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Preparatory work to support the impact assessment on reviewing the rules on the financing of official controls A final report to DG SANCO
20 September 2011
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Preparatory work to support the impact assessment on reviewing the rules on the financing of official controls - Final report
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Preparatory work to support the impact assessment on reviewing the rules on the financing of official controls A final report to DG SANCO
A report submitted by GHK
in association with
ADAS, UK
Date: 20 September
Job Number 30258474
Elta Smith
GHK 2nd Floor, Clerkenwell House 67 Clerkenwell Road London EC1R 5BL
T +44 (0)20 7611 1100 F +44 (0)20 3368 6960
www.ghkint.com
Preparatory work to support the impact assessment on reviewing the rules on the financing of official controls - Final report
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Document control
Document Title Preparatory work to support the impact assessment on reviewing the rules on the
financing of official controls – final report
Job number 30258474
Prepared by Elta Smith, Eoghan Daly, Ali Erbilgic, Dick Groothuis, Alan Lyne
Checked by Andrew Jarvis
Date 20 September 2011
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Contents
Executive Summary ......................................................................................................... 1
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 7 1.1 Study work programme ............................................................................................................ 7 1.2 Methodology ............................................................................................................................. 7 1.3 Structure of the report .............................................................................................................. 8
2 Problem definition ............................................................................................ 10 2.1 Overview of the system for financing official controls ............................................................ 10 2.2 Articles 26-29 of the Regulation are designed to ensure consistency in the financing for
official controls across Member States and to ensure that adequate financing is available
for these controls .................................................................................................................... 13
3 Policy objectives and policy options ................................................................. 17 3.1 Policy objectives of the proposed revisions to Articles 26-29 of the Regulation are set at
three levels ............................................................................................................................. 17 3.2 Policy options have been identified to achieve the objectives of the proposed revisions to
Articles 26-29 of the Regulation ............................................................................................. 18 3.3 The options are assessed against a ‘do nothing’ reference scenario .................................... 21
4 Appraisal of the policy options ........................................................................ 27 4.1 Option evaluation criteria are set to assess opportunities to develop a clearer, simpler
and more transparent system ................................................................................................ 27 4.2 Option assessment ................................................................................................................ 30 4.3 From independent components to an integrated package – building a sustainable solution
with Option A .......................................................................................................................... 78 4.4 Monitoring .............................................................................................................................. 84
5 Conclusions ...................................................................................................... 87
Annex 1 Detailed assessment of options and their impacts ............................... 89
Annex 2 Member State case studies .................................................................. 188
Annex 3 Responses from EU level industry stakeholders ................................ 241
Annex 4 Administrative burdens ...................................................................... 249
Annex 5 Control activity and associated industry data .................................... 263
Annex 6 Reporting cost estimates regarding financing of official controls ..... 359
Annex 7 Participants in the consultation .......................................................... 363
Annex 8 References ........................................................................................... 369
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Executive Summary
E.2 This report examines the impacts of proposed changes to Regulation (EC) 882/2004 regarding the rules on financing official controls
This is the final report of a study to assess the impacts of potential revisions to Regulation (EC) 882/2004
regarding the rules on financing official controls. The report presents results of the research conducted and
impact analysis on options proposed by the Directorate-General for Health and Consumers (DG SANCO)
to change the current system in order to improve shortcomings identified in an evaluation of the Regulation
conducted in 2008. The study was led by GHK Consulting Ltd working with ADAS UK Ltd.
This study contributes to the preparation of an impact assessment of proposed revisions to Regulation
882/2004/EC regarding the rules on financing official controls. The objective of the study was to provide
the Commission with:
▪ Data that substantiate the problems in the current operation of the legislation with respect to
financing official controls; and
▪ An assessment of the impacts of policy options identified by the Commission to address
these problems.
The analysis demonstrates that there are options available that, when suitably packaged and with careful
implementation, could mobilise the resources needed to finance efficient controls at the same time as
fostering the development of a system that is fairer, more transparent, and does more to encourage
efficient management of risk by both food business operators and competent authorities.
E.1 The objectives of the existing legislation are not being met
The objective of Articles 26-29 of the Regulation is to ensure that the approach to financing official controls
is consistent across Member States (MS). The Regulation describes the general approach that should be
taken by MS, and the principles that should be adopted by the relevant authorities. Articles 26-29 of the
Regulation outline the provisions related to the financing of official controls. They specify that:
▪ Member States must ensure that adequate financial resources are made available for official
controls (Article 26);
▪ Where inspection fees are imposed on feed and food business operators, common principles
must be observed for fee-setting and the methods and data used for calculating the fees
must be published or otherwise made available to the public (Article 27); and
▪ When official controls reveal non-compliance with feed and food law, the extra costs that
result from more intensive controls must be borne by the feed and food business operator
concerned (Article 28).
Previous analysis of the implementation of Articles 26-29 has identified four main problems with the
legislation and its implementation: a lack of clarity and uniformity, a lack of transparency in the calculation
of costs by competent authorities, the fact that in most instances fees do not cover inspection costs, and a
lack of flexibility in the current legal framework. The reforms are intended to address those issues.
E.1.1 There is a lack of clarity and uniformity in the Regulation, which results in diverging interpretations in EU Member States
Text of the Regulation is imprecise in places. This has resulted in differences of interpretation by Member
States and led, in turn, to significantly different fee charging systems in which Member States calculate
fees on different bases. Fees that, according to EU law, are compulsory are not always collected. The level
of cost recovery achieved varies widely. Article 3 specifies criteria that Member States should follow in the
design of their official control fees systems. These are particularly relevant where Member States adapt
their controls systems in light of risk factors, the degree of businesses’ past compliance and own checks,
the presence of small businesses and issues related to the location of remote businesses. The way in
which these criteria are described in the legislation makes them difficult to implement.
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E.1.2 There is a lack of transparency in the calculation of costs at Member State level
Many Member States calculate fees in breach of the terms set out in Article 27 of the Regulation. Many
also fail to provide the Commission with the calculation method they use as required by Article 27.12.
Where the calculation method has been made available it has often not been transparent: the cost
categories included and the Competent Authority that has incurred them are unclear, as are the time
periods to which the costs relate. Furthermore, under Annex VI of the Regulation fees can be used to
recover ‘staff salaries’, ‘staff costs’ and ‘laboratory analysis and sampling’. But the wording of the Annex is
insufficiently precise and has proven to be open to various interpretations – resulting in a lack of
consistency of approach across and even within Member States.
E.1.3 Fees do not cover inspection costs
The general principle of financing official controls is that funding should be made available to Competent
Authorities for control activities and that for some controls a fee must be levied. Where fees must be levied,
these should cover the costs of carrying out the specified control activities. In the majority of Member
States, however, the fees collected do not cover the inspection costs. Fees collected are often
incorporated into a Member State’s general revenues (either in entirety or in part), with no restrictions or
conditions regarding how they should be used subsequently.
E.2 The Commission has developed proposals for revision of the legislation that are intended to address these problems
The legislative revision is intended to develop a clearer, simpler and more transparent system, while taking
into account the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity and the need to avoid disturbing the internal
market. Embedded in the general objectives are principles of proportionality, subsidiarity and food
business operator responsibility that to be taken into account by Member States when considering the
scope and specification of fees. The specific objectives for the reforms are to ensure:
▪ Mobilisation of resources for efficiently delivered controls: ensuring that Member State official
bodies have adequate financial means to efficiently perform official controls to ensure food
safety;
▪ Simplification: providing a clearer and simpler legal framework;
▪ Comparability: avoiding disturbance of the internal market while accounting for different cost
structures across Member States;
▪ Streamlining: reducing the administrative burden on Member States and stakeholders as far
as possible; and
▪ Accountability: ensuring that stakeholders have access to information on how resources are
collected and used.
DG SANCO has identified three policy options, drawing on an evaluation conducted in 2008 and further
evidence collected from stakeholders and the Food and Veterinary Office. These options are:
▪ Option A: Improve the current system;
▪ Option B: Harmonise inspection fees; and
▪ Option C: Implement full subsidiarity of inspection fees.
Option A includes a number of distinct sub-options. In this analysis interactions between sub-options have
been considered with a view to the development of a coherent ‘package’ of complementary and mutually
reinforcing measures. Options have been assessed against a reference ‘do nothing’ scenario represented
by the Member States’ current arrangements for financing official controls.
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E.3 The analysis suggests that the problems with the Regulation would best be remedied by improving the current system, rather than moving to a model based on full harmonisation or on full subsidiarity
Option A – improvement of the current system – is the most promising reform option. The various potential
components of the option have each been assessed on their own merits, and the way in which they might
best be ‘packaged’ also considered. The paragraphs below summarise that analysis.
E.3.1 Extend the scope of mandatory fees
This sub-option specifies an extension in the scope of the mandatory fees (i.e. increasing the number of
official controls for which Member States are obliged to collect fees). In simple terms, it shifts the financing
of controls from tax revenue to the businesses that are subject to controls but do not currently pay fees.
Managed appropriately and in combination with other sub-options, this sub-option could encourage
processes that improve Competent Authority efficiency and improve comparability, creating a level playing
field across the EU and the food chain. The measure would result in new costs for those sectors that are
not currently charged. It could also increase administrative costs to Competent Authorities in the additional
assessment and collection of fees (though such costs could themselves be covered by fees if the
legislation was appropriately worded). The controls for which fees are mandatory should be clearly stated.
Clearer definitions of cost should be considered in conjunction with potentially extending the scope of fees.
Some of the industry which pays fees today believes that extension of mandatory fees across the food
chain would reduce the cost of controls to those businesses.
E.3.2 Require full cost recovery
This sub-option would impose a legal requirement on Member States to achieve full cost recovery of the
(eligible) costs of official controls where mandatory fees apply. This is likely to have a positive impact on
mobilisation of resources to finance controls, and therefore meets the primary objective that this sub-option
is designed to achieve. Most Member States do not achieve full cost recovery at present, and a
requirement would enable Member States to put systems in place to do so. It would shift the financing
burden from general taxation to the food chain, increasing costs to FBOs. A year-by-year staged increase
in cost recovery rates (where these are currently less than 100%) would provide time for adjustment both
by FBOs and by Competent Authorities. If businesses are being asked to pay more it is important that the
system is seen to be fair, transparent and efficient therefore this option would best be combined with
complementary measures on transparency, governance and clear definition of eligible costs. The sub-
option that gives Member States the option to provide fee exemptions to micro-enterprises would also
enable Member States to mitigate impacts of full cost recovery on very small businesses where necessary.
E.3.3 Clearly define eligible costs
This sub-option would change Annex VI of the Regulation in order to define more clearly the costs that can
be recovered via fees linked to performing official controls. A precise definition of eligible costs is required.
Definitions that leave scope for differences of interpretation (e.g. on the recovery of overheads and
administrative costs) are unlikely to solve the present problems. An alternative list of eligible costs
proposed by the Commission provides a solid basis for discussion. It would be helpful to have clear rules
on recovery of competent authorities’ overheads and administrative costs, such as by setting a ceiling on
such recovery that is set at a given percentage of eligible staff costs.
E.3.4 Introduce time-based fees
This sub-option would require that time-based fees (rather than flat fees) are used for official controls that
require continuous or systematic presence of officials, and potentially for other controls too. Time-based
fees can be aligned to efficient, risk-based inspection strategies. A shift from flat fees to time-based fees
where continuous/systematic presence of officials is needed can affect the distribution of payments within
a sector. Larger operations with high throughput may pay less under a time-based fee regime while small
operations with low throughputs may find that charges increase. The potential risks to FBOs of time-based
fees – that is, of excess payments for inefficiently delivered inspections – can be mitigated by other sub-
options on governance, transparency, clear definition of eligible costs and the option for micro-enterprise
exemptions. The extension of time-based fees to controls where continuous presence is not required
warrants careful consideration on a case-by-case basis.
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E.3.5 Require ring-fencing of resources
Under this sub-option the Regulation would introduce a requirement that fee revenue be used exclusively
to cover the costs of the official controls for which they are being charged. This sub-option could have
significant positive impacts on mobilisation of resources for official controls and result in improved
accountability and comparability of official controls systems.
E.3.6 Incorporate bonus-malus principles
This sub-option would introduce new wording into the Regulation that supports the incorporation of bonus-
malus principles in the fee system for official controls such that best performers are rewarded while the
worst performers are penalised. Bonus-malus principles are likely to have a positive impact on the
efficiency of official controls systems by encouraging risk-minimising behaviour. They can reinforce risk-
based controls strategies in which resources are used to target establishments that pose greater risks to
the food chain. It may be difficult to provide specific measures within the Regulation’s text on the financing
of official controls but Articles 26-29 should be screened to ensure that they do not inadvertently inhibit use
of such strategies and application of bonus-malus principles. The specification of minimum fees in EU
legislation, for instance, can inhibit the application of fee schedules that reward good performance with
lower fees.
E.3.7 Introduce transparency and reporting requirements
In this sub-option the Regulation would require Member States to provide information to the Commission
regarding the financial resources devoted to official controls each year, and to the public regarding fees,
modes of payment and other administrative procedures. Providing information to the public regarding fees
for official controls will have positive impacts on accountability and the additional administrative costs are
expected to be modest. A requirement to report to the Commission on resources devoted to official
controls will have similarly positive impacts on accountability, but comes with greater administrative cost
burdens to Competent Authorities, particularly in Member States with decentralised systems. The scale of
that burden will vary depending on exactly what data or indicators are required and on whether existing
reporting requirements are rationalised and clarified. Increased transparency will contribute to the creation
of a fairer, more efficient system and thus has significant indirect positive impacts for FBOs.
E.3.8 Provide for industry participation
In this sub-option the Regulation would provide FBOs with the right to participate in the process of setting
the structure of fee rates (though not in determining the fee levels). More participatory governance
arrangements should have positive impacts on accountability, giving industry a voice in the fee setting
process. Industry participation could provide opportunities for FBOs and Competent Authorities to work
together to pursue common objectives. Fee acceptance is also likely to be higher where industry can
participate in the process. Enhancing provisions for consultation, together with improved transparency,
ought to promote efficiency in the application of official controls and the emergence of a fairer system.
E.3.9 Introduce exemptions and reductions for micro-enterprises
Under this sub-option the Regulation would provide reduced fees or fee exemptions for micro-enterprises
(or provide an option for Member States to apply such exemptions). Where this sub-option is made a
requirement, it may reduce cost recovery in Member States, particularly for those with a large number of
such businesses. Respondents indicated a clear preference for having an option to provide such an
exemption or no provision of such an exemption, rather than a requirement to provide universal
exemptions or reductions. Providing Member States with the option to determine whether or not to provide
an exemption or reduction would allow this decision to be made on a case-by-case basis in each Member
State. This would also enable Member States to make judgements about how to mitigate impacts of other
sub-options (e.g. full cost recovery) on their smallest food businesses.
E.4 A policy ‘package’ built from the proposed sub- options under Option A has the potential to significantly reduce administrative burdens, improve cost recovery and create greater efficiencies in the system, if the potential for positive interactions between the sub-options is exploited
It is clear from the consultations and analysis that the sub-components of Option A need to be considered
as a ‘package’. The individual components deal with different elements of the ‘system’ and have a
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cumulative and collective impact on the problems that the reforms are intended to address. The
interactions between sub-options are mostly positive but sometimes negative.
The core purpose of the reforms is to ensure that the official controls are properly resourced but also
efficiently delivered and that charges that are fair, transparent and based on principles common to all
within the EU. Several of the core sub-options would increase payments made by food business operators
for the financing of official controls, shifting the financial burden from pressurised public finances to the
food chain. In some cases this represents a shift in approach, moving away from controls being a free
public service. If the scope and level of fees for business is to increase then there needs to be counter-
veiling pressures on competent authorities to discharge their responsibilities efficiently, not least to reduce
the financial impact to FBOs. This can be done through, for instance, enhanced transparency, industry
participation, a clearer definition of what costs can be included. Risk-based control strategies that result in
efficient use of authorities’ resources and focus effort on FBOs which pose greater risk will also help
relieve burdens on well-run businesses. A coherent reform package can thus encourage a restructuring of
the cost base (where needed) at the same time as addressing fees and revenues.
E.5 Full harmonisation of inspection fees for official controls is unlikely to be feasible
There are valid questions about the feasibility of full harmonisation of inspection fees for official controls
throughout the EU, as proposed in Option B. Developing a cost model or set of pricing principles for each
official control that was seen by stakeholders to be fair and appropriate (given control costs) would be an
extremely challenging exercise. Due to the significant differences in the organisation of official controls
systems, variation in cost factors, etc. amongst Member States it would be impossible to identify a fee level
that would be appropriate for every country. Harmonised fees would also be politically difficult to
implement in Member States with highly decentralised decision making and governance structures. In
Member States with decentralised control systems, it may not be possible to specify the fee rates under
existing national legislative arrangements. There are cases where new national legislation would be
needed.
E5.1 Introduce unified fees for the EU-27
In this sub-option fees for the provision of controls are determined on a unified basis for the EU as a whole
(i.e. the same fee rates apply in each Member State). This is likely to have a negative impact on official
controls systems across the EU-27. Full harmonisation, applying a unified rate across the EU-27, is likely
to reduce the efficiency of the official control system. The distribution of impacts is affected by the level at
which harmonised fees are set. If fees were harmonised at the level of the highest prevailing fee in Europe
then aggregate payment by industry would rise substantially. If the fees were harmonised at the level of the
lowest prevailing fee then industry would, on balance, gain but there would be a corresponding deficit in
government income and in the overall cost-recovery rate. If fees were set in the middle of the current range
then there would be ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ on a state-by-state basis.
E.5.2 Adjust unified fees using a cost of living index
This sub-option is a modified version of the above, in which harmonised fees are adjusted for each
Member State using a cost of living index. Indexation of rates according to the cost of living would mitigate
some of the impacts of harmonisation on a unified basis but the process of setting an appropriate
harmonised fee would remain burdensome and is very unlikely to result in a schedule of fees that reflects
the actual costs of inspecting individual FBOs or even whole sectors at a Member State level. Although the
sub-option could result in positive impacts on comparability and streamlining, these are likely to be
outweighed by the significant negative impacts on efficiency and also of fairness and adherence to
principles of cost recovery.
E.5.3 Introduce EU harmonised fees only for certain import controls
Under this sub-option the Regulation would require that certain import controls are subject to harmonised
fees, particularly those controls where there is a higher degree of harmonisation (e.g. BIPS and DPEs). A
single, uniform price would apply to any EU border point. As with the other sub-options for harmonised
fees, harmonisation of fees for import controls is likely to have a negative impact on the official controls
systems across the EU-27. Development of a cost model or set of pricing principles for import controls
would be an extremely challenging exercise, and due to variance in the current controls systems it would
be impossible to identify a fee level that would be appropriate for every country.
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E.6 Repealing Articles 26-29 of the Regulation and moving to full subsidiarity is expected to increase problems associated with lack of coherence and consistency in the application of fees for official controls
Option C considers the possibility that Member States are obliged to allocate ‘sufficient resources’ to
official controls but that each Member State will be free to determine the approach they follow. Option C
requires repeal of Articles 26-29 in Regulation 882/2004/EC. This option is likely to have a negative impact
on the coherence and consistency of the financing of official controls system in the EU. It is likely to widen
disparities between Member States. Some Competent Authorities may be pressured to lower fees in order
to maintain industry’s competitive advantage which would constrain the resources available for proper
delivery of official controls. Other CAs may increase fees and/or expand fee collection for control activities
in order to achieve full cost recovery.
E.7 Monitoring indicators should be collected in order to assess the effectiveness and impact of the legislative revision
In order to assess whether the legislative revision is achieving its objectives, and whether there are any
unexpected impacts, the European Commission will need to collect, review and publish monitoring
indicators. It will also be necessary to undertake a more detailed evaluation exercise once sufficient time
has elapsed, in order to thoroughly review the performance of the revised legislation.
Two sets of indicators can be considered. Macro indicators linked to strategic objectives can be used to
track progress of the system as a whole, using aggregate data reported by Member States. Alongside that
a set of micro indicators can be used to identify impacts on specific groups of actors within the system,
particularly food business operators and competent authorities. These impacts could be identified and
tracked through following a cohort over time and/or through periodic sampling of the population of FBOs
and authorities.
Work by the Commission, previous evaluations, and this study have all demonstrated the challenges of
mapping the situation in Member States in a context where arrangements for the financing of controls vary
widely, interpretation of the legislation varies and there has not always been timely compliance with
European legislation. In Member States, the central Competent Authorities themselves often have limited
visibility of the situation in different parts of their own countries due to the devolution of powers of control to
local and regional authorities and limited pass-through of information back up to the centre.
Changes in the financing of official controls could be tracked more easily if two changes are made. First,
the annual reports produced by Member States under Regulation 882/2004/EC need to be improved in
terms of their consistency, coverage and clarity. There is a case for reviewing the existing system of
reporting under the Regulation so that the performance of the overall system can be monitored more
effectively and efficiently against a set of key indicators without imposing undue burden on Member States.
Second, adoption of sub-option A7 on publication of cost data (and/or the second component of sub-option
A7 on reporting to the Commission) would ensure that information is made available to track changes over
time.
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1 Introduction
This is the final report of a study to assess the impacts of potential revisions to Regulation (EC)
882/2004 regarding the rules on financing official controls. The study was commissioned by DG
SANCO from GHK Consulting Ltd, working in association with ADAS, UK Ltd. The contract was
awarded following a tender process through Lot 3 of DG SANCO’s Food Chain framework
contract for evaluation and impact assessment services.
This is a final report of the study findings and follows an inception report submitted in February
2011, a progress report submitted in April 2011, and a draft final report submitted in May 2011.
The final report presents the results of the research and impact analysis.
1.1 Study work programme
The work programme and methodology for the study were set out in the proposal submitted by
GHK in October 2010 in response to the terms of reference issued by DG SANCO. Figure 1.1
illustrates the work programme followed for the study. A detailed description of the main stages of
the study is set out below.
Figure 1.1 Overview of the study work programme
Options analysis
•Purpose: Identify key issues and conduct data classification, review and mapping exercise of existing data.
Presentation of findings
•Purpose: Conduct gap analysis based on existing data, case studies in six Member States, and questionnaires and interviews with EU level stakeholders and CAs and national-level industry associations in the case study countries.
Definition
•Purpose: Draw together research phase results into a set of option appraisals. Examine extent to which options respond to stated study objectives. Profile the scale and distribution of impacts. Conduct a comparative assessment for Options A, B and C
Data collection
•Purpose: Reporting, which brings together the study results into a presentation and assessment of findings for the European Commission
Inception report
Draft final report
Final report
PROJECT WORK PROGRAMME DELIVERABLES
Progress report
1.2 Methodology
This section provides an overview of the method adopted for the study.
Stage 1 Problem Definition
The first stage of the study involved an inception phase and development of the problem
definition. Inception and problem definition phases took place over six weeks in January and
February 2010. The purpose of this stage of the study was to collect information on the nature of
the problem facing the legislative framework for the financing of official controls, and to determine
the available data for the study. Section 2 of this report provides the problem definition.
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Stage 2 Data Collection – Stakeholder Consultation and Data Analysis
The purpose of this stage was to collect quantitative and qualitative data on the current situation
in EU Member States and on the impacts of each of the policy options, and to review issues and
challenges with the implementation of the proposals. It involved the following activities:
▪ First, the study team developed a detailed mapping of the options to determine what
information would be required to inform the study. DG SANCO had already defined the
options at a fairly detailed level prior to study initiation. Based on further discussion with the
study Steering Group, the options were further refined. The set of options assessed for this
study is described in Section 3.2.
▪ The second stage of the study also involved assessing the available data to determine what
information might be used to support the empirical analysis.
▪ The consultation component involved several strands and included surveys and interviews of
Competent Authorities and industry stakeholders. The consultation stage of the study ran
from February to April 2011. The consultation exercise involved:
– A vertical component, to obtain in-depth information on impacts on individual
Member States, comprising six case studies across Belgium, Finland, France, the
Netherlands, Poland and the United Kingdom. The case studies involved consultation
(interviews and surveys) with Competent Authorities and industry representatives across
the food chain from businesses relevant to the official controls within the scope of this
study. The results of the case studies are presented in Annex 2; and
– A horizontal component, to obtain additional information at EU level and across
additional Member States where possible, through EU-industry stakeholder interviews
and surveys, and surveys returned by Competent Authorities in non-case study countries.
The EU-level stakeholder results are presented in Annex 3.
▪ The option assessment was conducted in relation to a baseline or ‘do-nothing’ scenario,
using the available baseline information provided by DG SANCO, as well as information
provided by the Regulation 882/2004 Annual Reports, FVO country reports, EUROSTAT data
and information provided by CAs and industry stakeholders (evidence from which is provided
in Annex 4).
Stage 3 Options Analysis
Drawing on the information collected through the consultation exercise, and referencing this to
the baseline scenario, the study team carried out an appraisal of the impacts of each of the policy
options. Section 4 sets out an option-by-option summary of the impact assessment results, with
supporting material provided in Annex 1.
Stage 4 Presentation of findings
The final stage commenced in May 2011 with the preparation of a Draft Final Report presenting
the study findings. Submission of the Draft Final Report was followed by a Steering Group
meeting to discuss the results, which was held on 10 August. Comments received have been
incorporated into this revised Final Report. The Final Report was submitted on 19 September
2011, incorporating further comments from the Steering Group.
1.3 Structure of the report
The remainder of this report is structured as follows:
▪ Section 2 sets out the problem definition for the study;
▪ Section 3 details the policy objectives for the legislative revision of Regulation (EC) 882/2004
and the proposed policy options and sub-options;
▪ Section 4 presents the impact assessment results for each of the policy options and sub-
options; and
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▪ Section 5 provides conclusions based on the impact assessment of the options and sub-
options.
Supporting material is provided in the Annexes to the report:
▪ Annex 1 provides the detailed assessment of the policy options (as summarised in section 4).
It in turn draws on blocks of evidence that are presented in further annexes;
▪ Annex 2 details the case study consultations and analysis carried out for Belgium, Finland,
France, the Netherlands, Poland, and the United Kingdom;
▪ Annex 3 summarises and analyses the responses received from EU level stakeholders
(mostly industry associations);
▪ Annex 4 provides an assessment of the administrative burdens associated with the options
for amending Regulation 882/2004 with respect to fees charged for official controls; and
▪ Annex 5 provides:
– Data on Competent Authority controls performed in EU MS as reported in the study
survey (section A5.1, page 272);
– Business statistics for selected sectors most affected by official control activity –
meat, fish, dairy and feed (section A5.2, page 282);
– Production and trade statistics (section A5.3, page 310);
– DG SANCO’s validated database on the current situation vis-à-vis official controls
(section A5.4, page 316);
– Data on competent authority staff numbers (section A5.5, page 343); and
– Information on control activity from Regulation 882/2004 Annual Reports as supplied
to the European Commission for Finland, the Netherlands, Poland and the UK (section
A5.6, page 346).
The options assessment also draws on a costing exercise covering the supply of additional
financial data to the Commission, described in Annex 6. Annex 7 lists the participants in the
consultations carried out for the study while Annex 8 lists supplementary references.
Figure 1.2 shows the overall report structure schematically.
Figure 1.2 Schematic representation of the structure of the report
Section 4Appraisal of the policy
options
Annex 3Responses from EU level stakeholders
Annex 2Member State Case studies
Annex 1 Detailed assessment of options
and their impacts
Annex 6Reporting costs estimates
regarding financing of
official controls
Annex 5Costing exercise
on reporting
Annex 6 Participants in the consultations
Section 5Conclusions
Section 3Policy objectives and
policy options
Section 2Problem definition
Annex 7 References
Section 1Introduction
Annex 4Responses from EU
level industry
stakeholders
Annex 5Control activity and associated industry
data
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2 Problem definition
This section of the report analyses the problems with the operation of Articles 26-29 of
Regulation 882/2004 that the options developed by the European Commission are intended to
address. A background discussion on the organisation and operation of official controls is not
included here as it has been discussed at some length in other documents, including the final
report to the Study on fees or charges collected by the Member States to cover the costs
occasioned by official controls prepared by the Food Chain Evaluation Consortium for DG
SANCO in 2009. This section focuses on the specific issue of fees for controls.
2.1 Overview of the system for financing official controls
2.1.1 The scope of official controls extends to food business operators across the food chain
Official controls are the inspections and other control activities prescribed under EU law on food
and feed, plant health, animal health and animal welfare. A suite of regulations have been
designed to implement the EU’s General Food Law (Regulation 178/2002/EC) to ensure food
safety across the EU Member States (MS).
Regulations 852/2004/EC, 853/2004/EC and 854/2004/EC are particularly relevant as they
describe what the official controls relate to and what the controls themselves entail. These
regulations specify a range of official controls and together comprise the ‘hygiene package’:
▪ Regulation 852/2004/EC applies to all food business operators (FBOs). It is a general
description of the requirements of food producers handling foodstuffs. In the context of this
regulation, a foodstuff is anything that has been harvested or slaughtered and is intended for
human consumption.
▪ Regulation 853/2004/EC is similar to Regulation 852/2004/EC, but has specific provisions for
foodstuffs of animal origin.
▪ Regulation 854/2004/EC describes what Competent Authorities (CAs) should inspect and
check to ensure appropriate food hygiene standards are observed on foodstuffs of animal
origin intended for human consumption.
Additionally, Regulation 183/2005 lays down requirements for feed hygiene. Regulation
2076/2005 lays down transitional arrangements for the implementation of Regulations 853/2004,
854/2004 and 882/2004.
The hygiene package is supplemented by other EU legislation:
▪ Directive 89/662/EEC aims to harmonise the internal market with respect to veterinary checks
on intra-EU trade.
▪ Directive 90/425/EC lays down rules relating to veterinary and zoo technical checks on live
animals and products of animal origin for intra-EU trade.
▪ Directive 93/119/EEC relates to animal welfare and sets out measures on the protection of
animals at the time of slaughter or killing.
▪ Directive 96/23/EC sets out measures to monitor certain substances and residues for live
animals and products of animal origin.
▪ Directive 97/78/EC sets out the principles governing the organisation of veterinary checks on
products entering the EU from third countries.
▪ Directive 91/496/EEC sets out principles governing the organisation of veterinary checks on
animals entering the EU from third countries
Regulation 882/2004/EC sets out the requirements for official controls organised and undertaken
by Competent Authorities in EU Member States for this body of legislation with respect to
monitoring and verifying compliance with, and enforcing EU law in these areas.
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2.1.2 Articles 26-29 of Regulation 882/2004/EC aim to ensure consistency in the fee charging systems for official controls in EU Member States
Articles 26-29 of Regulation 882/2004/EC describe the fee charging obligations for official
controls with respect to food and feed law, and animal health and welfare rules. The inspection
activities covered by Articles 26-29 of the Regulation include:
▪ Controls applied to goods imported to the EU within certain product sectors (such as
inspections to verify the health of live animals brought into the EU and inspections relating to
residues in animal products);
▪ Controls applied to establishments based in the EU, including those relating to:
– The movement of relevant products within the EU (such as inspections and controls
relating to law governing the transportation of animals); and
– The proper operation of establishments within individual Member States (such as
inspections at slaughterhouses, food hygiene inspections in food service and food retail
establishments).
In particular, these articles of the Regulation:
▪ Do not apply to official controls on organisms harmful to plants and plant products – these are
covered by Council Directive 2000/29/EC.
▪ Do apply to other aspects of the plant health sector, including EU inspections within the
Member States and third countries.
Regulation 882/2004/EC describes how CAs should conduct the inspections and checks required
under EU law.
2.1.2.1 The Regulation obliges Member States to collect fees for certain official controls
Article 27 of the Regulation states that Member States may collect fees or charges to cover the
costs occasioned by official controls and, further, that for certain controls Member States shall
ensure the collection of such a fee. This gives rise to the terms ‘voluntary fee’ and ‘mandatory
fee’ which commonly appear in discussions of this area of EU law.
Under Article 27, Member States are obliged to collect fees (commonly known as ‘mandatory
fees’) on activities defined in:
▪ Annex IV (section A), that is:
– Activities covered by Directives 89/662/EEC1, 90/425/EEC
2, 93/119/EEC
3 and
96/23/EC4 for which Member States are currently collecting fees pursuant to Directive
85/73/EEC5; and
– The approval of feed establishments.
▪ Annex V (section A), that is, activities covered by Directives 97/78/EC6 and 91/496/EEC
7 for
which Member States are currently collecting fees pursuant to Directive 85/73/EEC.
1 Council Directive 89/662/EEC of 11 December 1989 concerning veterinary checks in intra-Community trade with a
view to the completion of the internal market 2 Council Directive 90/425/EEC of 26 June 1990 concerning veterinary and zootechnical checks applicable in intra-
Community trade in certain live animals and products with a view to the completion of the internal market 3 Council Directive 93/119/EEC of 22 December 1993 on the protection of animals at the time of slaughter or killing
4 Council Directive 96/23/EC of 29 April 1996 on measures to monitor certain substances and residues thereof in live
animals and animal products and repealing Directives 85/358/EEC and 86/469EEC and Decisions 89/187/EEC and 91/664/EEC 5 Council Directive 85/73/EEC of 29 January 1985 on the financing of health inspections and controls of fresh meat
and poultry meat
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The use of the terms ‘mandatory’ and ‘voluntary’ (or ‘non-mandatory’) thus relates to whether
Member States are obliged to collect a fee.
Table 2.1 lists controls within the scope of Regulation 854/2004/EC and Regulation 882/2004/EC
for which a fee is mandatory under Regulation 882/2004/EC.
Table 2.1 Official controls within the scope of Regulation 854/2004 and Regulation 882/2004/EC for which a fee is mandatory
Regulation Control
854/2004
Approval of establishments that produce products of animal origin for human consumption
Audit of fresh meat establishments (domestic ungulates, poultry and lagomorphs, farmed and
wild gamed)
Inspection of fresh meat establishments (including ante- and post-mortem inspection and animal
welfare, but not SRM controls and TSE testing)
Inspection of fresh meat establishments: SRM controls and TSE testing
Checks at milk production holdings
Checks on production and marketing of fishery products and aquaculture products
Checks at other food establishments approved in accordance with Regulation 853/2004
882/2004
Checks on animal health at holdings of origin for live animals
Monitoring residues of veterinary medicines and other substances
Approval of feed establishments
Approval of animal by-products establishments
Checks at animal by-product establishments
Checks on imported live animals
Checks on imported feed and food of animal origin8
Checks on imported feed and food of non-animal origin
Checks on live animals and goods transiting the community
2.1.2.2 Articles 26-29 of the Regulation set upper and lower boundaries on the level of mandatory fees, albeit with some scope for fees to fall below the lower limit
Under the Regulation, Member States are free to set the appropriate level of fees or charges but
only within certain common boundaries, that is:
▪ Fees should not be higher than the actual cost of the official controls; and
▪ Minimum levels for mandatory fees are defined in Annexes IV and V.
Minimum fees are defined on a throughput basis – for example, per type of animal or bird for
slaughter and per tonne of meat entering the plant for cutting operations.
Until 1 January 2008 Member States were allowed to use the charge rates defined in Directive
85/73/EEC (which previously defined charges for meat hygiene controls) as a minimum level for
fees.
6 Council Directive 97/78/EC of 18 December 1997 laying down the principles governing the organisation of veterinary
checks on products entering the Community from third countries 7 Council Directive 91/496/EEC of 15 July 1991 laying down the principles governing the organisation of veterinary
checks on animals entering the Community from third countries and amending Directives 89/662/EEC, 90/425/EEC and 90/675/EEC 8 A fee for control activity on imported feed and food of animal origin is required only with respect to Article 15.5
commodities.
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2.2 Articles 26-29 of the Regulation are designed to ensure consistency in the financing for official controls across Member States and to ensure that adequate financing is available for these controls
The objective of Articles 26-29 of the Regulation is to ensure that the approach to financing official controls is consistent across Member States. The Regulation describes the general approach that should be taken by Member States, and the principles that should be adopted by relevant authorities in MS.
Articles 26-29 of the Regulation outline the provisions related to the financing of official controls. The main principles of these provisions can be summarised as:
▪ Member States must ensure that adequate financial resources are made available for official
controls (Article 26);
▪ Where inspection fees are imposed on feed and food business operators, common principles
must be observed for fee-setting and the methods and data used for calculating the fees
must be published or otherwise made available to the public (Article 27); and
▪ When official controls reveal non-compliance with feed and food law, the extra costs that
result from more intensive controls must be borne by the feed and food business operator
concerned (Article28).
Articles 26-29 also reflect a set of principles that should be taken into account by MS when
considering the scope and specification of fees, which are identified in the FCEC study (2009):
▪ Proportionality: Article 5 of the Treaty indicates that EU Regulation should not go beyond
what is necessary in order to achieve the objectives pursued9;
▪ Subsidiarity: Article 5 of the Treaty also indicates that where objectives cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the Member States and would therefore, by reason of their
complexity, trans-border character and, with regard to feed and food imports, international
character, be better achieved at EU level, the EU may adopt measures10
; and
▪ FBO responsibility: EU food and feed law is based on the principle that FBOs at all stages
within the business under their control are responsible for ensuring product safety11
.
There is substantive evidence12
from stakeholders, however, that these objectives are not being
met due to differences in the interpretation and application of the Regulation across MS.
2.2.1 There are three main reasons why the objectives related to the fee setting elements of the Regulation are not being met
Failure to meet the objectives set out in Articles 26-29 of the Regulation can be described in
terms of four issues: lack of clarity and uniformity, lack of transparency in calculating costs, fees
do not cover inspection costs, and there is a lack of flexibility in the current legal framework.
2.2.1.1 Issue 1: There is a lack of clarity and uniformity in the Regulation, which results in diverging interpretations in EU MS
The Regulation is vague, and therefore open to diverging interpretation by Member States. This
has led to significantly different fee charging systems, with MS generally calculating and charging
fees at different levels and on different bases. Compulsory fees are not always collected. There is
9 Preamble (48) of Regulation 882/2004/EC; preamble (66) of Regulation 178/2002/EC
10 Preamble (48) of Regulation 882/2004/EC
11 Preamble (4) of Regulation 882/2004/EC; Article 17.1 of Regulation 178/2002/EC
12 The European Commission launched an external evaluation of these rules which concluded in February 2009. The
Commission reported on this to the European Parliament and Council with Report COM/2009/334/Final in July 2009 (in line with Article 65 of the Regulation).
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significant variation in the level of fees charged. Several MS do not collect fees for non-
compulsory control activities whilst others do.
Section A of Annex IV (concerning domestic production) and Annex V (imports) of the Regulation
specify the types of goods, establishments and activities for which fees should be charged for
official controls. These fees are termed ‘compulsory’ within the meaning of Article 27.2. Not all
MS collect the required level of compulsory fees. The Regulation also includes provisions for
collection of fees for official control activities outside of those identified in Section A of Annex IV
and Section A of Annex V, but collection of fees for these activities is ‘non-compulsory’ (Article
27.1). Several MS collect fees for such official control activities (i.e. non-compulsory fees) while
others do not collect any fees beyond those they are obliged to collect by the Regulation (under
Article 27.2). While the legislation envisaged that this may occur, in practice the variance in
controls for which fees are collected creates a lack of uniformity which makes it difficult to
compare systems across the EU and a lack of clarity as to why collection of fees for some control
activities is mandatory and for others it is not.
Article 28 provides for the collection of fees on expenses arising from additional official controls
beyond ‘routine controls’. The interpretation of ‘routine’ differs between MS; as a result, some
MS are not collecting fees where these are supposed to be mandatory.
Article 27.7 specifies that where several official controls are conducted at the same establishment
they should be charged as one control. There is evidence of double charging, however: fees are
being collected more than once at the same establishment at different points along the supply
chain for what should effectively be considered the same control. This is contrary to Article 27.7
of the Regulation. The FCEC evaluation found evidence of doubling charging, for example, in the
meat sector where some industry respondents indicated that they were charged fees for the
same activity both at slaughter and meat cutting points. Additionally, there is evidence that
charges are being levied more than once when a good is traded across MS borders. For
example, the FCEC evaluation found that dairy products brought into one MS from another are
being re-examined for residues, despite coming from an approved EU-factory in a MS that
applies a residue plan.
Fees are charged according to two main principles: fees must not be below minimum levels and should not be higher than the actual cost of the controls. In practice, these principles are often not applied.
Article 27 describes the basic principles of how fees for official controls should be charged: first,
fees must be at least the minimum specified in Annexes IV and V, and second, they should not
be more than the actual costs of the controls. The actual fee system employed is left to the
discretion of the MS.
The FCEC study13
found that the provisions of Article 27 are perceived by Competent Authorities
and other stakeholders as unclear and vague. Article 27 is subsequently interpreted in various
and often quite different ways by MS, leading to multiple scenarios for the fee rates used.
Most Member States use a combination of flat rates and/ or minimum rates
A combination of flat and minimum rates is often used. Under the Regulation, flat rates may be
used where the rate represents the actual cost of the control activity. Baseline data for 2010
provided by DG SANCO indicate that 17 out of 27 MS use a mix of flat and minimum rates (Table
2.2). One MS (Malta) uses minimum rates for Annex IV and V activities and does not collect fees
outside of these areas. Seven MS use flat rates for all activities for which they collect fees, in
accordance with paragraphs 1 or 2 of Article 27.
In many cases where a combination of flat and minimum fees are used, minimum fees are
applied to control activities for which a fee is mandatory, while flat fees are calculated for control
13 Ibid.
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activities for which a fee is non-mandatory. Other MS collect minimum fees for a more limited set
of controls or in special circumstances. For example, the Netherlands only charges the minimum
fee for import controls and a flat fee for all other controls, while in Finland municipalities may
choose to charge smaller establishments either the minimum fee or a charge based on costs.
In some cases, the application of flat or minimum rates is not consistent with Article 27.4(a). This
Article stipulates that fees should not be higher than the costs borne by the CA (in accordance
with the list of eligible costs in Annex VI) and that the fee may be based either on CA costs or on
the minimum fees set out in section B of Annexes IV and V. At least two Member States charge
the minimum fee for controls where the fee is greater than actual costs (e.g. DE and the UK).
Some Member States apply fee rates below the minimum rates set out in Annexes IV and V of Regulation 882/2004
Five MS apply fees that are below the minimum rates specified in Annexes IV and V. Although
Article 27.6 makes provision for charging a reduced fee in certain limited circumstances, in
practice the lower fees are not necessarily always applied in accordance with this provision. Two
Member States charge less than the minimum fee as the fee calculation indicates that the control
costs are lower than the minimum rates set out in the legislation (i.e. LT and NL). One MS
indicates that lower fees are charged for import controls in accordance with the exceptions set
out in the legislation (HU). In two MS, it is unclear why rates are charged below the minimum (i.e.
FR and DE (Bavaria)).
Many Member States use flat rates based on throughput or time basis
Where flat rates are used, the rates are often calculated on a throughput basis (animal or
tonnage basis in accordance with Articles 26 – 29), or based on the actual time and cost of the
staff performing the official controls. These are often complex calculations that differ widely
across MS. In some MS, an hourly fee is set for certain controls (e.g. DE and IT). Several MS use
a flat minimum rate supplemented by a time based fee.
Table 2.2 Fee rates used for official controls across the EU-27
Member
State
Flat rates
only
Minimum
rates only
Flat + min
rates
Reduction below
minimum rates
Flat rates on throughput
or time basis
AT
BE
BG
CY
CZ
DE
DK
EE
ES
FI
FR
GR
HU
IE
IT
LT
LU*
LV
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Member
State
Flat rates
only
Minimum
rates only
Flat + min
rates
Reduction below
minimum rates
Flat rates on throughput
or time basis
MT
NL
PT
PL
RO
SE
SI
SK
UK
TOTAL 7 1 17 5 17
Source: DG SANCO Baseline data (2010)
*Luxembourg – no data available
Finally, Article 3 specifies criteria that Member States should follow in the design of their official
control fees systems. These are particularly relevant where Member States adapt their controls
systems in light of risk factors, the degree of businesses’ past compliance and own checks, the
presence of small businesses and issues related to the location of remote businesses. The way
in which these criteria are described in the legislation makes them difficult to implement.
2.2.1.2 Issue 2: There is a lack of transparency in the calculation of costs at MS level
The calculation of fees is governed by Article 27. Many MS calculate fees in breach of the
provisions of the Regulation. The calculation method used to determine the appropriate time
based fee should be transparent and communicated to the Commission (as per Article 27.12).
Numerous MS fail to provide the calculation method used to the Commission. Where the
calculation method has been made available it has often not been transparent; the cost
categories included and the CA that has incurred them are unclear, as are the time periods to
which the costs relate.
The three cost categories that can be included in calculating fees are specified in Annex VI as:
staff salaries, staff costs (including facilities, tools, equipment, training, travel, and associated
costs) and laboratory analysis and sampling. Member States perceive these categories to be
vague. As a result, there is considerable uncertainty as to how cost calculations are derived.
2.2.1.3 Issue 3: Fees do not cover inspection costs
The general principle of financing official controls is that funding should be made available to CAs
for control activities and that for some controls a fee must be levied. Where fees must be levied,
these should cover the costs of carrying out the specified control activities. In the majority of MS,
however, the fees collected do not cover the inspection costs14
. Fees collected are often
incorporated into a Member State’s general budget (either in entirety or in part), with no
restrictions or conditions regarding how they should be used subsequently.
14 Ibid.
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3 Policy objectives and policy options
This section of the report outlines the general objectives of the proposed revisions to Articles 26-
29 of Regulation 882/2004/EC on the financing of official controls, as well as the specific and
operational objectives that contribute towards meeting the general objectives. This section also
summarises the policy options for the proposed revisions to the Regulation, and how they relate
to achieving the policy objectives.
3.1 Policy objectives of the proposed revisions to Articles 26-29 of the Regulation are set at three levels
European Commission guidelines recommend developing objectives at three levels (all three
levels need not always be considered):
▪ General objectives: the Treaty-based goals towards which the policy aims to contribute;
▪ Specific objectives: aims specific to the policy intervention under consideration. These should
contribute directly to meeting the general objectives of the legislative revision; and
▪ Operational objectives: the deliverables (outputs) of the legislative revision, which contribute
to meeting the specific objectives of the revisions.
3.1.1 General objectives are set to achieve the primary goal of ensuring that Member States have adequate financial resources to carry out official controls
The general objectives of revisions to Articles 26-29 of the Regulation are set to achieve one
main goal: ensuring that Member States have adequate financial resources to carry out
official controls. These include:
▪ Developing a clearer, simpler and more transparent system;
▪ Taking into account the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity; and
▪ Taking into account the need to avoid disturbing the internal market.
3.1.2 Five specific objectives have been set to achieve the general objectives
The specific objectives aim to contribute directly to achieving the general objectives:
▪ Mobilisation of resources for efficiently delivered controls: ensuring that Member State
official bodies have adequate financial means to efficiently perform official controls to ensure
food safety;
▪ Simplification: providing a clearer and simpler legal framework;
▪ Comparability: avoiding disturbance of the internal market while accounting for different cost
structures across Member States;
▪ Streamlining: reducing the administrative burden on Member States and stakeholders as far
as possible; and
▪ Accountability: ensuring that stakeholders have access to information on how resources are
collected and used.
3.1.3 Operational objectives describe the anticipated outputs from legislative changes; these are developed based on the results from this study
The operational objectives for revisions to the legislation describe the outputs that are anticipated
once the changes have come into force. Operational objectives are considered in Section 4.4 as
part of the outline of a monitoring and evaluation framework for the legislative revision.
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3.2 Policy options have been identified to achieve the objectives of the proposed revisions to Articles 26-29 of the Regulation
The European Commission developed a set of policy options for revision to Articles 26-29 of the
Regulation in order to improve financing for official controls. These were defined and updated
over the period December 2009 to September 2010. These options were developed based on the
results of an evaluation in 200815
and further evidence collected from stakeholders and the Food
and Veterinary Office (FVO), DG SANCO. They have been further refined during the inception
phase of the study and again following submission of the interim report. The options are:
▪ Option A: Improve the current system;
▪ Option B: Harmonise inspection fees; and
▪ Option C: Full subsidiarity of inspection fees.
Each of these options is mutually exclusive and must be considered in isolation. Option A
includes a series of sub-options which must be considered together as a potential ‘package’ of
options. In this case, the sub-options are not mutually exclusive and may be considered as
potentially co-existing in any revisions to Articles 26-29 of Regulation (EC) 882/2004.
Nonetheless, there are interactions between many of the sub-options which must be weighed in
order to develop an optimised ‘package’ within Option A. These interactions are discussed in
Section 4.3.
Table 3.1 lists the three options and the sub-options to Options A and B assessed in this study.
The options and sub-options are described in the remainder of this section.
Table 3.3 The study considers three main options and a series of sub-options, each of which contributes to addressing the specific policy objectives
Ref Policy option & sub-option
A
Improve the current system
A1 Extend the scope of mandatory fees
A2 Require full cost recovery
A3 Clearly define eligible costs
A4 Introduce time-based fees
A5 Require ring-fencing of resources
A6 Incorporate bonus-malus principles
A7 Introduce transparency and reporting requirements
A8 Provide for industry participation
A9 Introduce exemptions and reductions for micro-enterprises
B Full harmonisation
B1 Introduce unified fees for the EU-27
B2 Adjust unified fees using a cost of living index
B3 Introduce EU harmonised fees only for certain import controls
C Repeal Articles 26-29 of the Regulation (full subsidiarity)
15 Report COM/2009/334/Final (July 2009).
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3.2.2 Option A - Improve the current system
Option A considers a set of potential modifications to the current system through amendments to
Articles 26-29 of the Regulation. Each sub-option could be considered a ‘stand-alone’ possibility,
although in some cases, respondents indicated that they may be necessarily linked.
3.2.2.4 Sub-option A1 – Extend the scope of mandatory fees
Sub-option A1 considers extending the scope of mandatory fees to cover some or all of the
controls for which fees are currently ‘non-mandatory’ (i.e. increasing the number of official
controls for which Member States are obliged to collect fees).
The option as specified does not indicate which controls would be made mandatory. In its more
robust form this sub-option could, in principle, require that fees are applied for all controls across
the food chain – ensuring equal treatment of all businesses involved, from inputs to production
(such as feed) to retail and food service. In a more moderate form it could cover those controls
carried out on operators subject to the provisions of Regulations (EC) 852/2004 and 183/2005 for
which fees are currently not mandatory.
3.2.2.5 Sub-option A2 – Require full cost recovery
Sub-option A2 considers whether the Regulation should impose a legal requirement on Member
States to achieve full cost recovery of the (eligible) costs of official controls.
3.2.2.6 Sub-option A3 – Clearly define eligible costs
Sub-option A3 considers changes to the Regulation that more clearly define the costs that can be
recovered from fees to those directly linked to performing official controls. Currently, Annex VI
sets out a definition of eligible costs as follows:
▪ Salaries of the staff involved in official controls;
▪ Staff costs related to control activities, including facilities, tools, equipment, training, travel,
and associated costs; and
▪ Laboratory sampling and analysis costs.
As reported in the previous evaluation, this specification has been criticised for lack of clarity and
there have been differences of interpretation.
The terms of reference for this study specified a suggested alternative schedule of eligible costs.
This list is intended to define costs more clearly and so address the problems that there have
been in the interpretation of the current Annex VI text.
The suggested eligible cost items are:
▪ Salaries for inspectors, including social contributions;
▪ Tools and instruments to be used during inspections;
▪ Out of office hours activities;
▪ Travelling linked to official controls;
▪ Training of inspectors;
▪ Quota of administrative costs linked to the inspection activities (including planning); and
▪ Sampling and analysis costs (when needed).
This sub-option considers whether, and how:
▪ Each of the above costs set out in the revised list should remain;
▪ The revised list is sufficiently clear to avoid different interpretations;
▪ Other costs should be added and/or certain items should be deleted from the list;
▪ The ‘quota of administrative costs’ should be more clearly specified (if it remains in the list);
and
▪ The ‘quota of administrative costs’ adequately cover overheads related to inspection
activities.
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3.2.2.7 Sub-option A4 – Introduce time-based fees
Sub-option A4 considers the impact of requiring time-based fees in the Regulation for official
controls that require continuous and systematic presence of officials.
Consideration of this sub-option includes stakeholder views on where time-based fees might be
applied beyond those controls that require continuous or systematic presence of officials.
3.2.2.8 Sub-option A5 – Require ring-fencing of resources
Sub-option A5 considers whether the Regulation should introduce a requirement that fee revenue
be used exclusively to cover the costs of the official controls for which they are being charged
(i.e. directly with a budget line or indirectly through the general budget).
3.2.2.9 Sub-option A6 – Incorporate bonus-malus principles
Sub-option A6 considers whether Articles 26-29 of the Regulation should be changed to
incorporate bonus-malus principles in the fee system for official controls such that best
performers are rewarded while the worst performers are penalised. This sub-option considers:
▪ How the Regulation can promote bonus-malus principles (and not inhibit their application);
▪ Which controls are most suitable for fees that incorporate bonus-malus principles; and
▪ How the overall performance of Option A can be improved by incorporating bonus-malus
principles.
Bonus-malus systems incorporated into fee schedules are a separate matter from the legal
sanctions (including fines) imposed by authorities on businesses in cases of non-compliance.
Fines and other sanctions are outside the scope of this study.
3.2.2.10 Sub-option A7 – Introduce transparency and reporting requirements
Sub-option A7 considers whether Articles 26-29 of the Regulation should be changed to require
Member States to provide information:
▪ To the Commission regarding the financial resources devoted to official controls each year
(through the annual reports required under Regulation 882/2004/EC); and
▪ To the public regarding fees (e.g. the implementing rules, fee review process, and the
calculation method), modes of payment and other administrative procedures.
3.2.2.11 Sub-option A8 – Provide for industry participation
Sub-option A8 considers changes to Articles 26-29 of the Regulation that would provide FBOs
with the right to participate in the process of setting the structure of fee rates. This sub-option
considers:
▪ Whether and how FBOs already participate in this process in each Member State;
▪ Advantages and disadvantages of amending the Regulation to provide each FBO with the
right to participate; and
▪ Stakeholders’ views of how such an amendment should be specified so as to maximise its
positive impacts and minimise negative impacts.
3.2.2.12 Sub-option A9 – Introduce exemptions and reductions for micro-enterprises
Sub-option A9 considers whether the Regulation should be changed to provide reduced fees or
fee exemptions for micro-enterprises. The sub-option does not state whether the exemption
would be mandatory or an option that Member States could choose to exercise. The (potential)
exemption relates only to the levying of fees, and not the imposition of controls.
3.2.3 Option B – Fully harmonise inspection fees for official controls
Option B considers the possibility to fully harmonise inspection fees for official controls
throughout the EU. Option B is equivalent to the ‘full harmonisation’ option considered in the
evaluation study carried out for DG SANCO by the Food Chain Evaluation Consortium (FCEC).
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Under this scenario all MS would pay the same fees (fixed rates) for the same activities (i.e. full
harmonisation). There are three sub-options within this option.
3.2.3.13 Sub-option B1: Introduce unified fees for the EU-27
Fees for the provision of controls are determined on a unified basis for the EU as a whole (i.e. the
same fee rates apply in each Member State).
3.2.3.14 Sub-option B2: Adjust unified fees using a cost of living index
A modified version of this option in which harmonised fees are adjusted for each Member State
using a cost of living index (e.g. based on Purchasing Power Parity or other price indexes).
3.2.3.15 Sub-option B3: Introduce EU harmonised fees only for certain import controls
This sub-option for import controls considers whether the Regulation should require that certain
import controls are subject to harmonised fees, particularly those controls where there is a higher
degree of harmonisation (e.g. BIPS and DPEs). A single, uniform price would apply to any EU
border point.
3.2.4 Option C – Repeal Articles 26-29 of the Regulation (full subsidiarity)
Option C considers the possibility that Member States are obliged to allocate ‘sufficient
resources’ to official controls but that each Member State will be free to determine the approach
they follow. Option C requires repeal of Articles 26-29 in Regulation 882/2004/EC. This would
mean deregulation of fee requirements for official control activity and is broadly equivalent to the
‘full subsidiarity’ option in the 2009 FCEC study.
3.3 The options are assessed against a ‘do nothing’ reference scenario
The options listed above are assessed against a reference scenario which in this instance
equates to a ‘do nothing option’ – that is, in relation to the arrangements currently in place for
financing official controls in the various Member States without reforming existing EU law. The
‘do nothing’ scenario can be defined with reference to the current situation in individual Member
States and expected changes over time, based on currently available information and present
expectations. The main sources of information available to assist with defining the current
situation are:
▪ Baseline data provided by DG SANCO which was collected from the following sources:
– The previous evaluation of the official control systems across EU Member States
(FCEC 2008);
– Competent Authority websites; and
– FVO inspections.
▪ Member State’s annual reports as prepared under Regulation 882/2004/EC.
▪ Data provided by DG SANCO on stakeholder views of the official controls systems.
▪ Data from Eurostat related to the NACE codes for labour costs, production, trade, SMEs and
micro enterprises.16
▪ Information obtained through the stakeholder consultation as part of this study.
The problem definition in the previous chapter outlined various aspects of the current situation.
The remainder of this section supplements that by highlighting further issues that are relevant to
the definition of the baseline scenario and to the appraisal of the proposed changes to the
Regulation. Annex 5 provides more data on the current operation of controls, the industries to
which controls are applied and relevant patterns of trade.
16 10.01 – processing and preserving of meat and production of meat products; 10.02 – processing and preserving of
fish, crustaceans and molluscs; 10.05 – manufacture of dairy products; and 10.09 – manufacture of prepared animal feeds.
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3.3.1 The organisation of official control systems ranges from the highly centralised to heavily decentralised, depending on the Member State
One of the most significant challenges faced in assessing the impacts of reforms to the current
legislation is that although the legislation prescribes a common approach, there is no standard
EU model for the delivery of official control services. Moreover, the organisation of Competent
Authorities responsible for implementing and administering official controls across the MS is
considerably more complex than the Regulation assumes. CAs are responsible for the overall
supervision and operations of the official controls system in each Member State (Article 2.417
).
The Competent Authorities are structured and organised differently in each MS, both in terms of
the administrative structure for fee collection and execution of the controls18
. Depending on the
Member State, CAs involved in the system of official controls may span national, regional and
district / municipal level authorities, and may also include external delegated bodies.
The Regulation includes provisions to ensure ‘efficient and effective coordination’ between such
organisations, but in practice these provisions are not always utilised. When several CAs or
delegated bodies are involved, the central CA does not always have complete information on the
actual operation of the system. Such differences pose significant difficulties when attempting to
calculate and apply fee rates.
The official control systems in Member States range from those with a high level of centralisation,
to those that are highly decentralised. Table 3.2 categorises each Member State in terms of how
centralised its official system is, using the following four categories:
▪ Highly centralised (HC): countries in which control responsibilities remain largely at national
level and the distribution of responsibilities for control activity is contained within a small
number of implementing bodies.
▪ Centralised (C): countries in which control responsibilities remain largely at national level, but
control activities themselves are delegated to regional offices and/or control responsibilities
are spread across a larger number of government departments.
▪ Decentralised (DC): countries in which control activity is delegated to regional or
municipal/local offices but control responsibilities are coordinated through a small number of
government departments.
▪ Highly decentralised (HDC): countries in which control responsibilities are spread across
national and regional offices or devolved administrations and control activities are
coordinated at municipal / local levels.
There is a relatively even split of countries between centralised (13) and decentralised systems
(11), with some further differences between each category (Table 3.2).
Table 3.4 Governance of official control systems in Member States
Member State Highly
centralised
Centralised Decentralised Highly
decentralised
Austria*
Belgium
Bulgaria
Cyprus
Czech Republic*
Denmark
17 Article 2.4: ‘Competent authority’ means the central authority of a Member State competent for the organisation of
official controls or any other authority to which that competence has been conferred. 18
FCEC (2009)
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Member State Highly
centralised
Centralised Decentralised Highly
decentralised
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany**
Greece
Hungary*
Ireland*
Italy
Latvia**
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands*
Poland
Portugal*
Romania**
Slovakia**
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
Total 5 8 3 8
Source: FVO country profiles
* Based on FVO country profile prior to 2008. **Supplementary research.
The level of centralisation influences how straightforward it is for central competent authorities to
implement options and changes set down in European law. In some Member States, such as
Finland, the central CAs have no direct jurisdiction over the municipal CAs responsible for
conducting the control activities and setting and collecting fees. OC systems which are highly
centralised, such as the system in France, could find it easier to implement changes to fee levels
without additional national measures.
3.3.2 The competent authorities delivering official controls also vary widely in scale
The composition of staff in CAs responsible for executing controls differs widely between MS,
ranging from higher-cost direct payroll public service individuals to lower cost / freelance
contractual arrangements with appropriately qualified persons. According to the most recent FVO
country profiles, the number of CA full-time equivalents (FTE) employed in Member States’
official control systems ranges between approximately 55 (Luxembourg) and 21,200 (Italy). The
number of CA FTEs depends on the size of the sector(s) to which the controls relate. As with the
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structure of control activity in different MS described in Section 3.3.1 this variation can pose
significant difficulties when attempting to calculate and apply fee rates19
.
Table 3.5 Staff resources of official control systems in Member States
Member State Staff resources
(FTE)
Austria* 2,500
Belgium 2,100
Bulgaria 3,300
Cyprus 600
Czech Republic* 3,700
Denmark 5,500
Estonia 1,400
Finland 1,300
France 8,200
Germany** -
Greece 4,700
Hungary* 3,200
Ireland* 2,300
Italy 21,100
Latvia** -
Lithuania 2,100
Luxembourg 55
Malta 133
Netherlands* 3,100
Poland 12,100 (and 5,200 private veterinary practitioners)
Portugal* 1,342
Romania** -
Slovakia** -
Slovenia 580
Spain 7,330
Sweden 3,400
United Kingdom 8,800
Source: FVO country profiles
* Based on FVO country profile prior to 2008.
**No country profile available.
19 The FVO country profiles present data on staff resources at varying levels of specificity. Some profiles provide a
detailed breakdown of staff resources by municipality, while others provide figures on a national basis only. Where figures are provided on a sub-national basis, it is often unclear if they relate to staff dedicated to official controls only. To avoid double counting, and ensure comparability between Member States, only national-level data on staff resources for official control systems is included in Table 3.5.
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3.3.3 The proportion of SMEs in affected sectors varies across the Member States, but remains high
The proportion of SMEs in the sectors most affected by fees for official controls varies from 21
per cent in Slovakia, to 75 per cent in Ireland (Table 3.4). The impact of changes in fee
arrangements on SMEs is an important consideration; small businesses may be less able to
absorb or pass on increases in cost triggered by new or higher official control fees.
Table 3.6 Proportion of SMEs in the four sectors most affected by fees for official controls20
Member State Proportion of SMEs (%)
Austria 66
Belgium 65
Bulgaria 40
Cyprus 62
Czech Republic No information available
Denmark No information available
Estonia 65
Finland 56
France No information available
Germany 75
Greece No information available
Hungary No information available
Ireland 75
Italy 53
Latvia 69
Lithuania 42
Luxembourg 46
Malta No information available
Netherlands No information available
Poland 60
Portugal 41
Romania 38
Slovakia 21
Slovenia 48
Spain 44
Sweden 64
United Kingdom 57
Eurostat 2008
20 The four sectors are: processing and preserving of meat and production of meat products; processing and
preserving of fish, crustaceans and molluscs; manufacture of dairy products; and manufacture of prepared animal feeds.
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3.3.4 Hard data on control costs and fees remain elusive
Successive studies have found that data on the control costs and fees collected for control
activities are difficult to obtain. Publication of fee rates is not a universal practice (see section
3.2.2.7). The survey for this study requested data on the costs (to competent authorities) of
carrying out control activity, but only two Member States provided complete information (the UK
and Bulgaria), and four provided information on import control activity (Ireland, Lithuania, Spain,
and Sweden) (see Annex 1,Table A5.2). Only one of these is a case study country from whom
this level of detail was requested. The problems of lack of transparency and inconsistency that
are cause for reform of the present arrangements also pose barriers to that reform by making it
difficult to assemble a clear picture of the baseline situation.
Data have been assembled where they are available. An assessment has been made of the
baseline situation and impacts of the proposed options based on extrapolations from the limited
information provided. Lack of data posed challenges to option assessment, constraining the
depth of analysis possible on each option. Section 4.4 proposes opportunities for data collection
that would assist future monitoring and evaluation of the official controls system based on the
challenges encountered in this study.
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4 Appraisal of the policy options
This section of the report summarises the impact assessment results for each policy option and
sub-option described in section 3. Detailed assessments of each option and sub-option are
provided in Annex 1 and should be read in conjunction with this section of the report.
4.1 Option evaluation criteria are set to assess opportunities to develop a clearer, simpler and more transparent system
At a strategic level, the proposals aim to develop a clearer, simpler and more transparent system,
taking into account in particular the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity and the need to
avoid internal market disturbance. They must ensure the fulfilment of the principle set in Article
26 of Regulation 882/2004/EC that Member States shall have adequate financial means to
provide the necessary staff and other resources for official controls.
The frame of reference is provided by:
▪ The baseline intervention logic for EU intervention in the governance of fees for official
controls as defined by Articles 26-29 of Regulation 882/2004/EC (Figure 4.1); and
▪ The logic framework for the current proposals for reform to Articles 26-29 of Regulation
882/2004/EC (Figure 4.2);
The options will need to be individually and collectively evaluated, with reference to the ‘do
nothing’ scenario, on the basis of the following criteria:
▪ Efficiency: ensuring that Member States’ official bodies have adequate financial means for
the efficient performance of official controls to ensure food safety;
▪ Simplification: creating a clearer and simpler legal framework;
▪ Comparability: avoiding the disturbance of the internal market, while taking into account
different MS cost structures;
▪ Streamlining: reducing the administrative burden on MS and on stakeholders as much as
possible; and
▪ Accountability: ensuring that stakeholders have access to information on how resources are
collected and used.
The options are also assessed with respect to their:
▪ Feasibility: possibility to implement the option and extent of the required changed; and
▪ Wider impacts: wider consequences of implementing the option, including sector-specific,
food chain and extra-EU effects.
Finally, the assessment considers the overall contribution of the option to meeting the specific
objectives, and correcting a known deficiency in the official controls system.
The impact assessment for each policy option is based on:
▪ Evidence collected through stakeholder consultation at EU level;
▪ Six case studies of official control systems in EU Member States (summarised in Annex 2);
and
▪ Other data gathered on the market and current operation of official controls.
The evidence collected includes a range of qualitative and quantitative information.
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Figure 4.3 Intervention logic for proposed reforms to Articles 26-29 of Regulation 882/2004/EC
Inputs• Skilled staff
• Financial management and reporting systems• Billing infrastructure
• Time management and recording systems
• Time involved in fee setting, consultations/appeals/etc
Specific Objectives• Ensure a harmonised approach with regard to official controls
consistent with:o The principle of proportionality
o The principle of subsidiarity
o The principle of FBO responsibility• Authorities achieve cost recovery on efficiently delivered
service
Global Objectives• Ensure a high level of protection of human life and health and
the protection of consumers' interests, including fair practices in food trade, taking account of, where appropriate, the
protection of animal health and welfare, and the environment
• Achieve the free movement in the Community of food and feed manufactured or marketed according to the general principles
and requirements of EU law• Promote better regulation and maintain / support
competitiveness.
Activities• Application of charges & collection of
revenues• Time/cost accounting & bill generation
processes
• Financial reporting• Rate-setting activities (including
consultation and appeal processes)• Budgeting
Outputs• Cost recovery on specified official control
activities• Fees levied on FBOs which match the cost
of inspection
OutcomesAdequately resourced official controls
delivered as part of an professional, efficient, risk-sensitive system for monitoring
compliance & managing
ProblemInterpretation & application of current law
ProblemScope & basis of charging fees lack
Harmonisation
Transparency Coherence
Impacts• Improved protection of human health
• Fairer food trade practices• Greater protection of animal health and
welfare
• Improved market functioning
Problem:Lack of full cost recovery in
most Member States
A well-functioning system, based on
implementation of the proposed
changes will have
positive outcomes (and thus, impacts)
that correspond with the objectives of the
legislation
ProblemResourcing of controls is
inadequate (?)
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Figure 4.4 Logic framework for the proposed reforms to Articles 26-29 of Regulation 882/2004/EC
Option C – Improve current system
Improve
market operation &
outcomes by
addressing problems in
interpretation & application
of current law
Lack of full
cost recovery
for MS
Lack of
harmonisation
Dysfunction in
EU internal
market
Lack of
coherence
Lack of
transparency
Time-based
fees for
continuous
activity
(based on
one of):
1.MS costs
2.EU-wide
hourly rate
3.Detailed cost
calculation
Extended
scope for
mandatory
fees
Full cost
recovery
requirement
Internal market
functions, but
MS cost
structures
considered
Clearer &
simpler legal
f ramework
MS adequately
f inance
controls
Lower MS &
stakeholder
administrative
burdens
Greater
efficiency
Streamlined
processes
Comparability
Simplified
system
Greater
accountability
Rationale Problem areas Interventions OutputsIntermediate
Outcomes Outcomes
Ensure
stakeholder
access to
information
Flat-rate fees
where time-
based fees are
inappropriate
Eligible costs
clearly def ined This study
assesses the potential
effects of the
proposed interventions
and the extent to which they
will deliver the
anticipated outcomes
Exemptions
for micro-
enterprises
Transparency
& reporting
obligations
Industry
participation &
right of appeal Bonus-malus
system
Ring-fencing
Option B – Full subsidiarity
Option A – Full harmonisation
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4.2 Option assessment
4.2.1 Option A - Improve the current system
Option A considers a set of potential modifications to the current system through
amendments to Articles 26-29 of the Regulation. It consists of a number of sub-options.
These are first assessed individually and then (in Section 4.3) a commentary is provided on
linkages between the sub-options and the development of a robust package.
4.2.1.16 Sub-option A1 – Extend the scope of mandatory fees
Summary of the option:
The impacts of extending the scope of mandatory fees are expected to be positive for CAs overall and negative for FBOs not currently charged. This sub-option could increase the resources available for financing official controls and improve comparability, creating a level playing field across the EU and across sectors of the food chain. This option could see some increased costs to CAs where they must assess and collect a fee for these controls, and new costs for those business sectors that are not currently subject to fees. Clearer definitions of eligible costs should be considered in conjunction with extending the scope of fees.
4.2.1.17 Sub-option A1 - Specification
Sub-option A1 considers an extension in the scope of the mandatory fees (i.e. increasing the
number of official controls for which Member States are obliged to collect fees). Specifically,
Article 27 of Regulation 882/2004/EC is changed so that controls are transferred from the
‘non-mandatory’ category to the ‘mandatory’ category.
The option as specified in the terms of reference did not indicate which controls would be
made mandatory. In principle, mandatory charging could be extended to all controls covered
by Regulation 882/2004/EC and thus the full breadth of the food chain. In this study,
however, an ‘intermediate’ option was considered whereby mandatory fees are extended to
controls carried out on operators subject to the provisions of Regulations (EC) 852/2004 and
183/2005. That is, the hypothetical scenario considers extending the scope to control areas
that would have a wide impact across different parts of the food chain, and for a large
number of FBOs, but does not encompass the full range of controls for which charges could
be levied.
Survey respondents were asked to consider the advantages and disadvantages of changing
the status of particular controls from ‘non-mandatory’ to ‘mandatory’, list those controls that
might be considered for reclassification, and indicate the potential impacts of this change
from a long and short term perspective.
4.2.1.18 Sub-option A1 – Evidence and analysis
Respondent scores and comments
Overall, Competent Authorities believe that extending the scope of mandatory fees would
have a positive impact on official controls systems in Member States. In particular, extending
the scope would improve efficiency and comparability of systems. Industry believes that
extending the scope of fees would have a negative impact, and have particular concerns
about increasing costs, though industry also sees opportunities for positive impacts
(specifically, for improved comparability of systems) as well.
Some CA and industry respondents indicated that fees should be mandatory across all
sectors, without discrimination. This is an issue of fairness – the principle of equal treatment
of all sectors in the food chain with regard to charging, rather than the costs of official
controls being recovered only from particular sectors. Some CAs are concerned, however,
that extending the scope of fees could create additional administrative burdens.
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When asked to indicate fees that are currently non-mandatory, but should become
mandatory, respondents suggested the following categories:
▪ Certification,
▪ Audits,
▪ Feed-stuffs of non-animal origin,
▪ Fees for border veterinary controls,
▪ Commercial quality control of agricultural and food products in production, marketing and
import stage, and
▪ Supervision activities across a range of sectors (detailed in Annex A1.1.1, page 101).
Case study assessment
Extending the scope of mandatory fees will impact each of the case study countries
differently, according to the current set of non-mandatory fees charged and the new
mandatory fees included in any revision to Regulation 882/2004/EC.
▪ Fees in Belgium cover the entire food chain. Any extension of scope from non-
mandatory to mandatory is likely to have little, if any, impact on the fee control system in
this country. The same is likely to be true in Poland, where most control activities across
the food chain are charged a fee.
▪ Fees are charged on some controls for which fees are non-mandatory in Finland,
France, and the Netherlands. Impacts in these countries will depend on the specific
control activities that become mandatory.
▪ Fees in the United Kingdom cover mostly the mandatory controls, with some exceptions.
Few areas are included from the non-mandatory category. There are likely to be impacts
in the UK where an extension of scope is implemented, but this depends on the control
activities covered.
Other evidence
The scope of fees collected under official controls systems in different Member States varies
widely across the EU-27, as described in Table A1.5, page 108. The range of fees collected
can be broken down into four categories:
▪ Only mandatory fees are collected.
▪ Only mandatory fees, with some exceptions (some mandatory fees are not collected).
▪ Mandatory fees and some activities outside them are collected.
▪ Fees are collected across the food chain.
Many Member States collect fees for some controls for which fees are not mandatory. Table
4.1 indicates those areas for which CAs in the case study countries collect fees. The degree
of impact of an extension of scope within the four categories described above will depend to
a great extent on the specific controls chosen to be ‘mandatory’ under any revisions to the
Regulation. A hypothetical extension to controls carried out on operators subject to the
provisions of Regulations (EC) 852/2004 and 183/2005 is discussed below.
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Table 4.7 Fees charged for official controls - CA survey responses
PL UK BE FI FR NL
1 Approval of establishments that produce products of animal origin for human consumption
2 Audit of fresh meat establishments
3 Inspection of fresh meat establishments (ante- and post-mortem inspections)
4 Inspection of fresh meat establishments: SRM controls and TSE testing
5 Checks at milk production holdings
6 Checks on production and marketing of fishery products and aquaculture products
7 Checks at other food establishments approved in accordance with Regulation 853/2004
8 Checks on hygiene of foodstuffs at primary production holdings
9 Checks on hygiene of foodstuffs at food establishments other than establishments approved
in accordance with Regulation 853/2004
10 Checks on animal health at holdings of origin for live animals
11 Monitoring residues of veterinary medicines and other substances
12 Approval of feed establishments
13 Checks at feed establishments
14 Approval of animal by-products establishments
15 Checks at animal by-product establishments
16 Checks on imported live animals
17 Checks on imported feed and food of animal origin
18 Checks on imported feed and food of non-animal origin
19 Checks on live animals and goods transiting the community
20 Welfare checks on live animals exiting the EU
21 Checks on live animals at assembly centres
22 Organic production
23 Labels (e.g. geographical indications)
24 Animal by-product checks at food establishments
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25 Export certification (living animals, semen, ova, hatching eggs)
26 Export animal products
27 Re-inspection after incidental inspection
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If the scope of mandatory fees was extended to all controls carried out on operators subject
to the provisions of Regulations (EC) 852/2004 and 183/2005. This would reach up the food
chain to primary producers (i.e. those not already covered by a mandatory fee such as fish
and aquaculture production) and down the food chain to food retail and food service
establishments. Overall, the number of enterprises affected in each Member State would
increase. Table 4.2, Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 summarise the potential impact of extending
the scope of mandatory fees (based on Eurostat data21
).
Table 4.2 considers the potential impact of extending the scope of mandatory fees to include
enterprises related to Regulations 882 852 / 2004 and 183/2005, excluding primary holdings.
The assessment is based on the proportion of enterprises that could potentially be affected
by an extension of existing mandatory fees, excluding primary producers. It includes food
processors such as companies manufacturing animal feed, and food establishments, such
as caterers and restaurants. Impacts in each Member State will depend on the number of
controls and their related costs included in any extension, in addition to the number of
enterprises affected.
Extending the scope of mandatory fees to other enterprises in the food chain (excluding
primary producers) could have a significant impact in the UK and Spain, potentially affecting
169,000 (33 per cent) and 442,000 (20 per cent) of enterprises, respectively. Moderate
impacts are expected in 13 Member States where 10 – 19 per cent of enterprises could be
affected. For example, in Portugal the fee for certification could be extended to other FBOs,
such as food retailers. Low impacts are expected in eight Member States where between 4
– 9 per cent of enterprises could be affected. This could mean, for example, that in Poland
the fee to register a FBO could be extended to primary producers or food retailers.
Table 4.3 examines the impacts of extending the scope of mandatory fees to include primary
producers only (i.e. excluding other enterprises such as feed businesses and food retailers).
It suggests significant impacts for primary producers in six Member States. 69 - 94 per cent
of relevant enterprises could be affected. This is due to the relative importance of agriculture
in these countries. Moderate impacts are expected in 13 Member States (35 - 67 per cent of
total enterprises), and low impacts in six Member States (8 - 31 per cent of total enterprises).
21 The Eurostat (2008) data include the number of enterprises, by Member State, for the following sectors:
1.Processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables; 2. Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats;
3.Manufacture of grain mill products, starches and starch products; 4.Manufacture of beverages; 5.Wholesale of
agricultural raw materials and live animals; 6. Wholesale of food, beverages and tobacco; 7.Retail sale of food,
beverages and tobacco in specialised stores; 8.Restaurants and mobile food service activities; 9. Event catering
and other food service activities; 10.Beverage serving activities; 11.All holdings with arable land; 12.All holdings
with permanent grassland and meadow; 13.All holdings growing permanent crops; 14.All holdings rearing
livestock; and, 15.All holdings rearing other livestock. It is likely that this data is indicative of the number of
enterprises only. There may be double counting of enterprises, and / or relevant enterprises may not appear in
the data set. In addition, there may be other sectors which could be subject to official controls following an
extension of their scope. Data for sectors 1 – 10 above was not available for the Czech Republic, France or
Malta. Data for sectors 11 – 15 were not available for Germany, Estonia or Sweden.
