pritchard epistemological contextualism; problems and prospects

8/12/2019 Pritchard Epistemological Contextualism; Problems and Prospects

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Scots Philosophical AssociationUniversity of St Andrews

Epistemological Contextualism: Problems and ProspectsAuthor(s): Michael Brady and Duncan Pritchard

Source:The Philosophical Quarterly,

Vol. 55, No. 219 (Apr., 2005), pp. 161-171Published by: Oxford University Presson behalf of the Scots Philosophical Associationand theUniversity of St. AndrewsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3542886.

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The hilosophicaluarterly,ol.5,No. 19ISSN o3-8o94 April005

EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONTEXTUALISM:PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTSBY MICHAEL BRADY AND DUNCAN PRITCHARD

Epistemologicalontextualismas becomene fthemostmportantndwidelyiscussedewproposalsn hetheoryf nowledge.his pecialssue ontributeso he ebatey ringingogethersomef hemainarticipantso rovidestate-of-the-artiscussionf heroposal.erewe fferbriefverviewf he ontextualistosition,escribeomef hemaininesf riticismhat ave eenlevelledgainsthe iew,nd resentsummaryf achf he ontributionso hisollection.

I. EPISTEMOLOGICAL ATTRIBUTOR CONTEXTUALISM:THE FIRST WAVEOne ofthe most mportantmovementsn contemporarypistemologyasbeen thatofepistemologicalttributorontextualism.ike all contextualistthesesn epistemology,hisviewholdsthat heepistemictatus f a belieftypically,hether hetarget elief s an instance fknowledge candependin a non-trivial ay upon contextual actors.More specifically,ttributorcontextualismhenceforthust contextualism')sprimarily linguistichesis,inthat t holdsthatknows' s a context-sensitiveermn thefollowingense:assertions f sentences nvolving his term will varyin theirtruth-valuedependinguponthe context f he erson akinghe ssertion.his iswhytheview sknown s attributorontextualism,norder oemphasize he fact hatit is the context f theperson making he assertion hat s important oepistemic tatus, ather han,where his s different,he context f thesub-ject who is beingascribedknowledge.For simplicity, e here focus onattributorontextualismbout knows'rather hanon related ontextualistthesesregarding therepistemic erms, uch as 'justified' r 'warranted'.)Accordingly,wopeople could bothsimultaneouslyssert hat, ay, JohnknowsthatParis is thecapitalofFrance',and be in agreement n everyrelevant pistemologicalact aboutJohn,and yetone could be speakingtruly nd the otherfalsely ecause their espectivessertions re made inC The Editors f The hilosophicaluarterly,oo5.PublishedyBlackwellublishing,6oo Garsingtonoad,Oxford x4 2%, UK,and350MainStreet, alden,MA02148,USA.

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162 MICHAELBRADYANDDUNCAN RITCHARDdifferentontexts hereknows' sgoverned ydifferenttandards,nd thuswhere hepropositionssertedneach case isdifferent.'The historical asis for ontextualismf thisvariety an be found n thewritingsf a number fphilosophers,uch as Austin nd Wittgenstein.2twas not, however, ntilDavid Lewis' workon how to keepthe score n alanguagegamethatwe have thebeginningsf thefirst eal accountofwhata context-sensitiveccountof knows'might ook likeand how it can beapplied to some of theperennialproblems fepistemology.3ewis'workgave impetus o a number fphilosopherst thevanguard f the first aveof attributorontextualism,groupwhich ncluded s central igures eithDeRose and Stewart ohen; and Lewis himself lso returned o thefray ospellout the detailsofhisparticular ariant n this hesis.4 lthoughhereare importantdifferencesetween the positionsadvocated by Lewis,DeRose and Cohen,what s common otheseviews s thegeneral dea thatthecontextualisthesis resents s with he bestwayofaccommodatinghelinguistic ata regarding ur use ofepistemic erms,while also offeringneat and compellingesolutiono various pistemologicalroblems,uchastheproblem fradical cepticism.It isworthooking t this ast claim nmoredetail, incemuch of the at-traction fthe contextualistiew has tendedto lie in itsresponse o thesceptic.Considerthefollowingceptical rgument, here e' is somepara-digm everyday' ropositionwhich we would all take ourselves o know(suchas thatone ispresentlyeated), nd 'sh' s a scepticalhypothesissuchas the brain na vat'hypothesis)hich s nconsistentith :SI. I don'tknow hatnot-shS2. If don'tknow hatnot-sh,hen don'tknowSC. I don'tknow .

