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Contribution Limits after Citizens United Iliev Political Parties Super PACs Contribution Limits after Citizens United Iliyan R. Iliev March 24, 2014

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Page 1: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Contribution Limits after Citizens United

Iliyan R. Iliev

March 24, 2014

Page 2: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Party Contributions andExpenditures

• FECA did not allow for independent spending by parties

• Parties and candidates coordinate their activities

• Should coordinated expenditures be limited?

• Colorado I (1996)

Page 3: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Party Contributions andExpenditures

• FECA did not allow for independent spending by parties

• Parties and candidates coordinate their activities

• Should coordinated expenditures be limited?

• Colorado I (1996)

Page 4: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Party Contributions andExpenditures

• FECA did not allow for independent spending by parties

• Parties and candidates coordinate their activities

• Should coordinated expenditures be limited?

• Colorado I (1996)

Page 5: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Party Contributions andExpenditures

• FECA did not allow for independent spending by parties

• Parties and candidates coordinate their activities

• Should coordinated expenditures be limited?

• Colorado I (1996)

Page 6: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Colorado I

• No majority opinion

• Unconstitutional – prohibits independent expenditures

• No evidence for corruption

• Soft money – party activities, “get out the vote” drives

• Soft money presents no danger

• Cannot be used to influence a federal campaign except inlimited “party-building” activities

Page 7: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Colorado I

• No majority opinion

• Unconstitutional – prohibits independent expenditures

• No evidence for corruption

• Soft money – party activities, “get out the vote” drives

• Soft money presents no danger

• Cannot be used to influence a federal campaign except inlimited “party-building” activities

Page 8: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Colorado I

• No majority opinion

• Unconstitutional – prohibits independent expenditures

• No evidence for corruption

• Soft money – party activities, “get out the vote” drives

• Soft money presents no danger

• Cannot be used to influence a federal campaign except inlimited “party-building” activities

Page 9: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Colorado I

• No majority opinion

• Unconstitutional – prohibits independent expenditures

• No evidence for corruption

• Soft money – party activities, “get out the vote” drives

• Soft money presents no danger

• Cannot be used to influence a federal campaign except inlimited “party-building” activities

Page 10: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Colorado I

• No majority opinion

• Unconstitutional – prohibits independent expenditures

• No evidence for corruption

• Soft money – party activities, “get out the vote” drives

• Soft money presents no danger

• Cannot be used to influence a federal campaign except inlimited “party-building” activities

Page 11: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Colorado I

• No majority opinion

• Unconstitutional – prohibits independent expenditures

• No evidence for corruption

• Soft money – party activities, “get out the vote” drives

• Soft money presents no danger

• Cannot be used to influence a federal campaign except inlimited “party-building” activities

Page 12: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Colorado I

• Lack of coordination between the candidate and thesource of the expenditure (the party)

• Are party expenditures different from contributions?

• How separate are the candidates and their parties?

• Do you think that “party-building activities” can be usedto promote a specific candidate? Should we differentiateregular campaigns and “party-building activities”?

Page 13: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Colorado I

• Lack of coordination between the candidate and thesource of the expenditure (the party)

• Are party expenditures different from contributions?

• How separate are the candidates and their parties?

• Do you think that “party-building activities” can be usedto promote a specific candidate? Should we differentiateregular campaigns and “party-building activities”?

Page 14: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Colorado I

• Lack of coordination between the candidate and thesource of the expenditure (the party)

• Are party expenditures different from contributions?

• How separate are the candidates and their parties?

• Do you think that “party-building activities” can be usedto promote a specific candidate? Should we differentiateregular campaigns and “party-building activities”?

Page 15: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Colorado I

• Lack of coordination between the candidate and thesource of the expenditure (the party)

• Are party expenditures different from contributions?

• How separate are the candidates and their parties?

• Do you think that “party-building activities” can be usedto promote a specific candidate? Should we differentiateregular campaigns and “party-building activities”?