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Table 4.8 Potential impact of extending the scope of mandatory fees to include enterprises related to Regulations 852 /2004 and 183/2005, excluding primary holdings*
U
K
ES
CY
SE
PT
BE
AT
IE
BG
LU
IT
De
NL
DK
HU
SL
RO
PL
FI
LV
SK
EE
LT
CZ
FR
GR
MT
High impact
Medium impact
Low impact
No data available
High impact
(>20% enterprises)
Medium impact
(10% - 19% enterprises)
Low impact
(0% - 9% enterprises)
Eurostat 2008
*Total number of enterprises in the following sectors: Processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables; Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats; Manufacture of grain mill products, starches and starch products; Manufacture of prepared animal feeds; Manufacture of beverages; Wholesale of agricultural raw materials and live animals; Wholesale of food, beverages and tobacco; Retail sale of food, beverages and tobacco in specialised stores; Restaurants and mobile food service activities; Event catering and other food service activities; and, Beverage serving activities.
Table 4.9 Potential impact of extending the scope of mandatory fees to include primary holdings (excluding other potentially relevant enterprises) related to Regulations 852 /2004 and 183/2005*
RO
LT
BG
LV
PL
SK
SL
HU
CY
IE
PT
AT
EE
IT
ES
SE
SE
UK
FI
FR
DK
NL
BE
LU
CZ
GR
MT
High impact
Medium impact
Low impact
No data available
High impact
(>67% enterprises)
Medium impact
(33% - 66% enterprises)
Low impact
(0% - 33% enterprises)
Eurostat 2008
*Primary holdings include: All holdings with arable land; all holdings growing permanent crops; all holdings rearing livestock; and, all holdings rearing other livestock.
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Table 4.10 Potential impact of extending the scope of mandatory fees to include enterprises and primary holdings related to Regulations 852/2004 and 183/2005*
RO
LT
BG
PL
LV
SK
SL
HU
CY
IE
UK
PT
AT
ES
SE
IT
EE
FI
DK
DE
BE
FR
NL
LU
CZ
GR
MT
High impact
Medium impact
Low impact
No data available
High impact
(>67% enterprises)
Medium impact
(33% - 66% enterprises)
Low impact
(0% - 33% enterprises)
Eurostat 2008
*Total number of enterprises in the following sectors: Processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables; Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats; Manufacture of grain mill products, starches and starch products; Manufacture of prepared animal feeds; Manufacture of beverages; Wholesale of agricultural raw materials and live animals; Wholesale of food, beverages and tobacco; Retail sale of food, beverages and tobacco in specialised stores; Restaurants and mobile food service activities; Event catering and other food service activities; and, Beverage serving activities. Primary holdings include: All holdings with arable land; all holdings growing permanent crops; all holdings rearing livestock; and, all holdings rearing other livestock.
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Table 4.4 includes both primary producers and other enterprises likely to be affected.
Significant impacts could occur in 10 Member States, where between 67 - 95 per cent of
relevant enterprises and primary holdings could be affected. Of these 10 Member States,
nine are new Member States (the exception is Ireland), indicating that extending the scope of
mandatory fees could have a significant impact in new Member States. Moderate impacts
are expected in 10 Member States, where between 34 - 58 per cent of enterprises and
primary holdings could be affected. Low impacts are expected in five Member States where
between 8 - 31 per cent of enterprises and primary holdings could be affected.
The magnitude of impacts
The scale of the impact of this option on individual Member States and on individual FBOs
would be determined by the controls currently considered to be ‘non-mandatory’ that become
‘mandatory’. Each Member State that currently collects fees on those controls would then
need to be assessed. Those MS that already collect fees for those controls are unlikely to be
affected. In MS that do not, an estimate of the magnitude would depend on the fee rates at
which the new mandatory controls are set, and the number of businesses affected. The
assessment of expanding the scope of mandatory controls to primary producers and to food
establishments other than those approved in accordance with Regulation 852/2004/EC
indicates that high impact will be felt in a relatively small number of countries, but where a
large number of businesses may be affected. The majority of MS would see moderate
impact from this hypothetical extension.
Incidence of impact and distributional issues
Impacts would fall primarily within the EU. This option would impact on all FBOs operating in
Member States where fees for the newly mandatory controls are not already charged under
the ‘non-mandatory’ category. Member States would also see their fee revenue increase
where the new mandatory controls are charged for, but were not previously.
The distribution of impacts depends on the controls that become mandatory, and then by the
fee rate set by each Member State for each newly mandatory control.
In sectors where fees are not currently charged, any new fees charged for controls will affect
SMEs in those sectors.
Compliance costs and administrative burdens
This option would increase the administrative burdens associated with calculating,
discussing, setting, communicating and collecting fees for any new mandatory controls in
Member States where fees are not already collected for those controls. There will be no
additional administrative burdens in those Member States where a fee is already collected
on a ‘non-mandatory’ basis.
Costs and benefits
The net financial outcome for CAs of the change in scope of mandatory fees will depend on
the extent of cost recovery achieved by the fees, the fate of the revenues, and the extent to
which additional fee income is offset by compensating reductions in the budget allocations
made to CAs by finance ministries (or their equivalent source of general finance). The
specific impact on the resources available for financing controls cannot therefore be
determined ex ante though the general principles determining that impact can be
determined.
If fee revenues are recycled back in to the CAs then the change should result in a revenue
stream for financing of official controls that moves in line with the expansion or contraction of
the food chain (and the inspection thereof). The shift would connect CA financing more
closely to changes in the food chain and less closely to overall public expenditure (as with
finance by general taxation). This does not occur if there is no link between FBO fee
payments and the revenue of the CA, for example, if fees are paid into general public
revenue.
There is therefore a potential positive relationship between extension of mandatory fees, full
cost recovery, ring-fencing, and measures on transparency, governance (participation of
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FBOs) and incentives on CAs to continuously improve the efficiency of controls. The
potential to create positive feedback loops within the system will be missed if (for example):
▪ CAs become more dependent on industry for their income but no more accountable to
FBOs for the efficiency with which inspections are carried out (e.g. where the basis of
fees is unclear and there is no mechanism for industry engagement); and
▪ Fees are paid by FBOs but the revenues do not contribute to the resources available to
the CA for application of controls (e.g. where fees are paid into general government
revenue).
The introduction of additional fees would result in some incremental administrative costs for
CAs in the short run due to determining appropriate fees for control activities concerned.
However, these additional costs are likely to decrease over time as CAs’ charging systems
for the newly mandatory fees are implemented. There are likely to be increased costs
associated with the administrative burdens of collecting fees from FBOs.
Industry costs are likely to rise in most Member States, but to differing degrees depending on
the number of enterprises that become subject to mandatory fees for the first time. The
actual cost incurred by industry will depend to a large extent on the precise mandatory fees
to which they are subject. In cases where fee income from one food sector is currently cross-
subsidising the inspection of other sectors, the extension of fees (subject to the income
allocation issues discussed above) ought to reduce the added burden on those sectors that
pay most today. Extension of mandatory fees could thus make the system ‘fairer’. Inevitably
some FBOs will need to pay more, such as the feed sector; there are theoretically some
circumstances in which the burden on FBOs which are charged today could also fall, for
example, in the meat sector.
4.2.1.19 Sub-option A2 – Require full cost recovery
Summary of the option:
A full cost recovery option, especially when used in conjunction with ring-fencing, ought to increase
the resources available for the application of official controls and therefore support progress towards
the primary objective that the reforms are intended to reach. Most Member States do not achieve full
cost recovery at present, and a requirement to do so would enable MS to put systems in place to do
so. On the other dimensions, however, full cost recovery is not considered to have a positive impact.
In particular, it is likely to involve some increase in administrative costs to CAs and create
complications where MS must change their legal frameworks and system structures to implement
and monitor cost recovery. Industry is concerned that this requirement will lead to less efficient
inspections while increasing their costs.
A year-by-year staged increase in cost recovery rates (where these are currently less than 100 per
cent) would provide time for adjustment both by FBOs and by Competent Authorities. If businesses
are being asked to pay more it is important that the system is seen to be fair, transparent and
efficient therefore this option would best be combined with complementary measures on
transparency, governance and clear definition of eligible costs. The sub-option that gives Member
States the option to provide fee exemptions to micro-enterprises would also enable Member States
to mitigate impacts of full cost recovery on very small businesses where necessary.
4.2.1.20 Sub-option A2 - Specification
Sub-option A2 considers whether the Regulation should impose a legal requirement on
Member States to achieve full cost recovery of the (eligible) costs of official controls.
Respondents were asked to consider the positive and negative impacts of a full cost
recovery requirement. As interpreted here, the option relates to recovery of the costs of the
controls for which fees are charged. There are thus complementarities between sub-options
A2 and A1 in terms of recovery of costs of the overall control regime (Figure 4.3).
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Figure 4.5 Sub-options A1 and A2 have complementary effects on overall cost recovery
Proportion of official
controls subject to fees
Level of
cost
recovery
achieved
by fees
100%
100%
A2 Require
full cost
recovery
A1 Extend mandatory fees
A1 + A2
4.2.1.21 Sub-option A2 – Evidence and analysis
Respondent scores and comments
Industry does not favour full cost recovery for official control activity. In particular, industry is
concerned that the requirement would not provide incentives for CAs to conduct efficient
control inspections or reduce the cost of delivery for control activities, and that it might
enable CAs to charge for control activities that are not strictly necessary.
A full cost recovery requirement is also likely to negatively impact small businesses as costs
are likely to increase for control activities. Finally, a requirement could reduce the
competitiveness of European businesses due to increased cost burdens.
Fewer than half of the CAs who responded to the survey (6 of 13) supported full cost
recovery. CAs indicated that it could improve efficiency and increase accountability, but the
option is thought to have negative impacts with respect to comparability and where
implementation increases administrative costs.
Case study assessment
The case study results indicate that a full cost recovery requirement would have varied
impacts on Member States depending on:
▪ Current levels of cost recovery;
▪ The degree of decentralisation in the official controls system; and
▪ Legislative requirements that may require changes.
In Member States with a high degree of public financing and low degree of cost recovery
from fees (e.g. Belgium), a full cost recovery requirement could be difficult to achieve. There
would also be legislative changes required in Belgium and in Finland, which would create
some administrative burdens, at least initially. In MS such as Finland where local authorities
set fee rates and bear responsibility for their own cost recovery, the implementation of this
sub-option would need to be designed carefully to avoid substantial new administrative costs
at the central level.
Other evidence
DG SANCO baseline data indicate that only five Member States may achieve full cost
recovery through fee collection for control activities (where fees are applied): Lithuania,
Latvia, Portugal, Poland and Slovenia (Table A1.8, page 121). In other MS, fees cover costs
in most areas, with some exceptions. For example, Denmark and Finland achieve full cost
recovery, except for fees collected from small FBOs. In Austria and France, costs are
recovered, except on border controls. In most Member States, current fee recovery does not
cover costs, and the level of recovery is between approximately 30 and 80 percent. A full
cost recovery requirement will therefore impact most Member States.
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Cost recovery levels should be interpreted with caution, however. Information related to
levels of cost recovery is relatively limited, and where available from multiple sources, is
sometimes contradictory. For example, in the context of the current study, representatives
from the Polish CA stated that data on cost recovery levels were unavailable, and that fee
recovery was likely to be below 100 per cent. But the DG SANCO baseline data report that
Poland recovers 100 per cent of official control costs. Cost recovery data are also
problematic for Finland, where figures for cost recovery vary widely. The DG SANCO
baseline states that cost recovery is 20 per cent for small FBOs, while the FCEC (2009)
study provides a more nuanced picture, indicating that the level of cost recovery ranges from
20 per cent (municipal food control) to 97 per cent (veterinary border control). A selection of
the potential factors behind the disparity of cost recovery in Finland is discussed in the box
below.
Cost recovery rates in Finland
Official controls for small FBOs in Finland, of which there are many, are the responsibility of the
municipal control unit. Evira, the Finnish CA, is responsible for collecting fees from large FBOs, of
which there are few. The FCEC (2009) study of official controls found that cost recovery for large
FBOs was 99 per cent and only 20 per cent for municipal controls; data reported in DG SANCO
baseline indicates that cost recovery is 20 per cent for small FBOs
Consistent with this finding, Lepostö et al. (2010) investigated the extent to which Finnish Competent
Authorities recovered the costs of performing official controls. The fees collected were compared to
costs incurred, based on a questionnaire of municipal environmental health and food control
authorities. The study found that only 38 per cent of municipal control units collected fees that
covered 100 per cent of control costs. This compares with the 20 per cent reported in the FCEC
study.
The data suggest that cost recovery levels in Finland are high for a small proportion of FBOs, but low
for the majority of FBOs.
This discrepancy may, in part, be explained by the characteristics of the Finnish official control
system where there are regional differences in the application of official control fees. Rates are set
at municipal level, and are based on actual costs or may even be less than costs.22
Additionally,
Lepostö et al. (2010) found that official control activities were often conducted in conjunction with
inspections related to other legislation (such as health and safety inspections), but these inspections
were considered as one inspection and charged as one single control. This was the case in 54 per
cent of control units. This supports the points made by an interviewee from Evira for this study, who
stated that it is very difficult to determine the proportion of cost recovery for official controls in Finland
because control units do not separately record the time dedicated to official control activities. Official
controls are considered as a sub-set of controls in a larger set that control units are responsible for
administering. In the interviewee’s opinion, it would require the introduction of burdensome data
collection mechanisms to accurately record the level of official control cost recovery in Finland.
Table 4.5 illustrates the potential level of impact for each MS achieving 100 per cent cost
recovery based on their current cost recovery rates as reported in the DG SANCO baseline
dataset. It is intended to provide an indication of the potential impact only; due to the issues
with the cost recovery data it is not intended to be a definitive analysis23
. The potential
impact of increasing recovery to 100 per cent is expressed in terms of high impact (MS
currently recovering between 0% - 33% of costs), medium impact (MS currently recovering
between 34% - 66% of costs), low impact (MS currently recovering between 67% - 99% of
costs) and no impact (MS currently recovering 100% of costs). For several MS no
information was identified to indicate current rates of cost recovery.
These data suggest that six MS would be impacted very little or not at all by a full cost
recovery option. Nine MS would see a moderate impact for this requirement, and eight would
require significant changes in the operation of their fee recovery systems in order to meet a
22 Lepostö et al. (2010)
23 The baseline relates only to fees currently charged, and these vary from country to country.
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full cost recovery requirement. The potential impacts are unknown for three MS, where
information is currently unavailable.
The magnitude of impacts
The scale of the impact of this option on individual Member States and on individual FBOs
would be determined by the approach and principles underpinning a full cost recovery
requirement. If the requirement were to be phased in over time, for example, CAs would
have time to adjust their systems to increase cost recovery incrementally. If the requirement
were to be effective immediately with a revision to the Regulation, most Member States are
likely to struggle to achieve full cost recovery and the requirement will simply go unmet. The
specification of the requirement, however, is unknown.
In addition, the scale of the impact would be influenced by the ability of CAs to accurately
determine the costs of performing official controls. Where official controls are performed
alongside controls relating to other legislation during an inspection, for example, CAs may
find it difficult to accurately determine the cost of performing one of a suite of controls. Some
CAs may require the introduction of new systems, organisational and / or technological, to
accurately record and determine the cost of official controls.
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Table 4.11 Potential impact of requiring MS to achieve full cost recovery on controls for which fees are currently applied24
BG
CZ
EE
ES
*
FI*
*
SE
*
GR
*
IE
BE
DK
FR
HU
IT
MT
RO
SK
UK
NL
AT
PL
+
LT
LV
PT
SI
DE
CY
LU
High impact
Medium
impact
Low impact
No impact
Unknown
High impact (0 – 33% costs
recovered)
Medium impact (34% - 66% costs
recovered)
Low impact (67% - 99% costs
recovered)
No impact
(100% costs recovered)
Unknown
DG SANCO baseline
*Fees are not covered by costs, but the precise recovery rate is unknown.
**Data about cost recovery rates in Finland is contradictory. The DG SANCO baseline states that it is 20 per cent; a previous evaluation (FCEC 2008) found that it was 99 per cent (for large FBOs) and an independent academic study (Lepostö et al. 2010) found that it is 38 per cent for municipal control authorities. This study has concluded that cost recovery rates are likely to be high for large FBOs (of which there are few) and low for small FBOs (of which there are many).
+Data in the DG SANCO baseline indicates that cost recovery is 100%; however during an interview the Polish CA indicated that this is highly unlikely. The Polish CA
could not provide a precise recovery rate as an alternative to the 100% in the DG SANCO baseline.
24 The data used to construct this table is highly uncertain and is often contradictory. It is intended to provide an indicative assessment of the distributional impact of requiring full
cost recovery based on current rates of recovery. Actual impacts will be influenced by a range of factors in addition to current cost recovery rates.
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Factors influencing the aggregate impact on the food chain of moving to full cost recovery include: (i)
the range of controls on which fees are applied (as discussed in A1), (ii) the speed with which the
transition is made and thus firms’ opportunity to adjust, (iii) the extent to which there are changes in
the regulatory cost base over the transition period, and (iv) the design of the fee structure. For
example, if the efficiency of controls is improved during the transition period (e.g. encouraged by
greater transparency and accountability) and bonus-malus principles are designed into the fee
structure then the proportionate change in costs to a well-performing firm may be less than the
change in the recovery rate.
Incidence of impact and distributional issues
Impacts would fall primarily within the EU. This option would, in principle, impact on all FBOs
subject to fees for official controls, and the income of all entities that collect fees for control
activities.
The distribution of impacts depends on the degree to which full cost recovery is already
achieved in the Member State and the control activity concerned (e.g. for small FBOs and/or
for border inspections).
The net impact on business would also be influenced by the approach taken by CAs to
recover costs. Where a cost recovery requirement is met through a bonus-malus approach
to fee collection, some FBOs may find their costs reduced and others with their costs
increased. This has not been specified, however, and is only speculative.
There is no particular SME bias to the impacts but if there are fee exemptions or reductions
for small or micro businesses, CAs will need to determine how to recover costs from
elsewhere in the system or from other revenue sources.
There is a related issue of the level at which the cost-recovery is assessed. For example, is
cost recovery to be assessed and reported on for each type of control, and at the Competent
Authority level, and/or at Member State level? The implications of this choice are likely to
vary according to the level of decentralised administration for official controls. In a country
where there are a large number of Competent Authorities, the calculation of a ‘blended’
national cost recovery rate is likely to be complex and the scope to move revenues from
points of ‘over-recovery’ to those of ‘under-recovery’ limited.
Compliance costs and administrative burdens
Costs may increase for FBOs, but they may also decrease, depending on the interaction of
this sub-option with other sub-options that may be included in any revisions to the
Regulation. There would be some increase in administrative costs for CAs that are not
currently able to estimate their cost recovery rate as accounting and information systems are
upgraded.
Costs and benefits
For CAs there will be administrative burdens associated with determining the actual costs of
official controls, and ensuring that these costs are reflected in control fees. There are also
likely to be administrative burdens (and hence costs) associated with setting appropriate fee
levels for FBOs. The net impact will be influenced by whether those costs can be recovered
from the fees themselves.
Costs are likely to increase for FBOs in Member States where current recovery levels are
low. The actual impact on FBOs will depend on current recovery levels, the trajectory set
towards full cost recovery, and the extent to which there are adjustments in the regulatory
cost base over that period.
Overall, requiring full cost recovery is likely to increase costs for FBOs. There will be more
significant impacts in Member States where current recovery levels are low.
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4.2.1.22 Sub-option A3 – Clearly define eligible costs
Summary of the option:
A precise (‘definitive’) definition of eligible costs is required. A clear definition is likely to have strong
positive impacts for official controls systems across the EU.
CAs expect improved cost recovery from this sub-option. Evidence suggests it will also improve
comparability, transparency and accountability. Greater specification or adding new costs may
increase the administrative burden on CAs, though this is not likely to be significant.
CA respondents agreed that the proposed list of eligible costs is appropriate and that each category
should be included in any future list. CAs proposed that overhead costs should be included, as well
as the salary costs for local veterinarians and inspection report preparation. Industry responses were
more varied, with a strong majority agreeing with salaries and tools and instruments, and significant
disagreement regarding travel costs and administrative costs. Industry, in contrast to CAs, indicated
that overhead costs should not be included.
The imprecise specification of allowable administrative (overhead) cost recovery in the text used for
this study could be open to the same differences of interpretation that have caused problems in the
current legislation. A simple means of resolving this difficulty is to for the legislation to specify that
administrative costs cannot exceed a given percentage of salary costs. Further engagement with
Member States (in particular) would be required to establish what percentage is appropriate as the
problem was identified during the study and there has been no second round of consultations on the
potential remedies.
4.2.1.23 Sub-option A3 - Specification
Sub-option A3 considers changes to the Regulation that would define more clearly the costs
that can be recovered from fees linked to performing official controls. Currently, Annex VI
sets out a definition of eligible costs as follows:
▪ Salaries of the staff involved in official controls;
▪ Staff costs related to control activities, including facilities, tools, equipment, training,
travel, and associated costs; and
▪ Laboratory sampling and analysis costs.
Although Regulation 882/2004 attempts to do this through Annex VI, the specification is
unclear and has resulted in differences of interpretation. This study assessed the following
list provided by DG SANCO, which more clearly defines the eligible costs:
▪ Salaries for inspectors, including social contributions;
▪ Tools and instruments to be used during inspections;
▪ Out of office hours activities;
▪ Travelling linked to official controls;
▪ Training of inspectors;
▪ Quota of administrative costs linked to the inspection activities (including planning); and
▪ Sampling and analysis costs (when needed).
Respondents were asked to consider whether (and how):
▪ They agree or disagree with each of the revised costs;
▪ The revised list is sufficiently clear to avoid different interpretations; and
▪ Other costs should be added and/or items should be deleted from the list.
Net change in income to CAs (or to the other public body receiving fee income) through this
sub-option is influenced by the decisions taken on other sub-options, as illustrated by Figure
4.4.
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Figure 4.6 A3 determines the eligible cost base on which the rates considered in sub-option A2 are calculated, and which determines income generated by sub-option A1
Proportion of official
controls subject to fees
Level of cost
recovery achieved by
feesA2 Require
full cost
recovery
A1 Extend mandatory fees
Scope of
eligible costs
A3 Define
eligible costs
Baseline
position
4.2.1.24 Sub-option A3 – Evidence and analysis
Respondent scores and comments
Both CA and industry respondents indicated that a clear definition of eligible costs would
have a positive impact on official controls systems. CAs in particular expected significant
positive impacts on efficiency, accountability and simplicity of the system. CAs also uniformly
agree that each individual cost specified (i.e. salaries, tools and instruments, out of office
hours activities, travel costs, administrative costs, and sampling and analysis) should be
included.
Industry views are more varied on the specified list of costs:
▪ A strong majority agree that salaries (75%) and tools and instruments (72%) should be
included;
▪ A majority agree that costs of sampling and analysis (66%), travelling linked to official
control activities (59%), and out of office hours activities (53%) should be included; but
▪ A majority disagree that training of inspectors (72%) and a quota of administrative costs
(59%) should be included.
When asked to specify other costs that should be included, CAs proposed:
▪ Overhead costs (e.g. buildings and maintenance, legal fees, financial administration, IT
costs);
▪ Salaries of local veterinarians; and
▪ Inspection report preparation.
Conversely, industry representatives indicated that overhead costs in particular should not
be included.
One CA suggested that rather than specify a list of costs, activity-based costing (ABC)
should be used to identify the relevant activities associated with official controls and assign a
cost to each according to actual consumption. ABC identifies and separates out the fixed,
variable and overhead costs for different activities. In particular, overhead costs are assigned
in proportion to the activity’s direct costs. This model can be used to help an organisation
identify ineffective resource allocation thereby increasing the efficiency of operations. It can
be resource intensive to implement, however, and is constrained predominantly by the
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availability of data required to implement it. There is also scope for differences of
interpretation and lack of consistency across the EU.
Case study assessment
A clear definition of costs will have a positive impact on each of the case study countries,
particularly where reduced ambiguity ensures that fees charged cover only those costs
directly related to control activity. CAs are likely to benefit where this helps recover costs and
reduce uncertainty about what is ‘allowable’. Industry benefits where CAs are not allowed to
include unrelated costs, and thus FBOs pay lower rates.
Other evidence
The cost categories themselves require precise definition in order to overcome the variations
in the cost base identified in the FCEC Evaluation. Criteria need to be precise enough to
ensure that Member States are consistent in their application of the eligible cost categories
to fee rates. The ‘quota’ of administrative costs referred to in the current text is potentially
open to different interpretations, and any overhead costs that may be included are also
subject to significant variance in what might be considered a relevant component. One
option is to specify that administrative costs cannot exceed a given percentage of staff costs.
The magnitude of impacts
The scale of the impact of the sub-option on individual Member States and on individual
FBOs would be determined by:
▪ The ultimate definition of eligible costs (e.g. specification of allowable costs under each
allowable category);
▪ The gap between that definition and current practice and
▪ The costs associated with each component and for each control in individual Member
States (i.e. the baseline costs).
The final definition of eligible costs has yet to be determined. The variance between the draft
list and current practice across the CAs within the 27 MS is not documented.
Incidence of impact and distributional issues
Impacts would fall primarily within the EU. This sub-option would, in principle, impact all
FBOs subject to fees for official controls, and the income of all entities that collect these fees.
The distribution of impacts is affected by the cost categories that are included, and the
components within those categories that are considered allowable. For example, if the
generosity of the overhead allowance increases, the costs to industry (and income to
government) are likely to increase. If travel costs and/or administrative costs are excluded,
as suggested by many industry respondents, then industry costs are likely to decrease and
income to CAs (or finance ministries) is likely to fall.
Many businesses operating in the sectors affected by official controls are SMEs. SMEs
would be affected where the definition of eligible costs widened and resulted in increased
fees. For example, inclusion of inspector travel costs could affect rural SMEs.
Compliance costs and administrative burdens
Administrative burdens may increase initially for CAs as the newly defined cost categories
must be assessed against current fee charging practices and adjusted as required. Costs
are likely to decrease over time, however, as the lack of ambiguity ensures that fees cover
only directly related costs and accounting practices have been adopted and implemented
accordingly.
Costs and benefits
The impact of redefining eligible costs will vary by CA according to the final definition
adopted and current charging practice. The sub-option, as with A2 (and the sub-option on
transparency, A7), requires CAs to have an understanding of the costs of their official control
activity. Where that understanding is currently lacking the reform package as a whole would
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result in some initial cost increase as CAs assess their cost base and (re)assess fees for
control activities based on the more precise list of cost categories. Those incremental costs
would be expected to diminish over time once a new system is established.
Industry costs may rise in some Member States, where new cost calculations result in high
fees. Equally, industry costs may decrease in Member States where the reverse occurs.
Overall, both CAs and industry believe that a precise definition of costs will improve the
official controls system in the EU. In particular, precise cost definitions are likely to increase
efficiency for CAs to recover control costs. Transparency and accountability will improve,
which benefits industry. CA uncertainty over what should be included is reduced, which CAs
indicated would be an improvement over the current system.
4.2.1.25 Sub-option A4 – Introduce time-based fees
Summary of the option:
Time-based fees are already in use in a number of MS as illustrated by the case study results.
Respondents indicated that inspections in slaughterhouses and cutting plants are best suited to time-
based fees. Other areas that may be well-suited to time based fees include certifications, audits, and
border inspections.
The codification of time-based fees in EU legislation is expected, overall, to result in a slight positive
impact of the overall functioning of official controls systems in EU Member States. This approach to
fee-setting can increase efficiency, and is consistent with adoption of risk-based approaches to
inspection. But time-based fee systems are also more likely to be difficult to compare across
Member States. Their introduction can increase the administrative burden on CAs.
When asked to rank the method of fee-setting, both CAs and industry favour fees set according to
MS costs operating to standard EU rules on eligible costs. There is an established practice with
some MS of billing (eligible costs) according to a detailed cost calculation. Text in the revised
legislation which did not inhibit use of detailed billing of individual FBOs on the basis of actual costs
(and based on a common schedule of what types of cost are eligible) would avoid those MS having
to move away from systems which provide a good approximation of true control costs.
4.2.1.26 Sub-option A4 - Specification
Sub-option A4 considers the impact of specifying time-based fees in the Regulation for
official controls that require continuous or systematic presence of officials.
The expectation is that fees would be calculated on the basis of Member States’ costs under
common EU rules, though other options were also assessed including a standard, EU-wide,
hourly rate; a standard, EU-wide, hourly rate, indexed in each MS by a cost-of-living
adjustment; and local costs determined under common rules.
4.2.1.27 Sub-option A4 – Evidence and analysis
Respondent scores and comments
CAs and industry agree that there is likely to be a slight positive impact from introducing
time-based fees for official controls that require continuous or systematic presence. In
particular, CAs expected improved efficiency and accountability, as well a simplified system
with reduced administrative burdens. Both CAs and industry respondents noted that time-
based fees are naturally suited to a system that employs risk-based principles, thus ensuring
that time is spent only for activities and on businesses that present the most risk to the food
chain. Nonetheless, CAs voiced some concerns regarding complications arising from trying
to calculate time-based fees. Both groups were concerned that time-based fees could
incentivise veterinarians to conduct inspections that are longer than required in order to
obtain more fees.
When asked what fees in particular might be well-suited to time-based principles, both CAs
and industry agree that red meat and poultry inspections, in slaughterhouses and cutting
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plants and for ante- and post-mortem inspections would be appropriate. Industry also sees
potential for audit, certification and import control checks though some CAs indicated that
audit and import controls should remain as flat fees.
Respondents were also asked to rank their preference for the method to use in setting time-
based fees. CAs and industry stakeholders ranked the options as follows:
▪ CAs prefer setting time-based fees according to MS costs under EU rules and industry
also sees this as a good option.
▪ Industry prefers setting time-based fees according to a standard, EU-wide hourly rate
that is indexed in each Member State by a cost-of-living index, but CAs see this as a less
appealing option: while no CA ranked this option last, only 1 ranked it first and 8 ranked it
third.
▪ Neither CAs nor industry prefers setting time-based fees based on a standard, EU-wide,
hourly rate (without a cost-of-living index)—this option ranked lowest for both groups.
While CAs support time-based fee setting according to a detailed cost calculation (9 CAs
ranked it first or second), 1 CA ranked this as the worst option; and while industry sees this
as the third best option (18 ranked it third or fourth), 8 ranked it first. The greatest diversity of
response arose for this option, with no clear preference expressed by either CAs or industry.
Case study assessment
Time-based fees are already used in a number of Member States. They operate in a number
of areas in all case study countries except for France. The areas currently covered by time
based fees include:
▪ Meat inspections (Netherlands and UK);
▪ Most areas, with a few exceptions (Belgium); and
▪ Time-based fees are used, but coverage of official control areas is unknown (Poland and
Finland).
In Belgium, time-based fees are already used. Respondents foresee that their wider
introduction alongside an increased use of flat fees could improve CA cost recovery and
reduce administrative burdens, while encouraging more efficient inspections and improve
accountability through a common EU-wide approach to define MS costs.
In Finland and Poland, time-based fees are already used, and as in Belgium, their wider use
could improve cost recovery for CAs. But this sub-option could have a negative effect on the
simplicity of the system and may increase administrative burdens and reduce comparability.
In France, time-based fees are not in use. Business associations and the trade union for
veterinarians were of the opinion that their introduction is expected to result in greater cost
recovery for CAs and improve transparency, though it may reduce comparability and
increase administrative burdens. This is mainly due to the lack of transparency and cost
effectiveness of the current system where the fees do not reflect the inspection cost.
In the UK, views diverged considerably between CAs and industry where time-based fees
are already used in slaughterhouses. The CA believes this has improved efficiency and
effectiveness of controls because it has forced some inefficient plants to change their
procedures. Industry disagrees, however, and has stated that they believe time-based fees
remove the incentive to move to truly risk-based controls. The CA also believes time-based
fees would simplify the process, and improve comparability and accountability, but again
industry disagrees on each point, stating that SMEs in particular would be unable to afford
the fees.
Other evidence
Time-based fees are widely used amongst Member States for meat controls. Figure 4.5
shows the market turnover for four sectors most affected by mandatory fees for official
controls. Meat processing and production represents a significant portion of these four
sectors (nearly 50 per cent in 2008); introducing a requirement for time-based fees for the
meat processing and production sector would thus affect a significant share of the food
processing sector.
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Figure 4.7 Several inspections in the meat sector – which is an economically important part of the food chain - are amenable to use of time-based fees
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
160,000
180,000
200,000
Processing and preserving of meat and production of
meat products
Processing and preserving of f ish, crustaceans and
molluscs
Manufacture of dairy products
Manufacture of prepared animal
feeds
Source: Eurostat
Data collected through this study on time-based fees illustrate the variance in approach and
rates across four Member States (Table A1.34). In the Netherlands, Austria and the UK, a
single fee is applied for each inspection regardless of the size of the FBO (i.e. number or
rate of slaughter lines). In Belgium, fees vary based on the rate and number of slaughter
lines, with different rates for small and large slaughterhouses (€6.80 and €8.80 per head
respectively). In Belgium and the Netherlands, fees vary according to the category of animal
(young cattle, adult cattle, and pigs), but in Austria and the UK, the fees are uniform across
these categories. Some Member States also charge a base administrative fee (Austria and
the Netherlands), while others do not. Figure 4.6 illustrates the variance in fee rates amongst
the fees charged in Member States illustrated here.
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Figure 4.8 Scatter plot showing variance of time based fees in selected Member States, average euro (€) per hour
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
€ / hr NL (ante and post mortum) € / hr AT (veterinarian / official inspector)
€ / hr BE (slow/fast & single/multiple slaughter) €/hr UK (slaughterhouse/cutting plant/game)
The majority of fees range between €25 - €75 / hour, covering a range of inspection types
Fees for fast slaughter lines in Belgium are considerably higher
Source: Clitravi data collected by Member State on inspection fees in the meat industry (2009)
* Exchange rate £1 = €1.13158, 18/06/2011
The magnitude of impacts
The scale of the impact of this sub-option on individual Member States and on individual
FBOs would be determined by the definition of the eligible cost base for time-based fees and
the detailed fee structure. This includes the controls subject to time-based fees and the basis
on which the fees are set.
Incidence of impact and distributional issues
Impacts would fall primarily within the EU. This sub-option would, in principle, impact on all
FBOs subject to a switch to time-based fee inspections. This could potentially include any
sector that currently pays fees for official controls, but meat inspections are the most likely
sector to be affected, as time-based fees are considered to be best suited for this area of
control activity.
The net impact on business will depend on the affected sectors, as already mentioned, as
well as any efficiency gained (or lost) through time-based fees. All else being equal, facilities
that have a higher throughput per inspection-hour are likely to benefit from lower fees in a
time-based system. Facilities with a low throughput per inspector-hour may face higher
charges. This could result in (for instance) fee burdens shifting from large scale, ‘efficient’
slaughterhouses to smaller scale operations.
Two other factors potentially affecting the impact are:
▪ Whether there are mechanisms in place to ensure that inspections are efficient (e.g. to
ensure inspectors do not spend longer than necessary on the inspections to increase
income); and
▪ Whether fixed minimum fees of the kind used under current legislation still apply
(considered below).
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Compliance costs and administrative burdens
Respondents raised some concerns over the effectiveness of time-based fees where
inspectors do not have an incentive to perform the control as efficiently as possible. But
where time-based fees are used in conjunction with risk-based principles, these may
represent an ‘automatic’ bonus-malus system for such controls.
Additional considerations
A shift to time-based fees raises questions about how to treat the minimum fees that are
currently defined in the legislation, but are defined as flat rates based on throughput. Using
both time and flat rate fee schedules simultaneously may cause problems related to
consistency and administrative efficiency – accounting on both bases could increase the
administrative burden on Competent Authorities and potentially increase costs for
businesses as well.
There is an opportunity, in this context, to consider whether minimum fees are still required
and, if so, the basis on which they should be set. Minimum fees could be abolished. If the
other elements of the reforms are thought sufficient drive the desired improvements in the
fee regime, then the added value of minimum fee is less apparent. Indeed, their removal
could support a renewed focus on actual assessed costs.
An alternative to abolition is to revise the mechanism by which they are set. For example,
minimum fees could be set on a percentage basis rather than according to throughput (i.e.
as a fixed percentage of eligible costs). This:
▪ would ensure that minimum fee rates moved with inflation in actual costs. This option
also
▪ provides for the opportunity to set out a schedule specifying a rising rate of cost recovery
to drive the system as a whole towards full cost recovery.
▪ could address the misconception reported by some consultees of minimum fees being
the ‘fair price’ or the EU’s ‘expected price’ for a given control.
▪ could also reduce administrative burdens and avoid the problems generated by currency
exchange fluctuations which can require authorities in countries outside the Eurozone to
regularly revise fees to comply with the euro rate, and where actual costs are below the
minimum fees set in the European legislation.
Implementation would require that the CA calculate and evidence its actual costs (which is
consistent with other options).
Costs and benefits
CAs and industry stakeholders have divergent views on the merits and likely impacts of
introducing time-based fees.
The introduction of time-based fees is likely to benefit CAs by (in combination with other sub-
options) helping to ensure that the full costs of inspections are recovered through fees levied
on FBOs. There would likely be an initial increase in costs for CAs, due to administrative
burdens associated with developing the mechanism for calculating appropriate fees (e.g.
consulting with industry), but these costs would reduce over time.
A shift to time-based fees is likely to change the distribution of the cost burden with a given
sector. It could shift costs onto smaller and/or less efficient operators. For example, the
time taken to travel to a small FBO is the same as for a large FBO, and large operations may
be able to sustain higher throughput per hour of inspector’s time.
Inspection protocols agreed with industry would help to address FBOs concerns that a shift
to time-based fees could invite over-billing by inspectors working inefficiently.
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4.2.1.28 Sub-option A5 – Require ring-fencing of resources
Summary of the option:
This option could have significant positive impacts on efficiency and result in improved accountability
and comparability of official controls systems. It would result in some additional investment and
additional administrative costs where CAs are required to handle receipts for the first time, but these
are expected to be comparatively minor.
4.2.1.29 Sub-option A5 - Specification
Sub-option A5 considers whether the Regulation should introduce a requirement that fee
revenue be used exclusively to cover the costs of the official controls for which they are
being charged (i.e. directly with a budget line or indirectly through the general budget).
Respondents were asked to consider the positive and negative impacts of a ring-fencing
requirement.
The ultimate concern of the reform package is to ensure that official controls are properly
resourced. The sub-options that address resource mobilisation only contribute to that
outcome if there is a corresponding increase in the funds allocated to the financing of official
controls. Ring-fencing would commonly see revenues paid direct to the CA. If there are
compensating reductions in general budgetary support then overall CA income may be little
changed, or even diminished, and could potentially be more volatile.
4.2.1.30 Sub-option A5 – Evidence and analysis
Respondent scores and comments
Overall, CAs and industry respondents indicated that this sub-option would be expected to
have a positive impact on official controls systems. In particular, positive impacts are
expected for CA resource mobilisation and accountability. Industry also felt that the sub-
option could reduce administrative costs and burdens, while CAs felt that these were likely to
increase under a ring-fencing requirement.
Case study assessment
The case studies indicate that ring-fencing would likely have positive impacts on CA
resources, and increase transparency and accountability. In Member States that already
have some degree of ring-fencing in place, there is likely to be little impact, but this impact is
expected to be positive. In some Member States, however, such as Poland, a ring-fencing
requirement would require legislative changes that could be very difficult to implement. A
system that has a clear definition of eligible costs, transparency of reporting and full cost
recovery requirements, however could effectively operate as a ring-fencing mechanism
without an explicit requirement to do so.
Other evidence
Ring-fencing already occurs for official control activities in many Member States to some
degree (Table A1.21, page 144):
▪ Eight Member States ring-fence 100 per cent of fee resources: Germany, Denmark,
Hungary, Latvia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania and Sweden;
▪ Eight Member States have some ring-fencing requirements or arrangements that are
functionally ring-fencing: Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Italy, Poland and
the UK.
▪ In the remaining 11 MS, all resources from fees charged for control activities go to the
general budget.
In Member States that already ring-fence resources there will likely be little, if any, impact
from this sub-option. In those Member States where ring-fencing is already employed but not
in every area, there will be administrative costs to implementation, but these may not be
significant. Ring-fencing will likely improve cost recovery in these MS and improve
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accountability and transparency. In Member States where a significant portion or all of the
resources go the general budget, there may be significant administrative costs and
bureaucratic complexity to implementing a ring-fencing requirement.
The magnitude of impacts
The scale of the impact of this option on individual Member States and on individual FBOs
would be determined by the degree to which ring-fencing practices are already employed
and in which sectors. In the 16 Member States where ring-fencing already occurs, the impact
will be modest, if any. In the 11 Member States where all resources go to the general
budget, the adoption of the sub-option would involve investment in new systems and greater
administrative costs, but also significantly improving accountability and transparency.
Incidence of impact and distributional issues
Impacts would fall primarily within the EU. Ring-fencing costs incurred by CAs would include
the one-off cost associated with setting up an accounts receivable department where one
does not already exist, plus the incremental cost for processing receipt of each payment.
The costs associated with billing and handling receipts are already borne by an entity in each
Member State, regardless of the extent of ring-fencing. Introducing the ring-fencing option
would simply transfer the incremental cost from one public body to another (where ring-
fencing does not already occur). The net cost to each MS is thus expected to be zero.
Nonetheless, individual CAs in each MS will be impacted where ring-fencing does not
already occur. This option would then, in principle, impact on the income of all entities that
collect such fees in Member States where all resources go to the general budget. In Member
States where ring-fencing occurs in some but not all sectors, those sectors in which ring-
fencing does not occur will be impacted. There is no particular SME bias to the impacts
expected from this sub-option.
Compliance costs and administrative burdens
Legislative costs would be incurred in some cases. Administrative burdens would fall on CAs
in Member States that do not already ring-fence resources, and particularly in those where
all fee income goes to the general budget. Administrative burdens are likely to be low in
Member States where ring-fencing already occurs.
Costs and benefits
Ring-fencing creates a direct link between industry payments and CA income. This sub-
option will result in one-off costs for CAs that do not currently ring-fence resources in
expenditure associated with setting up the administrative processes and procedures
necessary to ensure that fee resources are ring-fenced. Following these initial costs, CAs
should have minimal (if any) ongoing administrative costs. Administrative costs may be
recoverable through fees. The change may require legislation in some cases, with the
associated costs and uncertainty.
Ring-fencing fees will have limited impact on FBOs, although industry stakeholders
considered that over time it could reduce the cost of official controls to FBOs. Industry
stakeholders favoured ring-fencing of fees as they were of the opinion that it would improve
the efficiency and accountability of controls (thereby reducing costs over time). There is
uncertainty about such a benefit. Finance authorities’ response to CAs being given ring-
fenced income would affect where the CAs emerge with larger (or smaller) net income.
4.2.1.31 Sub-option A6 – Incorporate bonus-malus principles
Summary of the option:
Integration of bonus-malus principles into fee structures is likely to have a positive impact on the
efficiency of official controls systems. Bonus-malus arrangements must be consistent with the
principle that the fees charged are set according to their actual cost, and any extra costs for controls
for non-compliance are borne by the businesses concerned. This constrains the redistribution of
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costs from good performers to poor performers.
However, a risk-based inspection regime where the frequency and intensity of inspection is set
according to risk of non-compliance and/or past history of compliance can fulfil this purpose (though
this option is outside the scope of the current study). Accordingly, businesses demonstrating a high
level of safety are inspected less often and therefore pay fees less frequently, and those with a poor
record of safety are inspected more often or more intensely and therefore pay fees more often.
It is important that the Regulation does not create barriers to the adoption of bonus-malus principles
or a move to risk-based inspection regimes. There are some aspects of the current Regulation that
could constrain successful implementation of bonus-malus principles, one example being the
schedule of minimum fees.
4.2.1.32 Sub-option A6 - Specification
Sub-option A6 considers whether Articles 26-29 of the Regulation should be changed to
incorporate bonus-malus principles in the fee system for official controls such that best
performers are rewarded while the worst performers are penalised. This sub-option
considers:
▪ How Regulation 882/2004 can promote bonus-malus principles;
▪ Which controls are most suitable for fees that incorporate bonus-malus principles; and
▪ How the overall performance of Option A can be improved by incorporating bonus-malus
principles.
4.2.1.33 Sub-option A6 – Evidence and analysis
Respondent scores and comments
CA and industry respondents indicated that incorporating time-based fees and risk-based
principles could provide an ‘automatic’ bonus-malus system for official controls. Industry
favours self-control to reduce the inspection frequency and therefore, the costs both for
industry and CAs. These systems must be based on oversight by CAs and/or certification by
independent bodies in order to be effective. In particular, bonus-malus principles would
improve efficiency and accountability.
Case study assessment
The findings from the case studies are largely consistent with the wider findings from the
impact assessment. There is general support for the incorporation of bonus-malus principles
into official controls systems, with correspondingly positive impacts on cost recovery for CAs
anticipated. Bonus-malus principles are already incorporated into fee systems in several
Member States and considered to be a positive feature. In Poland, there is little experience
with bonus-malus systems and respondents indicated difficulty envisaging how bonus-malus
principles would operate in practice. Potential increases in administrative burdens were
identified as a particular concern in all Member States.
Other evidence
Some Member States have elements of a bonus-malus system already in place, some of
which are described in the DG SANCO baseline information (Table A1.23, page 150).
There are some shared principles that underlie the systems already in place across Member
States that could be considered in bonus-malus arrangements implemented through
changes to Regulation 882/2004:
▪ Self-control systems operated by FBOs can be used to reduce the costs for fee
collection to CAs and reduce costs for FBOs where the costs for self-control systems are
less than the cost of official inspection (e.g. Belgium, Italy).
▪ Fee rates can be linked to whether the FBO has a HACCP system that is accredited by a
certified body, with lower fees paid by FBOs that do; higher fees by those that do not
(e.g. Belgium).
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▪ FBOs with a track record of good performance pay lower fees or are inspected less
frequently and poor performers pay higher fees or are inspected more frequently (e.g.
France, Germany, Italy).
▪ Time-based fees are utilised to lower the costs for good performers. Inspections take
less time when FBOs conform to the rules and risk-based principles can be used to vary
the intensity and/or frequency of checks (e.g. Netherlands).
▪ CAs and industry negotiate the steps that may be taken by an FBO on an individual
business basis to determine what changes would result in lower fees/fewer inspections
(e.g. UK).
There are some aspects of the Regulation that currently constrain successful implementation
of bonus-malus principles. The most important issue is minimum fees. As reported in the
FCEC 2009 evaluation, some CAs view the minimum fees as the indicative rate and charge
neither more nor less for control activities. But the primary assumption underlying a bonus-
malus system for fee collection is that good performers pay lower fees (or less often) than
poor performers. Minimum fees serve to constrain opportunities for bonus-malus principles
to apply to the fees charged where the system incorporates two (or more) pricing schedules
(for good and bad performers) or where fee rates overall are higher for control activity, but
because good performers pay less frequently, they ultimately pay fewer fees than poor
performers.
The magnitude of impacts
The scale of the impact of this option on individual Member States and on individual FBOs
would be determined by the bonus-malus principles applied. This is not known. For those
MS where bonus-malus principles are already in place (9 MS), however, impacts are
expected to be less than for those MS that have little or no experience in this area.
Incidence of impact and distributional issues
Impacts would fall primarily within the EU. This option would, in principle, impact on all FBOs
subject to fees for official controls, and the income of all entities that collect these fees. The
distribution of impacts is affected by the principles adopted under a bonus-malus system and
the sectors that would be affected (e.g. based on a risk assessment).
The net impact on business would be influenced by the principle adopted as well. Self-
control systems, consultation with industry on steps to improve performance and reduce fee
costs, and other mechanisms could all benefit compliant FBOs and result in higher costs to
non-compliant FBOs. In order to ensure that fees do not exceed costs, bonus-malus
principles would need to ensure that the redistribution of costs equals the cost to perform the
control. Therefore, the frequency of inspection or the intensity of inspection will meet this
objective, while simply charging more to non-compliant businesses and less to compliant
ones, while still performing the same number and level of controls for each would not
conform to this principle.
There is no particular SME bias. Good performing SMEs will pay less and poor performers
will pay more. Bonus-malus principles could have a positive impact on SMEs where good
performers are able to reduce their costs.
Compliance costs and administrative burdens
There is some uncertainty regarding the overall impact on administrative costs as there
would be some increase in costs to implement the system but potentially fewer costs over
time as inspections become more efficient and fewer in number. Further specification and
development of the sub-option (and its interpretation in the context of varied MS fee
systems) is required for the burdens to be quantifiable.
Cost-benefit assessment
The administrative costs are unknown and the extent to which they result in higher or lower
costs to MS and FBOs depends entirely on the principles identified as under girding a bonus-
malus system. Administrative costs are, however, expected to fall over time as the system is
fine-tuned and control activity becomes more efficient. The overall benefits include greater
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efficiency in control activity, which allows MS to target the most risky businesses and
provides incentives for businesses to improve their operations to reduce their inspection
costs.
4.2.1.34 Sub-option A7 – Introduce transparency and reporting requirements
Summary of the option:
Overall, providing information to the public regarding fees for official controls will have positive
impacts on accountability and is likely to require little additional administrative cost, particularly in
cases where such information is already provided through CA websites.
A requirement to report to the Commission on resources devoted to official controls will have
similarly positive impacts on accountability, but comes with greater administrative cost burdens to
CAs, particularly in MS with decentralised systems. Yearly reporting may be too onerous and could
be required every other year or less frequently. The overall change in administrative burdens would
be influenced by the exact reporting requirements (e.g. cost recovery rate only, or full financial and
control data) and whether existing reporting requirements under Regulation 882/2004 are
rationalised.
4.2.1.35 Sub-option A7 - Specification
Sub-option A7 considers whether Articles 26-29 of the Regulation should be changed to
require Member States to provide information:
▪ To the Commission regarding the financial resources devoted to official controls each
year (through the annual reports required under Regulation 882/2004/EC); and
▪ To the public regarding fees (e.g. the implementing rules, fee review process, and the
calculation method), modes of payment and other administrative procedures.
Respondents were asked to consider the positive and negative impacts of these
requirements.
4.2.1.36 Sub-option A7 – Evidence and analysis
Respondent scores and comments
Results from the analysis of survey responses as regards the impacts of this policy option
are summarised as follows:
▪ Competent Authorities and industry indicate that this sub-option is likely to result in
strong positive impacts on accountability, comparability and efficiency.
▪ In particular, positive impacts include:
– Improved information sharing amongst CAs and between CAs and industry;
– Improved transparency of the fee system; and
– Increased opportunities to benchmark between CAs in different Member States,
though some respondents warned that comparisons are not straightforward and
should be carefully considered.
Negative impacts may occur where these requirements introduce additional administrative
costs for CAs.
Case study assessment
The findings from the case study indicate that a trade-off is likely between improvements in
accountability and increased costs and complexity for setting up and maintaining systems of
information provision to the Commission and the public. In Member States with centralised
official controls systems, the costs and complexities are reduced because the necessary
information is more readily available. In decentralised systems, the effort to collect
information, particularly to report to the Commission regarding resources allocated to official
controls, is likely to be time-consuming and therefore costly. With regard to providing
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information to industry and the public more broadly, this is likely to entail some, but not
significant costs in Member States where information is not already provided.
Other evidence
The SANCO baseline data provide information on the current provision of information by
Member States to the public. Some Member States already publish information regarding fee
rates and the legislation itself on a public website. Seven Member States share complete
information in this fashion (Table 4.6). Some Member States provide access to the
legislation through the Official Journal, but do not provide any information through other
sources. Eleven Member States share information through the Official Journal, four of which
provide information both online and in the Official Journal: Finland, Netherlands, Spain, and
Sweden. No baseline information on reporting is available for the remaining 12 Member
States.
In Member States where all information on fee rates and the relevant legislation is provided
both through a public website and through the Official Journal, the component of sub-option
A7 that would require reporting to the public would likely have little or no impact. However,
the sub-option does not specify what particular reporting channels would satisfy a
requirement to provide information to the public. A change to the Regulation may therefore
add requirements for MS that only share information through the Official Journal or through a
website, but not both. The added costs for sharing information through both channels are
expected to be minimal. Member States that do not share information at all will have some
administrative costs associated with doing so, but these are not expected to be high.
The cost of sharing the information in Member States will depend on the average hourly
employment cost for CA employees. The study identified CA hourly rates for seven Member
States; Belgium, Finland, France, UK, Spain, Lithuania and Bulgaria. For Member States
where this information was not available, the average public sector hourly rate from Eurostat
was used to estimate if a CA is likely to have a high, medium or low rate. Where information
for public sector wage levels was not available in Eurostat, private sector wages were used
instead. Table 4.7 groups the Member States into four categories based on the average
wage rate (using CA, public sector or private sector data, where available). The table below
demonstrates that introducing mandatory reporting would be more expensive in Ireland and
Denmark than Italy and Greece, for example.
The second component of sub-option A7 would require Member States to provide
information to the Commission on resources devoted to official control activity through the
Regulation 882/2004/EC Annual Reports. The impact on Member States under this
requirement depends on the staff costs in each MS, the amount of time expected to be
required to collect and collate the data, and the degree to which the required information is
already collected.
In order to understand the likely impact of this sub-option, the survey for this study attempted
to collect information from each CA on the labour costs, time requirements and current data
collection practices of the case study Member States. Some Member States in the non-case
study countries also returned surveys and a few CAs provided information on this sub-option
as well. In total, seven CAs provided information on full-time equivalent (FTE) costs, but only
two estimated the staff time required to provide information on resources to the Commission.
Under these circumstances, construction of a standard cost model to estimate likely impacts
was not viable.
The UK’s Food Standards Agency (FSA) provided detailed information on the cost of
reporting to the Commission under three hypothetical scenarios indicative of the options that
might be considered under this sub-option. The data reported by CAs in other Member
States indicates the range of FTE costs across the EU.
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Table 4.12 Transparency and reporting to the public on fees for official controls by EU Member State
BE
IE
UK
ES
FL
NL
SE
DE
EE
FR
IT
LT
PL
SK
MT
AT
BG
CY
CZ
DK
GR
HU
LU
LV
PT
RO
SI
All information available
online
Legislation published in
the Official Journal
Information recorded but
not available / published
No information available
High transparency Medium transparency Low transparency No information available
Source: DG SANCO baseline
Table 4.13 Average hourly wage rate for Member States, 2008
IE
BE
DE
FI
FR
UK
AT
*
ES
NL
SE
*
LU
*
DE
CY
MT
*
IT*
SL
GR
PT
*
CZ
PL
HU
EE
LV
LT
SL
RO
BG
High €65 €42 €30 €49
Moderately high €20
Moderately low
Low €3 €2
High
( > €30 / hour)
Moderately high
(€20 – €29 / hour)
Moderately low
(€10 – €19 / hour)
Low
(< €10 / hour)
Eurostat 2008
*Average hourly public sector wage rates not available; countries grouped using average private sector hourly rate.
Wage rates for France, Belgium, United Kingdom, Spain, Lithuania and Bulgaria provided via CA survey.
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UK scenarios
The Food Standards Agency (FSA) provided a baseline (based on current costs) and three
alternative scenarios for reporting on controls undertaken by local authorities25
. Two of these
scenarios include a description of the cost implications of different levels of data collection;
while the third describes potential costs but does not provide an estimate (see section
A1.1.7.2 in Annex 1 for detailed calculations).
The current total cost of collecting data on meat inspections is estimated at between €3,055
and €3,960 including overheads.
The FSA expects collecting information on the total resources dedicated to meat inspections
to be relatively straightforward due to the low level of detail required. It estimates that it
would cost €1,655-€1,815 per year to collect only data on the number of FTEs dedicated to
meat inspections. These costs relate to collecting data at the national and local authority
level respectively. If more detailed information was required, such as the precise costs
based on actual time spent on each business by inspectors, the proposition becomes
considerably more expensive. Although actual monetary estimates were not provided, the
FSA listed the additional resources it thinks would be necessary:
▪ Enforcement officers, trading standards officers, and administrative staff at local
authorities recording time spent on each visit.
▪ The development of an IT system to capture this information at each local authority and
then report to the FSA.
▪ A large overhead at the FSA to produce reports.
This would all be new activity. Costs are unknown, but they are expected to be
considerable.
Data from Finland
The Finnish CA (Evira) estimated that it would cost €500,000 and require 4 FTEs to collect
and submit information about the resources spent by CAs in the execution of official control
activities. During interview, Evira stated that the €500,000 represents an initial investment to
set up an IT system capable of collecting the necessary data at a local (municipal) level.
Once the system was up and running, they estimated that it would require 4 FTEs on an
ongoing basis. Both the Finnish and UK official control systems are decentralised; it is
reasonable to assume that the cost of a more detailed calculation of costs as described
above for the UK may be similar to Finland’s estimate.
Table 4.8 provides data that was submitted by CAs through the study survey on FTE rates.
Though the data are limited, it gives an indication of the high variance in FTE rates across
Member States (from €1.86 / hour in Bulgaria to €64.74 / hour in Belgium). Consequently,
there is likely to be high variance in the potential administrative burdens under a requirement
to report information to the Commission, regardless of which model is implemented per the
UK’s three hypothetical options.
Nonetheless, given that the UK and Finland are Member States with a relatively high FTE
rate, and that they have a decentralised structure which makes reporting at MS level more
challenging than in other MS, it is reasonable to assume that providing a total resource
estimate for each MS, without subdivisions by control activity or level of administration might
cost around €1500 per country (FI estimate of €1470 at 5 days, €42/hr and UK estimate of
€1,655). A requirement to provide complete information by control and by level of
administration would likely impose an additional one-time cost of around €500,000 per MS to
implement an information system to collect this information, plus 4 FTEs per year to
administer the system.
25 For the figures in this section, an exchange rate £1 = €1.13158 (18/06/2011) is used.
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Table 4.14 Data for the Standard Cost Model obtained through the survey indicate high variation in FTE rates across MS (between €3.31/hour and €64.74/hour)
MS CA Response
Q1 Q2 Q3
BE Federal Agency for the Safety
of the Food Chain (FASFC)
€64.74 / hr Staff time: 836
hours
External costs: 0
Staff time: 836
hours
External costs: 0
BG Bulgarian Food Safety Agency €1.86 / employee / hr n/a n/a
ES SG Sanidad Exterior (MSPSI);
SG Acuerdos Sanitarios y
Control en Frontera (MARM)
€20.42 / hr n/a n/a
FI Finnish Food Safety Authority
(Evira)
€42 / hr Staff time: 4 FTE
External costs:
€500,000
n/a
FR Direction générale de
l’alimentation (DGAI) –
Ministère chargé de
l’agriculture
€29.50 / hr n/a n/a
LT State Food and Veterinary
Service of Republic of
Lithuania
€3.31 / hr n/a n/a
UK Food Standards Agency (FSA) Grade 7: €55.44 / hr
Senior Executive
Officer: €42.07 / hr
Staff time: 5-6 FTE n/a
Source: Survey of CAs conducted as part of this study.
The magnitude of impacts
The scale of the impact of this sub-option on individual Member States will vary depending
on the level of detail required for reporting to the Commission—both the level of detail and
frequency of reporting to the Commission on resources devoted to official controls and the
type of public provision of information. These are unknown.
Based on the hourly rates contained in Table 4.8 above, it is clear that CA wages are
significantly higher in some Member States compared to others. For example, wages in
Bulgaria are approximately €1.86 per hour compared to €29.50 per hour in France. The cost
of collecting data and reporting to the Commission will be higher in Member States with
higher CA hourly wage levels. The wage data collected thought the CA survey is a relatively
good match with the Eurostat data on average public sector wages. This indicates that
Member States with high or moderately high wage levels may have a more significant
impact, in terms of costs, compared to Member States with moderately low or low average
public sector wage levels (Table 4.7).
Incidence of impact and distributional issues
Impacts would fall primarily within the EU. This sub-option would, in principle, impact on all
CAs and FBOs subject to fees for official controls.
Member States with decentralised official controls systems are likely to be more affected by
financial resource reporting requirements than centralised systems because collecting and
reporting the information will require greater efforts and by more individuals. This effect
would be more pronounced in Member States with high wage rates (Figure 4.7).
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Figure 4.9 Costs of introducing and maintaining detailed reporting on resources to the Commission will be greater for Member States with decentralised systems and higher wage rates
e.g. DE, UK, FI
Organisation of controls
Wage
rates
High
Low
DecentralisedCentralised
Member States that already collect detailed information on financial resources devoted to
official controls and/or publicise their fee rates and legislation will be subject to little or no
impact from these requirements.
Publicising information on fee rates and other related information to the public is likely to
have a low impact on Member States that do not already publicise this information.
There is no particular SME bias to this sub-option.
Compliance costs and administrative burdens
The more detailed the reporting requirements, the greater the administrative burden
associated with reporting them. The three scenarios set out by the UK CA indicate a range of
possibilities of varying potential administrative burdens, depending on the level of detail
required in any reporting scenario. Member States with decentralised official controls
systems are likely to have higher administrative burdens than centralised Member States,
due to the additional effort required to collect information at different government levels.
Costs and benefits
This sub-option will increase costs for CAs; the extent of the cost increase will depend on the
current arrangements in Member States related to data collection. Costs will relate to setting
up and maintaining systems necessary to collect and collate relevant data. Costs for CAs in
decentralised Member States will be higher than centralised Member States; collecting
standardised data in decentralised Member States will require more effort and have a larger
administrative burden. Over time, increasing transparency and reporting could reduce costs
for CAs by increasing sharing of best practice.
Increasing transparency and reporting of data to the Commission will not increase costs for
FBOs. It could, over time, reduce costs by improving benchmarking and sharing of best
practice between Member States.
The specification of reporting requirements and their relationship to the revised performance
monitoring and management system for Regulation 882/2004 is important. If the reports to
the Commission covered core performance measures that Member States themselves would
need to be monitoring in order to check compliance with the Regulation, then the incremental
cost of submitted data to Brussels would be very modest.
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4.2.1.37 Sub-option A8 – Provide for industry participation
Summary of the option:
Industry participation could have significant positive impacts on accountability for the efficient
conduct of official controls and the associated fee setting process. Industry participation could
provide opportunities for FBOs and CAs to work together to pursue common objectives. Fee
acceptance is also likely to be higher where industry can participate in the process.
4.2.1.38 Sub-option A8 - Specification
Sub-option A8 considers changes to Articles 26-29 of the Regulation that would provide
FBOs with the right to participate in the process of setting the structure of fee rates. This
sub-option considers:
▪ Whether and how FBOs already participate in this process in each Member State;
▪ Advantages and disadvantages of amending the Regulation to provide each FBO with
the right to participate; and
▪ Stakeholders’ views of how such an amendment should be specified so as to maximise
its positive impacts and minimise negative impacts.
4.2.1.39 Sub-option A8 – Evidence and analysis
Respondent scores and comments
Industry respondents generally view this option positively and believe it would improve
efficiency, accountability and comparability of official controls systems. The option would
allow industry to have a meaningful role in the fee setting process and could provide
opportunities for sharing information that could increase effectiveness of inspections. It could
also motivate FBOs and CAs to work together to pursue common objectives. Fee
acceptance is also likely to be higher where industry can participate in the process.
CAs generally indicated that this option would have little impact on the current official
controls systems overall, but could have positive impacts on accountability, where it
increased transparency in the fee-structuring process.
Case study assessment
Respondents in all of the case study countries indicated that industry participation in fee
structuring and other aspects of system implementation would positively impact on
accountability. It could improve the fairness of the fee schedules and increase acceptance of
the fees as a result. CAs expressed concern, however, that participation could lead to
increased administrative burdens. Responses were mixed regarding the extent to which
industry participation would simplify official control activity. Some respondents thought it
would introduce complexity in the fee setting process that currently does not exist in many
Member States, while others thought it could simplify the process.
Other evidence
No additional information is available on participation by FBOs in fee setting and system
development for official controls.
The magnitude of impacts
The scale of the impact of this sub-option on individual Member States and on individual
FBOs would be determined by the level of participation granted to industry and the degree to
which industry perceives itself to have a meaningful role in the process. This will depend on
the specification of any participatory process, and this is currently unknown.
Incidence of impact and distributional issues
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Impacts would fall primarily within the EU. This option would, in principle, impact all FBOs
subject to fees for official controls, and all Competent Authorities in EU Member States.
The distribution of impacts would depend on the level of industry participation offered by any
changes to the Regulation, and the degree to which industry believed it had a meaningful
role in the fee setting process as well as any costs to CAs related to ensuring participation
and any benefits to CAs and industry from improvements to the fee systems as a result of
industry participation.
Compliance costs and administrative burdens
The direction of change for CAs related to administrative burdens is impossible to predict.
There will be some additional costs to creating and implementing participatory systems. CAs
will potentially see some reduced costs where industry participation results in greater
efficiencies in official controls systems or conversely increased costs where industry
participation leads to greater difficulties in considering and agreeing a fee system.
Costs and benefits
CAs are likely to face some increased administrative burdens to organise and operate
participatory processes with industry, but these costs are likely to be low. Industry will also
face increased costs where it chooses to participate in the process. Costs to industry cannot
be measured because the decision to participate or not in any new process will vary by
Member State and sector. Industry will, however, only participate in any new process where
the benefits are seen to outweigh the costs.
Both industry and CAs expect that introducing participatory processes will result in improved
transparency and accountability. There is likely to be an additional improvement in the
efficiency of control activity where information sharing leads to innovations in control
activities, and thus their effectiveness.
4.2.1.40 Sub-option A9 – Introduce exemptions and reductions for micro-enterprises
Summary of the option:
Mandatory fee reductions or exemptions for micro-enterprises may reduce cost recovery in Member
States, particularly for those with a large number of such businesses. There is no correlation that can
be determined, however, between the percentage of micro enterprises in a MS, the degree of cost
recovery and whether or not a MS already offers an exemption or reduction. More information is
required to understand this relationship.
Nonetheless, respondents indicated a clear preference for the choice to provide such an exemption
or no provision for such an exemption, rather than a requirement to provide universal exemptions or
reductions. Providing Member States with the option to determine whether or not to provide an
exemption or reduction would allow this decision to be made on a case-by-case basis in each MS
and would not require those MS that already provide an exemption (at least 11 of 27 MS) to remove
the already existing fee reduction or exemption provisions in its control system.
4.2.1.41 Sub-option A9 - Specification
Sub-option A9 considers whether the Regulation should be changed to provide reduced fees
or fee exemptions for micro-enterprises. The sub-option does not state whether the
exemption would be mandatory or an option that Member States could choose to exercise.
The (potential) exemption relates to the levying of fees only, and not the imposition of
controls. Respondents were asked to consider the advantages and disadvantages of
including fee reductions or exemptions, impacts on different stakeholder groups, and
whether the Regulation should provide a universal exemption for micro-enterprises under EU
law or provide the option for Member States to implement reductions or exemptions as they
choose.
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4.2.1.42 Sub-option A9 – Evidence and analysis
Respondent scores and comments
CA and industry respondents clearly favour the option to have an exemption or reduction, or
to have no special terms for micro enterprises, rather than to introduce a universal
exemption or reduction.
Competent Authority and industry respondents uniformly indicated that this sub-option would
have negative or no impacts on official controls systems. In particular, this option is likely to
have a negative impact on resource mobilisation where less fee revenue is collected but the
number of controls remains the same. Nonetheless, respondent comments indicate that the
amendment would reduce the financial burden on micro-enterprises and help to encourage
development of small businesses. Several respondents indicated that fee exemptions or
reductions are unfair, and that inspections should be undertaken according to risk. An
effective risk-based system would automatically reduce the costs for the best-performing
micro-enterprises.
Respondents clearly favour the option of an exemption or reduction, or no special terms for
micro enterprises, rather than a universal exemption or reduction. No CAs and 8 industry
respondents prefer a universal exemption or reduction. CAs strongly prefer the choice to
implement an exemption or reduction (8 CAs) and 11 industry respondents prefer a choice
as well. Industry respondents prefer no special mention and no special terms for micro
enterprises (13) and 2 CAs prefer no special mention as well.
Case study assessment
The findings from the case study indicate that fee reductions or exemptions for micro-
enterprises are likely to have negative impacts in some Member States and positive impacts
in others. This depends in part on the proportion of micro-enterprises in a given Member
State relative to other businesses, as well as the extent of cost recovery in that Member
State. Where there are a large number of micro-enterprises, fee reductions or exemptions
will have a negative impact on the resources mobilised from fees. Similarly, this sub-option
could simplify the system by reducing the number of FBOs subject to fees (if information
systems can distinguish such FBOs).
Other evidence
Micro-enterprises represent a significant proportion of all FBOs in sectors most affected by
official controls (Figure 4.8). In 16 of the 23 Member States for which data are available,
micro enterprises represent more than half of all FBOs. In seven Member States, they
represent between approximately 70 – 80 per cent of FBOs.
Data suggest that fee reductions or exemptions are currently provided to micro enterprises in
11 Member States. Five Member States do not offer such reductions or exemptions. No
information is available for the remaining 11 Member States (Table A1.32, page 172).
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Figure 4.10 Micro-enterprises as a percentage of total number of enterprises in four major European industries affected by official control activity (2008)26
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Micro-enterprises
Source: Eurostat
The impact of a fee reduction or exemption is likely to depend on the proportion of micro
enterprises in the population of FBOs and the extent of full cost recovery. Predicting the
likely effects further would require more complete data. Relevant information includes
whether or not a MS currently provides an exemption or reduction, full cost recovery status
and the percentage of micro enterprises across Member States. There are only 12 MS for
which complete information is available, and 10 of these already offer an exemption.
The magnitude of impacts
The scale of the impact on Member States and individual FBOs would be determined by
whether or not the option to exempt micro-enterprises (or reduce their fees) is exercised.
Where a fee reduction is chosen, the impact of that reduction will further vary by Member
State depending on their already existing fee rates.
In Member States that currently exempt micro enterprises, there will be little or no impact of
requiring that such exemptions are provided. However, introducing a requirement in
Member States where such exemptions are not provided could have a high impact. Table
4.9 illustrates the Member States where high and low impacts may occur.
Compliance costs and administrative burdens
Administrative burdens may be increased or decreased as a result of mandatory exemptions
or reductions, but the precise direction of the impact is difficult to predict and will vary by
Member State. For example, administrative burdens could increase where Member States
must identify micro-enterprises to ensure fees are reduced or eliminated. Additional costs will
arise where a fee reduction must be calculated, discussed, set, communicated and collected.
Conversely, administrative burdens could decrease where Member States are not obligated
to collect a fee where an exemption is implemented.
26 Industry sectors include: processing and preserving of meat and production of meat products; processing and
preserving of fish, crustaceans and molluscs; manufacture of dairy products; manufacture of prepared animal feeds. Greece and Malta are not included in Eurostat dataset. Data for the Czech Republic and France are not available.
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Costs and benefits
Introducing fee exemptions for micro-enterprises will reduce the proportion of costs
recovered by CAs. This will be especially pronounced in Member States with a high
proportion of micro-enterprises, and high cost recovery levels.
There is a potential tension between the micro-enterprise exemption and other objectives.
Where micro-enterprise reductions or exemptions are applied, the costs of inspection must
be met by alternative sources. Cross-subsidy of very small businesses by levying a
surcharge on fees applied to larger firms is not consistent with the principle that each
business should not be charged more than the costs of inspecting that business. If the
deficit is made up with revenues from general taxation then the CA (and MS) will not be able
to achieve full cost recovery.
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Table 4.15 A requirement to provide an exemption or fee reductions for micro enterprises will have little or no impact on MS where such exemptions or reductions already exist, but could have a high impact where they do not
DE
ES
FR
PL
SK
BE
DK
EE
FI
IE
IT
NL
PT
RO
SE
UK
AT
BG
CY
CZ
GR
HU
LT
LU
LV
MT
SI
No exemptions or
reductions / no
specific rules
Exemptions and/or
reductions provided
No information
% micro-enterprises
to all enterprises in
relevant sectors
58 60 N/A 66 13 69 57 40 74 26 71 66 63 62 80 58 69 43 79 N/A N/A 57 48 47 41 N/A 73
% full cost
recovery27
N/A N/A
45 -
70
10028
51 37 35* 20 20*
40 -
90 50 81 100 50 N/A 43 100 27 N/A 28 N/A 60 100 N/A 100 39 100
High impact Low impact
No information available /
identified
DG SANCO baseline and Eurostat 2008
N/A – those countries for which micro-enterprise data or full cost recovery information is not available.
DK cost recovery for small abattoirs = 35%; FI cost recovery for small plants = 20%
27 See Table A1.8 for full cost recovery details by Member State.
28 The baseline data provided by DG SANCO indicate that Poland achieves full cost recovery; interviews with the Polish CA for this study, however, suggest that there is little
data on cost recovery and that the available data indicate that cost recovery is insufficient.
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4.2.2 Option B –Fully harmonise inspection fees for official controls
Option B considers the possibility to fully harmonise inspection fees for official controls
throughout the EU. Option B is equivalent to the ‘full harmonisation’ option considered in the
evaluation study carried out for DG SANCO by the Food Chain Evaluation Consortium
(FCEC). Under this scenario all MS would pay the same fees (fixed rates) for the same
activities (i.e. full harmonisation).
There are three sub-options within this option:
▪ Fees are determined on a unified basis for the EU as a whole;
▪ A modified version, in which harmonised fees are adjusted for each Member State using
a cost of living index; and
▪ A sub-option that considers whether fees should be harmonised only for certain import
controls.
In the first two cases, respondents were asked to consider the impacts of harmonised fees
on official controls determined on both a time unit and a number/quantity basis.
General points relevant to the impact assessment are that:
▪ The actual price schedule (and indeed the costing model that would be needed to
underpin the harmonised prices) was not specified in the option text provided for this
study. The quantitative appraisal of impacts is thus constrained not only by the gaps in
the baseline data, but also by uncertainty about the ex-post position (i.e. at what level
fees would be set); and
▪ The feedback received from consultees reflected their perceptions of how the level of a
harmonised EU fee might compare to the current fee in their particular Member State,
about which there is uncertainty.
4.2.2.43 Sub-option B1: Introduce unified fees for the EU-27
Summary of the option:
Full harmonisation on the basis of a unified schedule of rates is likely to have a negative impact on
official controls systems across the EU-27.
There are valid questions about the feasibility of this option. Developing a cost model or set of
pricing principles for each official control that was seen by stakeholders to be fair and appropriate
(given control costs) would be an extremely challenging exercise. Due to the significant differences
in the organisation of official controls systems, variation in cost factors, etc. amongst Member States
it would be impossible to identify a fee level that would be appropriate for every country.
Harmonised fees would also be politically difficult to implement in MS with highly decentralised
decision making and governance structures. In MS with decentralised OC systems, it may not be
possible to specify the fee rates under existing national legislative arrangements. There are cases
where new national legislation would be needed.
4.2.2.44 Sub-option B1 - Specification
In this sub-option the fees for the provision of controls are determined on a unified basis for
the EU as a whole (i.e. the same fee rates apply in each Member State).
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4.2.2.45 Sub-option B1 – Evidence and analysis
Respondent scores and comments
Respondents were asked to consider whether they agree or disagree with a set of
advantages and disadvantages for sub-option B1 and to offer any additional benefits or
drawbacks that they could see arising. Results from the analysis of survey responses as
regards the impacts of this policy option are summarised as follows:
▪ Competent Authorities and industry stakeholders indicated that this option would be
positive in terms of simplification and streamlining of the system.
▪ Competent Authorities also noted that unified fees would improve comparability and
accountability, though industry stakeholders felt the option would have little or a slightly
negative impact in these areas.
▪ Both CAs and industry believe that the option would have a negative impact on
efficiency, however. Moreover, respondent comments indicate that this option may not
be practical, could be too rigid and would not provide incentives for efficiency gains.
Overall, full harmonisation, applying a unified rate across the EU-27, is likely to reduce the
efficiency of the official control system. CAs consider that it could have a positive effect on
the other four criteria, but expressed concerns about the inability of a harmonised fee to
reflect differences in official controls systems between MS, and inadequately cover actual
costs. FBOs are similarly concerned with the potential negative impacts on the efficiency of
the controls system, and argue that harmonised fees would have little positive impact on the
other four criteria. Due to the wide divergence in official controls systems across the MS,
FBOs do not think that full harmonisation is a realistic option.
Case study assessment
Results from the case studies reflect the inherent uncertainty as to the direction of change
under harmonised fees. There are two possible extreme scenarios under full harmonisation
that respond to two different objectives of the legislation:
1. Fees are set at the highest common denominator in order to ensure full cost recovery in
the most expensive Member State; or
2. Fees are set at the lowest common denominator in order to ensure that in the least
expensive Member State fees are not higher than the actual cost of controls.
The first scenario is reflected in the impacts projected in some of the case study countries.
For example, in Member States where fees are relatively low (e.g. Poland), harmonised fees
are likely to increase the fee rates charged and thus increase cost recovery. These
increases might, however, place an unacceptably high burden on industry where the controls
become too costly to operate viable businesses. The CAs in Poland are likely to recover
more fees than required to cover costs. In Member States where costs are relatively high
(e.g. the UK), harmonised fees will have less overall impact as there is likely to be little
change in the fees charged to operate the controls system.
Conversely, if fees are set at the lowest common denominator, Poland will be less impacted
(and still achieve full cost recovery), but the UK system will be under funded (in the UK only
44 per cent of costs were recovered under the current system in 2009).
Other evidence
Figure 4.9 illustrates why the impacts of harmonised fees are so uncertain. Considering only
one control (adult cattle slaughter rates) in one area of official control activity (meat controls),
the rates charged in a selection of Member States are plotted by the cost in euro per head of
cattle. The fee rates are taken from a survey of rates charged to industry conducted by
CLITRAVI in 2007 and updated in 2009. For the purposes of this chart an arbitrary
harmonised fee rate of five euro per head was chosen because it is the current minimum fee
for this control and many Member States currently charge the minimum fee. This provides an
illustration of the variance in fee rates relative to the average rate. Significant complexity in
the fees charged underlies the highly simplified diagram below, as described in Table 4.10.
Nevertheless, it illustrates the gap between the fees currently charged in a selection of
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Member States and any potential harmonised fee. The actual harmonised fee rate that
might be used under Option B is unknown, and therefore precise impacts are impossible to
calculate.
Figure 4.11 Fee harmonisation would change prices for most FBOs and control fee income for governments - but the direction, scale and distribution of change would be determined by the actual level at which fees are set
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
BE BG CZ DK ES FL FR HU IT LI LV NL IE RO SE SI
Maximum rate (€/head)
Minimum rate (€/head)
Hypothetical harmonised fee (€/head)
There is a considerable gap between the fees currently charged in different MS and any potential harmonised fee.
There is uncertainty regarding how a harmonised fee would compare to current fees in EU MS
Figure prepared by GHK. The hypothetical example shown here is based on fee rates for slaughtering adult cattle (€/head). Fee rates are taken from a survey of MS fee rates by CLITRAVI, updated in 2009.