1 See S. Cohen, Contextualism nd Skepticism', hilosophicalssues,Io (2000), pp. 94-107,atp. 94,for neatpresentationfthis oint.2 See J.L. Austin,OtherMinds',ProceedingsftheAristotelianSociety,upp. Vol. 20 (1946),pp. 148-87;L. Wittgenstein,nCertainty,d. G.E.M. Anscombe nd G.H. vonWrightOx-ford:Blackwell, 969).Variants n thecontextualisthesis an also be found sometimesn usta suggestiveorm)nthefollowingexts:A. Goldman, Discriminationnd PerceptualKnow-ledge', Journalof Philosophy,3 (1976), pp. 771-91; G.C. Stine, 'Skepticism,RelevantAlternatives,nd DeductiveClosure',Philosophicaltudies,9 (1976),pp. 249-61; D.B. Annis,'A Contextualistheory ofJustification',mericanhilosophicaluarterly,5 1978),pp. 213-19;F. Dretske, The PragmaticDimension of Knowledge', Philosophicaltudies, 0 (1981),pp. 363-78; M. Williams,Unnaturaloubts: pistemologicalealism ndtheBasis ofScepticism(Oxford:Blackwell,991).3 See D. Lewis, Scorekeepingn a LanguageGame',Journal fPhilosophicalogic, (i979),PP. 339-59.4 See K. DeRose, 'Solving heSkeptical roblem', hilosophicaleview,1041995), P 1-52;Cohen, 'Contextualism nd Skepticism'; ewis, ElusiveKnowledge',Australasianournal fPhilosophy,4 1996),pp. 549-67.? The Editors f The hilosophicaluarterty,005



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EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONTEXTUALISM: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 163Famously, ome haveresponded o this rgumentither y simply enying(SI) or by denyingS2) via a rejection f theprinciple hatknowledgesclosed under knownentailmentthe 'closure' principle)on which (S2)appearsto depend very oughly,losureholds that f one knowsone pro-position, uch as e, and one knows hat thisentails secondproposition,such as not-sh,hen one also knows the secondproposition,n thiscasenot-sh).5eithermanoeuvresparticularlyompelling, owever, inceboth(Si) and the closureprinciple re highlyntuitive. ccordingly, ejectingthesepremiseseemstantamount olarge-scale pistemologicalevisionism.This is whatmakes he alternativeiagnosis fthesceptical roblem fferedbycontextualismo attractive,ince tholdsout thepromise fresolvinghisdifficultyithout aving oengage nrevisionismfthis ort.According o contextualism, hat is happeninghere is a shift n thecontextwhichbrings bout a shiftn theepistemictandards emandedofan agentbefore hatagentcan be truly aid to have knowledge.n parti-cular,the dea is that n quotidian ontexts heepistemictandardswill below,therebynsuringhat ssertionsfascriptionentencesi.e.,sentenceswhich scribeknowledgeo an agent)will endtobe true.This accounts orwhywe find SC) so counter-intuitive,incenormallyhe assertion f anascriptionentenceregardingn e-type ropositionwilltend to expresstruth.Moreover,since closure holds, it followsthat our possessionofknowledge fe-type ropositionselative o theepistemictandardsnplayin quotidian ontextswill be accompanied providedwe knowthe relevantentailment t least)by knowledge f the denials of scepticalhypotheses,contraSI).In contrast,n more demandingcontexts, uch as contextsn whichthescepticalproblem s at issue,theepistemic tandardswillrise, o thatassertions f ascription entenceswill now no longertend to be true.Accordingly,t willnow be true osaythatwe lackknowledgef the denialsof scepticalhypothesis, hich s the intuition rivingSi), and relative othese tandards n assertion fthe ceptical onclusion,SC),will ikewise etrue lso, so there s no tensionwith losurehere either. he contextualisttherefore as a powerful iagnosis f theproblem fscepticism one thataccommodatesboth sceptical nd anti-scepticalntuitions hileretainingthehighlyntuitivelosure rinciple orknowledge.