Page 16: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Colorado II (2001)

• Following Shrink Missouri – coordinated expenditures area “functional” contribution limit

• Parties do not speak generally of electing candidates

• Contributions to parties come from contributors withpersonal interests

• Parties are instruments of contributors who do not supportthe party’s message or candidates across the board, butspecific candidates and specific positions on an issue

Page 17: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Colorado II (2001)

• Following Shrink Missouri – coordinated expenditures area “functional” contribution limit

• Parties do not speak generally of electing candidates

• Contributions to parties come from contributors withpersonal interests

• Parties are instruments of contributors who do not supportthe party’s message or candidates across the board, butspecific candidates and specific positions on an issue

Page 18: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Colorado II (2001)

• Following Shrink Missouri – coordinated expenditures area “functional” contribution limit

• Parties do not speak generally of electing candidates

• Contributions to parties come from contributors withpersonal interests

• Parties are instruments of contributors who do not supportthe party’s message or candidates across the board, butspecific candidates and specific positions on an issue

Page 19: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Colorado II (2001)

• Following Shrink Missouri – coordinated expenditures area “functional” contribution limit

• Parties do not speak generally of electing candidates

• Contributions to parties come from contributors withpersonal interests

• Parties are instruments of contributors who do not supportthe party’s message or candidates across the board, butspecific candidates and specific positions on an issue

Page 20: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Colorado II

• Parties act as agents for spending on behalf of interestswho “seek to produce obligated officeholders”

• Parties are not different from self-interested political actors

• Thomas, Scalia, Kennedy dissented – Buckley should beoverruled

• Parties should not be treated as individuals and politicalcommittees

• Parties are not “instruments” of the donors

Page 21: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Colorado II

• Parties act as agents for spending on behalf of interestswho “seek to produce obligated officeholders”

• Parties are not different from self-interested political actors

• Thomas, Scalia, Kennedy dissented – Buckley should beoverruled

• Parties should not be treated as individuals and politicalcommittees

• Parties are not “instruments” of the donors

Page 22: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Colorado II

• Parties act as agents for spending on behalf of interestswho “seek to produce obligated officeholders”

• Parties are not different from self-interested political actors

• Thomas, Scalia, Kennedy dissented – Buckley should beoverruled

• Parties should not be treated as individuals and politicalcommittees

• Parties are not “instruments” of the donors

Page 23: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Colorado II

• Parties act as agents for spending on behalf of interestswho “seek to produce obligated officeholders”

• Parties are not different from self-interested political actors

• Thomas, Scalia, Kennedy dissented – Buckley should beoverruled

• Parties should not be treated as individuals and politicalcommittees

• Parties are not “instruments” of the donors

Page 24: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Colorado II

• Parties act as agents for spending on behalf of interestswho “seek to produce obligated officeholders”

• Parties are not different from self-interested political actors

• Thomas, Scalia, Kennedy dissented – Buckley should beoverruled

• Parties should not be treated as individuals and politicalcommittees

• Parties are not “instruments” of the donors

Page 25: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Colorado I & II

• Allow parties to spend independently without limit

• Limits on the spending that is coordinated with thecandidates

• Do parties and candidates coordinate their efforts?

• Are there a lot of uncoordinated activities?

Page 26: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Colorado I & II

• Allow parties to spend independently without limit

• Limits on the spending that is coordinated with thecandidates

• Do parties and candidates coordinate their efforts?

• Are there a lot of uncoordinated activities?

Page 27: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Colorado I & II

• Allow parties to spend independently without limit

• Limits on the spending that is coordinated with thecandidates

• Do parties and candidates coordinate their efforts?

• Are there a lot of uncoordinated activities?

Page 28: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Colorado I & II

• Allow parties to spend independently without limit

• Limits on the spending that is coordinated with thecandidates

• Do parties and candidates coordinate their efforts?

• Are there a lot of uncoordinated activities?