Table 4.16 Explanation of data underlying Figure 4.9 for meat industry inspection rates - 2009 fee rates for slaughtering adult cattle (€/head)
MS Rate explanation
BE Different rates are charged for small slaughterhouses and large slaughterhouses:
▪ €5.12 is the rate for slaughter lines slaughtering more than 50 animals per hour
▪ €11.63 is the rate for small slaughterhouses
▪ €15.50 is the rate for slaughterhouses slaughtering four animals or fewer per hour
The minimum and maximum rates are used in this example
DK Different rates are charged for small and large slaughterhouses:
▪ €6.80 for small slaughterhouses
▪ €8.80 for large slaughterhouses
These are set as the minimum and maximum rates in this example
ES A wide range of rates are charged depending on fees set by region:
▪ In some regions, rates charged cover costs
▪ In other regions, no charge is levied
▪ A range of rates may be charged between these extremes
The maximum charge is unknown. The minimum (i.e. no charge) is used in this example.
FI Slaughterhouses are charged once a month. The invoice covers all meat inspection and control
activities including hygiene, food safety, animal welfare, animal diseases, etc. There is no animal-
based fee and an estimate is difficult to provide as most slaughterhouses process several types
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of animal. There is also large variation between large and small slaughterhouses.
The fees presented here are estimates of the minimum and maximum cost per animal for cattle.
HU A range of fees is charged depending on the examination time and using a multiplier to vary the
rate according to the distance of the slaughterhouse from the location of the official veterinarian.
▪ Rates by time of inspection:
– €4.72 (between 6 am - 4.30 pm)
– €9.44 (between 4.30 pm - 6 am)
▪ Multiplier by distance:
– 1.2 (<10 km)
– 1.3 (between 10-50 km)
– 1.4 (between 50-100 km)
– 1.5 (between 100-200 km)
– 1.6 (> 200 km) This example presents the highest and lowest possible fee (i.e. €9.44 * 1.6 and €4.72 * 1.2)
IT Charges vary by region and size of establishment. Establishments handling:
▪ >70,001 units per year are charged €3 per head
▪ 50,001-70,000 are charged €3.50 per head
▪ 25,001 to 50,000 are charged €4 per head
▪ 10,001-25,000 are charged €4.5 per head
▪ 10,000 or fewer are charged €5 per head
The minimum and maximum charges (i.e. €3 and €5 per head) are used in this example
LI A lump sum is charged for issuing a supervision certificate and checking 10 adult cattle (€50.10).
In this example, the estimate of €5.01 per head is used, but this includes a portion of the cost for
issuing the certificate and is thus an overestimate.
NL Hourly rates are charged:
▪ €26.48 per hour for ante-mortem inspections
▪ €19.28 per hour for post-mortem inspections
▪ Minimum rates per animal are also set (€2.02 per head)
Minimum rates are used in this example.
SE A range of fees is charged depending on the size of the establishment. The range for cattle is
€12-25 per head. The largest slaughterhouses pay the lowest fee.
The minimum and maximum charges (€12 and €25 per head) are used in this example.
The magnitude of impacts
The scale of the impact of this option on individual Member States and on individual FBOs
would be determined by the level at which the harmonised fee was set for any given control
and how that relates to the existing (baseline) fee. This is not known.
Incidence of impact and distributional issues
Impacts would fall primarily within the EU. This option would, in principle, impact on all
FBOs subject to fees for official controls, and the income of all entities that collect such fees.
The distribution of impacts is affected by the level at which harmonised fees are set. If fees
were harmonised at the level of the highest prevailing fee in Europe then aggregate payment
by industry would rise substantially. If the fees were harmonised at the level of the lowest
prevailing fee then industry would, on balance, gain but there would be a corresponding
deficit in government income and in the overall cost-recovery rate. If fees were set in the
middle of the current range then there would be ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ on a state-by-state
basis. In MS with relatively higher costs, a harmonised fee rate could reduce resources
available for performing official controls. In MS with relatively lower costs, harmonised fees
could result in fee levels that are higher than actual costs, placing an unfair burden on FBOs.
Businesses in eastern MS, where costs and fees tend to be lower, would on balance pay
more whereas businesses in some western and northern MS, where fees tend to be higher,
would pay less.
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The net impact on business would also be influenced by how governments (including, where
relevant, local municipalities) responded to any income deficit on official control fees – for
example, whether they raised local business taxes to generate compensating revenues.
There is no particular SME bias to the impacts but clearly a scenario in which the option
resulted in large changes in fees would affect many SMEs.
The distribution of impacts is also influenced by the specification and development of the
option. There is ambiguity in the option (as specified) in terms of how it would affect variation
in the scope and application of fees at Member State level – for instance, if a Member State
does not currently charge for a particular control would Option B mean that it was obliged to
do so? This creates some additional uncertainty in the definition of impacts and again
means that analysis has to be restricted to issues of principle and the direction of change
that the option in principle would be expected to create.
Compliance costs and administrative burdens
This option would avoid the administrative burdens associated with calculating, discussing,
setting and communicating local/regional/national fees. However, if fees were to be set on
the basis of aggregate cost to the EU as a whole of a given control then it would imply that
cost data would need to be reported to the Commission. As discussed under sub-option A7
(introducing additional transparency and reporting requirements) there is a cost to collating
this information, especially in Member States where responsibility is devolved to lower tiers
of government. Fee harmonisation would also negate the need for minimum fees in the
legislation, and the associated administrative costs.
There would then be the task of setting harmonised fees on the basis of that information and
operating the associated administrative and consultative processes. As noted above, it
would be very challenging to develop and operate a cost model for each control.
Cost-benefit assessment
This option could have a very significant impact on the aggregate cost to business of official
controls and change the distribution of such costs across the EU. Where harmonised fees
are set at the highest common denominator, MS with low costs will obtain higher revenue
from fees than the costs of the control activity, which puts an unfair burden on businesses.
Where harmonised fees are set at the lowest common denominator, MS with high costs will
not receive sufficient revenue to recover costs, and may have to increase taxes or use other
means to fund control activities.
It will also affect the administrative costs to government for operating fee charging systems.
Harmonised fees would lower administrative costs for determining fees at MS level, but
would likely increase costs for collating information in order for the EU to assess and
determine the harmonised fee rate.
The benefits include greater transparency and simplification of a complex fee setting system
across the EU. The option would, however, undermine the cost recovery principle set out in
the legislation. The costs are expected to outweigh the benefits for this option.
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4.2.2.46 Sub-option B2: Adjust unified fees using a cost of living index
Summary of the option:
This sub-option would be likely to have a negative overall effect on the functioning of official control
systems across the Member States. Although the sub-option could result in positive impacts on
comparability and streamlining, these are likely to be outweighed by the significant negative impacts
on efficiency and also of fairness and adherence to principles of cost recovery.
Indexation of rates according to the cost of living would mitigate some of the impacts of
harmonisation (as discussed for sub-option B1 above) but the process of setting an appropriate
harmonised fee would remain burdensome and is very unlikely to result in a schedule of fees that
reflects the actual costs of inspecting individual FBOs or even whole sectors at a Member State
level.
Harmonised fees would also be politically difficult to implement in MS with highly decentralised
decision making and governance structures. In MS with decentralised OC systems, it may not be
possible to specify the fee rates under existing national legislative arrangements.
4.2.2.47 Sub-option B2 - Specification
This sub-option is a modified version of full harmonisation in which harmonised fees are
adjusted for each Member State using a cost of living index (e.g. based on Purchasing
Power Parity or other price indexes).
4.2.2.48 Sub-option B2 –Evidence and analysis
Respondent scores and comments
Respondents were again asked to consider whether they agree or disagree with a set of
advantages and disadvantages for Option B and to offer any additional benefits or
drawbacks. They were also asked to consider whether including a cost-of-living index would
change their overall assessment of Option B.
CA and industry respondents agreed that the sub-option could have slightly positive effects
on the functioning of the OC system. Indexing harmonised fees for cost of living would
reduce some respondent concerns related to the potential for excessively high or low fee
rates. Nonetheless, CAs felt that the sub-option would be difficult to enforce, and could
increase distortions rather than reduce them. Industry believes that although harmonisation
could simplify the administration of the OC system, it would not necessarily improve the
effectiveness of the system and would be unable to account for the significant differences
between OC systems in the Member States. Overall, respondents argued that full
harmonisation would not adequately improve the current OC system.
Case study assessment
Results from the case studies reflect the inherent uncertainty as to the direction of change
under harmonised fees with a cost-of-living adjustment. Less extreme versions of the two
scenarios set out under sub-option B2 remain:
1. Fees may be set high enough so that a cost-of-living index ensures full cost recovery in
the most expensive Member State; or
2. Fees are set low enough to ensure that in the least expensive Member State fees are not
higher than the actual cost of controls.
There will be some ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ under either scenario, with CAs in some Member
States profiting under the first scenario and some industries bearing unnecessary costs. In
the second scenario, many CAs will not be able to cover costs with fees. Additionally, where
fee rates must be adjusted based on currency fluctuations (e.g. the UK), the sub-option is
likely to add administrative cost and bureaucratic challenges for CAs.
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Strict rules would be required to ensure that MS maintain harmonised fee rates and the cost-
of-living adjustments are likely to be burdensome on CAs.
Other evidence
Consultations and research suggest that there is only one viable candidate for a cost of living
benchmark under this scenario—Eurostat’s Price Level Indices (PLIs) which compare
average price levels across countries and are calculated from Purchasing Power Parities.
The data are produced by comparing the prices of a basket of (around 2500) goods and
services in all EU countries. The recommended option is to use the PLIs for an aggregate
called ‘Actual Individual Consumption‘(Figure 4.10). This includes both households’ own
expenditures and government's expenditures on, for example, health and education that are
for the benefit of households. Hence, it is a good indicator for the standard of living of
households. PLIs are expressed as an index with the EU-27 as reference: for example, an
index of 110 means that the country is 10 per cent more expensive than the EU-27
average29
.
One practical issue is the time-lag in publication of the index. As an example, 2010 data will
be added in December 2011. It would mean that adjustments to the relative level of fees in
individual Member States would need to be made one or two years in arrears.
Figure 4.12 Eurostat’s Price Level Index for Actual Individual Consumption is a potential adjustment factor for harmonised fees under sub-option B2
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
EU27 D
E
NO IE LT FL BE FR AT SE NL IT DE IS ES
GR
UK CY PT SI
MT EE LV SK CZ LT HU PL RO BG
PLI (AIC) 2009
EU27
Source: Eurostat
The magnitude of impacts
As with sub-option B1, the magnitude of impacts would be determined by the level at which
the reference (harmonised) price was set. This is not known.
29 See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/purchasing_power_parities/introduction for
more information.
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Incidence of impact and distributional issues
As with sub-option B1, impacts would fall primarily within the EU and this option would, in
principle, impact on all FBOs subject to fees for official controls, and the income of all entities
that collect such fees.
The distribution of impacts is affected by the level at which harmonised fees are set.
Compliance costs and administrative burdens
As with B1 this option would avoid the administrative burdens associated with calculating,
discussing, setting and communicating local/regional/national fees, and would also negate
the need for minimum fees in the legislation, and the associated administrative costs.
Yet cost data would also still need to be reported to the Commission and that is known to be
burdensome for some Member States. There would then be the task of setting harmonised
fees on the basis of that information and operating the associated administrative and
consultative processes. As noted above, it would be very challenging to develop and
operate a cost model for each control.
Cost-benefit assessment
Though it seems likely that impacts would be less severe that those of sub-option B1, the
current specification suggests that this option could have a significant impact on the
aggregate cost to business of official controls and change the distribution of such costs
across the EU. It would also impact on government costs as described under sub-option B1.
There may be some benefits with respect to improved transparency and simplification of the
system, but these benefits are not thought to outweigh the costs.
4.2.2.49 Sub-option B3 – Introduce EU harmonised fees only for certain import controls
Summary of the option:
Harmonisation of fees for import controls is likely to have a negative impact on the official controls
systems across the EU-27.
The argument for harmonised fees for import controls is that it would create a ‘level playing field’
across the EU-27 for such fees and remove the potential for trade distortions derived from importers
seeking out border points with lower fees. Some stakeholders claim that ‘BIP shopping’ is a major
problem which harmonised fees would resolve, but this study found no evidence for such ‘BIP
shopping’. When stakeholders were asked about the occurrence of BIP shopping, some indicated
that they understood it to be a problem but could provide no concrete examples of the problem.
As with the other sub-options for harmonised fees, development of a cost model or set of pricing
principles for import controls that is viewed by stakeholders as fair and appropriate (given control
costs) would be an extremely challenging exercise. Due to the significant differences in the
organisation of official controls systems, variation in cost factors, and other issues amongst Member
States, it would be impossible to identify a fee level that would be appropriate for every country.
A cost-of-living adjustment for these controls would face the same challenges described under
Option B2. Indexation of rates for cost of living would mitigate some of the impacts of harmonisation,
but the process of setting an appropriate, harmonised fee would remain burdensome and is unlikely
to result in a schedule of fees that reflects actual costs of inspection.
Harmonised fees would also be politically difficult to implement in MS with highly decentralised
decision-making and governance structures. In MS with decentralised OC systems, it may not be
possible to specify the fee rates under existing national legislative arrangements.
4.2.2.50 Sub-option B3 - Specification
This sub-option considers whether the Regulation should require that certain import controls
are subject to harmonised fees, particularly for those controls where there is currently a
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higher degree of harmonisation (e.g. BIPS and DPEs). A single, uniform price would apply to
any EU border point.
4.2.2.51 Sub-option B3 - Evidence and analysis
Respondent scores and comments
Respondents were asked to consider the impact of harmonising import controls. Overall,
CAs and industry representatives indicated that this option would have a positive impact on
official controls systems in EU Member States. In particular, harmonised import control fees
would simplify the system, improve comparability amongst Member States and reduce
administrative burdens on CAs. Competent Authorities also foresee strong positive impacts
on efficiency and accountability. Both CAs and industry noted that harmonised fees would
reduce BIP selection at border posts, reducing competition distortions.
CAs and industry also noted, however, that in order to affect full cost recovery for all Member
States, the fee would need to be set according to the MS with the highest costs. Thus, some
Member States would profit from fee revenue above what is required to perform the control.
Some respondents indicated a preference for a cost-of-living adjusted fee rate for
harmonised controls though this would detract from the benefits mentioned above.
Case study assessment
The case studies indicate that the impacts of harmonised import controls are likely to be
similar to the impacts described under Options B1 and B2 (full harmonisation, with or without
a cost-of-living adjustment). CAs with high costs for import controls will find it difficult to
recover costs if the fee is set at the highest common denominator (e.g. Finland) and CAs
with low costs will recover more fees than the actual cost of control activity (e.g. Poland).
The reverse is true in the case where the fee is set at the lowest common denominator.
FBOs benefit from a low-cost fee but face unfair cost burdens where a high-cost fee is set.
Other evidence
Some indication of the distribution of impacts could be estimated where the number of FBOs
subject to import controls is known. This information, however, is unavailable. Where import
controls information is provided in detail by Member States through the Regulation
882/2004/EC Annual Reports, this information refers only to the number of inspection
centres that are subject to controls (i.e. those belonging to a BIP) and the total number of
checks by category, not to the number of affected businesses.
During interviews, a selection of stakeholders was asked to provide information on the
occurrence of ‘BIP-shopping’. While some respondents indicated that this practice is
believed to occur, none could identify concrete examples of these activities. No solid
evidence could be obtained in this study to support the idea of ‘BIP shopping’.
The magnitude of impact
As with sub-options B1 and B2, the magnitude of impacts would be determined by the level
at which the reference (harmonised) price was set, which is unknown. Furthermore, baseline
data are missing for most countries—the fees currently charged for import controls are also
unknown.
Incidence of impact and distributional issues
As with sub-options B1 and B2, impacts would fall primarily within the EU and this option
would, in principle, impact on all FBOs subject to import controls, and the income of all
entities that collect such fees.
The distribution of impacts is affected by the level at which harmonised fees are set, which is
unspecified. As with sub-options B1 and B2, however, there would be ‘winners’ and ‘losers’
depending on whether the harmonised fee resulted in MS receiving more revenue than the
cost of import control activities or insufficient revenue to recover costs.
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Compliance costs and administrative burdens
As with sub-options B1 and B2, this sub-option would avoid the administrative burdens
associated with calculating, discussing, setting and communicating local/regional/national
fees, and would also negate the need for minimum fees in the legislation, and the associated
administrative costs.
Yet cost data would also still need to be reported to the Commission and that is known to be
burdensome for some Member States. There would then be the task of setting harmonised
fees on the basis of that information and operating the associated administrative and
consultative processes. As noted in Options B1 and B2, it would be challenging to develop
and operate a cost model for the relevant controls.
Cost-benefit assessment
The costs are likely to be similar for those identified under sub-options B1 and B2.
4.2.3 Option C – Repeal Articles 26-29 of the Regulation (full subsidiarity)
Summary of the option:
Full subsidiarity could have a positive impact on the functioning of official controls systems; it would
enable CAs to organise controls in a way that most appropriately reflects the particular
characteristics of their systems. This could reduce unnecessary control activities and improve overall
efficiency.
It is more likely, however, that full subsidiary would have a negative impact on the OC system. It
would widen disparities between Member States, and increase pressure on CAs to lower fees to
maintain industry’s competitive advantage. Over time this would reduce the level of resources
available to finance official controls, resulting in a reduction in control activity.
4.2.3.52 Option C - Specification
Under Option C Member States would be obliged to allocate ‘sufficient resources’ to official
controls but each Member State would be free to determine its own approach to fee setting.
Option C requires repeal of Articles 26-29 in Regulation 882/2004/EC. This is broadly
equivalent to the ‘full subsidiarity’ option in the 2009 FCEC study.
Option C – Evidence and analysis
Respondent scores and comments
Respondents were asked to consider whether they agree or disagree with a set of
advantages and disadvantages for Option C and to offer any additional benefits or
drawbacks. Competent Authorities and industry hold similarly negative views of this option.
CAs expressed concerns that full subsidiary would increase disparities between MS, which
could increase pressure to reduce fees in order to gain a competitive advantage over other
Member States. Industry had similar concerns about the negative consequences of full
subsidiarity, but in several instances these related to CAs operating inefficiently, charging
excessively high fees or conducting controls that are not strictly necessary.
Case study assessment
Full subsidiarity is likely to have a significant negative impact on most of the case study
countries. It is likely to increase pressure on CAs to reduce fee rates in order to ensure that
FBOs are not disadvantaged relative to fee rates in other Member States. Cost recovery is
likely to decrease as a result.
Other evidence
Member States already exhibit significantly wide variance in their fee collection for control
activities. Cost recovery rates vary across MS from as little as 37 per cent in Belgium to 100
per cent claimed in some countries (Table A1.8, page 121), and within Member States
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depending on the governance arrangements for fee collection (decentralised to centralised).
Some sectors also have higher cost recovery rates (e.g. for import controls, CAs often do
adequately recover costs through fees). This degree of variation can be seen across each
issue examined in this study, including the availability of information to the public (Table
A1.26, page 158), the rates and controls covered by time-based fees (Section A1.1.4, page
132), charging practices and scope of fees for non-mandatory controls (A1.1.1, page 98),
bonus-malus principles in operation (Table A1.23, page 150), and the degree of ring-fencing
(Table A1.21, page 144).
Full subsidiarity is likely to increase the degree of variation amongst official control systems
across the EU-27, and likely to reduce comparability between MS, and transparency and
accountability of CAs as a result.
The magnitude of impacts
The magnitude of impacts cannot be stated with any confidence because they would be
determined entirely by how Member States decided to modify their domestic fee regimes in
the absence of the framework provided by current EU legislation.
Incidence of impact and distributional issues
The impacts of this option on businesses and national authorities would be indirect and are
uncertain – as stated above, they would be determined by how Member States decided to
modify their domestic fee regimes once given the freedom to do so.
Commentary on how domestic policies might develop under such a scenario would be
essentially speculative. However, it seems reasonable to assume that over time Member
States’ systems would diversify further, potentially with impacts on the Single Market.
Compliance costs and administrative burdens
This option would remove those administrative burdens associated with administration of
minimum fees and other processes specific to the European legislation, but Member States
would still face the costs of administering their domestic fee regime.
Cost-benefit assessment
The overall effect of this option depends on the approach taken by each Member State in
response to this proposed change. Full subsidiarity could result in Member States charging
higher fees in order to better recover costs or it could result in MS charging fees below
current rates due to pressure from industry to compete against other MS. Where fees are
lowered, industry would benefit from lower costs, but MS would face costs associated with
insufficient funds to carry out the required activities. Where they are raised, MS would benefit
from higher cost recovery, but industry would face higher costs. Administrative costs to
Member States may also be higher or lower depending on whether subsidiarity leads MS to
streamline their systems, or if it increases their complexity and therefore the resources
required to operate them.
4.3 From independent components to an integrated package – building a sustainable solution with Option A
The preceding sections discuss the various sub-components of Option A as distinct and
independent propositions. Table 4.11 provides a rating for each sub-option, considered in
isolation from the other sub-options under Option A. Ratings are presented against each
objective for reforming the fee control system based on the predicted impacts on CAs and
industry. A net rating summarises the cumulative impact of each sub-option. In sum, the
effect on CAs and industry for each sub-option considered independently from other
changes is likely to be positive for all but the full cost recovery and micro enterprise
exemption sub-options.
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Table 4.17 Impacts of Option A sub-options on CAs and industry for reforming the fee collection system
Option Objective / score Net rating
Adequate
resources
for CAs
Efficient
control
activities
Simplification Comparability Streamlining Accountability
CA
s
Industr
y
CA
s
Industr
y
CA
s
Industr
y
CA
s
Industr
y
A1 Extend the scope of mandatory fees ++ + - - ++ + + - + - +
A2 Require full cost recovery ++ - + - - - - -- + - -
A3 Clearly define eligible costs ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++
A4 Introduce time-based fees + +/- ++ + +/- +/- +/- + + + +
A5 Require ring-fencing of resources ++ + + + + + + - + + +
A6 Incorporate bonus-malus principles ++ ++ +/- +/- +/- + +/- + + + +
A7 Introduce transparency & reporting
requirements
+ ++ + + ++ + - + ++ ++ ++
A8 Provide for industry participation +/- ++ +/- + +/- + +/- +/- ++ ++ +
A9 Introduce exemptions & reductions
for micro-enterprises
- - +/- - - - +/- +/- +/- +/- -
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The primary objective for changes to the fee system for official controls is to ensure that CAs
have adequate resources for official control activities. Other key considerations for legislative
reform include the likely increased efficiency for performing official control activities and any
administrative burdens that might fall to CAs and industry. Table 4.12 presents a rating for
each sub-option based on their ability to ensure adequate CA resources, and their ability to
incentivise efficient control activity. The likely direction of change for administrative burdens
is also considered. An overall expected impact rating is provided considering each of these
criteria. The sub-options that are likely to have the strongest positive impact based on this
analysis include:
▪ Clearly defined eligible costs;
▪ A ring-fencing requirement; and
▪ The introduction of transparency and reporting requirements.
Yet, as is clear from the consultations and analysis, the Option also needs to be considered
as a ‘package’. The individual components deal with different elements of the ‘system’ and
have a cumulative and collective impact on the problems that the reforms are intended to
address. The last column in Table 4.12 considers which other sub-options would improve the
net impact of each sub-option if they were introduced together, as well as other potential
changes that could have positive impacts as well.
Considering the cumulative effects of sub-options introduced together, a full cost recovery
option can support the extension of scope of mandatory fees and a ring-fencing requirement.
These three options, taken together, are likely to provide the strongest potential for ensuring
adequate resources for official control activities.
Options that introduce greater transparency, clarity, and accountability can support
availability of sufficient resources, including clearly defined eligible costs, transparency and
reporting requirements and industry participation. Greater efficiency of control activity can be
achieved where bonus-malus principles are also introduced. Time-based fees could provide
the basis for an effective bonus-malus system.
Table 4.18 Option A scores - prioritise adequate CA financial resources
Ensures
adequate
resources for
official controls
Incentivises
efficient
control
activity
Estimated impact
on administrative
burdens
Overall
expected
impact
Additional
positive effects
(with other
sub-options &
other changes)
A1 Extend the scope
of mandatory fees
++ 0 Increase (except
where a fee is
already collected)
+ (CAs)
+/- (industry)
A2, A5, A6
A7, A8
A2 Require full cost
recovery
++ +/- Increase for CAs
Increase or
decrease for
industry,
depending on
interaction with
sub-options
+ A1, A5
A3 Clearly define
eligible costs
++ ++ Increase for CAs
– short term;
decrease for CAs
– long term
++ A7, A8
A4 Introduce time-
based fees
+ +/- Increase for CAs
– short term;
decrease for CAs
– long term
+ A6
(also phase out
or eliminate
minimum fees)
A5 Require ring-
fencing of
++ 0 One-off cost for
some CAs to set
++ A2, A3, A7
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resources up system
A6 Incorporate
bonus-malus
principles
+ ++ Uncertain + A4, A8
(also phase out
or eliminate
minimum fees)
A7 Introduce
transparency &
reporting
requirements
+ ++ Slight increase for
some CAs to
publish
information
Increase for CAs
to report on cost
recovery
++ A8
A8 Provide for
industry
participation
+ + Slight increase for
CAs
Slight increase for
industry to
participate
+ A7
A9 Introduce
exemptions &
reductions for
micro-enterprises
- 0 Uncertain +/- (option to
provide an
exemption)
The potential for interactions between Option A components are mostly positive, but
sometimes negative, as illustrated in Figure 4.11. For example:
▪ Increasing the transparency of the system by publishing details of the fee basis (A7)
ought to increase the positive impacts associated with promoting industry participation
(A8);
▪ A clear definition of eligible costs (A3) and mechanisms for promoting industry
participation (A8) could mitigate some of the concerns from industry about how the
efficiency of inspections would be sustained under a time-based fee arrangements (A4);
▪ The use of time-based fee arrangements (A4) is positive with regard to the integration of
bonus-malus principles into the inspection regime (A6); but
▪ A requirement to provide fees exemption for micro-enterprises (A9) would act in
opposition to a cost recovery objective (A2) in those areas where a significant proportion
of FBOs are micro-enterprises.
The analysis has also identified issues raised by implementation of Option A as currently
specified, which are not explicitly addressed in the current sub-option specifications. One
example is minimum fees. The sub-option proposing time-based fees for controls where
there is continuous presence of officials does not yet address whether minimum fees would
continue to be applied on a throughput basis. Some examples of the challenges created by
current minimum fee arrangements were discussed in the analysis, for example:
▪ Fees need to be revised by CAs to align them with legislated minimum fee values due to
movements of the local currency against the euro rather than changes in actual costs;
▪ The possibility that actual costs of inspecting a business are lower than the minimum fee
given in the Regulation;
▪ The need for ‘parallel accounting’ on both a throughput and time basis.
There is also the relationship between the provisions governing fees and the provisions
governing the wider inspection regime. If, for instance, the inspection regime is informed by
assessments of the risks posed by individual FBOs, and the fee levied on each business
reflects the cost of inspecting that business, then a system with ‘bonus-malus’ attributes has
been created. It is more difficult to apply ‘bonus-malus’ principles via the fee schedule alone,
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that is, where risk assessment plays no part in determination of the inspection regime
applied to FBOs.
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Figure 4.13 There are both positive and negative interactions between the components of Option C
+veA8 Publication of cost data
A7 Industry
participation
A6 Bonus-malus
A9 Exemptions
for micro-enterprises
A4 Time-based fees for continuous
presence
-veA3
Definition of eligible
costs
+ve
A1 Extend scope of mandatory
fees
+ve
The extra costs of additional
controls are borne by non-compliant FBO
Common principles & methods / data used are published or otherwise
made available
Financial resources
provided for official controls are adequate
A2 Full cost recovery
A5 Ring
fencing
There is a lack of transparency in the
calculation of costs at MS level
Fees do not cover inspection costs
There is a lack of clarity and uniformity in the Regulation,
which results in diverging interpretations in EU MS
Objectives of the Regulation
Current problems
Option A components
+ve+ve
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4.4 Monitoring
Monitoring indicators enable policy makers to assess whether an intervention is proceeding
as intended, and whether there are any unintended impacts. The terms of reference for this
study require the contractor to consider the issue of ex-post monitoring of the proposed
legislative changes and the indicators by which changes might be tracked in order to
address the problems discussed in Section 2.
Work by the Commission, previous evaluations, and this study have all demonstrated the
challenges of mapping the situation in Member States in a context where arrangements for
the financing of controls vary widely, interpretation of the legislation varies and there has not
always been timely compliance with European legislation. In Member States, the central
Competent Authorities themselves often have limited visibility of the situation in different
parts of their own countries due to the devolution of powers of control to local and regional
authorities and limited pass-through of information back up to the centre.
Two classes of indicator can be considered:
▪ ‘Macro’ indicators that provide information about the progress that the system as a
whole has made towards it core objectives; and
▪ ‘Micro’ indicators that give information on the impacts of the changes introduced by the
reforms to specific actors within the system (e.g. food business operators, competent
authorities).
4.4.1 ‘Macro’ / system indicators
The main principles of the provisions under review here (as laid out in Section 2) are that:
▪ Member States must ensure that adequate financial resources are made available for
official controls (Article 26);
▪ Where inspection fees are imposed on feed and food business operators, common
principles must be observed for fee-setting and the methods and data used for
calculating the fees must be published or otherwise made available to the public (Article
27); and
▪ When official controls reveal non-compliance with feed and food law, the extra costs that
result from more intensive controls must be borne by the feed and food business
operator concerned (Article28).
Table 4.13 provides a commentary on potential ‘macro’ indicators. Changes in the financing
of official controls against these kinds of measures could be tracked more easily if there was:
▪ An improvement in the consistency, coverage and clarity of the annual reports produced
by the Member States under Regulation 882/2004/EC;
▪ A performance management framework for the system that included a core set of agreed
metrics; and
▪ Adoption of sub-option A7 on publication of cost data (and/or the second component of
sub-option A7 on reporting to the Commission, see also Table 4.13).
The Annual Reports provided to the study team for this impact assessment reveal several
significant barriers to effective provision of information through this mechanism:
▪ Clarity: many of the annual reports appear to have been translated into English via
translation software. For these reports, it is virtually impossible to understand what
information is provided. In some reports, the readability is better but in many cases vital
information is missing (e.g. units) or key words remain in the original language.
▪ Consistency: for those reports that can be read and understood, a second problem is a
lack of consistency amongst the reports. This includes the organisation of the reports,
the control areas covered, and the type of information provided. Reports cannot currently
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be compared across Member States, even regarding basic information such as the
number of controls performed or hours of inspection activity.
▪ Coverage: in many cases, the level of detail is insufficient in the reports. Control activity
is often combined and described as a category of activity such that it is impossible in
some cases to know precisely what controls fall within that category. In many reports,
entire areas of control activity are not reported on at all.
If the Commissioned published the status of all Member States against the macro indicators
of system performance on a regular basis, it could help harness the ‘power of information’ to
encourage further progress towards the given objectives.
4.4.2 Indicators of micro / specific impacts
The impacts of the regulatory reform should also be evaluated in terms of impacts on
specific actors within the system. This could be achieved by examining the effect on a
sample of (i) food business operators and (ii) competent authorities. A comparative analysis
that stretches across a number of Member States could capture aspects of the variation
caused by differences of circumstance in different parts of the EU.
Examples of the indicators that could be used in assessing impacts on those actors are
given below:
▪ For competent authorities:
− Change in resources devoted to official controls;
− Change in source/structure of the revenues used for financing official controls;
− Volatility in income available for financing of official controls; and
− Indicators/information relating to specific sub-options of Option A (if adopted), for
example, (i) cost recovery rate achieved, (ii) proportion of controls for which fees are
charged, (iii) structure of fees (including use of the option for micro-enterprise
exemption, integration of bonus-malus principles), and (iv) practices related to
transparency and industry participation.
▪ For FBOs
− Change in expenditure on official controls (aggregate/as percentage of turnover); and
− Qualitative indicators relating to factors addressed by the reforms (e.g.
understanding of the basis of fees, perceived ‘fairness’ and transparency of fee
structures).
Such evaluations would be made more robust if statistically significant samples were taken
on a regular basis (e.g. every couple of years), and/or cohort(s) of actors were followed over
a period of time.
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Table 4.19 High level indicators of progress against elements of the problem definition
Element of the problem
definition
Potential direct
indicator(s)
Commentary Potential ‘proxy’ &
complementary
indicators
Commentary
Member States must ensure
that adequate financial
resources are made available
for official controls
Member States’
expenditure on official
controls as compared to
that required to efficiently
deliver a prudent, risk-
based inspection regime
Lack of consistency in reporting
within MS and to the
Commission in Regulation
882/2004/EC annual reports is a
barrier to the benchmarking of
efficiency and comparison of
control strategies.
Not all CAs publish expenditure
data.
Cost-recovery ratio
(value of fees collected
as a percentage of
estimated control
expenditure)
Cost recovery rate alone lacks a reference to
specification of control strategy and the efficiency
with which it is delivered. Estimates of this
indicator have been made for some MS but there
are issues with consistency and coverage.
For this to be feasible: Central Competent
Authorities need to understand the full costs of
controls and the totality of control-related revenue
to government (whether sent to CAs or to finance
ministries/other government departments).
Where inspection fees are
imposed on feed and food
business operators, common
principles must be observed
for fee-setting and the
methods and data used for
calculating the fees must be
published or otherwise made
available to the public (Article
27)
Regular statement to the
Commission from MS
(based on returns from all
Competent Authorities) that
there has been publication
of (i) principles of fees, (ii)
method of calculation, and
(iii) cost data on which fees
are based.
For this indicator to be feasible:
▪ Competent authorities need
to understand their costs and
cost structures vis-à-vis the
application of official
controls.
▪ Member States need the
internal mechanisms to
gather declarations at the
centre where powers of
control are devolved.
When official controls reveal
non-compliance with feed and
food law, the extra costs that
result from more intensive
controls must be borne by the
feed and food business
operator concerned (Article28)
Regular declaration to the
Commission (‘yes’/’no’)
from MS that control
regimes place burden of
additional control costs
arising from non-
compliance on the
offending FBO.
For this indicator to be feasible
Member States need the internal
mechanisms to gather
declarations at the centre where
powers of control are devolved.
Bonus-malus systems
are risk-based and MS
report on full cost
recovery rate
A risk-based bonus-malus system would be
developed where the frequency and intensity of
inspection is set according to risk of non-
compliance and/or past history of compliance.
This combined with an indication of full-cost
recovery would suggest that extra costs are borne
by non-compliant FBOs.
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The Annual Reports could be improved so that they can be a useful mechanism for providing
transparent and complete information on control activity to the Commission. Further
improvements in transparency would result from publication of the annual reports through
the Commission website. This change will require:
▪ Standard formatting principles for each area of control activity;
▪ Specification of the type and level of detailed information required; and
▪ Quality control to ensure that the reports can be understood in the language they are
written.
Over time, with sufficient information being put in the public domain, it ought to be possible
for researchers to carry out more comparative analysis on the resources consumed and
outputs delivered of inspection regimes in different locations and thus improve collective
understanding of their comparative efficiency (allowing for differences in approach to
inspection).
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5 Conclusions This report presents the results of a study to assess a set of proposed revisions to
Regulation 882/2004/EC regarding the fees for official control activity in EU Member States
in order to inform an impact assessment in this area.
The analysis has established the substantive nature of the impacts expected to arise from
the options. Their performance and relative advantages and disadvantages in different
operating contexts (e.g. centralised or decentralised systems) have been established as far
as is possible given:
▪ The fact that many of the options are framed as shifts in the principle or broad approach
to be adopted in particular sections of the Regulation rather than specific changes to
specific controls; and
▪ The very limited data provided by Member States here and in response to previous
enquiries on the level of control activity and the associated costs.
The Member States of the European Union need official control regimes that are properly
resourced and efficiently operated in which:
▪ Regulators are efficient and the regulated are responsible;
▪ The authorities take a risk-based approach to inspection and levy fees that reflect fair
costs;
▪ Companies are rewarded for risk-reducing behaviour and penalised for poor risk
management;
▪ There is transparency and stakeholders have a ‘voice’; and
▪ Financing of official controls does not contribute to distortions of the European single
market.
It can reasonably be argued that - given the diversity of control and locality-specific
circumstances - there is merit in focusing on a ‘system-based’ approach that focuses on
fostering positive behaviours rather than attempting to define each individual parameter in a
way that is appropriate to all. The diversity of approaches adopted by Member States in the
delivery and financing of official controls means that, even with good data, appraisal of
specific options would be complex. For the most part good data are lacking.
Of the three options assessed, Option A has the greatest potential to meet that challenge.
Further work is required on some aspects but the substantive aims of the option provide an
appropriate balance between EU harmonisation (with the consistency of approach which that
can bring) and recognition of local circumstances. With some adjustments it defines the
‘direction of travel’ for the next set of reforms and addresses a number of specific problems
with the existing system (e.g. the determination of eligible costs).
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ANNEXES
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Annex 1 Detailed assessment of options and their impacts
This annex contains the detailed appraisal of each option and sub-option under
consideration in the context of proposals to revise Regulation (EC) 882/2004. The analysis is
summarised in Section 3 of the main report.
The policy baseline is the current situation as described in Section 3.3 and elaborated in
Annex 1.
For each reform option and sub-option, the following information is provided:
▪ Baseline scenario information provided by DG SANCO, with an assessment of the likely
impacts relative to the current situation across the EU-27 Member States for the sub-
options under Option C to amend the current system;
▪ Relevant abstracts of the data gathered on the organisation and operation of official
controls in each Member State, and the scale and characteristics of the market and the
FBOs within it where it illustrates the expected scale and distribution of impacts;
▪ Scores awarded by study respondents:
– Presentation of scores according to each of the five appraisal criteria, which
relate to the specific objectives of the system revisions: efficiency, simplification,
comparability, streamlining and accountability.
– Respondents were asked to rate each option on a scale of -2 to +2, where -2
means ‘significant negative impact’, 0 means ‘no impact’, and +2 means ‘significant
positive impact’. Results have been disaggregated according to whether the
respondents are Competent Authorities or industry representatives, and further
disaggregated by sector where industry views are not aligned.
– In some cases, respondents did not provide a scorecard, but did complete the
accompanying questionnaire. In these cases, the questionnaire was used to
determine the scores, as responses are directly transferable from the questionnaire
to the scorecard. Additionally, two industry associations indicated that they wished to
be represented by the responses from another industry association. In these cases,
the same scores are used for the represented organisation as for the one
representing.
▪ Summary of the comments received from respondents to the impacts of each option and
sub-option. Comments were received through the scorecard, a detailed questionnaire
and in-depth interviews. These comments provide additional context and insight into the
specific likely impacts in each sub-option and related concerns.
▪ Case study assessment of the impacts in six Member States based on the detailed
analysis presented in Annex 2: Belgium, Finland, France, Netherlands, Poland and the
United Kingdom.
▪ Additional information to support the analysis, where available.
▪ A summary assessment of the impact assessment results, synthesising the baseline and
other supporting information, stakeholder responses and case study results to provide an
overview of the economic (and where relevant, social) impacts for each policy option and
sub-option, considering specifically the:
– Magnitude
– Incidence, including:
◦ Distribution across and within business sectors;
◦ Whether they fall inside or outside the EU;
◦ Any impact on other industries;
◦ Impacts on SMEs; and
– Compliance costs and administrative burdens.
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Under Option A there is also a discussion of how the sub-options can be combined to form a
coherent ‘package’. This involves looking at how sub-options interact with one another (both
positively and negatively) and how the legislative amendments could encourage the
development of a ‘system’ that rewards prudent risk management by FBOs, risk-based
approaches to inspection, greater efficiency in the delivery of controls, and better
mobilisation of resources to finance them.
Finally there is a comparison of the principal options (A, B and C) with each other.
As discussed in Section 3 the options are assessed against five criteria: efficiency,
simplification, comparability, streamlining and accountability. The working definition used
for these terms as set out in the study terms of reference is repeated here for ease of
reference:
Efficiency: Ensure that Member States’ official bodies have adequate financial means for the
efficient performance of official controls to ensure food safety30
.
Simplification: Clearer and simpler legal framework.
Comparability: Avoid disturbance of the internal market taking into account Member States’ different
cost structures.
Streamlining: Reduce the administrative burden on the Member States and on stakeholders as
much as possible.
Accountability: Ensure that stakeholders have access to information on how resources are
collected and used.
A1.1 Option A - Improve the current system
Option A considers a set of potential modifications to the current system through
amendments to Regulation 882/2004. It consists of a number of sub-options. These are first
assessed individually and then (in Section 4.3) a commentary is provided on linkages
between the sub-options and the development of a robust package.
A1.1.1 Sub-option A1 - Extend the scope of mandatory fees
A1.1.1.1 A1 - Specification
Sub-option A1 considers an extension in the scope of the mandatory fees (i.e. increasing the
number of official controls for which Member States are obliged to collect fees). Specifically,
Article 27 of Regulation 882/2004/EC is changed so that controls are transferred from the
‘non-mandatory’ category to the ‘mandatory’ category.
Table A1.1 provides an indicative list31
of the controls under Regulation 854/2004 (controls
numbered 1-7) and Regulation 882/2004 (controls numbered 10-18) that are currently
considered mandatory for Member States to charge a fee for official control activity. Controls
numbered 8 and 9, controls under Regulation 183/2005, number 19, are currently non-
mandatory—that is, it is not currently required for Member States to collect a fee for control
activities in these areas.
Extending the scope of fees to cover all of Regulation 852/2004 activities would essentially
mean adding to the list of mandatory controls those numbered 8, 9, and 19 in Table A1.1:
1. Checks on hygiene of foodstuffs at primary production holdings;
30 Note that this Commission definition does not refer to the efficiency with which CAs operate.
31 This list is comprehensive but not exhaustive; it is intended to ensure that this study includes a
range of official controls sufficient to explore options for revisions to the fee charging system of
Regulation 882/2004.
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2. Checks on hygiene of foodstuffs at food establishments other than establishments
approved in accordance with Regulation 853/2004;
3. Checks at feed establishments.
This would mean that primary producers who are not already covered by a mandatory
fee (where milk production, and fishery and aquaculture are already covered), feed
establishments, and most food establishments farther up the food chain (e.g. retailers,
including restaurants, and some transport and storage operations) would be brought under
the ‘mandatory’ requirement and would thus be affected by an extension of scope of the
mandatory fees.
This could be considered a ‘moderate’ extension. A more comprehensive extension would
see fees becoming mandatory on all official controls applied across the food chain.
Survey respondents were asked to consider the advantages and disadvantages of changing
the status of particular controls from ‘non-mandatory’ to ‘mandatory’, list those controls that
might be considered for reclassification, and indicate the potential impacts of this change
from a long and short term perspective.
Table A1.1 Selected official controls within the scope of Regulation 854/2004, Regulation 882/2004, and Regulation 183/2005 for which a fee is mandatory or where an extension may be considered
Regulation Controls
854/2004
1 Approval of establishments that produce products of animal origin for human
consumption
2 Audit of fresh meat establishments
3 Inspection of fresh meat establishments (ante- and post-mortem inspections)
4 Inspection of fresh meat establishments: SRM controls and TSE testing
5 Checks at milk production holdings
6 Checks on production and marketing of fishery products and aquaculture
products
7 Checks at other food establishments approved in accordance with Regulation
853/2004
8 Checks on hygiene of foodstuffs at primary production holdings*
9 Checks on hygiene of foodstuffs at food establishments other than
establishments approved in accordance with Regulation 853/2004*
882/2004
10 Checks on animal health at holdings of origin for live animals
11 Monitoring residues of veterinary medicines and other substances
12 Approval of feed establishments
13 Approval of animal by-products establishments
14 Checks at animal by-product establishments
15 Checks on imported live animals
16 Checks on imported feed and food of animal origin
17 Checks on imported feed and food of non-animal origin
18 Checks on live animals and goods transiting the community
183/2005 19 Checks at feed establishments*
*Controls activities for which a fee is currently non-mandatory.
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A1.1.1.2 A1 – Evidence and analysis
Respondent scores and comments
The scores awarded by survey respondents as regards the impacts of this policy option are
summarised in Figure A1.1. Selected comments from CAs and industry are provided in
Table A1.2.
Overall, Competent Authorities believe that extending the scope of mandatory fees would
have a positive impact on official controls systems in Member States. In particular, extending
the scope would improve efficiency and comparability of systems. Industry believes that
extending the scope of fees would have a negative impact, and have particular concerns
about increasing costs, though industry also sees opportunities for positive impacts
(specifically, for improved comparability of systems) as well.
Some CA and industry respondents indicated that fees should be mandatory across all
sectors, without discrimination. This is an issue of fairness – the principle of equal treatment
of all sectors in the food chain with regard to charging, rather than the costs of official
controls being recovered only from particular sectors. Some CAs are concerned, however,
that extending the scope of fees could create additional administrative burdens and reduce
flexibility in the system.
When asked to indicate fees that are currently non-mandatory, but should become
mandatory, respondents suggested the following categories:
▪ Certification,
▪ Audits,
▪ Feed-stuffs of non-animal origin,
▪ Fees for border veterinary controls,
▪ Commercial quality control of agricultural and food products in production, marketing and
import stage,
▪ Supervision activities across a range of sectors including:
– Fresh fruit and vegetables,
– Wine,
– Poultry meat quality,
– Fertilizers,
– Classification of bovine and porcine carcasses in EUROP system,
– Accredited certifying bodies in organic farming, and
– Systems of regional and traditional products,
– Retail sector,
– Dairy sector,
– Controls undertaken due to non-compliance and controls requested to obtain a
higher rating or score, and
– Laboratory tests for random or ‘one-off’ food safety issues.
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Figure A1.1 CAs believe extending the scope of mandatory fees will have positive impacts on OC systems, while industry believes the impacts will be negative. Both groups, however, see the potential for improved comparability in this area.
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0Efficiency
Simplification
ComparabilityStreamlining
Accountability
Industry Competent Authorities
Base = 22 industry responses; 11 CA responses
Average score awarded by survey respondents based on a scale where -2 means ‘significant negative impact’ and +2 means ‘significant positive impact’. Responses that received a score of ‘don’t know’ are not included in the score.
Table A1.2 Sub-option A1: Comments provided by survey respondents about extending the scope of mandatory fees
Competent Authority Industry
Positive
▪ [It could reduce] distortion because
more inspection activities [would be]
covered.
▪ [It could] increase receipts to CAs.
▪ [It would] ensure better harmonisation of
fees across EU [and] avoid debate at
local level on whether fees should be
applied.
▪ The classification of mandatory fees
makes it clear for which official controls
MS should collect fees.
▪ [It would improve] transparency for all.
[There would be] less distortions
between MS.
▪ [It would lead to] more efficient controls
and more compliance with bonus-malus
[principles].
▪ [It would] facilitate budget planning.
▪ [It would lead to] greater consistency
and transparency as to what controls
are subject to the collection of fees
across the EU. Meat industry
representative.
▪ It would reduce the distortion of
competition among different sectors.
Meat industry representative.
▪ Some degree of commonality across
MS applies. Meat industry
representative.
▪ Increases the level playing field across
the EU. Meat industry representative.
▪ FBOs as well as authorities will have a
clear knowledge on what the fees cover.
Meat industry representative.
▪ Increase resources for controls,
provided fees can be "ring fenced".
Public health representative.
Negative
▪ Increasing the number of official
controls would burden inspectors; there
might be some problems in relation to
the limited staff capacity. At the same
▪ [It] could mean that some costs for
controls currently borne by government
(e.g. some TSE controls) [would] be
transferred to industry. Meat industry
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time FBOs would be exposed to [sic]
additional financial charges.
▪ [It could increase] costs of [the]
administrative process to collect fees,
e.g. fees to micro business may not
cover cost of collection. [This] could
present state aid issues in associated
expenditure.
▪ [It would be] less flexible.
▪ [It could lead to] higher costs for
industry and extra controls for the CAs.
representative.
▪ No incentive for control authorities to
improve efficiency. Meat industry
representative.
▪ Increasing fees on the same sectors for
new activities (e.g. meat processors
others than cutting plants) would be
devastating. Meat industry
representative.
▪ Could lead to conflicts with political
direction and between officials carrying
out controls and businesses. Public
health representative.
▪ [It would reduce fairness] and
transparency. Dairy sector
representative.
Respondents also made the following comments about the expansion of mandatory fees:
Table A1.3 Respondent comments on expanding the scope of mandatory fees
Competent Authority
▪ Article 27 should be cross-sectoral and focus on statutory fees for food and feed
establishments with the possibility to assess the feasibility of including other registered
establishments.
▪ All the actors of the food chain [should be subject to mandatory fees]
▪ Instead of mandatory fees it is more important to give clear rules what costs are included.
▪ 882/2004 should focus on the required outcomes of the fee systems not on the fee systems
themselves; due to the divergence of CA organizations across and within MS it is unlikely
that there is a "one size fits all" fee system. In short 882/2004 may state that a percentage
of total costs for delivery of OCs is required; MS will then decide how, at what level or levels
within the food chain; and taking national interest and structures into account this may be
best achieved.
▪ If the scope of mandatory fees is extended to other products (ex: for feed products of non-
animal origin), then the requirements for importation and import controls should be
established at EU level.
Industry
▪ No discrimination between sectors, animal/non animal products, production, imports and
exports.
▪ Fees to be charged to the FBO owning or utilizing the establishment where the inspection
costs are made and inspection costs at farm level should not be covered by fees charged to
slaughterhouses.
▪ There would be an increased need for clear definition of all the cost components of
additional mandatory controls for which fees would be collected.
▪ Existing mandatory fees are not charged by some MS - this must be corrected before any
addition
▪ Clarity on who is covered by mandatory fees is needed, for example currently some
approved establishments under 853/2004 are covered by statutory fee systems whilst not
others. The implementation of statutory fees should be considered not on a commodity
basis but on the applicable legislation (e.g. whether they fall under 853/2004 or not)
▪ The best solution is to maintain mandatory fees only for activities where the permanent or
systematic presence of an official is required. Other activities should be exempted from fees
(i.e. no possibility for MS to charge fees for the type of control referred to in article 27).
▪ Costs of [controls that are] national priorities have to be covered by other tax income.
▪ This system should be abandoned - controls are either required or not - 'optional 'controls
promote gold-plating and inter-MS charging disparities. It will be efficient only if fees are
directly appointed to official controls.
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In addition to asking respondents to the stakeholder consultation about the impacts of
extending the scope of mandatory fees, which is discussed in Table A1.2 and Table A1.3
above, respondents were also asked to indicate those controls on which fees are currently
non-mandatory, but which should become mandatory. A list of those fees is provided in
Table A1.4.
Table A1.4 Non-mandatory fees (under Article 27 of Regulation 882/2004) which should become mandatory
Competent Authority
▪ Certification
▪ Audits ‘on request’
▪ Feeding-stuffs of non-animal origin
▪ All fees concerning official border veterinary control
▪ Audits and inspections in all industrial producing food or feed establishments (animal and
non-animal origin, approved and registered)
▪ Commercial quality control of agricultural and food products in production, marketing and
import stage
▪ Supervision over the following markets: fresh fruit and vegetables, wine, poultry meat quality,
fertilizers
▪ Certification of hops and hop products
▪ Supervision over classification of bovine and porcine carcasses in EUROP system
▪ Control of the bovine meat from adult male bovine animals and control of the marketing of
the meat from bovine animals aged 12 months or less (granting special export refunds)
▪ Exempting operators on their request from the marking obligations, where eggs are delivered
directly from the production site to the food industry
▪ Control of the goose breeding and fattening conditions
▪ Supervision, including over accredited certifying bodies in organic farming and over system
of regional and traditional products
▪ Laboratory tests for random or ‘one-off’ food safety issues
Industry
▪ Retail sector
▪ Dairy sector
▪ 852 controls which occur either as a result of significant business non compliance or where a
Hygiene Rating scheme exists and the business seeks a revisit in order to gain a higher
score i.e. they have improved compliance as a result of official controls and wish to be "re-
rated" before the next programmed visit.
▪ [Controls] mentioned under article 27 point 5 could be moved to the category of mandatory
fees
Case study assessment
Extending the scope of mandatory fees will impact each of the case study countries
differently, according to the current set of non-mandatory fees charged and the new
mandatory fees included in any revision to Regulation 882/2004.
▪ Fees in Belgium cover the entire food chain. Any extension of scope from non-
mandatory to mandatory is likely to have little, if any, impact on the fee control system in
this country. The same is likely to be true in Poland, where fees also cover most of the
food chain.
▪ Fees are charged on some controls for which fees are non-mandatory in Finland,
France, and the Netherlands. Impacts in these countries will depend on the specific
control activities that become mandatory.
▪ Fees in the United Kingdom cover mostly the mandatory controls, with some exceptions.
Few areas are included from the non-mandatory category. There are likely to be impacts
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in the UK where an extension of scope is implemented, but this depends on the control
activities covered.
The scores awarded by respondents in the case study countries as regards the impacts of
this policy option are summarised in Figure A1.2.
Figure A1.2 Extending the scope of mandatory fees is likely to improve comparability. Respondents in the UK are uniformly opposed to this option.
-2
-1
0
1
2BG
FL
FR
NL
PL
UK
Comparability Net score Streamlining
Base = 22 industry responses; 11 CA responses
Average score awarded by survey respondents based on a scale where -2 means ‘significant negative impact’ and +2 means ‘significant positive impact’.
Findings from the case studies as presented in Figure A1.2 suggest that no impact is
foreseen from extending the scope of mandatory fees. But as indicated previously, this is
because CAs largely favour of an extension while industry is not, and this results in an
overall score of ‘no impact’. When taking this into account, the case study results suggest
similar concerns as reflected in the wider assessment: administrative burdens would likely
increase for CAs and the cost burden would increase for industry. Both groups see
opportunities for improved comparability, however, noting that this could create a ‘level
playing field’ across sectors and EU Member States.
Other evidence
The scope of fees collected under official controls systems in different Member States vary
widely across the EU-27. The range of fees collected can be broken down into four
categories:
▪ Only mandatory fees are collected.
▪ Only mandatory fees, with a few exceptions (some mandatory fees are not collected).
▪ Mandatory fees and some activities outside them are collected.
▪ Fees are collected across the food chain.
Most Member States collect the mandatory fees as well as fees for some controls for which
fees are not mandatory (see main report Table 4.1. The degree of impact of an extension of
scope within the four categories described above will depend to a great extent on the
specific controls chosen to be ‘mandatory’ under any revisions to the Regulation.
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Extending the scope of fees to cover all of Regulations 852/2004 and 183/2005 would mean
that fees for those controls numbered 8, 9 and 13 in Table A1.1 become mandatory32
. To
estimate the potential impact of an extension of the scope of mandatory fees, it is possible to
compare the number of enterprises in each Member State that would become, in theory,
subject to mandatory fees.
Table A1.5 includes the number of enterprises that could be affected if the scope of
mandatory fees included primary producers, companies manufacturing animal feed, and
food establishments, such as caterers and restaurants. The totals are provided separately
for primary producers and other business potentially affected; there are significantly more
primary producers in the Member States compared to other enterprises which could be
affected. Separating the two makes it easier to determine the potential impacts on non-
primary producing sectors. The last column presents the total for primary producers and
other enterprises potentially affected. Table A1.6 provides the number of enterprises,
including and excluding primary producers, as a proportion of the total number of enterprises
in each Member State33
. Presenting the data as a proportion of the total facilitates a
comparison between Member States.
Excluding primary producers, extending the scope of mandatory fees to other enterprises in
the food chain could have a significant impact in the UK and Spain, potentially affecting
169,000 (33 per cent) and 442,000 (20 per cent) enterprises respectively. In the UK, for
example, this could mean that primary producers and retailers require authorisation and
export certification (where relevant). Moderate impacts are expected in 13 Member States
where between 10 - 19 per cent of enterprises could be affected. For example, in Portugal
the fee for certification could be extended to other FBOs, such as food retailers. Low
impacts are expected in eight Member States where between 4 – 9 per cent of enterprises
could be affected. This could mean, for example, that in Poland the fee to register FBOs
could be extended to primary producers or food retailers.
If primary producers are included, the potential impacts extending the scope of mandatory
fees change. Significant impacts could occur in 10 Member States, where between 67 - 95
per cent of relevant enterprises and primary holdings could be affected. Of these 10
Member States, nine are new Member States (the exception is Ireland). This indicates that
extending the scope of mandatory fees could have a significant impact in new Member
States which have a high proportion of primary holdings relative to other enterprises.
Moderate impacts are expected in 10 Member States, where between 34 - 58 per cent of
enterprises and primary holdings could be affected. Low impacts are expected in five
Member States where between 8 - 31 per cent of enterprises and primary holdings could be
affected.
A1.1.1.3 A1 - Summary
General conclusions
The impacts of extending the scope of mandatory fees are expected to be positive for CAs
overall and negative for industry. This sub-option could improve mobilisation of resources for
controls and improve comparability, creating a level playing field across the EU and across
sectors of the food chain. This option could increase costs to CAs and industry, however,
32Checks on hygiene of foodstuffs at primary production holdings; and Checks on hygiene of
foodstuffs at food establishments other than establishments approved in accordance with Regulation
853/2004.
33 Total number of enterprises estimated by adding total number of enterprises in the following sectors;
Manufacturing, mining and quarrying and other industry; Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and
storage, accommodation and food service activities; Information and communication; Financial and
insurance activities; Real estate activities; and, Professional, scientific, technical, administration and
support service activities.
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with more inspections required of CAs and a greater cost burden on some sectors already
subject to mandatory fees and new costs for those that are not. A greater focus on clarity of
the mandatory controls and clearer definitions of cost should be considered in conjunction
with potentially extending the scope of fees. One solution could be to remove the ‘non-
mandatory’ category from the legislation altogether and specify only mandatory fees.
The magnitude of impacts
The scale of the impact of this option on individual Member States and on individual FBOs
would be determined by the controls currently considered to be ‘non-mandatory’ that become
‘mandatory’. Each Member State that currently collects fees on those controls would then
need to be assessed. Those MS that already collect fees for those controls are unlikely to be
affected. In MS that do not, an estimate of the magnitude would depend on the fee rates at
which the new mandatory controls are set, and the number of businesses affected. The
assessment of expanding the scope of mandatory controls to primary producers and to food
establishments other than those approved in accordance with Regulation 852/2004/EC
indicates that high impact will be felt in a relatively small number of countries, but where a
large number of businesses may be affected. The majority of MS would see moderate
impact from this hypothetical extension.
Incidence of impact and distributional issues
Impacts would fall primarily within the EU. This option would impact on all FBOs operating in
Member States where fees for the newly mandatory controls are not already charged under
the ‘non-mandatory’ category. Member States would also see their fee revenue increase
where the new mandatory controls are charged for, but were not previously.
The distribution of impacts depends on the controls that become mandatory, and then by the
fee rate set by each Member State for each newly mandatory control.
In sectors where fees are not currently charged, any new fees charged for controls will affect
SMEs in those sectors.
Compliance costs and administrative burdens
This option would increase the administrative burdens associated with calculating,
discussing, setting, communicating and collecting fees for any new mandatory controls in
Member States where fees are not already collected for those controls. There will be no
additional administrative burdens in those Member States where a fee is already collected
on a ‘non-mandatory’ basis.
Costs and benefits
The net financial outcome for CAs of the change in scope of mandatory fees will depend on
the extent of cost recovery achieved by the fees, the fate of the revenues, and the extent to
additional fee income is offset by compensating reductions in the budget allocations made to
CAs by finance ministries (or their equivalent source of general finance). The specific impact
on the resources available for financing controls cannot therefore be determined ex ante
though the general principles determining that impact can.
If fee revenues are recycled back in to the CAs then the change should result in a revenue
stream for financing of official controls that moves in line with the expansion or contraction of
the food chain (and the inspection thereof). The shift would connect CA financing more
closely to changes in the food chain and less closely to overall public expenditure (as finance
by general taxation). This does not occur if there is no link between FBO fee payments and
the revenue of the CA, e.g. if fees are paid into general public revenue.
There is therefore a potential positive relationship between extension of mandatory controls,
full cost recovery, ring-fencing, and measures on transparency, governance (participation of
FBOs) and incentives on CAs to continuously improve the efficiency of controls. The
potential to create positive feedback loops within the system will be missed if (for example):
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▪ CAs become more dependent on industry for their income but no more accountable to
FBOs for the efficiency with which inspections are carried out (e.g. where the basis of
fees is unclear and there is no mechanism for industry engagement); and
▪ Fees are paid by FBOs but the revenues do not contribute to the resources available to
the CA for application of controls (e.g. where fees are paid into general government
revenue).
The introduction of additional fees would result in some incremental administrative costs for
CAs in the short run due in determining appropriate fees for control activities concerned.
However these additional costs are likely to decrease over time as CAs once charging
systems for the newly mandatory fees have been implemented. There is likely to be
increased costs associated with the administrative burdens of collecting fees from FBOs.
Industry costs are likely to rise in most Member States, but to differing degrees depending on
the number of enterprises that become subject to mandatory fees for the first time. The
actual cost incurred by industry will depend to a large extent on the precise mandatory fees
to which they are subject. In cases where fee income from one food sector is currently
cross-subsidising the inspection of other sectors, the extension of fees (subject to the
income allocation issues discussed above) ought to reduce the added burden on those
sectors that pay most today. Extension of mandatory fees could thus make the system
‘fairer’. Inevitably some FBOs will need to pay more; there are theoretically some
circumstances in which the burden on FBOs which are charged today could fall.
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Table A1.5 Fees currently collected by Member States, and the number of enterprises that could be affected by an extension of scope in mandatory fees to controls under Regulation 852/2004 and 183/2005
MS Activities subject
to fees
Non-mandatory fees collected Number of enterprises
that could be affected by
extending the scope of
mandatory fees
(excluding primary
holdings)*
Number of primary
holdings that could be
affected by extending the
scope of mandatory
fees**
Total enterprises and
primary holdings
AT Mandatory fees and
some minor activities
outside them.
▪ Hygiene checks in establishments that are subject to
approval in accordance with Regulation (EC) No
853/2004 (processing; milk; eggs; fish).
39,282 237,420 276,702
BE The whole food chain
(also primary
production).
▪ Fees for non-mandatory controls are covered by the
contributions paid by all participants to the food chain at
the beginning of the year.
▪ Activities carried out on FBOs request (e.g. export
certificates) - a combination of cost per certificate and
hourly rates.
▪ In general authorisation / registration requests are not
covered by fees even if they require an inspection on the
spot. However the authorisation of some establishments
is subject to a fee.
63,002 77,560 140,562
BG Only mandatory fees
and minor activities
outside them.
▪ Animal welfare controls and import of feed of non animal
origin. 35,382 892,780 928,162
CY Only mandatory fees
and minor activities
outside them.
▪ Export certificates and import of products of animal
origin outside Regulation 882/2004. 7,879 67,430 75,309
CZ Only mandatory fees
and minor activities
outside them.
▪ Issuing certificates.
▪ Approval and registration of establishments and
laboratories.
0 67,460 67,460
DE Mainly veterinary
area but in some ▪ Non-mandatory fees charged in some Landers. No
further information provided. 183,655 582,940 766,595
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MS Activities subject
to fees
Non-mandatory fees collected Number of enterprises
that could be affected by
extending the scope of
mandatory fees
(excluding primary
holdings)*
Number of primary
holdings that could be
affected by extending the
scope of mandatory
fees**
Total enterprises and
primary holdings
Landers also food
safety in general
(whole food chain).
DK Mandatory fees and
some activities
outside them.
▪ Food and feed of non animal origin.
▪ Food additives.
▪ Animal by-products.
▪ Food contact materials.
▪ Animal welfare during transport.
▪ Approval and registration of establishments.
17,035 71,700 88,735
EE The whole food and
feed chain. ▪ The whole food and feed chain is covered but fees are
calculated in different ways according to sector. 2,080 33,370 35,450
ES Not all control
activities are covered
by rules or specific
provisions on fees
collection under
Regulation 882/2004.
Fees are collected for
imports of food of
animal origin.
▪ Non-mandatory fees are charged in some Autonomous
Communities.
▪ La Agencia Española de Seguridad Alimentaria y
Nutrición (AESAN) has some fees for the evaluation and
registration of several dietetic foods. 441,765 1,485,030 1,926,795
FI Mandatory fees and
some activities
outside them.
▪ All feed controls and approval of establishments. 12,610 97,470 110,080
FR Only mandatory
areas under Reg.
882/2004 (with some
▪ A fee for animal by-products during slaughter is
collected on national basis (part fee part subsidy).
▪ Non-mandatory fees for export certification and
0 849,920 849,920
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MS Activities subject
to fees
Non-mandatory fees collected Number of enterprises
that could be affected by
extending the scope of
mandatory fees
(excluding primary
holdings)*
Number of primary
holdings that could be
affected by extending the
scope of mandatory
fees**
Total enterprises and
primary holdings
exceptions) authorisation of plants are being considered.
GR Mandatory fees and
other minor activities
outside them.
▪ All type of inspections of feed stuffs. 0 1,427,280 1,427,280
HU Mandatory fees and
some activities
outside them.
▪ Inspection of herds.
▪ Certification and control of animals.
▪ Transport of animal products.
▪ Control of animal exhibitions and competition.
▪ Tuberculin testing and sampling.
47,300 986,120 1,033,420
IE Mandatory areas
under Regulation
882/2004.
▪ Meat cold stores supervised by the Department of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food.
▪ The National Standards Association of Ireland fee’s for
premises requiring recognition for the extraction of
natural mineral water.
17,575 183,400 200,975
IT Food chain, excluding
retail, animal by-
products, feed and
primary production.
Authorisation of
establishments,
including feed
businesses (subject
to a flat rate fee).
Export certification
(time-based fee).
Out of office hours
▪ Non-mandatory fees are covered by the flat rate
contributions paid by FBOs at the beginning of the year,
and fees on import of food of non animal origin.
404,341 2,457,920 2,862,261
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MS Activities subject
to fees
Non-mandatory fees collected Number of enterprises
that could be affected by
extending the scope of
mandatory fees
(excluding primary
holdings)*
Number of primary
holdings that could be
affected by extending the
scope of mandatory
fees**
Total enterprises and
primary holdings
activities.
Italy is considering
the possibility to
extend fees also to
the transhipment part
of import.
LV Only mandatory fees
and minor activities
outside them.
▪ Issuing of health certificates and permits.
▪ Import of food contact materials and feed of non-animal
origin.
4,364 525,870 530,234
LT Only mandatory fees
and minor activities
outside them.
▪ Issuing of specific certificates. 3,182 3,910 7,092
LU NO INFORMATION
AVAILABLE ▪ NO INFORMATION AVAILABLE 3,887 211,390 215,277
MT Red meat inspection
fees.
Fees charged by
Border Inspection
Posts (as per Annex
V of the Regulation).
▪ No non-mandatory fees; implementing legislation would
be required.
0 13,700 13,700
NL Mandatory fees and
some activities
outside them.
In general fees are
applied for all official
veterinary controls
▪ Registration of FBOs.
▪ Approval and maintenance of approvals for dairy, milk,
eggs and egg products. 51,791 112,080 163,871
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MS Activities subject
to fees
Non-mandatory fees collected Number of enterprises
that could be affected by
extending the scope of
mandatory fees
(excluding primary
holdings)*
Number of primary
holdings that could be
affected by extending the
scope of mandatory
fees**
Total enterprises and
primary holdings
and analyses in
approved FBOs and
border inspection
posts.
PT Mandatory fees and
some activities
outside them.
▪ Checks in establishments subject to approval in
accordance with Regulation (EC) No 853/2004
(processing; milk; eggs; fish), and control under
Regulation (EC) No 1774/2002 and import from third
countries (BIP, minimum annex V).
▪ Certification.
▪ Slaughter.
▪ Rabies vaccination.
▪ Medicines and veterinary products approval and
licensing.
▪ Import control of foodstuffs of non-animal origin
▪ Costs of the analysis for audits to verify traceability and
HACCP requirements.
94,347 3,971,650 4,065,997
PL The whole food chain
(apart from primary
production) but with
specific systems for
veterinary and non
veterinary areas.
▪ In the veterinary area: certification (export, health), feed
(domestic), animal by-products, emergency slaughter
outside plant, genetic materials, markets, animal
quarantine,
▪ Outside the veterinary area Regulation 656/2009
introduces a fee for official controls on food other than in
the veterinary area.
122,665 614,310 736,975
RO Mandatory fees and
some other activities
outside them.
▪ Inspection of FBOs related to products of non animal
origin. 41,068 7,600,760 7,641,828
SK Mandatory fees. ▪ Non-mandatory fees are collected as time-based fees. 34,359 114,660 149,019
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MS Activities subject
to fees
Non-mandatory fees collected Number of enterprises
that could be affected by
extending the scope of
mandatory fees
(excluding primary
holdings)*
Number of primary
holdings that could be
affected by extending the
scope of mandatory
fees**
Total enterprises and
primary holdings
▪ Import of food of non-animal origin.
▪ Veterinary controls of animals, hatching eggs, germinal
products and animal by products (also with reference to
export).
SL Mandatory areas and
some activities
outside them.
▪ Animal feed (control of approved establishments)
▪ Official controls not covered by Annex IV of Regulation
882/2004.
3,121 126,500 129,621
SE The whole food
chain, except primary
producers.
▪ Pesticides and residues.
▪ Import of feed of non animal origin and animal by-
products.
▪ Animal welfare in slaughterhouses.
8,188 180,150 188,338
UK Generally only
mandatory areas
under Regulation
882/2004, with the
exclusion of dairy
sector and a number
of exemptions (see
right).
▪ Approval of irradiation facilities.
▪ Pesticide residues programme (fee on chemical
industry).
▪ Sampling and testing of raw cow milk in England and
Wales.
168,753 309,370 478,123
Eurostat (2008)
*Total number of enterprises in the following sectors; Processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables; Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats; Manufacture of grain mill products, starches and starch products; Manufacture of prepared animal feeds; Manufacture of beverages; Wholesale of agricultural raw materials and live animals; Wholesale of food, beverages and tobacco; Retail sale of food, beverages and tobacco in specialised stores; Restaurants and mobile food service activities; Event catering and other food service activities; and, Beverage serving activities.
**All holdings with arable land; all holdings growing permanent crops; all holdings rearing livestock; and, all holdings rearing other livestock.
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Table A1.6 Proportion of enterprises, compared to the total number of enterprises34, that could be affected by extending the scope of mandatory fees to controls under Regulations 852/2004 and 183/2005
MS Proportion of enterprises that could be
affected by extending the scope of mandatory
fees (excluding primary holdings)*
Proportion of primary holdings that could be
affected by extending the scope of mandatory
fees**
Proportion of enterprises that could be
affected by extending the scope of mandatory
fees (including primary holdings)
AT 15% 47% 55%
BE 17% 17% 31%
BG 14% 78% 81%
CY 19% 62% 70%
CZ 0 8% 8%
DE 11% 26% 34%
DK 10% 29% 36%
EE 5% 44% 47%
ES 20% 40% 52%
FI 7% 35% 40%
FR 0% 31% 31%
GR 0% 0 0%
34 Total number of enterprises estimated by adding total number of enterprises in the following sectors; Manufacturing, mining and quarrying and other industry; Wholesale and
retail trade, transportation and storage, accommodation and food service activities; Information and communication; Financial and insurance activities; Real estate activities; and, Professional, scientific, technical, administration and support service activities.
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MS Proportion of enterprises that could be
affected by extending the scope of mandatory
fees (excluding primary holdings)*
Proportion of primary holdings that could be
affected by extending the scope of mandatory
fees**
Proportion of enterprises that could be
affected by extending the scope of mandatory
fees (including primary holdings)
HU 10% 67% 70%
IE 15 61% 67%
IT 12 43% 50%
LV 4% 82% 82%
LT 14% 14% 26%
LU 6% 76% 77%
MT 0 0 0
NL 11% 19% 28%
PT 7% 75% 77%
PL 19% 48% 58%
RO 9% 94% 95%
SK 19% 39% 50%
SL 5% 69% 71%
SE 9% 67% 70%
UK 33% 38% 58%
Eurostat (2008)
*Total number of enterprises in the following sectors; Processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables; Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats; Manufacture of grain mill products, starches and starch products; Manufacture of prepared animal feeds; Manufacture of beverages; Wholesale of agricultural raw materials and live animals; Wholesale of food, beverages and tobacco; Retail sale of food, beverages and tobacco in specialised stores; Restaurants and mobile food service activities; Event catering and other food service activities; and, Beverage serving activities.
**All holdings with arable land; all holdings growing permanent crops; all holdings rearing livestock; and, all holdings rearing other livestock.
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A1.1.2 Sub-option A2 – Require full cost recovery
A1.1.2.1 A2 - Specification
Sub-option A2 considers whether the Regulation should impose a legal requirement on
Member States to achieve full cost recovery of the (eligible) costs of official controls.
Respondents were asked to consider the positive and negative impacts of a full cost
recovery requirement. As interpreted here, the option relates to recovery of the costs of the
controls for which fees are charged. There are thus complementarities between sub-options
A2 and A1 in terms of recovery of costs of the overall control regime (Figure A1.3).
Figure A1.3 Sub-options A1 and A2 have complementary effects on overall cost recovery
Proportion of official
controls subject to fees
Level of
cost
recovery
achieved
by fees
100%
100%
A2 Require
full cost
recovery
A1 Extend mandatory fees
A1 + A2
A1.1.2.2 A2 – Evidence and analysis
Respondent scores and comments
The scores awarded by survey respondents as regards the impacts of this policy option are
summarised in Figure A1.4. Selected comments from CAs and industry are provided in
Table A1.7.
▪ Industry does not favour full cost recovery for official control activity. In particular:
– It would not provide incentives for CAs to conduct efficient control inspections or
reduce the cost of delivery for control activities;
– It would negatively impact small businesses as costs are likely to increase for
control activities; and
– It could reduce the competitiveness of European businesses due to increased
cost burdens.
▪ Competent Authorities support full cost recovery, as it would improve efficiency and
increase accountability. The option is thought have negative impacts, however, with
respect to comparability and where implementation increases administrative costs.
Figure A1.4 CAs favour full cost recovery where it improves efficiency and accountability, but it may have negative impacts on administrative costs and comparability. Industry believes full cost recovery will have uniformly negative impacts.
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-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0Efficiency
Simplification
ComparabilityStreamlining
Accountability
Industry Competent Authorities
Base = 22 industry responses; 14 CA responses
Average score awarded by survey respondents based on a scale where -2 means ‘significant negative impact’ and +2 means ‘significant positive impact’. Responses that received a score of ‘don’t know’ are not included in the score.
Table A1.7 Option A2: Comments provided by survey respondents about full cost recovery
Competent Authority Industry
Positive
▪ The fees would [sic] ensure sustainable
financing of the official control.
▪ MS would recover all the costs
associated with official controls.
▪ [It would] guarantee full-costs recovery.
▪ [A] level playing field [would be] create
as...Member States [would] have similar
costs.
▪ [It would] guarantee of resources for
official controls.
▪ FBOs [would] have an interest to enable
the CA / inspector to work efficiently.
Meat industry representative.
▪ If controls were risk based, full cost
recovery would provide a bonus-malus
system and incentivise compliance.
Meat industry representative.
▪ [It would promote] fair competition.
Meat industry representative.
▪ Industry would [sic] be subjected to
much less control. Meat industry
representative.
▪ The overall cost of OC delivery [would]
reduce. Meat industry representative.
▪ Ideally [it] would increase control
resources, if ring fenced. Public health
representative.
▪ The budgets of the MS [may be]
improved [sic]. Food and agricultural
sector representative.
▪ Inspections [may] increase in quality
and uniformity. Food and agricultural
sector representative.
▪ [It may] provide sufficient resources for
the effective and efficient operation of
official inspections. Food and
agricultural sector representative.
▪ Industry would [sic] be subjected to
much less control. Food and
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Competent Authority Industry
agricultural sector representative.
▪ The overall cost of OC delivery will
reduce. Food and agricultural sector
representative.
Negative
▪ [There could be] pressure on CAs to
decrease the frequency of audits.
▪ [There could be a] reduction in official
animal welfare monitoring.
▪ Some sectors, particularly smaller
businesses, may be put under
increased financial pressure if costs of
official controls are imposed / increased.
▪ Cost / fees would differ between MS
and decrease harmonisation [sic] [of
the] system.
▪ Costs would increase for FBOs.
▪ Impossible to calculate...whether the
fees collected cover the full costs of
control as they are collected by the
National Treasury. [It] is not possible to
know which public activities they
[subsequently] finance.
▪ [It could] changing the frequency of
controls (higher than needed or lower
than necessary) because of financial
reasons.
▪ [It could lead to] more discussions with
FBOs.
▪ Full cost recovery leads to an unequal
[sic] of impact on sectors. There is a
difficulty in definition of what full cost
recovery means, what overheads are
covered and it would be very expensive,
in terms of resources, for the
Commission to police.
▪ No incentive for improving efficiency.
Meat industry representative.
▪ The requirement for full cost recovery,
of itself, provides no incentive for the
competent authority to improve the
efficiency or reduce the cost of delivery
of official controls. Meat industry
representative.
▪ If controls are not risk based they would
not provide value for money and lead to
the closure of businesses for no public
health reason. Meat industry
representative.
▪ Many smaller plants will be lost.
Costs will be passed down the chain till
livestock producers where margins are
already tight, resulting in even great
reductions in livestock numbers. Meat
industry representative.
▪ Reduction in consumer safety.
Reduction in official animal welfare
monitoring. Industry will be decimated.
Meat industry representative.
▪ Consumer choice will be restricted.
Smaller premises will close resulting in
higher 'food miles' thus damaging
animal welfare. May increase financial
burden for FBO. Meat industry
representative.
▪ No incentive for CAs to improve
performance plus increases cost of
production for feed manufacturer.
Animal feed sector representative.
▪ Could have significant business impacts
which are likely to result in increased
costs to consumers. Also potential to
lead to conflict with CAs. Public health
representative.
▪ [If] FBOs are further burdened with
costs, the competitiveness of European
enterprises would be weakened
dramatically. Food and agricultural
sector representative.
▪ Many smaller plants may be lost. Food
and agricultural sector representative.
▪ Costs will be passed down the chain to
livestock producers where margins are
already tight, resulting in even greater
reductions in livestock numbers,
particularly from the more sensitive
regions. Food and agricultural sector
representative.
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Competent Authority Industry
▪ Will impact disproportionately on SME
FBOs: consumer protection will not be
enhanced by their demise. Decision
needed on which costs should be
funded from general taxation. Food
sector representative.
▪ [It would] destroy [sic] [the] level playing
field for EU importers and exporters.
Food sector representative.
▪ No incentive to control authorities to
improve their performance. Food sector
representative.
▪ Level playing field is destroyed for both
EU importer and exporter. Food sector
representative.
▪ Reduction in consumer safety.
Reduction in official animal welfare
monitoring. Veterinary sector
representative.
Case study assessment
The case study results indicate that a full cost recovery requirement would have varied
impacts on Member States depending on:
▪ Current levels of cost recovery;
▪ The degree of decentralisation in the official controls system; and
▪ Legislative requirements that may require changes.