5 The first actic fsimply enyingSI) is often alled the Moorean' anti-scepticaltrategy,since it shares certainfeatureswiththeresponse o scepticism ffered y G.E. Moore. SeeMoore, 'A Defence of Common Sense', Contemporaryritishhilosophy2nd series), d. J.H.Muirhead London:Allen ndUnwin,1925), nd Proof f n ExternalWorld',Proceedingsf heBritishcademy,5 (1939),Pp. 273-300.For the maindiscussions fthe second tactic fdeny-ing theclosureprinciple, ee Dretske,EpistemicOperators',Journal fPhilosophy,7 (1970),pp. 1007-23;R. Nozick,PhilosophicalxplanationsOxfordUP, 1981).C TheEditorsf The hilosophicaluarterly,005



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164 MICHAEL BRADY AND DUNCAN PRITCHARDIn general, he contextualisttrategyas been to use this hesis boutthecontext-sensitivityf knows' to capturethe intuitions e have regardingthevarying onditions nderwhichwe deem it appropriate o ascribe ordeny)knowledge.t seems, or xample, hatwhere here s a lotat stake nan ascription,he standards hatthesubjectneedsto meet n orderto betruly scribedknowledge iseaccordingly,nd contextualisms clearly na strong osition o accommodate his ntuition.Moreover, ytaking eri-ously heapparent ontext-sensitivityfepistemicerms,ontextualistsavearguedthatthisview can be employed o castlight n a number fothercentral ssues n epistemologysidefrom hesceptical roblem, uchas, forexample, he ottery uzzle. t isthus ittlewonder hat ontextualismasso

quicklybecome one of the most discussedpositions n contemporaryepistemology,fnot nphilosophys a whole.II. REACTIONS AND REFINEMENTS

Inevitably,his irst aveofwork n contextualism asfollowed ythefirstwave ofcritique. lthoughhis snot at all an exhaustiveist, ne canregardthefirst ave ofcriticisms focused n thefollowinghree ssues:I. The contextualistlaimthatwe are able toknow hedenialsofscepticalhypothesesnundemandingontexts2. The intellectualdequacyofthecontextualistesponse oscepticism3. The linguisticbasis for contextualism;n particular,whether thelinguisticdata' could not be better ccounted or ya non-contextualist(i.e., nvariantist)iew.

The first roblem oncerns he unusualstatus f our knowledge fthedenialsof scepticalhypothesesn thecontextualistiew. It is essential ocontextualismhatwe are able to possessthisknowledge, ince,shortofsurrenderingo scepticismt anyrate, heretention fclosurewilldemandit. The problem s that hisputative nowledge as an odd standingccord-ingto this heory,incealthought is possessed, ne can apparently evertruly ssert sentencewhich ascribes hisknowledge,ince n raising hesceptical ossibilityn thiswayone raisestheepistemictandards,herebymakingwhat is assertedfalse.At the very east, then, t seems to be aconsequenceofcontextualismhat pistemologists,hoare concernedwithproblemsike his s a matter fcourse, rerarelyble toknowverymuch.66 Atleast unlesswe can make senseof Lewis' suggestionhatwe are 'compartmentalized'thinkers,uch thatone 'compartment's able to know a greatdeal even while a second'compartment',hatwhich s concernedwiththescepticalproblem,knowsnextto nothing.See Lewis, ElusiveKnowledge'.? The Editorsf The hilosophicaluarterly,005



