, to meet BC requirements.

13.5. Discharge of sea water cooling.

13.5.1. High temperature at the discharge, possible chlorite content leading to environmental hazard.

13.5.1.1. System designed to achieve acceptable temperature at the discharge dispersion. Location confirmed by modeling.

13.5.1.2. Dechlorination by a passive aeration in the outflow, with discharge monitoring.

13.5.1.3. Temperature and flow monitoring of discharge.


14.1. Leachate from landfill.

14.1.1. Contamination of the soil and ground water.

14.1.1.1. Existing landfill is lined. Leachate is collected and treated.

64. Sample existing leachate to determine the contaminants that are present and ensure that treatment is adequate.

PMT CR

14.1.1.2. Sampling to confirm the discharge quality.

65. Review the expected material to be added to the landfill and predict the leachate composition and flow which must be treated. Design the leachate treatment appropriately.

BOP AR


15.1. Damage to sea water inlet hypochlorite dosing system or maloperation.

15.1.1. Discharge of concentrated hypochlorite to sea at the inlet.

66. Consider if hypochlorite injection pipework should be inside the sea water intake, so that leakage is not to the sea.

BOP AR



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Node: 8. Flare Systems



External Fire 1.1. Emergency flaring case.

1.1.1. Thermal radiation to plant areas, personnel access routes, etc.

1.1.1.1. Flare to be designed so that manned and accessible areas are not exposed to excessive radiation (to be confirmed by flare study).

1.1.2. Risk of ignition for foliage.

1.1.2.1. Clear area to be established around the flare, based on flare radiation study.

1.2. Fire in LNG train affecting flare piperack.

1.2.1. Inability to blowdown.

25. Review the protection of flare headers and support structures against process area fire, to ensure blowdown duration is protected.

BOP CR

1.3. Fire affecting flare piperack from FSO.

1.3.1. Inability to vent gas from FSO to flare safely.

26. Review the protection of flare headers and support structures from FSO against process area fire. Ensure that safe venting is available in the case of impairment of the flare system.

BOP CR

Internal Fire 2.1. Air ingress into flare system.

2.1.1. Fire or explosion in flare headers.

2.1.1.1. N2 purge.

2.1.1.2. Flare design.

2.1.1.3. HAZOP to consider process causes.

External Explosion 3.1. Explosion in process area.

3.1.1. Damage to piperacks, lines and flare structure. Inability to depressurise unaffected inventories and FSO off-gas.

27. Review the implications of damage to the flare system in the event of a vapour cloud explosion in the LNG area. Identify if a design accidental load for blast is required.

BOP AR


Loss of Containment 5.1. No new scenarios identified.



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Cryogenic Hazard 6.1. No new scenarios identified.





Noise 9.1. Flare noise.

9.1.1. Exposure of personnel.

9.1.1.1. Flares to be designed to meet Worksafe BC requirements for noise.

9.1.2. Noise nuisance in area.

9.1.2.1. Flare noise included in noise model for off-site noise.


10.1. See discharges, below.

HAZARD from OSBL



12.1. No routine flaring.


13.1. Not applicable.




15.1. Flare flame-out.

15.1.1. Unignited gas release. Risk of flammable gas cloud in process areas, particularly from cold releases.

15.1.1.1. Multiple pilots with flame monitoring and ignition systems.

28. Conduct unignited gas dispersion studies to confirm that emergency flare releases, without ignition, do not lead to an unsafe condition due to flammable gas cloud formation.

Solaris - Flare

AR



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29. Review the reliability of utility gas supply to pilots, and if a backup supply is required (e.g. from BOG or local bottle supply). Concern is that Fortis maintenance or defect may require isolation of utility gas.

PMC - BOP

AR

15.2. Build up liquid in KO drums.

15.2.1. Liquid carryover through the flare - "burning rain".

15.2.1.1. KO drum volume and level indication.

15.2.1.2. See HAZOP study for process causes and safeguards.

15.3. Emergency flaring - See External Fire, above.



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Node: 9. FSO (Rundown and Storage Mode)



External Fire 1.1. Fire at substation or adjacent building onshore.