In Member States with a high degree of public financing and low degree of cost recovery
from fees (e.g. Belgium), a full cost recovery requirement could be difficult to achieve. There
would also be legislative changes required in Belgium and in Finland, which would create
some administrative burdens, at least initially. In MS such as Finland where local authorities
set fee rates and bear responsibility for their own cost recovery, the implementation of this
sub-option would need to be designed carefully to avoid substantial new administrative costs
at the central level.
The scores awarded by respondents in the case study countries as regards the impacts of
this policy option are summarised in Figure A1.5.
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Figure A1.5 Responses varied across case study countries with respect to full cost recovery. Some indicated that it could have positive overall impacts while others foresee negative impacts.
-2
-1
0
1
2BG
FL
FR
NL
PL
UK
Eff iciency Net score Simplif ication
Base = 22 industry responses; 11 CA responses
Average score awarded by survey respondents based on a scale where -2 means ‘significant negative impact’ and +2 means ‘significant positive impact’.
The variance in responses across case study countries can be explained in part by the
extent to which official controls are publicly funded:
▪ In Belgium, official controls are primarily publicly funded. Full cost recovery would likely
require additional national legislation and would therefore have a negative impact for
simplification. Full cost recovery could however have slight positive impacts on efficiency
and comparability.
▪ In Finland, most CAs are under funded—only one-third are able to fully recover costs.
This is due largely to competition amongst municipal CAs to avoid charging
comparatively higher fees than neighbouring CAs. Central government has no legal
authority to influence fee rates. So, while respondents indicated that this option is likely
to have a positive impact on efficiency, it would create complications within the legal
framework and potentially reduce accountability as CAs would have less incentive to
control costs.
▪ In France, approximately 70 per cent of costs are recovered. Respondents indicated that
full-cost recovery could improve efficiency (i.e. cost recovery), while reducing the
efficiency of inspections and incentives for CAs to improve their performance.
▪ In the Netherlands, full cost recovery requirements would have a significant positive
impact on efficiency, and weakly so on comparability and accountability.
▪ In Poland, there is little information regarding current levels of cost recovery, but it is
thought to be insufficient. This option could improve efficiency and comparability, but is
thought to have a significant negative impact with respect to streamlining, as the option
would increase CA administrative burdens.
▪ In the UK, the CA is currently consulting with industry on full cost recovery in the meat
sector and considering changes for all other control activities. Industry, however,
considers this unfair where they are required to bear more of the costs, particularly as it
is unlikely to incentivise CA inspection efficiency.
Other evidence
DG SANCO baseline data indicate that only five Member States may achieve full cost
recovery through fee collection for control activities (where fees are applied): Lithuania,
Latvia, Portugal, Poland and Slovenia. In the case of Portugal and Slovenia, there is no
evidence to substantiate the CAs claim of full cost recovery, however. In other MS, fees
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cover costs in most areas, with some exceptions. For example, Denmark and Finland
achieve full cost recovery, except for fees collected from small FBOs. In Austria and France,
costs are recovered, except on border controls. In most Member States, current fee recovery
does not cover costs, and the level of recovery is between approximately 30 and 80 percent.
A full cost recovery requirement will therefore impact most Member States.
Table A1.8 Full cost recovery across EU Member States
Member
state
Full cost
recovery
Percentage cost
recovery
(if less than
100%)
Fees cover
costs with some
exceptions
Fees do not
cover costs
(percentage
unknown)
No information
AT Fees for border
checks
BE 37% (2009)
BG 27% (2007)
CY
CZ 28% (2007)
DE
DK 35% (small
abattoirs)
EE 20% (2007)
ES
FI 20% (small FBOs)
FR 45% - 70%
(domestic)
(imports)
GR
HU 60% (2007)
IE
40% meat
90% milk
76% imports
(2009)
IT 50% (2007)
LT
LU
LV
MT 39% (2007)
NL 81% (2007)
PT
PL35
RO
50% non-animal
origin
(2007)
(processing
products of animal
origin)
35 The baseline data provided by DG SANCO indicate that Poland achieves full cost recovery; interviews with the
Polish CA for this study, however, suggest that there is little data on cost recovery and that cost recovery is thought to be insufficient.
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Member
state
Full cost
recovery
Percentage cost
recovery
(if less than
100%)
Fees cover
costs with some
exceptions
Fees do not
cover costs
(percentage
unknown)
No information
SE
SI
SK 51% (2007)
UK 43% (2008)
DG SANCO baseline
Notes on the baseline data presented in Table A1.8
Italy:
▪ From 2009 fees are to be applied with an automatic 20% increase, then after the end of
the year the actual cost is calculated and the automatic increase/decrease is re-
calculated to reach 100% cost coverage.
▪ A 0.5% increase is meant to cover costs related to the implementation of MANCP and
ring fenced for this purpose to the Ministry of Health.
United Kingdom:
▪ Annex VI is the reference including social security costs and overheads.
In the slaughterhouse and cutting plant sector the following level of cost recovery was
achieved
Poland:
▪ The baseline data provided by DG SANCO indicate that Poland achieves full cost
recovery; interviews with the Polish CA for this study, however, suggest that there is little
data on cost recovery and that the available data indicate that cost recovery is
insufficient.
Portugal:
▪ CA claims 100% but has no data to support claim
Lithuania
▪ CA claims 100%
Greece
▪ Fees do not cover costs. No data available (for the years before 2008 fees were not
collected).
Austria
▪ At the Swiss border, lower fees are charged in accordance with an agreement between
the EU and Switzerland.
Sweden
▪ Generally speaking, the aim of the fees system is full cost recovery for all official
controls. The fees charged must be sufficient to finance the official control deemed
necessary, and fees may not be used to finance other activities. Administrative costs,
training, overheads, development of OC are included in the hourly rate. Slaughter up to
200 tonnes per year is partly subsidised (approx. total of 9 million SEK in subsidies
2010).
The notes on the baseline above indicate that data related to cost recovery levels should be
interpreted with caution. Information related to levels of cost recovery is relatively limited,
and where available from multiple sources, is sometimes contradictory. For example,
several of the CAs reporting 100% cost recovery but do not have the data to substantiate
their claim. Individuals from the Polish CA stated that data on cost recovery levels were
unavailable, but was likely to be below 100%, but the DG SANCO baseline states that
Poland recovers 100 per cent of official control costs. Another example of issues with cost
recovery data is Finland, where figures for cost recovery vary widely. The DG SANCO
baseline states that it is 20 per cent for small FBOs, while the FCEC (2008) study provides a
more nuanced picture, indicating that the level of cost recovery ranges from 20 per cent
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(municipal food control) to 97 per cent (veterinary border control). A selection of the
potential factors behind the disparity of cost recovery in Finland is discussed in the box
below.
Cost recovery rates in Finland
Official controls for small FBOs in Finland, of which there are many, are the responsibility of the
municipal control unit. Evira, the Finnish CA, is responsible for collecting fees from large FBOs, of
which there are few. The FCEC (2009) study of official controls found that cost recovery for large
FBOs was 99 per cent and only 20 per cent for municipal controls; data reported in DG SANCO
baseline indicates that cost recovery is 20 per cent for small FBOs
Consistent with this finding, Lepostö et al. (2010) investigated the extent to which Finnish Competent
Authorities recovered the costs of performing official controls. The fees collected were compared to
costs incurred, based on a questionnaire of municipal environmental health and food control
authorities. The study found that only 38 per cent of municipal control units collected fees that
covered 100 per cent of control costs. This compares with the 20 per cent reported in the FCEC
study.
The data suggest that cost recovery levels in Finland are high for a small proportion of FBOs, but low
for the majority of FBOs.
This discrepancy may, in part, be explained by the characteristics of the Finnish official control
system where there are regional differences in the application of official control fees. Rates are set
at municipal level, and are based on actual costs or may even be less than costs.36
Additionally,
Lepostö et al. (2010) found that official control activities were often conducted in conjunction with
inspections related to other legislation (such as health and safety inspections), but these inspections
were considered as one inspection and charged as one single control. This was the case in 54 per
cent of control units. This supports the points made by an interviewee from Evira for this study, who
stated that it is very difficult to determine the proportion of cost recovery for official controls in Finland
because control units do not separately record the time dedicated to official control activities. Official
controls are considered as a sub-set of controls in a larger set that control units are responsible for
administering. In the interviewee’s opinion, it would require the introduction of burdensome data
collection mechanisms to accurately record the level of official control cost recovery in Finland.
Table A1.9 illustrates the potential level of impact for each MS achieving 100 per cent cost
recovery based on their current cost recovery rates as reported in the DG SANCO baseline
dataset. It is intended to provide an indication of the potential impact only; due to the issues
with the cost recovery data it is not intended to be a definitive analysis. The potential impact
of increasing recovery to 100 per cent is expressed in terms of high impact (MS currently
recovering between 0% - 33% of costs), medium impact (MS currently recovering between
34% - 66% of costs), low impact (MS currently recovering between 67% - 100% of costs)
and no impact (MS currently recovering 100% of costs). For several MS no information was
identified to indicate current rates of cost recovery.
These data suggest that eight MS would be impacted very little or not at all by a full cost
recovery option. Nine MS would see a moderate impact for this requirement, and five would
require significant changes in the operation of their fee recovery systems in order to meet a
full cost recovery requirement. The potential impacts are unknown for five MS, where
information is currently unavailable.
Table A1.9 Full cost recovery across EU Member States
Member
state
Percentage of costs
recovered
Percentage of costs
not recovered
Impact of reaching
100% recovery
AT 100% 0% No impact
BE 37% (2009) 63% Medium
BG 27% 73% High
36 Lepostö et al. (2010)
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Member
state
Percentage of costs
recovered
Percentage of costs
not recovered
Impact of reaching
100% recovery
(2007)
CY No information Unknown Unknown impact
CZ 28%
(2007) 72% High
DE No information Unknown Unknown impact
DK 35% (small abattoirs) 65% Medium
EE 20%
(2007) 80% High
ES Costs not covered Unknown High
FI 20% (small FBOs) 80% High
FR 45% - 70% (domestic) 30% - 55% Medium
GR Costs not covered Unknown High
HU 60%
(2007) 40% Medium
IE
40% meat
90% milk
76% imports
(2009)
67%
(average) High
IT 50%
(2007) 50% Medium
LT 100% 0% No impact
LU No information Unknown Unknown impact
LV 100% 0% No impact
MT 39%
(2007) 61% Medium
NL 81%
(2007) 19% Low
PT 100% 0% No impact
PL37
100% 100% No impact
RO
50%
non-animal origin
(2007)
50% Medium
SE Costs not covered Unknown High
SI 100% 0% No impact
SK 51%
(2007) 49% Medium
UK 43%
(2008) 57% Medium
DG SANCO baseline
37 The baseline data provided by DG SANCO indicate that Poland achieves full cost recovery; interviews with the
Polish CA for this study, however, suggest that there is little data on cost recovery and that cost recovery is thought to be insufficient.
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Factors influencing the aggregate impact on the food chain of moving to full cost recovery include: (i)
the range of controls on which fees are applied (as discussed in A1), (ii) the speed with which the
transition is made and thus firms’ opportunity to adjust (iii) the extent to which there are changes in
the regulatory cost base over the transition period, (iv) the design of the fee structure. For example,
if the efficiency of controls is improved during the transition period (e.g. encouraged by greater
transparency and accountability) and bonus-malus principles are designed into the fee structure then
the proportionate change in costs to a well-performing firm may be less than the change in the
recovery rate.
A1.1.2.3 A2 - Summary
General conclusions
A full cost recovery option is likely to have a positive impact on efficiency, and therefore
meets the primary objective that this option is designed to achieve. Most Member States do
not achieve full cost recovery at present, and a requirement to do so would enable MS to put
systems in place to achieve this. On the other dimensions, however, full cost recovery is not
considered to have a positive impact. In particular, it is likely to increase administrative costs
to CAs and create complications where MS must change their legal frameworks and system
structures to implement and monitor cost recovery. Industry is concerned that this
requirement will lead to less efficient inspections while increasing their costs.
The magnitude of impacts
The scale of the impact of this option on individual Member States and on individual FBOs
would be determined by the approach and principles underpinning a full cost recovery
requirement. If the requirement were to be phased in over time, for example, CAs would
have time to adjust their systems to increase cost recovery incrementally. If the requirement
were to be effective immediately with a revision to the Regulation, most Member States are
likely to struggle to achieve full cost recovery and the requirement will simply go unmet. The
specification of the requirement, however, is unknown.
In addition, the scale of the impact would be influenced by the ability of CAs to accurately
determine the costs of performing official controls. Where official controls are performed
alongside controls relating to other legislation during an inspection, for example, CAs may
find it difficult to accurately determine the cost of performing one of a suite of controls. Some
CAs may require the introduction of new systems, organisational and / or technological, to
accurately record and determine the cost of official controls.
Incidence of impact and distributional issues
Impacts would fall primarily within the EU. This option would, in principle, impact on all FBOs
subject to fees for official controls, and the income of all entities that collect fees for control
activities.
The distribution of impacts depends on the degree to which full cost recovery is already
achieved in the Member State and the control activity concerned (e.g. for small FBOs and/or
for border inspections).
The net impact on business would also be influenced by the approach taken by CAs to
recovering costs. Where a cost recovery requirement is met through a bonus-malus
approach to fee collection, some FBOs may find their costs reduced and others with their
costs increased. This has not been specified, however, and is only speculative.
There is no particular SME bias to the impacts but there are fee exemptions or reductions for
small or micro businesses, CAs will need to determine how to recover costs from elsewhere
in the system or from other revenue sources.
There is a related issue of the level at which the cost-recovery is assessed. For example, is
cost recovery to be assessed and reported on for each type of control, at the Competent
Authority level, at Member State level? The implications of this choice are likely to vary
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according to how decentralised the administration of official controls is. In a country where
controls there are a large number of Competent Authorities the calculation of a ‘blended’
national cost recovery rate is likely to be complex and the scope to move revenues from
points of ‘over-recovery’ to those of ‘under-recovery’ limited.
Compliance costs and administrative burdens
Costs may increase for FBOs, but they may also decrease, depending on the interaction of
this sub-option with other sub-options that may be included in any revisions to the
Regulation. There would be some increase in administrative costs for CAs that are not
currently able to estimate their cost recovery rate as accounting and information systems are
upgraded.
Costs and benefits
For CAs there will be administrative burdens associated with determining the actual costs of
official controls, and ensuring that these costs are reflected in control fees. There are also
likely to be administrative burdens (and hence costs) associated with setting appropriate fee
levels for FBOs. The net impact will be influenced by whether those costs can be recovered
from the fees themselves.
Costs are likely to increase for FBOs in Member States where current recovery levels are
low. The actual impact on FBOs will depend on current recovery levels, and the trajectory
set towards full cost recovery, and the extent to which there are adjustments in the
regulatory cost base over that period.
Overall, requiring full cost recovery is likely to increase costs for FBOs. There will be more
significant impacts in Member States where current recovery levels are low.
A1.1.3 Sub-option A3 - Clearly define eligible costs
A1.1.3.1 A3 - Specification
Sub-option A3 considers changes to the Regulation that more clearly define the costs that
can be recovered from fees to those directly linked to performing official controls. Currently,
Annex VI sets out a definition of eligible costs as follows:
▪ Salaries of the staff involved in official controls;
▪ Staff costs related to control activities, including facilities, tools, equipment, training,
travel and associated costs; and
▪ Laboratory sampling and analysis costs.
Although Regulation 882/2004 attempts to do this through Annex VI, the specification is
unclear and has resulted in differences of interpretation. This study assessed the following
list, which more clearly defines the eligible costs:
▪ Salaries for inspectors, including social contributions;
▪ Tools and instruments to be used during inspections;
▪ Out of office hours activities;
▪ Travelling linked to official controls;
▪ Training of inspectors;
▪ Quota of administrative costs linked to the inspection activities (including planning); and
▪ Sampling and analysis costs (when needed).
Respondents were asked to consider whether (and how):
▪ They agree or disagree with each of the costs set out in the revised list;
▪ The revised list is sufficiently clear to avoid different interpretations; and
▪ Other costs should be added and/or items should be deleted from the list.
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Net change in income to CAs (or to the other public body receiving fee income) through this
sub-option is influenced by the decisions taken on other sub-options, as illustrated by Figure
A1.6.
Figure A1.6 A3 determines the eligible cost base on which the rates considered in sub-option A2 are calculated, and which determines income generated by sub-option A1
Proportion of official
controls subject to fees
Level of cost
recovery achieved by
feesA2 Require
full cost
recovery
A1 Extend mandatory fees
Scope of
eligible costs
A3 Define
eligible costs
Baseline
position
A1.1.3.2 A3 – Evidence and analysis
Respondent scores and comments
The scores awarded by survey respondents as regards the impacts of this policy option are
summarised in Figure A1.7. Selected comments from CAs and industry are provided in
Table A1.12. In summary:
▪ Both CA and industry respondents indicated that a clear definition of eligible costs would
have a positive impact on official controls system. CAs in particular expected significant
positive impacts on efficiency, accountability and simplicity of the system.
▪ CAs also uniformly agree that each individual cost specified (i.e. salaries, tools and
instruments, out of office hours activities, travel costs, administrative costs, and sampling
and analysis) should be included.
▪ Industry views are more varied on the specified list of costs:
– A strong majority agree that salaries (75%) and tools and instruments (72%)
should be included;
– A majority agree that costs of sampling and analysis (66%), travelling linked to
official controls activities (59%), and out of office hours activities (53%) should be
included; and
– A majority disagree that training of inspectors (72%) and a quota of
administrative costs (59%) should be included.
▪ When asked to specify other costs that should be included, CAs proposed:
– Overhead costs (e.g. buildings and maintenance, legal fees, financial
administration, IT costs);
– Salaries of local veterinarians; and
– Inspection report preparation.
▪ Conversely, industry representatives indicated that overhead costs in particular should
not be included.
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▪ One CA suggested that rather than specify a list of costs, activity-based costing (ABC)
should be used to identify the relevant activities associated with official controls and
assigns a cost to each according to actual consumption.
Figure A1.7 CA and industry respondents uniformly agree that a clear definition of eligible costs will have a net positive impact on official controls systems
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0Efficiency
Simplification
ComparabilityStreamlining
Accountability
Industry Competent Authorities
Base = 22 industry responses; 14 CA responses
Average score awarded by survey respondents based on a scale where -2 means ‘significant negative impact’ and +2 means ‘significant positive impact’. Responses that received a score of ‘don’t know’ are not included in the score.
Survey respondents were asked to indicate whether they agree or disagree with the
inclusion of a set of different costs, including salaries, tools and instruments, out of office
hours activities, travelling, training, administrative costs, and sampling and analysis.
Competent Authorities who responded to this question unanimously agreed with the
proposed list, with the exception of one who disagreed regarding ‘out of office hours
activities’. Industry responses were more varied. Table A3.5 provides the breakdown of
responses for both groups.
Table A1.10 CA and industry respondents who agree with each of the proposed eligible costs directly linked to official control activities
Category Competent Authority Industry
Salaries for inspectors, including
social contributions
12 out of 12 (100%) 24 out of 32 (75%)
Tools and instruments to be used
during inspections
12 out of 12 (100%) 23 out of 32 (72%)
Out of office hours activities 11 out of 12 (92%) 17 out of 32 (53%)
Travelling linked to official controls 12 out of 12 (100%) 19 out of 32 (59%)
Training of inspectors 12 out of 12 (100%) 9 out of 32 (28%)
Quota of administrative costs linked
to inspection activities
12 out of 12 (100%) 13 out of 32 (41%)
Costs of sampling and analysis 12 out of 12 (100%) 21 out of 32 (66%)
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Respondents were also asked to propose additional categories or wording to the list of
eligible costs set out in option specification. Table A3.14 provides the wording and
categories proposed by CAs and industry stakeholders.
Table A1.11 Sub-option A3: Other categories or proposed wording for eligible costs
Competent Authority
▪ The salaries of local veterinaries taking care of farm animals should be included in control
costs.
▪ Cost of building and maintenance of the required facilities for inspection should be added to
the list for costs recovery.
▪ [The] same authorities take care of animal health. The salaries of local veterinaries taking
care of farm animals should be included in control costs.
▪ Inspection activities include also inspection report (only planning is mentioned).
▪ Overhead costs linked to the above mentioned activities (personnel and organization, IT,
housing, ...)
▪ Maintenance of the technical equipment.
▪ Legal costs associated with enforcement action.
▪ Administrative costs must be determined clearly.
▪ Cost of building and maintenance of the required facilities for inspection.
▪ Financial administration, including salary administration
▪ Equipment of inspectors (clothes, boots...) and facilities
Industry
▪ Tools and instruments and administrative costs: [should] only [be] included [sic] if they are
harmonised between all MS. Food sector representative.
▪ Cost recovery should not be sought for salaries and certainly not for travel costs or training.
Food and agriculture representative.
▪ Quota of administrative costs linked to secretaries, vets, offices etc [should not be included].
Meat industry representative.
▪ [Should] not have salary covered...only the cost of the service provided [and] tools /
instruments should be included. Long-term equipment should not be part of costs. Meat
industry representative.
▪ Governmental overheads are unacceptably high and reflect inherent inefficiency and
bureaucracy which should not be passed on to an efficient and competitive industry - no
overhead should be charged to industry as this will have negative effects on the delivery of
OCs and result in a diversion of resource away from ensuring safe food. Veterinary
industry representative.
▪ No changes of Annex VI Dairy industry representative
▪ Tools and instruments: long-term equipment should not be part of costs, but usable tools for
the specific inspection can be part of it
▪ Out of office activities: for specific [instances when the CA is needed] Dairy industry
representative
▪ Costs of sampling: only if way of working and reporting is harmonized Fruit and vegetable
industry representative
▪ Cost of sample taking in case same needs to be effected manually by hired workers.
Transport of samples. Animal feed trade and export representative
▪ Parts of the overhead costs like planning, IT, or social contribution e.g. should be born by
the authorities from the state budget. Food and agricultural trade representative
Table A1.12 Sub-option A3: Comments provided by survey respondents about a clear definition of eligible costs
Competent Authority
▪ [The definition of] out of office hours activities is unclear for me.
▪ Detailed lists tend to have a detrimental effect as they can still be interpreted in a number of
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different ways, potentially increasing the administrative burden on the CA due to increased
analysis, recording and reporting. We believe that the principle of activity based costing
should be applied. Activity-based costing (ABC) is a costing model that identifies activities in
an organization and assigns the cost of each activity resource to all products and services
according to the actual consumption by each.
▪ Overhead costs are always difficult to define.
Industry
▪ This is a critical concept. Harmonization of the understanding of what is included within the
calculation of the fee is paramount to ensure a more level [sic] playing field but also to
reduce the significant number of legal challenges currently suffered by CA from stakeholder
organizations. Public health representative.
Case study assessment
A clear definition of costs will have a positive impact on each of the case study countries,
particularly where reduced ambiguity ensures that fees charged cover only those costs
directly related to control activity. CAs are likely to benefit where this helps recover costs and
reduce uncertainty about what is ‘allowable’. Industry benefits where CAs are not allowed to
include unrelated costs, and thus FBOs pay lower rates.
The scores awarded by respondents in the case study countries as regards the impacts of
this policy option are summarised in Figure A1.8.
Figure A1.8 Overall, case study country respondents indicate that a clear definition of costs will have a positive impact on official controls systems, and particularly for efficiency
-2
-1
0
1
2BG
FL
FR
NL
PL
UK
Efficiency Net score Streamlining
Base = 22 industry responses; 11 CA responses
Average score awarded by survey respondents based on a scale where -2 means ‘significant negative impact’ and +2 means ‘significant positive impact’.
The case study results indicate a similarly net positive impact expected from clearly defining
eligible costs. Respondents in Belgium, Finland, France and the Netherlands foresee
positive impacts particularly for efficient cost recovery. The overall effect is likely to be less in
Poland, where in practice fee rates may be determined through negotiation between central
CAs and industry associations. In France and the Netherlands, some respondents are
concerned that increasing the number of eligible costs could also increase the administrative
burdens on Competent Authorities.
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Other evidence
The cost categories themselves require precise definition in order to overcome the variations
in the cost base identified in the FCEC Evaluation. Criteria need to be precise enough to
ensure that Member States are consistent in their application of the eligible cost categories
to fee rates. The ‘quota’ of administrative costs referred to in the current draft text is
potentially open to different interpretations, and any overhead costs that may be included are
also subject to significant variance in what might be considered a relevant component. One
option is to specify that administrative costs that cannot exceed a given percentage of staff
costs.
A1.1.3.3 A3 - Summary
General conclusions
A clear definition of eligible costs is likely to have strong positive impacts for official controls
systems across the EU. The strongest positive impact is likely with respect to efficient cost
recovery for CAs. Greater specification or adding new costs may, however, increase the
administrative burden on CAs, though this is not likely to be significant.
When asked to assess a specific list of eligible costs, CAs agreed that the proposed list was
appropriate and that each category should be included. CAs proposed that overhead costs
should also be included, as well as the salary costs for local veterinarians and inspection
report preparation. Industry responses were more varied, with a strong majority agreeing
with salaries and tools and instruments, and significant disagreement regarding travel costs
and administrative costs. Industry, in contrast to CAs, indicated that overhead costs should
not be included.
If the problems with the existing Annex VI text are to be avoided then a clear definition of
each cost element is required. The definition of eligible overheads is an area of particular
difficulty. The wording currently proposed for these other administrative costs may not be
sufficiently clear (the scale or basis of the ‘quota’ referred to in the text is not defined).
The magnitude of impacts
The scale of the impact of the sub-option on individual Member States and on individual
FBOs would be determined by:
▪ The ultimate definition of eligible costs (e.g. specification of allowable costs under each
allowable category);
▪ The gap between that definition and current practice and
▪ The costs associated with each component and for each control in individual Member
States (i.e. the baseline costs).
The final definition of eligible costs has yet to be determined. The variance between the
draft list and current practice across the CAs within the 27 MS is not documented.
Incidence of impact and distributional issues
Impacts would fall primarily within the EU. This sub-option would, in principle, impact all
FBOs subject to fees for official controls, and the income of all entities that collect these fees.
The distribution of impacts is affected by the cost categories that are included, and the
components within those categories that are considered allowable. For example, as the
generosity of the overhead allowance increases, the costs to industry (and income to
government) are likely to increase. If travel costs and/or administrative costs are excluded,
as suggested by many industry respondents, then industry costs are likely to decrease and
income to CAs (or finance ministries) is likely to fall.
Many businesses operating in the sectors affected by official controls are SMEs. SMEs
would be affected where the definition of eligible costs widened and resulted in increased
fees. For example, inclusion of inspector travel costs could affect rural SMEs.
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Compliance costs and administrative burdens
Administrative burdens may increase, at least initially, for CAs as the newly defined cost
categories must be assessed against current fee charging practices and adjusted as
required. Costs are likely to decrease over time, however, as the lack of ambiguity ensures
that fees cover only directly related costs and accounting practices have been adopted and
implemented accordingly.
Costs and benefits
The impact of redefinition of eligible costs will vary by CA according the final definition
adopted and current charging practice. The sub-option, as with A2 (and the sub-option on
transparency, A7), requires CAs to have an understanding of the costs of their official control
activity. Where that understanding is currently lacking the reform package as a whole would
result in some initial cost increase as CAs assess their cost base and (re)assess fees for
control activities based on the more precise list of cost categories. Those incremental costs
would be expected to diminish over time once a new system is established.
Industry costs may rise in some Member States, where new cost calculations result in high
fees. Equally, industry costs may decrease in Member States where the reverse occurs.
Overall, both CAs and industry believe that a precise definition of costs will improve the
official controls system in the EU. In particular, precise cost definitions are likely to increase
efficiency for CAs to recover control costs. Transparency and accountability will improve,
which benefits industry. CA uncertainty over what should be included is reduced, which CAs
indicated would be an improvement over the current system.
A1.1.4 Sub-option A4 – Introduce time-based fees
A1.1.4.1 A4 - Specification
Sub-option A4 considers the impact of Regulation 882/2004 specifying time-based fees for
official controls that require continuous or systematic presence of officials. Flat fees would
apply to those controls outside the scope of time-based fees.
The expectation is that fees would be calculated on the basis of Member States’ costs under
common EU rules, though three alternative bases for the fee calculation are provided:
▪ A standard, EU-wide, hourly rate;
▪ A standard, EU-wide, hourly rate, indexed in each MS by a cost-of-living adjustment; or
▪ Detailed cost calculations (i.e. local costs determined under common rules).
A1.1.4.2 A4 – Evidence and analysis
Respondent scores and comments
The scores awarded by survey respondents as regards the impacts of this policy option are
summarised in Figure A1.9. Selected comments from CAs and industry are provided in
Table A1.13.
CAs and industry agree that there is likely to be a slight positive impact from introducing
time-based fees for official controls that require continuous or systematic presence. In
particular, CAs expected improved efficiency and accountability, as well a simplified system
with reduced administrative burdens. Both CAs and industry respondents noted that risk-
based fees are naturally suited to a system that employs risk-based principles, thus ensuring
that time is spent only for activities and on businesses that present the most risk to the food
chain. Nonetheless, CAs voiced some concerns regarding complications arising from trying
to calculate time-based fees. Both groups are concerned that time-based fees could
incentivise veterinarians to conduct inspections that are longer than required in order to
obtain more fees.
When asked what fees in particular might be well-suited to time-based principles, both CAs
and industry agree that red meat and poultry inspections, in slaughterhouses and cutting
plants and for ante- and post-mortem inspections would be appropriate. Industry also sees
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potential for audit, certification and import control checks, though some CAs indicated that
audit and import controls should remain as flat fees.
Respondents were also asked to rank their preference for the method to use in setting time-
based fees. CAs and industry stakeholders ranked the options as follows:
▪ CAs prefer setting time-based fees according to MS costs under EU rules and industry
also sees this as a good option.
▪ Industry prefers setting time-based fees according to a standard, EU-wide hourly rate
that is indexed in each Member State by a cost-of-living index, but CAs see this as a less
appealing option: while no CA ranked this option last, only 1 ranked it first and 8 ranked it
third.
▪ Neither CAs nor industry prefer setting time-based fees based on a standard, EU-wide,
hourly rate—this option ranked lowest for both groups.
▪ While CAs support time-based fee setting according to a detailed cost calculation (8
ranked it first or second), 1 ranked this as the worst option; and while industry sees this
as the third best option (18 ranked it third or fourth), 8 ranked it first. The greatest
diversity of response arose for this option, with no clear preference expressed by either
CAs or industry.
Figure A1.9 Overall, CAs indicate positive impacts from introducing time-based fees, while industry believes it may improve comparability and simplify the system, but have little or no impact on efficiency, accountability and streamlining
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0Efficiency
Simplification
ComparabilityStreamlining
Accountability
Industry Competent Authorities
Base = 22 industry responses; 14 CA responses
Average score awarded by survey respondents based on a scale where -2 means ‘significant negative impact’ and +2 means ‘significant positive impact’. Responses that received a score of ‘don’t know’ are not included in the score.
Table A1.13 Official controls that CAs and industry expect to be covered by time-based fees
Competent Authority
▪ Meat inspection – slaughterhouse and cutting controls
▪ Control of organic farming
▪ BIP checks
Industry
▪ Meat and poultry= inspection – slaughterhouse and cutting controls
▪ Ante mortem and post mortem inspections
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▪ Serious random events (e.g. dioxins or widespread identification of undesirable substances
▪ Controls on a continuous or systematic basis as laid down in Annex 1 of Regulation
854/2004
▪ Import controls
▪ Audits
▪ Certification
Table A1.14 Official controls that CAs and industry expect to remain as flat fees (i.e. should not become time-based)
Competent Authority
▪ On the spot official checks
▪ Audits
▪ Feed controls
▪ Import controls
▪ Residue controls
▪ Laboratory analysis
Industry
▪ Ad-hoc controls
Table A1.15 Sub-option A4: Comments provided by survey respondents about time-based fees
Competent Authority Industry
Positive
▪ [The] matching principle [should be]
possible to realize.
▪ Additional fees [should] be paid for
veterinary control of consignment [in]
case checks take longer than usual or
additional checks are required.
▪ [It would enable] more efficient use of
time and better cost recovery.
▪ Controls [would]...be risk based and
with that bonus-malus would be
automatically applied [sic]. Less time
[would be]...spent at well organized
establishments and they [would] need
less frequent controls.
▪ This will help to harmonize, simplify and
clarify outcomes.
▪ [It would enable] more realistic fees
[that reflect the] actual expense of [sic]
for official controls
▪ [It would increase]...financing for EU
Member States control [activities].
▪ Cost effective for efficient higher
throughput plants. Meat industry
representative.
▪ Theoretically acts as an incentive for
slaughterhouse to operate more
efficiently. Meat industry
representative.
▪ Greater transparency. Meat industry
representative.
▪ In slaughter houses, compared to a flat
rate, [time-based fees would be] better
to show actual costs. Food and
agriculture representative.
▪ The fee is based on real value of the
control. Food and agriculture
representative.
▪ More attention and punctuality of the
controls (accountability is expected to
increase). Food and agriculture
representative.
Negative
▪ Different fee rate would not be accepted
well from the FBOs; time is not a real
indicator for the quality of the performed
official control.
▪ Might include a temptation [for
inspectors] to work extra slow. Food
and agriculture representative.
▪ [It could lead to] unnecessary
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Competent Authority Industry
▪ Changing the system may meet some
difficulties and it may not give real
benefits.
▪ Too complicated to calculate.
▪ It could be abused by veterinary
inspector of BIP, who could prolong
[the] time of inspection...in order to get
higher fee for veterinary control.
▪ Operators [might] concentrate on speed
of production rather than hygiene of
production.
▪ It would be better to keep product-
based fees instead of introducing time-
based fees.
▪ Special consideration must be given to
small and medium enterprises, and the
burden that such changes may impose
on them.
inspections to finance organisational
costs [of CAs]. Food sector
representative.
▪ Operators [may] concentrate on speed
of production rather than [the] hygiene
of production. Meat industry
representative.
▪ Increases CA inefficiency; would not be
affordable in slaughterhouse and game
plant SMEs, removes incentives for CAs
to negotiate risk based controls that do
not require continuous presence. Meat
industry representative.
▪ It could result in] extra costs for
ineffective [sic] FBOs, increasing costs
for micro-FBOs (e.g. butchers). Meat
industry representative.
▪ It was suggested prior to introduction in
the UK that it would result in a
concentration in slaughtering hours.
This has not been the case as operators
already had to operate efficiently to
survive. Meat industry
representative.
▪ Smaller businesses may have flexible
operating hours, [which are]...very
difficult to work with in a flexible manner
for charges based on continuous
presence for official controls. Food and
agriculture representative.
▪ [It could increase an] FBOs focus on
cost rather than compliance,
[increasing] pressure on inspectors to
leave premises due to time based
charging. Veterinary sector
representative.
▪ May be difficult to calculate. Public
health representative.
Respondents were also asked to rank their preference for the method to use in setting time-
based fees. CAs and industry stakeholders ranked the options as follows:
▪ Fees based on a standard, EU-wide hourly rate: Both CAs and industry ranked this
option as the worst option (9 CAs and 22 industry stakeholders gave this option a score
of 3 or 4).
▪ Fees based on a standard, EU-wide hourly rate, indexed in each Member State by a
cost-of-living index: CAs view this as the second worst option (8 CAs gave this a score of
3 or 4), while industry ranked this option as the best (20 industry respondents gave this a
score of 1 or 2).
▪ Fees based on MS costs as prescribed under common EU rules: CAs view this as the
best option (10 gave this a score of 1 or 2) and industry views this as the second best
option (18 gave this a score of 1 or 2).
▪ Fees based on a detailed calculation of costs (i.e. local costs determined under common
rules): CAs view this as the second best option (9 gave this a score of 1 or 2), while
industry views this as the second worst option (18 gave this a score of 3 or 4).
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Case study assessment
Time-based fees are already used in a number of Member States. In the case study
countries, they operate in a number of areas in all case study countries except for France.
The areas currently covered by time based fees include:
▪ Meat inspections (Netherlands and UK);
▪ Most areas, with a few exceptions (Belgium); and
▪ Fees are used, but coverage of official control areas is unknown (Poland and Finland).
The scores awarded by respondents in the case study countries as regards the impacts of
this policy option are summarised in Figure A1.10.
Figure A1.10 Time-based fees are likely to have a strong positive effect on efficiency, but a negative impact on comparability.
-2
-1
0
1
2BG
FL
FR
NL
PL
UK
Eff iciency Net score Comparability
Base = 22 industry responses; 11 CA responses
Average score awarded by survey respondents based on a scale where -2 means ‘significant negative impact’ and +2 means ‘significant positive impact’.
▪ In Belgium, time-based fees are already used. Respondents foresee that their wider
introduction alongside an increased use of flat fees could improve CA cost recovery and
reduce administrative burdens, while encouraging more efficient inspections and improve
accountability through a common approach to define costs.
▪ In Finland and Poland, time-based fees are already used, and as in Belgium, their wider
use could improve cost recovery for CAs. But this sub-option could have a negative
effect on the simplicity of the system may increase administrative burdens and reduce
comparability.
▪ In France, time-based fees are not in use. Their introduction is expected to result in
greater cost recovery for CAs, though it may increase administrative burdens38
.
▪ In the UK, views diverged considerably between CAs and industry where time-based
fees are already used in slaughterhouses. The CA believes this has improved efficiency
and effectiveness of controls because it has forced some inefficient plants to change
38 CA representatives stated that introducing a time-based fee mechanism to calculate fees would be likely to
improve cost recovery rates. The CA representatives also stated that introducing time-based fees would require a detailed definition of the control procedures and the precise costs associated with each element. In their opinion, obtaining and recording such information would increase the administrative burden associated with official controls; currently the fee collection mechanism does not reflect the resources required by official control activities.
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their procedures. Industry disagrees, however, and has stated that they believe time-
based fees remove the incentive to move to truly risk-based controls. The CA also
believes time-based fees would simplify the process, and improve comparability and
accountability, but again industry disagrees on each point, stating that SMEs in particular
would be unable to afford the fees, would be driven out of business and with fewer small
slaughterhouses animal welfare is likely to suffer as transport distances would increase.
Other evidence
Time-based fees are widely used amongst Member States for meat controls as shown in
Table A1.16 through Table A1.19 for selected Member States. Figure A1.11 shows the
market turnover for four sectors most affected by mandatory fees for official controls. Meat
processing and production represents a significant portion of these four sectors (nearly 50
per cent in 2008); introducing a requirement for time-based fees for the meat processing and
production sector would thus affect a significant share of the food processing sector.
Figure A1.11 Several inspections on the meat sector – which is an economically important part of the food chain – are amenable to use of time-based fees
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
160,000
180,000
200,000
Processing and preserving of meat and production of
meat products
Processing and preserving of f ish, crustaceans and
molluscs
Manufacture of dairy products
Manufacture of prepared animal
feeds
Source: Eurostat
Data collected through this study on time-based fees illustrates the variance in approach and
rates across four Member States. In the Netherlands, Austria and the UK, a single fee is
applied for each inspection regardless of the size of the FBO (i.e. number or rate of slaughter
lines). In Belgium, fees vary based on the rate and number of slaughter lines. In Belgium and
the Netherlands, fees vary according to the category of animal (young cattle, adult cattle,
and pigs), but in Austria and the Netherlands, the fees are uniform across these categories.
Some Member States also charge a base administrative fee (Austria and the Netherlands),
while others do not. Figure A1.12 illustrates the variance in fee rates amongst the fees
charged in Member States illustrated here.
Table A1.16 Time-based fees for meat inspection - Netherlands
Inspection Ante Mortem
Cost per hour (€)
Post Mortem
Cost per hour (€)
Inspections of adult / young
cattle - veterinarian
106 77
Inspections of pigs - veterinarian 106 77
Inspections of pigs – official
assistant
77 77
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Rate for starting activities 8 8
Average* 73 54
Clitravi data collected by Member State on inspection fees in the meat industry (2009)
*Excludes hourly rate for official assistants for pig inspections.
Table A1.17 Time-based fees for meat inspection - Belgium
Inspection Slow slaughter lines
Cost per hour (€)
Fast slaughter lines
Cost per hour (€)
Slaughterhouse – one line
Adult cattle 62 256
Young cattle 15 164
Pigs 62 406
Average 46 275
Slaughterhouse - several lines
Adult cattle 62 256
Young cattle 31 128
Pigs 12 52
Average 35 145
Clitravi data collected by Member State on inspection fees in the meat industry (2009)
Table A1.18 Time-based fees for meat inspection - Austria
Inspection Veterinarian
Cost per hour (€)
Official inspector
Cost per hour (€)
Inspection fee (pigs / cattle) 66 42
Admin fee 8 8
Total 74 50
Clitravi data collected by Member State on inspection fees in the meat industry (2009)
Table A1.19 Time-based fees for meat inspection - United Kingdom
Inspection Hourly cost
Cost per hour (€)*
Slaughterhouse 28
Cutting Plant 28
Game 28
Average 28
Clitravi data collected by Member State on inspection fees in the meat industry (2009)
* Exchange rate £1 = €1.13158, 18/06/2011
Figure A1.12 Scatter plot showing variance of time based fees in selected Member States, average euro (€) per hour
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0
50
100
150
200
250
300
€ / hr NL (ante and post mortum) € / hr AT (veterinarian / official inspector)
€ / hr BE (slow/fast & single/multiple slaughter) €/hr UK (slaughterhouse/cutting plant/game)
The majority of fees range between €25 - €75 / hour, covering a range of inspection types
Fees for fast slaughter lines in Belgium are considerably higher
Clitravi data collected by Member State on inspection fees in the meat industry (2009)
* Exchange rate £1 = €1.13158, 18/06/2011
A1.1.5 A4 - Summary
General conclusions
Time-based fees are already in use in a number of MS as illustrated by the case study
results. Respondents indicated that red meat and poultry inspections are best suited to time-
based fees, in slaughterhouses and cutting plants and for ante- and post-mortem
inspections. Other areas that may be well-suited to time based fees include certifications,
audits, and BIPs.
The codification of time-based fees in EU legislation is expected, overall, to result in a slight
positive impact of the overall functioning of official controls systems in EU Member States.
This approach to fee-setting can increase efficiency. But time-based fee systems are also
more likely to be difficult to compare across Member States. Their introduction can also
increase the administrative burden on CAs.
When asked to rank the method of fee-setting, both CAs and industry favour fees according
to MS costs under EU rules.
The magnitude of impacts
The scale of the impact of this sub-option on individual Member States and on individual
FBOs would be determined by the definition of the eligible cost base for time-based fees and
the detailed fee structure. This includes the controls subject to time-based fees and the basis
on which the fees are set.
Incidence of impact and distributional issues
Impacts would fall primarily within the EU. This sub-option would, in principle, impact on all
FBOs subject to a switch to time-based fee inspections. This could potentially include any
sector that currently pays fees for official controls, but meat inspections are the most likely
sector to be affected, as time-based fees are considered to be best suited for this area of
control activity.
The net impact on business will depend on the affected sectors, as already mentioned, as
well as any efficiency gained (or lost) through time-based fees. All else being equal, facilities
that have a higher throughput per inspection-hour are likely to benefit from lower fees on a
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time-based system. Facilities with a low throughput per inspector-hour may face higher
charges. This could result in (for instance) fee burdens shifting from large scale, ‘efficient’
slaughterhouses to smaller scale operations.
Two other factors potentially affecting the impact are:
▪ Whether there are mechanisms in place to ensure that inspections are efficient (e.g. to
ensure inspectors do not spend longer than necessary on the inspections to increase
income);
▪ Whether fixed minimum fees of the kind used under current legislation still apply
(considered below).
Compliance costs and administrative burdens
Respondents raised some concerns over the effectiveness of time-based fees where
inspectors do not have an incentive to perform the control as efficiently as possible. But
where time-based fees are used in conjunction with risk-based principles, these may
represent an ‘automatic’ bonus-malus system for such controls.
A1.1.5.1 Additional considerations:
A shift to time-based fees raises questions about how to treat the minimum fees that are
currently defined in the legislation, but are defined as flat rates based on throughput.
Operating time and flat rate fee schedules simultaneously raises questions of consistency
and efficiency – accounting on both bases could increase the administrative burden on
Competent Authorities and potentially increase costs for businesses as well.
There is an opportunity, in this context, to consider whether minimum fees are still required
and, if so, the basis on which they should be set. For example, minimum fees could be set
on a percentage basis rather than according to throughput (i.e. as a fixed percentage of
eligible costs). This could reduce administrative burdens and would avoid the problems
generated by currency exchange fluctuations which require authorities to constantly revise
fees in countries outside the Eurozone, and where actual costs are below the minimum fees
set in the European legislation. This option also provides for the opportunity to set a rising
schedule of cost recovery over time to drive the system as a whole towards full cost
recovery. Implementation would require that the CA calculate and evidence its actual costs.
Recalibrating minimum fees on a percentage basis could also address the misconception
reported by some consultees of minimum fees being the ‘fair price’ or the EU’s ‘expected
price’ for a given control.
Costs and benefits
CAs and industry stakeholders had divergent views on the merits and likely impacts of
introducing time-based fees.
The introduction of time-based fees is likely to benefit CAs by (in combination with other sub-
options) helping to ensure that the full costs of inspections are recovered through fees levied
on FBOs. There would likely be an initial increase in costs for CAs, due to administrative
burdens associated with developing the mechanism for calculating appropriate fees (e.g.
consulting with industry), but these costs would reduce over time.
A shift to time-based fees is likely to change the distribution of the cost burden with a given
sector. It could shift costs onto smaller and/or less efficient operators. For example, the
time taken to travel to a small FBO is the same as for a large FBO, and large operations may
be able to sustain higher throughput per hour of inspector’s time.
Inspection protocols agreed with industry would help to address FBOs concerns that a shift
to time-based fees could invite over-billing by inspectors working inefficiently.
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5.1.1 Sub-option A5 – Require ring-fencing of resources
A1.1.5.2 A5 - Specification
Sub-option A5 considers whether Regulation 882/2004 should introduce a requirement that
fee revenue be used exclusively to cover the costs of the official controls for which they are
being charged (i.e. directly with a budget line or indirectly through the general budget).
Respondents were asked to consider the positive and negative impacts of a ring-fencing
requirement.
The ultimate concern of the reform package is to ensure that official controls are properly
resourced. The sub-options that address resource mobilisation only contribute to that
outcome if there is a corresponding increase in the funds allocated to the financing of official
controls. Ring-fencing would commonly see revenues paid direct to the CA. If there are
compensating reductions in general budgetary support then overall CA income may be little
changed, or even diminished, and could potentially be more volatile.
A1.1.5.3 A5 – Evidence and analysis
Respondent scores and comments
The scores awarded by survey respondents as regards the impacts of this policy option are
summarised in Figure A1.13. Selected comments from CAs and industry are provided in
Table A1.20.
▪ Overall, CAs and industry respondents indicated that this sub-option would be expected
to have a positive impact on official controls systems.
▪ In particular, positive impacts are expected for CA resource mobilisation and
accountability.
▪ Industry felt that the sub-option could reduce administrative costs and burdens, while
CAs felt that these were likely to increase under a ring-fencing requirement.
Figure A1.13 Overall, CAs and industry indicated a positive impact from a ring-fencing requirement
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0Efficiency
Simplification
ComparabilityStreamlining
Accountability
Industry Competent Authorities
Base = 22 industry responses; 14 CA responses
Average score awarded by survey respondents based on a scale where -2 means ‘significant negative impact’ and +2 means ‘significant positive impact’. Responses that received a score of ‘don’t know’ are not included in the score.
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Table A1.20 Sub-option A5: Comments provided by survey respondents about ring-fencing resources
Competent Authority Industry
Positive
▪ [It would] improve [sic] efficiency.
▪ Better enforcement of application /
collection of fees by section of CA [that]
would get [the fee revenue] back to
spend.
▪ [It would provide] clarity to FBOs [about]
how fees are being used to provide...the
delivery of OCs.
▪ [It would provide] assurances to CAs
[that] the necessary financial resources
to deliver OCs [would be available].
▪ [It would] guarantee full-cost recovery.
▪ This is needed in order to fulfil the
requirement for cost recovery, and to
have a link between cost / controls and
costs / compliance. Otherwise there is
no efficiency and transparency.
▪ [It would] guarantee...resources for
official controls.
▪ The obligation to invest the money
collected through import control fees in
improving the inspection services
should be established at EU level.
▪ FBOs [would] only bear the cost of
official controls to which they are
subject. Meat industry
representative.
▪ [It would encourage] fair competition.
Meat industry representative.
▪ [It would facilitate a] level playing field.
Meat industry representative.
▪ [It would] provide some transparency so
excess funds are not funnelled off by
CAs. Meat industry representative.
▪ Would assist with ensuring adequate
resources are available to carry out
official controls. Particularly important
when resource allocation is determined
at local level for activities that are
carried out as a national benefit rather
than for a local need. Public health
representative.
▪ Clear budget and clear allocation for
stakeholders, and also final consumers.
Dairy sector representative.
▪ Inspections [may] increase in quality
and uniformity. Veterinary sector
representative.
▪ [It would] provide sufficient resources
for the effective and efficient operation
of official inspections. Veterinary
sector representative.
Negative
▪ [It would be] time consuming [and an]
administrative burden.
▪ [It is] very difficult to assess...the actual
cost associated with OC delivery by [sic]
CAs.
▪ [It could require] potentially difficult
accounting procedures.
▪ [It] may be difficult to implement where
budgets are not ring-fenced.
▪ The requirement for fee revenue to be
used exclusively to cover the costs of
official controls provides no incentive for
the competent authority to improve the
efficiency or reduce the cost of delivery
of official controls. Meat industry
representative.
▪ [It could result in a] lack of
transparency, [and] distortion of
competition among different sectors.
Meat industry representative.
▪ [It would] reduce flexibility for CAs to
use its resources to the maximum
benefit of the consumer. Meat industry
representative.
▪ Very difficult to assess what is the
actual cost associated with OC delivery
from CAs. Meat industry
representative.
▪ Politically difficult particularly when local
competent authorities are ideologically
against ring fenced budgets. Public
health representative.
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Case study assessment
The case studies indicate that ring-fencing would likely have positive impacts on CA
resources, and increase transparency and accountability. In Member States that already
have some degree of ring-fencing in place, there is likely to be little impact, but this impact is
expected to be positive. In some Member States, however, such as Poland, a ring-fencing
requirement would require legislative changes that could be very difficult to implement. A
system that has a clear definition of eligible costs, transparency reporting and full cost
recovery requirements, however could effectively operate as a ring-fencing mechanism
without an explicit requirement to do so.
The scores awarded by respondents in the case study countries as regards the impacts of
this policy option are summarised in Table A1.21.
Figure A1.14 A ring-fencing requirement was seen to have little net impact in most of the case study countries, with the exception of France, where a positive impact is expected. In particular, ring-fencing would improve accountability but also result in additional administrative costs to CAs.
-2
-1
0
1
2BG
FL
FR
NL
PL
UK
Streamlining Net score Accountability
Base = 22 industry responses; 11 CA responses
Average score awarded by survey respondents based on a scale where -2 means ‘significant negative impact’ and +2 means ‘significant positive impact’.
The case study results reported appear to indicate less positive overall impacts from a ring-
fencing requirement than the EU-wide assessment above. Taking into consideration
comments received from respondents in the case study countries through the surveys and
interviews helps to explain the reasons for this:
▪ In Belgium, no net impact of ring-fencing is expected, aside from some administrative
inputs by CAs. Respondents consider this to be a good option, however, as it would
increase accountability by clarifying the relationship between costs and fee revenue.
▪ In Finland, fees collected at municipal level are retained at this level, so that ring-fencing
is already in effect operational in Finland to a certain extent. But municipal units are also
responsible for other activities and it would be difficult to accurately allocate the
resources spent by a CA on official controls activities alone.
▪ In France, ring-fencing principles do not exist, and fees are incorporated into the general
budget. But respondents consider that ring-fencing would result in greater efficiency,
simplify the system and improve comparability and accountability.
▪ In the Netherlands, 70 per cent of official control activity is publicly financed. A ring-
fencing would result in greater administrative costs to CAs. Respondents indicated that
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ring-fencing could effectively be achieved, however, through a clearly administered
system with identifiable costs and income.
▪ In Poland, ring-fencing occurs where the GVI retain fee revenues to fund their work, but
CAs direct fee revenue to the state budget. A ring-fencing requirement may improve
efficiency, comparability and accountability, but would require changes to current legal
arrangements and could increase the administrative burden on CAs.
▪ In the UK, respondents consider a ring-fencing requirement to be desirable, but unlikely
to be implemented given the current system structure. The requirement could, however,
improve efficiency and accountability.
Other evidence
Ring-fencing already occurs for official control activities in many Member States to great and
lesser degrees:
▪ Eight Member States ring-fence 100 per cent of fee resources: Germany, Denmark,
Hungary, Latvia, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania and Sweden;
▪ Eight Member States have some ring-fencing requirements or arrangements that are
functionally ring-fencing: Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Italy, Poland and
the UK.
▪ In the remaining 11 MS, resources from fees charged for control activities go to the
general budget.
In Member States that already ring-fence resources there will likely be little, if any, impact
from this sub-option. In those Member States where ring-fencing is already employed but not
in every area, there will be administrative costs to implementation, but these may not be
significant. Ring-fencing will likely improve cost recovery in these MS and improve
accountability and transparency. In Member States where a significant portion or all of the
resources go the general budget, there may be significant administrative costs and
bureaucratic complexity to implementing a ring-fencing requirement.
Table A1.21 Ring-fencing of resources for official control activity in EU Member States
MS All resources
ring-fenced
Percentage 0f resources
ring-fenced
(if less than 100%
Resources ring-
fenced, with
some
exceptions
Resources to
general budget
No
information
AT Border inspection
fees
BE
95% local CA and
laboratories
5% regional and central
CAs
20% import fees
For AFSCA
activities
BG
CY
CZ
DE
DK
EE Feed control
ES
FI
Controls by
municipal
authorities
Other controls
FR Imports Domestic
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MS All resources
ring-fenced
Percentage 0f resources
ring-fenced
(if less than 100%
Resources ring-
fenced, with
some
exceptions
Resources to
general budget
No
information
production
GR
HU
IE
IT
95% domestic fee income
for local CA and
laboratories
5% regional and central
CAs
20% import fees
LT
LU
LV
MT
NL
PT
PL
Veterinary controls
when contractors
used
RO
SE
SI
SK
UK
100% FSA controls for
slaughterhouses and cutting
plant controls.
Other controls are
performed by local
authorities and revenue
remains at this level.
DG SANCO baseline
Notes on baseline data for ring-fencing in EU MS:
United Kingdom:
▪ Controls carried out by Food standards agency operations in slaughterhouses and meat
cutting plants are ring fenced (collected and used within the agency).
▪ The rest of the sectors when monies are collected this is done through Local Authorities
and kept within the authority.
Germany:
▪ In general fees are collected to be directly used to finance the official controls (they are
in fact mainly based on full cost recovery). In those Landers where fees go to the
general budget in any case they are earmarked for the CA.
Sweden:
▪ Local and central authorities use fees directly to finance their official controls. Fees may
not be used to finance other activities.
A1.1.5.4 A5 - Summary
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General conclusions
This option could have significant positive impacts on efficiency and result in improved
accountability and comparability of official controls systems. There would be negative
impacts on CAs where additional administrative costs are required to implement the
requirement. Where inspectors also have responsibilities for other activities, it could be very
difficult for Member States to determine the precise allocation of resources spent on official
control activities separate from these other activities.
The magnitude of impacts
The scale of the impact of this option on individual Member States and on individual FBOs
would be determined by the degree to which ring-fencing practices are already employed
and in which sectors. In the 16 Member States where ring-fencing already occurs, the impact
will be modest, if any. In the 11 Member States where resources go to the general budget,
the adoption of the sub-option would involve investment in new systems and greater
administrative costs, but also significantly improving accountability and transparency.
Incidence of impact and distributional issues
Impacts would fall primarily within the EU. Ring-fencing costs incurred by CAs would include
the one-off cost associated with setting up an accounts receivable department where one
does not already exist, plus the incremental cost for processing receipt of each payment.
The costs associated with billing and handling receipts are already borne by an entity in each
Member State, regardless of the extent of ring-fencing. Introducing the ring-fencing option
would simply transfer the incremental cost from one public body to another (where ring-
fencing does not already occur). The net cost to each MS is thus expected to be zero.
Nonetheless, individual CAs in each MS will be impacted where ring-fencing does not
already occur. This option would then, in principle, impact on the income of all entities that
collect such fees in Member States where all resources go to the general budget. In Member
States where ring-fencing occurs in some but not all sectors, those sectors in which ring-
fencing does not occur will be impacted. There is no particular SME bias to the impacts
expected from this sub-option.
Compliance costs and administrative burdens
Legislative costs would be incurred in some cases. Administrative burdens would fall on CAs
in Member States that do not already ring-fence resources, and particularly in those where
all fee income goes to the general budget. Administrative burdens are likely to be low in
Member States where ring-fencing already occurs.
Costs and benefits
Ring-fencing creates a direct link between industry payments and CA income. This sub-
option will increase costs and administrative burdens for the majority of CAs that do not
currently ring-fence resources. There will be initial costs associated with setting up the
administrative processes and procedures necessary to ensure that fee resources are ring-
fenced. Following these initial costs, CAs should have minimal (if any) ongoing
administrative costs. Administrative incurred costs may be recoverable through fees. The
change may require legislation in some cases, with the associated costs and uncertainty.
Ring-fencing fees will have limited impact on FBOs, although industry stakeholders
considered that over time it could reduce the cost of official controls to FBOs. Industry
stakeholders favoured ring-fencing of fees as they were of the opinion that it would improve
the efficiency and accountability of controls (thereby reducing costs over time). There is
uncertainty about such a benefit. Finance authorities’ response to CAs being given ring-
fenced income would affect where the CAs emerge with larger (or smaller) net income.
A1.1.6 Sub-option A6 – Incorporate bonus-malus principles
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A1.1.6.1 A6 - Specification
Sub-option A6 considers whether Regulation 882/2004 should be changed to incorporate
bonus-malus principles in the fee system for official controls such that best performers are
rewarded while the worst performers are penalised. Respondents were asked to consider:
▪ How Regulation 882/2004 can promote bonus-malus principles;
▪ Which controls are most suitable for fees that incorporate bonus-malus principles; and
▪ How the overall performance of Option C can be improved by incorporating bonus-malus
principles.
A1.1.6.2 A6 – Evidence and analysis
Respondent scores and comments
The scores awarded by survey respondents as regards the impacts of this policy option are
summarised in Figure A1.15. Selected comments from CAs and industry are provided in
Table A1.22.
▪ CA and industry respondents indicated that incorporating time-based fees and risk-
based principles could provide an ‘automatic’ bonus-malus system for official controls.
▪ Industry favours self-control to reduce the inspection frequency and therefore, the costs
both for industry and CAs. These systems must be based on oversight by CAs and/or
certification by independent bodies in order to be effective.
▪ In particular, bonus-malus principles would improve efficiency and accountability.
Figure A1.15 Incorporating bonus-malus principles into the fee system is likely to have a positive impact on CA cost recovery and to improve accountability
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0Efficiency
Simplification
ComparabilityStreamlining
Accountability
Industry Competent Authorities
Base = 22 industry responses; 14 CA responses
Average score awarded by survey respondents based on a scale where -2 means ‘significant negative impact’ and +2 means ‘significant positive impact’. Responses that received a score of ‘don’t know’ are not included in the score.
Table A1.22 Sub-option A6: Comments provided by survey respondents about bonus-malus systems
Competent Authority Industry
Positive
▪ Bonus-malus systems are difficult to ▪ ...the [CA] presence should be
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Competent Authority Industry
apply [sic] in real circumstances, but
would [sic] encourage the better
performers.
▪ Bonus-malus is automatically enacted
[sic] when official controls are time and
risk based.
maximised for FBOs that are highly
compliant (i.e. a risk-based approach).
This would reduce the costs of
inspections to such FBOs. Meat
industry representative.
▪ If the charged fee includes a time-based
element this immediately rewards
efficiency contributions for the FBO.
Meat industry representative.
▪ The regulation should provide more
explicit provisions about bonus-malus
systems, for example, by referring to the
results of inspections carried out over a
period of time, or the implementation of
systems of self-control, etc. Meat
industry representative.
▪ If controls were truly risk based there
would be no need for a separate bonus-
malus system as higher risk
establishments would receive more
controls. Meat industry
representative.
▪ [A] very stimulating tool also used in
other sectors. Should be linked to the
use of self-control system certified by
independent bodies. Meat industry
representative.
▪ It should a good incentive for the FBO
to encourage him to perform better on
the animal welfare field (and food
safety). Meat industry representative.
▪ Bonus-malus system is a very good
principle to promote incentives for the
effectiveness and efficiency of the
official controls. Food and agricultural
sector representative.
▪ ...plants that work hard to comply and
can show themselves to be low risk
should be rewarded with reduced
inspection levels. It is important...that
standards are consistent across the EU.
Food and agricultural sector
representative.
▪ Provides incentives for high compliance.
Public health representative.
Negative
▪ Adequate [sic] sanctions for non-
compliances are more effective than
establishing a bonus-malus system.
[Such a system] would be
unmanageable and might pose legal
problems for its application in certain
MS.
▪ Bonus-malus systems are clear
perhaps, [but] not necessarily simpler.
Meat industry representative.
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Case study assessment
The findings from the case studies are largely consistent with the wider findings from the
impact assessment. There is general support for the incorporation of bonus-malus principles
into official controls systems, with correspondingly positive impacts on efficiency for CAs.
Bonus-malus principles are already incorporated into fee systems in several Member States
and considered to be a positive feature. In Poland, there is little experience with bonus-
malus systems, however, and respondents indicated difficulty envisaging how bonus-malus
principles would operate in practice. Potential increases in administrative burdens were
identified as a particular concern in all Member States.
The scores awarded by respondents in the case study countries as regards the impacts of
this policy option are summarised in Figure A1.16.
Figure A1.16 Respondents in most of the case study countries indicated that bonus-malus principles would have a net positive impact on official controls systems, with the exception of Poland where a negative impact is anticipated
-2
-1
0
1
2BG
FL
FR
NL
PL
UK
Eff iciency Net score Streamlining
Base = 22 industry responses; 11 CA responses
Average score awarded by survey respondents based on a scale where -2 means ‘significant negative impact’ and +2 means ‘significant positive impact’.
Other evidence
Some Member States have elements of a bonus-malus system already in place, some of
which are describes in the DG SANCO baseline information (Table A1.23).
There are some shared principles that underlie the systems already in place across Member
States that could be considered in bonus-malus arrangements implemented through
changes to Regulation 882/2004:
▪ Self-control systems operated by FBOs can be used to reduce the costs for fee
collection to CAs and reduce costs for FBOs where the costs for self-control systems are
less than the cost of official inspection (e.g. Belgium, Italy).
▪ Fee rates can be linked to whether the FBO has a HACCP system that is accredited by a
certified body, with lower fees paid to FBOs that do; higher fees by those that do not
(e.g. Belgium).
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▪ FBOs with a track record of good performers pay lower fees or are inspected less
frequently and poor performers pay higher fees or are inspected more frequently (e.g.
France, Germany, and Italy).
▪ Time-based fees are utilised to lower the costs for good performers. Inspections take
less time when FBOs conform to the rules and risk-based principles can be used to vary
the intensity and/or frequency of checks (e.g. Netherlands).
▪ CAs and industry negotiate the steps that may be taken by an FBO on an individual
business basis to determine what changes would result in lower fees/fewer inspections
(e.g. UK).
There are some aspects of the Regulation that currently constrain successful implementation
of bonus-malus principles. The most important issue is minimum fees. As reported in the
FCEC 2009 evaluation, some CAs view the minimum fees as the indicative rate and do not
charge more for control activities, nor less. But the primary assumption underlying a bonus-
malus system for fee collection is that good performers pay lower fees (or less often) than
poor performers. Minimum fees serve to constrain opportunities for bonus-malus principles
to apply to the fees charged where the system incorporates two (or more) pricing schedules
(for good and bad performers) or where fee rates overall are higher for control activity, but
because good performers pay less frequently, they ultimately pay fewer fees than poor
performers.
Table A1.23 Member State bonus-malus arrangements for official controls fees
Member
State
Description
BE Annual contributions are reduced by 50% if the Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point
system of the FBO is certified by accredited bodies (recognised by AFSCA). If such
an accredited system is not in place then FBOs must pay an additional 20% (2009),
60% (2010) and 100% (2011). Poultry slaughterhouses where FBOs are involved in
controls have reduced fees. Animals in slaughterhouses that are not clearly identified
are subject to a higher fee.
FR Slaughterhouses are classified in 4 categories depending on their level of compliance.
FBOs in the two categories with good compliance receive a reward, while FBOs in the
two categories with poor compliance receive a punishment. The reward / punishment
system is specified in the case study analysis A2.3.
DE Some Landers have trialled a system of categorising meat establishments according to
risk. The frequency of inspections is changed to reflect the risk posed by the FBO.
IT The application of mandatory fees may take into consideration the FBOs previous
record of conformity, risk category and the efficiency of their own checks.
MT No mechanism exists to reward FBOs. However there is a procedure to levy fines for
breaches of some elements of the Regulation.
NL There is a fee per inspection visit and a time-based fee charged per quarter of an hour.
FBOs that have better organised operations and require less CA time have lower cost.
Where possible official controls are risk-based. There are surcharges for requests for
controls outside regular working hours, and CA overtime that is incurred over the time
originally requested by the FBO.
SP The application of mandatory fees may take account of an FBOs previous record of
conformity, its risk category, the efficiency of its own checks, and other items such as
the level of administrative support required, or if inspections occur at unsocial hours.
SE FBOs deemed to have a higher risk incur longer and / or more frequent inspections,
and thus have higher inspection costs. The level of risk posed by an FBO is
determined by the FBO’s past record; compliance or non-compliance can lead to a
reduction or an increase in the annual control time and annual fees.
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UK FBOs and CAs agree to the amount of time a CA will spend during inspections. FBOs
can propose changes to the production process to decrease the need for CA
presence.
Source: DG SANCO baseline
A1.1.6.3 A6 - Summary
General conclusions
Bonus-malus principles are likely to have a positive impact on the efficiency of official
controls systems, particularly where resources can more effectively be used to target
establishments that pose greater risks and where overall inspection numbers are reduced.
Critically, bonus-malus principles must be consistent with the principle that the fees charged
are set according to their actual cost, and any extra costs for controls for non-compliance are
borne by the businesses concerned. This constrains the redistribution of costs from good
performers to poor performers. A risk-based inspection regime where the frequency and
intensity of inspection is set according to risk of non-compliance and/or past history of
compliance can fulfil this purpose (though this option is outside the scope of the current
study). Accordingly, businesses demonstrating a high level of safety are inspected less often
and therefore pay lower fees, and those with a poor record of safety are inspected more
often or more intensely and therefore pay higher fees.
The magnitude of impacts
The scale of the impact of this option on individual Member States and on individual FBOs
would be determined by the bonus-malus principles applied. This is not known. For those
MS where bonus-malus principles are already in place (9 MS), however, the impacts are
expected to be less than for those MS that have little or no experience in this area.
Incidence of impact and distributional issues
Impacts would fall primarily within the EU. This option would, in principles, impact on all
FBOs subject to fees for official controls, and the income of all entities that collect these fees.
The distribution of impacts is affected by the principles adopted under a bonus-malus system
and the sectors that would be affected (e.g. based on a risk assessment).
The net impact on business would be influenced by the principle adopted as well. Self-
control systems, consultation with industry on steps to improve performance and reduce fee
costs, and other mechanisms could all benefit compliant FBOs and result in higher costs to
non-compliant FBOs. In order to ensure that fees do not exceed costs, bonus-malus
principles would need to ensure that the redistribution of costs equals the cost to perform the
control. Therefore, the frequency of inspection or the intensity of inspection will meet this
objective, while simply charging more to non-compliant businesses and less to compliant
ones, while still performing the same number and level of controls for each would not
conform to this principle.
There is no particular SME bias, though good performing SMEs will pay less and poor
performers will pay more. Bonus-malus principles could have a positive impact on SMEs
where good performers are able to reduce their costs.
Compliance costs and administrative burdens
There is some uncertainty regarding the overall impact on administrative costs as there
would be some increase in costs to implement the system but potentially fewer costs over
time as inspections become more efficient and fewer in number. Further specification and
development of the sub-option (and its interpretation in the context of varied MS fee
systems) is required for the burdens to be quantifiable.
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Costs and benefits assessment
The administrative costs are unknown and the extent to which they result in higher or lower
costs to MS and FBOs depends entirely on the principles identified as undergirding a bonus-
malus system. Administrative costs are, however, expected to fall over time as the system is
fine-tuned and control activity becomes more efficient. The overall benefits include greater
efficiency in control activity, which allows MS to target the most risky businesses and
provides incentives for businesses to improve their operations to reduce their inspection
costs.
A1.1.7 Sub-option A7 – Introduce transparency and reporting
A1.1.7.1 A7 - Specification
Sub-option C5 considers whether Regulation 882/2004 should be changed to require
Member States to provide information:
▪ To the Commission regarding the financial resources devoted to official controls each
year (through the 882/2004 annual reports); and
▪ To the public regarding fees (e.g. the implementing rules, fee review process, and the
calculation method), modes of payment and other administrative procedures.
Respondents were asked to consider the positive and negative impacts of these
requirements.
A1.1.7.2 A7 – Evidence and analysis
Respondent scores and comments
The scores awarded by survey respondents as regards the impacts of this policy option are
summarised in Figure A1.17. Selected comments from CAs and industry are provided in
Table A1.24.
▪ Competent Authorities and industry indicate that this sub-option is likely to result in
strong positive impacts on accountability, comparability and efficiency.
▪ In particular, positive impacts include:
– Improved information sharing amongst CAs and between CAs and industry;
– Improved transparency of the fee system; and
– Increased opportunities to benchmark between CAs in different Member States,
though some respondents warned that comparisons are not straightforward and
should be carefully considered.
▪ Negative impacts may occur where these requirements introduce additional
administrative costs for CAs.
Figure A1.17 Overall, introducing requirements to provide information on official controls systems is likely to have a positive impact, particularly on accountability, though the administrative burden is likely to increase for CAs to implement these requirements
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-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0Efficiency
Simplification
ComparabilityStreamlining
Accountability
Industry Competent Authorities
Base = 22 industry responses; 14 CA responses
Average score awarded by survey respondents based on a scale where -2 means ‘significant negative impact’ and +2 means ‘significant positive impact’. Responses that received a score of ‘don’t know’ are not included in the score.
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Table A1.24 Sub-option A7: Comments provided by survey respondents about transparency and reporting
Competent Authority Industry
Positive
▪ Knowledge about practices [may]
increase.
▪ [It may improve] transparency of the fee
establishment process and of the
relevant financial system.
▪ [It may improve] clarity to stakeholders
on the way fees are calculated, [leading
to] greater accuracy and fairness.
▪ The requirement on publication of
information on fees for public [may]
ensure awareness and familiarity with
implementation of official control fee
system.
▪ [It would ensure] free access to
information for all stakeholders.
▪ [It could] create a kind of bench marking
between CAs in different MSs. Meat
industry representative.
▪ It would resolve the present problem in
the UK of [the] FSA seeking full cost
recovery without providing transparency
on what costs it wishes to recover.
Meat industry representative.
▪ Greater transparency; FBOs as well as
consumers would [sic] have clear
knowledge on the costs of food
inspection. Meat industry
representative.
▪ Transparency may facilitate the
comparison between Member States as
regards the efficiency of their controls
and could also facilitate the transfer of
best practices (e.g. for the bonus-malus
system). Meat industry
representative.
▪ [It] might help to hold MS to account.
Meat industry representative.
▪ More transparency; the public will have
a possibility to understand the public
good; the food businesses will have a
better understanding for the level of the
costs. Meat industry representative.
▪ Transparency may facilitate efficiency
between Member States. Animal feed
sector representative.
▪ Transparency and clarity about amounts
allocated to official controls. Public
health representative.
▪ FBOs as well as consumers will have
clear knowledge on the costs of food
inspection. Food and agriculture
sector representative.
▪ Transparency may facilitate the
comparison between Member States as
regards the efficiency of their controls
and could also facilitate the transfer of
best practices (e.g. for the bonus-malus
system). Food sector representative.
Negative
▪ [The] administrative burden [may]
increase.
▪ [The] information provided may be
difficult to interpret and misleading.
▪ In MS with devolved regions it may be
difficult to ascertain [the] charging
system at different levels of
government.
▪ [It could increase the] administrative
burden. Meat industry representative.
▪ Comparison between countries should
be handled with care to avoid too
simplistic conclusions. Meat industry
representative.
▪ Extra bureaucracy and fairly pointless
as some MS will simply provide
inaccurate information to suit their own
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Competent Authority Industry
▪ [The] costs of the system to get all this
knowledge by the same way from all
MS are huge.
▪ [It could result in] more legal cases if the
FBOs do not [sic] agree with the
calculation (on individual or sector level)
▪ [It would be] difficult to evaluate for the
Commission and [would] cause endless
discussions.
needs. Meat industry representative.
▪ If you accept that it is up to the MS to
decide what level of fees they wish to
collect, how in effect they wish to
finance their own official controls, and
accept that harmonization is impossible,
who cares what they charge and what is
the point of the exercise? The FVO can
simply audit if controls are adequately
enforced or not. Meat industry
representative.
▪ Comparison between countries should
be handled carefully to avoid too
simplistic a conclusion. Animal feed
sector representative.
▪ This is pointless unless the FVO
actually validates and verifies the
accuracy of the information being
submitted - strong enforcement is
needed to ensure compliance and
without this then it is of limited value to
ask for this information. Veterinary
sector representative.
Case study assessment
The findings from the case study indicate that a trade-off is likely between improvements in
accountability and increased costs and complexity for setting up and maintaining systems of
information provision to the Commission and the public. In Member States with centralised
official controls systems, the costs and complexities are reduced because the necessary
information is more readily available. In decentralised systems, the effort to collect
information, particularly to report to the Commission regarding resources allocated to official
controls, is likely to be time-consuming and therefore costly. With regard to providing
information to industry and the public more broadly, this is not likely to entail some, but not
significant costs in Member States where information is not already provided.
The scores awarded by respondents in the case study countries as regards the impacts of
this policy option are summarised in Figure A1.18.
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Figure A1.18 Respondents in the case studies believe that providing information is likely to have a positive impact on accountability, but introduce complexity in the system
-2
-1
0
1
2BG
FL
FR
NL
PL
UK
Accountability Net score Streamlining
Base = 22 industry responses; 11 CA responses
Average score awarded by survey respondents based on a scale where -2 means ‘significant negative impact’ and +2 means ‘significant positive impact’.
Other evidence
The SANCO baseline data provide information on the current provision of information by
Member States to the public. Some Member States already publish information regarding fee
rates and the legislation itself on a public website. Seven Member States share complete
information in this fashion (Table A1.26). Some Member States provide access to the
legislation through the Official Journal, but do not provide any information through other
sources. Eleven Member States share information through the Official Journal, four of which
provide information both online and in the OJ: Finland, Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden. No
baseline information on reporting is available for the remaining 12 Member States.
In Member States where all information on fee rates and the relevant legislation is provided
both through a public website and through the Official Journal, the component of sub-option
A7 that would require reporting to the public would likely have little or no impact. However,
the sub-option does not specify what particular reporting channels would satisfy a
requirement to provide information to the public. A change to the Regulation may therefore
add requirements for MS that only share information through the Official Journal or through a
website, but not both. The added costs for sharing information through both channels are
expected to be minimal. Member States that do not share information at all will have some
administrative costs associated with doing so, but these are not expected to be high.
The cost of sharing the information in Member States will depend on the average hourly
employment cost for CA employees. CA hourly rates were identified for seven Member
States; Belgium, Finland, France, UK, Spain, Lithuania and Bulgaria. For Member States
where this information was not available, the average public sector hourly rate provides an
indication of a CA’s average hourly rate. When information for public sector wage levels was
not available (in Eurostat), private sector wages are used to instead. Table A1.25
demonstrates that introducing mandatory reporting would be more expensive in Ireland and
Denmark compared to Italy and Greece, for example.
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Table A1.25 Average hourly wage rate for Member States, 2008
Member State CA hourly rate
(Average € / hour)
Private sector
(Average € / hour)
Public sector
(Average € / hour)
Austria No information available 20.03 No information available
Belgium €65 23.66 No information available
Bulgaria €2 2.09 2.71
Cyprus No information available 14.09 19.12
Czech Republic No information available 6.7 7.85
Estonia No information available 5.77 7.19
Finland €42 20.91 22.87
France €30 20.99 No information available
Germany No information available 22.56 21.24
Greece No information available 13.52 12.24
Hungary No information available 5.54 7.45
Italy No information available 18.36 No information available
Latvia No information available 4.65 6.58
Lithuania €3 4.23 6.03
Luxembourg No information available 26.89 No information available
Malta No information available 10.37 No information available
Poland No information available 6.34 7.82
Portugal No information available 9.89 No information available
Romania No information available 3.23 4.19
Slovakia No information available 5.48 5.53
Slovenia No information available 11.56 14.77
Spain €20 14.33 16.76
Sweden No information available 21.22 No information available
United Kingdom €49 18.12 19.86
Eurostat 2008
.
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Table A1.26 Transparency and reporting to the public on fees for official controls by EU Member State
BE
IE
UK
ES
FL
NL
SE
DE
EE
FR
IT
LT
PL
SK
MT
AT
BG
CY
CZ
DK
GR
HU
LU
LV
PT
RO
SI
All information available
online
Legislation published in
the official journal
Information recorded but
not available / published
No information available
/ identified
High transparency Medium transparency Low transparency No information available / identified
DG SANCO baseline
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The second component of sub-option A7 would require Member States to provide
information to the Commission on resources devoted to official control activity through the
Regulation 882/2004 Annual Reports. The impact on Member States under this requirement
depend on the staff costs in each MS, the amount of time expected to be required to collect
and collate the data, and the degree to which the required information is already collected.
In order to understand the likely impact of this sub-option, the survey for this study attempted
to collect information from each CA on the labour costs, time requirements and current data
collection practices of the case study Member States. Some Member States in the non-case
study countries also returned surveys and a few CAs provided information on this sub-option
as well. In total, seven CAs provided information on full-time equivalent (FTE) costs, but only
two estimated the staff time required to provide information on resources to the Commission.
Under these circumstances, construction of a standard cost model to estimate likely impacts
was not viable.
The UK’s Food Standards Agency (FSA) provided detailed information on the cost of
reporting to the Commission under three hypothetical scenarios indicative of the options that
might be considered under this sub-option. The data reported by CAs in other Member
States indicates the range of FTE costs across the EU.