Page 29: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Soft Money

• Hard money – contributions made with funds that aresubject to disclosure, source and amount limitations

• Donations for state and local elections are not hard money

• Parties can use soft money for “get out the vote drives”and “generic party advertising”

• Soft money for “legislative advocacy mediaadvertisements” – ads allowed “even if the ads mentionedthe name of a federal candidate, so long as they did notexpressly advocate the candidate’s election or defeat”

• “Support the Democratic Party, our candidate is JohnSmith” – permissible?

Page 30: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Soft Money

• Hard money – contributions made with funds that aresubject to disclosure, source and amount limitations

• Donations for state and local elections are not hard money

• Parties can use soft money for “get out the vote drives”and “generic party advertising”

• Soft money for “legislative advocacy mediaadvertisements” – ads allowed “even if the ads mentionedthe name of a federal candidate, so long as they did notexpressly advocate the candidate’s election or defeat”

• “Support the Democratic Party, our candidate is JohnSmith” – permissible?

Page 31: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Soft Money

• Hard money – contributions made with funds that aresubject to disclosure, source and amount limitations

• Donations for state and local elections are not hard money

• Parties can use soft money for “get out the vote drives”and “generic party advertising”

• Soft money for “legislative advocacy mediaadvertisements” – ads allowed “even if the ads mentionedthe name of a federal candidate, so long as they did notexpressly advocate the candidate’s election or defeat”

• “Support the Democratic Party, our candidate is JohnSmith” – permissible?

Page 32: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Soft Money

• Hard money – contributions made with funds that aresubject to disclosure, source and amount limitations

• Donations for state and local elections are not hard money

• Parties can use soft money for “get out the vote drives”and “generic party advertising”

• Soft money for “legislative advocacy mediaadvertisements” – ads allowed “even if the ads mentionedthe name of a federal candidate, so long as they did notexpressly advocate the candidate’s election or defeat”

• “Support the Democratic Party, our candidate is JohnSmith” – permissible?

Page 33: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Soft Money

• Hard money – contributions made with funds that aresubject to disclosure, source and amount limitations

• Donations for state and local elections are not hard money

• Parties can use soft money for “get out the vote drives”and “generic party advertising”

• Soft money for “legislative advocacy mediaadvertisements” – ads allowed “even if the ads mentionedthe name of a federal candidate, so long as they did notexpressly advocate the candidate’s election or defeat”

• “Support the Democratic Party, our candidate is JohnSmith” – permissible?

Page 34: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Soft Money

• Soft money was 5% of party spending in 1984

• 42% in 2000

• In 1996, 5 soft-money donors gave $9million

• In 2008, $300million from 800 donors, minimum donation$120, 000

Page 35: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Soft Money

• Soft money was 5% of party spending in 1984

• 42% in 2000

• In 1996, 5 soft-money donors gave $9million

• In 2008, $300million from 800 donors, minimum donation$120, 000

Page 36: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Soft Money

• Soft money was 5% of party spending in 1984

• 42% in 2000

• In 1996, 5 soft-money donors gave $9million

• In 2008, $300million from 800 donors, minimum donation$120, 000

Page 37: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Soft Money

• Soft money was 5% of party spending in 1984

• 42% in 2000

• In 1996, 5 soft-money donors gave $9million

• In 2008, $300million from 800 donors, minimum donation$120, 000

Page 38: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Soft Money

Page 39: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Soft Money

• Soft money donations usually seek access, not ideologicalsupport

• Candidates solicit soft money donations – direct donors totax-exempt organizations

• Cases of candidates that advise supporters who reachedthe legal maximum to use other means and makeadditional contributions

• Is that corruption? Is soliciting contributions pressuringthe donors?

Page 40: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Soft Money

• Soft money donations usually seek access, not ideologicalsupport

• Candidates solicit soft money donations – direct donors totax-exempt organizations

• Cases of candidates that advise supporters who reachedthe legal maximum to use other means and makeadditional contributions

• Is that corruption? Is soliciting contributions pressuringthe donors?