1.1.1. Risk of escalation to adjacent rundown and BOG pipework on the piperack. Potential loss of ability to discharge BOG.

1.1.1.1. ESD.


1.1.1.3. FSO is separated by distance.

1.1.1.4. In the event that the piperack is lost, FSO tank pressure build up can be contained for at least 3 days, before local relief to atmosphere at each tank.

1.2. Major fire on LNG train or condensate storage.

1.2.1. Risk of escalation to FSO.

1.2.1.1. ESD / blowdown at the train.


1.2.1.3. FSO is separated by distance (to be reviewed in siting study).


1.2.1.5. Moss tank design has heat protection capability.

1.2.2. Loss of normal BOG discharge route.

1.2.2.1. Direct connection to LP flare.


1.2.3. Loss of power / utilities to FSO.

1.2.3.1. Onboard emergency power generation supplying safety systems.



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1.2.3.2. Onboard N2 generation, supplied by emergency power.

1.2.4. Personnel on FSO are unable to evacuate past the process area.

1.2.4.1. Two escape routes (fore and aft) and evacuation by boat from the north end of the site.

44. Consider if FSO control room should be permanently manned, and if it should remain manned in the case of a fire on the jetty or train. If so, review fire and blast protection requirements.

FSO AR

45. Review evacuation routes from all areas on the FSO.

FSO AR

1.3. Fire on vehicle on jetty or utility ramp area.

1.3.1. Escalation to rundown and BOG lines. Fire adjacent to FSO.

1.3.1.1. Fire detection and fire fighting system on jetty.

46. Review access and mechanical handling for maintenance on transfer arm between jetty and FSO, as this may be conducted during operation with the spare arm in use.

BOP CR

1.3.1.2. ESD on shore to FSO, on both sides of flexible connections.

1.3.1.3. Control of access, only required for loading arm maintenance.

Internal Fire 2.1. Fire on FSO equipment (e.g. emergency generator, compressors or equipment room).

2.1.1. Escalation to cargo systems, leading to major fire on the FSO.

2.1.1.1. Non-process (emergency generators, etc.) will be located in compartments, outside the cargo area and separate from essential utilities (N2, control, etc.)

2.1.1.2. Fire detection, fire protection and fixed fire fighting systems to class requirements

2.1.2. Loss of utilities, control, etc. between FSO and shore.

2.1.2.1. Fire detection, fire protection and fixed fire fighting systems to class requirements

2.1.2.2. Non-process (emergency generators, etc.) will be located in compartments, outside the cargo area and separate from essential utilities (N2, control, etc.)



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External Explosion 3.1. Explosion in the LNG train.

3.1.1. Overpressure on the FSO. Risk of damage leading to loss of containment.

3.1.1.1. Separation by distance and withstand capability of the Moss tank system. To be confirmed by siting study.


FSO AR

3.2. LNG release to sea from jetty to FSO connection failure.

3.2.1. Possible RPT between jetty and FSO. Risk of damage to equipment.

3.2.1.1. Inherent strength of ship's hull sufficient to withstand RPT pressure.

3.2.2. Cold damage to FSO hull, risk of structural failure.

3.2.2.1. Compartmentalisation - double hull with ballast tanks - localised damage would not cause loss of stability or buoyancy.

47. Consider cold protection in the area of the rundown line from shore to avoid damage to the hull in case of leakage (e.g. sacrificial splash plate).

FSO AR

48. Consider cold protection in the area of the rundown line from shore to avoid damage to the jetty piles in case of leakage.

Jetty AR

Internal Explosion 4.1. LNG leak into hold space.

4.1.1. Flammable atmosphere, potential explosion in the hold space. Escalation to other tanks.

4.1.1.1. No equipment or ignition sources in the hold space.

49. Review reliability and availability of hold space LNG secondary containment sump pumps, and if emergency power is required.