UK scenarios
The Food Standards Agency (FSA) provided a baseline (based on current costs) and three
alternative scenarios for reporting on controls undertaken by local authorities39
. Two of these
scenarios include a description of the cost implications of different levels of data collection,
while the third describes potential costs but does not provide an estimate.
Baseline: Current costs of reporting (not incremental).
Collecting information on meat inspections for the FSA’s annual accounts takes
approximately 10 working days, split between a Senior Executive Officer and a Grade 7
equivalent. Using wage rates from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) survey control
guidance (Table A1.27), the cost of this time is at €3,055 to €3,960, including overheads.
If data had to be reported on in greater detail, and in a different format, considerably more
time would be required.
Scenario 1: Provision of total resource estimates for the UK as a whole, with no subdivisions.
The FSA estimated that collating information on total resources estimates for 2009-10 took
approximately five days (excluding time taken for preparing a report or presenting the data in
a standard format to report to the EU or the public). Assuming two days of a middle
manager’s time and three days of a junior manager’s time and using their respective hourly
rates40
((Table A1.27), the total cost of extending the scope of reporting to include
information on the financial resources devoted to official controls each year would be around
€1,655.
Scenario 2: Precise figures of costs based on a flat rate per local authority.
Providing precise figures for total resources at a sub-national level, that is by local authority,
would require additional resources compared to collating data for the UK as a whole. The
FSA estimates that it would take approximately six days for an FSA analyst. This would
result in a cost to the FSA of approximately €1,815 (Table A1.27). As per Scenario 1, this
cost does not include any time required to put the information into a standard format for the
EU or the public. This would require more time than scenario 1 as the reporting would need
to be at a local authority level.
39 For the figures in this section, an exchange rate £1 = €1.13158 (18/06/2011) is used.
40 The hourly rates are based on civil service “full economic” pay rates and up-rates each year based on the
Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings inflation rate (ASHE). http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/product.asp?vlnk=13101
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Table A1.27 Civil service ‘full economic’ pay rates in 2010 / 2011
Civil service
grade /
position
FSA grade /
position41
Hourly
wage rate
(€)
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Time
(days)
Cost (€) Time
(days)
Cost (€)
Director Director 103.24
Senior
manager
Grade 5 80.29
Middle
manager
Grade 7 55.44 2 775
Junior
manager
Higher /
Senior
Executive
Officer
42.07 3 880 6 1,817
Clerical Executive
Officer 26.74
Total 1,655
1,815 +
formatting
Source: Provided by the FSA as part of its contribution to the CA questionnaire.
The FSA outlined several caveats and limitations related to these calculations:
▪ Figures for charges and fees are only available for food hygiene and for England. UK
and food standard figures would need to be estimated by scaling up based on FTEs.
▪ The calculation is based on definitions of food safety expenditure. If there were precise
rules about what to include when calculating costs (and these rules required significantly
different information from what was included in current estimations) it would require
significant additional work, for example additional reporting from over 400 local
authorities.
▪ The information currently held on sales, fees and charges also includes other income;
precise details of charges to Food Business Operators (FBOs) are not currently
available. Precise figures for charges would require a lot of additional work, including
additional reporting from local authorities.
▪ The number of visits, premises and FTEs only relates to visits reported through the
system used to monitor local authority enforcement actions. The costs may also include
other food safety work undertaken by local authorities.
▪ The ability to provide information about the resources devoted to official controls
assumes that the relevant government department (currently the Department of
Communities and Local Government) continues to produce food safety costs and that
local authorities continue to report through the local authority enforcement monitoring
system.
Scenario 3: Precise figures of cost based on actual time spent on each business.
Collecting precise data on costs, based on actual time spent on each FBO, would require:
▪ Enforcement officers, trading standards officers, and administrative staff at local
authorities recording time spent on each visit.
▪ The development of an IT system to capture this information at each local authority and
then report to the FSA.
▪ A large overhead at the FSA to produce reports.
41 The allocation of FSA grades across the five civil service positions is an assumption.
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This would all be new activity. Costs are unknown, but they are expected to be
considerable.
Data from Finland
The Finnish CA (Evira) estimated that it would cost €500,000 and absorb 4 FTEs to collect
and submit information about the resources spent by CAs in the execution of official control
activities. During interview, Evira stated that the €500,000 represents an initial investment to
set up an IT system capable of collecting the necessary data at a local (municipal) level.
Both the Finnish and UK official control systems are decentralised; it is reasonable to
assume that the cost of Scenario 3 above for the UK may be similar to Finland’s estimate.
Table A1.28 provides data that was submitted by CAs through the study survey on FTE
rates. Though the data are limited, it gives an indication of the high variance in FTE rates
across Member States (from €1.86 / hour in Bulgaria to €64.74 / hour in Belgium).
Consequently, there is likely to be high variance in the potential administrative burdens
under a requirement to report information to the Commission, regardless of which model is
implemented per the UK’s three hypothetical options.
Table A1.28 Data for the Standard Cost Model obtained through the survey indicate high variation in FTE rates across MS (between €3.31 / hour and €64.74 / hour)
MS CA Response
Q1 Q2 Q3
BE Federal Agency for the Safety of
the Food Chain (FASFC)
€64.74 / hour Staff time: 836
hours
External costs: 0
Staff time: 836
hours
External costs: 0
BG Bulgarian Food Safety Agency €1.86 / employee /
hour
n/a n/a
ES SG Sanidad Exterior (MSPSI);
SG Acuerdos Sanitarios y
Control en Frontera (MARM)
€20.42 / hour n/a n/a
FI Finnish Food Safety Authority
(Evira)
€42 / hour Staff time: 4 FTE
External costs:
€500,000
n/a
FR Direction générale de
l’alimentation (DGAI) – Ministère
chargé de l’agriculture
€29.50 / hour n/a n/a
LT State Food and Veterinary
Service of Republic of Lithuania
€3.31 / hour n/a n/a
UK Food Standards Agency (FSA) Grade 7: €55.44 /
hour
Senior Executive
Officer: €42.07 /
hour
Staff time: 5-6 FTE n/a
Source: Survey of CAs conducted as part of this study.
Nonetheless, given that the UK and Finland are Member States with a relatively high FTE
rate, and that they have a decentralised structure which makes reporting at MS level more
challenging than in other MS, it is reasonable to assume that providing a total resource
estimate for each MS, without subdivisions by control activity or level of administration might
cost around €1500 per country (FI estimate of €1470 at 5 days, €42/hr and UK estimate of
€1,655). A requirement to provide complete information by control and by level of
administration would likely impose an additional one-time cost of around €500,000 per state
to implement an information system to collect this information, plus 4 FTEs per year to
administer the system.
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A1.1.7.3 A7 - Summary
General conclusions
Overall, providing information to the public regarding fees for official controls will have
positive impacts on accountability and is likely to require little or no additional administrative
costs, particularly in cases where such information is already provided through CA websites.
A requirement to report to the Commission on resources devoted to official controls will have
similarly positive impacts on accountability, but comes with greater administrative cost
burdens to CAs, particularly in MS with decentralised systems. Yearly reporting may be too
onerous and could be required every other year or less frequently.
The magnitude of impacts
The scale of the impact of this sub-option on individual Member States will vary depending
on the level of detail required for reporting to the Commission—both the level of detail and
frequency of reporting to the Commission on resource devoted to official controls and the
type of public provision of information. These are unknown.
Based on the hourly rates contained in Table A1.28 above, it is clear that CA wages are
significantly higher in some Member States compared to others. For example, wages in
Bulgaria are approximately €1.86 per hour compared to €29.50 per hour in France. The cost
of collecting data and reporting to the Commission will be higher in Member States with
higher CA hourly wage levels. The wage data collected thought the CA survey is a relatively
good match with the Eurostat data on average public sector wages. This indicates that
Member States with high or moderately high wage levels may have a more significant
impact, in terms of costs, compared to Member States with moderately low or low average
public sector wage levels (Table A1.25).
Incidence of impact and distributional issues
Impacts would fall primarily within the EU. This sub-option would, in principle, impact on all
CAs and FBOs subject to fees for official controls.
Member States with decentralised official controls systems are likely to be more affected by
financial resource reporting requirements than centralised systems because collecting and
reporting the information will require greater efforts and by more individuals. This effect
would be more pronounced in Member States with high wage rates (Figure A1.19)
Figure A1.19 Costs of introducing and maintaining detailed reporting on resources to the Commission will be greater for Member States with decentralised systems and higher wage rates
e.g. DE, UK, FI
Organisation of controls
Wage
rates
High
Low
DecentralisedCentralised
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Member States that already collect detailed information on financial resources devoted to
official controls and/or publicise their fee rates and legislation will be subject to little or no
impact from these requirements.
Publicising information on fee rates and other related information to the public is likely to
have a low impact on Member States that do not already publicise this information.
There is no particular SME bias to this bus-option.
Compliance costs and administrative burdens
The more detailed the reporting requirements the greater the admin burden associated with
reporting them. The three scenarios set out by the UK CA indicate a range of possibilities of
varying potential administrative burdens, depending on the level of detail required in any
reporting scenario. Member States with decentralised official controls systems are likely to
have higher administrative burdens than centralised Member States, due to the additional
effort required to collect information at different government levels.
Costs and benefits
This sub-option will increase costs for CAs; the extent of the cost increase will depend on the
current arrangements in Member States related to data collection. Costs will relate to setting
up and maintaining systems necessary to collect and collate relevant data. Costs for CAs in
decentralised Member States will be higher than centralised Member States; collecting
standardised data in decentralised Member States will require more effort and have a larger
administrative burden. Over time, increasing transparency and reporting could reduce costs
for CAs by increasing sharing of best practice.
Increasing transparency and reporting of data to the Commission will not increase costs for
FBOs. It could, over time, reduce costs by improving benchmarking and sharing of best
practice between Member States.
The specification of reporting requirements and their relationship to the revised performance
monitoring and management system for Regulation 882/2004 is important. If the reports to
the Commission covered core performance measures that Member States themselves would
need to be monitoring in order to check compliance with the Regulation then the incremental
cost of submitted data to Brussels would be very modest.
A1.1.8 Sub-option A8 - Industry participation
A1.1.8.1 A8 - Specification
Sub-option A8 considers changes to Regulation 882/2004 that would provide FBOs with the
right to participate in the process of setting the structure. Respondents were asked to
consider:
▪ Whether and how FBOs are already involved in setting fees in each Member State;
▪ Stakeholders’ review of how participation should be specified so as to maximise the
positive impacts and minimise negative impacts.
A1.1.8.2 A8 – Evidence and analysis
Respondent scores and comments
The scores awarded by survey respondents as regards the impacts of this policy option are
summarised in Figure A1.20. Selected comments from CAs and industry are provided in
Table A1.29.
▪ Industry respondents generally view this option positively and believe it would improve
efficiency, accountability and comparability of official controls systems. The option would
allow industry to have a meaningful role in the fee setting process and could provide
opportunities for sharing information that could increase effectiveness of inspections. It
could also motivate FBOs and CAs to work together to pursue common objectives. Fee
acceptance is also likely to be higher where industry can participate in the process.
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▪ CAs generally indicated that this option would have little impact on the current official
controls systems overall, but could have positive impacts on accountability, where it
increased transparency in the fee-setting process.
Figure A1.20 Industry expects this option to improve efficiency. Industry and CA respondents expect improvements in accountability.
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0Efficiency
Simplification
ComparabilityStreamlining
Accountability
Industry Competent Authorities
Base = 22 industry responses; 14 CA responses
Average score awarded by survey respondents based on a scale where -2 means ‘significant negative impact’ and +2 means ‘significant positive impact’. Responses that received a score of ‘don’t know’ are not included in the score.
Table A1.29 Sub-option A8: Comments provided by survey respondents about industry participation
Competent Authority Industry
Positive
▪ [It could improve] transparency.
▪ This should permit FBOs to have say in
their own future.
▪ Participation of FBOs [may] improve the
acceptance of fees imposed.
▪ It is a good way to motivate FBOs and
CAs to pursue common objectives.
▪ As the paying 'customer', industry would
have a meaningful role in the process
for setting fees and driving efficiencies.
Meat industry representative.
▪ Reducing distortion of competition. Fees
affect the economy of FBOs. It would be
fair for FBOs to participate in setting
schedules. Meat industry
representative.
▪ It would remove much of the current
conflict surrounding official control
invoices. Meat industry
representative.
▪ This will lead to a better cost/benefit
based scenario for the industry. Meat
industry representative.
▪ This will improve the fairness of the fee
schedules and will increase the rate of
acceptance. Meat industry
representative.
▪ Greater say and flexibility in the
provision of the services. Meat
industry representative.
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Competent Authority Industry
▪ It forces FBOs to intensify their quality
system including self controls, in
addition it is a good way to motivate
FBO and competent authority to pursue
common objectives as well as a better
understanding for the level of the costs.
Meat industry representative.
▪ [It may] encourage the authority to
continually evaluate efficiency. Meat
industry representative.
▪ [It could result in a] better reflection of
real structures and costs, possibly also
best benefit per risk. Dairy sector
representative.
▪ Could introduce "ownership" as Fees
would be [sic] better accepted. Public
health representative.
▪ [It] would strengthen the stakeholder’s
position. Food and agricultural sector
representative.
▪ Greater say and flexibility in the
provision of services. Food and
agricultural sector representative.
▪ [It would increase] dialogue and
interaction between stakeholders and
authorities. Food sector
representative.
▪ Knowledge on food quality and safety
[would be] better used and harmonised
within food chain. Food sector
representative.
▪ Authorities [would] learn from private
quality and food safety system and
standards. Food sector
representative.
Negative
▪ [It] would increase the admin burden
▪ [It could result in] too much lobbying.
▪ [It could introduce an] unrealistic
expectation by FBOs that fees would
decrease.
▪ [It could] increase [the] administrative
burden on FBOs and CAs due to
development of a process (business
agreements) that wasn't previously
required.
▪ FBOs would be interested in approval of
the lowest possible fees for veterinary
control.
▪ [It could cause] endless discussions on
the fee setting.
▪ [It could result in] less financing for EU
MS as FBOs would like low fees.
▪ No negative impact for FBOs. Maybe
only [an additional] burden for
administration. Meat industry
representative.
▪ [It could] reduce fairness [sic] between
member states and on national level.
Meat industry representative.
▪ The CA needs to be required to take
heed of views as well as merely
consulting - without this requirement
then this could simply be a bureaucratic
exercise of being seen to consult. Meat
industry representative.
▪ Less financing for EU Member States
as FBOs would like low fees. Meat
industry representative.
▪ Likely to introduce conflict about costs
and levels of controls. Could distort
trade across EU. Public health
representative.
▪ Might strain the member states budgets
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Competent Authority Industry
if they have to agree on lower fees then
planned. Food and agricultural
sector representative.
Case study assessment
The scores awarded by respondents in the case study countries as regards the impacts of
this policy option are summarised in Figure A1.21.
Figure A1.21 Respondents in all case study countries indicated that industry participation would have positive impacts on accountability, but some indicated potential negative impacts in other areas
-2
-1
0
1
2BG
FL
FR
NL
PL
UK
Accountability Net score Simplif ication
Base = 22 industry responses; 11 CA responses
Average score awarded by survey respondents based on a scale where -2 means ‘significant negative impact’ and +2 means ‘significant positive impact’.
Respondents in all of the case study countries indicated that industry participation in fee
setting and other aspects of system implementation would positively impact on
accountability. It could improve the fairness of the fee schedules and increase acceptance of
the fees as a result. CAs expressed concern, however, that participation would lead to
increased administrative burdens. Responses were mixed regarding the extent to which
industry participation would simplify official control activity. Some respondents thought it
would introduce complexity in the fee setting process that currently does not exist in many
Member States, while others thought it could simplify the process.
Other evidence
No additional information is available on participation by FBOs in fee setting and system
development for official controls.
A1.1.8.3 A8 - Summary
General conclusions
Industry participation is likely to have significant positive impacts on accountability, where
industry believes it has a meaningful role in the fee setting process. Industry participation
could provide opportunities for FBOs and CAs to work together to pursue common
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objectives. Fee acceptance is also likely to be higher where industry can participate in the
process.
The magnitude of impacts
The scale of the impact of this sub-option on individual Member States and on individual
FBOs would be determined by the level of participation granted to industry and the degree to
which industry perceives itself to have a meaningful role in the process. This will depend on
the specification of any participatory process, and this is currently unknown.
Incidence of impact and distributional issues
Impacts would fall primarily within the EU. This option would, in principle, impact all FBOs
subject to fees for official controls, and all Competent Authorities in EU Member States.
The distribution of impacts would depend on the level of industry participation offered by any
changes to Regulation 882/2004, and the degree to which industry believed it had a
meaningful role in the fee setting process as well as any costs to CAs related to ensuring
participation and any benefits to CAs and industry from improvements to the fee systems as
a result of industry participation.
Compliance costs and administrative burdens
The direction of change for CAs related to administrative burdens is impossible to predict.
There will be some additional costs to creating and implementing participatory systems. CAs
will potentially see some reduced costs where industry participation results in greater
efficiencies in official controls systems or conversely increased costs where industry
participation leads to greater difficulties in considering and agreeing a fee system.
Costs and benefits
CAs are likely to face some increased administrative burdens to organise and operate
participatory processes with industry, but these costs are likely to be low. Industry will also
face increased costs where it chooses to participate in the process. Costs to industry cannot
be measured because the decision to participate or not in any new process will vary by
Member State and sector. Industry will, however, only participate in any new process where
the benefits are seen to outweigh the costs.
Both industry and CAs expect that introducing participatory processes will result in improved
transparency and accountability. There is likely to be an additional improvement in the
efficiency of control activity where information sharing leads to innovations in control
activities, and thus their effectiveness.
A1.1.9 Sub-option A9 – Introduce exemptions and reductions for micro-enterprises
A1.1.9.1 A9 - Specification
Sub-option A9 considers whether Regulation 882/2004 should be changed to provide
reduced fees or fee exemptions for micro-enterprises. Respondents were asked to consider
the advantages and disadvantages of including fee reductions or exemptions, impacts on
different stakeholder groups, and whether the Regulation should provide a universal
exemption for micro-enterprises under EU law or provide the option for Member States to
implement reductions or exemptions as they choose.
A1.1.9.2 A9 – Evidence and analysis
Respondent scores and comments
The scores awarded by survey respondents as regards the impacts of this policy option are
summarised in Figure A1.22. Selected comments from CAs and industry are provided in
Table A1.30.
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▪ Competent Authority and industry respondents uniformly indicated that this sub-option
would have negative or no impacts on official controls systems.
▪ In particular, this option is likely to have a negative impact on resource mobilisation
where less fee revenue is collected but the number of controls remains the same.
▪ Nonetheless, respondent comments indicate that the amendment would reduce the
financial burden on micro-enterprises and help to encourage development of small
businesses.
▪ Several respondents indicated that fee exemptions or reductions are unfair, and that
inspections should be undertaken according to risk. An effective risk-based system
would automatically reduce the costs for the best-performing micro-enterprises.
▪ Respondents clearly favour the option of an exemption or reduction, or no special terms
for micro enterprises, rather than a universal exemption or reduction:
– Only 1 CAs and 7 industry respondents prefer a universal exemption or
reduction;
– 7 CAs and 10 industry respondents prefer the choice to implement an
exemption or reduction; and
– 2 CAs and 14 industry respondents prefer no special mention and no special
terms for micro enterprises in Regulation 882/2004.
Figure A1.22 Fee reductions or exemptions for micro-enterprises are expected to have negative or no impact on the operation of official controls systems
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0Efficiency
Simplification
ComparabilityStreamlining
Accountability
Industry Competent Authorities
Base = 22 industry responses; 14 CA responses
Average score awarded by survey respondents based on a scale where -2 means ‘significant negative impact’ and +2 means ‘significant positive impact’. Responses that received a score of ‘don’t know’ are not included in the score.
Table A1.30 Sub-option A9: Comments provided by survey respondents about exemptions and reductions for micro-businesses
Competent Authority Industry
Positive
▪ It would put less financial burden on the
micro-enterprises.
▪ [It would] assist with [the] creation and
maintenance and development of
artisan type establishments.
▪ No negative impact if exemptions are
given to micro-enterprises with a proven
▪ This amendment would reduce the
inspection pressure (sometimes
unnecessary) on operators. Meat
industry representative.
▪ It would drive CAs to negotiate more
risk based controls. Meat industry
representative.
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record of good functioning.
▪ The direct linkage between fees and
delivery of OCs has proved instrumental
on encouraging FBOs to efficiently use
CAs resources. The removal of fees as
a tool to encourage compliance could
result on an increased risk to the
consumer.
▪ It would maintain local marketing of
products and production of traditional
products. It would also maintain current
animal welfare advantages of having
local slaughterhouses. Meat industry
representative.
▪ Given that most micro-enterprises
source stock/raw material from known
suppliers locally and supply to the local
community at very low levels it can be
argued that from a risk impact view-
point this will be limited.
Negative
▪ Lower cost recovery may lead to lower
efficiency of CAs.
▪ [It could result in] less revenue income.
▪ Any discounts provided to FBOs by CAs
should remain based on a percentage
discount of actual costs at a level
sufficient to incentivise efficient use of
CA resources by FBOs. At the same
time, on those instances of poor
performance, any additional controls
should be cost recoverable to the same
level than any other business and to full
cost.
▪ Full costs recovery cannot be achieved
on micro-enterprises and it is unfair to
charge this to the big operators.
▪ [There could be a] risk of food products
not complying with safety and quality
requirements entering market.
▪ Exemptions for micro-enterprises could
potentially have competitiveness
implications depending on how 'micro-
enterprise' is defined. Meat industry
representative.
▪ Exemptions for micro-enterprises could
potentially have competitiveness
implications depending on how 'micro-
enterprise' is defined between member-
states. Meat industry representative.
▪ A small size does not mean a smaller
risk. Meat industry representative.
▪ [It could] increases risks to the public if
exemptions are not based on the risks
posed by the business. Public health
representative.
▪ A small size does not mean a lower risk.
This may depend on sectors but at least
this is true in the feed sector. An
exemption of fees would certainly
benefit the competent authorities
administratively speaking but would also
be a further incentive to authorities to
focus controls on large companies and
"ignore" micro-enterprises. Food
sector representative.
Table A1.31 CA and industry respondents who prefer a universal exemption or reduction, the option to create an exemption or fee reduction, or no mention/no special terms
Category Competent Authority Industry
Universal exemption or reduction 0 out of 10 (0%) 8 out of 32 (25%)
Option to create exemptions or
reductions
8 out of 10 (80%) 11 out of 32 (34%)
No mention and no special terms 2 out of 10 (20%) 13 out of 32 (41%)
Case study assessment
The findings from the case study indicate that fee reductions or exemptions for micro-
enterprises are likely to have negative impacts in some Member States and positive impacts
in others. This depends in part on the proportion of micro-enterprises in a given Member
State relative to other businesses, as well as the extent of cost recovery in that Member
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State. Where there are a large number of micro-enterprises, fee reductions or exemptions
will have a negative impact on the resources mobilised from fees. Similarly, this sub-option
could simplify the system by reducing the number of FBOs subject to fees (if information
systems can distinguish such FBOs).
The scores awarded by respondents in the case study countries as regards the impacts of
this policy option are summarised in Figure A1.23.
Figure A1.23 Overall, case study country respondents indicated that fee reductions or exemptions for micro-enterprises will have no or negative impacts on official controls systems
-2
-1
0
1
2BG
FL
FR
NL
PL
UK
Eff iciency Net score Simplif ication
Base = 22 industry responses; 11 CA responses
Average score awarded by survey respondents based on a scale where -2 means ‘significant negative impact’ and +2 means ‘significant positive impact’.
Fee reductions or exemptions for micro enterprises are currently offered in four of the case
study countries (Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands and the UK). France and Poland do not
offer fee reductions or exemptions. In six of these Member States, micro enterprises
represent more than half of all businesses operating in the sectors most affected by official
control activities (i.e. meat, fish, dairy and feed sectors). In Finland, micro enterprises
represent almost 74 per cent of all businesses operating in these sectors. Data on the
number of micro enterprises operating in France are not available.
The impact of this sub-option on Member States depends on the number of micro
enterprises relative to all businesses, as well as the extent of cost recovery in each. For
example:
▪ Belgium offers fee exemptions or reductions for micro enterprises, but only recovers 40
per cent of its costs through fees; the remainder comes from public funds. In Belgium,
approximately 70 per cent of businesses subject to official controls are micro enterprises
[mandatory fees/voluntary fees?].
▪ The United Kingdom offers reductions or exemptions, but only recovers approximately
40 per cent of its costs through fees. In the UK, approximately 60 percent of businesses
subject to official controls are micro enterprises.
▪ Finland also offers fee reductions or exemptions, but only recovers 20 per cent of costs
through fees from small businesses. In Finland, approximately 70 per cent of businesses
subject to official controls are micro enterprises.
▪ Poland does not offer fee reductions or exemptions and claims to achieve full cost
recovery. In Poland, approximately 65 per cent of businesses subject to official controls
are micro enterprises.
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Other evidence
Micro-enterprises represent a significant proportion of all FBOs in sectors most affected by
official control activity (Figure A1.24). In 16 of the 23 Member States for which data are
available, micro enterprises represent more than half of all FBOs. In seven Member States,
they represent between approximately 70 – 80 per cent of FBOs (Table A1.32).
Data suggest that fee reductions or exemptions are currently provided to micro enterprises in
11 Member States. Five Member States do not offer such reductions or exemptions. No
information is available for the remaining 11 Member States.
Figure A1.24 Micro-enterprises as a percentage of total number of enterprises in four major European industries affected by official control activity (2008)42
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Micro-enterprises
Source: Eurostat
42 Industry sectors include: processing and preserving of meat and production of meat products; processing and
preserving of fish, crustaceans and molluscs; manufacture of dairy products; manufacture of prepared animal feeds. GR and MT are not included in Eurostat dataset. Data for CZ and FR are not available.
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Table A1.32 Exemptions or reductions for micro-enterprises by EU-Member State and the proportion of micr0-enterprise to all enterprises in sectors affected by fees for official controls
DE
ES
FR
PL
SK
BE
DK
EE
FI
IE
IT
NL
PT
RO
SE
UK
AT
BG
CY
CZ
GR
HU
LT
LU
LV
MT
SI
No exemptions or
reductions / no
specific rules
Exemptions and/or
reductions provided
No information
% micro-enterprises
to all enterprises in
relevant sectors
58 60 N/A 66 13 69 57 40 74 26 71 66 63 62 80 58 69 43 79 N/A N/A 57 48 47 41 N/A 73
% full cost
recovery43
N/A N/A
45 -
70
10044
51 37 35* 20 20*
40 -
90 50 81 100 50 N/A 43 100 27 N/A 28 N/A 60 100 N/A 100 39 100
High impact Low impact
No information available /
identified
DG SANCO baseline and Eurostat 2008; N/A – those countries for which micro-enterprise data or full cost recovery information is not available.
DK cost recovery for small abattoirs = 35%; FI cost recovery for small plants = 20%
43 See Table A1.8 for full cost recovery details by Member State.
44 The baseline data provided by DG SANCO indicate that Poland achieves full cost recovery; interviews with the Polish CA for this study, however, suggest that there is little
data on cost recovery and that the available data indicate that cost recovery is insufficient.
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The impact of a fee reduction or exemption is likely to depend on the proportion of micro
enterprises in the population of FBOs and the extent of full cost recovery. Predicting the
likely effects further would require more complete data. Relevant information includes
whether or not a MS currently provides an exemption or reduction, full cost recovery status
and the percentage of micro enterprises across Member States. There are only 12 MS for
which complete information is available, and 10 of these already offer an exemption.
A1.1.9.3 A9 - Summary
General conclusions
Mandatory fee reductions or exemptions for micro-enterprises may reduce cost recovery in
Member States, particularly for those with a large number of such businesses. There is no
correlation that can be determined, however, between the percentage of micro enterprises in
a MS, the degree of cost recovery and whether or not a MS already offers an exemption or
reduction. More information is required to understand this relationship.
Nonetheless, respondents indicated a clear preference for the choice to provide such an
exemption or no provision for such an exemption, rather than a requirement to provide
universal exemptions or reductions. Providing the choice to Member States to determine
whether or not to provide an exemption or reduction would allow this decision to be made on
a case-by-case basis in each MS and would not require those MS that already provide an
exemption (at least 11 of 27 MS) to remove the already existing fee reduction or exemption
provisions in its control system.
The magnitude of impacts
The scale of the impact on Member States and individual FBOs would be determined by
whether or not the option to exempt micro-enterprises (or reduce their fees) is exercised.
Where a fee reduction is chosen, the impact of that reduction will further vary by Member
State depending on their already existing fee rates.
Compliance costs and administrative burdens
Administrative burdens may be increased or decreased as a result of mandatory exemptions
or reductions, but the precise direction of the impact is difficult to predict and will vary by
Member State. For example, administrative burdens could increase where Member States
must identify micro-enterprises to ensure fee are reduced or eliminated. Additional costs will
arise where a fee reduction must be calculated, discussed, set, communicated and collected.
Conversely, administrative burdens could decrease where Member States are not obligated
to collect a fee where an exemption is implemented.
Costs and benefits
Introducing fee exemptions for micro-enterprises will reduce the proportion of costs
recovered by CAs. This will be especially pronounced in Member States with a high
proportion of micro-enterprises, and high cost recovery levels.
There is a potential tension between the micro-enterprise exemption and other objectives.
Where micro-enterprise reductions or exemptions are applied the costs of inspection must
be met from alternative sources. Cross-subsidy of very small businesses by levying a
surcharge on fees applied to larger firms is not consistent with the principle that each
business should not be charged more than the costs of inspecting that business. If the
deficit is made up with revenues from general taxation then the CA (and MS) will not be able
to achieve full cost recovery.
A1.2 Option B – Fully harmonise inspections fees for official controls
Option B considers the possibility to fully harmonise inspection fees for official controls
throughout the EU. Option B is equivalent to the ‘full harmonisation’ option considered in the
evaluation study carried out for DG SANCO by the Food Chain Evaluation Consortium
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(FCEC)45
. Under this scenario all MS would pay the same fees (fixed rates) for the same
activities (i.e. full harmonisation).
There are three sub-options within this option:
▪ The first whereby fees are determined on a unified basis for the EU as a whole.
▪ The second, modified version, in which harmonised fees are adjusted for each Member
State using a cost of living index.
▪ A third sub-option that considers whether fees should be harmonised only for certain
import controls.
In the first two cases, respondents were asked to consider the impacts of harmonised fees
on official controls determined on a time unit and a number/quantity basis.
General points relevant to the impact assessment are that:
▪ The actual price schedule (and indeed the costing model that would be needed to
underpin the harmonised prices) was not specified in the option text provided for this
study. The quantitative appraisal of impacts is thus constrained not only by the gaps in
the baseline data, but also by uncertainty about the ex-post position (i.e. at what level
fees would be set); and
▪ The feedback received from consultees reflected their perceptions of how the level of a
harmonised EU fee might compare to the current fee in their particular Member State,
about which there is uncertainty.
A1.2.1 Sub-option B1: Unified fees for the EU-27
A1.2.1.1 B1 - Specification
In this sub-option the fees for the provision of controls are determined on a unified basis for
the EU as a whole (i.e. the same fee rates apply in each Member State).
A1.2.1.2 B1 – Evidence and analysis
Respondent scores and comments
Respondents were asked to consider whether they agree or disagree with a set of
advantages and disadvantages for sub-option B1 and to offer any additional benefits or
drawbacks that they could see arising. The scores awarded by survey respondents as
regards the impacts of this policy option are summarised in Figure A1.25. Selected
comments from CAs and industry are provided in Table A1.33:
▪ Competent Authorities and industry stakeholders indicated that this option would be
positive in terms of simplification and streamlining of the system.
▪ Competent Authorities also noted that unified fees would improve comparability and
accountability, though industry stakeholders felt the option would have little or a slightly
negative impact in these areas.
▪ Both CAs and industry believe that the option would have a negative impact on
efficiency, however. Moreover, respondent comments indicate that this option may not
be practical, could be too rigid and would not provide incentives for efficiency gains.
Overall, full harmonisation, applying a unified rate across the EU-27, is likely to reduce the
efficiency of the official control system. CAs consider that it could have a positive effect on
the other four criteria, but expressed concerns about the inability of a harmonised fee to
reflect differences in official controls systems between MS, and inadequately cover actual
costs. FBOs are similarly concerned with the potential negative impacts on the efficiency of
45 Study on fees or charges collected by the Member States to cover the costs occasioned by official controls.
Final Report. Part One: Main Study And Conclusions. Submitted by: Food Chain Evaluation Consortium (FCEC). Project Leader: Agra CEAS Consulting.
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the controls system, and argue that harmonised fees would have little positive impact on the
other four criteria. Due to the wide divergence in official controls systems across the MS,
FBOs do not think that full harmonisation is a realistic option.
Figure A1.25 CAs and industry see opportunities to simplify and streamline official controls through harmonised fees, but the overall impact on efficiency would likely be negative.
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0Efficiency
Simplification
ComparabilityStreamlining
Accountability
Industry Competent Authorities
Base = 22 industry responses; 14 CA responses
Average score awarded by survey respondents based on a scale where -2 means ‘significant negative impact’ and +2 means ‘significant positive impact’. Responses that received a score of ‘don’t know’ are not included in the score.
Table A1.33 Sub-option B1: Comments provided by survey respondents regarding full harmonisation with unified fee for the EU-27
Competent Authority Industry
Positive
▪ [Full harmonisation would
prevent]...disputes with establishments
[FBOs]...and reduce [sic] legal claims.
Negative
▪ Local authorities [sic] [would] pay if [the]
uniform fee rate did not [sic] cover all
costs. This would [sic] decrease [the]
resources [available to them].
▪ [It] would not provide incentives for
efficiency gains...where [they are]
needed; fee per item; fee per hour.
▪ ...[it would be] a rigid system...not
subject to adjustment [based on] the
pricing level of the MS.
▪ ...it would [sic] be very difficult to set a
common fee rate that should apply in all
Member States given the different cost
levels. Therefore we do not see this
option as practical.
▪ The principle of fee rates creates a
problem in itself: a move should be
▪ Full harmonisation would not be
realistic. All 27 MS have a different
living index and different meat
inspection systems.
▪ Given the huge variation in economic
standards across all 27 countries this
might actually prove to be anti-
competitive putting some country's
industries at a disadvantage.
▪ [It] does not take into account the
national risk profile.
▪ Since official inspection is in hands of a
monopolist there is no guarantee that in
case the fee is covering the full costs,
the monopolist will function as
efficient[ly] as possible. Therefore a
scheme with shared costs may be the
best incentive for both sides to
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Competent Authority Industry
Positive
made to fees based on actual costs.
▪ The rules on the financing of official
control must not be constructed in such
a way that risk assessments are [sic] no
longer the basis for prioritizing the
controls.
▪ [The] option does not increase
transparency or harmonisation since
MS who disagree with the philosophy of
charging will find a way to disguise
subsidy, at central or local government
level.
▪ Given the huge variation in economic
standards across all 27 countries this
might actually prove to be anti-
competitive putting some country's
industries at a disadvantage.
contribute to the efficiency [of the OC
system].
▪ Set fees at EU level would put pressure
on profligate CAs to maximise efficiency
of delivery, and to negotiate more risk-
based controls that would require less
input.
▪ Overall there will be no incentive for CA
to improve efficiency and quality of
controls.
▪ There would need to be full
consideration of the impacts for MS
outside the Eurozone; how would parity
be maintained, and how would relative
cost be determined, i.e. what might
seem reasonable based on income in
one country might be expensive in
another.
Case study assessment
Results from the case studies reflect the inherent uncertainty as to the direction of change
under harmonised fees. There are two possible extreme scenarios under full harmonisation
that respond to two different objectives of the legislation:
1. Fees are set at the highest common denominator in order to ensure full cost recovery in
the most expensive Member State; or
2. Fees are set at the lowest common denominator in order to ensure that in the least
expensive Member State fees are not higher than the actual cost of controls.
The first scenario is reflected in the impacts projected in some of the cases study countries.
For example, in Member States where fees are relatively low (e.g. Poland), harmonised fees
are likely to increase the fee rates charged and thus increase cost recovery. These
increases might, however, place an unacceptably high burden on industry where the controls
become too costly to operate viable businesses. The CAs in Poland are likely to recover
more fees than required to cover costs. In Member States where costs are relatively high
(e.g. the UK), harmonised fees will have less overall impact as there is likely to be little
change in the fees charged to operate the controls system.
Conversely, if fees are set at the lowest common denominator, Poland will be less impacted
(and still achieve full cost recovery), but the UK system will be under funded (in the UK only
44 per cent of costs were recovered under the current system in 2009).
The scores awarded by respondents in the case study countries as regards the impacts of
this policy option are summarised in Figure A1.26.
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Figure A1.26 Respondents in most of the case study MS indicated that the overall impact of harmonised fees with a unified fee is likely to be negative.
-2
-1
0
1
2BG
FL
FR
NL
PL
UK
Eff iciency Net score Streamlining
Base = 22 industry responses; 11 CA responses
Average score awarded by survey respondents based on a scale where -2 means ‘significant negative impact’ and +2 means ‘significant positive impact’.
The findings from the case studies are largely consistent with the wider findings from the
survey results. There are concerns that harmonised fee rates would fail to account for
significant differences between Member States and that this would reduce the effectiveness
of the official controls system.
Responses from CAs and industry in some Member States diverged in some areas. For
instance, respondents in Poland argued that full harmonisation would be likely to have a
significantly positive effect on the cost recovery achieved in the Polish controls system. The
cost of official controls is relatively lower in Poland than in many other Member States, and
respondents considered it likely that harmonised fee rates would increase the fee rate from
current levels, and subsequently increase the resources available for official controls.
However the Polish respondents agreed that, overall, full harmonisation would be likely to
have negative impact on the controls system.
The UK respondents argued that from their perspective, overall, full harmonisation would be
unlikely to have any significant impact on the controls system, but it could reduce the
administrative burden associated with controls (i.e. promote streamlining). The respondents
thought that due to the likely reduction in fee levels, harmonised fees would put pressure on
CAs to maximise the efficiency of delivery and implement more risk-based controls requiring
less CA input.
Respondents from Finland thought that full harmonisation would have significant negative
effects on the Finnish controls system. Respondents stated that it would be extremely
difficult to implement harmonised fees in Finland as fee levels are calculated at the local
level by local CAs. Central CAs have no legal power to specify fee rates to local CAs. This
administrative relationship is a feature of governance in Finland more generally, and is
enshrined in legislation that would be practically difficult to change. For this reason the full
harmonisation option would pose particular feasibility issues in Finland.
Other evidence
Figure A1.27 illustrates why the impacts of harmonised fees are so uncertain. Considering
only one control (adult cattle slaughter rates) in one area of official control activity (meat
controls), the rates charged in selection of Member States are plotted by the cost in euro per
head of cattle. The fee rates are taken from a survey of rates charged to industry by
CLITRAVI in 2007 and updated in 2009. For the purposes of this chart an arbitrary
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harmonised fee rate of five Euros per head was chosen because it is the current minimum
fee for this control and many Member States currently charged the minimum fee. This
provides an illustration of the variance in fee rates relative to the average rate. Significant
complexity in the fees charged underlies the highly simplified diagram below, as described in
Table A1.34. Nevertheless, it illustrates the gap between the fees currently charged in a
selection of Member States and any potential harmonised fee. Uncertainty as to the actual
harmonised fee rate that might be used under Option A is unknown, and therefore precise
impacts are impossible to calculate.
Figure A1.27 Fee harmonisation would change prices for most FBOs and control fee income for governments - but the direction, scale and distribution of change would be determined by the actual level at which fees are set
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
BE BG CZ DK ES FL FR HU IT LI LV NL IE RO SE SI
Maximum rate (€/head)
Minimum rate (€/head)
Hypothetical harmonised fee (€/head)
There is a considerable gap between the fees currently charged in different MS and any potential harmonised fee.
There is uncertainty regarding how a harmonised fee would compare to current fees in EU MS
Figure prepared by GHK. The hypothetical example shown here is based on fee rates for slaughtering adult cattle (€/head). Fee rates are taken from a survey of MS fee rates by CLITRAVI, updated in 2009.
Table A1.34 Explanation of data underlying Figure A1.27 for meat industry inspection rates - 2009 fee rates for slaughtering adult cattle (€/head)
MS Rate explanation
BE Different rates are charged for small slaughterhouses and large slaughterhouses:
▪ €5.12 is the rate for slaughter lines slaughtering more than 50 animals per hour
▪ € 11.63 is the rate for small slaughterhouses
▪ €15.5 is the rate for slaughterhouses slaughtering four animals or fewer per hour.
The minimum and maximum rates are used in this example
DK Different rates are charged for small and large slaughterhouses:
▪ €6.80 for small slaughterhouses
▪ €8.8 for large slaughterhouses
These are set as the minimum and maximum rates in this example
ES A wide range of rates are charged depending on fees set by region:
▪ In some regions, rates charged cover costs
▪ In other regions, no charge is levied.
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▪ A range of rates may be charged between these extremes.
The maximum charge is unknown. The minimum (i.e. no charge) is used in this example.
FI Slaughterhouses are charged once a month. The invoice covers all meat inspection and control
activities including hygiene, food safety, animal welfare, animal diseases, etc. There is no animal-
based fee and an estimate is difficult to provide as most slaughterhouses process several types
of animal. There is also large variation between large and small slaughterhouses.
The fees presented here are estimates of the minimum and maximum cost per animal for cattle.
HU A range of fees is charged depending on the examination time and using a multiplier to vary the
rate according to the distance of the slaughterhouse from the location of the official veterinarian.
▪ Rates by time of inspection:
▪ €4.72 (between 6 am - 4.30 pm)
▪ €9.44 (between 4.30 pm - 6 am),
▪ Multiplier by distance:
▪ 1.2 (<10 km)
▪ 1.3 (between 10-50 km)
▪ 1.4 (between 50-100 km)
▪ 1.5 (between 100-200 km)
▪ 1.6 (> 200 km)
This example presents the highest and lowest possible fee (i.e. €2.72 * 1.6 and €1.36 * 1.2)
IT Charges vary by region and size of establishment. Establishments handling:
▪ >70,001 units per year are charged €3 per head;
▪ 50,001-70,000 are charged €3.50 per head;
▪ 25,001 to 50,000 are charged €4 per head;
▪ 10,001-25,000 are charged €4.5 per head;
▪ 10,000 or fewer are charged €5 per head
The minimum and maximum charges (i.e. €3 and €5 per head) are used in this example
LI A lump sum is charged for issuing a supervision certificate and checking 10 adult cattle (€50.10).
In this example, the estimate of €5.01 per head is used, but this includes a portion of the cost for
issuing the certificate and is thus an overestimate.
NL Hourly rate are charged:
▪ €26.48 per hour for ante-mortem inspections and
▪ €19.28 per hour for post-mortem inspections
▪ Minimum rates per animal are also set (€2.02 per head).
Minimum rates are used in this example.
SE A range of fees is charged depending on the size of the establishment. The range for cattle is
€12-25 per head. The largest slaughterhouses pay the lowest fee.
The minimum and maximum charges (€12 and €25 per head) are used in this example.
A1.2.1.3 B1 - Summary
General conclusions
Full harmonisation on the basis of a unified schedule of rates is likely to have a negative
impact on the official control system across the EU-27.
There are valid questions about how feasible this option is. Development of a cost model or
set of pricing principles for each official controls that was seen by stakeholders to be fair and
appropriate (given control costs) would be an extremely challenging exercise. Due to the
significant differences in the organisation of official controls systems, variation in cost factors,
etc. amongst Member States it would be impossible to identify a fee level that would be
appropriate for every country.
Harmonised fees would also be politically difficult to implement in MS with highly
decentralised decision making and governance structures. In MS with decentralised OC
systems, it may not be possible to specify the fee rates under existing national legislative
arrangements. There are cases where new national legislation would be needed.
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The magnitude of impacts
The scale of the impact of this option on individual Member States and on individual FBOs
would be determined by the level at which the harmonised fee was set for any given control
and how that relates to the existing (baseline) fee. This is not known.
Incidence of impact and distributional issues
Impacts would fall primarily within the EU. This option would, in principle, impact on all
FBOs subject to fees for official controls, and the income of all entities that collect such fees.
The distribution of impacts is affected by the level at which harmonised fees are set. If fees
were harmonised at the level of the highest prevailing fee in Europe then aggregate payment
by industry would rise substantially. If the fees were harmonised at the level of the lowest
prevailing fee then industry would, on balance, gain but there would be a corresponding
deficit in government income and in the overall cost-recovery rate. If fees were set in the
middle of the current range then there would be ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ on a state-by-state
basis. In MS with relatively higher costs, a harmonised fee rate could reduce resources
available for performing official controls. In MS with relatively lower costs, harmonised fees
could result in fee levels that are higher than actual costs, placing an unfair burden on FBOs.
Businesses in eastern MS, where costs and fees tend to be lower, would on balance pay
more whereas businesses in some western and northern MS, where fees tend to be higher,
would pay less.
The net impact on business would also be influenced by how governments (including, where
relevant, local municipalities) responded to any income deficit on official control fees – e.g.
whether they raised local business taxes to generate compensating revenues.
There is no particular SME bias to the impacts but clearly in a scenario whether the option
resulted in large changes in fees then many SMEs would be affected.
The distribution of impacts is also influenced by the specification and development of the
option. There is ambiguity in the option (as specified) in terms of how it would affect
variation in the scope and application of fees at Member State level – for instance, if a
Member State does not currently charge for a particular control would Option A mean that it
was obliged to do so? This creates some additional uncertainty in the definition of impacts
and again means that analysis has to be restricted to issues of principle and the direction of
change that the change in principle would be expected to create.
Compliance costs and administrative burdens
This option would avoid the administrative burdens associated with calculating, discussing,
setting and communicating local/regional/national fees. However, if fees were to be set on
the basis of aggregate cost to the EU as a whole of a given control then it would imply that
cost data would need to be reported to the Commission. As discussed below there is a cost
to that cost collation, especially in Member States where responsibility is devolved to lower
tiers of government. Fee harmonisation would also negate the need for minimum fees in the
legislation, and the associated administrative costs.
There would then be the task of setting harmonised fees on the basis of that information and
operating the associated administrative and consultative processes. As noted above, it
would be very challenging to develop and operate a cost model for each control.
As noted above, this option could have a very significant impact on the aggregate cost to
business of official controls and change the distribution of such costs across the EU.
Cost-benefit assessment
This option could have a very significant impact on the aggregate cost to business of official
controls and change the distribution of such costs across the EU. Where harmonised fees
are set at the highest common denominator, MS with low costs will obtain higher revenue
from fees than the costs of the control activity, which puts an unfair burden on businesses.
Where harmonised fees are set at the lowest common denominator, MS with high costs will
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not receive sufficient revenue to recover costs, and may have to increase taxes or use other
means to fund control activities.
It will also affect the administrative costs to government for operating fee charging systems.
Harmonised fees would lower administrative costs for determining fees at MS level, but
would likely increase costs for collating information in order for the EU to assess and
determine the harmonised fee rate.
The benefits include greater transparency and simplification of a complex fee setting system
across the EU. The option would, however, undermine the cost recovery principle set out in
the legislation. The costs are expected to outweigh the benefits for this option.
A1.2.2 Sub-option B2: Adjust unified fees using a cost of living index
A1.2.2.1 B2 - Specification
This sub-option is a modified version of full harmonisation in which harmonised fees are
adjusted for each Member State using a cost of living index (e.g. based on Purchasing
Power Parity or other price indexes).
A1.2.2.2 B2 –Evidence and analysis
Respondent scores and comments
Respondents were again asked to consider whether they agree or disagree with a set of
advantages and disadvantages for Option B1 and to offer any additional benefits or
drawbacks. They were also asked to consider whether including a cost-of-living index would
change their assessment of Option B.
The scores awarded by survey respondents as regards the impacts of this policy option are
summarised in Figure A1.28. Selected comments from CAs and industry are provided in
Table A1.35.
CA and industry respondents agreed that the sub-option could have slightly positive effects
on the functioning of the OC system. Indexing harmonised fees for cost of living would
reduce some respondent concerns related to the potential for excessively high or low fee
rates. However, the positive overall impact represented in Figure A1.28 fails to convey the
range of divergent respondent opinion. CAs felt that the sub-option would be difficult to
enforce, and could increase distortions rather than reduce them. Industry believes that
although harmonisation could simplify the administration of the OC system, it would not
necessarily improve the effectiveness of the system and would be unable to account for the
significant differences between OC systems in the Member States. Overall, respondents
argued that full harmonisation would not adequately improve the current OC system.
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Figure A1.28 CAs indicated that the impact of harmonised fees with a cost of living adjustment could be positive overall; industry respondents indicated weakly positive or no impact under this sub-option
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0Efficiency
Simplification
ComparabilityStreamlining
Accountability
Industry Competent Authorities
Base = 22 industry responses; 14 CA responses
Average score awarded by survey respondents based on a scale where -2 means ‘significant negative impact’ and +2 means ‘significant positive impact’. Responses that received a score of ‘don’t know’ are not included in the score.
Study respondents provided the following comments regarding this policy option:
Table A1.35 Sub-option B2: Comments provided by survey respondents about full harmonisation, fee adjustment using a cost of living index
Competent Authority Industry
Positive
▪ [There would be] fewer [sic] legal
issues.
▪ Allows efficient administration of funds
at national level.
▪ Harmonisation is crucial and MS should
be charged the same effective rate
taking into account the real difference in
costs of providing equivalent services
given significant variation in labour
charges.
Negative
▪ The system might be rather complex,
bureaucratic and subject to on-going
challenge.
▪ Efficiency gains [would] depend on the
choice of harmonized fee, i.e. unit or
time.
▪ ...this system would be difficult to
enforce and possibly result in even
greater distortion than at present.
▪ Harmonisation of the fee doesn't
necessarily means that official controls
are harmonised or standardized
▪ Although this [option] takes into account
differences on cost of living index, it still
fails to address some of the main
▪ [Full harmonisation] does not take into
account the national risk profile.
▪ Set fees at EU level would put pressure
on profligate CAs to maximise efficiency
of delivery and to negotiate more risk-
based controls that would require less
input.
▪ One EU price might not necessarily
provide all member states with
adequate financial means.
▪ [Full harmonisation] does not reflect the
different structures / ways of working in
the MS. [It] does not reflect the real
costs to all (flat rate), [does] not take
into account different real costs (e.g.
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Competent Authority Industry
shortcomings presented with current
system.
costs for labour, transport, analysis
etc.).
Case study assessment
Results from the case studies reflect the inherent uncertainty as to the direction of change
under harmonised fees with a cost-of-living adjustment. Less extreme versions of the two
scenarios set out under sub-option B1 remain:
1. Fees may be set high enough to ensure that a cost-of-living index ensures full cost
recovery in the most expensive Member State; or
2. Fees are set low enough to ensure that in the least expensive Member State fees are not
higher than the actual cost of controls.
There will be some ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ under either scenario, with CAs in some Member
States profiting under the first scenario and some industries bearing unnecessary costs. In
the second scenario, many CAs will not be able to cover costs with fees. Additionally, where
fee rates must be adjusted based on currency fluctuations (e.g. the UK), the sub-option is
likely to add administrative cost and bureaucratic challenges for CAs.
Strict rules would be required to ensure that MS maintain harmonised fee rates and the cost-
of-living adjustments are likely to be burdensome on CAs.
The scores awarded by respondents in the case study countries as regards the impacts of
this policy option are summarised in Figure A1.29.
Figure A1.29 There was significant variation in reactions to the option among the case study countries
-2
-1
0
1
2BG
FL
FR
NL
PL
UK
Comparability Net score Simplif ication
Base = 22 industry responses; 11 CA responses
Average score awarded by survey respondents based on a scale where -2 means ‘significant negative impact’ and +2 means ‘significant positive impact’.
Full harmonisation, indexed for cost of living differences, has similar levels of support in the
case study countries as full harmonisation based on a unified fee rate. Only France has
slightly higher levels of support for the cost of living adjusted harmonised fee rate compared
to the unified fee. French stakeholders believe that it would improve efficiency and
comparability. Current levels of fee recovery are very low in France, and the respondents
thought that a harmonised fee would increase fee revenue and improve the efficiency of the
OC system.
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Respondents in the Netherlands had a generally positive view of the sub-option. They were
of the opinion that harmonised fees would simplify the OC system, but expressed concerns
about the ability of legislation to ensure full harmonisation. They stated that strict provisions
would be required to prevent differences between Member States. There was a general
consensus that the sub-option would improve comparability between Member States in
relation to cost structures and fee levels. Finally, there was tentative support in relation to
potential reductions in administrative costs but this was qualified with reservations as any
impacts would depend on the final structure of harmonised fees.
The UK respondents were of the opinion that this sub-option would be complex and
bureaucratic, and would have to be frequently amended to take into account economic
growth indicators and changes to exchange rates. Respondents in the UK were consistently
negative about this sub-option across all criteria, with the exception that the option could
positively streamline official controls. Harmonised fees would likely increase pressure on
CAs, and encourage them to implement risk based systems that would be likely to reduce
administrative costs.
Other evidence
Consultations and research suggest that there is only one viable candidate for a cost of living
benchmarking for current purposes and that is Eurostat’s Price Level Indices (PLIs) which
compare average price levels across countries and are calculated from Purchasing Power
Parities. The data are produced by comparing the prices of a basket of (around 2500) goods
and services in all EU countries. The recommended option is to use the PLIs for an
aggregate called "Actual Individual Consumption". This includes both households’ own
expenditures and government's expenditures on e.g. health and education that are for the
benefit of households. Hence, it is a good indicator for the standard of living of households.
PLIs are expressed as an index with the EU27 as reference, e.g. an index of 110 means that
the country is 10% more expensive than the EU27 average46
.
One practical issue is the time-lag in publication of the index. As an example, 2010 data will
be added in December 2011. It would mean that adjustments to the relative level of fees in
individual Member States would need to be made one or two years in arrears.
46 See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/purchasing_power_parities/introduction for
more information.
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Figure A1.30 Eurostat’s Price Level Index for Actual Individual Consumption is a potential adjustment factor for harmonised fees under Sub-option A2
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
EU27 D
E
NO IE LT FL BE FR AT SE NL IT DE IS ES
GR
UK CY PT SI
MT EE LV SK CZ LT HU PL RO BG
PLI (AIC) 2009
EU27
Source: Eurostat
A1.2.2.3 B2 - Summary
General conclusions
This sub-option would be likely to have a negative overall effect on the functioning of official
control systems across the Member States. Although the sub-option could result in positive
impacts on comparability and streamlining, these are likely to be outweighed by the
significant negative impacts on efficiency and also of fairness and adherence to principles of
cost recovery.
Indexation of rates for cost of living would mitigate some of the impacts of harmonisation (as
discussed for sub-option B1 above) but the process of setting an appropriate harmonisation
fee would remain burdensome and is very unlikely to result in a schedule of fees that
reflected actual costs of inspecting individual FBOs or even whole sectors at a Member State
level.
Harmonised fees would also be politically difficult to implement in MS with highly
decentralised decision making and governance structures. In MS with decentralised OC
systems, it may not be possible to specify the fee rates under existing national legislative
arrangements.
The magnitude of impacts
As with B1, the magnitude of impacts would be determined by the level at which the
reference (harmonised) price was set. This is not known.
Incidence of impact and distributional issues
As with B1 impacts would fall primarily within the EU and this option would, in principle,
impact on all FBOs subject to fees for official controls, and the income of all entities that
collect such fees.
The distribution of impacts is affected by the level at which harmonised fees are set.
Compliance costs and administrative burdens
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As with B1 this option would avoid the administrative burdens associated with calculating,
discussing, setting and communicating local/regional/national fees, and would also negate
the need for minimum fees in the legislation, and the associated administrative costs.
Yet cost data would also still need to be reported to the Commission and that is known to be
burdensome for some Member States. There would then be the task of setting harmonised
fees on the basis of that information and operating the associated administrative and
consultative processes. As noted above, it would be very challenging to develop and
operate a cost model for each control.
Though it seems likely that impacts would be less severe that those of B1, the current
specification suggests that this option could have a significant impact on the aggregate cost
to business of official controls and change the distribution of such costs across the EU.
Cost-benefit assessment
Though it seems likely that impacts would be less severe that those of sub-option B1, the
current specification suggests that this option could have a significant impact on the
aggregate cost to business of official controls and change the distribution of such costs
across the EU. It would also impact on government costs as described under sub-option B1.
There may be some benefits with respect to improved transparency and simplification of the
system, but these benefits are not thought to outweigh the costs.
A1.2.3 Sub-option B3 - Fee structures – Introduce EU harmonised fees only for certain import controls
A1.2.3.1 Specification
Sub-option B3 considers whether Regulation 882/2004 should require that certain import
controls are subject to harmonised fees, particularly those controls where there is a higher
degree of harmonisation (e.g. BIPS and DPEs). A single, uniform price would apply to any
EU border point.
A1.2.3.2 Evidence and analysis
Respondent scores and comments
Respondents were asked to consider the impact of harmonising import controls. The scores
awarded by survey respondents as regards the impacts of this policy option are summarised
in Figure A1.31. Selected comments from CAs and industry are provided in Table A1.36.
Overall, CAs and industry representatives indicated that this option would have a positive
impact on official controls systems in EU Member States. In particular, harmonised import
control fees would simplify the system, improve comparability amongst Member States and
reduce administrative burdens on CAs. Competent Authorities also foresee strong positive
impacts on efficiency and accountability. Both CAs and industry noted that harmonised fees
would reduce BIP selection at border posts, reducing competition distortions.
CAs and industry also noted, however, that in order to effect full cost recovery for all Member
States, the fee would need to be set according to the MS with the highest costs. Thus, some
Member States would profit from fee revenue above what is required to perform the control.
Some respondents indicated a preference for a cost-of-living adjusted fee rate for
harmonised controls.
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Figure A1.31 CAs and industry respondents indicate that harmonised fee rates for import controls would have a net positive impact on official controls systems
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0Efficiency
Simplification
ComparabilityStreamlining
Accountability
Industry Competent Authorities
Base = 22 industry responses; 14 CA responses
Average score awarded by survey respondents based on a scale where -2 means ‘significant negative impact’ and +2 means ‘significant positive impact’. Responses that received a score of ‘don’t know’ are not included in the score.
Table A1.36 Sub-option B3: Comments provided by survey respondents about harmonising fees for certain import controls
Competent Authority Industry
Positive
▪ [It would] simplify and harmonise [the]
rules; equal conditions would apply for
all FBOs.
▪ [It would be] easier to compare with
other countries.
▪ [It would] reduce competitive distortions
[sic] of competition, [and also] increase
transparency [and] accountability.
▪ The harmonization of fees in all EU
could avoid [the selection of BIPs on the
basis of fee level].
▪ [It would] improve [the] transparency of
costs.
▪ In order to avoid possible disruptions to
natural trade routes a minimum fee
under which no MS shall go should be
set at EU level; at the same time MS
shall be allowed to set charges between
that minimum fee and full cost recovery.
▪ [It would] avoid the selection of the EU
border point based on the level of the
fee and therefore reduces the potential
for artificial movements of goods with
higher transport distances. Meat
industry representative.
▪ Fairer competition among the border
points (airports and ports). Meat
industry representative.
▪ Improved transparency of costs,
improved choice options for customers.
Meat industry representative.
▪ Better safety of imported products.
Food sector representative.
▪ Would [reduce] trade barriers. Public
health representative.
▪ [It would promote a] level playing field
as well in the internal market as
between EU and 3rd country
competitors in similar context. Dairy
industry representative.
▪ More consistency in the controls
Animal welfare representative.
Negative
▪ The number of consignments differs ▪ Some MS may have difficulties in
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Competent Authority Industry
between countries. MS with a large
number of consignments can be more
cost-effective. Some MS may not
achieve full cost recovery.
▪ [There are] different costs per Member
States, differences [in] salaries, etc.
▪ The fees of border veterinary control
would be harmonized in different EU
countries however salaries of BIPs
veterinary inspectors would remain
different.
▪ If [the] harmonised fee is too low, [the]
CA [would] lose money.
▪ Cost of living anomalies.
▪ [It may result in] less financing for some
EU Member States controls. It doesn’t
take [account of a] cost of living index.
getting the cost covered and others may
get money out of it. Meat industry
representative.
▪ An arrangement on the basis of the
highest denominator would be
necessary. Meat industry
representative.
▪ Not indexed to the living cost. Food
and agriculture representative.
▪ Cost of living anomalies reduced
incentives to improve efficiency and
reduced competitiveness. Veterinarian
industry representative.
▪ Would not reflect local cost differences
e.g. payment rates for officials. Public
health representative.
▪ Member states will be inclined to set the
fees on a very high level to gain an
additional income from import controls
for their budgets. Food and agriculture
representative.
Case study assessment
The case studies indicate that the impacts of harmonised import controls are likely to be
similar to the impacts described under Option B1 and B2 (full harmonisation, with or without
a price-of-living adjustment). CAs with high costs for import controls will find it difficult to
recover costs if the fee is set at the highest common denominator (e.g. Finland) and CAs
with low costs will recover more fees than the actual cost of control activity (e.g. Poland).
The reverse is true in the case where the fee is set at the lowest common denominator.
FBOs benefit from a low-cost fee but face unfair cost burdens where a high-cost fee is set.
The scores awarded by respondents in the case study countries as regards the impacts of
this policy option are summarised in Figure A1.32.
Figure A1.32 There was little consistency in the scores awarded to this option across the case study Member States
-2
-1
0
1
2BG
FL
FR
NL
PL
UK
Eff iciency Net score Accountability
Base = 22 industry responses; 11 CA responses
Average score awarded by survey respondents based on a scale where -2 means ‘significant negative impact’ and +2 means ‘significant positive impact’.
The case study results illustrate the disparity between the principle of harmonised controls,
which has a high level of support amongst respondents, and the practice of implementing
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these controls. Where respondents considered the practical implementation issues, a
negative response was often given. For example, in Finland, respondents are concerned that
harmonised fees could lead to over- and/or under-funding of CA activity depending on the
basis for harmonised fees. Respondents also raised concerns that harmonised fees would
complicate and increase administrative costs to controls system in Finland because it would
require oversight at Central Administration level, whereas controls are generally the
responsibility of municipal bodies.
In Poland, harmonised fees would likely have a significant positive impact on efficient cost
recovery, as the fee rate is likely to be set higher than the actual costs of control activity in
this Member State. But, as fees are often negotiated between the central CA and industry,
harmonised fees could reduce the flexibility for such agreements, giving industry a reduced
role in the process. Moreover, harmonised fees would likely result in increased costs to
industry above the actual cost for CAs to perform the control activities.
UK respondents believe that while harmonisation could have positive impacts, it is unlikely to
be practical to implement due to the highly varied organisation of official controls systems in
EU Member States and significant variation in costs.
Other evidence
Some indication of the distribution of impacts could be estimated where the number of FBOs
subject to import controls is known. This information, however, is unavailable. Where import
controls information is provided in detail by Member States through the Regulation 882/2004
Annual Reports, this information refers only to the number of inspection centres that are
subject to controls (i.e. those belonging to a BIP) and the total number of checks by
category, not to the number of affected businesses.
A1.2.4 Summary of impact assessment results for harmonising fees for certain import controls
General conclusions
Harmonisation of fees for import controls is likely to have a negative impact on the official
controls systems across the EU-27.
The argument for harmonised fees for import controls is that it would create a ‘level playing
field’ across the EU-27 for such fees and remove the potential for trade distortions derived
from importers seeking out border points with lower fees. Yet evidence for such ‘BIP
shopping’ could not be found through this study.
Development of a cost model or set of pricing principles for import controls that is viewed by
stakeholders as fair and appropriate (given control costs) would be an extremely challenging
exercise. Due to the significant differences in the organisation of official controls systems,
variation in cost factors, and other issues amongst Member States, it would be impossible to
identify a fee level that would be appropriate for every country.
A cost-of-living adjustment for these controls would face the same challenges described
under Option B2. Indexation of rates for cost of living would mitigate some of the impacts of
harmonisation, but the process of setting an appropriate, harmonised fee would remain
burdensome and is unlikely to result in a schedule of fees that reflects actual costs of
inspection.
Harmonised fees would also be politically difficult to implement in MS with highly
decentralised decision-making and governance structures. In MS with decentralised OC
systems, it may not be possible to specify the fee rates under existing national legislative
arrangements.
The magnitude of impact
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As with sub-options B1 and B2, the magnitude of impacts would be determined by the level
at which the reference (harmonised) price was set, which is unknown. Furthermore, baseline
data are missing for most countries—the fees currently charged for import controls are also
unknown.
Incidence of impact and distributional issues
As with sub-options B1 and B2, impacts would fall primarily within the EU and this option
would, in principle, impact on all FBOs subject to import controls, and the income of all
entities that collect such fees.
The distribution of impacts is affected by the level at which harmonised fees are set, which is
unspecified. As with sub-options B1 and B2, however, there would be ‘winners’ and ‘losers’
depending on whether the harmonised fee resulted in MS receiving more revenue than the
cost of import control activities or insufficient revenue to recover costs.
Compliance costs and administrative burdens
As with sub-options B1 and B2, this sub-option would avoid the administrative burdens
associated with calculating, discussing, setting and communicating local/regional/national
fees, and would also negate the need for minimum fees in the legislation, and the associated
administrative costs.
Yet cost data would also still need to be reported to the Commission and that is known to be
burdensome for some Member States. There would then be the task of setting harmonised
fees on the basis of that information and operating the associated administrative and
consultative processes. As noted in Options B1 and B2, it would be challenging to develop
and operate a cost model for the relevant controls.
Cost-benefit assessment
The costs are likely to be similar for those identified under sub-options B1 and B2.
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A1.3 Option C – Repeal Articles 26-29 of the Regulation (full subsidiarity)
This section considers the second strategic option – deregulation.
A1.3.1.1 C - Specification
Under Option C Member States would be obliged to allocate ‘sufficient resources’ to official
controls but each Member State would be free to determine its own approach to the setting
of fees. Option C requires repeal of Articles 26-29 in Regulation (EC) 882/2004. This is
broadly equivalent to the ‘full subsidiarity’ option in the 2009 FCEC study.
A1.3.1.2 C – Evidence and analysis
Respondent scores and comments
Respondents were asked to consider whether they agree or disagree with a set of
advantages and disadvantages for Option C and to offer any additional benefits or
drawbacks. The scores awarded by survey respondents as regards the impacts of this
policy option are summarised in Figure A1.33. Selected comments from CAs and industry
are provided in Table A1.37.
Competent Authorities and industry hold similarly negative views of this option. CAs
expressed concerns that full subsidiary would increase disparities between MS, which could
increase pressure to reduce fees in order to gain a competitive advantage over other
Member States. Industry had similar concerns about the negative consequences of full
subsidiarity, but in several instances these related to CAs operating inefficiently, charging
excessively high fees or conducting controls that are not strictly necessary.
Figure A1.33 CAs and industry uniformly indicated that the impacts of full subsidiarity are likely to be negative overall.
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0Efficiency
Simplification
ComparabilityStreamlining
Accountability
Industry Competent Authorities
Base = 22 industry responses; 14 CA responses
Average score awarded by survey respondents based on a scale where -2 means ‘significant negative impact’ and +2 means ‘significant positive impact’. Responses that received a score of ‘don’t know’ are not included in the score.
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Table A1.37 Option C: Comments provided by survey respondents about full subsidiarity
Competent Authority Industry
Positive
▪ Full subsidiarity may put the politicians
in the driving seat with negative or
positive consequences dependent on
the influence of the stakeholders and
can even lead to discrimination between
sectors.
▪ [Full subsidiarity could] encourage the
provision of efficient services.
▪ ...if this option is used properly it [sic]
will cover actual costs and enable
allocation of resources for the control.
▪ [The option] recognizes that
harmonisation is not possible.
Negative
▪ Local authorities [sic] won't necessarily
use [the] ‘possible greater potential to
cover real costs’.
▪ Although such principle offers potential,
in reality it creates a practical difficulty
due to potential inter MS distortions.
▪ It would be extremely difficult (if not
impossible) for MS to develop fee
systems or even increase levels of cost
recovery in a completely disharmonized
EU environment, due to stakeholders
pressure, fears of possible distortions to
trade or competitive disadvantages
being created to the national sector.
▪ Well developed national charges
systems could be undermined, and this
approach may negatively affect the
delivery of OCs due to diminishing
financial resources with an ultimate
outcome of reduced consumer
protection.
▪ Full subsidiarity may put the politicians
in the driving seat with negative or
positive consequences dependent on
the influence of the stakeholders and
can even lead to discrimination between
sectors.
▪ Full subsidiarity would [allow] CAs to
recoup the full cost of inefficiently
delivered official controls, and [it] would
[also] remove drivers to achieve
efficiency and negotiate more risk-
based controls in the fresh meat sector.
▪ This system would permit a MS to
'abuse' the level of flexibility permitted
within the regulations such that OCs
could be gold-plated or watered down to
inappropriate levels. If a MS determines
that OCs do not 'add value' then they
could feasibly simply seek to undermine
the inspection process by failing to fund
or resource it as required.
▪ Full subsidiarity would not necessarily
lead to greater 'accountability'.
Case study assessment
Full subsidiarity is likely to have a significant negative impact on most of the case study
countries. It is likely to increase pressure on CAs to reduce fee rates in order to ensure that
FBOs are not disadvantaged relative to fee rates in other Member States. Cost recovery is
likely to decrease as a result.
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Figure A1.34 Overall, respondents in the case study countries indicated that the impact of full subsidiarity is likely to be negative; Belgium foresees a potentially weak positive effect.
-2
-1
0
1
2BG
FL
FR
NL
PL
UK
Streamlining Net score Simplif ication
Base = 22 industry responses; 11 CA responses
Average score awarded by survey respondents based on a scale where -2 means ‘significant negative impact’ and +2 means ‘significant positive impact’.
The majority of the case study respondents expected that this option would have a negative
impact on the official controls system in their respective countries. A common concern was
that full subsidiarity would result in a downward pressure on fees as MS attempted to ensure
that their FBOs are not at a competitive disadvantage.
Respondents in the UK were particularly concerned that full harmonisation would eventually
reduce the financing available for official controls to such an extent that it would result in the
failure to provide official controls. Respondents from the Netherlands expressed divergent
opinions in relation to the potential impacts to simplification. Some expected that there
would be no change as a result of the option, while others thought it would lead to more
complicated legislation. The potential for complicated legislation was related to concerns
that FBOs would be at an unfair cost disadvantage relative to fees in other MS. French
respondents were consistent in their view that full subsidiarity would have a negative impact
on their OC system; it would lead to lower fees and increase inconsistencies between
inspections.
Respondents in Belgium were the only group to consider that the option would have a
positive impact on official controls. As the option would enable the tailoring of the OC
system to the local situation, the respondents thought that it would improve the efficiency of
the Belgian system. In particular, full subsidiarity would provide the flexibility for the CA to
move costs from one budget to another. In addition, full subsidiarity would simplify the
Belgian system so that only two issues would have to be addressed: full cost recovery under
mandatory fees, and the controls subject to mandatory fees.
Other evidence
Member States already exhibit significantly wide variance in their fee collection for control
activities. Cost recovery rates vary across MS from as little as 37 per cent in Belgium to 100
per cent claimed in Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia (Table A1.8), and within Member
States depending on the governance arrangements for fee collection (decentralised to
centralised) and the sector (e.g. import controls often do adequately recover costs through
fees). This degree of variation can be seen across each issue examined in this study,
including the availability of information to the public (Table A1.26), the rates and controls
covered by time-based fees (Figure A1.12), charging practices and scope of fees for non-
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mandatory controls (Table A1.4), bonus-malus principles in operation (Table A1.23), and
degree of ring-fencing (Table A1.21).
Full subsidiarity is likely to increase the degree of variation amongst official control systems
across the EU-27, and likely to reduce comparability between MS, and transparency and
accountability of CAs as a result.
A1.3.1.3 C - Summary
General conclusions
Full subsidiarity could have a positive impact on the functioning of official controls systems; it
would enable CAs to organise controls in a way that most appropriately reflects the particular
characteristics of their systems. This could reduce unnecessary control activities and
improve overall efficiency.
However, it is more likely that full subsidiary would have a negative impact on the OC
system. It would widen disparities between Member States, and increase pressure on CAs
to lower fees to maintain industry’s competitive advantage. Over time this would reduce the
level of resources available to finance official controls, resulting in a reduction in control
activity.
The magnitude of impacts
The magnitude of impacts cannot be stated with any confidence because they would be
determined entirely by how Member States decided to modify their domestic fee regimes in
the absence of the framework for that provided by current EU legislation.
Incidence of impact and distributional issues
The incidence of impacts on business and authorities of this option would be indirect and are
uncertain – as stated above, they would be determined by how Member States decided to
modify their domestic fee regimes once given the freedom to do so.
Commentary on how domestic policies might develop under such a scenario would be
essentially speculative. However, it seems reasonable to assume that over time Member
States’ systems would diversify further, potentially with impacts on the Single Market.
Compliance costs and administrative burdens
This option would remove those administrative burdens associated with administration of
minimum fees and other processes specific to the European legislation, but Member States
would still face the costs of administering their domestic fee regime.
Cost-benefit assessment
The overall effect of this option depends on the approach taken by each Member State in
response to this proposed change. Full subsidiarity could result in Member States charging
higher fees in order to better recover costs or it could result in MS charging fees below
current rates due to pressure from industry to compete against other MS. Where fees are
lowered, industry would benefit from lower costs, but MS would face costs associated with
insufficient funds to carry out the required activities. Where they are raised, MS would benefit
from higher cost recovery, but industry would face higher costs. Administrative costs to
Member States may also be higher or lower depending on whether subsidiarity leads MS to
streamline their systems, or if it increases their complexity and therefore the resources
required to operate them.
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Annex 2 Member State case studies
This annex reports the results of case study research carried out in:
▪ Belgium
▪ Finland
▪ France
▪ Netherlands
▪ Poland
▪ UK
These case studies involved interviews with competent authorities and industry
representatives, data requests and supplementary analysis.
These Member States were selected for their variety of approaches to financing of official
controls, including differences in the prevailing rates of cost recovery, differing use of bonus-
malus systems, and differences in organisational (centralised/devolved).
A2.1 Belgium
A2.1.1 Introduction
This case study was informed by three interviews (two CAs and one industry representative)
and four returned questionnaires. The Federation for the Food Industry (FEVIA) responded
on behalf of the Belgian food industry.
A2.1.2 Option A: Improve the current system
Stakeholders generally agree that the official controls system in Belgium functions well and
that adjustments per Option C sub-options could improve the system.
A2.1.3 Sub-option A1: Extend the scope of mandatory fees
Belgium collects levies from all companies active in the food chain, from primary production
to retail and restaurants. Fees are charged, unit based or time based, for all legally required
activities, and also for other services on request.
The CA has expressed a desire to increase the scope of mandatory fees to include:
certification; approval for feed and food business establishments, and for laboratory tests
required in response to random / once off food safety issues.
Table A2.38 Sub-option A1: Impacts in Belgium of extending the scope of mandatory fees
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency 0 According to the CA, this option will have little or no effect, as most activities are
already covered by fees and all food businesses pay a levy. A substantial part of
the CA’s budget comes from the government (approximately 62%). This
percentage will likely change marginally by extension of mandatory fees to
those listed above.
Simplification 0 No impacts identified.
Comparability + The allocation of all food producing industries to mandatory fees could reduce
distortions between MS.
Streamlining - The administrative burden for CAs could increase if more establishments are
subject to mandatory fees.
Accountability 0 No impacts identified.
A2.1.4 Sub-option A2: Require full cost recovery
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Table A2.39 Option A2: Impacts in Belgium of requiring full cost recovery
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency + Full cost recovery would improve resourcing of official controls.
Simplification -- The main source of funding for official controls is currently public funding. Full
cost recovery would be likely to require additional national legislation (to collect
adequate fee revenues and to ensure that CAs can be funded in the absence of
public funds).
Comparability + It would improve comparability between MS and encourage fair competition.
Streamlining 0 No impacts identified.
Accountability 0 No impacts identified.
A2.1.4.2 Sub-option A3: Clearly define eligible costs
Stakeholders agreed that a clear definition of eligible costs would be useful, but disagreed
about what the list should contain. The CA that all possible costs should be considered, but
industry though that they should be limited to salaries and equipment used during inspection.
Table A2.40 Sub-option A3: Impacts in Belgium of a clearly defining eligible costs
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency + A clear definition of costs could help in financing official controls as it would
improve understanding of what fees should relate to.
Simplification ++ Clear definitions are likely to simplify the OC system and are unlikely to require
major changes to the system.
Comparability ++ Although using the same list of eligible costs does not necessarily mean that
systems will be the same in MS, positive impacts on comparability are expected.
It would result in a relative improvement from the current situation.
Streamlining + A clear definition of eligible costs would reduce the administrative burden for
stakeholders as only agreed costs would be considered in fee calculation rates.
Accountability + The option would be likely to improve transparency of what fees are based on,
which would thus increase accountability.
A2.1.4.3 Sub-option A4: Time-based fees and flat fees
Belgium operates unit based fees in slaughterhouses, which are dependent on the number
of animals slaughtered per hour. Certificates are issued on a per unit basis. Other activities
are time-based.
Table A2.41 Option A4: Impacts in Belgium of the introduction of time-based fees for which the continuous of systematic presence of official controls in required
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency + Time based fees are already used. However, increased use of flat fees could
improve efficiency as it would encourage FBOs to increase their operational
activity and contribute to the smooth operation of controls.
Simplification + Existing legislation would need only a slight adaptation for wider introduction of
time-based fees.
Comparability - Time-based fees would reflect the unique situations in individual MS, which is
likely to reduce comparability.
Streamlining ++ Simplifying the fee structure would reduce the administrative burden for
stakeholders. Time-based fees would also encourage staff to be more efficient.
Accountability + A common approach to define costs would improve accountability.
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A2.1.5 Sub-option A5: Requiring ring-fencing of resources
Table A2.42 Option A5: Impacts in Belgium of ring-fencing resources
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency 0 No impacts identified.
Simplification 0 It would not require significant revisions to existing legislation.
Comparability 0 Ring fencing, as such, does not contribute to comparability.
Streamlining - Ring-fencing could require additional administrative input by CAs.
Accountability + It would clarify the relationship between costs and fee revenue.
A2.1.6 Sub-option A6: Incorporate bonus-malus system principles
A bonus-malus system is in operation based on certification of the company’s food safety
system. Meat inspection is based on the number of animals inspected. The real salary costs
are time based. In order to achieve realistic cost recovery, slaughterhouses with a higher
throughput have a reduced fee per animal slaughtered. Effectively, efficient slaughterhouses
pay less per head of animal. This can be seen either as the implementation of bonus-malus
principles or as stratification of costs in relation to the hours spent by the inspector.