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EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONTEXTUALISM: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 165A relatedproblem s that fwe can make senseof the idea thatwe areable to know he denialsof ceptical ypotheses,hen t s far rom learwhywe would alsowantto endorse ontextualism.fterll,therejectionf SI)willby tselfsufficeo blockthesceptical rgument, egardlessfwhethert sallied to a contextualisthesis.Remember hat heproblemwith SI) wasn'tthat while we approximate o meeting he standardsnecessary orknow-ledge, n this ase we don'tquitemeet hem, utrather hat his sthe ort fproposition hat it is impossibleorcreatures ike us to know,whateverincrementalmprovementse mightmaketo ourepistemic ositions. husit is farfrom lear thatmerelyoweringheepistemictandards orknow-ledgewilldo thetrick. nd notethat f his oes do thetrick if heproblem

here s simplyhatwe don'tquitemeet ustere ceptical pistemictandards- then hisnvites hethoughthat erhaps hemoral o be drawn s not thatwe shouldregard knows'as a context-sensitiveerm, ut rather hatweshouldresisthemove to thesceptic's ustere pistemictandards nd insistinsteadon evaluating ssertions f ascription entences elative o morerelaxed uotidian pistemictandardsin every ontext).7Aswe ustnoted, hecontextualistreatmentfscepticismeemsto leavethecontextualistith muteresponse o thesceptic, ince thechallenge salways,by itsverynature,posed in a scepticalontextwhere assertions fascriptionentenceswill tendto be false.This sort fdifficultyor he viewhas ledmany oquestion he ntellectualdequacyofthe contextualistnti-sceptical hesis. ndeed,since thecontextualistllows that t is thescepticwho is workingwiththehigher pistemic tandards,t is easyto see whysome commentators ave claimed that the contextualistresolution' oscepticismeaves one with heuneasy eelinghat, trictlypeaking, e don'thaveknowledgefter ll, t's ustthat t's OK (though trictlypeaking alse)to saythatwe do whenwe are speakingoosely nquotidian onversationalcontexts.n short, heworry ere s thatcontextualismeemsto leave thedooropentoinfallibilismfthe sort efendednearlywork yPeterUnger,where knows',rather hanbeingtreated s a context-sensitiveerm,s infact reated s an absoluteerm uchthatno one,strictlypeaking,ver hasany knowledge, ince the standardsdemanded forknowledge ossession(infallibility)reso stronghatnoone can evermeet hem.8

7For more on thisproblem, ee D. Pritchard,Recent Work on Radical Skepticism',Americanhilosophicaluarterly,9 (2002),pp. 215-57, n ?6. CrispinWright lso explores hisproblem or hecontextualistreatmentfscepticismn hiscontributiono this olume.8 See P. Unger, A Defence ofSkepticism', hilosophicaleview,o (I97I), pp. 198-219, ndIgnoranceOxford:ClarendonPress,1975). n more recentworkUngerhas arguedfortheweakerthesis hat here s no wayofadjudicating etween contextualistccount of knows'which nables us to avoid scepticism,nd an infallibiliston-contextualistccountwhichdoesnot.Accordingly, e are in no better osition s regards hesceptical roblem, ince we stillhave no reasonnottobe sceptics. ee Unger,PhilosophicalelativityOxford:Blackwell, 984).C The Editors f The hilosophicaluarterly,005



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166 MICHAELBRADYANDDUNCAN RITCHARDA similar roblemnthis egardsthatwhile heearly ontextualistiewswerevery lear abouthowthe standards orknowledge ould be raisedsothat t wasno longer ossible o assert scriptionentencesruly,t wasn't tall clear whatwould be involvednloweringhestandardsgainafterwardsso that assertions f thesesame ascription entenceswould now expresstruths. his is the so-calledproblem f epistemic escent', nd it s crucialthat contextualistsave an account of such descent fthey re to explainhow thosewho have actively onsidered he scepticalproblem an, oncetheyengageonce more in normalquotidiancontexts, eturn o assertingascriptionentencesrulys they id before.9This last issue relatesto the third ypeof problem nitially aised for