FSO AR

4.1.1.2. Annular space between tank and insulation is N2 purged and has gas detection at the purge outlet.

4.1.1.3. Gas detection in the hold space, with ability to inert the hold space with inert gas or N2.

4.1.1.4. Liquid containment system with recovery pump, to control credible liquid leaks.

4.2. Air ingress into cargo tank due to underpressure or incorrect operating (e.g. maintenance release).

4.2.1. Possible explosive mixture inside the tank.

4.2.1.1. Maintenance procedures to inert and refill tanks following maintenance.

50. Identify if vacuum breakers on LNG tanks could be removed, as is current practice for Moss tanks, and develop vacuum protection design.

FSO AR

51. Review LNG tank protection against air ingress at HAZOP.

PMC CR

4.3. Malfunction of IGG (inert gas generator).

4.3.1. Potential explosion in the IGG.

4.3.1.1. IGG located in the machinery area, in a dedicated compartment.



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4.3.1.2. Burner management system in IGG package.

Loss of Containment 5.1. Loss of containment on cargo system or jetty connection.

5.1.1. Vapour release leading to flammable gas cloud.

5.1.1.1. ESD for rundown lines and jetty connections.

5.1.1.2. Gas detection system.

5.1.1.3. All vapour lines are low pressure.

5.1.1.4. All lines and cargo headers are freely ventilated, open area.

5.1.1.5. Compressor rooms provided with forced ventilation and gas detection to meet class requirements.

5.1.2. LNG release leading to flammable gas cloud and cryogenic damage to structures and equipment.



FSO AR



Jetty AR


88. Review the risk of cryogenic damage to structures on the FSO from header leaks, and identify if any additional cryogenic protection is required.

FSO AR

5.1.2.4. Compressor rooms (containing LNG vapourisor for gas up of tanks) provided with forced ventilation and gas detection to meet class requirements.

5.1.2.5. All connections have catchment to protect against small cryogenic leaks.

5.2. Loss of containment on rundown system ashore.

5.2.1. Vapour release leading to flammable gas cloud.





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5.2.1.3. All vapour lines are low pressure.


5.2.2. LNG release leading to flammable gas cloud and cryogenic damage to structures and equipment.


89. Review the possibility of LNG leak on the rundown line. If credible leak sources are identified, provide LNG leak containment.

BOP AR



5.2.2.4. LNG jetty has containment sloped to spill basin.

5.3. Loss of containment of diesel in machinery area or transfer.

5.3.1. Spill of diesel to the environment.

90. Relocate FSO diesel bunkering point to the aft access bridge, to avoid unnecessary vehicle operations near the process connections. Ensure that spill protection is provided.

BOP CR

5.3.2. Risk of damage to process equipment during the transfer due to vehicles on the jetty.


BOP CR

5.4. Loss of containment of N2 into a confined space.

5.4.1. Asphyxiation hazard on entry.

5.4.1.1. Normally no entry. Confined space entry procedures.

5.5. Activation of CO2 fire fighting system.

5.5.1. Hazard to personnel in the area.

91. Review hazards from existing CO2 fire fighting system. Consider upgrading to modern standards.

FSO AR

Cryogenic Hazard 6.1. Roll over.

6.1.1. High pressure in the cargo tank, risk of overpressure and failure.

6.1.1.1. Operating procedures to circulate tanks to avoid stratification.

92. Review the potential for roll over in the FSO tank, considering the feed composition. If required, confirm that roll over is within the sizing basis for FSO tank PSVs.

FSO CR

6.1.1.2. Roll over requires static tank conditions for prolonged period - unlikely in a floating facility with frequent loading / offloading.



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6.1.1.3. LNG composition is reasonably consistent, significant density differences between components are unlikely in this feed.


7.1. Ship collision.

7.1.1. Damage to FSO hull. In extreme case, loss of containment.

7.1.1.1. Marine operation procedures and ship exclusion to be confirmed by TERMPOL.

7.1.1.2. Double hull design with damage stability criteria.

7.1.1.3. Fendering system reduces impact energy.

7.1.1.4. Nav lights.

7.2. Mechanical handling.

7.2.1. Risk of damage to process lines leading to loss of containment.


95. Establish position of cranes/ lifting equipment for plant maintenance and loading and offloading operation, consider minimising requirements for lifting over live plant .

