preventing and combating illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material
DESCRIPTION
JRC Information Day and S&T Workshops Bucharest – 11 May 2006. Preventing and combating illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material Klaus Lützenkirchen Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU), Joint Research Centre, European Commission Karlsruhe, Germany. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
Preventing and combating illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material
Klaus Lützenkirchen Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU), Joint Research Centre,
European CommissionKarlsruhe, Germany
JRC Information Day and S&T WorkshopsBucharest – 11 May 2006
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
• Traditional Safeguards and Physical Protection fail(operator accountancy versus verification)
• Illicit trafficking of nuclear material
• Seizure (border control, intelligence services)
• Nuclear Forensic analysis
Illicit Trafficking and Nuclear Forensics
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
Threat by nuclear terrorism:• Theft of nuclear material to produce a nuclear explosive device• Theft of radioactive material ( Dirty Bomb)
Fight against Illicit Trafficking
UO2 Fuel• stolen in Lithuania,• seized in Poland,• produced in Russia,• analysed at JRC-ITU
(Source IAEA)
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
– Training sessions for law enforcement services and laboratory experts jointly with IAEA (2002, …): New EU and CC, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova,…
– Model Action Plan: RITNUM Handbook national Response to Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Material (developed jointly with ITWG)
– Delivery of portable equipment for categorisation of material
– Demonstration exercises inside countries and at borders : 07/2002 Bucharest, 10/2002 BG/TR, 09/2004 PL/BY, ….
Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear MaterialProjects with Romania
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
target fieldSPEC
Exploranium: GR-135
XRF: ICS-4000
SAIC: RADSMART
Handheld Gamma Spectrometers
NaI
CdTe
Illicit trafficking and radiation detection
(Support to IAEA)
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
Demonstration Exercise
Romania18 July, 2002
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
National Exercise on Combating Nuclear Terrorism
Braşov County, Romania,10 May 2006Interception of illegal transport
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
Joint Demonstration ExerciseBorder Bulgaria/Turkey - Kapikule, Oct. 2002
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
Future EU border: Romania with Ukraine and Moldova
• Joint border exercises
• TACIS projects with Ukraine and Moldova
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
– training of personnel– installation of hand-held and mobile
equipment– Improvement of scientific/technical
infrastructure– implementation of the RITNUM
handbook and creation of a Model Action Plan
– demonstration exercises– workshop to strengthen regional co-
operation and co-ordination– Joint Analysis Agreement to analyze
seized material
Multicountry Project
COOPERATIONthat counts
Republic of Azerbaijan
Republic of GeorgiaRussian Federation
Ukraine
Republic of Moldova Republic of Kazakhstan
The TACIS Multicountry Project to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material
Estimated duration: 60 months
Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent
States
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
What is Nuclear Forensics ?
Information on the nature of the seized material, its intended use and its origin
Fingerprint ?Characteristic properties (isotopic composition, trace elements, macro- and microscopic structure)
Origin, legal owner, intended use, …
Examples
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
?Nuclear Forensics
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
Nuclear Forensics
Origin and intended use ?
First observations/conclusions:
• geometry 5 x 5 x 5 cm, unconventional application/reactor
• elemental composition pure U metal
• isotopic composition natural U D2O or graphite moderated reactor
• main impurities Al, Ca, Fe, Mg, Mn, Na, Pb, Si (200 mg material)
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
1. Origin
• Nuclear Materials Database
nuclear fuel data from western and Russian suppliers (UO2, MOX) (based on World Nuclear Industry Handbook and bilateral contracts, various degrees of access)
• Electronic literature archive on non- conventional fuels (Russian sources)
• Open literature
Nuclear Forensics
Geometry points at German origin
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
2. Age determination
• spiking with 228Th (or 233Pa)
• chemical separation
• measurement: alpha spectrometry or mass spectrometry
Nuclear Forensics
5*107
2*104 After 20 years
Age via 234U / 230Th
α-spec.: 59.0 1.5 years
ICP-MS: 59.3 2.0 years
=> Date of production: second half of 1943
Age indicates German (or US) nuclear programme
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
Case StudyIllicit Trafficking - Case Study : Find 26 – Rotterdam
On 16th Dec. 2003- 2-3 kg radioactive material was detected in a scrap metal shipment in Rotterdam harbour. The shipment arrived from a dealer in Jordan. Materials sent to ITU on 10th March 2004 and consisted of 2 bulk samples and 3 swipes.
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
Results - bulk Gamma spectrometry
• U-235 enrichment 0,7 %
TIMS and MC-ICP-MS• U-234 = 0,0052 %• U-235 = 0,712 %• U-238 = 99,283 %
natural uranium, no indication of an enriched or irradiated uranium
Titration• U-content ~70 %
Lead isotopics• Pb-204 = 1.47 %• Pb-206 = 24.83 %• Pb-207 = 21.47 %• Pb-208 = 52.24 %
resembles natural lead, no radiogenic lead
Anions (qualitative)• (NO3)
- and (CO3)2-
ICP-MS• Main impurities (>1000 ppm): Al, Ca, Cr, Fe, Mg, Mo, Na, Ni, P
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
Results - bulk SEM/EDX
• agglomerates of small crystals with an average length of 10 µm and diameter of 2 µm• uranium together with Fe, Ni and Cr• Al, Ca, Mg and Si were in the amorphous part around
11 Line W% A%
Cr Ka 0.71 2.96
Fe Ka 1.67 6.45
Ni Ka 0.75 2.77
U Ma 96.87 87.82
100.00 100.00
200 m
20 m
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
Find-26: RotterdamBulk material:
• natural uranium oxides with ≈ 70% U
• presence of (CO3)2-
• main impurities: Al, Ca, Cr, Fe, Mg, Mo, Na, Ni, P
• lead isotopic composition
Swipes:
• natural uranium, Cs-137, Eu-154 and Am-241 (evidence of nuclear activities)
What information did the analysis yield?
• Intermediate product, possibly (NH4)4
(UO2)(CO3)3
• Impurities point to phosphate rich ores
(North Africa, Middle East, USA, South
Africa, Brazil)
• Pb isotopic composition (natural) indicates low uranium content in the ore, which is the case for P-rich ores
• evidence of nuclear activities
• Origin of the material: combination of scientific results and information from other services
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
Radioactive Dispersion Devices (RDDs) or Dirty Bombs)
What is a “dirty bomb”?
A “dirty bomb,” also known as a radiological weapon, is a conventional explosive such as dynamite packaged with radioactive material that scatters when the bomb goes off. A dirty bomb kills or injures through the initial blast of the conventional explosive and by airborne radiation and contamination—hence the term “dirty.”
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
The propagation of the radioactive cloud in a cityRDD with 2000 Ci 60Co
(7.4∙1013 Bq)
1.5 kg conv. explosives
No real explosion!scale 1:10,000 DMA IKONOS satellite map (wind with 0.5 m/s from 290° north, weather conditions neutral/unstable)
effective dose scale
(inhalation)
Time after the detonation:
10 minutes20 minutes30 minutes40 minutes50 minutes60 minutes70 minutesTotal for 2 hours
Inhalation dose in the center of the explosion: 680 mSv
Radioactive Dispersion Devices
In collaboration with the BfS, Germany
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials
Conclusions:
• has extensive experience in working with IAEA, EU member states, national and international organisations in combating illicit trafficking of nuclear material
• is developing tools for modelling / scenario assessment reports for and post event support following a Radioactive Dispersion Event
• has the experience, dedicated facilities and extensive databases for nuclear forensic analyses
The JRC…