contextualists,hich oncerns he inguisticasisoftheview.The challengehere s tospecifyusthow conversationalactors an alter heepistemictan-dards nplay, nd do so in a waythatdoesnot offendgainst he inguisticdata. For example, n the case ofepistemic escentustdescribed,t seemsthatwhatthe contextualistredictsn terms f inguisticehaviour swill-ingness n thepartof theagent i)to assert he relevantscriptionentencein a quotidianconversationalontext; ii) to assert the negationof thisascriptionentence nce theagentmoves nto thesceptical onversationalcontexti.e., to say thatthetarget ubjectdoesn'tave theknowledge hatwas previouslyscribed oher);and (iii)togo backto assertingheoriginalascriptionentencewhenthequotidian onversationalontext eturns. nthefaceof t,however,his redictions notborneoutbythe inguisticata.In general,we would nottreat omeone s a good asserter'f he alteredherassertionsmerelyn the ight fconversationalactorsnthisway.'0More generally, furtherine ofcritique n thisregardhas concernedwhether he apparent context-sensitivityf 'knows' could not be simplyaccommodatedwithin Griceanpicture.On thisview,certain ssertionsbecome unassertable s the conversational ontext hanges perhapsbe-cause,for xample, he new conversationalontextmeans that heassertionnow carriesdifferentonversationalmplicatures,nes which are nowmostly alse eventhough hey o not shiftn their ruth-value.t couldbe,for xample, hat t s conversationallynappropriateo saythatone knowsthat ne is notthevictim fa sceptical ypothesis,venthough his s infacttrue, ecause ofwhat his ssertion ould mply. I

9For a developmentf this ine ofcritique,ee Pritchard,Contextualism,kepticism,ndtheProblem fEpistemic escent',Dialectica,5 2oo0), pp. 327-49.10For more on this point,see Pritchard, Contextualism, kepticism nd WarrantedAssertabilityanoeuvres',nJ.Keim-Campbell,M. O'Rourke and H. Silversteineds),Know-ledgend kepticismMIT Press, orthcoming).For thefirstustained evelopmentf this ort fobjection, ee P. Rysiew,The Context-SensitivityfKnowledgeAttributions',Noas, 5 (200oo),p. 477-514.C TheEditors f The hilosophicaluarterly,005



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EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONTEXTUALISM: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 167Relatedly, ontextualismas come underpressure rom n alternativeaccount,known as 'subject-sensitivenvariantism'SSI), whichhas beenproposedbyJohnHawthorne ndJasonStanley.'2Whereascontextualismholds that it is the contextof the personmakingthe assertion hat isimportanto the truth-valuefa knowledge scription,SI deniesthis ndmaintains nstead thatepistemic tatusdepends upon the context f thesubject. n particular,SI holdsthat t s the salienceof error ossibilitiesotheubjecthatdetermines hether rnot he knows omeproposition,atherthanthesalience f suchpossibilitieso theascriber.n thisway,proponentsof SSI reinterprethephenomenon fcontext-sensitivityo as to avoid acontextualistonclusion.Moreover,supporters f SSI maintainthat the

evidence rom rdinaryanguageno more upports contextualistonstrualof such sensitivityhan it supports subject-sensitivenvariantisteading.Contextualists hus owe us an explanationas to why we should becontextualistsather han nvariantistsfthis ort.III. CONTEXTUALISM AND ANTI-CONTEXTUALISM:THE NEW WAVE

The recentwork on contextualism as seen contextualistsefine nd de-veloptheir iew nresponse oobjections fthis ort, nd has also seen thoseunsympathetico contextualism eveloptheircritiques s a result.Thisspecial issuerepresents broad cross-section f this new wave of debateabout contextualism.The first wo papersfocuson the critiqueof contextualismaisedbyHawthorne nd Stanley, nd hence on the relativemerits f contextualismversusSI. In the first fthesepapers, The OrdinaryLanguageBasis forContextualism,nd the New Invariantism', eith DeRose arguesthatthelinguistic ata support ontextualism ver this rivalapproach.DeRose isconcerned o set the contextualistroject quarelywithin he tradition f'ordinaryanguage'philosophy,s exemplifiedn the workofAustin, ndargues that the best groundsfor contextualismoncerningknowledgeattributionsomefrom owknowledge-attributingandknowledge-denying)sentences reused nordinary on-philosophicalalk. DeRose thinkst besttoputthesceptical roblem oone side, argely ecause it s not clearwhatto make of disagreementsn the scepticalcase, but also because it isimportant hat contextualism an be motivated on groundsthat areindependent f thisproblem.) Buildingon his earlierwork,but going