Table A2.43 Option A6: Impacts in Belgium of introducing a bonus-malus principles
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency ++ Bonus-malus principles, when effective, would reduce the total income of the CA,
but it could also improve the efficiency of controls and contribute to food safety.
Simplification + Elements of a bonus-malus system already exist in Belgium. It would not be
difficult to incorporate in national legislation.
Comparability + If all MS apply a bonus-malus system it would not cause significant distortions,
and would be likely to improve comparability (if only slightly).
Streamlining -- It could complicate the administration of the OC system as different groups of
enterprises would have to be treated and considered differently.
Accountability 0 No impacts identified.
A2.1.7 Sub-option A7: Introduce transparency and reporting requirements
The CA produces a very detailed annual report on the activities and finances, which is
available on the CA website. This provides information for the consumers and industry. All
documents can be found on the website including the relevant legislation.
Table A2.44 Sub-option A7: Impacts in Belgium of introducing transparency and reporting requirements
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency 0 The CA of Belgium already produces an extensive annual report which fulfils
the requirement. So no change is to be expected.
Simplification 0 No change is to be expected.
Comparability 0 No change is to be expected.
Streamlining 0 No change is to be expected.
Accountability 0 No change is to be expected.
A2.1.8 Sub-option A8: Provide for industry participation
The CA has an advisory committee in which representatives from consumers, primary
production, food processors (three of the four haven been consulted for this investigation),
food trade, catering and restaurants, transport, and feed.
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Table A2.45 Sub-option A8: Impacts in Belgium of providing for industry participation
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency + Increasing participation would improve the fairness of the fee schedules and
increase the rate of acceptance as a result.
Simplification + Improving industry participation could simplify the OC system.
Comparability + It would increase transparency, which would improve comparability.
Streamlining - Could lead to increased administrative burden as it would be relatively
complicated to implement.
Accountability + It would increase transparency, which would improve accountability.
A2.1.9 Sub-option A9: Introduce exemptions and reductions for micro-enterprises
Table A2.46 Sub-option A9: Impacts in Belgium of introducing exemptions and reductions for micro-enterprises
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency - Negative impacts on efficiency likely as it would decrease the rate of cost
recovery. As exemptions and reductions would be introduced for a social reason,
the costs would have to be met by public funding.
Simplification 0 No impacts identified.
Comparability - Comparability likely to be reduced as MS have different proportion of micro-
enterprises in their OC systems.
Streamlining - The option would create an extra category in the OC system, which would require
additional administration. However the impact is likely to be limited.
Accountability 0 No impacts identified.
A2.1.10 Option B: Fully harmonise inspection fees for official controls
Full harmonisation was viewed unfavourably by stakeholders. They argued that full
harmonisation would be unable to reflect the specific situation in Belgium, which could create
significant inconsistencies and jeopardise the functioning of the system. It was considered
inflexible, unable to accommodate the specific needs of the country and insufficient to deliver
comparable official control systems between Member States.
A2.1.10.1 Option B1: Fees for provision of controls are determined on a unified basis for the EU as a whole (i.e. the same fee rates apply in each Member State)
Table A2.47 Option B1: Impacts of full harmonisation in Belgium where the same fee rates apply in each MS
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency -- Harmonisation would be difficult as the content of the control activity would have
to be harmonised to avoid significant differences between inspection costs and
fee revenue. It is likely that harmonisation would result in fees that are too high
or too low.
Simplification - It is likely that harmonisation would require additional national legislation in
Belgium.
Comparability - While harmonisation could improve comparability between MS on a legislative
basis, it would also introduce distortions. MS would have to adapt the system to
their specific needs to prevent unwanted or unrealistic situations. It would be
difficult to find a common denominator, which could result in fees not being
collected or significant adaptations to the frequency of controls.
Streamlining - Harmonisation could increase the number of activities for which fees are
collected, increasing the administrative burden. However, calculating fees on a
per unit basis would reduce this impact somewhat.
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Accountability 0 No impacts identified.
A2.1.11 Option B2: Harmonised fees are adjusted for each Member State using a cost of living index
Although adjusting harmonised fees based on a cost of living could alleviate some concerns,
stakeholder’s views for this option were the same as those for harmonisation based on the
same fee rates in each MS.
Table A2.48 Option B2: Impacts of full harmonisation in Belgium where fee rates adjusted using a cost of living index apply in each MS
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency -- Harmonisation, even indexed to cost of living, would be difficult as the content of
the control activity would have to be harmonised to avoid significant differences
between inspection costs and fee revenue. It is likely that harmonisation would
result in fees that are too high or too low.
Simplification - It is likely that harmonisation would require additional national legislation in
Belgium.
Comparability - While harmonisation could improve comparability between MS on a legislative
basis, it would also introduce distortions. MS would have to adapt the system to
their specific needs to prevent unwanted or unrealistic situations. It would be
difficult to find a common denominator, which would result in fees not being
collected, or significant adaptations to the frequency of controls.
Streamlining - Harmonisation could increase the number of activities for which fees are
collected, increasing the administrative burden. However, calculating fees on a
per unit basis would reduce this impact somewhat.
Accountability 0 No impacts identified.
A2.1.12 Sub-option B3: Harmonise fees for certain import controls
The current system in Belgium is unit based for import controls.
Table A2.49 Option B3: Harmonise fees in Belgium for certain import controls
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency 0 Currently, cost recovery is not directly related to each consignment in the unit
based system. Therefore, the tariff can be adjusted to a level that makes the
fees for import controls cost effective. In a harmonised system, with the same
tariff all over Europe, it will be dependent on the tariff whether full costs for the
import controls will be recovered. It would be very difficult to set a fee at the
correct level that recovers costs but avoids profits on the import controls.
Simplification - Unit-based fees are straightforward to implement, but harmonisation would
require additional EU regulations.
Comparability + Harmonised fees would improve comparability and reduce the selection of ports
on the basis of fee levels.
Streamlining 0 A similar system is currently in operation, so minimal adaptation would be
required.
Accountability 0 No impacts identified.
A2.1.13 Option C: Repeal Articles 26-29 of the Regulation (full subsidiarity)
Table A2.50 Option C: Impacts of full subsidiarity in Belgium where fee rates are set differently in each Member State
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency ++ The option would enable the tailoring of the OC system to the local situation,
which would have a positive impact on the efficiency. The CA would have the
flexibility to move costs from on budget to another.
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Simplification + It is likely that minimal changes would be required to national legislation. It
would probably improve the simplicity of the system in Belgium. The system
would only have to address two issues; full cost recovery with mandatory fees,
and the controls subject to mandatory fees.
Comparability - Could reduce comparability due different fee structures and levels between MS.
Streamlining 0 Could reduce the administrative burden for CAs as they could organise their
fees for controls as per their specific needs, that is, administration and OC
activities could be fully complementary. However industry’s cost could increase
if more controls are brought under mandatory fees.
Accountability 0 No impacts identified.
A2.1.14 Issues/considerations
Full harmonisation is not considered a ‘real solution’. It would be difficult to adapt
harmonised fees to the Belgian situation. In addition, time registration poses difficulties for
properly recording the respective definition of the units. Respondents expressed doubts in
relation of feasibility that is, that a definition of costs per unit or the time spent on a certain
task will be difficult to harmonise.
Full subsidiarity is considered to be very positive by the CA on all parameters, except for
comparability and accountability. Some drawbacks identified include potential trade
distortions and the loss of a common approach across Europe.
Improving the current system is welcomed by all stakeholders. Time based fees are
considered a feasible option, but not for import controls. Time based fees, and the costs they
relate to, should be based on common EU rules. Stakeholders consider it likely that time
based fees would reduce the admin burden over time. Harmonised fees for import controls
are welcomed by all respondents.
Labour costs differ substantially between the MSs. A standard fee per unit, in euro, all over
Europe leads to differences in cost recovery by the respective CAs. It will result in either
surplus or financial deficit, leading to not a full cost recovery (too much or too little).
Extending the scope of mandatory fees was welcomed by the CA, but not by FBOs. The CA
mentions in particular mandatory fees for: certification, approval of food and feed
establishments, audits/services on request of the FBO and extra controls needed in case
harmful products entered the market.
Concerns were expressed about introducing exemptions for micro-businesses; respondents
thought it could increase risks to food safety, and should only be granted to FBOs with a
good track record.
Industry did not think that the transparency and reporting option would lead to many
changes.
Bonus-malus principles are welcomed and already in operation. Food business operators
with a certified food safety system, either certified by the FAVV or another certification body,
benefit from reduced fees.
Full recovery of costs is viewed positively by the CA, but the industry considers controls (at
least) partly a public service which should be covered by the MS budget.
Ring fencing was considered to contribute to the correct allocation of costs.
A2.1.14.1 Conclusions
Some overarching observations include:
▪ The CA does not expect much change in future. It wishes to continue the present system
as it is well adapted to the Belgian situation.
▪ Fees should be set based on local costs, but under EU common rules.
▪ Import fees should be harmonised, but time-based in order to provide a better service.
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▪ Full recovery of costs should include all costs, including for example, overheads, training,
office facilities, etc.
Potential effects of the options include:
▪ Efficiency: the CA sees the efficiency (collecting money) favourable when the scope of
mandatory fees is extended and full subsidiarity is accomplished. Industry considers
opposite. No major effects are anticipated
▪ Simplification: clear definition of eligible costs will contribute
▪ Comparability: industry participation and transparency and reporting will contribute.
Extension of the scope will have a positive effect supposed by the CA, but a negative is
expected by the industry
▪ Streamlining: very divergent opinions in relation to full harmonisation and full subsidiarity,
but harmonisation of fees for import controls and definition of costs have a positive
effect.
▪ Accountability: clear definition of costs and transparency and reporting contribute as
does industry participation in setting fees.
Options as seen acceptable by several parties include:
▪ Time based fees
▪ Harmonised fees for import controls
▪ Definition of eligible costs
▪ Bonus-malus
Options with diverging acceptance include:
▪ Full subsidiarity, the CA is in favour
▪ Extension of the scope of mandatory fees
▪ Exemptions for micro enterprises
Options facing resistance include:
▪ Full recovery of costs
▪ Extension of the scope of mandatory fees (industry)
Options contributing to the acceptance of fees include:
▪ Industry participation in setting fees
▪ Ring fencing
▪ Accountability
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A2.1.14.2 Belgium: summary table of option analysis
Table A2.51 Belgium: summary table of option analysis
Option Parameter/score
Efficiency Simplification Comparability Streamlining Accountability
A Improve the current system
A1 Extend scope of mandatory
fees
0 0 + - 0
A2 Full cost recovery + -- + 0 0
A3 Clear definition of eligible
costs
+ ++ ++ + +
A4 Time-based fees + + - ++ +
A5 Ring-fencing resources 0 0 0 - +
A6 Bonus-malus system ++ + + -- 0
A7 Transparency & reporting 0 0 0 0 0
A8 Industry participation + + + - +
A9 Micro-enterprises - 0 - - 0
B B1 Full harmonisation, unified
fees
-- - - - 0
B2 Full harmonisation, cost-of-
living adjusted
-- - - - 0
B3 Import fees 0 - + 0 0
C Full subsidiarity ++ + - 0 0
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A2.2 Finland
A2.2.1 Introduction
This case study was informed by 3 interviews (2 CA and 1 industry stakeholders) and 4
questionnaires. Information from a country profile of Finland (DG SANCO 2010), and a
study by Lepistö et al. (2010), were also used.
A2.2.2 Option A: Improve the current system
Fees for official controls are calculated differently by MFCAs across Finland. Some MFCAs
base fees on a flat rate, some fees are time based, but most are a mix of both time based
and flat fees.
A2.2.3 Sub-option A1: Extended the of scope mandatory fees
Extending the scope of mandatory fees should not pose any specific issues in Finland.
Although MFCAs are responsible for setting fee levels and conducting inspections, the range
of mandatory fees are set centrally.
Table A2.52 Sub-option A1: Impacts in Finland of extending the scope of mandatory fees
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency + The majority of MFCAs do not recover enough fees to cover actual costs.
Extending the scope of mandatory fees could help to increase the fees available
to competent authorities (CAs).
Simplification 0 It is unlikely that the sub-option will have any effect on the clarity and simplicity
of the legal framework in Finland.
Comparability + The sub-option may improve the comparability of Finland with other Member
States. In addition, it could help to improve the comparability with Finland
between the numerous MFCAs.
Streamlining -- The sub-option could require an increase in the control and inspection of
municipal CAs by central CAs to ensure that mandatory fees are being
collected. It may also result in fees being charged for activities for which there
is no specific need. Both of these factors could increase the administration
burden and increase compliance costs.
Accountability 0 Extending the scope of mandatory fees would be unlikely to change
accountability in Finland. Stakeholders have good access to information about
how controls are organised and conducted. The MANCP includes objectives on
communication, and control reports are published on the internet. Confidentiality
of controls is legislated for in the Open of Government Activities Act 621/1999.
A2.2.4 Sub-option A2: Requiring full cost recovery
The majority of CAs are under funded; only one third recover fees that cover actual costs.
Due to the high number of CAs (over 300) there is a desire amongst MFCAs to avoid
charging comparatively higher fees than a neighbouring municipality (to ensure that local
businesses remain competitive). Central government has no legal authority to influence OC
fee rates; they are set locally by MFCAs. For these reasons it is likely to be extremely
difficult to achieve full cost recovery in Finland.
Table A2.53 Option A2: Impacts in Finland of requiring full cost recovery
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency ++ The sub-option would ensure the adequate funding of OCs.
Simplification -- The sub-option would complicate the legal framework as central administration in
Finland cannot influence the fee level set by MFCAs. The sub-option would require
significant changes to the workings of Finland’s governance system (beyond official
controls).
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Comparability + Full cost recovery could improve comparability as actual costs would be apparent.
Streamlining - The sub-option is likely to increase compliance costs for industry as it would require
that industry cover all costs associated with official controls.
Accountability -- If CAs will have all official control costs provided by FBOs, it could reduce the
incentive for CAs to be as efficient as possible. Thus the sub-option could reduce
accountability.
A2.2.4.2 Sub-option A4: Time-based fees, flat fees
Table A2.54 Option A4: Impacts in Finland of the introduction of time-based fees for which the continuous of systematic presence of official controls in required
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency ++ The sub-option could have a positive impact on the financing of official controls.
Wider application of time based fees could reduce the disparity between actual
costs and the fees collected, but this would depend on the definition of eligible
costs. Introducing flat fees could improve the financing of official controls as it
would set a minimum fee for certain activities which some MFCAs may not be
currently charging for.
Simplification -- The sub-option could have major negative effect on the legal framework for official
controls in Finland. Finnish central administration does not have the legal power
to dictate how MFCAs charge for official controls. Significant legal changes would
be required in Finland for this sub-option to be implemented.
Comparability - Time-based fees could improve the comparability of official controls across the
Member States while having enough flexibility to account for Finland’s particular
cost structures. However, the introduction of flat rates could lead to distortions to
the Finnish official control system. Currently MFCAs calculate fee rates based on
actual costs and a risk assessment. The introduction of flat fees could lead to the
under funding of some MFCAs, and the over funding of others.
Streamlining - It would require an increase in the administrative control from central
administration in Finland to ensure that this sub-option is introduced across
Finland. This increase would probably result in increased costs on CAs and
industry.
Accountability 0 Introducing time based fees could improve accountability as CAs may have
communicate clearly the actions undertaken during an OC inspection. However,
introducing flat fees could reduce the accountability of CAs. Fees could be
charged at a rate higher than actual costs, and for activities which might not be
required.
A2.2.5 Sub-option A3: Clearly define eligible costs
There is a list of eligible costs used in Finland to calculate time based fees which is similar to
the list proposed in the sub-option. Finland is a relatively sparsely populated country, and as
a result travel time for OC inspections can be significant. Including travel time could place
an unfair cost burden on FBOs in remote locations.
Several respondents stated that the list of eligible costs is less important than clearly defining
and describing each eligible cost in detail. Doing so reduces confusion and avoids the mis-
interpretation of eligible costs.
Table A2.55 Sub-option A3: Impacts in Finland of clearly defining eligible costs
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency ++ It is likely that clearly defining eligible costs would increase the financing
available for performing official controls. Finland uses a similar list of eligible
costs to calculate time based fees.
Simplification 0 The sub-option would be unlikely to clarify of simplify the legal framework in
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Finland.
Comparability + The sub-option is likely to have a minor positive effect as a similar list of eligible
costs is already used to calculate time based fees in Finland. However it could
improve the comparability of the Finnish system with those in other Member
States if all were to use a standard list of eligible costs.
Streamlining + Clearly defining eligible costs could reduce the administration burden for CAs by
removing uncertainty of what they can, and cannot, charge for.
Accountability 0 As Finland already uses a similar list of eligible costs, and publishes official
control reports online, it is unlikely if the sub-option would have any effect on the
accountability of the OC system in Finland.
A2.2.6 Sub-option A5: Requiring ring-fencing of resources
Fees collected by MFCAs for OC activities are retained by MFCAs, they do not go to the
central state budget. Thus resources are somewhat ring-fenced. However the units in
MFCAs responsible for conducting OC inspections are also responsible for a range of other
inspections. FBOs inspections often include multiple activities, that is, FBOs may be
inspected for OCs in addition to other issues. It would be difficult to accurately allocate the
resources spent by a CA on OC activity only. For this reason the ring-fencing of resources
below the MFCA level (i.e. to specific units) would be practically impossible.
Table A2.56 Option A5: Impacts in Finland of requiring ring-fencing of resources
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency 0 The majority of CAs (MFCAs) do not collect enough in fees to cover the actual costs
of official control activities. Ring-fencing resources is unlikely to improve this
situation.
Simplification -- MFCAs are responsible for control activities unrelated to official controls. Due to
these institutional arrangements it is likely that requiring ring-fencing of resources
would complicate the legal framework.
Comparability 0 No effects identified.
Streamlining - Requiring ring-fencing of resources is likely to increase the administrative burden in
Finland. Identifying the resources MFCAs allocate specifically to OC activity would
not be straightforward, and would require additional administrative procedures.
Accountability + Ring-fencing of resources could improve accountability as it would help to determine
the relationship between actual OC costs and fee revenue.
A2.2.7 Sub-option A6: Incorporate bonus-malus principles
There are currently elements of a bonus-malus system in Finland. For example the Food
Act specifies that the fee rate and frequency of OC inspections should be based on risk
assessment, and the majority of CAs use time based fees in conjunction with flat fees. In
practice, however, it is not clear if risk assessment is applied regularly and consistently by
CAs.
Table A2.57 Option A6: Impacts in Finland of incorporating bonus-malus principles
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency ++ The sub-option could improve the financing of official controls as FBOs requiring
longer or more frequent inspections would be charged higher fees.
Simplification 0 Elements of a bonus-malus system, including risk assessment and time based fees,
already exist in Finland.
Comparability - Improving the correlation between risk levels and fee rates could reduce
comparability between Finland and other Member States; fees would be based on the
specific circumstances of very different OC systems.
Streamlining ++ The sub-option should improve the efficiency of the OC system as it could reduce
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unnecessary inspections or inspection activities, reducing costs for well performing
FBOs. It could also reduce the administrative burden as CAs would be able to focus
on poorly performing FBOs.
Accountability + A bonus-malus system could improve accountability of CAs. They may have to
clarify the justification for OC activities.
A2.2.8 Sub-option A7: Introduce transparency and reporting requirements
Transparency in Finland is high. Official control reports are published online, and
transparency is supported by national legislation that relates to the transparency of all
government activities (Open of Government Activities Act 621/1999). Information about fees
and how they are calculated is available from individual MFCAs upon request.
Reporting of time and resources dedicated specifically to OC activities would be difficult in
Finland. OC inspections are often conduced in conjunction with inspections which are
unrelated to OCs. In addition, CAs are generally responsible for a range of control activities
not related to OCs (such as tobacco control, for example). It would be extremely laborious (if
not impossible) to accurately determine the financial resources dedicated to OC activity.
Table A2.58 Sub-option A7: Impacts in Finland of introducing transparency and reporting requirements
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency - The official control system is already quite transparent. Methods used to calculate
fees are publicly available, official control reports are published online. Transparency
of the system is underpinned by the Open of Government Activities Act 621/1999.
Requiring CAs to collect and submit information to the Commission could increase
the administrative burden and reduce the efficiency of the system.
Simplification 0 This sub-option is unlikely to change the legal framework of the OC system in
Finland.
Comparability 0 The sub-option could increase the comparability of the Finnish OC system, both
within Finland and between Finland and other Member States. However, due to the
unique arrangements in Finland (and in each Member State) respondents were
concerned that comparing OC systems would be meaningless.
Streamlining -- The sub-option would increase the administrative burden and compliance costs for
CAs. These costs would likely be passed on to industry.
Accountability + The sub-option could have a positive effect on accountability as all elements of the
OC system would be in the public domain.
A2.2.9 Sub-option A8: Provide for industry participation
FBOs are currently involved in the preparation of OC control plans prepared by CAs. They
can influence the activities engaged in by CAs, but cannot influence the level of the fee.
However, if an FBO feels that a fee is excessive they can protest to the CA and request that
it be reduced.
Table A2.59 Sub-option A8: Impacts in Finland of providing for industry participation
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency 0 Increasing industry participation is unlikely change the efficiency of the OC system in
Finland.
Simplification -- Due to the high number of CAs in Finland this sub-option could complicate the OC
system.
Comparability - Comparability could be reduced, as greater involvement of FBOs could increase the
differences how fees are calculated.
Streamlining - The sub-option could increase the administrative burden of CAs as could have to
spend time engaging with industry. Industry costs could also increase if they spend a
significant amount of resources engaging with CAs.
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Accountability + The sub-option could increase accountability if CAs have to justify decisions related
to OC inspections and fee rates.
A2.2.10 Sub-option A9: Introduce exemptions and reductions for micro-enterprises
A significant proportion of FBOs in Finland could be considered micro-businesses
(potentially as high as 90 per cent). Respondents commented that a requirement to exempt
micro-businesses could seriously reduce the availability of funds for CAs, and could increase
health risks in the food chain. They maintained that any exemptions should be based on a
risk assessment rather than the size of a business.
Table A2.60 Sub-option A9: Impacts in Finland of introducing exemptions and reductions for micro-enterprises
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency -- In Finland the majority of FBOs are micro-enterprises. If they were exempted
from inspections, or received reductions in their fees, it would significantly
reduce the finances available for performing OCs.
Simplification 0 This sub-option would be unlikely to change the legal framework in Finland.
Comparability 0 This sub-option would be unlikely to change the comparability of the Finnish
system.
Streamlining ++ The majority of FBOs in Finland are micro-enterprises. The sub-option would
reduce compliance costs for FBOs in Finland, would significantly reduce the
administrative burden for CAs.
Accountability 0 This sub-option would be unlikely to change the accountability of the Finnish
system.
A2.2.11 Option B: Full harmonisation
Fees in Finland are charged at the municipal level. They vary widely among municipalities,
in terms of both the amount and how they are calculated. Full harmonisation would be
extremely difficult to implement in Finland due to the devolvement of official control activities
to municipal control authorities (MFCAs). It would require a restructuring of the Finnish
official control system as central authorities currently do not have legal power (related to
control activities) over municipal authorities.
Fee rates differ considerably between Finnish municipalities and it is estimated that only
one-third collect enough fees to cover actual costs. Harmonised fee rates could result in
some MFCAs becoming under funded, and others over funded. Fees are currently
determined through a risk assessment process; harmonised fees reduce the incentive for
good behaviour encouraged by the use of risk assessment. Where full harmonisation results
in significantly increased fees in some municipal authorities, the costs borne by FBOs would
also increase, potentially reducing the competitiveness of Finnish exports, and increasing
prices for Finnish consumers.
A2.2.11.1 Option B1: Fees for provision of controls are determined on a unified basis for the EU as a whole (i.e. the same fee rates apply in each Member State
Table A2.61 Option B1: Impacts of full harmonisation in Finland where the same fee rates apply in each MS
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency -- Fee rates differ considerably between Finnish municipalities and only a third
collect enough fees to cover actual costs. Harmonised fee rates could result in
some MFCAs becoming under funded, and others over funded. Fees are
currently determined using a risk assessment; harmonised fees reduce the
incentive for good behaviour encouraged by the use of risk assessment.
Simplification -- Harmonised fees would complicate the legal framework as it would require
changes to longstanding arrangements between different levels of Finnish
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Government.
Comparability -- Harmonised fees would fail to take account of the cost differences between
municipalities in Finland.
Streamlining -- Harmonised fees could increase the administrative burden in Finland as central
government may have to become involved in monitoring the application of
harmonised fee rates across Finland’s 300+ municipalities.
Accountability 0 Harmonised fees would be unlikely to change accountability in Finland.
Stakeholders have good access to information about how controls are organised
and conducted. The MANCP includes objectives on communication, and control
reports are published on the internet. Confidentiality of controls is legislated for in
the Open of Government Activities Act 621/1999.
A2.2.12 Option B2: Harmonised fees are adjusted for each Member State using a cost of living index
The legal power for charging official controls exists at the municipal level in Finland; central
authorities do not have the power to compel municipal authorities to charge prescribed fees.
Fees vary widely between municipalities, in terms of both the amount and how they are
calculated. Some municipalities do not charge fees at all.
It is unlikely that this option would improve the efficiency of the official control system in
Finland. Due to the current institutional and legal arrangements it would be extremely
difficult to implement. It would require a complete restructuring of the Finnish official control
system. If it were introduced, it could also result in significantly higher fees in municipal
authorities that currently charge low (or no) fees.
Table A2.62 Option B2: Impacts of full harmonisation in Finland where fee rates adjusted using a cost of living index apply in each MS
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency -- Fee rates differ considerably between Finnish municipalities and only a third
collect enough fees to cover actual costs. Harmonised fee rates, even if
adjusted using a costs of living index, could result in some MFCAs becoming
under funded, and others over funded. Harmonised fees could also reduce the
incentive for good behaviour currently encouraged by the inclusion of a risk
assessment in fee calculation rates.
Simplification -- Harmonised fees would complicate the legal framework as it would require
changes to longstanding arrangements between different levels of Finnish
Government.
Comparability -- Harmonised fees, adjusted for cost of living arrangements, would fail to take
account of the cost differences between municipalities in Finland.
Streamlining -- Harmonised fees, adjusted for cost of living arrangements, could increase the
administrative burden in Finland as central government may have to become
involved in monitoring the application of harmonised fee rates across Finland’s
300+ municipalities.
Accountability 0 Harmonised fees, adjusted for cost of living arrangements, would be unlikely to
change accountability in Finland. Industry has good access to information about
how controls are organised and conducted. The MANCP includes objectives on
communication, and control reports are published on the internet. Confidentiality
of controls is legislated for in the Open of Government Activities Act 621/1999.
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Table A2.63 Option B3: Harmonise fees in Finland for certain import controls
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency -- Harmonised fees could have a negative impact as they could lead to the over-
funding (indicating excessive fee rates) or under-funding (indicating insufficient
fee rates) of OC activities.
Simplification - The option could complicate the official control system in Finland as it could
require central administration to check and ensure the harmonised fee rate is
applied.
Comparability - It is unlikely that a harmonised fee for certain import controls would be capable
of accommodating the particular costs structures in Finland.
Streamlining - It would require an increase in the administrative control from central
administration in Finland to ensure that this sub-option is introduced across
Finland. This increase would probably result in higher costs for CAs and
industry.
Accountability 0 Harmonised import control fees would be unlikely to change accountability in
Finland. Stakeholders have good access to information about how controls are
organised and conducted. The MANCP includes objectives on communication,
and control reports are published on the internet. Confidentiality of controls is
legislated for in the Open of Government Activities Act 621/1999.
A2.2.13 Option C: Repeal Articles 26-29 of the Regulation (full subsidiarity)
The current OC arrangements are governed by national legislation (the Food Act). MFCAs
are responsible for setting fee levels, which should reflect local costs and the level of risk
posed by the FBO in question. It is unlikely that the OC system would change under full
subsidiarity.
Table A2.64 Option C: Impacts of full subsidiarity in Finland where fee rates are set differently in each Member State
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency 0 Unlikely to change the adequacy of financing for performing official controls in
Finland. Currently MFCAs are responsible for calculating fee rates, which should
be based on actual costs and a risk assessment. However only one third of
MFCAs collect enough fees to cover actual costs.
Simplification 0 Unlikely to have any impact in Finland. The Finnish system is based on national
legislation that specifies institutional responsibilities and provides a clear legal
framework. Due to this legalisation and the clearly defined responsibilities it is
unlikely that full subsidiarity would have an impact in Finland.
Comparability 0 It is unlikely that this option would change the internal market in relation to
Finland. Official control costs are determined at the local level by MFCAs. They
differ widely between MFCAs.
Streamlining 0 It is unlikely that this option would impact on the administrative burden or
compliance costs on CAs and industry. The current system of official controls is
based on national legislation that would be unlikely to change if this option was
introduced.
Accountability 0 Access to official control information is good in Finland. National legislation
(Open of Government Activities Act 621/1999) enshrines transparency in how
official controls are calculated and organised, and in addition control reports are
published online.
A2.2.14 Issues/considerations
Local government in Finland is strong, and the relationship between local, regional and
central government is defined and supported by legislation. The Food Act sets out the roles
and responsibilities of institutions across the three levels of government; Evira is responsible
for specifying how OC activity should be conducted, while MFCAs are responsible for
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conducting OCs and setting and collecting OC fees. Evira has no legal power to influence
the fees charged by MFCAs. These institutional arrangements mean that options which
require specific fee rates, such as ‘full harmonisation’ or ‘full cost recovery’ would be
extremely difficult to implement in Finland. They would require changes to legislation
beyond those related to official controls.
There are already elements of a bonus-malus system in place in Finland, such as time-
based fees and the use of risk assessment in determining the frequency and length of OC
inspections. The bonus-malus option could probably be introduced relatively simply in
Finland; it would build on existing features of the current system and would also complement
the devolved structure of OC inspection and fee collection. It may also help with the current
low rates of cost recovery, as low risk FBOs would not be inspected.
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A2.2.14.1 Finland: summary table of option analysis
Table A2.65 Finland: summary table of option analysis
Option Parameter/score
Efficiency Simplification Comparability Streamlining Accountability
A Improve the current system
A1 Extend scope of mandatory
fees
+ 0 + -- 0
A2 Full cost recovery ++ -- + - --
A3 Clear definition of eligible
costs
++ 0 + + 0
A4 Time-based fees ++ -- - - 0
A5 Ring-fencing resources 0 -- 0 - +
A6 Bonus-malus system ++ 0 - ++ +
A7 Transparency & reporting - 0 0 -- +
A8 Industry participation 0 -- - - +
A9 Micro-enterprises -- 0 0 ++ 0
B B1 Full harmonisation, unified
fees
-- -- -- -- 0
B2 Full harmonisation, cost-of-
living adjusted
-- -- -- -- 0
B3 Import fees -- - - - 0
C Full subsidiarity 0 0 0 0 0
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A2.3 France
A2.3.1 Introduction
This case study was informed by 2 interviews with industry stakeholders (CAs did not
respond to requests for interview) and 2 questionnaires.
A2.3.2 Option A: Improve the current system
A2.3.3 Sub-option A1: Extending the scope of mandatory fees
Collection of fees is limited to mandatory fees: the French system does not charge any fees
for other controls which may fall under Article 27(1) (i.e. official controls for which Member
State may, but is not obliged to, charge fees).
Table A2.66 Option A1: Impacts of improving the current system in France by extending the scope of mandatory fees
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency + Extending the scope of mandatory fees will increase revenue for the competent
authority. This will ensure minimum level required (cost-recovery level) to achieve
effective controls. Businesses think that fees should take the cost of in-house
control measures into account and argued that increasing the scope of mandatory
fees does not necessarily increase efficiency.
Simplification + Given recent discussions about introducing new fees for controls which do not fall
under mandatory fees category, the extension the scope of the latter will in certain
extent clarify current fee system in France and increase the simplicity of the fee
mechanism in the implementation. This impact is however expected to be
marginal.
Comparability +
Narrowing room for arbitrary decision on fee applications (e.g. extending the
scope of mandatory fees) will increase the degree of harmonisation among EU
Member States. This will improve level playing field at the EU level while
accounting for different cost structures.
Streamlining - There are more than 300 slaughterhouses in France. Collecting more fees will
make the system more complex and will increase the administrative cost for
competent authorities. This impact is however expected to be minor.
Accountability 0 Extending the scope of mandatory fees is unlikely to have any impacts on
accountability of the OC system in France.
A2.3.4 Sub-option A2:Requiring full cost recovery
The FCEC study for the European Commission (2009)47
shows that the amount collected
does not appear to be sufficient to achieve full cost recovery. In 2008, an estimated 70% of
the total costs for domestic products was recovered (€80 million costs and €56 million
recovered). The gap between costs and revenues occurred mainly in slaughter and meat
cutting areas.
For import controls, cost recovery is around 100% but as discussed above, in general rental
costs are not included here and paid by operators directly. The rental costs accounts for
about 20% of total costs.
Stakeholders expressed concern that introduction of full-cost recovery could result in a trade-
off between cost recovery and efficiency of the inspectors. Stakeholders stated that full cost
recovery may reduce incentivises for competent authorities to improve their performance.
47 FCEC (2009) Study on fees or charges collected by MS for official controls: Final Report.
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Table A2.67 Option A2: Impacts of improving the current system in France by requiring full cost recovery
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency + Fees in France are currently below cost recovery levels therefore the principle will
increase revenues for competent authorities.
Simplification - Some stakeholders argued that this may make the system more complex, given
the simplicity of the current fee system. This mainly depends on the variation in
the potential increase of fees for different segment of the industry.
Comparability + Fee setting mechanism will be clearer and more comparable if businesses are
entitled to pay the competent authorities full cost of the inspections. Under current
situation it is difficult to assess the magnitude of an amount paid for a particular
service because in most cases the declared amount does not reflect the full value
of it. If full-cost recovery is implemented then price difference can be compared,
for example giving different living cost standards.
Streamlining - It will introduce further transition and administrative cost to competent authorities
as they will have to amend the current system and update the cost elements and
cost levels regularly. These costs can potentially be reflected on to businesses.
Accountability + The policy requires more precise definition of cost elements and hence fee
calculation. This is expected to create a link between fees and official controls and
increase accountability of the competent authority vis-à-vis fee payers and
citizens.
A2.3.5 Sub-option A3: Clearly define eligible costs
The previous study by FCEC48
showed that it is not clear whether and what type of criteria
have been used for the calculation of the current fee levels in France. The cost elements
included in fee setting mechanism in France are similar to the ones specified in the
Regulation. Fee setting mechanism in France includes the following costs:
▪ For domestic production:
– Staff costs (i.e. salaries).
– Training costs.
– Property charges.
– Operational costs including sampling.
▪ For import products:
– Rental costs for BIPs (if not already paid by FBOs).
– Staff costs (i.e. salaries).
– Equipments.
– Training.
– Cleaning.
– Travelling expenses.
– Sampling.
Table A2.68 Option A3: Impacts of improving the current system in France by clearly defining eligible costs in the Regulation
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency ++ Stakeholders agreed that it is necessary to clarify and precisely define the elements
for eligible cost. This will reflect the real costs for inspections and bring the fees in
France up to cost-recovery levels.
Simplification 0 Stakeholders do not see any impact of the sub-option in terms of simplification of
the system.
48 Study on fees or charges collected by MS for official controls (2009)
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Comparability 0 Same definition and hence same cost elements in fee calculation are expected to
have a small positive impact on the comparability aspect of the system across EU
Member States however this will not change the current structure in France
between national actors.
Streamlining - Some stakeholders think that the sub-option will not affect the administrative cost
while some others argued that this may create small negative impact in terms of
higher administrative cost for competent authorities and businesses.
Accountability ++ Well defined eligible costs will inform businesses and competent authorities about
the cost elements and will remove any doubts and conflicts between national actors
in fee determination.
A2.3.6 Sub-option A4: Time-based fees, flat fees
The French system for official controls does not include time-based fees. Unit-based fee
structure forms the basis of the French system for official controls. For domestic production,
the system follows the rules similar to the national rules on VAT. Rates for official controls
are slightly below minimum fees specified in Regulation 882/2004. For import products, the
costs are calculated the year before on BIP basis and then adjusted for the next year to
achieve a balance between costs and revenues.
The policy approach is considered to be a viable option. Stakeholder consultation shows that
French businesses support this policy sub-option. This will require amendments in national
legal framework.
Some areas and activities mentioned by stakeholders, where time-based fee can be
introduced, include:
▪ Areas:
– Slaughterhouses.
– Ports for seafood.
– Wholesale markets.
▪ Activities:
– Ante-mortem inspection.
– Post-mortem inspection.
– Agreements and audits.
– Issuing sanitary certification.
– Analysis within the framework of national supervision plans.
A2.3.7 Sub-option A4: Introduce time-based fees
Table A2.69 Option A4: Impacts of improving the current system in France with the introduction of time-based fees in each MS
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency ++ Time-based fee will include risk elements and give FBOs incentive to increase
operational efficiency and hence enable shorter time for a complete inspection.
Efficiency will also be increased through higher transparency and precise definition
of cost calculation. However, time-based fee system may work at the detriment of
micro and small FBOs with relatively (with respect to large enterprises) slower lines
and production chain. Therefore, cost for official controls under time-based fees are
expected to be higher for micro and small enterprises and therefore this may create
distortions in French market. In order to ensure the optimum level of efficiency EU
institutions should also introduce guidelines preventing the adverse incentives of
the inspectors (e.g. spending more time in inspections to generate higher revenue).
There are different viewpoints expressed by the stakeholders for the structure of
time-based fee system. Businesses’ favourite option is ‘fees based on a detailed
calculation of costs’ while trade unions for health and veterinary services preferred
‘Fees based on a standard, EU-wide hourly rate, indexed in each Member State by
a cost-of-living adjustment’.
Simplification ++ French fee system in its current structure is clear and simple. Each FBO knows
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what to pay and where to pay, and they do not complain about the current system.
However, In overall, time-based fee is expected to increase clarity for businesses
and simplification from administrative perspective.
Comparability - Stakeholders have different viewpoints on the comparability of the system under
time-based fee structure but overall they think that time-based fee will reduce the
level of comparability under different time-based fee structures. Time-based fee
system reflects the real costs of controls both internalising the efficiency of FBOs
and the inspectors however it may create more variations between Member States.
Streamlining -- Compared to current simplicity and clarity of the fee system in France the
administrative cost and compliance costs are expected to be higher. Both for the
businesses and public authorities.
Accountability ++ Time-based fee system specifies and clarifies the elements in cost calculation. This
can also be supported by EU policy documents, as suggested by some
stakeholders. Under this sub-option, French authorities and businesses can have
access to information on cost elements and fees as well as the destination of the
paid fees.
A2.3.8 Sub-option A5: Requiring ring-fencing of resources
Ring fencing principle does not exist in the French system. Fees in the form of taxes
collected by the competent authority are incorporated into general state budget.
Table A2.70 Option A5: Impacts of improving the current system in France by requiring the ring-fencing of resources
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency ++ Ring-fencing of resources will increase revenues for official controls in France.
Simplification + The principle of ring-fencing will make the system in France more simple if there
is a precise and clear table indicating where the money is spent and for which
inspection activities.
Comparability + Higher level of harmonisation through the introduction of the principle will
facilitate comparability across Member States. Some stakeholders however
mentioned a risk of turning the system into harmonised fee system where
businesses in each Member State end up paying approximately same the level
of fees. Such tendencies can potentially distort fair competition. Some Member
States may have difficulties to justify some costs.
Streamlining - This will increase administrative burden for competent authorities.
Accountability + Simplified and clarified cost structure will increase transparency and hence
accountability of the competent authorities vis-à-vis EU institutions, businesses
and citizens.
A2.3.9 Sub-option A6: Incorporate bonus-malus principles
France has a system of classification based on the conformity of the businesses with current
standards. The aim of this system is to ensure the development of hygiene standards in
slaughterhouses. This classification system operates similarly to a bonus-malus system. A
structural update of the current classification system is expected to be in place in 2012
(although initially foreseen for 2011). Under this model the businesses are classified into
four categories:
▪ Group 1: In full conformity with the rules.
▪ Group 2: Small non-conformities of no impact on safety/quality.
▪ Group 3: Significant non-conformities of impact on safety/quality.
▪ Group 4: Serious non-conformities.
FBOs under categories 1 and 2 benefit from tax rebates while the businesses under group 3
pay the full rate. In the updated version of the system the fourth category becomes a
temporary class leading either to the closure of the business or to the improvement and in a
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short time period upgrade to the third group. Categorisation has implications. For example,
FBOs classified under group 3 cannot export their products to third countries. In France,
about 80% of the slaughterhouses are categorised under either group 1 or group 2. In its
general lines, the criteria that businesses are evaluated against include:
▪ The structure of the establishment.
▪ The working conditions of the personnel.
▪ Hygiene rules.
▪ Good manufacturing practice.
▪ Documentation.
Table A2.71 Option A6: Impacts of improving the current system in France by incorporating bonus-malus principles in the Regulation
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency + Bonus-malus type mechanism or ‘modulation’ system is already in operation in
French system. This helps businesses internalise the cost of controls (i.e.
establishing in-house auto-control mechanisms). The impact of introducing a
bonus-malus system at EU level will have minor positive impact on French
system if any. It will attach a bonus-malus element to French system and
standardise the existing practice.
Simplification 0 Elements of a bonus-malus system already exist in France. Including such a
system in the Regulation is therefore unlikely to have an impact on the legal
framework.
Comparability + Businesses argued that it is important to have a common bonus-malus system
in order to provide a benchmark across Member States. Criteria to determine a
bonus-malus system, the objectives to be achieved etc. should be clear.
Streamlining - System is already embedded in French system. The introduction of this policy at
EU level will put small compliance and transition cost on competent authority
and hence businesses. Stakeholders expect this impact to be small.
Accountability + It is expected that this increases accountability as it is the case in current
French system. Businesses are classified depending on their conformity with
standards. The mechanism informs them about how they should perform and
which standards they should meet. Competent authorities as well justify
possible reduction or penalties in collection of fees.
A2.3.10 Sub-option A7: Introduce transparency and reporting requirements
Legislation is published in the Official Journal of the European Union.
At the national level, Competent Authority and other relevant government institutions (e.g.
Customs) publish relevant information (e.g. a detailed list of establishments which have been
controlled and the result of conformity assessment) on their websites.
Table A2.72 Option A7: Impacts of improving the current system in France by introducing transparency and reporting requirements
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency ++ This enables an efficient level of information on the cost elements. This will allow
competent authorities and businesses to learn from other experiences from different
Member States and apply good practice. It is important for businesses to know for
which purposes the revenues generated from official controls are spent.
Simplification + Higher level of transparency and an effective reporting system can potentially
simplify the procedures for businesses when they improve their standards to
achieve full conformity. Also legal framework under a more transparent environment
is expected to create less conflict in the definitions and in practice.
Comparability + Stakeholders think that this policy will increase transparency and hence facilitates
comparability across EU Member States. It will facilitate the system for competent
authorities to benchmark and make necessary improvements in national system.
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Streamlining - This will create cost on competitive authorities. Stakeholders did not comment on
whether the benefits can exceed the cost.
Accountability ++ All stakeholders think that this policy will increase accountability of the competent
authority vis-à-vis businesses, EU institutions and citizens.
A2.3.11 Sub-option A8: Providing for industry participation
In France the framework for OCs does not include a systematic and organised mechanism
for industry participation. Business representations mentioned that there are small
information negotiations (i.e. lobbying activities) between public authorities and mainly large
businesses. Stakeholders think that exchange of views before setting fee levels for OCs and
interaction between government and business representation, which will create a consensus,
would make the mechanism for OCs more efficient. Such mechanism would have also
potential dangers if the public authority acts in the interests of the businesses instead of
public interest (i.e. regulatory capture).
Table A2.73 Option A8: Impacts of improving the current system in France by providing for industry participation
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency + Fees for OCs in France are slightly below cost recovery levels and FBOs are
happy with the current fees. A potential policy for industry participation is
expected to have a positive impact in terms of efficiency as fees for OCs will be
based on a consensus. In practice the impact is however expected to be low and
lead to a great change in the status quo.
Simplification 0 Not applicable Policy option is not expected to have an impact in terms of
simplification because the current fee setting mechanism is simple and well
accepted by the FBOs (i.e. there are not any conflicts between government and
businesses).
Comparability 0 No impacts identified.
Streamlining ++ Systematic negotiations and interaction between public institutions and the
businesses before setting the level of fees will add a small administrative cost
however the benefits are expected to exceed this cost.
Accountability + Industry participation is expected to increase accountability because fee
determination process will be based on negotiations and hence fees will be an
outcome of a consensus. In theory, accountability is effective if FBOs have a third
party to refer to in the case of unfair treatment during negotiations. This is
however unlikely in French case because there are currently not any conflict
between the parties as far as the fee levels are concerned.
A2.3.12 Sub-option A9: Introduce exemptions and reductions for micro-enterprises
Fee rates in official control mechanism are uniform and each business operator, regardless
of its size, pays the same unit-based fee.
Given the relatively small size of micro enterprises (in terms of revenue) in French food
industry covered by the Regulation, the impacts of the sub-option are expected to be small.
Table A2.74 Option A9: Impacts of improving the current system in France by introducing exemptions and reductions for micro-enterprises
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency - Providing exemptions or reductions for micro businesses will reduce revenues for
competent authorities however this direct impact of such policy will depend on the
size of the micro enterprises in sub-sectors of the industry. In France where
market share of micro enterprises is relatively small, this impact is expected to be
minor.
Simplification + Collecting fees from fewer enterprises will simplify fee collection process, both for
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competent authorities and businesses.
Comparability 0 Given the size of micro enterprises stakeholders foresee no impact or minor
impact of this policy sub-option in terms of comparability.
Streamlining + Collecting fees from fewer enterprises will reduce administrative cost, both for
competent authorities and businesses. This impact is however expected to be
minor.
Accountability 0 No impacts identified.
A2.3.13 Option B: Fully harmonise inspection fees for official controls
Given the structure of the current fee system in France, stakeholders argued that full
harmonisation is not a viable option: the potential negative impacts of the policy option are
likely to exceed its potential benefits. The main argument expressed by the stakeholders was
that harmonised fees based on a common denominator would not reflect the actual costs in
France. Unit-based fees currently charged in France are slightly below the minimum rates
specified in the Regulation. Harmonised fees based on a common denominator, which do
not reflect the true costs, could diminish the effectiveness and efficiency of national fee
system for official controls, and harm the competitiveness of French industry relative to
industry in other MS.
Some stakeholders stated that it is difficult to assess the potential impact of the policy
options as concrete definitions for certain elements, such as the common denominators, are
not available. It is therefore difficult to assess the potential benefits and drawbacks to certain
options. For example, full harmonisation may result in great added-value to the system in
terms of simplification of the procedures at the EU level. But simplified procedure through
harmonised fees may also create distortions in the European market. From this perspective,
simplification would simplify and clarify control mechanism but would also reduce fairness.
A2.3.13.1 Option B1: Fees for provision of controls are determined on a unified basis for the EU as a whole (i.e. the same fee rates apply in each Member State)
Table A2.75 Option B1: Impacts of full harmonisation in France where the same fee rates apply in each MS
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency -- This option may improve efficiency as the fees charged in France are currently
slightly lower than the minimum rates specified by the Regulation, and are
significantly lower than some other Member States. In addition, fees in France are
below cost-recovery levels. This policy option, depending on the common
denominator, is expected to have a direct negative impact on French businesses in
as fee level changes may not reflect local realities. If the harmonised rates are
determined on the basis of the lowest denominator then there is a risk that fees will
not cover the costs, but if the fees are determined on the basis of the highest
denominator then the fees will exceed the costs. In the first scenario, competent
authorities will not have enough resources to undertake effective controls while in
the latter they will make profit. The lack of a direct link between fees and official
controls (i.e. fees are incorporated in the general budget in the form of taxes)
makes the efficiency improvements less visible. Industry stakeholders argued that
this is not a viable option as harmonised fees will not reflect local realities.
Simplification 0 Full harmonisation increases the level of clarity and simplicity for EU level
operations however, the added-value of this option in terms of simplification is
uncertain for the French system. The fee system is already clear and simple in
France.
Comparability -- Harmonised fee rates will enable cross-country benchmarking. This simplifies
operational and administrative procedures at the EU level. However, finding a
common denominator in fee calculation for all EU Member States may increase the
level of fees in France where they are currently one of the lowest in Europe. Full
harmonisation does not account for different cost national structures and does not
allow flexibility. This may then create distortions in the market.
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Parameter Score Analysis
Streamlining + At Member State level full harmonisation of fees will introduce compliance cost but
reduce the administrative costs since competent authorities will spend fewer
resources on the calculation of fees for official controls. Given the simplicity of the
current fee system in France, the potential impact of the policy option in terms of
streamlining is positive but relatively small.
Accountability 0 Applying same definitions and elements for cost calculation and fees is expected to
increase accountability. Given the use of the general budget to finance official
controls, the policy option will help FBOs have access to information on the
destination of paid fees for official controls. The impact of this option in terms of
accountability is however considered to be negligible by the stakeholders.
A2.3.14 Option B2: Harmonised fees are adjusted for each Member State using a cost of living index
Stakeholders think that cost of living-adjusted harmonised fees address some of the issues
under full harmonisation.
Article 50 and 52 of the French Tax Code form the legal basis for the collection of OC fees
related to domestic production. The introduction of harmonised fees would require changes
to the tax code and supporting legislation.
Table A2.76 Option B2: Impacts of full harmonisation in France where the fee rates adjusted using a cost of living index apply in each MS
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency ++ Index-adjusted fees can reflect local realities of Member States. Adjusted
harmonised fees may therefore increase efficiency in France, as they will lift up
current below-cost recovery fees for official controls. Updating the index will
introduce further costs for both EU and national officials. French stakeholders
agreed on the potential benefits of living cost-adjusted fee system in terms of
efficiency.
Simplification -- The current French fee system for official controls is clear and simple.
Harmonisation of fees at the EU level will not have added-value in terms of
simplification Stakeholders think that this option will have a negative impact in terms
of simplification of the system.
Comparability ++ Index-adjusted and updated harmonised fees allow comparability and account for
cost variance across Member States.
Streamlining + At Member State level full harmonisation of fees will introduce compliance cost but
on the other hand reduce the administrative costs since competent authorities will
spend fewer resources on the calculation of fees for official controls in the long-run.
Given the simplicity of the current fee system in France, the potential impact of the
policy option in terms of streamlining is positive but relatively small.
Accountability 0 Harmonised definitions and elements for cost calculation and fees are expected to
increase accountability. The current system is simple and clear in France. The
impact of this option in terms of accountability is however considered to be
negligible by the stakeholders.
A2.3.15 Sub-option B3: Introduce EU harmonised fees only for certain import controls
Table A2.77 Option B3: Impacts of improving the current system in France where the same fee rates or certain import controls apply in each MS
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency ++ Stakeholders believe the sub-option will increase efficiency. It is however difficult to
find a common denominator at the EU level, which will reflect local realities and fit-
for-all approach may decrease efficiency for some other Member States.
Simplification + Fees for import controls are harmonised across France. The current system is
considered effective with clear definitions of cost elements. Given the current
situation in France this option is expected to have a positive but minor impact.
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Comparability ++ Harmonised fees for certain import controls avoids fee-based BIP selection,
prevents distortions, and facilitates monitoring and inspections.
Streamlining ++ There will be less resource allocated for fee calculation mechanism. This is
therefore expected to reduce costs both on competent authorities and businesses.
Accountability ++ Harmonised fee structure if accompanied with a clear cost and fee calculation then
will increase accountability.
A2.3.16 Option C: Repeal Articles 26-29 of the Regulation (full subsidiarity)
Full subsidiarity option has certain advantages, including flexibility and full cost-recovery.
The latter is particularly important in French context given the fees in the current system are
under cost recovery level. However, stakeholders considered the option to be unviable.
They were of the opinion that, as MS are likely to have significantly different systems, full
subsidiarity could create distortions in the EU market.
Table A2.78 Option C: Impacts of full subsidiarity in France where the fees are determined in each MS
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency -- Current fees in France are below cost-recovery level and they are slightly lower than
the minimum rates specified in the Regulation. French businesses think that the
current involvement of the European Commission creates an effective third party
control mechanism over national competent authority. Adopting policy for OCs only
at national level is expected to decrease efficiency because it will eliminate the
current third party control. Industry stakeholders also indicated that there is some
inconsistency during inspections such as assessment of hygiene conditions. Lack of
EU involvement may increase the number of these cases.
Simplification -- The current system in France is simple and clear. Stakeholders think that full
subsidiarity will not have an added value in terms of simplification but create more
administrative procedures at national level.
Comparability -- It may create distortions in the level playing field in internal market and hence
damage the market share of France in the EU.
Streamlining - Changing the structure and transferring the responsibilities which are currently under
the scope of the EU institutions to national authorities will result in some
administrative costs.
Accountability - This will decrease the level of accountability of national competent authorities. The
current structure creates a system of checks between EU institutions and national
competent authorities. Removing third party control could have direct implications on
French system, for example leading to inconsistent assessment of FBO’s hygiene
standards.
A2.3.17 Issues/considerations
There are different viewpoints about financing official controls in France. The incorporation of
fees for official controls into the general state budget and lack of link between official controls
and fees collected for the service have implications on a number of principles considered for
the assessment, including full-cost recovery and ring-fencing. Who should pay for official
controls is therefore a relevant question to be agreed on in order to achieve certain
objectives.
For example, ring fencing of resources will require that the fees will be allocated to
Competent Authority’s accounts rather than to the general state budget. In order to achieve
effective official controls the fees incorporated into the budget of the Competent Authority
should be at full cost-recovery levels. In the current form, also citizens pay for the official
controls. If full cost recovery is not achieved then this may not allow the introduction of a ring
fencing principle.
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A2.3.17.1 France: summary table of option analysis
Table A2.79 France: summary table of option analysis
Option Parameter/score
Efficiency Simplification Comparability Streamlining Accountability
A Improve the current system
A1 Extend scope of mandatory
fees
+ + + - 0
A2 Full cost recovery + - + - +
A3 Clear definition of eligible
costs
++ 0 0 - ++
A4 Time-based fees ++ ++ - -- ++
A5 Ring-fencing resources ++ + + - +
A6 Bonus-malus system + 0 + - +
A7 Transparency & reporting ++ + + - ++
A8 Industry participation + 0 0 ++ 0
A9 Micro-enterprises - + 0 + 0
B B1 Full harmonisation, unified
fees
-- 0 -- + 0
B2 Full harmonisation, cost-of-
living adjusted
++ -- ++ + 0
B3 Import fees ++ + ++ ++ ++
C Full subsidiarity -- -- -- - -
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A2.4 Netherlands
A2.4.1 Introduction
A total of 17 organisations were contacted to take part in the study. Including the CA, 10
returned the questionnaire or were interviewed. Several organisations did not respond
directly as their opinions were expressed by other organisations that did respond. Several
other non-responders indicated that they did not feel competent to make a response. Some
reactions were very limited while others reacted extensively, in particular the organisations of
FBOs that are most involved in fees. Interviews with the CA, meat board and retail
organisation contributed much to the information obtained. Generous cooperation was
received from the CA.
Four (groups of) stakeholders were identified:
3. The competent authority (CA). The budget of the CA is often under pressure in relation
to fees and resources. There is pressure on resources due to general cuts in
government budgets, and there is continuous pressure from industry to charge less and
lower fees. The CA’s reaction is to look for other, more secure, sources for financing.
Apart from extending the scope of mandatory fees to other business, CAs consider it fair
that all food businesses should pay fees, not only those involved in the production of
food of animal origin. To this end the CAs are striving towards a levy for all businesses
in the food sector, including retail, to provide a predictable source income.
4. Organisations representing food businesses dealing with food of plant origin and the
central retail organisation. These groups are of the opinion that the enforcement of
national law is the duty of the state and should therefore be funded on public money.
5. Meat and meat product organisations. These accepted fees on condition that the CA
operates efficiently.
6. A private company. This is strongly in favour of good controls and is willing to pay for
them provided that the controls are of high quality and for a reasonable price.
A2.4.2 Option A: Improve the current system
A2.4.2.1 Sub-option A1: Extend the scope of mandatory fees
Table A2.80 Sub-option A1: Impacts in the Netherlands of extending the scope of mandatory fees
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency - Extension of the scope makes the financing of the controls less dependable on the
state budget and as a consequence less dependable on political moods. However,
increasing the dependency of CAs on private funding might have a negative effect
on the income of the CA.
Simplification + The legal framework can be simplified as not all categories have to be mentioned,
but the effect will be minimal.
Comparability +
Likely to have a positive impact as extending the scope of mandatory fees would
increase comparability between FBOs.
Streamlining -
The administration would slightly increase as more invoices would have to be
made. The effect will be minimal as the system is already in place for the current
invoicing of mandatory fees.
Accountability + Extension would have no significant influence on accountability as the system
would remain unchanged. Bringing fees under closer control of the Ministries could
increase budget accountability, but only slightly.
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A2.4.3 Sub-option A2: Requiring full cost recovery
Table A2.81 Option A2: Impacts in the Netherlands of requiring full cost recovery
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency ++ The CA would be assured of its financial situation. There would be no influence
from political intervention.
However, full cost recovery lacks the incentive for the CA to operate efficient and
cost effective.
Simplification 0 Very little or no impact; legislation for cost recovery is already in place and only
minor amendments would be required.
Comparability + Full cost recovery would reduce exemptions and differences in interpretations
made by MS. It would also ensure that costs are reflected in fees.
Streamlining 0 The current administration is already constructed in such way that the full
recovery of costs is foreseen for the mandatory fees.
Accountability + Costs incurred by CAs, or income collected by CAs, would be more transparent
under this option. This would have a positive impact on accountability.
A2.4.3.2 Sub-option A3: Clearly define eligible costs
In the Netherlands fees are currently based on how businesses calculate costs for services.
All costs are taken into account to calculate the costs per ¼ hour. These costs are related to
the activities performed. The costs include: salaries (including social fees), other staff costs
(temporarily staff), equipment (travel, car, IT, telephone, office, personal standard
equipment, and banking), rent of buildings, other housing costs, depreciation and interest.
Reorganisation costs are excluded.
Industry in the Netherlands is keen to ensure that it pays for costs only, while CAs consider
that industry should meet some of the administration costs too.
Table A2.82 Sub-option A3: Impacts in the Netherlands of clearly defining eligible costs
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency ++ Clearly defining eligible costs would make a positive contribution to efficiency
provided that the costs incorporated in the fees are calculated as is common in
business; all costs should be listed, and more should be identified in the definition.
Any limitation of costs in the fees will lead to non-compliance with the requirement
for “full cost recovery”. The CA is dependent on the government for its resources –
government provides approximately 60% of the budget.
Simplification ++ The option would have a positive impact on the simplicity of the OC system in the
Netherlands by listing clearly what costs are eligible.
Comparability ++ The option would improve the comparability between MS as all would apply the
same list in their respective OC systems.
Streamlining - If the list of eligible costs increases it could increase the admin burden for CAs.
Accountability - As the administration becomes more complicated the accountability will become
more complicated too. More costs have to be accounted for.
A2.4.3.3 Sub-option A4: Time-based fees and flat fees
Table A2.83 Option A4: Impacts in the Netherlands of the introduction of time-based fees for which the continuous of systematic presence of official controls in required
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency + Time-based fees could improve efficiency as well organised establishments would
require shorter and more infrequent inspections. However flat fees could reduce
the incentive for CAs and FBOs to work together to facilitate efficient controls.
Simplification 0 Elements of a bonus-malus system already exist, so no impacts to legal
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framework likely.
Comparability - Time-based fees could reduce comparability as differences in the efficiency CA
staff could result in differing FBO costs. Flat fees would reduce the transparency
of the relationship between fees and control costs.
Streamlining - Controls which are not really necessary could be performed to justify inspector
time and generate revenue for the CA.
Accountability ++ Time-based fees, as part of a bonus-malus system, would improve accountability
by improving efficiency and encouraging CAs to justify control activities.
A2.4.4 Sub-option A5: Requiring ring-fencing of resources
Almost 70 per cent of OC activity is publicly financed. Ring-fencing a small proportion of
CAs income would be relatively meaningless, and would increase the admin burden of
allocating money to operations.
Table A2.84 Option A5: Impacts in the Netherlands of requiring ring-fencing of resources
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency + If full cost recovery is strived for, administration is effective and fees are
transparent, than ring-fencing is automatically achieved.
Simplification 0 No impacts identified.
Comparability 0 Not applicable
Streamlining 0 No extra effort needed when accountability is achieved
Accountability 0 Ring fencing can be made and at the same time accountability can be very poor.
Ring fencing in a physical manner is meaningless unless a good administration is
in place. Without a good administration nothing can be guaranteed.
A2.4.5 Sub-option A6: Incorporate bonus-malus principles
Elements of a bonus-malus already exist in the Netherlands. The CA currently applies time-
based fees and risk-based controls.
Table A2.85 Option A6: Impacts in the Netherlands of incorporating bonus-malus principles
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency ++ Likely to improve the efficiency of the system over time.
Simplification 0
As fees are already time-based and controls risk-based, no extra arrangement of
legislation would be required. Bonus-malus is intrinsic to the system currently in
operation.
Comparability + If all MS use the same system it would improve comparability.
Streamlining 0 No effect, as no special arrangements would have to be made (time based fees
and risk based controls are incorporated in the current system)
Accountability 0 No impacts likely.
A2.4.6 Sub-option A7: Introduce transparency and reporting requirements
Table A2.86 Sub-option A7: Impacts in the Netherlands of introducing transparency and reporting requirements
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency + Positive impact likely as it could increase the acceptability of OC fees, and as a
result increase the settlement of invoices.
Simplification 0 No impacts likely.
Comparability + Reporting would increase comparability of CAs between MS, which would act as an
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Parameter Score Analysis
incentive for increasing the efficiency of performing official controls. However
comparison between countries can lead to simplistic conclusions.
Streamlining - Likely to lead to some additional admin burden for CAs. Some of the information is
likely to be available already, but extra effort will be required to make it suitable for
use and access by the public.
Accountability ++ Transparency and reporting contributes to accountability. Such systems are
common in the Netherlands. Institutionalising a system for official controls would
require minimal effort.
A2.4.7 Sub-option A8: Provide for industry participation
In the Netherlands stakeholders are usually consulted on many issues in relation to the final
arrangements for the official control system (amongst others). For example, opinions are
usually sought on the agenda for the Standing Committee for Food of the Commission. The
comments are taken on board, but the final decisions are made by the CA / Government.
Table A2.87 Sub-option A8: Impacts in the Netherlands of providing for industry participation
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency + Likely to improve acceptance of fees, and could result in faster settlement of
invoices.
Simplification - Stakeholders are frequently consulted in the Netherlands. However the
introduction of a legal arrangement might be counterproductive as it would pose
a negative incentive for voluntary participation. In addition, consultation does not
necessarily bring results, so putting participation on a legal footing could increase
the expectations of industry.
Comparability + Participation could improve the comparability of OC systems in MS; it would help
to reveal differences between MSs.
Streamlining + Although organising meetings would require some effort, it is likely that
consultation would improve the functioning of the OC system.
Accountability + Providing stakeholders with the opportunity to express their views could improve
accountability, and would be likely to improve perceptions of accountability.
A2.4.8 Sub-option A9: Introduce exemptions and reductions for micro-enterprises
In relation to official controls, micro-enterprises in the Netherlands are defined by CAs as
those processing 10 or fewer large animal units a week.
Table A2.88 Sub-option A9: Impacts the Netherlands of introducing exemptions and reductions for micro-enterprises
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency 0
No impacts on resourcing likely; exemptions for small enterprise would have no
influence on adequate financing, nor on the quality of controls. The option would be
justified on a social basis, and as such any shortfall in resources would be paid for
by the Government.
Simplification - The option would require some additional national legislation, but it would not be
overly complex. The important subject is to define the maximum size of the
establishment. The proposed definition (turnover 2 million euro and 10 staff) is far
too large for the Netherlands.
Comparability 0 Limited impact likely. Not many micro-enterprises exist in the Netherlands.
Streamlining 0 The option could increase admin burden related to categorising establishments, but
impact likely to be minimal.
Accountability 0 No impact likely.
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A2.4.9 Option B: Fully harmonise inspection fees for official controls (full harmonisation)
In the Netherlands fees are time-based, except for import controls which are unit based.
A2.4.9.1 Option B1: Fees for provision of controls are determined on a unified basis for the EU as a whole (i.e. the same fee rates apply in each Member State
Table A2.89 Option B1: Impacts of full harmonisation in the Netherlands where the same fee rates apply in each MS
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency -- All stakeholders agreed that this option would have a negative effect on the
performance of the CA; there would be no incentive for efficiency; and harmonised
fees bear no relation to actual costs.
Adequate resourcing of official controls would be undermined; either the fees would
be too low to cover all costs, or would be higher than actual costs. Neither
situation is desirable.
Simplification ++ There was a general consensus that this option would simplify the Dutch OC
system. However, complications could arise related to achieving adequate cost
recovery. Complicated legislation would be required to deliver full harmonisation
and ensure adequate cost recovery. Strict provisions would also be required to
prevent differences between MS.
Comparability ++ There was a general consensus that this option would improve comparability in
relation to cost structure and level of fees. However, due to differences of cost of
living it would cause distortions between MS. This is illustrated by the following
quote: “Businesses (in NL) see an advantage in relative lower fees compared to
other EU members.”
Streamlining + There was a general consensus that the option would reduce administration costs.
However, the impacts on the Dutch OC system are dependent on the final structure
of harmonised fees. A forecast on the effect on administration is very difficult to
estimate. Any conclusion on this subject is premature.
Accountability + Whatever system is chosen, accountability fully depends on the structure of the
administration. Exchange rates have influence, interfering with harmonisation
A2.4.10 Option B2: Harmonised fees are adjusted for each Member State using a cost of living index
This option has the same drawbacks as under harmonised fees. It is slightly better because
indexation would reduce distortions between MS.
Table A2.90 Option B2: Impacts of full harmonisation in the Netherlands where fee rates are adjusted for each MS using a cost of living index
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency -- All stakeholders agreed that this option would have a negative effect on the
performance of the CA; there would be no incentive for efficiency; and
harmonised fees bear no relation to actual costs.
Adequate resourcing of official controls would be undermined; either the fees
would be too low to cover all costs, or would be higher than actual costs. Neither
situation is desirable.
Simplification ++ There was a general consensus that this option would simplify the Dutch OC
system.
However, complications could arise related to achieving adequate cost recovery.
Complicated legislation would be required to deliver full harmonisation and
ensure adequate cost recovery. Strict provisions would also be required to
prevent differences between MS.
Comparability ++ There was a general consensus that it this option would improve comparability in
relation to cost structure and level of fees.
However, due to differences of cost of living it would cause distortions between
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MS. This is illustrated by the following quote: “Businesses (in NL) see an
advantage in relative lower fees compared to other EU members.”
Streamlining + There was a general consensus that the option would reduce administration
costs.
However, the impacts on the Dutch OC system are dependent on the final
structure of harmonised fees. A forecast on the effect on administration is very
difficult to estimate. Any conclusion on this subject is premature.
Accountability + Whatever system is chosen, accountability fully depends on the structure of the
administration. Exchange rates have influence, interfering with harmonisation
A2.4.10.2 Option B3: Harmonise fees in the Netherlands for certain import controls
Table A2.91 Option B3: Impacts in the Netherlands of the introduction of harmonised fees for import controls
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency ++ For all import controls a unit based fee is preferred. Costs of controls are different
in the MS. The government assures the financial means for the CA, but the budget
might become under political pressure. Much of the imports in the Netherlands will
be for other European countries. In the situation that the import controls are not
cost effective, the Netherlands is subsidising the import control for other countries.
It is not possible to predict the extent to which the Netherlands government is
willing to do that.
Simplification - Harmonised fees could reduce fee rates that make recovery of costs impossible.
This would require complicated national legislation to address, which would have a
negative impact on simplification. Stakeholders stated that it would be likely that
harmonised fees would, however, lead to conflicts that would be impossible to
solve, even using national legislation.
Comparability ++ Likely to have a positive impact on comparability. It would lead to unambiguous
tariffs and remove differences between ports. It would also reduce preference for
harbours based on control fees.
Streamlining ++ The administration would be simple if fees were levied on a unit bases. It would be
simple to relate the invoice to the control and the applicable tariff.
Accountability ++ If a proper administration is in place accountability is no problem. Moreover, the
simplicity of the system would have a positive impact on accountability.
A2.4.11 Option C: Repeal Articles 26-29 of the Regulation (full subsidiarity)
Under full subsidiarity, the CA involved is unlikely to change its fee strategy. There is a long
history of charging fees for meat inspection and cutting plants in the Netherlands. At present
fees are charged mainly on inspection and controls in the sectors processing food of animal
origin. That, most likely will not change under a full subsidiarity scenario. However, the
introduction of this option could lead to more discussions about allocating controls to
mandatory fees. The CA is very much in favour of charging fees for all controls in the food
industry and sectors of industry currently not subject to fees will object. Industry fully accepts
that fees will be charged for issuing certificates and approvals when legally required,
provided the controls are of high standard and for a reasonable price.
Table A2.92 Option C: Impacts of full subsidiarity in the Netherlands where fee rates are set differently in each Member State
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency -- The adequacy of financing is very much dependent on the conditions set in the
EU. The option could increase the influence of politics, which in turn could lead
to a reduction in the funding available for official controls. On the other hand
subsidiarity could also lead to extravagant fees.
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Simplification - Stakeholders expressed divergent views on the impacts of this option for
simplification. Some expected that at first no change would result. Others
thought that it could lead to more complicated legislation in the Netherlands due
to a willingness to ensure that FBOs are not at an unfair cost disadvantage
relative to fees in other MS.
Comparability -- Likely to reduce comparability; MS would have less confidence in each other's
systems.
Streamlining 0 It is unlikely that the system would change much in the Netherlands.
Complexity would depend on how individual MS organise the fees for official
controls, irrespective of how simple the EU legislation is.
Accountability - Unlikely that accountability would change in the Netherlands.
The major contributor, the Ministry of Health, keeps a close view on how the CA
is operating. The well organised industry follows the performance of the CA
closely and meets frequently with the CA.
A2.4.12 Issues /considerations
A2.4.12.1 Summary
The opinions of the CA and industry are divergent. The CA favours more mandatory fees,
but while other stakeholders accept that fees are necessary, they are concerned that fees
should include an incentive for efficiency of CAs. Stakeholders that are not paying any fees
wish this to remain the same.
Summarised issues and considerations are listed below:
▪ Efficiency: Full harmonisation conflicts with the objective of full cost recovery. Such a
system does not provide an incentive for the CA to improve efficiency of the organisation
Time-based controls would enable the FBO to control the invoice on the time spent.
Participation of stakeholders in the operation of the CA will contribute as well as
transparency and reporting.
▪ Simplification: One system of time based fees is not a too complicated legal issue,
combined with clear definition of which costs are incorporated in the fee. One line
regulating the compulsory application of time based fees only for controls, import
controls excluded, followed by the definition of costs in the fee and description of starting
fee and how to calculate.
▪ Comparability: only full subsidiarity would significantly reduce comparability; the other
options would generally improve comparability.
▪ Streamlining: exemptions, micro-enterprises, extension of mandatory fees and
transparency and reporting would increase the administrative burden and thus reduce
streamlining. However the administrative burden should not be exaggerated as
administration is already in place to operate the service. Only reporting could be
considered to cause extra activities. Increasing transparency and reporting would
contribute to the proper operation of the OC system and enhance food safety.
▪ Accountability: clear eligibility of costs, transparency, reporting and ring-fencing would
contribute to accountability. No impact is expected from extending the scope of
mandatory fees, exemptions for micro enterprises, full cost recovery or bonus-malus
system.
Options considered acceptable by several parties:
▪ Time based fees.
▪ Unit based fees for import controls.
▪ Definition of eligible costs for the fees, what costs to be included face different opinions.
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▪ Fees charged for certificates, documents or activity required for bringing products on the
market.
Options with diverging acceptance:
▪ Controls on approvals and HACCP.
▪ Extension of the scope of controls with mandatory fees.
▪ Exemptions for micro-enterprises are acceptable, provided the financial deficit is publicly
funded.
Options facing resistance:
▪ Fees for controls on compliance with food safety regulations (risk based, unnoticed
controls)
Options contributing to the acceptance of fees based controls:
▪ Transparency and reporting
▪ Participation
▪ Bonus-malus system
▪ Ring-fencing
A2.4.12.2 The Competent Authority
The CA stated that in principle all controls should be paid for by FBOs. Doing so contributes
to full cost recovery and makes the CA less dependent on public funds (which are liable to
cuts). The discussion on time-based or unit-based fees has ended and resulted in time-
based fees for all activities, import controls excluded. The system automatically fulfils the
requirement for a bonus-malus. More efficiently organised businesses require less time for
controls and those having an excellent food safety system profit from less frequent
inspections. In slaughter, the lines with a higher throughput face lower inspection costs per
animal than the ones with a less efficient system. That means that bonus-malus type effects
are built in to the time based fee system. Controls of well organised companies with a good
quality system are less time consuming and when combined with risk based controls, risks
set at individual companies, automatically implements bonus-malus.
Tension remains about which controls should have a mandatory fee and which should be
publicly funded. The CA considers that all FBOs should pay for controls as they need to
have a HACCP system which needs regular auditing. Retail and restaurants should be
excluded from fees. The CA would like to pose a levy on all companies in the food chain to
secure a regular income.
A2.4.12.3 Plant products and retail organisations
This group of stakeholders consider that “the enforcement of public laws is the duty of a
state and must be financed publicly”. These stakeholders generally have good quality
systems in place that operate well. Official controls with mandatory fees do not relate to
them.
A2.4.12.4 Organisations representing firms dealing in products of animal origin
These organisations are used to paying fees and therefore focus on how the system can be
arranged in a practical way. They believe that, in order to share the burden, other food
producing establishments should be subject to mandatory fees. They are very much in
favour of time-based fees and risk based controls as it would implement a bonus-malus
system, something they support. Approvals should remain outside the mandatory fee
system (food establishments processing food of animal origin are legally required to have an
approval from the CA in order to produce; the CA states in the approval that the
establishment produces in compliance with the legislation).
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This stakeholder group emphasised the need for a level playing field. In their opinion, this
would require a clear definition of eligible costs, controls which fall under mandatory fees and
incentives for efficient operation by the CA.
A2.4.12.5 Company
The company interviewed does not object to paying for controls providing they are of a high
standard and the fees are reasonable. It supports fees, as long as fees reflect actual costs
and are based on bonus-malus principles.
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A2.4.12.6 The Netherlands: summary table of option analysis
Table A2.93 The Netherlands: summary table of option analysis
Option Parameter/score
Efficiency Simplification Comparability Streamlining Accountability
A Improve the current system
A1 Extend scope of mandatory
fees
- + + - +
A2 Full cost recovery ++ 0 + 0 -
A3 Clear definition of eligible
costs
++ ++ ++ - -
A4 Time-based fees + 0 - - --
A5 Ring-fencing resources + 0 0 0 0
A6 Bonus-malus system ++ 0 + 0 0
A7 Transparency & reporting + 0 + - ++
A8 Industry participation + - + + +
A9 Micro-enterprises 0 - 0 0 0
B B1 Full harmonisation, unified
fees
-- ++ ++ + +
B2 Full harmonisation, cost-of-
living adjusted
-- ++ ++ + +
B3 Import fees ++ - ++ ++ ++
C Full subsidiarity -- - -- 0 -
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A2.5 Poland
A2.5.1 Introduction
This case study was informed by 6 interviews (2 CAs and 4 industry stakeholders) and 2
questionnaires. One of the two questionnaires received was a joint response from the
Department of Food Safety and Veterinary Matters (MARD) on behalf of the General
Veterinary Inspectorate (GVI) Animal Health and Welfare, GVI Law Office, GVI Border
Office, GVI Safety of Food of Animal Origin, GVI Laboratory Post, GVI Animal Feed Stuffs,
Vet Medicine Products and Rendering Office.
A2.5.2 Option A: Improve the current system
A2.5.2.1 Sub-option A1: Extending the scope of mandatory fees
All fees charged in Poland are ‘non-compulsory’ as defined by the Regulation. During the
stakeholder consultation, CAs thought that it could be useful to reclassify certain
(unspecified) non-mandatory fees as mandatory to improve consistency across Europe, but
that doing so across the MS in a way that suited each MS would be difficult. Other
stakeholders (trade associations) did not think that there was a need to extend the scope of
mandatory fees.
The Polish OC system is centralised and it would be relatively straightforward to change the
list of mandatory fees.
Table A2.94 Sub-option A1: Impacts in Poland of extending the scope of mandatory fees
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency -- Increasing the scope of mandatory fees could place an additional burden on
CAs. If funding from the state budget did not increase, it could result in the
capacity of CAs being exceeded.
Simplification - Could potentially complicate the legal framework as no compulsory fees are
currently charged, however centralised nature of Polish system means that any
complications are likely to be minimal.
Comparability + Extending the scope of mandatory fees could increase the comparability of the
OC system across Europe and the list of activities charged for would be similar
across MS.
Streamlining -- The sub-option could increase the administration burden of CAs as they would
have to charge for a wider range of activities. It would also be likely to increase
compliance costs for industry.
Accountability 0 No impacts identified.
A2.5.2.2 Sub-option A2: Require full cost recovery
There is little information available on the level of cost recovery in Poland, but what
information does exist indicates that fee revenue is insufficient to adequately finance official
controls.
Table A2.95 Sub-option A2: Impacts in Poland of requiring full-cost recovery
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency + Ensuring full cost recovery is likely to improve the adequacy of finances for
official controls. However, as CAs are funded from the state budget it may
make little difference to their budget in practice.
Simplification 0 No impacts identified.
Comparability + Full cost recovery would increase comparability of CAs in Poland with those in
other MS as it would ensure that fee rates reflected actual costs.
Streamlining -- The sub-option would require a change from the current system and could
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increase CA’s administrative burden as a result. The sub-option is also likely to
increase the cost for FBOs as fees would increase.
Accountability 0 No impacts identified.
A2.5.2.3 Sub-option A3: Clearly define eligible costs
Fee rates in Poland are often calculated based on a list of eligible costs defined by the
central CA (GVI and the SSI) following guidelines set by MARD or the MH.
Table A2.96 Sub-0ption A3: Impacts in Poland of clearly defining eligible costs
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency 0 Fees are, in principle, based on a list of eligible costs defined by central CAs.
However in practice fee rates may be determined by negotiations between
central CAs and industry bodies. For this reason this sub-option is unlikely to
have effect in Poland.
Simplification 0 No impact identified.