FSO AR


8.1. Asbestos present in existing marine equipment onboard.

8.1.1. Hazard to personnel if disturbed.

8.1.1.1. Hazardous material study to identify existing hazardous material and prevent exposure hazards.




HAZARD from OSBL


11.1.1. Damage to mooring. Risk of breakaway of FSO.

11.1.1.1. Designed for 1/100 year storm event in normal operation.

93. Consider the margin available above the design storm event and confirm that break away will not occur due to small exceedance.

BOP CR

11.2. Seismic activity.

11.2.1. Damage to mooring. Risk of breakaway of FSO.

11.2.1.1. Designed for 1/475 year seismic event in normal operation, including accelerations and ground movement (lateral spreading).



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11.2.1.2. Designed to survive 1/2475 year seismic event, including accelerations and ground movement (lateral spreading).

11.3. Incorrect attitude of FSO, e.g. damage, ballasting or loading error.

11.3.1. Possible load on mooring system leading to damage.

11.3.1.1. Damage stability analysis identified maximum heel and trim angles, in worst case loading and damaged conditions.

94. Confirm that mooring design can accommodate maximum angles from damage stability analysis, when available.

FSO CR




13.1. Surface runoff from FSO deck.

13.1.1. Minor contamination (e.g. maintenance fluids).

13.1.1.1. Maintenance procedures and local drip trays where required.




15.1. Venting from FSO tank PSVs or vent mast.

15.1.1. Release of flammable gas cloud.

15.1.1.1. Designed to release to safe location.

97. Consider requirement for dispersion modelling of FSO tank PSVs to ensure release to safe location.

PMC AR

15.1.1.2. Hazardous area zoning of FSO.



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Node: 10. LNG Offloading



External Fire 1.1. Fire on LNGC.

1.1.1. Risk of escalation to the FSO.

1.1.1.1. Quick release mooring system.

1.1.1.2. Breakaway couplings.

1.1.1.3. Tugs available continuously during loading operation with fire fighting capability and LNG carrier has wires readily available for tugs.

1.1.1.4. Electrical supply to LNGC has staged shutdown and breakaway built in.

1.1.1.5. Emergency procedures to be developed as part of TERMPOL.


External Explosion 3.1. No new scenarios identified.


Loss of Containment 5.1. Loading arm failure.

5.1.1. Release of LNG between FSO and the LNGC. Risk of cryogenic damage to both hulls. Formation of gas cloud and risk of fire / explosion.

5.1.1.1. Gas detection in the area.

5.1.1.2. Loading operation is permanently supervised, operator has ESD function.

5.1.1.3. Water curtain to protect both hulls.

5.1.1.4. Spill protection at both manifolds and joints.

5.2. Excess vessel movement.

5.2.1. Exceeding motion limits of arms leading to loss of containment.

5.2.1.1. Motion monitoring with alarms and shutdown on arm positional envelope.



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5.2.1.2. Mooring load monitoring system with alarm.

5.2.1.3. Operating procedure to restrict weather conditions.

5.2.1.4. Breakaway coupling with mechanical isolation at both sides in the event of uncontrolled breakaway.

5.2.2. Possible loss of electrical supply leading to LNGC blackout.

5.2.2.1. Electrical supply to LNGC has staged shutdown and breakaway built in.

Cryogenic Hazard 6.1. No new scenarios identified.


7.1. Collision during berthing.

7.1.1. Damage to FSO LNGC and mooring.

7.1.1.1. Mooring design and fendering system.

7.1.1.2. Marine operation procedures to be confirmed by TERMPOL.

7.2. Mechanical handling - transport between FSO and LNGC.

7.2.1. Risk of damage to process lines leading to loss of containment.



FSO AR






HAZARD from OSBL



12.1. Venting from LNGC (e.g. gassing up or maloperation)

12.1.1. Discharge from the LNGC to the environment of inert gas and some hydrocarbon.

12.1.1.1. LNGC gassing up procedures and safe vent location.

96. Consider if gassing up of LNGCs should be considered as an operation for the site, including the discharge that this involves.

