presentation - venture capital financing, major deal elements
TRANSCRIPT
Major Deal Elements Venture Capital Term Sheets Analysis
Daniel J. PiedraJ.D., expected ‘16University of San Diego School of Law
Major Deal Elements
1. A Preferred Return
2. Protection of Valuation and Position re: Future Money
3. Management of the Investment
4. Exit Strategies
Preferred Return❖ Perception of the VC Investor:
❖ When the Investor writes the check, he has done almost everything he promised
❖ The entrepreneur has done nothing yet
❖ Result: The VC wants its money to be paid back before the Entrepreneur gets his/her return.
❖ Instrument: CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED STOCK
Preferred Return❖ Dividends:
❖ Paid to Preferred First
❖ Cumulative or Accruing
❖ Liquidation Preference ❖ “Straight” Liquidation Preference: The Preferred receives its original
investment amount plus accrued dividends (if any) before Common receives anything.
❖ Participating (“Double Dip”) Preferred: The Preferred first gets its liquidation preference and then shares any remaining proceeds with Common. Increasingly subject to a cap of 3X or 4X (including preference).
Preferred Return: Liquidation Events
❖ Liquidation, dissolution, sale of assets
❖ Money comes into corporation
❖ Money paid out to stockholders to redeem stock
❖ “Deemed liquidation”— merger or other positive event
❖ Consideration may be stock or cash
❖ Consideration may go directly to stockholders
Protection of Valuation:Conversion and Anti-dilution
❖ Anti-dilution Adjustment increases the number of shares received on conversion of Preferred
❖ What Triggers Anti-dilution Adjustment?
❖ Issuance or “deemed issuance” of Common at less than preferred issuance price
❖ “Deemed issuance”— adjust upon issuance of derivative security; if common never issued, readjust later
❖ Options, warrants
❖ Convertible securities
Protection of Valuation:Conversion and Anti-dilution
❖ Conversion Events: When Does Preferred Convert Into Common?
❖ Voluntary
❖ Forced: often some % of Preferred can force conversion of all
❖ Automatic--upon “Qualified IPO”
❖ Minimum total offering; minimum share price (usually 3 to 5 times initial purchase price)
❖ Conversion Ratio--initially 1:1
❖ Adjustments--stock splits, etc; price anti-dilution
❖ Exceptions--option pool, conversion of preferred, outstanding warrants, other existing conditions, other special exceptions
Valuation❖ Conversion Ratio:
❖ Original Purchase Price (OPP)/ Conversion Price (CP)
❖ Initially OPP = CP, so Conversion Ratio = 1:1
❖ “Full ratchet”: CP reset to equal price at which diluting security is sold
❖ “Weighted average”: CP new = CP old x R
❖ Where R = (N + M/CP old)/(N+S)
❖ N = old shares outstanding (fully diluted)
❖ S = new shares to be issued
❖ M = new money ($)
Protection of Position: Preemptive Rights
❖ Permits Investors to participate pro rata in future financings, to preserve their percentage ownership
❖ Subject to exclusions:
❖ Option pool issuances
❖ Strategic alliances & licenses
❖ “Pay to Play”
Preemptive Rights, cont'd
❖ Granted by Founders/Other Investors
❖ First Refusal: Gives Investors the right to acquire shares offered by the grantor, pro rata
❖ May be partial or “all or nothing”
❖ Tag Along (Co-Sale): Gives Investors the right to sell shares pro rata if a Founder sells shares to others
❖ Helps lock in Founders
Management of the Investment❖ Board Seat(s)
❖ Importance of the “Independent Director(s)”
❖ Business Approvals ❖ Capital Expenditures, etc.
❖ Approval of Annual Budget and Operating Plans
❖ Information Rights ❖ Reports, financial statements — NDA advised
Other Management Considerations
❖ Option Pools
❖ Traditionally 12% to 18% at Round One
❖ Two Year Pool
❖ Vesting of Founders/Key Management Stock
❖ Non-Competition and Invention Agreements
Exit Strategies• IPOs and Registration Rights
• Sale/Acquisition
• Redemption of Stock
• Registration Rights
Registration Rights
❖ Shares cannot be freely sold without filing a Registration Statement with the SEC
❖ Only the Company can file
❖ So the Investors negotiate for certain Registration Rights to insure a contractual ability to exit into the public markets
Registration Rights, cont’d❖ Enables Investors to sell shares publicly by means
of a registered offering❖ Sales prior to end of 1-year holding period❖ Avoid compliance with volume limitations of
Rule 144❖ Registration paid for by the Company❖ Are Founders included?
Demand Registration Rights
❖ Exercisable after the IPO or within 3-7 years of investment
❖ Can be exercised 1 to 3 times;
❖ Can be exercised by holders of 20-50% of the registrable shares, with value of [$$$]
Piggyback Registration Rights❖ Investors “piggyback” on another registration
❖ Can they participate in other shareholders’ demand rights?