Comparability + If Poland used the same list of eligible costs as other MS it would improve
comparability between MS, and would also account for different MS costs
structures.
Streamlining 0 No effect identified. The sub-option could result in either lower or higher costs,
depending on the final list of eligible costs decided upon, and the difference
between these costs and those currently applied in Poland.
Accountability + Clearly defining costs could improve accountability as both CAs and FBOs
would be clear about eligible costs.
A2.5.2.4 Sub-option A4: Time-based fees and flat fees
Fees in Poland are set based on a range of criteria specified by MARD, and also by
negotiation between MARD and industry bodies. Fees are a mix of time-based fees and flat
fees.
Sub-option A4: Introduce time-based fees
Table A2.97 Sub-option A4: Impacts in Poland of introducing time-based fees
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency + Time-based are already used in some cases. Flat fees are currently charged for
certain OC activities. Expanding the list of activities for which flat fees are charged
may improve the resources available to CAs, especially the GVI which is the only
CA not to return fee revenue to the State Budget.
Simplification 0 Time-based are already used in some cases; the option would be unlikely to impact
the legal framework for official controls.
Comparability - Time-based fees could reduce the comparability of Poland with other MS as it may
be less transparent than the current system. To avoid issues around transparency
it is important that the eligible costs are well defined. Extending the scope of
activities for which flat fees are charged could improve the comparability of Poland
with other MS, especially as such fees would be based on a common methodology
but reflecting local cost considerations.
Streamlining -- As responsibilities between the various CAs are well defined it is likely that it would
be possible to determine which activities are related specifically to OC activities.
However time-based fees could increase the administration burden slightly in
Poland as they may require new administrative procedures. Extending the scope of
flat fees could increase the administrative burden for CAs, and could also increase
costs for FBOs.
Accountability ++ Time-based could increase accountability as CAs would have to justify time spent
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on OC activities. Flat fees could increase accountability as fees would reflect the
scale of the operations inspected.
A2.5.2.5 Sub-option A5:Require ring-fencing of resources
There is minimal ring-fencing of resources in Poland. Only the GVI retain fee revenues for
their own use; all other CAs direct fee revenues to the state budget. All CAs, including the
GVI, receive their funding from the state budget.
Table A2.98 Sub-option A5: Impacts in Poland of requiring ring-fencing of resources
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency + As fee rates are below actual costs, and CAs currently receive the majority of
their funding from the state budget, ring-fencing of resources is likely have a
limited positive effect on the financing of OC activity in Poland.
Simplification - Could require changes to current legal arrangements.
Comparability + The sub-option could help to determine the relationship between fees and actual
costs in Poland.
Streamlining - Could increase the admin burden as CAs would have to introduce arrangements
to collect and retain fee revenue.
Accountability + Could increase transparency about relationship between cost of controls and
fee revenue, which could increase accountability.
A2.5.2.6 Sub-option A6: Incorporate bonus-malus principles
Stakeholders had limited or no experience of a bonus-malus system; they had difficulty
envisaging how such a system could operate in practice.
Table A2.99 Sub-option A6: Impacts in Poland of incorporating bonus-malus principles
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency - A bonus-malus system could, if it reduced the fee revenue collected, decrease
the finances available for CAs. However, as all CAs receive funding from the
state budget, and only the GVI keeps fee revenue, the potential for negative
effects are somewhat constrained.
Simplification - It is likely that this sub-option would require significant changes to the OC
system in Poland.
Comparability - Due to the complexities involved in introducing a bonus-malus system it is likely
that this sub-option would reduce comparability between Poland and other MS.
Streamlining -- This sub-option would require significant changes to the current OC system and
would probably increase the administrative burden on CAs.
Accountability 0 No impacts identified.
A2.5.2.7 Sub-option A7: Introduce transparency and reporting requirements
Transparency in Poland is limited. Polish CAs do not regularly publish information about the
OC system, or provide information about precisely how fees are calculated. Funding for
CAs is provided centrally from the general State budget; it would be difficult to identify which
funds are specifically related to official controls, and thus determine the relationship been
fees and actual costs.
Table A2.100 Sub-option A7: Impacts of in Poland of introducing transparency and reporting requirements
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency 0 Unlikely to have an impact as fees are directed to the State budget, and
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resources are allocated directly to the CA from the central State budget.
Simplification 0 Unlikely to have an impact as fees are directed to the State budget, and
resources are allocated directly to the CA from the central State budget.
Comparability 0 Unlikely to have an impact as fees are directed to the State budget, and
resources are allocated directly to the CA from the central State budget.
Streamlining -- Likely to increase the admin burden as CAs do not currently engage in reporting,
and the relationship between fees and actual costs is unclear.
Accountability + Increasing transparency and reporting could increase access to information, and
help in the understanding of how information is collected and used.
A2.5.2.8 Sub-option A8: Providing for industry participation
In principle, fees in Poland should reflect actual costs. The central CA has defined eligible
costs and methodologies to calculate appropriate fee rates. However, in practice fees are
often set following negotiations between central the CAs and industry bodies. In this way
there already exists an, albeit informal, mechanism to include industry in the process of
setting fees.
Table A2.101 Sub-option A8: Impacts in Poland of providing for industry participation
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency - Industry negotiates with central CAs about fee rates, and this is considered to
result in fee rates that are lower than actual costs. Increasing the opportunity of
industry participation could place further downward pressure on fees. However,
as all CAs (except the GVI) direct fee revenues to the state budget, further
decreases in fees may not adversely affect their own budgets.
Simplification -- The sub-option could complicate the legal framework by creating a mechanism
for industry to challenge fee levels.
Comparability 0 No impacts identified.
Streamlining -- The sub-option could increase the burden on CAs if they have to engage with
industry and respond to legal challenges.
Accountability + The sub-option could increase the accountability of CAs to FBOs.
A2.5.2.9 Sub-option A9: Introduce exemptions and reductions for micro-enterprises
Approximately 20 to 30 per cent of meat on the Polish market originates from uncontrolled
slaughter. In the opinion of stakeholders exemptions for micro-enterprises should not be
introduced as they could increase the proportion of meat originating from uncontrolled
slaughter, increasing food safety risks in the food chain.
Table A2.102 Sub-option A9: Impacts in Poland of introducing exemptions and reductions for micro-enterprises
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency + The sub-option could reduce the amount of inspections CAs have to conduct. As
CAs are funded from the state budget, and (except for the GVI) do not keep fee
revenue, it could reduce their workload without reducing their resources. This
would improve the resourcing of CAs.
Simplification - The sub-option could complicate the legal framework as exemptions would be
granted on the basis of size rather than risk.
Comparability - The option could reduce comparability as different MS are likely to have different
proportions of micro-enterprises.
Streamlining ++ The sub-option could potentially reduce the burden on CAs and also reduce
compliance costs on industry.
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Accountability - The option could reduce accountability as exemptions would be granted on the
basis of size rather than risk.
A2.5.3 Option B: Fully harmonise inspection fees for official controls
Fees in Poland, in principle, should reflect full cost recovery of official control activities.
However final fees are based on negotiations between MARD and industry bodies, which
would suggest that they are unlikely to sufficiently high to recover full costs. Due to the
comparatively lower costs in Poland compared to the euro-area average, harmonised fee
rates could significantly increase the fees charged for official controls.
A2.5.3.1 Option B1: Fees for provision of controls are determined on a unified basis for the EU as a whole (i.e. the same fee rates apply in each Member State
Table A2.103 Option B1: Impacts of full harmonisation in Poland where the same fee rates apply in each MS
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency ++ Full harmonisation is likely to significantly increase fees in Poland, which would
probably improve financing for performing OC activities in the GVI. Other CAs may
not benefit as fee revenue is returned to the State Budget.
Simplification 0 No impact identified.
Comparability -- Full harmonisation would not account for the particular costs structures in Poland.
Streamlining -- Full harmonisation is likely to result in higher fees in Poland, which would increase
compliance costs on industry. It would be unlikely to affect the administration
burden for CAs.
Accountability - Fees are currently based on several criteria specified by MARD, but are also
influenced by negotiations between MARD and industry bodies. Harmonised fees
may reduce the scope for industry to influence fee rates and may also reduce
transparency about how fees are calculated.
A2.5.3.2 Option B2: Harmonised fees are adjusted for each Member State using a cost of living index
Table A2.104 Option B2: Impacts of full harmonisation in Poland where fee rates are adjusted for each MS using a cost of living index
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency ++ Fee rates in Poland do not bear relation to the actual costs incurred. Although
information is limited about the proportion of full cost recovery, what evidence exists
suggests that it is low. Full harmonisation, adjusted for cost of living index, would
probably increase fee rates in Poland. This could increase revenue available for
the GVI, but would not necessarily affect the other CAs as they are funded centrally
(and all fees collected go to the State Budget).
Simplification 0 No impact identified.
Comparability - Full harmonisation with cost of living adjustment may increase OCs fees their
current low level, and improve comparability with other MS.
Streamlining -- OC fees are currently relatively low in Poland compared to other Member States.
Full harmonisation, adjusted for cost of living index, could increase OC fees and
increase compliance costs on industry.
Accountability - Fees are currently based on several criteria specified by MARD, but are also
influenced by negotiations between MARD and industry bodies. Harmonised fees,
adjusted for cost of living index, may reduce the scope for industry to influence fee
rates and may also reduce transparency about how fees are calculated.
A2.5.3.3 Sub-option B3: Harmonise fees for certain import controls
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Table A2.105 Sub-0ption B3: Impacts in Poland of harmonised fees for certain import controls
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency ++ Full harmonisation is likely to significantly increase fees in Poland, which could
improve financing for performing OC activities. However, as CAs conducting
import controls are funded from the state budget, and return fee revenue to the
state budget, the funding available for OC activities may not increase if fee revenue
increases.
Simplification 0 No impacts identified.
Comparability -- Full harmonisation would not account for the particular costs structures in Poland.
Streamlining -- Full harmonisation is likely to result in higher fees in Poland, which would increase
compliance costs on industry. It would be unlikely to affect the administration
burden for CAs.
Accountability - Fees are currently based on several criteria specified by MARD, but are also
influenced by negotiations between MARD and industry bodies. Harmonised fees
may reduce the scope for industry to influence fee rates and may also reduce
transparency about how fees are calculated.
A2.5.4 Option C: Repeal Articles 26-29 of the Regulation (full subsidiarity)
Industry stakeholders have previously expressed their support for full subsidiarity (FCEC
2008). In their opinion it provides MS with the flexibility required to reflect national cost
considerations in fee rates, which is especially important in Poland due to its relatively low
costs (compared to other MS). However, CAs have indicated that full subsidiarity could
reduce funding available to CAs, and reduce transparency between MS49
by increasing
differences in how fees are calculated.
Table A2.106 Option C: Impacts of full subsidiarity in Poland
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency -- Likely to result in the under funding of official control activities as fees may be
reduced substantially. Especially important for the GVI, the only CA not to return
fee revenues to the State Budget.
Simplification 0 No impact identified.
Comparability -- Likely to reduce comparability between MS as each will be free to arrange official
controls in a different way.
Streamlining 0 No impact identified.
Accountability 0 No impact identified.
A2.5.4.2 Issues/considerations
Implementing harmonised changes across the OC system in Poland is likely to be
complicated by the multiple administrative layers responsible for implementing OCs; the
system includes an extensive network of central, regional and district level CAs.
All CAs in Poland receive funding from the state budget. In principle the fee rates should
reflect actual costs, but in practice are heavily influenced by negotiations between central
CAs and industry bodies. The result is that fees do not provide adequate financing for OC
activity, but the shortfall between fee revenues and actual costs are met from the state
budget. Any changes that are likely to change the balance of funding away from the state to
FBOs are likely to significantly increase industry’s costs.
49 During interviews as part of this evaluation.
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A2.5.4.3 Poland: summary table of option analysis
Table A2.107 Poland: summary table of option analysis
Option Parameter/score
Efficiency Simplification Comparability Streamlining Accountability
A Improve the current system
A1 Extend scope of mandatory
fees
-- - + -- 0
A2 Full cost recovery + 0 + -- 0
A3 Clear definition of eligible
costs
0 0 + 0 +
A4 Time-based fees 1 0 - -- ++
A5 Ring-fencing resources + - + - +
A6 Bonus-malus system - - - -- 0
A7 Transparency & reporting 0 0 0 -- +
A8 Industry participation - -- 0 -- +
A9 Micro-enterprises + - - ++ -
B B1 Full harmonisation, unified
fees
++ 0 -- -- -
B2 Full harmonisation, cost-of-
living adjusted
++ 0 - -- -
B3 Import fees ++ 0 -- -- -
C Full subsidiarity -- 0 -- 0 0
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A2.6 United Kingdom
A2.6.1 Introduction
This case study was informed by 4 interviews (1 CA and 3 industry stakeholder(s)) and 9
questionnaires.
The CA for meat controls in Great Britain (Food Standards Agency (FSA)) consulted with
other CAs (Defra, VMD) to give a unified response, although a separate response was
received from Northern Ireland, where meat controls are delegated to Department for
Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD). DARD is also responsible for delivery of all
other official controls in Northern Ireland, which are otherwise largely delivered through local
authorities in GB (with the exception of checks at primary production holdings for milk and
eggs, imports through ports and veterinary residues).
Fees are currently charged for inspection and audit of fresh meat establishments, monitoring
of residues of veterinary residues, approval of feed establishments, and checks on imported
food.
This case study was undertaken at a time when the FSA was actively seeking to pass the full
cost of meat inspection onto the industry, which was causing considerable objections from
industry. The CA was also reviewing the funding of all official hygiene controls but had not
made any public announcements about its conclusions.
A2.6.2 Option A: Improve the current system
The statutory fee system should be cross-sectoral and not commodity based; therefore we
would envisage that 882/2004 could as an example state that all food and feed
establishments requiring approval (e.g. under 853/2004) should be covered by the fee
system.
A2.6.3 Sub-option A1: Extend the scope of mandatory fees
In the UK most emphasis and debate about charging for official controls concerns the meat
industry. In other sectors where charges are made, e.g. charging for veterinary residues,
industry accepts the charges as ‘legitimate’ and part of running their businesses. The vast
majority of food businesses in the UK do not pay fees for official hygiene controls, although
the CA are considering whether these should be introduced.
Table A2.108 Sub-option A1: Impacts in the United Kingdom of extending the scope of mandatory fees
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency -- Costs of collection of fees could, in some cases, exceed the receipts recovered.
Simplification -- Article 27 should be simplified and clarified; its remit should be cross-sectoral
and encompassing all food and feed establishments for which approval status is
required; at the same time careful consideration should be given to including in
such a fee system other food and feed registered establishments.
Comparability - There would be an increased need for clear definition of all the cost components
of additional mandatory controls for which fees would be collected. Existing
mandatory fees are not charged by some MS - this must be corrected before
any additional fees considered.
Streamlining - In essence all fees are mandatory as they are paid for out of taxation. Great
care would therefore be needed if the scope for mandatory fees was increased
to ensure that businesses were not paying twice.
Accountability -- Clarity on who is covered by mandatory fees is needed, for example currently
some approved establishments under 853/2004 are covered by statutory fee
systems whilst not others. This could mean that some costs for controls
currently borne by government (e.g. some TSE controls) could be transferred to
industry. The implementation of statutory fees should be considered not on a
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commodity basis but on the applicable legislation (e.g. whether they fall under
853/2004 or not)
A2.6.4 Sub-option A2: Requiring full cost recovery
The UK CA is currently consulting on full cost recovery for charging in the meat sector and
considering charges for all other OCs. With the current pressure on government
departments to reduce costs and improve efficiency there is likely to be more consideration
given to recover full costs wherever possible. Industry however is not convinced that they
should shoulder the costs which they consider to be unfair and where they are given no
choice as there is a ‘state monopoly’ on enforcement.
Table A2.109 Option A2: Impacts in the United Kingdom of requiring full cost recovery
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency -- The requirement for full cost recovery, of itself, provides no incentive for the
competent authority to improve the efficiency or reduce the cost of delivery of official
controls.
Simplification -- Move to full cost recovery could have significant business impacts which are likely to
result in increased costs to consumers, and also the potential to lead to conflict with
official control bodies.
Comparability -- Inspections are not a subsidy (as quoted by FSA) they are a cost imposed which will
affect EU MS FBOs vis-à-vis imports. Any decision on cost recovery must ensure
agreed cost sections are the same in each MS.
Streamlining + If controls were risk based full cost recover would provide a bonus-malus system and
incentivise compliance thus streamlining enforcement.
Accountability -- Any movements towards full cost recovery in the food and feed sector will have to be
fully approved and impact assessed before an official UK position can be taken on
this specific point.
A2.6.5 Sub-option A3: Clearly define eligible costs
Very strong opinions were registered by industry regarding the FSA’s proposal to include
pension deficit costs in the eligible costs calculation. This proposal has now been dropped.
There was more agreement in this section than most other sections.
Table A2.110 Sub-option A3: Impacts in the United Kingdom of clearly defining eligible costs
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency ++ Overhead recovery costs should be applied to FBOs which do not comply and
need a second inspection.
Simplification ++ Detailed lists tend to have a detrimental effect as they can still be interpreted on a number of different ways, potentially increasing the administrative burden on the CA due to increased analysis, recording and reporting.
Comparability ++ This is a critical concept, harmonization of the understanding of what is included
within the calculation of the fee is paramount, to ensure a more levelled playing
field but also to reduce the significant number of legal challenges currently
suffered by CA from stakeholder organizations. Only if cost categories are
tightly defined will this maximise the ' comparability' objective. Vague definitions
would lead to differential interpretations amongst member states. The need to
decide which of each section is centrally funded must be the same in all MS.
Allowing a single MS to determine its overhead cost will lead to unacceptable
variations.
Streamlining ++ The requirement to follow a widely recognized system like Activity Based
Costing, which is already used within the private sector could ensure that there
is a commonality of understanding and perhaps remove such different
interpretation which may streamline systems.
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Accountability + It must be made clear what is not chargeable.
A2.6.5.2 Sub-option A4: Time-based fees and flat fees
Table A2.111 Option A4: Impacts in the United Kingdom of the introduction of time-based fees for which the continuous of systematic presence of official controls in required
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency ++ This is current FSA system at slaughterhouses which FSA claim has encouraged
efficiency and effectiveness on the usage of official time by Food Business
Operators, but this is disputed by FBOs. Could disadvantage SMEs. Flat rates
based on actual costs are a way to reduce administrative burdens.
Simplification - FSA consider time-based fees would simplify – industry does not concur. Flat
fees could lead to distortion in costs between different sizes of operator -
disadvantages small establishments with slow throughput.
Comparability 0 FSA consider would provide some comparability – industry does not concur.
Streamlining + Industry is keen to see more radical changes in the EU meat inspection system to
implement a modern, risk-based system.
Accountability - Time based fees for audit might be acceptable as larger, higher risk
establishments would take longer to audit. Wide divergence of opinions.
A2.6.6 Sub-option A5: Requiring ring-fencing of resources
This was considered by most respondents to be desirable but given the current economic
climate and present structures to be very unlikely to be implemented, and therefore all
scores indicated no impact.
Table A2.112 Option A5: Impacts in the United Kingdom of requiring ring-fencing of resources
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency 0 Would assist with ensuring adequate resources are available to carry out official
controls.
Simplification 0 No impacts identified.
Comparability 0 No impacts identified.
Streamlining 0 No impacts identified.
Accountability 0 Particularly important when resource allocation is determined at local level for
activities that are carried out as a national benefit rather than for a local need.
A2.6.7 Sub-option A6: Incorporate bonus-malus principles
There was consensus that a truly risk-based and proportionate system would in effect
become a bonus-malus system as poorly performing businesses would be subject to more
frequent inspection and thus have higher costs. At present many retail FBOs are
uninspected and unscored. Only a small proportion of the illegal meats imported into UK are
detected and destroyed.
Table A2.113 Option A6: Impacts in the United Kingdom of incorporating bonus-malus principles
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency ++ The ultimate objective of official controls is to improve consumer protection; therefore
fees could not only ensure that adequate resources are available to tackle more time
consuming non compliant establishments, but as a tool that encourages compliance.
Simplification ++ A truly risk-based system would simplify a bonus-malus system.
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Comparability ++ For true comparability the system would need to be uniformly agreed across MS,
although there is still a strong argument for MS flexibility.
Streamlining ++ A truly risk-based system would streamline a bonus-malus system.
Accountability ++ The CAs support the principle that fee systems are a tool that can be used to protect
and incentivise consumer protection. Any extra resources that CA need to allocate
due to non compliance from FBOs should be fully recoverable via fee systems as
taxpayers should not be subsidizing establishments that increase their risk as
consumers.
A2.6.8 Sub-option A7: Introduce transparency and reporting requirements
There was wide agreement that transparency was desirable and essential, although as with
other sections lack of full agreement between CA and Industry.
Table A2.114 Sub-option A7: Impacts in the United Kingdom of introducing transparency and reporting requirements
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency + Official controls need to be both efficient and effective. If costs are minimised without
regard to effectiveness levels of public protection may be compromised.
Simplification - The CA already provide such information for those official controls for which there is a
well developed fee system (e.g. VMD; FSA), the main issue will be if we needed to do
so for official controls currently provided by local authorities which would increase the
overall administrative burden.
Comparability ++ There must be full transparency on the part of member states and competent
authorities as regards the composition of fees and how they are set to allow
comparisons. Reports are made of vets from eastern MS being employed at near the
national minimum wage and the full authorised professional UK rate being claimed by
the contractor. If correct will lead to undue costs placed on the FBO.
Streamlining - In MS with devolved regions, it may be difficult and costly to ascertain charging
system at different levels of government. For example there is currently no reliable
system for the CA to gather actual costs of hygiene enforcement by local authorities.
Accountability ++ Unanimity on this element. Industry comment - more transparency would resolve the
present problem in the UK of FSA seeking full cost recovery without providing
transparency on what costs it wishes to recover. CA Comment - those central
government departments that deliver or are the CA of official controls for which a fee
is being charged already publish financial details covering financial information via
their annual report of accounts.
A2.6.9 Sub-option A8: Provide for industry participation
As with previous sections there was a wide difference in opinions about this issue – the CA
consider they consult widely and listen to industry views, whereas industry feel their views
are not taken into account. Again the meat industry is the sector where opinions are most
strongly expressed.
Table A2.115 Sub-option A8: Impacts in the United Kingdom of providing for industry participation
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency ++ All charging requires legislative change which requires consultation on options. Amending 882 might improve efficiency but could adversely affect effectiveness.
Simplification + Industry has little influence over fee setting due to the highly complex of the UK system for hourly rate charging. They do have some influence over the number of inspectors, but none for instance on whether an inspector is an employed inspector on over-time or a contract inspector on plain time, or how long an audit takes.
Comparability ++ The Commission should provide Member States with the flexibility to develop their own policy.
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Streamlining 0 No impact identified.
Accountability ++ ‘Business agreements’ are legal agreements between FBOs and the CA. This system has proved to be useful on those instances where regular official presence is required (e.g. abattoirs). Its usefulness is more difficult to ascertain where risk based OCs are delivered. All acts of UK Government have an in built appeal process. In terms of revising 882, the appeal system would need to be independent and have industry representation.
A2.6.10 Sub-option A9: introduce exemptions and reductions for micro-enterprises
Exemptions for smaller businesses were generally welcomed but there was concern over
definitions. The point was made also that a truly risk-based and proportional system would
mean a lower burden on smaller businesses.
Table A2.116 Sub-option A9: Impacts in the United Kingdom of introducing exemptions and reductions for micro-enterprises
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency + The CA’s calculations indicate the total financial impact of allowing for
discounts for SMEs result in subsidy of roughly at around 5% of total cost for
delivery of the service, a manageable amount when taking into account the
value and employment that such business provide within local communities.
Simplification + Whilst some responses indicated that simplification would result it’s not clear
how this would be achieved.
Comparability + Clear EU-wide definition is required to avoid unfair competition.
Streamlining + Similarly whilst some responses indicated that streamlining would result it’s
not clear how this would be achieved
Accountability + MS should be able to develop actions plans to ensure that fee setting
mechanisms are not disproportionately detrimental to SMEs and the CA
considered that MS should maintain a level of flexibility on their classification
of SMEs- this was not supported by industry who favoured clear, EU-wide
definitions.
A2.6.11 Option B: Fully harmonise inspection fees for official controls
There were differing views expressed from competent authorities and from industry, with the
latter more supportive as this could potentially create a more level playing field, especially if
charges were based on throughput numbers.
A2.6.11.1 Option B1: Fees for provision of controls are determined on a unified basis for the EU as a whole (i.e. the same fee rates apply in each Member State
Table A2.117 Option B1: Impacts of full harmonisation in the United Kingdom where the same fee rates apply in each MS
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency - There were different scores given by respondents. The CA commented that
significant disparities on cost of living index across the EU will result on some of
the MS achieving significantly greater cost recovery than others. One industry
respondent commented that one EU price might not necessarily provide all
member states with adequate financial means - therefore may have variable
impacts in relation to 'Efficiency' and 'Comparability' objectives.
Simplification + The ‘per number’ basis would be simpler, so more beneficial for small businesses.
Comparability -- The only basis for this system to remain (as a possibility to be discussed) would
be at import points for food and feed as a way to discourage an artificial effect on
trade routes. This option does not increase transparency or harmonisation since
MS who disagree with the philosophy of charging will find a way to disguise
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subsidy, at central or local government level.
Fee rates set in Euros are proving problematic to those countries that are not
within the euro area due to currency exchange fluctuations.
Streamlining ++ Set fees at EU level would put pressure on profligate CAs to maximise efficiency
of delivery and to negotiate more risk-based controls that would require less input.
Accountability 0 Each Member State should retain a level of flexibility to develop their own fee
setting mechanisms and achieve a level of cost recovery within agreed
boundaries as they are accountable to their own Government.
A2.6.12 Option B2: Harmonised fees are adjusted for each Member State using a cost of living index
There was more agreement that this would be more equitable, but similar problems to full
harmonisation were envisaged.
Table A2.118 Option A2: Impacts of full harmonisation in the United Kingdom where fee rates adjusted using a cost of living index apply in each MS
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency - As with previous option: although this takes into account differences on cost of
living index it still fails to address some of the main shortcomings presented with
current system.
Simplification - The system might be rather complex, bureaucratic and subject to on-going
challenge. The system would still need to be sensitive to currency exchange
rates and would need to be amended frequently to take into account economic
growth indicators.
Comparability -- Significant disparities on salaries, working conditions, number of personnel,
structure and organization of official controls and industry across the EU will
make it difficult to find an adjusted rate that can work throughout EU 27. This
system would be difficult to enforce and possibly result in even greater distortion
than at present.
Streamlining ++ As above.
Accountability + Allows more flexibility and accountability.
Table A2.119 Option B3: Harmonise fees in the United Kingdom for certain import controls
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency 0 No impacts identified
Simplification - FSA support harmonization of outcomes, but believe that with significant
differences in the organization of OCs across and within MSs there is no one
fee system that will suit them all, unless based on actual costs
Comparability - Principles applicable to import controls should be treated differently to those for
other official controls due to the importance of trade routes and the need to
reduce "BIP or DPE shopping". CA should be allowed to work on a full cost
recovery basis with a minimum fee level set in EU law. Clarity of what official
controls are to be included with the fee system: surveillance and monitoring are
an integral part of the delivery of OCs and therefore should be included.
Streamlining - In the current financial situation, there is pressure to reduce sampling and
analysis activity for which costs cannot be recovered, this may impact on the
level of consumer protection, therefore fee systems should be developed in a
way that incentivises and enhances the level of consumer protection.
Accountability - This option implies that the operator should pay rather than government. It does
not address the fact that this option, as with the others, cannot be harmonised.
A2.6.13 Option C: Repeal Article 26-29 of the Regulation (full subsidiarity)
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This option was considered to be against the principle of greater EU harmonisation and
would do nothing to put pressure on profligate CA raising charges and causing inter MS
distortions.
Table A2.120 Option C: Impacts of full subsidiarity in the United Kingdom where fee rates are set differently in each Member State
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency -- Considered difficult to implement higher levels of cost recovery with full
subsidiarity. Full subsidiarity would CAs to recoup the full cost of inefficiently
delivered official controls and would remove drivers to achieve efficiency.
Simplification 0 Simplification would be totally dependent on MS approach, so may be simpler or
more complex.
Comparability -- It will remove the underpinning support to MS for their different fee systems, may
distort internal market, increase pressure on countries nearer full cost recovery
from countries with reduced (or no) charges.
Streamlining -- Ultimately could result on failure to provide required official controls due to lack of
required finances.
Accountability -- The current de-regulatory UK government may be unwilling to introduce charges
in some specific areas of official controls. Full subsidiarity may not lead to greater
accountability.
A2.6.14 Issues/considerations
Currently it is unclear which official controls are to be included within the fee system (animal
health and welfare, TSEs, animal by-products, animal identification), therefore it is not only
key to define which sectors of the food industry are covered by fees but also which statutory
OCs are included within it.
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A2.6.14.1 United Kingdom: summary table of option analysis
Table A2.121 United Kingdom: summary table of option analysis
Option Parameter/score
Efficiency Simplification Comparability Streamlining Accountability
A Improve the current system
A1 Extend scope of mandatory
fees
-- -- - - --
A2 Full cost recovery -- -- -- + --
A3 Clear definition of eligible
costs
++ ++ ++ ++ +
A4 Time-based fees ++ - 0 + -
A5 Ring-fencing resources 0 0 0 0 0
A6 Bonus-malus system ++ ++ ++ ++ ++
A7 Transparency & reporting + - ++ - ++
A8 Industry participation ++ + ++ 0 ++
A9 Micro-enterprises + + + + +
B B1 Full harmonisation, unified
fees
- + -- ++ 0
B2 Full harmonisation, cost-of-
living adjusted
- - -- ++ +
B3 Import fees 0 - - - -
C Full subsidiarity -- 0 -- -- --
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Annex 3 Responses from EU level industry stakeholders
A3.1.1 Introduction
This annex reports results of consultations with EU-level industry stakeholders. It was
informed by six interviews with international and EU-level industry stakeholders and 48
questionnaires.
A3.1.2 Option A: Improve the current system
A3.1.2.1 Sub-option A1: Extending the scope of mandatory fees
Annex IV and V of the Regulation specify activities for which fee collection is mandatory, for
domestic production and imports respectively. The FCEC evaluation (FCEC 2008a) found
that 18 Member States collect fees for all activities, while the remaining 9 Member States
collect such fees only in part.
Table A3.122 Sub-option A1: Extending the scope of mandatory fees
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency ++ Extending the scope of mandatory fees could improve the financing of OC
activities in MS that do not charge for non-mandatory activities.
Simplification + Extending the scope of mandatory fees could help to simplify the OC system
across the EU.
Comparability ++ Extending the scope of mandatory fees would improve comparability of the OC
system between MS across the EU.
Streamlining -- Increasing the scope of mandatory fees could increase the administration
burden on CAs by increasing the OC activities they have to perform. It could
also increase compliance costs for FBOs.
Accountability - The option could reduce accountability as CAs would not have to justify why
they are conducting certain controls.
A3.1.2.2 Sub-option A2: Requiring full cost recovery
The rationale for the charging and collection of fees is to cover the costs of official controls,
and meet the requirements of the Regulation to ensure adequate financial resources are
available (Article 26). However, the share of the costs of official controls covered by fee
revenue ranges from 20 per cent (Estonia) to 92 per cent (Finland) (2007 figures) (FCEC
2008a). At least 14 Member States have indicated that fees are insufficient to cover the cost
of official control activities (FCEC 2008a). Only 7 Member States claim fees cover costs,
and a further 6 claim that this may be occurring in some cases (FCEC 2008a).
Table A3.123 Sub-option A2: Impact for EU of requiring full cost recovery
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency ++ Would ensure that CAs are adequately financed.
Simplification -- Would complicate the legal framework as it would require that CAs are aware of
the actual costs of OCs.
Comparability + Would improve comparability between MS as actual costs would have to be
explicitly defined.
Streamlining -- Would increase CA admin burden as actual costs would have to be understood
and recorded. Likely to increase fees dramatically in some MS.
Accountability - Could reduce accountability as CAs would not have to justify the cost of control
activities.
A3.1.2.3 Sub-option A3: Clearly defining eligible costs
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The official control fee should reflect the actual costs incurred by the CA in conducting
control activities. To facilitate comparable calculations by Member States, costs should be
calculated based on cost categories specified in Annex VI; staff salaries; and staff costs
including overheads; laboratory analysis and sampling. The current definition of eligible
costs is perceived as vague, which results in Member States considering it their right to add
costs that are not necessarily justified in that they are directly linked to official controls
(FCEC 2008a).
Table A3.124 Sub-option A3: Impact for Europe of clearly defining eligible costs
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency + Likely to improve the financing of official controls as the option would clarify
what activities should be charged for.
Simplification ++ Likely to simplify the legal framework for OCs by clarifying what OC activity CAs
can charge for.
Comparability ++ The option would be likely to improve comparability between MS as each CA
would include the same list of costs when calculating fee rates.
Streamlining + Could increase or decrease compliance costs depending on impact on fee
rates; will depend on difference between current definition of eligible costs at
MS level and revised definition. However, clearly defining eligible costs are
likely to result in OC fees that closely reflect actual costs.
Accountability + Likely to improve accountability as CAs may restrict charges for the defined
costs.
A3.1.2.4 Sub-option A4: Time-based fees and flat fees
The fee calculation method used by Member States is generally not transparent; it is unclear
whether the costs used by Member States reflect the actual costs directly associated with
carrying out the official controls (FCEC 2008a).
Time based fees are based on the actual time during which controls are performed,
multiplied by the fee for the staff performing the control. The staff fee can be contentious as
it can differ based on what is included in the calculation, for example; travel time, staff
training costs, staff overheads (i.e. building cost, support staff), and holidays.
Flat fees can be calculated on a throughput basis (i.e. per tonne or per animal) at a level that
reflects actual costs, or where applicable, at the amounts specified in section B of Annex IV
and V of the Regulation (‘minimum rates’). A previous evaluation of the official control
system (FCEC 2008a) found that among the EU-27, 18 of 27 CAs use a mix of flat rates and
minimum rates. An additional 6 Member States use minimum rates for the activities outlined
in Annexes IV and V (but do not collect fees for any other activity). Only 3 Member States
use flat rates throughout all activities for which fees are collected.
Member States’ Border Inspection Posts (BIPs) can charge different rates depending on
whether they base their fees on the minimum rates specified in Annex IV of the Regulation,
or whether they use flat rates based on actual costs. The FCEC evaluation (FCEC 2008a)
found that 7 Member States charge flat rates, and 3 – 5 other Member States charge a
combination of flat and minimum rates on imports (i.e. flat rates on some imports and
minimum rates on others). The use of differing rates could potentially distort the internal
market, but whether this distortion will actually occur will depend on a range of other factors
(e.g. transport costs and other logistical considerations). No evidence of any such
distortions was found (FCEC 2008a).
Table A3.125 Sub-option A4: Impact for EU of introducing time-based fees
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency ++ Introducing time-based fees could help to incentivise CAs to improve the
efficiency of their OC activities. Flat fees could improve the financing available
for official controls by increasing the number of activities that CAs charge for.
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Simplification - Recording the information necessary to calculate time-based fees could
complicate the OC legal framework in MS that do not currently use time-based
fees. Flat fees could complicate the legal framework in MS that do not
currently apply flat fees, or where the flat fee is significantly higher or lower
than the current fee.
Comparability + Time-based fees could help to account for varying costs structures across the
MS, as fees would be likely to bear a closer relationship to actual costs.
Specifying which activities should have flat fees, and how these fees should
be calculated, should help to improve comparability across the MS.
Streamlining -- Recording the information necessary to calculate time-based fees could
increase the administration burden in MS that do not currently use time-based
fees. In MS where fees do not relate to actual costs it could also increase fee
rates. Introducing flat fees could increase compliance costs for industry.
Accountability + Time based fees could improve accountability as the relationship between
control activities and fee revenue may become clearer. Flat fees could reduce
accountability in some MS by reducing the transparency of the relationship
between OC activity and fee revenue.
A3.1.2.5 Sub-option A5: Requiring ring-fencing of resources
In the majority of Member States, the revenue from collected fees is directed to the State’s
general budget, either in entirety (11 Member States), or in part (7 Member States) (FCEC
2008a). Only 9 Member States claim to be ring-fencing fee revenues for the CAs performing
the controls (FCEC 2008a).
Table A3.126 Sub-option A5: Impacts for Europe of requiring ring-fencing of resources
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency + Could have a positive impact on efficiency in MS with fee levels that reflect
actual costs.
Simplification - Could complicate the legal framework as CAs often have responsibilities in
addition to, and alongside, their OC responsibilities. It would be complicated
to separate OC resources from other resources.
Comparability + Ring-fencing of resources would clarify which CAs are sufficiently funded by
fee revenues.
Streamlining 0 No impacts identified.
Accountability + Could improve accountability as the relationship between actual costs and fee
revenue would be clarified.
A3.1.2.6 Sub-option A6:Incorporate bonus-malus principles
The Regulation includes elements of a bonus-malus system. It includes the stipulation that
official controls should be carried out ‘on a risk basis with appropriate frequency’ (Article 3.1),
and also includes provision for time based fees.
While several Member States have time based fees, risk factors are not sufficiently taken
into account in the way systems for official controls are planned and implemented (FCEC
2008a).
Table A3.127 Sub-option A6: Impacts for Europe of incorporating bonus-malus principles
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency + Likely to have positive effects on the efficiency of the OC system over the long-
term; it would help to ensure that inspections and controls are targeted where
needed to ensure high levels of food safety.
Simplification -- Likely to complicate legal framework in numerous MS.
Comparability - Likely to reduce comparability as bonus-malus systems could be significantly
different between MS, but would take account for cost differences in MS.
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Streamlining ++
Could reduce both the admin burden and industry costs over long term by
providing dynamic incentive for both CAs and FBOs.
Accountability + Likely to improve accountability as CAs would have to justify inspections on the
basis of risks posed by an FBO.
A3.1.2.7 Sub-option A7: Introduce transparency and reporting requirements
Transparency and reporting is currently limited across the Member States; there is a lack of
precise information on how rates are set and what they include in different Member States
(FCEC 2008a).
Table A3.128 Sub-option A7: Impacts for Europe of introducing transparency and reporting requirements
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency -- Likely to increase costs for CAs due to increase in admin burden.
Simplification -- Obligation to report to the Commission may place legal requirement on CAs to
collect data, complicating the legal framework.
Comparability - Improved transparency and reporting could improve comparability between MS.
However, due to the significant differences between OC systems in MS, it is
questionable whether increased data would facilitate a meaningful comparison
between MS.
Streamlining -- Likely to increase CA costs and may potentially increase industry costs as a
result.
Accountability ++ Would increase accountability of CAs as they would have to describe their
internal processes in detail.
A3.1.2.8 Sub-option A8: Provide for industry participation
Levels of industry participation are different between MS, but in general there is at least
some involvement of industry in the design of OC system. In some MS this is restricted to
consultation about OC legislation (e.g. Poland), while in other MS industry have a significant
input into the OC inspection process (e.g. Finland).
Table A3.129 Sub-option A8: Impacts for Europe of providing for industry participation
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency - Could potentially reduce fee levels, decreasing the financing available to CAs.
Simplification - Likely to lead to legal challenge that could complicate the legal basis of the OC
system.
Comparability - If legal challenge resulted, and industry had a more significant influence on OC
fees, it could lead to increased differences between MS.
Streamlining - Could increase administration burden for CAs as they would have to engage
with, and respond to, industry representations.
Accountability ++ Would enable FBOs to force CAs to account for, and justify, their decisions.
A3.1.2.9 Sub-option A9: Introduce exemptions and reductions for micro-enterprises
The impact of introducing exemptions and reductions will differ according to the proportion of
micro-enterprises in individual Member States.
Table A3.130 Sub-option A9: Impact for EU of introducing exemptions and reductions for micro-enterprises
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency -- Likely to significantly reduce the efficiency of the OC systems. The potential
reduction in fee revenue may have to be covered by other FBOs, which would
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Parameter Score Analysis
increase their costs.
Simplification -- Introducing exemptions or reductions for micro-enterprises could complicate the
legal framework in certain MS. For example, in MS where exemptions are
based on risk assessment, introducing this option could complicate the existing
legal framework.
Comparability - Likely to have a negative impact on comparability as MS will have different
proportion of micro-enterprises in relevant sectors.
Streamlining + It could reduce the administration burden for CAs, and also reduce FBO costs.
Accountability 0 No impacts identified.
A3.1.3 Option B: Fully harmonise inspection fees for official controls
There are significant differences in how controls are applied and how fees are calculated to
recover costs; across the EU fee rates vary with a considerable range (FCEC 2008a). Fee
systems in Member States may be minimum and / or flat rate; flat rates calculated using
different calculation methods; or rates expressed on a throughput or time basis (there may
be multiple different factors influencing time based fees). There are also a range of control
activities covered by the various fee rates, that is, similar control activities may be charged
on one Member State but not in another.
Due to the variations and differences between Member States, there are concerns about
unfair competition leading to distortions within the internal market. These concerns relate to
inter- and intra- Member State comparisons, and also between sectors under the Regulation.
Harmonised fees could potentially reduce distortions between and within Member States.
A3.1.3.1 Sub-option B1: Fees for provision of controls are determined on a unified basis for the EU as a whole (i.e. the same fee rates apply in each Member State
Table A3.131 Sub-option B1: Impacts of full harmonisation for the EU
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency -- If harmonised fees are set at a level that is low enough to be acceptable across
MS it is likely that it will result in the inadequate funding for performing OCs in MS
with relatively higher costs.
Simplification 0 This option could simplify legal frameworks across Europe as fees would not have
to be calculated to any specific formula. However it could also complicate the
legal framework in countries which have delegated powers for setting fee rates to
regional or local administrations.
Comparability -- Fully harmonised fees would not account for different cost structures in MS.
Streamlining -- Could reduce the administrative burden for CAs as they would not have to
calculate fees. However it could also increase compliance costs in MS with
comparatively lower costs than the average.
Accountability -- Harmonised fees could reduce the need for CAs to justify fee rates; they would be
specified centrally.
A3.1.3.2 Sub-option B2: Harmonised fees are adjusted for each Member State using a cost of living index
Table A3.132 Sub-option B2: Impacts of full harmonisation in EU where fee rates are adjusted for each MS using a cost of living index
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency -- If harmonised fees are set at a level that is low enough to be acceptable across MS
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Parameter Score Analysis
it is likely that it will result in the inadequate funding for performing OCs in MS with
relatively higher costs.
Simplification 0 This option could simplify legal frameworks across Europe as fees would not have
to be calculated to any specific formula. However it could also complicate the legal
framework in countries which have delegated powers for setting fee rates to
regional or local administrations.
Comparability -- Fully harmonised fees would not account for different cost structures in MS.
Streamlining -- Could reduce the administrative burden for CAs as they would not have to calculate
fees. However it could also increase compliance costs in MS with comparatively
lower costs than the average.
Accountability -- Harmonised fees could reduce the need for CAs to justify fee rates; they would be
specified centrally.
Table A3.133 Sub-option B3: Impacts for Europe of harmonising fees for certain import controls
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency -- Harmonised fees for certain import controls could reduce the efficiency of the
OC system; they could result in fee rates that are significantly lower or higher
than actual costs.
Simplification 0 Harmonised fees could simplify the OC legal framework in some MS, but
complicate it in others.
Comparability + Harmonised fees for import controls would improve comparability between MS.
Streamlining 0 Harmonised fees for import controls could increase or decrease compliance
costs depending on the difference between the harmonised fees and existing
MS fees.
Accountability - Harmonised import control fees could reduce accountability by reducing the
transparency of the relationship between actual costs and fee rates.
A3.1.4 Option C: Repeal Article 26-29 of the Regulation (full subsidiarity)
Full subsidiarity would involve repealing Articles 26 – 29 of the Regulation to enable the
development of Member States system for financing official controls. Doing so could, in
theory, help solve some of the problems related to specifying methods for calculating fees.
These problems, for example, include:
▪ The minimum fees included in the Regulation may result in fees that, in some Member
States, are higher than actual costs.
▪ The current definition of eligible costs / mandatory fees may reflect the needs and
requirements of the official control system in some Member States.
▪ The specification of how time based fees should be calculated may, in some instances
and in some Member states, fail to sufficiently consider the specific features of relevant
sectors.
Table A3.134 Option C: Impacts of full subsidiarity for EU
Parameter Score Analysis
Efficiency - Lack of EU direction could increase opportunity for political interference in MS.
This could result in reduced fee rates.
Simplification 0 No impacts identified.
Comparability -- Likely to reduce comparability as each MS will implement a different system.
Streamlining 0 No impacts identified.
Accountability 0 No impacts identified.
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A3.1.5 Issues/considerations
Industry in Europe expressed the opinion that a lot of OC activity has a public good aspect to
it, and as such should be paid with from public funds. They thought that passing increasing
amount of OC costs to FBOs could reduce the incentives present for CAs to be as efficient
as possible in their operations. This issue was raised as a key point across numerous
options and sub-options; there should be a balance between FBOs and CAs to ensure that
both sides bear responsibility for improving the efficiency of the OC system.
The bonus-malus system was viewed as a logical progression for the OC system, and one
that would be likely to have a positive effect on efficiency (of the system) over the long term.
However, for a bonus-malus system to operate properly it should be introduced with
increased use of risk-assessment, time based fees, and clearly defined eligible costs. The
definition of eligible costs should be precise enough to ensure the comparability of OC
systems between MS.
Not all MS will have the institutional capacity to implement the options and sub-options
proposed. Stakeholders did not offer a solution for this issue, but highlighted that it should
be considered in the design of eventual options. For example, recording the data necessary
to determine actual costs may not be possible in certain MS, and as a result it would be
difficult to introduce time-based fees that were based on actual costs.
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A3.1.5.1 EU industry: summary table of option analysis
Table A3.135 EU industry: summary table of option analysis
Option Parameter/score
Efficiency Simplification Comparability Streamlining Accountability
A A1 Extend scope of mandatory
fees ++ + ++ -- -
A2 Full cost recovery ++ -- + -- -
A3 Clear definition of eligible costs + ++ ++ + +
A4 Improve the current system:
Time-based fees ++ - + -- +
A5 Ring-fencing resources + - + 0 +
A6 Bonus-malus system + -- - ++ +
A7 Transparency & reporting -- -- - -- ++
A8 Industry participation - - - - ++
A9 Micro-enterprises -- -- - + 0
B B1 Full harmonisation, unified fees -- 0 -- -- --
B2 Full harmonisation, cost-of-
living adjusted -- 0 -- -- --
B3 Improve the current system:
Import fees -- 0 + 0 -
B Full subsidiarity - 0 -- 0 0
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Annex 4 Administrative burdens
A4.1 Administrative burdens associated with the options for amending Regulation 882/2004 with respect to fees charged for official controls
The tables below describe the likely administrative burdens associated with the options for
amending the Regulation with respect to fees charged for official controls. In general it is not
possible to determine the direction (increase or decrease) of a likely impact as it will depend
on the specific situation of the Member State in question. Similarly, it is not possible to
provide a meaningful estimate of the additional time required for each activity under each
option. However the tables do provide an indication of the potential characteristics of likely
impacts to administrative burdens by the proposed options, and where these impacts are
likely to be experienced.
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Table 5.20 Administrative burdens associated with sub-option A1: extending the scope of mandatory fees
Admin activities Activity
involved
(Y/N)
Direction of
change
(increase/
decrease
Additional
time required
(if time
increases)
Skill level
required
Familiarising with the information obligation Increase CA – Skilled labour
Training members and employees about the information obligations Increase FBO – Skilled labour
Retrieving relevant information from existing data No change N/A
Adjusting existing data No change N/A
Producing new data No change N/A
Designing information material Increase
CA – Skilled labour
FBO – Skilled labour
Filling forms and tables, including recordkeeping Increase
CA – Skilled labour
FBO – Skilled labour
Holding meetings (internal/external with an auditor, lawyer and the like) Increase
CA – Skilled labour
FBO – Skilled labour
Inspecting and checking (including assistance to inspection by public
authorities) Increase CA – Skilled labour
Copying (reproducing reports, producing labels or leaflets) No change N/A
Submitting the information to the relevant authority (e.g. sending it to the
relevant authority) No change N/A
Filing the information No change N/A
Buying (IT) equipment & supplies No change N/A
Other No change N/A
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Table 5.21 Administrative burdens associated with sub-option A2: require full cost recovery
Admin activities Activity
involved
(Y/N)
Direction of
change
(increase/
decrease
Additional
time required
(if time
increases)
Skill level
required
Familiarising with the information obligation Increase CA – Skilled labour
Training members and employees about the information obligations No change N/A
Retrieving relevant information from existing data Increase CA – Skilled labour
Adjusting existing data No change N/A
Producing new data Increase CA – Skilled labour
Designing information material No change N/A
Filling forms and tables, including recordkeeping Increase CA – Skilled labour
Holding meetings (internal/external with an auditor, lawyer and the like) No change N/A
Inspecting and checking (including assistance to inspection by public
authorities) No change N/A
Copying (reproducing reports, producing labels or leaflets) No change N/A
Submitting the information to the relevant authority (e.g. sending it to the
relevant authority) No change N/A
Filing the information Increase CA – Skilled labour
Buying (IT) equipment & supplies Increase CA – Skilled labour
Other No change N/A
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Table 5.22 Administrative burdens associated with sub-option A3: clearly define eligible costs
Admin activities Activity
involved
(Y/N)
Direction of
change
(increase/
decrease
Additional
time required
(if time
increases)
Skill level
required
Familiarising with the information obligation Increase CA – Skilled labour
Training members and employees about the information obligations Increase CA – Skilled labour
Retrieving relevant information from existing data No change N/A
Adjusting existing data No change N/A
Producing new data Increase CA – Skilled labour
Designing information material No change N/A
Filling forms and tables, including recordkeeping Increase CA – Skilled labour
Holding meetings (internal/external with an auditor, lawyer and the like) No change N/A
Inspecting and checking (including assistance to inspection by public
authorities) No change N/A
Copying (reproducing reports, producing labels or leaflets) No change N/A
Submitting the information to the relevant authority (e.g. sending it to the
relevant authority) No change N/A
Filing the information Increase CA – Skilled labour
Buying (IT) equipment & supplies Increase CA – Skilled labour
Other No change N/A
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Table 5.23 Administrative burdens associated with sub-option A4: introduce time-based fees
Admin activities Activity
involved
(Y/N)
Direction of
change
(increase/
decrease
Additional
time required
(if time
increases)
Skill level
required
Familiarising with the information obligation Increase CA – Skilled labour
Training members and employees about the information obligations Increase CA – Skilled labour
Retrieving relevant information from existing data No change N/A
Adjusting existing data No change N/A
Producing new data Increase CA – Skilled labour
Designing information material No change N/A
Filling forms and tables, including recordkeeping Increase CA – Skilled labour
Holding meetings (internal/external with an auditor, lawyer and the like) No change N/A
Inspecting and checking (including assistance to inspection by public
authorities) No change N/A
Copying (reproducing reports, producing labels or leaflets) No change N/A
Submitting the information to the relevant authority (e.g. sending it to the
relevant authority) No change N/A
Filing the information No change N/A
Buying (IT) equipment & supplies Increase CA – Skilled labour
Other No change N/A
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Table 5.24 Administrative burdens associated with sub-option A5: ring-fencing of resources
Admin activities Activity
involved
(Y/N)
Direction of
change
(increase/
decrease
Additional
time required
(if time
increases)
Skill level
required
Familiarising with the information obligation No change N/A
Training members and employees about the information obligations No change N/A
Retrieving relevant information from existing data Increase CA – Skilled labour
Adjusting existing data Increase CA – Skilled labour
Producing new data Increase CA – Skilled labour
Designing information material No change N/A
Filling forms and tables, including recordkeeping Increase CA – Skilled labour
Holding meetings (internal/external with an auditor, lawyer and the like) No change N/A
Inspecting and checking (including assistance to inspection by public
authorities) No change N/A
Copying (reproducing reports, producing labels or leaflets) No change N/A
Submitting the information to the relevant authority (e.g. sending it to the
relevant authority) No change N/A
Filing the information No change N/A
Buying (IT) equipment & supplies Increase CA – Skilled labour
Other No change N/A
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Table 5.25 Administrative burdens associated with sub-option A6: incorporate bonus-malus principles
Admin activities Activity
involved
(Y/N)
Direction of
change
(increase/
decrease
Additional
time required
(if time
increases)
Skill level
required
Familiarising with the information obligation No change N/A
Training members and employees about the information obligations No change N/A
Retrieving relevant information from existing data Increase CA – Skilled labour
Adjusting existing data No change N/A
Producing new data No change N/A
Designing information material Increase CA – Skilled labour
Filling forms and tables, including recordkeeping No change N/A
Holding meetings (internal/external with an auditor, lawyer and the like) No change N/A
Inspecting and checking (including assistance to inspection by public
authorities)
Increase /
decrease
CA – Skilled labour
FBO – Skilled labour
Copying (reproducing reports, producing labels or leaflets) No change N/A
Submitting the information to the relevant authority (e.g. sending it to the
relevant authority) No change N/A
Filing the information No change N/A
Buying (IT) equipment & supplies No change N/A
Other No change N/A
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Table 5.26 Administrative burdens associated with sub-option A7: introducing transparency and reporting
Admin activities Activity
involved
(Y/N)
Direction of
change
(increase/
decrease
Additional
time required
(if time
increases)
Skill level
required
Familiarising with the information obligation Increase CA – Skilled labour
Training members and employees about the information obligations Increase CA – Skilled labour
Retrieving relevant information from existing data Increase CA – Skilled labour
Adjusting existing data Increase CA – Skilled labour
Producing new data Increase CA – Skilled labour
Designing information material Increase CA – Skilled labour
Filling forms and tables, including recordkeeping Increase CA – Skilled labour
Holding meetings (internal/external with an auditor, lawyer and the like) No change N/A
Inspecting and checking (including assistance to inspection by public
authorities) Increase
CA – Skilled labour
FBO – Skilled labour
Copying (reproducing reports, producing labels or leaflets) Increase
CA – Skilled labour
FBO – Skilled labour
Submitting the information to the relevant authority (e.g. sending it to the
relevant authority) Increase FBO – Skilled labour
Filing the information Increase CA – Skilled labour
Buying (IT) equipment & supplies Increase CA – Skilled labour
Other No change N/A
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Table 5.27 Administrative burdens associated with sub-option A8: provide for industry participation
Admin activities Activity
involved
(Y/N)
Direction of
change
(increase/
decrease
Additional
time required
(if time
increases)
Skill level
required
Familiarising with the information obligation Unknown
CA – Skilled labour
FBO – Skilled labour
Training members and employees about the information obligations Unknown
CA – Skilled labour
FBO – Skilled labour
Retrieving relevant information from existing data N/A
Adjusting existing data N/A
Producing new data N/A
Designing information material Unknown
CA – Skilled labour
FBO – Skilled labour
Filling forms and tables, including recordkeeping N/A
Holding meetings (internal/external with an auditor, lawyer and the like) Unknown
CA – Skilled labour
FBO – Skilled labour
Inspecting and checking (including assistance to inspection by public
authorities) N/A
Copying (reproducing reports, producing labels or leaflets) N/A
Submitting the information to the relevant authority (e.g. sending it to the
relevant authority) Unknown
CA – Skilled labour
FBO – Skilled labour
Filing the information Unknown
CA – Skilled labour
FBO – Skilled labour
Buying (IT) equipment & supplies N/A
Other N/A
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Table 5.28 Administrative burdens associated with sub-option A9: introduce exemptions and reductions for micro-enterprises
Admin activities Activity
involved
(Y/N)
Direction of
change
(increase/
decrease
Additional
time required
(if time
increases)
Skill level
required
Familiarising with the information obligation Increase CA – Skilled labour
Training members and employees about the information obligations Increase CA – Skilled labour
Retrieving relevant information from existing data Increase CA – Skilled labour
Adjusting existing data No change N/A
Producing new data No change N/A
Designing information material Increase CA – Skilled labour
Filling forms and tables, including recordkeeping No change N/A
Holding meetings (internal/external with an auditor, lawyer and the like) No change N/A
Inspecting and checking (including assistance to inspection by public
authorities) Decrease CA – Skilled labour
Copying (reproducing reports, producing labels or leaflets) Unknown CA – Skilled labour
Submitting the information to the relevant authority (e.g. sending it to the
relevant authority) Unknown FBO – Skilled labour
Filing the information No change N/A
Buying (IT) equipment & supplies No change N/A
Other No change N/A
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Table 5.29 Administrative burdens associated with sub-option B1: introduce unified fees for the EU-27
Admin activities Activity
involved
(Y/N)
Direction of
change
(increase/
decrease
Additional
time required
(if time
increases)
Skill level
required
Familiarising with the information obligation Increase CA – Skilled labour
Training members and employees about the information obligations No change N/A
Retrieving relevant information from existing data No change N/A
Adjusting existing data No change N/A
Producing new data Increase CA – Skilled labour
Designing information material No change N/A
Filling forms and tables, including recordkeeping No change N/A
Holding meetings (internal/external with an auditor, lawyer and the like) No change N/A
Inspecting and checking (including assistance to inspection by public
authorities) No change N/A
Copying (reproducing reports, producing labels or leaflets) Increase CA – Skilled labour
Submitting the information to the relevant authority (e.g. sending it to the
relevant authority) Decrease FBO – Skilled labour
Filing the information Decrease CA – Skilled labour
Buying (IT) equipment & supplies No change N/A
Other No change N/A
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Table 5.30 Administrative burdens associated with sub-option B2: adjust unified fees using a cost of living index
Admin activities Activity
involved
(Y/N)
Direction of
change
(increase/
decrease
Additional
time required
(if time
increases)
Skill level
required
Familiarising with the information obligation Increase CA – Skilled labour
Training members and employees about the information obligations No change N/A
Retrieving relevant information from existing data No change N/A
Adjusting existing data No change N/A
Producing new data Increase CA – Skilled labour
Designing information material No change N/A
Filling forms and tables, including recordkeeping No change N/A
Holding meetings (internal/external with an auditor, lawyer and the like) No change N/A
Inspecting and checking (including assistance to inspection by public
authorities) No change N/A
Copying (reproducing reports, producing labels or leaflets) Increase CA – Skilled labour
Submitting the information to the relevant authority (e.g. sending it to the
relevant authority) Decrease FBO – Skilled labour
Filing the information Decrease CA – Skilled labour
Buying (IT) equipment & supplies No change N/A
Other No change N/A
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Table 5.31 Administrative burdens associated with sub-option B3: introduce EU harmonised fees only for certain import controls
Admin activities Activity
involved
(Y/N)
Direction of
change
(increase/
decrease
Additional
time required
(if time
increases)
Skill level
required
Familiarising with the information obligation Increase CA – Skilled labour
Training members and employees about the information obligations No change N/A
Retrieving relevant information from existing data No change N/A
Adjusting existing data No change N/A
Producing new data Increase CA – Skilled labour
Designing information material No change N/A
Filling forms and tables, including recordkeeping No change N/A
Holding meetings (internal/external with an auditor, lawyer and the like) No change N/A
Inspecting and checking (including assistance to inspection by public
authorities) No change N/A
Copying (reproducing reports, producing labels or leaflets) Increase CA – Skilled labour
Submitting the information to the relevant authority (e.g. sending it to the
relevant authority) Decrease FBO – Skilled labour
Filing the information Decrease CA – Skilled labour
Buying (IT) equipment & supplies No change N/A
Other No change N/A
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Table 5.32 Administrative burdens associated with sub-option C: repeal Articles 26-29 of the Regulation (full subsidiarity)
Admin activities Activity
involved
(Y/N)
Direction of
change
(increase/
decrease
Additional
time required
(if time
increases)
Skill level
required
Familiarising with the information obligation No change N/A
Training members and employees about the information obligations Unknown
CA – Skilled labour
FBO – Skilled labour
Retrieving relevant information from existing data Unknown CA – Skilled labour
Adjusting existing data Unknown CA – Skilled labour
Producing new data No change N/A
Designing information material No change N/A
Filling forms and tables, including recordkeeping No change N/A
Holding meetings (internal/external with an auditor, lawyer and the like) No change N/A
Inspecting and checking (including assistance to inspection by public
authorities) No change N/A
Copying (reproducing reports, producing labels or leaflets) No change N/A
Submitting the information to the relevant authority (e.g. sending it to the
relevant authority) Unknown FBO – Skilled labour
Filing the information Unknown FBO – Skilled labour
Buying (IT) equipment & supplies No change N/A
Other No change N/A
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Annex 5 Control activity and associated industry data
This annex provides data from various sources which describe:
▪ Competent Authority fees collected for controls performed in EU MS as reported in the
study survey (section A5.1, page 272);
▪ Business statistics for selected sectors most affected by official control activity – meat,
fish, dairy and feed (section A5.2, page 282);
▪ Production and trade statistics (section A5.3, page 310);
▪ DG SANCO’s validated database on the current situation vis-à-vis official controls
(section A5.4 , page 316);
▪ Data on competent authority staff numbers (section A5.5, page 343);
▪ Information on control activity from Regulation 882/2004 Annual Reports as supplied to
the European Commission for Finland, the Netherlands, Poland and the UK (section
A5.6, page 346).
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A5.1 Competent Authority controls performed in EU MS as reported in the study survey
Table A5.136 Controls performed by Member State (MS)
Control BE FI50 F251 FR* NL PL* UK52 UK53 BG ES IE IT LT SE NO54
Approval of establishments that produce
products of animal origin for human
consumption
A B
A B C
(municipalities, SPO)
A B
A B
D B
A B C
(local authorities, DARD)
A B
A B
Audit of fresh meat establishments (domestic
ungulates, poultry and
lagomorphs, farmed and wild gamed)
A B
A B C
(SPOs)
A B
A B
D B A B
C (DARD)
A B
A B
Inspection of fresh meat establishments
(including ante- and post-mortem inspection
and animal welfare, but not SRM controls and
TSE testing)
A B
A B C
(municipalities, SPO)
A B
A B
D B
A B C
(local authorities, DARD)
A B
A B
Inspection of fresh meat establishments: SRM
controls and TSE testing A
A B C
(municipalities, SPO)
A B
A B C
(BSE for fee,
sheep governmental, SRM
D A B
A B C
(DARDNI, Defra CA for TSE testing)
A B
A B
50 Finnish Food Safety Authority (Evira)
51 Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities (representing Municipal local Authorities)
52 Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD), Northern Ireland
53 Food Standards Agency (FSA)
54 Associated Country of the EU
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Control BE FI50 F251 FR* NL PL* UK52 UK53 BG ES IE IT LT SE NO54
controls are part of
the regular work)
Checks at milk production holdings A B
C (municipalities, ELY-
centr)
A B
D
A B C
(no fee for milking
farms, fee for
processing and
residues)
D B
C (Local
Authorities and
DARDNI, AHVLA for dairy farms
A B
A B
Checks on production and marketing of fishery
products and aquaculture products
A B
C (municipal
ities)
A B
D A B
D C
(local authority)
C (local
authorities)
A B
A B
Checks at other food establishments approved
in accordance with Regulation 853/2004
A B
C (municipal
ities)
A B
A B
D
A B C
(local authoritie
s)
A B
A B
Checks on hygiene of foodstuffs at primary
production holdings
A B
C (municipal
ities)
A B
A B C
(we suppose primary=f
arms)
D B
A C
(local authoritie
s)
A B
A B
Checks on hygiene of foodstuffs at food
establishments other than establishments
approved in accordance with Regulation
853/2004
A B
C (municipal
ities)
A B
A B
D C
(local authority)
C (local
authorities)
A B
A B
Checks on animal health at holdings of origin
for live animals
A B
C (SPOs)
A B
A B
D A B
C (AHVLA)
A B
A B
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Control BE FI50 F251 FR* NL PL* UK52 UK53 BG ES IE IT LT SE NO54
Monitoring residues of veterinary medicines
and other substances
A B
A B
C (Evira)
A B
D A B
C (VMD) A B
A B
Approval of feed establishments A B
A B
C (Evira)
A B
D A B
C (local
authorities)
A B
A B
Checks at feed establishments A B
A B
C (Evira)
A B C
(fee for approved establishments)
D A B
C (local
authorities)
A B
A B
Approval of animal by-products establishments
A C
(Regional bodies & federal public
services)
A B C
(municipal veterinary
officer MVO, SPOs)
A B
A B
D A B
C (AHVLA)
A B
A B
Checks at animal by-product establishments
A B C
(Regional bodies & federal public
services)
A B C
(MVO, SPOs)
A B
A B C
(fee for approved establishments)
D A B
C (AHVLA)
A B
A B
Checks on imported live animals A B
A B
A B
D A B
C (AHVLA)
A B
A B
A B
A A B
A B
Checks on imported feed and food of animal
origin
A B
A B
D A B
D A B
C (Local
authorities)
A B
A B
A B
A A B
A B
Checks on imported feed and food of non-
animal origin
A B
A B C
(Customs)
D A B
D A B
C (Local
authorities)
A B
A B
A A B
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Control BE FI50 F251 FR* NL PL* UK52 UK53 BG ES IE IT LT SE NO54
Checks on live animals and goods transiting
the community
A B
A B C
(Customs)
A B
D A B
C (Local
authorities)
A B
A B
A B
A A B
A B
Other
C (Regions;
FPS Economy)
A B C
(municipalities, SPO)
D
A B C
(fee for intra EU and 3rd
countries; if
certificate is issued; additional inspection
s)
A C
(CEFAS; AFBI)
A B
If ‘other’, please specify – 1:
Organic productio
n
Animal by-
product checks at
food establish
ments
See footnote55
Export certificatio
n living animals, semen,
ova, hatching
eggs
Shell fish monitorin
g and testing
Checks on
exported live
animals
If ‘other’, please specify – 2: Labels (geograph
ical indication
s, designatio
Export animal
products
Phytosanitary
control
55 Other controls in which membership has an interest include: Commercial quality control of agricultural and food products in production, marketing and import stage; Supervision
over the following markets: fresh fruit and vegetables, wine, poultry meat quality, fertilizers; Certification of hops and hop products; Supervision over classification of bovine and porcine carcasses in EUROP system; Control of the bovine meat from adult male bovine animals; Control of the marketing of the meat from bovine animals aged 12 months or less (granting special export refunds); Control of the reporting of the market data; Exempting of the operators at their request from the marking obligations, where eggs are delivered directly from the production site to the food industry; Control of the goose breeding and fattening conditions; Evaluation of commercial quality on FBOs request; Supervision over accredited certifying bodies in organic farming; Supervision over system of regional and traditional products; and Ex-post control according to the Council Regulation No 485/2008.
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Control BE FI50 F251 FR* NL PL* UK52 UK53 BG ES IE IT LT SE NO54
ns of origin,
specialities
guaranteed)
If ‘other’, please specify – 3: Other controls including animal welfare
(table 17 of
MANCP)
Reinspection after
incidental inspection
Checks on
identification of
animals and
animal welfare
CA responses to questionnaire
Key: A: My authority is the CA; B: My authority delivers the controls; C: Another organisation delivers the controls (name of other organisation in brackets); D: My membership
has a direct interest
*Competent authority answered the questionnaire directed at trade associations and other stakeholder groups
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Table A5.137 Number of controls performed (checks) and costs by competent authority/ Member State - as collected through study survey
Competent Authority
Official Control
Bulgarian Food
Safety Agency (BG)
SG Sanidad Exterior
(MSPSI); SG
Acuerdos Sanitarios
y Control en Frontera
(MARM) (ES)
Department of
Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food
(IE)
State Food and
Veterinary Service of
Republic of Lithuania
(LT)
Swedish National
Food Administration
(HC) and Swedish
Board of Agriculture
(NHC) (SE)
Approval of establishments that produce
products of animal origin for human
consumption
682 FTEs required;
controls performed at 18
sites per year (18 visits
made per year)
n/a n/a n/a n/a
Audit of fresh meat establishments (domestic
ungulates, poultry and lagomorphs, farmed
and wild gamed)
682 FTEs required;
controls performed at
156 sites per year (156
visits made per year)
n/a n/a n/a n/a
Inspection of fresh meat establishments
(including ante- and post-mortem inspection
and animal welfare, but not SRM controls and
TSE testing)
682 FTEs required;
controls performed at
157 sites per year
(11,122 visits made per
year)
n/a n/a n/a n/a
Inspection of fresh meat establishments:
SRM controls and TSE testing
682 FTEs required;
controls performed at 91
sites per year (296 visits
made per year)
n/a n/a n/a n/a
Checks at milk production holdings
365 FTEs required;
controls performed at
10% of sites per year
(857 visits made per
year)
n/a n/a n/a n/a
Checks on production and marketing of
fishery products and aquaculture products
682 FTEs required;
controls performed at 50
sites per year (1,209
visits made per year)
n/a n/a n/a n/a
Checks at other food establishments
approved in accordance with Regulation
853/2004
682 FTEs required;
controls performed at
979 sites per year
n/a n/a n/a n/a
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Competent Authority
Official Control
Bulgarian Food
Safety Agency (BG)
SG Sanidad Exterior
(MSPSI); SG
Acuerdos Sanitarios
y Control en Frontera
(MARM) (ES)
Department of
Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food
(IE)
State Food and
Veterinary Service of
Republic of Lithuania
(LT)
Swedish National
Food Administration
(HC) and Swedish
Board of Agriculture
(NHC) (SE)
(26,775 visits made per
year)
Checks on hygiene of foodstuffs at primary
production holdings n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Checks on hygiene of foodstuffs at food
establishments other than establishments
approved in accordance with Regulation
853/2004
682 FTEs required;
controls performed at 90
sites per year (1,171
visits made per year)
n/a n/a n/a n/a
Checks on animal health at holdings of origin
for live animals
365 FTEs required;
controls performed at
10% of sites per year
(16,825 visits made per
year)
n/a n/a n/a n/a
Monitoring residues of veterinary medicines
and other substances 1,047 FTEs required n/a
0.1 FTEs required;
annual costs to
competent authority/
delivery agent: €15,000
n/a n/a
Approval of feed establishments
38 FTEs required;
controls performed at 3
sites per year (10 visits
made per year)
n/a n/a n/a n/a
Checks at feed establishments
38 FTEs required;
controls performed at
170 sites per year (340
visits made per year)
n/a n/a n/a n/a
Approval of animal by-products
establishments
682 FTEs required;
controls performed at 0
sites per year (0 visits
made per year)
n/a n/a n/a n/a
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Competent Authority
Official Control
Bulgarian Food
Safety Agency (BG)
SG Sanidad Exterior
(MSPSI); SG
Acuerdos Sanitarios
y Control en Frontera
(MARM) (ES)
Department of
Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food
(IE)
State Food and
Veterinary Service of
Republic of Lithuania
(LT)
Swedish National
Food Administration
(HC) and Swedish
Board of Agriculture
(NHC) (SE)
Checks at animal by-products establishments
682 FTEs required;
controls performed at
225 sites per year (1,261
visits made per year)
n/a n/a n/a n/a
Checks on imported live animals
136 FTEs required;
controls performed at 14
sites per year (355 visits
made per year)
1.7 FTEs required;
controls performed at 18
sites per year (152 visits
made per year); annual
costs to competent
authority/ delivery agent:
€154,553.60
1 FTE required; controls
performed at 2 sites per
year (40 visits made per
year); annual costs to
competent authority/
delivery agent: €30,000
12 FTEs required;
controls performed at 2
sites per year
3 FTEs required
Checks on imported feed and food of animal
origin
136 FTEs required;
controls performed at 14
sites per year (3,407
visits made per year)
68 FTEs required;
controls performed at 42
sites per year (60,931
visits made per year);
annual costs to
competent authority/
delivery agent:
€6,195,464
10 FTEs required;
controls performed at 2
sites per year (500 visits
made per year); annual
costs to competent
authority/ delivery agent:
€1,300,000
86 FTEs required;
controls performed at 12
sites per year
9.5 FTEs required
Checks on imported feed and food of non-
animal origin
136 FTEs required;
controls performed at 14
sites per year (217 visits
made per year)
73 FTEs required;
controls performed at
109 sites per year
(65,892 visits made per
year); annual costs to
competent authority/
delivery agent:
€6,699,899
n/a
88 FTEs required;
controls performed at 14
sites per year
n/a
Checks on live animals and goods transiting
the community
136 FTEs required;
controls performed at 14
sites per year (845 visits
made per year)
0.65 FTEs required;
controls performed at 4
sites per year (585 visits
made per year); annual
n/a
86 FTEs required;
controls performed at 13
sites per year
9.5 FTEs required
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Competent Authority
Official Control
Bulgarian Food
Safety Agency (BG)
SG Sanidad Exterior
(MSPSI); SG
Acuerdos Sanitarios
y Control en Frontera
(MARM) (ES)
Department of
Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food
(IE)
State Food and
Veterinary Service of
Republic of Lithuania
(LT)
Swedish National
Food Administration
(HC) and Swedish
Board of Agriculture
(NHC) (SE)
costs to competent
authority/ delivery agent:
€59,483
Other activities
Checks on exported live
animals: 15 FTEs
required; controls
performed at 1 site per
year (2,519 visits made
per year)
Animal welfare in animal
holdings: 365 FTEs
required; controls
performed at 10% of
sites per year (7,364
visits made per year)
Total control costs (NVS
for 2010) – €15,841,867
(of which for border
control – €744,574)
n/a n/a n/a n/a
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Table A5.138 Administrative burden by competent authority/ Member State
Competent
Authority
Indicator
Federal Agency
for the Safety of
the Food Chain
(FASFC) (BE)
Voedsel en
Waren Autoriteit
(VWA) (NL)
Bulgarian Food
Safety Agency
(BG)
SG Sanidad
Exterior (MSPSI);
SG Acuerdos
Sanitarios y
Control en
Frontera
(MARM) (ES)
Finnish Food
Safety Authority
(Evira)
State Food and
Veterinary
Service of
Republic of
Lithuania (LT)
Department of
Agriculture and
Rural
Development
(DARD) (UK)
Average staff cost €64.74 per hour €1.86 per employee
per hour €20.42 per hour €42 per hour €3.31 per hour
OV slaughter:
€42.41 per hour
OA slaughter:
€24.69 per hour
Average incremental cost
of extending the scope of
reporting to include
information regarding the
financial resources
devoted to official controls
each year (i.e. reporting
through the annual report
that is based on Art.44 of
the Regulation)
Staff time: 836 hours
External costs: 0 n/a n/a
Staff time: 4 FTE
External costs:
€500,000
n/a n/a
Average incremental cost
of making public
information on fees,
modalities of payment
and other administrative
procedures for the official
controls for which
authority is responsible
Staff time: 836 hours
External costs: 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Information channels
included in estimate
Internet/ website;
printed materials;
annual report
Internet/ website
Internet/ website;
printed materials;
internal documents
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A5.2 Business statistics for selected sectors most affected by official control activity – meat, fish, dairy and feed
In 2008 there were over 60,000 enterprises operating in four major sectors56
covered by the
Regulation 882/2004—meat, fish, dairy and feed. These sectors are henceforth referred to
as “the industry”. Figure A5.1 shows the breakdown of the total number of enterprises by EU
Member State. In 2008 the number of enterprises operated was above 12,000 in each
Member State; France and Germany together share about 40% of the total number of
enterprises in the industry.
Figure A5.35 Total number of enterprises in EU MS57 in selected industries (2008)
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
Source: Eurostat
The number of enterprises reflect also aggregated sectoral turnover in EU Member States.
Germany and France had the greatest sectoral turnover in four sectors subject to official
controls.58
Business turnover in 2008 was €78.5 billion and €77.6 billion respectively (Figure
A5.2). The top five Member States in terms of sectoral turnover represented about 70% of
the total EU market in 2008.
56 Processing and preserving of meat and production of meat products; Processing and preserving of fish,
crustaceans and molluscs; Manufacture of dairy products; Manufacture of prepared animal feeds. 57
GR and MT are not included in the dataset. 2007 figures for CZ and FR. 58
Processing and preserving of meat and production of meat products; Processing and preserving of fish, crustaceans and molluscs; Manufacture of dairy products; Manufacture of prepared animal feeds.
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Figure A5.36 Business turnover in selected industries in 200859 (million euros)
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
90,000
Source: Eurostat
There were over 1.5 million persons employed in the industry in 2008. Germany, France,
Poland, Spain and the UK employed the highest number of people: in 2008 they had a share
of 17%, 15%, 13%, 10%, and 9% respectively.
Figure A5.37 Total number of persons employed in 200860
59 GR and MT are not included in the dataset.
2007 figures for Processing and preserving of meat and production of meat products: CZ; Processing and preserving of fish, crustaceans and molluscs: SE; Manufacture of dairy products: CZ, FI.
Data are not available for Processing and preserving of fish, crustaceans and molluscs: CZ, CY, NL; Manufacture of dairy products: DK, LU; Manufacture of prepared animal feeds: CZ, PT. 60
GR and MT are not included in the dataset.
2007 figures for Processing and preserving of meat and production of meat products: CZ, FR; Processing and preserving of fish, crustaceans and molluscs: FR, SE; Manufacture of dairy products: CZ, FR, FI.
Data are not available for Processing and preserving of fish, crustaceans and molluscs: CZ, CY; Manufacture of dairy products: DK, LU; Manufacture of prepared animal feeds: CZ, FR, PT.
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0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
Source: Eurostat
A5.2.2 SME statistics
In 2008, there were approximately 45,000 SMEs operating in the industries covered by the
Regulation 882/200461
. Germany has the highest number of SMEs and in 2008 had a share
of 26% in the total number of European SMEs in the industry. Germany is followed by Italy
(17%), Spain (15%) and Poland (10%). Figure A5.4 shows total number of SMEs in the
industries in EU Member States.
Figure A5.38 Total number of SMEs in EU MS62 in selected industries (2008)
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
Source: Eurostat
61 This figure is the sum of total number of enterprises given their employee size (including the employee size
categories 0-9; 10-19; 20-49; and 50-249) in all sub-sectors and excludes CZ and FR due to data unavailability. 62
GR and MT are not included in the dataset. Figures for CZ and FR are not available.
Eurostat data on the number of enterprises are not available for some SMEs categories in certain sectors and for some Member States. Data gaps include: Processing and preserving of fish, crustaceans and molluscs: BE, CY, DE, HU, SK; Manufacture of dairy products: BG, CY, SK; Manufacture of prepared animal feeds: BE, CY, IE, SK.
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The tables below describe the total number of SMEs by MS in each of the four sub-sectors.
As presented below, in most of the Member States the number of SMEs is higher in the
processing and preserving of meat and production of meat products sub-sector. Germany
represented 37% in total number of SMEs in 2008.