PMT AR



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12.1.2. Flammable gas release from the LNGC, potentially affecting the FSO.

12.1.2.1. Cargo area of FSO is a hazardous zone and is a freely vented open area.

12.1.2.2. Vent location on LNGCs to disperse gas as far as practicable.









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Appendix B

HAZID Recommendations



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Recommendations Place(s) Used Responsibility Category

1. Ensure that Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) philosophies for all areas are compatible, as these form part of a single plant SIS.


Consequences: 1.2.1.1 PMC CR

2. Conduct AFP and PFP study to identify the benefits and hazards of deluge in each area.


Consequences: 1.5.1.1 PMC - Linde AR

3. Ensure that BC Work Safe BC OHS regulations are complied with in &AA S-PC 1031 - Working Environment Philosophy.


Consequences: 1.8.1.1 PMC - Linde CR

4. Consider operation for scenario where site access is not available (due to weather conditions, boat failure, etc.) Ensure that safe operation can be maintained, with personnel on site.


Consequences: 1.11.1.1 PMT AR

5. Confirm that the helipad locations are suitable and meet regulations.


Consequences: 1.11.2.1 BOP CR

6. Check if hot oil is always below its flash point, and therefore is non-hazardous in case of leak. If not practicable, review area classification for hot oil system area.



7. Review the open drains from the amine area, consider means to prevent amine spills contaminating the general water treatment system.


Consequences: 2.5.2.1 PMC - BOP AR



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8. Check if credible leak from stripping column overhead system discharge could lead to a health hazard, if so consider detection requirements.





Consequences: 2.8.5.1, 3.8.5.1, 4.8.5.1, 5.8.5.1

PMC AR



Consequences: 3.1.3.4, 4.1.3.4, 5.1.3.4

PMC AR



Consequences: 3.3.1.1, 4.3.1.1, 5.3.1.1

PMC - Linde CR



Consequences: 3.8.6.1, 4.8.6.1, 5.8.6.1

PMC AR

13. Ensure that effluent drainage and treatment is designed for the possibility of hydrocarbon condensate leakage (low flashpoint hydrocarbon) from any condensate handling areas in the LNG train.


Consequences: 4.1.4.1 AMEC AR

14. Confirm isolations on LNG transfer lines to limit LNG spill in the case of leakage, particularly for flexible joints at the moorings.





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15. Review potential for transformer failure leading to a hazard to the process plant. If required, consider additional safeguards.


Consequences: 6.1.2.2 PMC AR

16. Route hot oil and tempered water expansion vapour vent and PSVs to flare system (LP warm flare), to avoid hydrocarbon release to atmosphere.




Consequences: 7.1.1.1, 7.1.3.1, 7.1.5.1

PMC - BOP CR

18. Review segregation distance between condensate tank and LNG area. Confirm that code requirements are met.


19. Consider safeguards against external forest fire (e.g. fire break at plant boundary and/or perimeter boundary and vegetation control around plant area).


20. Select equipment for piperack area as minimum of Zone 2, or equivalent.

Consequences: 7.1.7.1 PMC - BOP CR

21. Develop standards for external vehicles (e.g. condensate trucks) within the safety management plan.

Consequences: 7.1.8.1 PMT - BOP CR

22. Review hazards from stored chemicals in the case of fire, and include mitigation requirements in the building basis of design.


23. Review hazards from fire in BOP systems and buildings adjacent to the rundown piperack and provide separation where required.


24. Review common cause loss of normal and emergency power, particularly to process plant, and the required system integrity.


25. Review the protection of flare headers and support structures against process area fire, to ensure blowdown duration is protected.


26. Review the protection of flare headers and support structures from FSO against process area fire. Ensure that safe venting is available in the case of impairment of the flare system.


27. Review the implications of damage to the flare system in the event of a vapour cloud explosion in the LNG area. Identify if a design accidental load for blast is required.