12See especially, .Hawthorne, nowledgendLotteriesOxfordUP, 2004);J.Stanley,On theLinguistic asis forContextualism',hilosophicaltudies,19 2004),pp. 1I9-46.C The Editors fThe hilosophicaluarterly,005



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168 MICHAEL BRADY AND DUNCAN PRITCHARDbeyondit in key respects, eRose identifies ariousaspectsof ordinarylanguage use and explains why theyprovide such strong upportforcontextualism.

He then urns isattention o the rival SI account, nd thesupport hispositionsthoughtoreceive rom ertainudgements rdinarypeakersreallegedly nclinedto make about how the contents f variousassertionsrelateto one another.DeRose arguesthatthe inguisticata do not eavethetworivalpositionsn an impasse,s Hawthorne nd Stanley laim,but nfact rovidemuchgreaterupport or ontextualism.In 'Knowledge, Speaker and Subject', Stewart Cohen also defendscontextualismgainstSSI. Cohen beginsby discussing ow contextualismattemptso resolve helottery aradox,and thengoes on to consider nobjection ocontextualism,ue toHawthornend Stanley,othe effecthatit cannot account for how 'knows' functionsn propositional-attitudereports. ohen arguesthaton closeranalysis hisobjectiondoes not holdwater, nd after omparing ontextualism ith Hawthorne nd Stanley'salternative roposalforresolvinghe lottery aradox,concludesthat thelatter alls hort fproviding satisfactoryesolution. ohen thus oncludesthatcontextualismas significantdvantagesover SSI when it comes toaccommodatingurepistemicntuitions.The thirdpaper in this collection lso focuseson the debatebetweencontextualistsnd invariantists,ut seeks to defend nsensitivenvariantismagainstbothcontextualismnd SSI. In 'Contextualism,ubject-SensitiveInvariantismnd KnowledgeofKnowledge',TimothyWilliamson rguesthat nsensitivenvariantismas theexplanatoryesources o accommodatethe standardcases used to supportboth contextualism nd SSI, andconcludes hat heusual motivationfferedor hese heoriessundermined.Williamson eginsbyarguing hat lthough ontextualismnd SSI relyupon a principle f charityn their nterpretationf assertionsnvolvingepistemic erms, eitherpproachsatisfieshisprinciple ully,nwhich aseinsensitivenvariantismhouldnot be dismissedas it usually s) on thegroundsthat it alone violatessuch a principle.Since all theoriesarecommitted o the view that speakersmake systematicrrors n usingepistemic erms,hechoice between hetheoriesmight eemnow torest nhowwellthey an explain ucherrors.Williamson roceeds o sketch owinsensitivenvariantisman explainthe illusion f gnorance' urroundingourdenials fknowledgenhigh tandards ontexts yappealing opsycho-logical bias caused by salience effects.One possibility s that thepsychological alienceof highpracticalcosts or vividsceptical cenariosfocuses ur attentionn certain rror ossibilitiesn such a wayas to giveriseto psychological ias effects.Williamson rguesthat a moreplausible? TheEditors fThe hilosophicalarterly,oo5