❖ Subject to underwriter “cutback”
❖ S-3 Registrations generally unlimited
❖ Acorn
❖ Beach
Redemption
❖ The Company’s repurchase of Preferred Stock at the demand of the Investors
❖ When Used: When the Company hasn’t gone public
❖ Because Founders Don’t Want To
❖ Because Business Doesn’t Develop Into an IPO Type
Redemption, cont’d❖When Does Redemption Kick In?
❖Typically after Five (5) years❖Often phased over Three (3) years
❖Trigger❖Automatic❖Upon vote of Preferred
❖Price❖Initial Purchase Price paid plus accrued dividends❖Sometimes additional return
❖Different classes of preferred — later classes won’t let earlier investors out first
Macon, Inc. Venture Capital Term Sheets Analysis
Daniel J. PiedraJ.D., expected ‘16University of San Diego School of Law
Similarities ❖ Investment Amount: $5 million
❖ Series A Convertible Preferred Stock
❖ Conversion Rate
❖ Registration Rights
❖ Information Rights
❖ No Termination Rights
❖ Closing Conditions: Acorn — “Securities Purchase Agreement”; Beach — “Conditions Precedent to Financing”
❖ No “No-shop” Provision
Differences
❖ Valuation ❖ Acorn: Pre-Calculated
❖ $7.53 million, with 3 million “performance shares”
❖ Performance Shares: “Shares held in escrow; non-issuable if Macon doesn’t reach performance milestone
❖ Beach: Standard, with employee option pool
Dividends (Differences)❖ Acorn:
❖ Non-cumulative — $0.08 (standard) on a Series A Preferred Outstanding, when and as declared by the Board of Directors
❖ Other dividends: Participates with Common Stock on an as-converted basis
❖ Most beneficial to company❖ Beach
❖ Cumulative — most beneficial to investors; bad for company❖ 10% (above standard) per year commencing on one year
anniversary of issuance of Series A Preferred❖ Ends when dividend accrual reaches 25% of Series A Purchase Price❖ Can also cease with consent of Board of Directors
Liquidation (Differences)❖ Acorn
❖ 3x multiple — A return of three times the initial pay issuance price
❖ Lower than standard 5x
❖ Beach ❖ 1 1/4 multiple — A return of 1.25 the initial purchase
price plus all declared but unpaid dividends
❖ Pro rata distribution
Automatic Conversion (Differences)❖ Acorn
❖ Majority of Preferred can consent to conversion
❖ No assurance that VC can control or at least veto and /or change number of holders
❖ Valuation: $25 million offering at $5 million/share
❖ Beach ❖ Valuation: $25 million offering at $20/share
❖ Consent of Preferred not required
❖ Automatic conversion at IPO
Liquidation Differences, cont’d
Acorn: ❖ Better option
❖ Investor payment is approx. $5,330,000 at a $0.08 dividend
❖ Preferred is capped at three times initial investment amount
❖ Lower than standard (5x)
❖ Better for a merger and IPO because Investors are capped at 3x their initial investment
Liquidation Differences, cont’d
Beach: ❖ Larger initial payback to the investors of roughly
$7,500,000 at a $0.25 unpaid dividend
❖ Allows for pro rata distribution of remaining proceeds to all shareholders
❖ No multiplier on distribution of remaining assets
❖ Excludes reference to subsequent financings
Anti-Dilution (Differences)❖ Acorn
❖ Broad-based weighted average❖ Carve out: No adjustment for issuance up to 3 million Common to
employees, directors, etc., pursuant to board-approved equity incentive plans❖ Helps to retain talent and incentivize employees
❖ Beach ❖ Weighted average❖ Share issuance of less than 50% of Series A Purchase Prices slips to
full ratchet ❖ Conditional: Only if Series A holder invests its pro rata share
Voting RightsAcorn
❖Standard list that requires 60% approval of Preferred, including:❖Creation / issuance of senior securities❖ Increase in number of authorized shares of Preferred❖Any changes in rights adverse to Preferred (typical)❖Change of control❖Dividend or distribution of capital stock❖Any transaction involving all or substantially all company assets
Beach ❖Friendlier terms❖Class vote with Common on as-converted basis on all matters presented to stockholders❖Exception: Preferred entitled to separate vote under Protective Provisions —
supermajority (does not state exact number) consent required for corporate actions to be agreed upon at a later date
Rights of First Refusal & Co-Sale❖ Acorn
❖Right of First Refusal❖Preferred has
❖ (1) pro rata right based on equity ownership to participate in subsequent equity financings; and
❖ (2) right to consider purchase of any potential sale of Common stock
❖Right of Co-Sale: Except through an IPO sale, Preferred have right to participate in Common transferring of shares
❖ Beach ❖Neither Right of First Refusal nor Co-Sale Rights
Anti-Dilution (Differences)
Beach ❖Down round after Series A financing❖No waiver ❖Reset of anti-dilution protection by existing investors required
Board Representation❖ Acorn
❖Favorable to investors❖ If Performance Shares released, then investors have option to replace the
outside director with a investor-chosen director❖Harmful to control
❖ Beach ❖More favorable to Founders❖Arrangements include:
❖One member elected by the Founder;❖Two Series A Investor-elected representatives;❖One outsider company nominated; and ❖One outsider company nominated and acceptable to all
Selection: Beach Fund❖ Acorn has three investors;
potential conflicts❖ Dividend term concerning but