Consequences: 8.3.1.1 BOP AR



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28. Conduct unignited gas dispersion studies to confirm that emergency flare releases, without ignition, do not lead to an unsafe condition due to flammable gas cloud formation.

Consequences: 8.15.1.1 Solaris - Flare AR

29. Review the reliability of utility gas supply to pilots, and if a backup supply is required (e.g. from BOG or local bottle supply). Concern is that Fortis maintenance or defect may require isolation of utility gas.


30. Identify any chemicals handled in the BOP area which may pass through oily water separation. If any are identified, provide separate containment to prevent drainage into the surface water system.


31. Review the disposal of lab drains to ensure that they are correctly treated.


32. Review if flammable gas hazard from landfill is credible.




Consequences: 7.12.3.1, 7.12.3.2

BOP AR

34. Review the detection and isolation of leaks at the inlet startup heater area, which is upstream of the ESDV.


35. Review the hazard from pentane fuel in module 2, near the fired equipment.


36. Review the segregation of refrigerant storage and flare system from plant hazards.


37. Establish the means for refrigerant supply to site and filling of refrigerant makeup storage.


38. When refrigerant delivery method is defined (refer to recommendation 37), review the hazards and controls required.



Consequences: 2.12.2.1, 2.12.3.1

BOP CR

40. Conduct drainage philosophy review, to ensure that the safety and environmental hazards for hydrocarbon into the drain system are addressed.

It is noted that an LNG train philosophy is available from Linde, but has not been integrated into the plant water treatment philosophy.



Consequences: 3.1.3.5, 4.1.3.5, 5.1.3.5

BOP CR

42. Conduct transient analysis of flow in the rundown line from LNG train to FSO, including surge and other upset conditions.

Consequences: 5.8.7.1 PMT CR



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43. Confirm that fire and explosion protection of substation in the train area is adequate to mitigate against common cause loss of power and control to train and equipment.



Consequences: 9.1.2.4, 9.3.1.1

FSO AR

45. Review evacuation routes from all areas on the FSO.

Consequences: 9.1.2.4 FSO AR

46. Review access and mechanical handling for maintenance on transfer arm between jetty and FSO, as this may be conducted during operation with the spare arm in use.




FSO AR



Jetty AR

49. Review reliability and availability of hold space LNG secondary containment sump pumps, and if emergency power is required.


50. Identify if vacuum breakers on LNG tanks could be removed, as is current practice for Moss tanks, and develop vacuum protection design.


51. Review LNG tank protection against air ingress at HAZOP.


52. Check overpressure protection of the condensate tank. If routed into the LP flare system, this has a design pressure greater than the tank, but if routed to atmosphere, there may be a flammable hazard in the area of the train.

Consequences: 7.1.2.1 PMC - Interface AR

53. Review the hazard of N2 in utility building, and ensure that asphyxiation hazard is addressed.




BOP CR

55. Review requirement for enclosed buildings in the utility and cooling water areas. Eliminate, where possible, to minimise the potential for vapour clouds inside buildings.


56. Review the hazard from temporary substation as a source of ignition, or a fire hazard which might affect process equipment.


57. Ensure that oxygen-rich gas from N2 generation is dispersed safely.


58. Review scenario of prolonged loss of power if the interim substation transformer fails. In this case, the plant could require to be maintained in a safe condition without external power for a period of months. Consider if offloading remaining stored inventory is possible without external power.




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59. Review the alternative means of control and shutdown, in the event that the control room has to be evacuated due to internal hazard.


60. Confirm that physical protection is provided around process areas and structures (e.g. pipe and cable bridges), to protect against accidental impacts from vehicles and handling operations.


61. Consider if a buffer storage is required for off-spec produced water, to enable plant operation to continue in an upset case at the treatment plant.


62. Check the basis for the maximum rainfall event used in sizing the surface runoff retention pond.


63. Consider if discharge points for runoff to sea should be provided with valves to stop the runoff in the case of a spill, e.g. on a roadway.


64. Sample existing leachate to determine the contaminants that are present and ensure that treatment is adequate.


65. Review the expected material to be added to the landfill and predict the leachate composition and flow which must be treated. Design the leachate treatment appropriately.