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EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONTEXTUALISM: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 169proposal emerges once we focus on the propriety f employingourknowledgenpractical easoning. n the faceof t,this hift ffocuswouldseem to favour ontextualismnd SSI, sincewhile t is appropriate rompractical tandpointorely n one'sknowledgenlow standards ontexts,tbecomes too risky o relyon the same propositions hen the stakes reraised and standardsbecome high.Williamson rgues,however, hat apropositionanbe an appropriateremise ouseinpractical easoningventhoughone is not in a positionto knowthat it is appropriate,nd somaintainsthat one can therefore now somethingwithoutbeing in aposition o knowthatone knows t.On Williamson's iew,thisfact an beused to explainwhywe are mistakenlyempted o deny ascriptions fknowledgenhigh tandards ontexts.In 'Contextualism nd Scepticism: ven-handedness,activitynd Sur-reptitiously aisingStandards',Crispin Wright ffers wokeystrands fcriticismgainst ontextualistesponses o scepticism.he firstrguesthatthe factivityfknowledge nsuresthat contextualisms unable to main-tain the even-handed reatment f scepticismnd anti-scepticismhat tpresents tself s offering. hat is, Wrightmaintainsthat contextualistresponses o scepticismre appealing, t least npart,becausethey eem toallow us to be sympathetico bothsides of the traditionalcepticism/anti-scepticismebate, nd torecover ome truthntheassertionsmadebybothparties.Wright rgues,however, hatthis s illusory,ince closerexamina-tionoftherole offactivityorknowledgendicates hat hecontextualists nfactunable to maintain ny such dialecticaldistance nd thusmust takesides nthis ebateafter ll.The second strandof criticism hatWrightevelsagainstcontextualistresponses o scepticisms that hey re unable torespond dequately othemain sceptical rguments. his is because the contextualistiagnosisofthesceptical hreat reats hat hreat s arising ut ofa raisingftherelevantepistemic tandards, nd yet,argues Wright,manyof the key scepticalarguments o not trade on a raisingof the epistemic tandards t all.Accordingly,ontextualisms impotentt dealingwith ceptical rgumentsofthis ort.The fifthaper in this pecial ssue,JessicaBrown's Adaptor Die: theDeath of nvariantism?',ocuses n another ssueofcontextualism,amely,thequestionofwhether hecontext-sensitivityf knows'can be straight-forwardlyccommodatedwithin Griceanpicture, s a numberof com-mentatorsaveclaimed.'3DeRose has argued gainst hisviewbyclaimingthatthere s no wayofexplainingwaytheapparent ontext-sensitivityn

'3 Seeespeciallyysiew,TheContext-SensitivityfKnowledgettributions'.? The Editors f The hilosophicaluarterly,005



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I70 MICHAEL BRADY AND DUNCAN PRITCHARDourusageofepistemic erms ysolely ppealing o thecontext-sensitivityftheassertability-conditionsfsentenceshat mploy hose erms.14t is thisDeRosean thesis hatBrown akes ssuewith.

Brownbegins by notingthat the classic argument or contextualismexploitshefact hat t can seem ntuitivelyorrect o ascribeknowledgeoasubject n one context, utnot n another, venthough he is in the sameepistemic osition n both contexts.n response,however, n invariantistmay exploit warranted ssertability anoeuvreor WAM) according owhichtheproblematicntuitionseflectmerechanges n the conversationalpropriety f the relevant ssertions, ather than changes in the truth-conditionsfthe sentences sserted. rown henfocuses n DeRose's attackon thepossibilityf an invariantist AM, notingfirst hat hisargumentdirectly ffects nly classical invariantism,nd not the more recentlydevelopedviewof SSI. Brownproceedsto considerDeRose's use of theknowledge ccountofassertion,s popularizedbyWilliamson,nd claims(withWilliamson n mind)that there s an important quivocationhereregardinghenotionof warrant'nplaywhen one talks bout warranted'assertions.With these considerations utlined,Brown offers classicalinvariantistheory f howonemight nderstandhe relevantinguisticatathatworkswithin nyreasonableconstraints e might lace on a WAM.On thebasisof the inguisticata alone, then, he stateofplayas regardscontextualismnd invariantisms Brown ees t sone of mpasseather hanthedefaultupport or ontextualismhatDeRose claims.In the final ull-lengthaper n this ssue,A Sense ofOccasion',CharlesTravis draws connectionsbetweenepistemologicalontextualism nd adifferent,lthough elated, ositionn thephilosophyf anguage.He seeksto explaina view ofknowledgewhichemerges ut of thewritingsftheBritishhilosopherJohnook Wilson nd featuresrominentlyntheworkof Austin ndJohnMcDowell. TravisbeginswithCook Wilson'sconcep-tionofknowledge, hich reatst as having wocentral eatures:i) t s irre-ducible' inparticular,t s nota species f, nddoes not nvolve, elief); nd(ii) t s unmistakable'if ne knows ,then isunmistakablyo for ne).According o Austin, rguesTravis,we need to appeal to a speaker'scircumstancesnorder o fix standard ftruthor he peaker's tterances.As Travisputs t,whatone doessay .. insaying hingso be suchand sucha way willdepend upon the circumstancesn which one says it'. Travispointsout that similar hings an be said for suchnotions s 'evidence','whatmightbe', and, importantlyn Cook Wilson'spicture, or factive