negotiation — Board’s consent authority mitigating factor
❖ Simple Board structure❖ Acorn’s Registration Rights
potential to be expensive❖ Better liquidation preference
(except for merger)
#3: Term Alterations During Negotiations
1.Valuation
2.Liquidation Preference
1. Caps
3.Anti-Dilution Provisions
4.Dividends
5.Voting Rights
6.Redemption Rights
7.Founders Vesting Rights
8.Board Composition
9.Miscellaneous
Valuation
❖ Risk of "counting chickens before the eggs have hatched”
❖ Goal: Increase value placed on company to minimize cost of VC investment
❖ Develop financial projections for time of likely VC exit
Liquidation Preference
❖ Goal: Cap on Participating Preferred
❖ Non-Participating Preferred
❖ Cannot participate as common shareholders
❖ Aim for non-participating preferred shares, but odds are slim
❖ IPO inapplicable
Dilution❖ Focus on definition of “Outstanding Securities”
❖ Investors want full ratchet
❖ Conversion price of preferred is adjusted downward for a dilutive issuance on a dollar-for-dollar basis
❖ Least favorable to company
❖ Always try to get a “floor” on ratchet
❖ Company wants broad-based provision
❖ Calculating dilution based upon a “weighted average” more beneficial to the company
❖ Easily negotiable
Dividends❖ “When as declared by Board” – a non-cumulative dividend
❖ If Board does not declare then there is no dividend
❖ Standard for an early stage company
❖ Typical not to get a dividend every year – VC more interested in getting a bigger return at end, rather than a bit back every year
❖ For later-stage companies, it is more common to see cumulative dividend, generally paid out
❖ These companies have more money and investors may want to start seeing return
Voting Rights❖ Focus on limiting to events that directly impact preferred
rights or investments
❖ holder of Preferred will have the
❖ 1:1 votes / share ideal
❖ Avoid provisions that give investors too much management control
❖ Acorn: Substantial control requirements
❖ Beach: Certain corporate actions requires “supermajority” vote by Series A Preferred
❖ Indicated flexibility
Founders Vesting Rights
❖ Negotiate for acceleration in the event of change of control or termination
❖ Request shorter vesting period
❖ Acorn: 4 years for employees with 12-month cliff
❖ Founders: 25% instant vesting, the rest spread out for three years
❖ Beach: Same, except unvested portion subject to buyback provision
Board Composition❖ Heavily negotiated❖ All about control❖ Critical for exits❖ Common for VCs to want at least one seat on the board (and perhaps
more depending on the amount invested)❖ Focus on the final seat
❖ Will preferred and common vote together as a single class or separately?
❖ Additional control granted if Company fails to meet benchmarks?❖ Negotiations will focus on amount invested and level of control sought or
required
Rights of First Refusal & Co-Sale Acorn ❖ Right of First Refusal too broad — includes all Series
A Preferred❖ Recommended: Preferred may exercise such right
only at a price equal to the lower of: ❖ (i) the price offered by the proposed third party
purchaser; and ❖ (ii) the price most recently set by the Board of
Directors as the fair market value of the Common.
Miscellaneous
❖ Information Rights ❖ Seek appropriate restrictions such as a non-disclosure
agreement
❖ Protective Provisions ❖ Ensure that VCs do not have too much control
❖ Drag Along Rights ❖ Focus on appropriate thresholds
• Instant growth mean results in higher valuation from subsequent investors
• If passion for company is high, then slow growth best option — but VC
investors wary
• Hobson’s Choice
• Key Determinant of Valuation: Risk
• Low valuation at start up
• Limit involvement with too many investors so as not to set unreachable
milestones
• Value of company grows and risks decrease as milestones are reached
• Result: Cost of company shares increase
• Ultimate Question: What is goal of company?
• Large Business
• Small Business
Acorn: •Automatic Conversion: Upon IPO, preferred shares are converted to
common, whereas the VC loses liquidation preference•Beneficial to Company
•Vesting Provision•One-year accelerated vesting following change of control transaction•Favorable to Founder
Beach: •Automatic conversion: For IPO, subject to share price limitation and
aggregate proceeds offering•70% preferred holders, acting as single voting class, can elect to not treat a
consolidation or merger as a dissolution or winding up•Favorable to preferred, because liquidation preference survives merger or
consolidation•Vesting Provision
•Restricts Founders’ access to shares with 48-month vesting period; early exit poses challenge
•Reputation
•Good chemistry with leaders
•Experience
•Track record
•Length of operation
•Successful investments
•Post-exit relationships with previous partners
•Successful management and operational structure
Personalities, Management & Track Record
VC Involvement: Normally involves a representation on boardOther factors:
Active •Value-added services (i.e., marketing, market knowledge, recruitment, etc.)
•An active partnership
Passive / Major Decisions •Involvement in major decisions
•Appointed board member as watchdog
•Information rights (periodic statements of financial and other information.
•Get-in and get-out