66. Consider if hypochlorite injection pipework should be inside the sea water intake, so that leakage is not to the sea.


67. Confirm that consistent pressure and temperature safeguarding philosophies are developed for BOP, flare and FSO scopes, and cover interfaces with the LNG train.

Consequences: 1.1.1.1 PMC - Process CR

68. Confirm that consistent fire and explosion protection philosophies are developed for BOP, flare and FSO scopes, and cover interfaces with the LNG train.

Consequences: 1.3.1.1 PMC - Fire Protection CR

69. Confirm that consistent fire and gas detection philosophies are developed for BOP, flare and FSO scopes, and cover interfaces with the LNG train.

Consequences: 1.4.1.1 PMC - Fire Protection CR

70. Confirm that consistent PFP and AFP philosophies are developed for BOP, flare and FSO scopes, and cover interfaces with the LNG train.

Consequences: 1.5.1.1 PMC - HSE CR

71. Confirm that blowdown philosophy has been updated to the latest LNG train configuration, and blowdown study remains valid.


72. Confirm that consistent ESD and EDP philosophies are developed for BOP, flare and FSO scopes, and cover interfaces with the LNG train.

Consequences: 1.6.1.1 PMC - Process CR

73. Confirm that consistent working environment philosophies are developed for BOP, flare and FSO scopes, and cover interfaces with the LNG train.


74. Consider the philosophy for evacuation and mustering of whole site area, including remote locations such as metering station, flare area, fire water tank, etc.

Consequences: 1.8.1.2 PMC - HSE AR



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75. Confirm that noise control philosophies are developed for BOP, flare and FSO scopes, and cover interfaces with the LNG train and that this meets the requirements of the site noise limits.



Consequences: 1.12.1.1, 1.12.3.1

BOP CR

77. Develop wildlife management plan (including bear hazards).



Consequences: 1.12.3.1, 1.12.3.2

PMT CR

79. Confirm that structural/ marine/ civil design criteria are consistent with the basis of design requirements, for all areas of the site.

Consequences: 1.13.1.2 PMC - Structural CR

80. Review the consequences of failure of the Henriette dam, and identify any additional safeguards required.


81. Conduct additional study into the likelihood and consequences of marine landslip, and identify additional design protection if practicable.


82. Ensure that civil design includes requirements to control dust from external areas.

Consequences: 1.19.1.1 PMC - Civil CR

83. Ensure that operational management plan includes dust control measures.


84. Study potential flooding of Mill creek and confirm that flood protection measures are appropriate for the hazard.


85. Review if raw water supply from Mill creek is sufficiently reliable to avoid operational upsets in the event of drought, considering the buffer volume available in the raw water tank.


86. Confirm that requirements for the EIA are incorporated in the basis of design. Note this applies to all environmental issues, not just lighting.


87. Ensure the operations philosophy complies with the requirements of the EA, for the handling of hazardous materials.


88. Review the risk of cryogenic damage to structures on the FSO from header leaks, and identify if any additional cryogenic protection is required.


89. Review the possibility of LNG leak on the rundown line. If credible leak sources are identified, provide LNG leak containment.




BOP CR

91. Review hazards from existing CO2 fire fighting system. Consider upgrading to modern standards.




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92. Review the potential for roll over in the FSO tank, considering the feed composition. If required, confirm that roll over is within the sizing basis for FSO tank PSVs.

Consequences: 9.6.1.1 FSO CR

93. Consider the margin available above the design storm event and confirm that break away will not occur due to small exceedance.


94. Confirm that mooring design can accommodate maximum angles from damage stability analysis, when available.

Consequences: 9.11.3.1 FSO CR


Consequences: 9.7.2.1, 10.7.2.1

FSO AR

96. Consider if gassing up of LNGCs should be considered as an operation for the site, including the discharge that this involves.


97. Consider requirement for dispersion modelling of FSO tank PSVs to ensure release to safe location.


98. Conduct avalanche hazard assessment, as required by Worksafe BC, and comply with requirements.


project safety studies

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