Page 41: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Soft Money

• Soft money donations usually seek access, not ideologicalsupport

• Candidates solicit soft money donations – direct donors totax-exempt organizations

• Cases of candidates that advise supporters who reachedthe legal maximum to use other means and makeadditional contributions

• Is that corruption? Is soliciting contributions pressuringthe donors?

Page 42: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Soft Money

• Soft money donations usually seek access, not ideologicalsupport

• Candidates solicit soft money donations – direct donors totax-exempt organizations

• Cases of candidates that advise supporters who reachedthe legal maximum to use other means and makeadditional contributions

• Is that corruption? Is soliciting contributions pressuringthe donors?

Page 43: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Outside Groups

PACs, 527 and 501c organizations

Page 44: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Super PACs

• Before Citizens United corporations could not spend theirgeneral treasury funds on election activities

• PACs can spend unlimited sums supporting or opposingcandidates

• Contributions to PACs used to be limited to $5,000

• Section 527 organizations not limited – not politicalcommittees, no contributions to candidates, no expressadvocacy

Page 45: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Super PACs

• Before Citizens United corporations could not spend theirgeneral treasury funds on election activities

• PACs can spend unlimited sums supporting or opposingcandidates

• Contributions to PACs used to be limited to $5,000

• Section 527 organizations not limited – not politicalcommittees, no contributions to candidates, no expressadvocacy

Page 46: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Super PACs

• Before Citizens United corporations could not spend theirgeneral treasury funds on election activities

• PACs can spend unlimited sums supporting or opposingcandidates

• Contributions to PACs used to be limited to $5,000

• Section 527 organizations not limited – not politicalcommittees, no contributions to candidates, no expressadvocacy

Page 47: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Super PACs

• Before Citizens United corporations could not spend theirgeneral treasury funds on election activities

• PACs can spend unlimited sums supporting or opposingcandidates

• Contributions to PACs used to be limited to $5,000

• Section 527 organizations not limited – not politicalcommittees, no contributions to candidates, no expressadvocacy

Page 48: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

527 and 501

• 527s spent $400million in 2004

• Soros was the biggest donor to 527s – $24million

• No limit for contributions to 527s

• FEC began regulating 527s

• Shift to 501c – “social welfare organizations and othernonprofits”

• 501c – donors’ identity is hidden

• PACs, 527s, 501c spent $1.22billion in 2008

Page 49: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

527 and 501

• 527s spent $400million in 2004

• Soros was the biggest donor to 527s – $24million

• No limit for contributions to 527s

• FEC began regulating 527s

• Shift to 501c – “social welfare organizations and othernonprofits”

• 501c – donors’ identity is hidden

• PACs, 527s, 501c spent $1.22billion in 2008

Page 50: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

527 and 501

• 527s spent $400million in 2004

• Soros was the biggest donor to 527s – $24million

• No limit for contributions to 527s

• FEC began regulating 527s

• Shift to 501c – “social welfare organizations and othernonprofits”

• 501c – donors’ identity is hidden

• PACs, 527s, 501c spent $1.22billion in 2008

Page 51: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

527 and 501

• 527s spent $400million in 2004

• Soros was the biggest donor to 527s – $24million

• No limit for contributions to 527s

• FEC began regulating 527s

• Shift to 501c – “social welfare organizations and othernonprofits”

• 501c – donors’ identity is hidden

• PACs, 527s, 501c spent $1.22billion in 2008

Page 52: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

527 and 501

• 527s spent $400million in 2004

• Soros was the biggest donor to 527s – $24million

• No limit for contributions to 527s

• FEC began regulating 527s

• Shift to 501c – “social welfare organizations and othernonprofits”

• 501c – donors’ identity is hidden

• PACs, 527s, 501c spent $1.22billion in 2008

Page 53: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

527 and 501

• 527s spent $400million in 2004

• Soros was the biggest donor to 527s – $24million

• No limit for contributions to 527s

• FEC began regulating 527s

• Shift to 501c – “social welfare organizations and othernonprofits”