14See DeRose, 'Contextualism:n Explanation ndDefense', nJ.Greco and E. Sosa (eds),EpistemologyOxford:Blackwell, 999),pp. 187-205, nd 'Knowledge,Assertion,nd Context',Philosophicaleview, 11 (2002), pp. 167-203.? TheEditorsfThe hiosophicaluarterly,005



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EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONTEXTUALISM: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 171meaning'.Giventhis, nowledgeoo willbe occasion-sensitiven thisway, ndTravisgoes on to explainhow this s relevant o externalistnd contemp-orary ontextualisthought.n the final ectionTravisexplainshowJohnMcDowell incorporates ook Wilson's core conception fknowledge, utwithout cceptingAustin's ccountof theoccasion-sensitivityfepistemicnotions.Travisarguesthat this s a mistake n McDowell's part,sinceitleads to a tensionwhichMcDowellcannotresolve.Occasion-sensitivityhusappearsobligatory.The issuecloseswithdiscussionsffour fthearticles.n 'Contextualism,Hawthorne's nvariantism nd Third-Person ases', AnthonyBruecknercasts criticalyeoverDeRose's contributiono this ssue. n particular,efocuses n DeRose's treatmentfknowledge-attributingentencesn third-person ases and maintains hat here re some mportantriticalacunaenDeRose's arguments.In her discussionof Williamson's rticle,Williamsonon Luminosityand Contextualism', rown claims that Williamson's ppeal to the non-luminosityfknowledge being uchthat ne can know proposition ith-outknowinghatone knows t- isunnecessary,incethecritiqueWilliam-son offers fcontextualismn terms fpsychological ias would sufficeyitself.Moreover, rguesBrown, his ccountof howpsychologicalias canaffect ur knowledge ttributionslso offers he bestaccountofwhythecases thatcontextualistsften ppeal to are characterized y a failure fluminosity.Tim Black's discussionpiece, 'Classic Invariantism, elevance andWarranted ssertabilityanoeuvres',ffers critique fBrown's ull-lengtharticle,ndalongthewayalsocriticizesn earlier rticle yDeRose. Brownoffers broadlyGricean ccountof how one could accountfor he pparentcontext-sensitivityn our epistemic erms y appealingonlyto theshiftingpropriety-conditionsorknowledge laims.This accountmakes use of theruleofrelevance,nd it s this eature fBrown's hesis hatBlack takes ssuewithhere, rguing hat, mongst ther hings,he correctGriceanaccountofthe pparent ontext-sensitivityfourepistemicermsieselsewhere.Finally,n 'Travis' Sense ofOccasion',Alan Millaroffers critical is-cussionofTravis'paper. In particular,Millar raises some issuesregardingexactlyhow Travis' view is to be understood,nd queriesthe extent owhichTraviscan employ onsiderationsegarding ccasion-sensitivityore-solve heepistemologicalroblems e isconcernedwith.Universityf tirling

? The Editors of ThePhilosophical uarter~l, 00oo5

pritchard epistemological contextualism; problems and prospects

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