preventing and combating illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material

JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06

Preventing and combating illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material

Klaus Lützenkirchen Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU), Joint Research Centre,

European CommissionKarlsruhe, Germany

JRC Information Day and S&T WorkshopsBucharest – 11 May 2006


• Traditional Safeguards and Physical Protection fail(operator accountancy versus verification)

• Illicit trafficking of nuclear material

• Seizure (border control, intelligence services)

• Nuclear Forensic analysis

Illicit Trafficking and Nuclear Forensics


Threat by nuclear terrorism:• Theft of nuclear material to produce a nuclear explosive device• Theft of radioactive material ( Dirty Bomb)

Fight against Illicit Trafficking

UO2 Fuel

• stolen in Lithuania,• seized in Poland,• produced in Russia,• analysed at JRC-ITU

(Source IAEA)


– Training sessions for law enforcement services and laboratory experts jointly with IAEA (2002, …): New EU and CC, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova,…

– Model Action Plan: RITNUM Handbook national Response to Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Material (developed jointly with ITWG)

– Delivery of portable equipment for categorisation of material

– Demonstration exercises inside countries and at borders : 07/2002 Bucharest, 10/2002 BG/TR, 09/2004 PL/BY, ….

Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Material

Projects with Romania


target fieldSPEC

Exploranium: GR-135

XRF: ICS-4000

SAIC: RADSMART

Handheld Gamma Spectrometers

NaI

CdTe

Illicit trafficking and radiation detection

(Support to IAEA)


Demonstration Exercise

Romania

18 July, 2002


National Exercise on Combating Nuclear Terrorism

Braşov County, Romania,10 May 2006Interception of illegal transport


Joint Demonstration ExerciseBorder Bulgaria/Turkey - Kapikule, Oct. 2002


Future EU border: Romania with Ukraine and Moldova

• Joint border exercises

• TACIS projects with Ukraine and Moldova


– training of personnel

– installation of hand-held and mobile equipment

– Improvement of scientific/technical infrastructure

– implementation of the RITNUM handbook and creation of a Model Action Plan

– demonstration exercises

– workshop to strengthen regional co-operation and co-ordination

– Joint Analysis Agreement to analyze seized material

Multicountry Project

COOPERATIONthat counts

Republic of Azerbaijan

Republic of GeorgiaRussian Federation

Ukraine

Republic of Moldova Republic of Kazakhstan

The TACIS Multicountry Project to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material

Estimated duration: 60 months

Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent

States


What is Nuclear Forensics ?

Information on the nature of the seized material, its intended use and its origin

Fingerprint ?Characteristic properties (isotopic composition, trace elements, macro- and microscopic structure)

Origin, legal owner, intended use, …

Examples


?Nuclear Forensics


Nuclear Forensics

Origin and intended use ?

First observations/conclusions:

• geometry 5 x 5 x 5 cm, unconventional application/reactor

• elemental composition pure U metal

• isotopic composition natural U D2O or graphite moderated reactor

• main impurities Al, Ca, Fe, Mg, Mn, Na, Pb, Si (200 mg material)


1. Origin

• Nuclear Materials Database

nuclear fuel data from western and Russian suppliers (UO2, MOX) (based on World Nuclear Industry Handbook and bilateral contracts, various degrees of access)

• Electronic literature archive on non- conventional fuels (Russian sources)

• Open literature

Nuclear Forensics

Geometry points at German origin


2. Age determination

• spiking with 228Th (or 233Pa)

• chemical separation

• measurement: alpha spectrometry or mass spectrometry

Nuclear Forensics

5*107

2*104 After 20 years

Age via 234U / 230Th

α-spec.: 59.0 1.5 years

ICP-MS: 59.3 2.0 years

=> Date of production: second half of 1943

Age indicates German (or US) nuclear programme


Case StudyIllicit Trafficking - Case Study : Find 26 – Rotterdam

On 16th Dec. 2003- 2-3 kg radioactive material was detected in a scrap metal shipment in Rotterdam harbour. The shipment arrived from a dealer in Jordan. Materials sent to ITU on 10th March 2004 and consisted of 2 bulk samples and 3 swipes.


Results - bulk Gamma spectrometry

• U-235 enrichment 0,7 %

TIMS and MC-ICP-MS• U-234 = 0,0052 %• U-235 = 0,712 %• U-238 = 99,283 %

natural uranium, no indication of an enriched or irradiated uranium

Titration• U-content ~70 %

Lead isotopics• Pb-204 = 1.47 %• Pb-206 = 24.83 %• Pb-207 = 21.47 %• Pb-208 = 52.24 %

resembles natural lead, no radiogenic lead

Anions (qualitative)• (NO3)

- and (CO3)2-

ICP-MS• Main impurities (>1000 ppm): Al, Ca, Cr, Fe, Mg, Mo, Na, Ni, P


Results - bulk SEM/EDX

• agglomerates of small crystals with an average length of 10 µm and diameter of 2 µm• uranium together with Fe, Ni and Cr• Al, Ca, Mg and Si were in the amorphous part around

11 Line W% A%

Cr Ka 0.71 2.96

Fe Ka 1.67 6.45

Ni Ka 0.75 2.77

U Ma 96.87 87.82

100.00 100.00

200 m

20 m


Find-26: Rotterdam

Bulk material:

• natural uranium oxides with ≈ 70% U

• presence of (CO3)2-

• main impurities: Al, Ca, Cr, Fe, Mg, Mo, Na, Ni, P

• lead isotopic composition

Swipes:

• natural uranium, Cs-137, Eu-154 and Am-241 (evidence of nuclear activities)

What information did the analysis yield?

• Intermediate product, possibly (NH4)4

(UO2)(CO3)3

• Impurities point to phosphate rich ores

(North Africa, Middle East, USA, South

Africa, Brazil)

• Pb isotopic composition (natural) indicates low uranium content in the ore, which is the case for P-rich ores

• evidence of nuclear activities

• Origin of the material: combination of scientific results and information from other services


Radioactive Dispersion Devices (RDDs) or Dirty Bombs)

What is a “dirty bomb”?

A “dirty bomb,” also known as a radiological weapon, is a conventional explosive such as dynamite packaged with radioactive material that scatters when the bomb goes off. A dirty bomb kills or injures through the initial blast of the conventional explosive and by airborne radiation and contamination—hence the term “dirty.”


The propagation of the radioactive cloud in a cityRDD with 2000 Ci 60Co

(7.4∙1013 Bq)

1.5 kg conv. explosives

No real explosion!scale 1:10,000 DMA IKONOS satellite map (wind with 0.5 m/s from 290° north, weather conditions neutral/unstable)

effective dose scale

(inhalation)

Time after the detonation:

10 minutes20 minutes30 minutes40 minutes50 minutes60 minutes70 minutesTotal for 2 hours

Inhalation dose in the center of the explosion: 680 mSv

Radioactive Dispersion Devices

In collaboration with the BfS, Germany


Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials

Conclusions:

• has extensive experience in working with IAEA, EU member states, national and international organisations in combating illicit trafficking of nuclear material

• is developing tools for modelling / scenario assessment reports for and post event support following a Radioactive Dispersion Event

• has the experience, dedicated facilities and extensive databases for nuclear forensic analyses

The JRC…

preventing and combating illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material

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