• 501c – donors’ identity is hidden

• PACs, 527s, 501c spent $1.22billion in 2008

Page 54: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

527 and 501

• 527s spent $400million in 2004

• Soros was the biggest donor to 527s – $24million

• No limit for contributions to 527s

• FEC began regulating 527s

• Shift to 501c – “social welfare organizations and othernonprofits”

• 501c – donors’ identity is hidden

• PACs, 527s, 501c spent $1.22billion in 2008

Page 55: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Speechnow.org v. FEC (2010)

• District Court case

• Speechnow is unincorporated nonprofit

• Governments cap on donations to political committees isunconstitutional

• Applies to groups that don’t make direct contributions tocandidates and don’t coordinate with candidates whenrunning independent advertisements

Page 56: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Speechnow.org v. FEC (2010)

• District Court case

• Speechnow is unincorporated nonprofit

• Governments cap on donations to political committees isunconstitutional

• Applies to groups that don’t make direct contributions tocandidates and don’t coordinate with candidates whenrunning independent advertisements

Page 57: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Speechnow.org v. FEC (2010)

• District Court case

• Speechnow is unincorporated nonprofit

• Governments cap on donations to political committees isunconstitutional

• Applies to groups that don’t make direct contributions tocandidates and don’t coordinate with candidates whenrunning independent advertisements

Page 58: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Speechnow.org v. FEC (2010)

• District Court case

• Speechnow is unincorporated nonprofit

• Governments cap on donations to political committees isunconstitutional

• Applies to groups that don’t make direct contributions tocandidates and don’t coordinate with candidates whenrunning independent advertisements

Page 59: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Speechnow

• The government has no anti-corruption interest in limitingindependent expenditures – Citizens United

• The definition of corruption is important

• Buying access is corruption – before Citizens United

• “Ingratiation and access are not corruption” – CitizensUnited

• Citizens United – “independent expenditures do notcorrupt or give the appearance of corrutpion”

• Given the definition, no anti-corruption interest in limitingcontributions to independent expenditure groups

Page 60: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Speechnow

• The government has no anti-corruption interest in limitingindependent expenditures – Citizens United

• The definition of corruption is important

• Buying access is corruption – before Citizens United

• “Ingratiation and access are not corruption” – CitizensUnited

• Citizens United – “independent expenditures do notcorrupt or give the appearance of corrutpion”

• Given the definition, no anti-corruption interest in limitingcontributions to independent expenditure groups

Page 61: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Speechnow

• The government has no anti-corruption interest in limitingindependent expenditures – Citizens United

• The definition of corruption is important

• Buying access is corruption – before Citizens United

• “Ingratiation and access are not corruption” – CitizensUnited

• Citizens United – “independent expenditures do notcorrupt or give the appearance of corrutpion”

• Given the definition, no anti-corruption interest in limitingcontributions to independent expenditure groups

Page 62: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Speechnow

• The government has no anti-corruption interest in limitingindependent expenditures – Citizens United

• The definition of corruption is important

• Buying access is corruption – before Citizens United

• “Ingratiation and access are not corruption” – CitizensUnited

• Citizens United – “independent expenditures do notcorrupt or give the appearance of corrutpion”

• Given the definition, no anti-corruption interest in limitingcontributions to independent expenditure groups

Page 63: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Speechnow

• The government has no anti-corruption interest in limitingindependent expenditures – Citizens United

• The definition of corruption is important

• Buying access is corruption – before Citizens United

• “Ingratiation and access are not corruption” – CitizensUnited

• Citizens United – “independent expenditures do notcorrupt or give the appearance of corrutpion”

• Given the definition, no anti-corruption interest in limitingcontributions to independent expenditure groups

Page 64: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Speechnow

• The government has no anti-corruption interest in limitingindependent expenditures – Citizens United

• The definition of corruption is important

• Buying access is corruption – before Citizens United

• “Ingratiation and access are not corruption” – CitizensUnited

• Citizens United – “independent expenditures do notcorrupt or give the appearance of corrutpion”

• Given the definition, no anti-corruption interest in limitingcontributions to independent expenditure groups

Page 65: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

After Speechnow and CitizensUnited

• FEC – corporations and labor unions can also contributeunlimited sums

• District Court decided that PACs that make directdonations to candidates may accept unlimited donations

• 501c organizations – groups that did not disclose theirdonors

• 501c spending rose from 1% to 47% since 2006

Page 66: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

After Speechnow and CitizensUnited

• FEC – corporations and labor unions can also contributeunlimited sums

• District Court decided that PACs that make directdonations to candidates may accept unlimited donations

• 501c organizations – groups that did not disclose theirdonors

• 501c spending rose from 1% to 47% since 2006

Page 67: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

After Speechnow and CitizensUnited

• FEC – corporations and labor unions can also contributeunlimited sums

• District Court decided that PACs that make directdonations to candidates may accept unlimited donations

• 501c organizations – groups that did not disclose theirdonors

• 501c spending rose from 1% to 47% since 2006

Page 68: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

After Speechnow and CitizensUnited

• FEC – corporations and labor unions can also contributeunlimited sums

• District Court decided that PACs that make directdonations to candidates may accept unlimited donations

• 501c organizations – groups that did not disclose theirdonors

• 501c spending rose from 1% to 47% since 2006

Page 69: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Super PACs

Page 70: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Super PACs

Page 71: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Super PACs

Page 72: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Super PACs

Page 73: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Coordination

• Members of Super PACs – former campaign managers,relatives of candidates, share consultants

• How can we control coordination?

Page 74: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Coordination

• Members of Super PACs – former campaign managers,relatives of candidates, share consultants

• How can we control coordination?

Page 75: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Incumbents v. Challengers

• Overwhelming percentage of contributions contributions toincumbents

• Disproportionate support for candidates based NOT onideology and voting record, but their relative position ofpower and ability to return favors

• Part of the logic behind Citizens United was protection ofchallengers?

Page 76: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Incumbents v. Challengers

• Overwhelming percentage of contributions contributions toincumbents

• Disproportionate support for candidates based NOT onideology and voting record, but their relative position ofpower and ability to return favors

• Part of the logic behind Citizens United was protection ofchallengers?

Page 77: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Incumbents v. Challengers

• Overwhelming percentage of contributions contributions toincumbents

• Disproportionate support for candidates based NOT onideology and voting record, but their relative position ofpower and ability to return favors

• Part of the logic behind Citizens United was protection ofchallengers?

Page 78: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Lobbyists

• Lobbyists are employed to influence public officials

• Lobbyists are individuals that enjoy constitutional rights

• Should people who directly influence decision makers facelimits?

• Individuals face contribution limits, certain organizationsdo not

• What if every individual forms a 501c?

Page 79: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Lobbyists

• Lobbyists are employed to influence public officials

• Lobbyists are individuals that enjoy constitutional rights

• Should people who directly influence decision makers facelimits?

• Individuals face contribution limits, certain organizationsdo not

• What if every individual forms a 501c?

Page 80: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Lobbyists

• Lobbyists are employed to influence public officials

• Lobbyists are individuals that enjoy constitutional rights

• Should people who directly influence decision makers facelimits?

• Individuals face contribution limits, certain organizationsdo not

• What if every individual forms a 501c?

Page 81: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Lobbyists

• Lobbyists are employed to influence public officials

• Lobbyists are individuals that enjoy constitutional rights

• Should people who directly influence decision makers facelimits?

• Individuals face contribution limits, certain organizationsdo not

• What if every individual forms a 501c?

Page 82: Presentation(6)

ContributionLimits afterCitizensUnited

Iliev

PoliticalParties

Super PACs

Lobbyists

• Lobbyists are employed to influence public officials

• Lobbyists are individuals that enjoy constitutional rights

• Should people who directly influence decision makers facelimits?

• Individuals face contribution limits, certain organizationsdo not

• What if every individual forms a 501c?