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Figure A5.39 Total number of SMEs in EU MS in processing and preserving of meat and
production of meat products (2008)
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
Source: Eurostat
Figure A5.6 below shows that the number of SMEs is highest in processing and preserving
of fish, crustaceans and molluscs sector in Spain.
Figure A5.40 Total number of SMEs in EU MS in processing and preserving of fish, crustaceans and molluscs (2008)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
Source: Eurostat
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Figure A5.7 below shows that the number of SMEs is highest in manufacture of dairy
products in Italy. In Italy, the total number of SMEs in the sector was above 3,000 in 2008.
Figure A5.41 Total number of SMEs in EU MS in manufacture of dairy products (2008)
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
Source: Eurostat
In 2008 Italy had the highest number of SMEs operating in prepared animal feeds sector
(Figure A5.8). Over 500 SMEs operated in the Italian animal feed sector in 2008. Poland, the
UK, Germany and Spain also had a high number of SMEs in prepared animal feeds sector in
2008.
Figure A5.42 Total number of SMEs in EU MS in manufacture of prepared animal feeds (2008)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Sourc
e: Eurostat
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Table A5.139 Share of SMEs in total number of enterprises in EU MS by sub-sectors (2008)63
Processing and
preserving of meat and
production of meat
products
Processing and
preserving of fish,
crustaceans and
molluscs
Manufacture of dairy
products
Manufacture of
prepared animal feeds
Total64
Total SMEs Share Total SMEs Share Total SMEs Share Total SMEs Share Total SMEs Share
AT 1,092 1,082 99% 6 6 100% 158 152 96% 56 55 98% 1,312 1,295 99%
BE 832 815 99% 56 4 7% 442 433 98% 149 139 93% 1,470 1,391 95%
BG 475 467 98% 31 31 100% 273 227 83% 106 106 100% 885 831 94%
CY 71 71 100% : : : 147 135 92% 38 32 84% 256 238 93%
CZ 1,467* : : : : : 146* : : : : : : : :
DK 147 138 94% 119 115 97% 75 74 99% 67 64 96% 408 391 96%
EE 53 50 94% 59 57 97% 31 28 90% 13 13 100% 156 148 95%
FI 204 194 95% 147 147 100% 52 49 94% 77 77 100% 480 467 97%
FR 10,410* : : 496* : : 1,457* : : : : : : : :
63 GR and MT are not included in Eurostat dataset.
64 Figures in Total column includes all available data.
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DE 11,044 10,953 99% 233 26 11% 401 361 90% 420 411 98% 12,098 11,751 97%
HU 592 566 96% 13 11 85% 100 92 92% 196 193 98% 901 862 96%
IE 133 121 91% 68 68 100% 59 53 90% 58 50 86% 318 292 92%
IT 3,559 3,532 99% 442 426 96% 3,295 3,281 100% 579 513 89% 7,875 7,752 98%
LV 128 123 96% 108 104 96% 42 38 90% 16 16 100% 294 281 96%
LT 176 167 95% 66 61 92% 69 63 91% 25 23 92% 336 314 93%
LU 27 26 96% 0 0 0% 5 4 80% 0 0 0% 32 30 94%
NL 491 480 98% 115 115 100% 258 253 98% 182 177 97% 1,046 1,025 98%
PL 3,283 3,188 97% 410 394 96% 718 675 94% 461 455 99% 4,872 4,712 97%
PT 633 622 98% 211 209 99% 439 435 99% 128 126 98% 1,411 1,392 99%
RO 909 873 96% 41 40 98% 633 612 97% 128 126 98% 1,711 1,651 96%
SK 72 62 86% 8 3 38% 38 16 42% 60 16 27% 178 97 54%
SI 163 159 98% 5 5 100% 87 86 99% 16 15 94% 271 265 98%
ES 4,153 4,113 99% 689 678 98% 1,462 1,445 99% 837 343 41% 7,141 6,579 92%
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SE 494 489 99% 214 213 100% 127 123 97% 100 99 99% 935 924 99%
UK 1,035 964 93% 343 334 97% 543 525 97% 426 423 99% 2,347 2,246 96%
Total 27,757** 29,255 98% 3,384*** 3,047 90% 9,454** 9,160 97% 4,138 3,472 84% 46,733 44,934 96%
Source: Eurostat
*2007 figure
**Sum does not include CZ and FR
***Sum does not include FR.
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SME sectoral turnover were highest in France and Germany. SME turnover in these Member
States was €37.7 billion and €35 billion respectively. The share of the top 5 Member States
was approximately 73 per cent of the total in 2008 (Figure A5.9).
Figure A5.43 SMEs turnover in selected industries in 200865 (million euros)
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
Source: Eurostat
65 GR and MT are not included in the dataset. Figures for CZ are not available.
Eurostat data are not available for certain MS SMEs at different sizes, therefore these data are not included in the aggregate figures.
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Table A5.140 Share of SMEs sectoral turnover in total sectoral turnover in EU MS (2008)66 (absolute figures in million euros)
Processing and
preserving of meat and
production of meat
products
Processing and
preserving of fish,
crustaceans and
molluscs
Manufacture of dairy
products
Manufacture of
prepared animal feeds
Total67
Total SMEs Share Total SMEs Share Total SMEs Share Total SMEs Share Total SMEs Share
AT 3,276 2,432 74% 32 0 0% 2,394 949 40% 900 513 57% 6,602 3,893 59%
BE 5,267 4,192 80% 482 103 21% 4,241 1,888 45% 3,259 1,811 56% 13,248 7,993 60%
BG 897 693 77% 30 30 100% 372 255 68% 147 147 100% 1,445 1,124 78%
CY 325 325 100% : 0 : 234 98 42% 136 99 72% 695 521 75%
CZ 2,573* : : : : : 1,817* : : : : : : : :
DK 5,374 868 16% 1,761 1,299 74% : 141 : 2,973 422 14% 10,109 2,729 27%
EE 246 110 45% 124 73 59% 383 227 59% 67 4 7% 820 415 51%
FI 2,499 692 28% 160 160 100% : 0 : 439 439 100% 3,098 1,291 42%
FR 35,750 16,906 47% 3,140 1,640 52% 26,780 12,073 45% 11,978 7,076 59% 77,648 37,695 49%
DE 39,522 21,581 55% 2,533 689 27% 27,593 8,107 29% 8,882 4,705 53% 78,529 35,081 45%
HU 2,645 1,150 43% 3 1 32% 1,106 315 29% 926 631 68% 4,680 2,097 45%
IE 4,275 2,674 63% 373 373 100% 3,556 1,430 40% 1,082 514 47% 9,287 4,991 54%
IT 19,153 12,144 63% 2,114 1,198 57% 17,423 11,894 68% 6,000 4,220 70% 44,691 29,455 66%
LV 375 265 71% 218 145 67% 349 115 33% 51 0 0% 993 525 53%
LT 615 281 46% 232 62 26% 856 148 17% 339 87 26% 2,042 577 28%
LU 116 4 3% 0 0 0% : 0 : 0 0 : 116 4 3%
66 GR and MT are not included in Eurostat datasets.
67 Figures in Total column includes all available data
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NL 8,248 616 7% : 299 : 9,642 186 2% 7,219 4,628 64% 25,109 5,729 23%
PL 11,800 6,143 52% 1,442 216 15% 6,064 2,213 36% 2,947 1,345 46% 22,253 9,918 45%
PT 2,199 1,467 67% 1,093 969 89% 1,703 563 33% : 1,515 : 4,995 4,514 90%
RO 2,481 1,144 46% 68 45 67% 1,053 384 36% 233 192 82% 3,834 1,764 46%
SK 703 273 39% 56 1 2% 585 276 47% 233 201 86% 1,576 750 48%
SI 670 417 62% 15 0 0% 316 15 5% 98 0 0% 1,099 432 39%
ES 19,637 12,292 63% 4,160 2,958 71% 10,659 5,018 47% 9,852 7,148 73% 44,308 27,416 62%
SE 3,502 1,852 53% : 288 : 2,752 385 14% 698 77 11% 6,951 2,602 37%
UK 16,624 5,364 32% 2,981 1,608 54% 9,609 3,564 37% 5,880 3,676 63% 35,092 14,212 40%
Total 186,197** 93,883 50% 21,017 11,570*** 55% 127,668** 50,099† 39% 64,338 37,933†† 59% 399,220 195,727 49%
Source: Eurostat
*2007 figure
**Sum does not include CZ.
***Sum does not include CY, NL and SE.
†Sum does not include DK, FI and LU.
††Sum does not include PT.
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Figure A5.44 Share of SMEs in total number of enterprises in selected European industries68 (2008)69
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
SMEs
Source: Eurostat
Figure A5.11 shows the total number of persons employed in SMEs in the sectors covered
by the Regulation 882/2004. Germany has the largest sector size in terms of the number of
persons employed, over 170,000. Spain, Poland, Italy and the UK followed Germany: the
total number of persons employed in these Member States varied from 96,616 (ES) to
53,097 (UK).
Figure A5.45 Total number of persons employed in SMEs70 (2008)
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
160,000
180,000
200,000
68 Processing and preserving of meat and production of meat products; Processing and preserving of fish,
crustaceans and molluscs; Manufacture of dairy products; Manufacture of prepared animal feeds. 69
GR and MT are not included in Eurostat dataset. Data for CZ and FR are not available. 70
No data are available for CZ and FR.
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Source: Eurostat
A5.2.3 Micro-business statistics
In 2008 there were approximately 31,000 micro-enterprises operating in the 4 sectors71
covered by the Regulation 882/2004. The total number of micro-enterprises varied from 15
(LU) to over 7,000 (DE) in 2008 (Figure A5.12). Most of these micro-enterprises were
located in Germany (23%), Italy (18%), Spain (14%) and Poland (10%).
Figure A5.46 Number of micro-enterprises in selected sectors in EU MS72 (2008)
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
Source: Eurostat
Figure A5.47 Number of micro-enterprises in processing and preserving of meat and production of meat products in 200873
71 Processing and preserving of meat and production of meat products; Processing and preserving of fish,
crustaceans and molluscs; Manufacture of dairy products; Manufacture of prepared animal feeds. 72
GR and MT are not in the dataset.
Figures are not available for CZ and FR.
Data are not available for: Processing and preserving of fish, crustaceans and molluscs: BE, CY, DE; ; Manufacture of prepared animal feeds: ES, SK. 73
Data are not available in Eurostat for CZ and FR; GR and MT are not included in the dataset.
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0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
Source: Eurostat
Figure A5.48 Number of micro-enterprises in processing and preserving of fish, crustaceans and molluscs in 200874
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
Source: Eurostat
Figure A5.49 Number of micro-enterprises in manufacture of dairy products in 200875
74 Data are not available in Eurostat for BE, CY, CZ, DE, FR; GR and MT are not included in the dataset.
75 Data are not available in Eurostat for CY, FR.
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0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
Source: Eurostat
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Figure A5.50 Number of micro-enterprises in manufacture of prepared animal feeds in
200876
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
Source: Eurostat
76 Data are not available in Eurostat for CZ, ES, FR and SK; GR and MT are not included in the dataset.
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Table A5.141 Share of micro-enterprises in total number of enterprises in EU MS by sub-sectors (2008)77
Processing and
preserving of meat and
production of meat
products
Processing and
preserving of fish,
crustaceans and
molluscs
Manufacture of dairy
products
Manufacture of
prepared animal feeds
Total78
Total Micro Share Total Micro Share Total Micro Share Total Micro Share Total Micro Share
AT 1,092 763 70% 6 2 33% 158 117 74% 56 25 45% 1,312 907 69%
BE 823 571 69% 56 : : 442 373 84% 149 76 51% 1,470 1,020 69%
BG 475 201 42% 31 8 26% 273 125 46% 106 47 44% 885 381 43%
CY 71 46 65% : : : 147 127 86% 38 28 74% 256 201 79%
CZ 1,467* : : : : : 146 : : : : : 1,613 : :
DK 147 89 61% 119 55 46% 75 49 65% 67 39 58% 408 232 57%
EE 53 20 38% 59 23 39% 31 11 35% 13 9 69% 156 63 40%
FI 204 142 70% 147 129 88% 52 29 56% 77 55 71% 480 355 74%
FR 10,410* : : 496* : : 1,457 : : : : : 12,363 : :
DE 11,044 6,558 59% 233 : : 401 207 52% 420 263 63% 12,098 7,028 58%
HU 592 334 56% 13 11 85% 100 53 53% 196 119 61% 901 517 57%
IE 133 26 20% 68 15 22% 59 20 34% 58 22 38% 318 83 26%
IT 3,559 2,495 70% 442 277 63% 3,295 2,469 75% 579 365 63% 7,875 5,606 71%
LV 128 62 48% 108 36 33% 42 15 36% 16 8 50% 294 121 41%
LT 176 69 39% 66 37 56% 69 46 67% 25 10 40% 336 162 48%
LU 27 14 52% 0 0 0% 5 1 20% 0 0 0% 32 15 47%
77 GR and MT are not included in Eurostat dataset.
78 Figures in Total column includes all available data.
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NL 491 325 66% 115 64 56% 258 206 80% 182 96 53% 1,046 691 66%
PL 3,283 2,134 65% 410 280 68% 718 467 65% 461 343 74% 4,872 3,224 66%
PT 633 382 60% 211 112 53% 439 345 79% 128 52 41% 1,411 891 63%
RO 909 532 59% 41 25 61% 633 413 65% 128 88 69% 1,711 1,058 62%
SK 72 17 24% 8 3 38% 38 3 8% 60 : : 178 23 13%
SI 163 110 67% 5 2 40% 87 77 89% 16 9 56% 271 198 73%
ES 4,153 2,771 67% 689 356 52% 1,462 1,168 80% 837 : : 7,141 4,295 60%
SE 494 367 74% 214 180 84% 127 108 85% 100 91 91% 935 746 80%
UK 1,035 545 53% 343 189 55% 543 357 66% 426 263 62% 2,347 1,354 58%
Total 29,757** 18,573 62% 3,095*** 1,804 58% 9,454** 6,786 72% 3,241 2,008 62% 60,709 29.171 48%
Source: Eurostat
*2007 figure
** Sum does not include CZ and FR.
*** Sum does not include BE, FR, DE.
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In terms of total sectoral turnover France had the greatest market in 2008. Sectoral turnover
of micro-businesses in France reached €7.3 billion in 2008, which was almost 38% of total
European micro-enterprise turnover in the sector. The top 5 Member States (FR, IT, ES, DE,
BE) with highest level of sectoral turnover represented 80% of the total EU figure.
Figure A5.51 Micro-business turnover in selected industries in 200879 (million euros)
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
Source: Eurostat
79 GR and MT are not in the dataset.
No data are available for CZ.
Data are not available for: Processing and preserving of fish, crustaceans and molluscs: AT, BE, CY, DE, FR, NL, PT, SI; Manufacture of dairy products: BG, DK, EE, FI, LU; Manufacture of prepared animal feeds: AT, ES, LT, LV, SI, SK.
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Table A5.142 Share of micro-enterprises’ sectoral turnover in total sectoral turnover in EU MS (2008)80 (absolute figures in million euros)
Processing and
preserving of meat and
production of meat
products
Processing and
preserving of fish,
crustaceans and
molluscs
Manufacture of dairy
products
Manufacture of
prepared animal feeds
Total81
Total Micro Share Total Micro Share Total Micro Share Total Micro Share Total Micro Share
AT 3,276 244 7% 32 : : 2,394 61 3% 900 : : 6,602 305 5%
BE 5,267 454 9% 482 0 : 4,241 153 4% 3,259 297 9% 13,248 904 7%
BG 897 33 4% 30 1 2% 372 : : 147 6 4% 1,445 40 3%
CY 325 26 8% : : : 234 27 11% 136 68 50% 695 121 17%
CZ : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
DK 5,374 76 1% 1,761 51 3% 0 : : 2,973 59 2% 10,109 185 2%
EE 246 10 4% 124 15 12% 383 : : 67 4 7% 820 30 4%
FI 2,499 49 2% 160 33 20% 0 : : 439 36 8% 3,098 117 4%
FR 35,750 3,597 10% 3,140 : : 26,780 2,907 11% 11,978 812 7% 77,648 7,316 9%
DE 39,522 1,720 4% 2,533 : : 27,593 69 0% 8,882 158 2% 78,529 1,946 2%
HU 2,645 109 4% 3 1 32% 1,106 11 1% 926 47 5% 4,680 168 4%
IE 4,275 31 1% 373 14 4% 3,556 32 1% 1,082 53 5% 9,287 129 1%
IT 19,153 1,251 7% 2,114 309 15% 17,423 1,589 9% 6,000 579 10% 44,691 3,728 8%
LV 375 9 2% 218 3 1% 349 2 1% 51 : : 993 13 1%
LT 615 9 1% 232 5 2% 856 1 0% 339 : : 2,042 14 1%
80 GR and MT are not included in Eurostat datasets.
81 Figures in Total column includes all available data
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LU 116 4 3% 0 0 : 0 : : 0 0 : 116 4 3%
NL 8,248 267 3% : : : 9,642 95 1% 7,219 222 3% 25,109 584 2%
PL 11,800 487 4% 1,442 52 4% 6,064 96 2% 2,947 117 4% 22,253 752 3%
PT 2,199 94 4% 1,093 : : 1,703 58 3% : 98 : 4,995 249 5%
RO 2,481 63 3% 68 2 3% 1,053 33 3% 233 2 1% 3,834 101 3%
SK 703 16 2% 56 1 2% 585 : : 233 : : 1,576 17 1%
SI 670 30 5% 15 : : 316 6 2% 98 : : 1,099 36 3%
ES 19,637 1,414 7% 4,160 178 4% 10,659 817 8% 9,852 : : 44,308 2,408 5%
SE 3,502 218 6% : 89 : 2,752 53 2% 698 77 11% 6,951 438 6%
UK 16,624 276 2% 2,981 64 2% 9,609 144 1% 5,880 247 4% 35,092 731 2%
Total 186,197 10,484 6% 13,722* 729** 5% 126,913**
*
6,151 5% 52,865† 2,784†† 5% 399,220 20,335 5%
Source: Eurostat
*Sum does not include AT, BE, FR, DE, PT and SI.
**Sum does not include SE.
***Sum does not include BG and EE.
†Sum does not include AT, LV, LT, SK, SI and ES.
††Sum does not include PT.
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Figure A5.52 Share of micro-enterprises in total number of enterprises in selected European industries82 (2008)83
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Micro-enterprises
Source: Eurostat
In 2008, total number of persons employed by micro-enterprises in the sectors covered by
the Regulation 882/2004 was highest in Germany.
Figure A5.53 Total number of persons employed in micro-enterprises (2008)84
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
Source: Eurostat
82 Processing and preserving of meat and production of meat products; Processing and preserving of fish,
crustaceans and molluscs; Manufacture of dairy products; Manufacture of prepared animal feeds. 83
GR and MT are not included in Eurostat dataset. Data for CZ and FR are not available. 84
GR and MT are not in the dataset.
No data are available for CZ and FR.
Data are not available for: Processing and preserving of fish, crustaceans and molluscs: AT, BE, CY, DE, PT, SI; Manufacture of dairy products: BG, DK, EE, FI, LU; Manufacture of prepared animal feeds: AT, ES, LT, SI, SK.
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Figure A5.54 Total number of enterprises and micro-enterprises in processing and preserving of meat and production of meat products85 (2008)
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
Total enterprises Micro-enterprises
Source: Eurostat
Figure A5.55 Total number of enterprises and micro-enterprises in processing and preserving of fish, crustaceans and molluscs86 (2008)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
Total enterprises Micro-enterprises
Source: Eurostat
85 Figure includes the Member States for which data are available both for micro and total number of enterprises.
86 Figure includes the Member States for which data are available both for micro and total number of enterprises.
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Figure A5.56 Total number of enterprises and micro-enterprises in manufacture of dairy products87 (2008)
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
Total enterprises Micro-enterprises
Source: Eurostat
Figure A5.57 Total number of enterprises and micro-enterprises in manufacture of prepared animal feeds88 (2008)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
Total enterprises Micro-enterprises
Source: Eurostat
87 Figure includes the Member States for which data are available both for micro and total number of enterprises.
88 Figure includes the Member States for which data are available both for micro and total number of enterprises.
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Figure A5.58 Total number of SMEs and micro-enterprises in processing and preserving of meat and production of meat products89 (2008)
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
Micro-enterprises SMEs
Source: Eurostat
Figure A5.59 Total number of SMEs and micro-enterprises in processing and preserving of fish, crustaceans and molluscs90 (2008)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
Micro-enterprises SMEs
Source: Eurostat
89 Figure includes the Member States for which data are available both for micro-enterprises and SMEs.
90 Figure includes the Member States for which data are available both for micro-enterprises and SMEs.
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Figure A5.60 Total number of SMEs and micro-enterprises in manufacture of dairy products91 (2008)
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
Micro-enterprises SMEs
Source: Eurostat
Figure A5.61 Total number of SMEs and micro-enterprises in manufacture of prepared animal feeds92 (2008)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Micro-enterprises SMEs
91 Figure includes the Member States for which data are available both for micro-enterprises and SMEs.
92 Figure includes the Member States for which data are available both for micro-enterprises and SMEs.
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A5.2.4 Labour cost
Table A5.8 shows labour cost per employee in 2008. In 2008, Denmark had the highest level
of labour cost in three of four sectors covered by the Regulation 882/2004. The Netherlands,
Sweden Belgium and Italy were also the Member States with high level of labour cost per
employee in selected sectors.
Table A5.143 Labour cost per employee FTE in 2008 ('000 euro)93
Processing and
preserving of
meat and
production of
meat products
Processing and
preserving of
fish,
crustaceans
and molluscs
Manufacture of
dairy products
Manufacture of
prepared
animal feeds
Austria 34.3 33.4 47.0 48.8
Belgium 41.7 43.9 52.6 53.1
Bulgaria 2.6 2.3 3.6 3.4
Cyprus 18.5 : 26.3 21.0
Czech Republic 10.9 9.4 13.5 15.1
Denmark 53.8 47.7 : 55.8
Estonia 10.8 9.3 12.9 16.3
Finland 40.8 35.2 : 47.4
Germany 26.1 33.2 47.0 48.8
Hungary 9.9 8.1 13.3 15.5
Ireland 36.4 31.5 49.8 40.2
Italy 39.1 37.8 41.4 49.5
Latvia 7.3 5.6 10.2 8.3
Lithuania 6.9 8.0 10.5 14.0
Netherlands 43.6 : 51.8 55.9
Romania 4.8 4.4 5.7 8.5
Slovakia 9.2 10.9 12.5 16.7
Spain 27.8 23.9 38.1 34.8
Sweden 44.2 : 54.8 48.2
United Kingdom 28.3 21.9 34.0 38.7
Source: Eurostat
93 GR and MT are not included in the dataset.
No data available for FR, LU, PL, SI.
Data for Portugal that have been extracted from Eurostat have been omitted as they data are not reliable:
Data for PT: Processing and preserving of meat and production of meat products: 1,337.9; Processing and preserving of fish, crustaceans and molluscs: 8,235.4; Manufacture of dairy products: 2,123.0. No data available for Manufacture of prepared animal feeds for PT.
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A5.3 Production and trade statistics
A5.3.1 Production
Table A5.9 shows the total number of slaughtering in EU Member States in 2010. Poultry
(over 6 billion units) and chickens (about 5.5 billion units) are the categories with the highest
number of animals slaughtered.
Top 3 producers of each animal type are;
▪ Adult cattle: France, Germany and Italy;
▪ Young cattle: Spain, the Netherlands and Denmark;
▪ Pigs: Germany, Spain and France;
▪ Sheep: UK, Spain and Greece;
▪ Poultry: France, UK and Spain; and,
▪ Chicken: UK, France, and Poland.
A5.3.2 Trade94
Given the data availability, pigs are the animals that are traded the most among EU Member
States. In 2010 approximately 17.5 million pigs are imported in the EU and about 13.2 million
pigs are exported to both other Member States and third countries. Germany is the Member
State with highest level of trade volume in the industry and trade of pigs forms the major part
of the German trade (Table A5.10).
94 Trade statistics have been extracted from ‘Agriculture and fisheries’ section of Eurostat, instead of ‘External
trade’ of Eurostat due to time constraint.
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A5.3.3 Production Table A5.144 Meat production: slaughtering in EU MS in absolute values ('000 units) and share in the total (%95) (2010)
Adult cattle Young cattle Pigs Sheep Poultry Chickens TOTAL
Units Share Units Share Units Share Units Share Units Share Units Share Unit Share
AT 625 3.0% : : 5,692 2.3% 315 0.7% 74,315 1.2% 72,310 1.3% 153,257 1.3%
BE 487 2.3% 32 2.0% 11,896 4.8% 143 0.3% 307,956 5.1% 306,797 5.6% 627,311 5.3%
BG 18 0.1% 3 0.2% 548 0.2% 603 1.3% 53,226 0.9% 46,451 0.9% 100,849 0.9%
CY 10 0.05% 6 0.4% 734 0.3% 132 0.3% 13,773 0.2% 13,736 0.3% 28,392 0.2%
CZ 245 1.2% 2 0.1% 3,116 1.3% 9 0.02% 135,378 2.2% 132,755 2.4% 271,505 2.3%
DK 363 1.7% 130 8.5% 20,114 8.1% 85 0.2% 107,153 1.8% 107,151 2.0% 234,994 2.0%
EE 36 0.2% 1 0.1% 408 0.2% 5 0.01% 9,642 0.2% : : 10,091 0.1%
FI 262 1.2% 2 0.1% 2,248 0.9% 37 0.1% 54,822 0.9% 53,432 1.0% 110,802 0.9%
FR 3,494 16.6% 103 6.7% 24,935 10.1% 4,429 9.4% 996,100 16.5% 798,185 14.5% 1,818,244 15.4%
DE 3,399 16.1% 28 1.8% 58,154 23.5% 974 2.1% 683 0.01% 591 0.01% 63,829 0.5%
GR 190 0.9% 43 2.8% 1,832 0.7% 6,700 14,2% 116,069 1.9% 115,396 2.1% 240,203 2.0%
HU 100 0.5% 3 0.2% 4,610 1.9% 11 0.02% 149,418 2.5% 119,389 2.2% 273,530 2.3%
IE 1,710 8.1% 3 0.2% 2,657 1.1% 2,383 5.1% 83,140 1.4% 77,539 1.4% 167,431 1.4%
IT 2,930 13.9% 72 4.7% 12,908 5.2% 3,744 7.9% 548,068 9.1% 491,360 9.0% 1,059,082 9.0%
LV 77 0.4% 6 0.4% 316 0.1% 9 0.02% 15,101 0.3% 15,101 0.3% 30,609 0.3%
LT 168 0.8% 2 0.1% 703 0.3% 5 0.01% 40,613 0.7% 37,777 0.7% 79,267 0.7%
LU 25 0.1% 1 0.04% 134 0.1% 2 0.004% : : 0 0% 162 0.001%
95 Percentages are rounded to first non-zero decimal where the integer is zero.
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MT 6 0.03% 0 0% 85 0.03% 3 0.01% 2,682 0.04% 2,682 0.05% 5,457 0.05%
NL 538 2.6% 245 15.9% 13,944 5.6% 582 1.2% 487,322 8.1% 479,015 8.8% 981,646 8.3%
PL 1,312 6.2% 3 0.2% 19,966 8.1% 49 0.1% 683,702 11.3% 591,907 10.9% 1,296,938 11.0%
PT 273 1.3% 65 4.2% 5,960 2.4% 983 2.1% 195,628 3.2% 179,605 3.3% 382,516 3.2%
RO 101 0.5% 21 1.3% 2,901 1.2% 218 0.5% 175,970 2.9% 175,825 3.2% 355,035 3.0%
SK 50 0.2% 0 0.03% 758 0.3% 84 0.2% 41,962 0.7% 41,956 0.8% 84,810 0.7%
SI 101 0.5% 2 0.1% 289 0.1% 9 0.02% 32,678 0.5% 29,437 0.5% 62,516 0.5%
ES 1,440 6.8% 721 46.8% 40,266 16.3% 11,179 23.7% 694,348 11.5% 585,613 10.7% 1,333,538 11.3%
SE 420 2.0% 38 2.4% 2,923 1.2% 250 0.5% 82,609 1.4% 78,507 1.4% 164,747 1.4%
UK 2,698 12.8% 8 0.5% 9,662 3.9% 14,173 30.1% 933,737 15.5% 905,030 16.6% 1,865,310 15.8%
TOTAL 21,074 100% 1,542 100% 247,758 100% 47,115 100% 6,036,094 100% 5,448,518 100% 11,802,101 100%
Source: Eurostat
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Table A5.145 Annual foreign trade in 2010 ('000 units)
Total Imports Intra-EU Imports Total Exports
Adult
cattle
Young
cattle
Pigs Sheep Chickens Adult
cattle
Young
cattle
Pigs Sheep Chickens Adult
cattle
Young
cattle
Pigs Sheep Chickens
AT* : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
BE 53 : 1,421 235 : 52 : 1,421 234 : 149 907 1 :
BG* : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
CY 0 0 0 9 : 0 0 0 0 : 0 0 0 0 :
CZ* : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
DK 0 0 0 0 : 0 0 0 0 : 1.4 0 8,209 1.9 :
EE 0.1 0 0.06 0 : 0.1 0 0 0 : 4.1 0 165 0 :
FI* : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
FR 16 3 288 553 : 14 2.5 288 553 : 910 : 605 733 :
DE 53 : 12,172 39 : 53 : 12,172 39 : 118 : 2,415 45 :
GR* : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
HU* : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
IE* : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
IT 21 1,060 1,619 1,377 : 20 1,060 1,619 1,377 : 2 0 3 0.004 :
LV* : : : : : : : : : : 5 : 169 : :
LT 19 : 44 0 : 19 0.2 42 0 : 3 0.033 443 0 :
LU 3 1.3 115 0.3 : 3 1.3 115 0.3 : 24 0 91 0.5 :
MT* : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
NL* : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
PL 11 0.1 1,754 1 : 11 0.1 1,754 1.4 : 29 0.7 243 74 :
PT* : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
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RO* : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
SK* : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
SI 3.4 : 3.2 : : : : : : : : : : : :
ES* : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
SE* : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
UK* : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
TOTAL 180 1,064 17,416 2,215 0 173 1,064 17,411 2,214 0 1,245 1 13,249 856 0
Source: Eurostat
*No data available.
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A5.4 DG SANCO validated baseline
Table A5.146 DG SANCO validated baseline, Belgium, Italy, United Kingdom, France, Poland and Germany
Issue to be
considered Belgium Italy UK France Poland Germany
Fees as a tool of
financing official
controls
Belgium's system is
based on the idea that
costs for official controls
need to be shared
between FBOs and MS.
So FBOs only contribute
to part of the costs and
the rest is financed with
the general budget (at
the moment around
40%FBOs-60%MS).
There are 2 types of
fees:
- retributions: these are
the areas covered by
mandatory fees and an
hourly rate between 40
and 60 euro is
applicable (depending
on the qualifications of
the inspectors) unless
the application of
throughput charges is
higher than that (these
charges are similar to
the mandatory fees in
882/2004).
- Contributions: paid by
all FBOs at the
beginning of the year
depending on size and
With the new legislation
of 2008 (Legislative
Decree 194/2008) Italy
intends to use the fees
to cover 100% of the
costs related to official
controls along the food
chain but with the
exclusion of retail, ABP,
primary production,
feed.
There are 2 types of
fees:
- mandatory fees under
Reg. 882/2004 are
calculated on a
throughput/quantity
basis (similar to Annex
IV and V) - fees are
provided also for import
of food of non-animal
origin
- fees for all the other
FBOs are calculated as
a flat rate contribution
paid at the beginning of
the year depending on
size/category (from 400
to 1500 euro /year)
UK mainly collects the
mandatory fees.
From 9/2009 a time-
based fee has been
introduced in the meat
slaughterhouses and
cutting plants
The fee to the
establishments varies
depending on their
size, as the percentage
of cost recovery was
originally based on
previous charges that
hinged on livestock and
throughput units.
The aim is to reach
100% coverage of
costs in a few years.
Fees are not applied in
the dairy sector.
According to UK the
fact that they did not
apply those fees prior
to Reg. 882/2004
exempts them from this
obligation.
There are differing
levels of fees being
applied on the fish
sector as it is
France only collects
mandatory fees.
Fees are based on cost
recovery. For import on
the basis of the costs
calculated the year
before (BIP by BIP)
and then adjusted for
the next year to cover
100% costs. For
domestic production
following rules similar
to the national rules on
VAT. Rates are slightly
below minimum fees in
Reg. 882/2004.
From June 2010 a fee
has been introduced for
the authorisation of
animal feed producers.
From 1 January 2010,
fees for controls on
slaughtering and
aquaculture production
now include also costs
related to the control of
residues of veterinary
medicines (before they
were separately
charged). In the fish
and aquaculture
Poland collects all the
mandatory fees under
Reg. 882/2004 at the
minimum levels
indicated (some
differences are due to
the exchange rate).
In the veterinary area
some non-mandatory
fees are set (feed,
certification, ABP, etc.).
In 2009 Regulation of
the Minister of Health
656/2009 introduced
fees for all official
controls performed on
FBOs dealing with food
(and not included in the
veterinary sector).
In this way fees cover
the whole food chain
(apart from primary
production)
Fees are under the
responsibility of each
Lander and therefore
systems vary greatly.
In general they only
cover mandatory fees
but a significant
number of Landers
cover also non
mandatory fees in the
areas of food safety
and animal health. Also
approval of plants is
mentioned among non
mandatory fees.
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Issue to be
considered Belgium Italy UK France Poland Germany
sectors. They cover
routine inspections
throughout the year
regardless if inspections
take place for a specific
FBO.
Out of office hours
activities have, in certain
cases, a surcharge.
acknowledged that the
actual administrative
burden of running the
fee system in some
establishments is
greater than the fees
collected
An exercise to improve
efficiency of the
inspection services in
the meat sector is on
going and has led to a
decrease of costs.
However fees are
growing at the moment
because:
- UK aim at increasing
cost coverage towards
100%
- the weak pound.
sectors a process of
aligning the mandatory
fees to the
requirements of
Regulation 882/2004 is
on-going.
Costs covered with
fees
2005: 42% of total costs
2006: 46% of total costs
2007: 39% of total costs
2008: 38% of total costs
2009: 37% of total costs
2005: 50% estimate
2006: 50% estimate
2007: 50% estimate
From 2009 fees are to
be applied with an
automatic 20%
increase, then after the
end of the year the
actual cost is calculated
and the automatic
increase/decrease is
re-calculated to reach
100% cost coverage.
A 0.5% increase is
meant to cover costs
related to the
Annex VI is the
reference including
social security costs
and overheads.
In the slaughterhouse
and cutting plant sector
the following level of
cost recovery was
achieved
2007:41%
2008:43%
2009:44%
2005: For import: 3.8
million costs - 3.7
million recovered
2006: For import: 4.1
million costs - 4.4
million recovered
2008: For import: 4.16
million costs - 4.21
million recovered
For domestic
production: 70%
estimate (80 million
euro costs, 56 million
recovered) => 45 %
estimate (125 million
euro costs, 55 millions
2008: CA claims 100%
cost coverage (no
data)
No data
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Issue to be
considered Belgium Italy UK France Poland Germany
implementation of
MANCP and ring
fenced for this purpose
to the Ministry of
Health.
recovered)
For import: around
100% (but in general
rental costs are not
included here and paid
by operators directly.
This accounts for about
20% of total costs)
Non-mandatory fees
Covered by the
contributions paid by all
participants to the food
chain at the beginning of
the year.
Covered by the flat
rates contributions paid
by FBOs at the
beginning of the year +
fees on import of food
of non animal origin.
Only specific areas:
approval of irradiation
facilities, pesticide
residues programme
(fee on chemical
industry), sampling and
testing of raw cow milk
in England and Wales
No. Fees for export
certification and
authorisation of plants
are being considered
inside and outside of
the EU
A fee for animal by-
products during
slaughter is collected
on national basis (part
fee part subsidy).
In the veterinary area.
They refer mainly to
certification (export,
health), feed
(domestic), ABP,
emergency slaughter
outside plant, genetic
materials, markets, and
animal quarantine.
Outside the veterinary
area, Regulation
656/2009 introduces a
fee for official controls
on food other than
veterinary area.
Charged in some
Landers.
Activities covered
The whole food chain
(also primary
production).
Also activities carried
out on FBOs request are
subject to fees (e.g.
export certificates) - a
combination of cost per
certificate and hourly
rates.
In general
authorisation/registration
requests are not
The food chain with
exclusion of retail, ABP,
feed and primary
production.
Authorisation of
establishments (also
feed) is subject to a flat
rate fee.
Export certification is
subject to hourly rate of
50 euro.
Out of office hours
activities have a
Only mandatory areas
under Reg. 882/2004
(with the exclusion of
dairy sector and the
few exceptions
mentioned above)
Only mandatory areas
under Reg. 882/2004
(with some exceptions)
The whole food chain
(apart from primary
production) but with
specific systems for
veterinary and non
veterinary areas.
Mainly veterinary area
but in some Landers
also food safety in
general (whole food
chain).
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Issue to be
considered Belgium Italy UK France Poland Germany
covered by fees even if
they require an
inspection on the spot.
However the
authorisation of some
establishments
(agreement) is subject
to a fee.
surcharge (30%).
Italy is considering the
possibility to extend
fees also to the
transhipment part of
import.
Calculation method
For retributions, the
hourly rates/throughput
fees are determined by
legislation.
For contributions a
declaration is made
every year (also
electronically) and
yearly fees depend on
size and sector (from
50eur up to 11,000).
All fees are calculated
on the basis of Annex
VI of Reg. 882/2004
(including social
contributions) and
reviewed at least every
2 years to ensure
coverage of 100% of
costs.
For administrative costs
a reference is made to
them being "linked to
the controls carried
out".
Fees are calculated on
the basis of annex VI of
Reg. 882/2004
including social
contributions and
overheads. In the meat
slaughterhouses and
cutting plant
establishments fees
are calculated as a
percentage of actual
costs, the percentage
being paid will differ
depending on the size
of the business,
therefore it takes into
account livestock and
throughput units. In the
case of the percentage
that is being charged
being lower than the
EU minima, charges
will then be increased
to meet EU minima. In
the fish sector
guidance provided to
Local Authorities
For import the following
elements are
considered: rental
costs for BIPs if not
already paid by
operators, equipment,
training, cleaning,
travelling expenses,
salaries of staff directly
involved in controls,
and sampling.
For domestic
production salaries of
staff directly involved,
training, property
charges, and
operational costs
including sampling.
In the veterinary area:
fees include the costs
for salaries of
personnel involved in
controls, administrative
costs related to
controls, training of
inspectors, sampling
and testing. Minimum
fees are used for areas
covered as mandatory
by Reg. 882/2004.
Specific fees for
veterinary non
mandatory fees
Outside the veterinary
area: fees include
transport costs,
document control,
sampling and testing,
verification procedures.
Flat rate of 45 PLN (13
EUR) is charged per
control + 15 PLN (4
EUR) per hour +
sampling + testing
In general a mix
between minimum fees
and cost based fees is
used. Costs are
calculated but then the
minimum fee acts as a
lower limit (apart from
Bavaria). In some
Landers fees are
calculated for each
establishment. In some
Landers also maximum
ceilings are included.
The costs recorded the
previous year are the
basis for the fees in the
following one.
For some fees (e.g.
authorisation of plants)
a hourly fee is set (with
min and max) at 44
euro/hour + travel
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Issue to be
considered Belgium Italy UK France Poland Germany
explains a calculation
method that is based
on relevant 882/2004
annex.
(specific rates).
Specific rates are also
set for import.
Small/disadvantaged
FBOs
Some small
establishments and
businesses are
exempted from payment
or payment reduced.
Some flexibility is
mentioned in the basic
law with a reference to
paragraphs 5 and 6 of
Art. 27 Reg. 882/2004
but that cannot
derogate 100% cost
recovery. Unclear if
specific rules are
needed.
A discount is calculated
on the time-based fee
as the percentage to be
paid decreases as
throughput and
livestock units
decrease.
Guidance on "Cold
inspection" have been
developed to maximize
CA efficiency
No specific rules but
the way fees are
applied seems not to
create particular
problems for them.
No specific rules. No specific rules
Transparency
All information is
available on line and
regularly updated.
www.afsca.be
Basic law is published
on the official journal.
Then information are
prepared and published
by local competent
authorities. No
centralized information.
The basic law prescribe
regular information to
the Commission on:
- calculation method
- figures on use of
income from fees.
All information is
available on line and
regularly updated.
www.food.gov.uk
Legislation is published
in the OJ.
Notes de service are
sent to the CA.
Relevant ministries
publish information
(Agriculture, Customs)
Legislation is published
in the OJ.
Legislation published in
the OJ
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Issue to be
considered Belgium Italy UK France Poland Germany
Mechanisms to
increase efficiency
A bonus-malus system
is in place. If haccp
system of the FBO is
certified by accredited
bodies recognized by
AFSCA, then the yearly
contributions are
reduced by 50%. If not,
a malus of 20%(2009),
60% (2010) and 100%
(from 2011) is applied.
For poultry
slaughterhouses where
FBOs are involved in
controls the fees are
reduced.
Application of
mandatory fees can
take into consideration
previous record of
conformity, risk
category and efficient
own checks but cannot
derogate to 100% cost
recovery.
With the agreement of
States/Regions it is
possible to determine
time-based fees for
slaughterhouses on the
basis of minimum
inspection times to be
respected by the CA
(e.g. 4 minutes per
cattle).
CA and FBOs sign
Business Agreements
where the presence of
the CA is agreed. In
case of disagreements
a mechanism is in
place to solve them. If
the CA loses the case
and they believe an
increased presence of
the CA is all the same
needed, they pay for it.
FBOs can propose
changes to the way of
production in order to
decrease the need for
CA presence. This
system has ensured
that the pressure to
ensure efficient and
effective delivery of
OCs has been shared
with FBOs.
No specific rules. No specific rules. No specific system in
place.
A system of
categorization of meat
establishments
according to risk is
being tried in some
Landers in order to
modulate frequency of
inspections to the
related risk category.
Industry is asking for
consultation on the
setting of fees in order
to increase efficiency
and risk based
approach. Salaries are
one of the biggest cost
but industry is not
involved in their setting
(only CA and trade
unions)
Reward/penalize
systems
See above. For the
mandatory fees a
specific system is not in
place apart from an
increase in the fees in
case animals with
unclear identification
(slaughterhouse)
See above The UK was to further
develop a fee system
that clearly takes into
account FBO
compliance levels
when setting the fee
system. Unclearness
within the UK as to the
legal meaning and
scope of articles 27
and 28 has previously
hampered
developments on that
A bonus malus system
is being considered.
Slaughterhouses are
classified in 4
categories depending
on level of compliance.
The first 2 categories
would have a bonus,
the others a malus.
No specific rules. No specific rules
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Issue to be
considered Belgium Italy UK France Poland Germany
front.
Fees for several
controls at the same
place
/ The principle included
in Art. 27.7 of Reg.
882/2004 is repeated in
the basic legislation
clarifying that the single
fee to be applied is
based on the recovery
of actual costs.
No specific rules. In
general fees take into
consideration the
proximity of
slaughterhouses and
cutting plants which is
to be considered in line
with Art. 27.7 of Reg.
882/2004.
No specific rules No specific rules. No specific rules
Operators charged The FBOs The FBOs the FBOs The FBOs The FBOs The FBOs
Ring-fence
Ring-fenced for AFSCA
activities
95% of the income from
fees on domestic
activities is ring fenced
for the local CA and
laboratories. 5% is for
regional and central
authorities to cover
costs related to
implementation of
MANCP.
20% of the income from
fees on imported
products is ring fenced
for the CA. 80% goes
to the general budget.
In part. Controls carried
out by Food standards
agency operations in
slaughterhouses and
meat cutting plants are
ring fenced (collected
and used within the
agency).
The rest of the sectors
when monies are
collected this is done
through Local
Authorities and kept
within the authority.
Fees for import are ring
fenced but not for
domestic production.
All fees are reversed to
the general budget. A
direct budget line is
against national tax
legislation.
Fees go to the general
budget.
Fees for veterinary
controls are ring-
fenced for the CA
when contractors are
used.
In general fees are
collected to be directly
used to finance the
official controls (they
are in fact mainly
based on full cost
recovery).
In those Landers where
fees go to the general
budget in any case
they are earmarked for
the CA.
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Issue to be
considered Belgium Italy UK France Poland Germany
Art. 28 - non-routine
checks
Inspections which reveal
non-compliances are not
charged per se.
However the costs
related to sampling and
analysis and further
enforcement actions
(destruction, treatment,
etc. ) are paid by the
FBOs.
Controls under Article
28 (and on the basis of
EU emergency
measures) are charged
to the operators with an
hourly rate of 50eur +
costs of analysis (rate
calculated on the basis
of Annex VI Reg.
882/2004).
UK has a very
restrictive
understanding of Art.
28 which leads to its
application only in
extreme cases of non
compliances which
lead to a risk for
consumers. So, in
general, additional
controls are not
charged to FBOs even
if they reveal non-
compliances as it was
felt at a UK level that
art. 28 was not drafted
to that effect, and that it
was unclear whether
art. 27 applied instead.
No specific rules No specific rules. No specific rules
Information sources
AFSCA website
Questionnaire submitted
in 2008 (fees study)
Legislative Decree
194/2008
Case study in the 2008
fees study
Web sites of a few local
authorities
FSA web site
Case study in 2008
fees study
Questionnaire
submitted in 2008 (fees
study)
Information received
from UK CA after
working group with
MSs
Case study in 2008
fees study
Questionnaire
submitted in 2008 (fees
study)
Information received
from France after an
FVO inspection
Notification from
France under Art.
27.12
Case study in 2008
fees study
Questionnaire
submitted in 2008 (fees
study)
Notification from
Poland under Art.
27.12
Case study in 2008
fees study
Questionnaire
submitted in 2008 (fees
study)
Notification from
Germany under Art.
27.12
Table A5.147 DG SANCO validated baseline, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Cyprus
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Issue to be
considered Slovakia Estonia Latvia Lithuania Bulgaria Cyprus
Fees as a tool of
financing official
controls
Fees included in
Annexes IV and V are
collected at the
minimum rates.
Non mandatory fees
are also collected for
import of food of non-
animal origin,
veterinary controls of
animals, hatching eggs,
germinal products and
animal by products
(also with reference to
export). These fees
are collected as time-
based fees.
Fees included in
Annexes IV and V are
collected at the
minimum rates.
Outside these sectors:
- food sector: FBOs are
charged using a time
based fee
- feed sector: rates are
calculated quarterly on
the basis of quantities
produced/exported
- veterinary sector other
than Annexes IV and V:
a time based fee is
used.
Fees cover all
mandatory fees (but not
milk) and some minor
activities outside these
sectors.
Specific rules and
calculation method
apply for fees in the
residues area (Dir.
96/23).
The other sectors are
either covered with the
minimum fee or a flat
rate based on actual
costs (depending on
the activity)
Fees cover all
mandatory fees and
some minor activities
outside these sectors.
Flat rate fees are
calculated on the basis
of actual costs.
Fees cover all
mandatory fees and
some minor activities
outside these sectors.
Flat rate fees are
calculated on the basis
of actual costs.
Fees cover all
mandatory fees and
some minor activities
outside these sectors.
Minimum fees are
followed apart from
cutting plants where an
hourly rate is used.
Costs covered with
fees
2005: 52%
2006: 55%
2007: 51%
2005: 31%
2006: 28%
2007: 20%
100% (according to the
CA)
100% (according to the
CA)
2005: no data
2006: 25%
2007: 29%
No data (CA state that
fees do not cover costs
but no data are
available)
Non-mandatory fees
Non mandatory fees
are also collected for
import of food of non-
animal origin,
veterinary controls of
animals, hatching eggs,
germinal products and
animal by products
(also with reference to
export). These fees
are collected as time-
based fees.
The whole food and
feed chain is covered
but fees are calculated
in different ways
according to sector.
Fees cover issuing of
health certificates and
permits. Fees cover
also import of food
contact materials and
feed of non-animal
origin
Fees cover issuing of
specific certificates
Fees cover animal
welfare controls and
import of feed of non
animal origin,
Fees cover export
certificates and import
of products of animal
origin outside
Regulation 882/2004.
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Issue to be
considered Slovakia Estonia Latvia Lithuania Bulgaria Cyprus
Activities covered
mandatory fees, import
of food of non-animal
origin, veterinary
controls of animals,
hatching eggs,
germinal products and
animal by products
(also with reference to
export).
The whole food and
feed chain.
Only mandatory fees
and minor activities
outside them.
Only mandatory fees
and minor activities
outside them.
Only mandatory fees
and minor activities
outside them.
Only mandatory fees
and minor activities
outside them.
Calculation method
Minimum fees for the
mandatory ones.
For import controls on
food of non animal
origin, veterinary
controls of animals,
hatching eggs,
germinal products and
animal by products
(also with reference to
export) a time based
fee (hourly) is
calculated on the basis
of the items included in
Annex VI of the
Regulation.
Fees under Annex IV
and V are collected at
the minimum rates.
Feed sector: fees
depend on quantity and
quality of feed.
Other veterinary fees
and food sector: hourly
fee calculated on the
basis of average
remuneration of a
supervisory official +
average administrative
and economic costs
relating to carrying out
the inspection. The
remuneration refers to
an official working for
the local CA or at BIPs
- the average refers to
remuneration in the
previous year.
The administrative and
economic costs are the
average cost per official
with reference to the
items listed in point 2 of
Covering the costs
mentioned in Annex VI
(administrative costs
are included adding
10% to the direct costs)
Covering the costs
included in Annex VI
(including social
security of inspectors).
Fees are calculated on
the basis of actual
costs and can go below
minimum fees if costs
are lower.
Covering the costs
included in Annex VI
(including social
security of inspectors).
Fees are calculated on
the basis of actual
costs using average
costs and a specific
hourly fee per inspector
(10 BGN)
Minimum fees for all
mandatory sectors
apart from cutting
plants where an hourly
fee is used (calculated
on the basis of the
salaries of inspectors)
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Issue to be
considered Slovakia Estonia Latvia Lithuania Bulgaria Cyprus
Annex VI to the
Regulation and related
to the inspection
activities.
Every year the hourly
fee is updated taking
into consideration the
costs of the year
before.
Small/disadvantaged
FBOs
No specific rules (CA
feel that different rules
would put some
business categories at
disadvantage
compared to others -
there is also the need
to maintain a minimum
level of income for
official controls).
Fully considered in the
food sector and partly
considered in the
veterinary area with the
use of a time based fee
outside Annexes IV and
V.
No information No information No information. No information
Transparency
Relevant legislation is
published in the official
journal.
Legislation published in
the OJ.
No information Basic law (Resolution)
and annual updates are
published in the official
journal
No information. No information
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Issue to be
considered Slovakia Estonia Latvia Lithuania Bulgaria Cyprus
Mechanisms to
increase efficiency
No specific rules. No specific rules. No information No information No information. No information
Reward/penalize
systems
No specific rules. No specific rules. No information No information No information. No information
Fees for several
controls at the same
place
CA applies only one fee
in slaughterhouses with
annexed cutting plants.
No specific rules. No information No information No information. No information
Operators charged
FBOs
In the milk sector only
dairy farms (not
processors) are
charged.
FBOs FBOs FBOs FBOs FBOs
Ring-fence
Fees go to the general
budget and only in part
it goes back to the
competent authorities
Fees (except for feed
control) are used
directly to finance
official controls. Fees
for feed control go to
the general budget.
Yes, fully. Fees go to the general
budget and only in part
it goes back to the
competent authorities
Fees go to the general
budget and only in part
it goes back to the
competent authorities
Fees go to the general
budget and only in part
it goes back to the
competent authorities
Art. 28 - non-routine
checks
Specific legislation for
additional official
controls needed after
detection of non
compliance. FBOs are
charged using a time
based fee (hourly)
identical to the one
foreseen for import of
food of non-animal
origin and veterinary
controls of animals,
hatching eggs,
germinal products and
animal by products
(also with reference to
export). Costs related
FBOs are charged
using a time based fee,
in case of laboratory
investigations the costs
of these are added.
In the residues area, if
non compliance is
detected the costs of
the controls carried out
are charged to the
operators.
No information No information. No information
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Issue to be
considered Slovakia Estonia Latvia Lithuania Bulgaria Cyprus
to sampling needed in
relation to the detected
non compliance are
also included.
Information sources
Case study in 2008
fees study
Questionnaire
submitted in 2008 (fees
study)
Notification from
Slovakia under Art.
27.12
Estonia notification
under Art. 27.12
Questionnaire
submitted in 2008 (fees
study)
Questionnaire
submitted in 2008 (fees
study)
Questionnaire
submitted in 2008 (fees
study)
Questionnaire
submitted in 2008 (fees
study)
Table A5.148 DG SANCO validated baseline; Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Greece and Spain
Issue to be
considered Czech Republic Denmark Finland Ireland Greece Spain
Fees as a tool of
financing official
controls
Fees cover all
mandatory fees and
some minor activities
outside these sectors.
Minimum fees are
followed for activities
within the EU and flat
rates, on the basis of
actual costs, for import.
Fees cover all
mandatory fees and
some other activities
outside these sectors.
Flat rates are used and
calculated on the basis
of actual costs.
Minimum fees are used
for small abattoirs
Fees cover all
mandatory fees and
some other activities
outside these sectors.
Flat rates are used and
calculated on the basis
of actual costs.
Minimum fees can be
used for smaller
establishments under
the responsibility of
municipalities.
Ireland collects
mandatory and some
non-mandatory fees.
Minimum fees are
followed for imports of
animal origin. For meat,
a system of standard
unit charges (which
may or may not recover
the full cost of the
service). In the dairy
sector a flat-rate system
Fees cover all
mandatory fees and
some minor activities
outside these sectors,
with the exception of
the costs for the
approval of feeding
stuffs' establishments
that is covered by
annual fees. Flat rates
are used and calculated
on the basis of actual
Fees are under the
responsibility of each
Autonomous
Community, not all
control activities are
covered by rules or
specific provisions on
fees collection under
Reg. 882/2004. For
imports of different
products the fees are
under responsibility of
Preparatory work to support the impact assessment on reviewing the rules on the financing of official controls - Final report
GHK Consulting with ADAS 329
Issue to be
considered Czech Republic Denmark Finland Ireland Greece Spain
applies, based on the
quantity of milk
purchased on a monthly
basis. The level of
Inspection fee currently
applying for imports of
products of animal
origin exceeds the
minimum level
requirements under
Regulation (EC) No.
882/2004. The National
Standards Authority of
Ireland (NSAI) provides
official food control
services in premises
requiring recognition for
the extraction of natural
mineral water. A fee is
charged by the NSAI to
cover the costs of audit
and on site activities.
costs. the Central Competent
Authority and they are
different of the indicated
in the Reg.882/2004.In
this moment, it is
preparing a new rule on
reinforced controls in
the products of non
animal origin (Reg
669/2009) and a new
fee should be created.
Costs covered
with fees
2005: 36%
2006: 33%
2007: 28%
CA state full cost
coverage with the
exception of small
abattoirs where only
35% of costs is
recovered (this subsidy
is calculated in around
10 million DKK a year)
2005: around 100%
(20% for small plants)
2006: around 100%
(20% for small plants)
2007: around 100%
(20% for small plants)
2005: Meat: 48% Milk:
90% Animal Feed: 82%
2006: Meat: 38% Milk:
90% Animal Feed: 80%
2007: Meat: 42% Milk:
90% Animal Feed: 76%
Imports of animal origin:
27% 2009 Meat: 40%
Milk: 90% (approx)
Imports of animal origin
no change, Mineral
Water Establishments
50-70%
Fees do not cover
costs. No data available
(for the years before
2008 fees were not
collected).
In general the fees do
not cover the costs.
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Issue to be
considered Czech Republic Denmark Finland Ireland Greece Spain
Non-mandatory
fees
Fees cover issuing
certificates and
approval and
registration of
establishments and
laboratories
Fees cover food and
feed of non animal
origin, food additives,
ABP, food contact
materials, animal
welfare during
transport, approval and
registration of
establishments
Fees cover all feed
controls and approval of
establishments
Yes for meat cold
stores supervised by
DAFF. The NSAI fees
for premises requiring
recognition for the
extraction of natural
mineral water.
Fees cover all type of
inspections in feeding
stuffs.
Charged in some
Autonomous
Communities. Also la
Agencia Española de
Seguridad Alimentaria y
Nutrición (AESAN) has
some fees on several
dietetic foods in relation
with the evaluation and
registration.
Activities covered
Only mandatory fees
and minor activities
outside them.
Mandatory fees and
some activities outside
them.
Mandatory fees and
some activities outside
them.
Mandatory areas under
Reg. 882/2004 and non
mandatory fees
charged for official
controls in cold stores
(See Appendix from
Ireland for further
information on rates)
Mandatory fees and
other minor activities
outside them.
Not all control activities
are covered by rules or
specific provisions on
fees collection under
Reg. 882/2004.In
imports they cover the
imports of food of
animal origin.
Calculation
method
Minimum fees for
domestic activities.
For import, flat rates are
calculated on the basis
of actual costs
according to the items
of Annex VI
Flat rates are calculated
on the basis of actual
costs. Small abattoirs
are charged minimum
fees.
A time based fee is
calculated plus a
starting fee for each
control which covers
associated costs).
Feed establishments
pay also an annual fee.
Analyses are charged
at cost.
For residues a quantity
based fee is calculated.
Flat rates are calculated
with a time based fee.
Smaller establishments
are under the
responsibility of
municipalities and they
can be charged on the
basis of costs or at
minimum fees
depending on the
municipality.
On what concerns meat
these fees are either a
fee per animal
slaughtered, a fee per
tonne of product going
through cutting plants
and independent cold
stores or an hourly
charge for time spent
supervising product in
processing plants,
integrated cold stores
and for overtime on
meat inspection work.
In the dairy sector a flat
rate system is followed,
fees are collected
according to quantity of
Flat rates are calculated
on the basis of actual
costs, according to the
criteria of Annex VI of
Regulation 882/2004.
In principle, minimum
fees are applied. In the
dairy sector, flat-rates
and minimum rates are
both used. In imports
the calculation of fees is
based on the type of
product and the weight
and it is calculated by
telematique way.
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Issue to be
considered Czech Republic Denmark Finland Ireland Greece Spain
milk produced and cost
of services on a
monthly basis.
Small/disadvantag
ed FBOs
No information Small abattoirs are
charged only minimum
fees and the extra costs
are paid with the state
budget.
Smaller establishments
in municipalities can be
charged minimum fees
instead of at cost.
Some small
establishments are
exempted from
payment or payment
reduced
The budget for the cost
of controls has been
planned and it was
allocated according to
the amounts that each
establishment produced
and disposed.
There are no
exemptions for the
small establishments.
Transparency
No information No information Relevant legislation is
published in the official
journal and on the
EVIRA website
Relevant legislation is
accessible on the
website www.fsai.ie and
www.irishstatutebook.ie
No information Basic laws and annual
updates are published
on the official journals
of the State (imports
and fees of AESAN)
and the Autonomous
Communities. For the
imports is also in the
web page of Ministerio
de Sanidad y Politica
Social. Also some
Autonomous
Communities and
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Issue to be
considered Czech Republic Denmark Finland Ireland Greece Spain
AESAN have developed
informatics applications
in their web pages.
Mechanisms to
increase efficiency
No information No information No information A working group has
been established to
review and evaluate the
fees charged by the
Department of
Agriculture, Fisheries
and Food for the
provision of official
controls and inspection
services in the meat
and dairy hygiene
sector as required
under EU legislation
No information Industry is asking for
consultation on the
setting of fees when a
basic law or an update
is preparing.
Reward/penalize
systems
No information No information No information Not applied No information Application of
mandatory fees can
take into consideration
previous record of
conformity, risk
category , efficient own
checks and other items
(not working at night
,administrative support)
but cannot derogate to
100% cost recovery.
Fees for several
controls at the
same place
No information No information No information Not applied No information There is not a general
rule. In some case is
charged a single fee
(the highest).In other
cases there is an
accumulation of the
fees.
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Issue to be
considered Czech Republic Denmark Finland Ireland Greece Spain
Operators
charged
FBOs FBOs FBOs FBOs of approved meat
and milk establishments
and importers of food of
animal origin (for
imports of non animal
origin see details in
Annex)
FBOs FBOs included
importers or responsible
for the consignments.
Ring-fence
Fees go to the general
budget and only in part
it goes back to the
competent authorities
Fees are used directly
to finance official
controls.
Fees are used directly
to finance official
controls in case of
controls under the
responsibility of
municipalities.
Otherwise it goes to the
general budget and only
in part it goes back to
the competent
authorities.
Fees go to the general
budget and only a
percentage is used to
cover the costs of the
controls carried out.
Fees go to the general
budget of the Ministry of
Rural Development and
Food and only a
percentage is used to
cover the costs of the
controls carried out.
Fees go to the general
budget and only in part
it goes back to the
competent authorities.
Art. 28 - non-
routine checks
Outside the veterinary
sector, when
inspections detect a
non compliance, the
cost of the analysis that
detected the non
compliance is charged
to the FBOs
No information No information Not applied No information In the most part of the
cases when there are
detections of non
compliance the
additional official
controls are charged
FBOs (operators
responsible for the non
compliance or importers
or FBO responsible for
the consignments).
Information
sources
Questionnaire
submitted in 2008 (fees
study)
Questionnaire
submitted in 2008 (fees
study)
Questionnaire
submitted in 2008 (fees
study)
Questionnaire
submitted in 2008 (fees
study);
notification from Ireland
under art. 27.12.
Questionnaire
submitted in 2008 (fees
study)
Questionnaire
submitted in 2008 (fees
study).Consult to
competent
authorities(June 2010).
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Table A5.149 DG SANCO validated baseline, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal
Issue to be
considered Luxembourg Hungary Malta Netherlands Austria Portugal
Fees as a tool of
financing official
controls
Fees cover all
mandatory activities
and some other
activities outside them.
Flat rates are used and
calculated on the basis
of actual costs; in the
case of import control a
fee below the minimum
rate is applied.
Fees are collected
according to the Fees
for Abattoir and
Veterinary Service
Regulations (LN
68/1986) (SL 35.10).
Implementing legislation
covers only red meat
inspection fees.
However, fees charged
by Border Inspection
Posts are collected
according to Annex V of
Regulation 882/2004,
under a minimum rate
system. SL 35.10 is
currently under review
to render collection of
fees for red meat
inspection in line with
minimum rates of
Annex IV of Council
Regulation (EC)
882/2004 and introduce
new fees for other
areas that are not
covered by Council
Regulation (EC)
882/2004 or SL 35.10
Fees cover mandatory
areas and some
activities outside them.
For imports minimum
fees are followed, for
other activities under
Annex IV of
Reg.882/2004, meat
and official controls on
residues a flat-rate
system is used. In fee
calculation the
principles of direct
benefit and
cost/effectiveness are
considered. For milk the
fee is below the
minimum rate because
the actual costs of
these official controls
are below the minimum
fee.
Fees cover all
mandatory fees and
some minor activities
outside them. Flat rates
are used and calculated
on the basis of actual
costs. The fees for
border checks are
calculated on a
minimum rate basis. For
small establishments,
fee setting is under
responsibility of the
different Landers.
Fees cover all
mandatory fees and
some other activities.
Minimum fees are
applied, with the
exception of plant
approval and inspection
on HACCP, where a
flat-rate is adopted. The
plant health fees, are
the minimal fees
according the EU
regulation.
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Issue to be
considered Luxembourg Hungary Malta Netherlands Austria Portugal
Costs covered
with fees
2005: around 60%
2006: around 60%
2007: around 60%
2005: 36.5 %
2006: 36.9 %
2007: 39.4 %
2005: 75 %
2006: 86 %
2007: 81 %
2008/2009: 90% (est.)
CA state that fees
entirely cover costs,
with the exception of
border checks (no data
available). At the Swiss
border, lower fees are
charged in accordance
with an agreement
between the Ec and
Switzerland.
No data (CA state that
fees do not cover costs
but no data are
available)
Non-mandatory
fees
Fees cover inspection
of herds; certification
and control of animals
and animal products
transport; control of
animal exhibition,
competition; tuberculin
testing and sampling.
No, implementing
legislation is required.
Fees cover all official
controls and analyses in
FBOs (meat and feed).
There are also fees for
registration of other
food operators,
approval and
maintenance of
approvals for dairy and
milk products and eggs
and egg products.
Fees cover hygiene
checks in
establishments that are
subject to approval in
accordance with
Regulation (EC) No
853/2004 (processing;
milk; eggs; fish).
Fees cover certification,
slaughter, rabies
vaccination, medicines
and veterinary products
approval and licensing.
other fees cover official
checks in
establishments that are
subject to approval in
accordance with
Regulation (EC) No
853/2004 (processing;
milk; eggs; fish), and
subject to control under
Regulation (EC) no
1774/2002 and import
from third countries
(BIP, minimum annex
V).; considering
vaccines it is in place a
fee, due to lab control,
before release to
market/users. On the
import control of
foodstuffs of non-animal
origin and within the
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Issue to be
considered Luxembourg Hungary Malta Netherlands Austria Portugal
scope of audits to verify
the traceability and
HACCP requirements,
operators support the
cost of the analysis.
Activities covered
Mandatory fees and
some activities outside
them.
The present
implementing legislation
directly covers only red
meat inspection fees.
However, fees charged
by Border Inspection
Posts are in line with
Annex V since July
2007.
Mandatory fees and
some activities outside
them. In general fees
are applied for all
official veterinary
controls and analyses in
approved FBOs and
border inspection posts.
Mandatory fees and
some minor activities
outside them.
Mandatory fees and
some activities outside
them.
Calculation
method
Flat rates are calculated
on the basis of the
actual costs. In the case
of import control, a fee
below the minimum rate
is being applied.
Fees under Annex V of
Regulation 882/2004
are collected at
minimum rates. Cost of
salaries of staff involved
in official controls are
included.
Minimum fees apply for
import activities. In the
areas under Annex IV
of Reg.882/2004, for
meat products and
official controls on
residues a flat-rate
system is followed. In
fee calculation the
following principles are
taken into
consideration: direct
benefit, a direct link is
Fees are charged on a
flat rate basis taking
into account the
duration, the position of
the person performing
the activity, the type of
activity and resources
used, and the type of
establishment,
distinctions being made
on the basis of
throughput. The fees for
border checks are
Minimum fees are
applied as defined in
Regulation 882/2004.
Minimum fees apply
even if they can clash
with other criteria set by
the Regulation (e.g.
fees cannot be higher
than costs). For plant
approval, plant
inspection and HACCP
(under the Regulation
(EC) No 853/2004) a
Preparatory work to support the impact assessment on reviewing the rules on the financing of official controls - Final report
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Issue to be
considered Luxembourg Hungary Malta Netherlands Austria Portugal
needed between the
benefit of the control
activities for the FBOs
and the fee to be paid
for such activity; the
cost/effectiveness, fees
have to cover integral
costs, but never being
higher than the costs to
be covered in a (group
of) sector(s) or
activities. Most fees
have an hourly rate.
calculated, under a
minimum rate system,
on the basis of Annex V
to Regulation (EC)
882/2004.
flat-rate system on the
basis of the actual costs
is adopted. On the
import control of
foodstuffs of non-animal
origin a standard value
for issuing certificates
are applied to all
operators. In addition, if
the commodity is
randomly selected for
analytical control the full
costs of laboratory
analyses are billed
directly to the operator
Within the scope of
audits to verify the
traceability and HACCP
requirements; operators
support only the cost of
the analysis if sampling
is done.
Small/disadvantag
ed FBOs
No information Malta's largest FBOs
are to be considered
small enterprises as per
definition of SMEs. The
greater majority of
Maltese FBOs are
micro enterprises with
highly reduced activity
and personnel.
There are reduced fees
for AM and PM
inspections in very
small slaughterers
taking into
consideration their low
throughput.
In the case small
establishments,
Landers are responsible
for fee setting.
Some small
establishments (local
micro-economies)
outside from Annex IV
of Reg (CE) n.º
882/2004 have reduced
fees.
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Issue to be
considered Luxembourg Hungary Malta Netherlands Austria Portugal
Transparency
No information Collection of funds by
the Agriculture and
Fisheries Regulation
Department for official
controls and meat
inspection are all
recorded in a general
direct accounting
system (DAS) under the
revenue vote. An
electronic receipt is
issued for each
payment. The system
falls under the Public
Service Auditing system
and is audited as part of
the normal audits that
take place from time to
time.
Legislation and fees are
published in OJ. This
information an further
information on
calculation method is
available on line
(www.vwa.nl)
No information No information
Mechanisms to
increase efficiency
No information We have combined
various controls to be
carried out during
inspections. This saves
sending numerous
teams of veterinarians
and officers to the same
establishments or farms
to carry out inspections
for different
issues/purposes.
> call fee and time
based fee (fee by
quarter of an hour): the
better the FBO
functions, shorter and
fewer official controls
are needed which
reduce the costs for
FBOs. > set of rules for
requests for official
controls by FBOs >
surcharges for i)
requests for controls
outside regular working
hours ii) overtime (on
top of original requested
time)
No information No information
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Issue to be
considered Luxembourg Hungary Malta Netherlands Austria Portugal
Reward/penalize
systems
No information No mechanism exists
for reward systems but
an administrative fine
procedure exists in the
parent Act (CAP 437)
for breaches of
regulations falling under
this Act.
If possible official
controls are risk-based
which in combination to
the time based fees
leads to less or more
charges to FBOs
No information No information
Fees for several
controls at the
same place
No information The system of
compounding fees is
not adopted at present.
Just one call fee for the
same official; the total
time for each official is
charged according to
the applicable fee for
the specific control
No information No information
Operators
charged
FBOs FBOs are charged.
Red meat slaughtering
establishments are run
by the state and
therefore only internal
paper transactions are
considered.
FBOs, BIPs, cattle
dealers, citizens who
need a veterinary
certificate
FBOs FBOs
Ring-fence
Fees are used directly
to finance official
controls.
Fees go to the general
budget and only in part
return back to the
competent authorities
Fees are directly and
only used to finance
control activities.
Fees are used directly
to finance official
controls. In the case of
Border Checks they are
incorporated into the
State's General Budget.
Fees are used directly
to finance official
controls.
Art. 28 - non-
routine checks
No information At present there is no
extra collection of fees
for enforcement work
arising out of additional
official controls for non-
compliance.
All FBOs, BIPs and
cattle traders - including
retail - are charged for
additional official
controls according to
art. 28 of Reg.
882/2004.
No information No information
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Issue to be
considered Luxembourg Hungary Malta Netherlands Austria Portugal
Information
sources
Questionnaire
submitted in 2008 (fees
study)
Questionnaire
submitted in 2008 (fees
study) (Updated
30.06.10)
Questionnaire
submitted in 2008 (fees
study); questionnaire
submitted in 2010
Questionnaire
submitted in 2008 (fees
study)
Questionnaire
submitted in 2008 (fees
study) Decreto-Lei nº
154/2005 (plant health
inspection);Decreto-Lei
n.º 178/2008 e Portaria
n.º 1450/2009 (controls
according Reg.(CE) n.º
853/2004; n.º 183/2005
e n.º1774/2002)
Table A5.150 DG SANCO validated baseline; Romania, Slovenia and Sweden
Issue to be
considered Romania Slovenia Sweden
Fees as a tool of
financing official
controls
Fees cover all mandatory fees and some other
activities outside them. Minimum fees are used on
a time-basis that takes into account the salaries
and the training costs for the personnel. For
official controls on residues, FBOs dealing with
products of non animal origin and some general
activities a flat-rate is applied.
Fees cover all mandatory fees and some control
activities outside them. Minimum fees are
followed, except for official controls on residues
and all non-mandatory activities, where a flat-rate
system based on the actual costs is used.
Food: Full cost recovery (Meat in 2010 approx
95% cost recovery). General national system
where FBOs pay an annual fee for official
controls. Annual fees are based on annual control
time, which in its turn is calculated by using a
model for risk classification of FBOs, taking into
account type and size of the FBO's activities, the
risks involved and the FBO's past record. For
slaughterhouses and GHE (and, to a certain
extent, cutting plants) a different system applies,
with annual fees calculated by estimating control
hours per year multiplied by hourly rates based on
actual costs for control performed by official
veterinarians and official auxiliaries.
Costs covered with
fees
Fees entirely cover costs for FBOs processing
products of animal origin, but not for FBOs that
process, stores and trades products of non animal
origin. 2006:
60%
2007: 50%
100% (According to the CA) Food: Generally speaking, the aim of the fees
system is full cost recovery for all official controls.
The fees charged must be sufficient to finance the
official control deemed necessary, and fees may
not be used to finance other activities.
Administrative costs, training, overheads,
development of OC are included in the hourly rate.
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Issue to be
considered Romania Slovenia Sweden
Slaughter up to 200 tonnes per year is partly
subsidised (approx. total of 9 million SEK in
subsidies 2010).
Non-mandatory fees
Fees cover businesses of products of non animal
origin
Fees cover animal feed (control of approved
establishments) and official control not covered by
Annex IV of Regulation 882/2004
Fees cover all official controls on food (including
imports), pesticides and residues, and the import
of feed of non animal origin and animal by-
products. Animal welfare in slaughterhouses is
included.
Activities covered
Mandatory fees and some other activities outside
them.
Mandatory areas and some activities outside them
(animal feed for control of approved
establishments, official controls not covered by
Annex IV of Regulation 882/2004 - to be further
described).
Food: The whole food chain, except primary
producers.
Calculation method
Minimum fees are applied on a time-basis system
that considers the total cost/hour for the control
activities making the sum between the salaries of
the involved personnel/hour and the costs for
personnel training/hour. For what concerns
official controls on residues, processing, storage
and trading businesses of products of non animal
origin and some other general activities (cold
stores, repackaging units, en-gross market) flat-
rates are applied.
Minimum fees for the mandatory sectors, including
total costs under Annex VI to regulation 882/2004
and, in case of live animals in I/C trade, also the
costs covered by Regulation 1857/2006. For what
concerns official controls on residues (Directive
96/23) and all activities covered by non-mandatory
fees a flat-rate system is adopted.
Food: Fees are calculated on the basis of Annex
VI of Reg. 882/2004. Flat rates are used, they are
based on an hourly rate including travel costs and
out-of-office hours costs. Overheads, training,
administrative costs are included. Minimum
levels in EU-legislation are obeyed.
Small/disadvantaged
FBOs
In the amount of time calculation, the production
volume and the sector of activity are also taken
into account.
No information Food: Annual fees for control take into account the
size of the FBO's activities. Reduced fees apply
for small slaughterhouses, based on applicable
minimum fees according to Regulation 882/2004
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Issue to be
considered Romania Slovenia Sweden
Transparency
No information No information Laws and regulations on fees are published
officially. Guidelines on risk classification have
been published by the NFA. Detailed information
on the calculating of fees is published on the
NFA's homepage. Detailed info on calculation of
control hours regarding slaughter houses and
GHE is published on the NFA´s homepage. FBOs
and other organisations receive proposals for new
fee rules or fee levels and are given opportunity to
comment the proposals.
Mechanisms to
increase efficiency
No information No information Food: Risk-based approach to fees means that
the risks in the FBO's activities are reflected in
annual control time. System also takes into
account the FBO's past record, where compliance
or non-compliance can lead to a reduction or an
increase in the annual control time and annual
fees.
Reward/penalize
systems
No information No information See above. FBO's past record affects the annual
fee paid.
Fees for several
controls at the same
place
No information No information Food: Separate fees may apply for export
authorisation, control of imported foodstuffs and of
residues. Authorization covering several
activities, i.e. Slaughterhouse with annexed
cutting plant and/or production plant, will be
charged one fee calculated on volumes placed on
market from each separate activity, provided each
activity can be considered separate from the other
activities.
Operators charged FBOs FBOs Food: FBOs
Ring-fence
Fees are used directly to finance official controls. Fees go to the general budget and only in part it
goes back to the competent authorities.
Local and central authorities use fees directly to
finance their official controls. Fees may not be
used to finance other activities.
Art. 28 - non-routine
checks
No information No information Food: Article 28 is applied in all cases where non-
compliance leads to extra control. An hourly rate
applies. Costs for all types of control are covered.
Information sources Questionnaire submitted in 2008 (fees study) Questionnaire submitted in 2008 (fees study) Questionnaire submitted in 2008 (fees study)
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A5.5 Competent Authority staff numbers
The Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) of DG SANCO has published, for the majority of
Member States, country profiles of official control systems. The quality of these reports
varies considerably; some are straightforward to read and understand, while others are
almost completely incomprehensible. The information contained in the reports reflects the
significant differences in official control systems between Member States; the reports
generally contain different data that is not amenable to simple comparison. However, the
reports are a useful source of information on the staffing of competent authorities across
Member States.
The data on staffing levels is presented in a variety of ways; to facilitate a comparison it has
been summarised by national, regional and local / departmental levels in Table A5.16 below.
Table A5.17 provides an example of the breakdown of veterinary staff, by qualified veterinary
numbers and approved auxiliary or technicians.
Some of the FVO reports have been updated recently (2010 / 2009) while others are older
(2007 / 2006). The information below therefore has to be treated with caution; it may be
dated in places. The table notes where Member State’s reports older than 2008.
Table A5.151 Breakdown of staff resources by competent authority level
Member State Number of CA personnel (FTE)
National Regional Local /
Departmental
Austria* 1,480 97296
Belgium 1,470 595
Bulgaria 3,262
Cyprus 571 (level unknown)
Czech Republic* 735 2,347 unknown
Denmark 3,701 1,558 154
Estonia 1,871 176
Finland 938 75 281
France 1,506 1,020 4,58097
Germany**
Greece 1,361 3,312
Hungary* 651 2,530
Ireland* 2,192 141
Italy 2,370 908 17,82698
Latvia**
Lithuania 753 (level unknown) 1,312
Luxembourg 55.25 (level unknown)
Malta 133
96 Laboratory and district level
97 A further 12,500 mandated part time staff are also employed at this level.
98 Figure includes data for local and laboratories – local figure excluding labs is 11,837
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Netherlands* 2845 280
Poland 508 11,665
Portugal* 433 75599
Romania**
Slovakia**
Slovenia 138 438
Spain 1,848 7,680100
Sweden 2,552 245 553
United Kingdom 6,841 2,000
Total101
36,835 14,833 26,787
*Based on FVO published prior to 2008. **No country profile available.
Table A5.152 Examples of split between vets and non-vet staff
Member State Vets Non-Vets Level of organisation (Name)
Austria* 47 23
National
(Ministry of health, Family and Youth)
Belgium 179 143
Bulgaria
Cyprus 207 145 Unknown – “Veterinary Services”
Czech Republic* 61
44
27
47
Central level (SVA)
Central Level (Institute for State Control
of Veterinary Biologicals & Medicines)
Denmark
Estonia 158 122 National (Veterinary and Food Board)
Finland 286 459 Local (Food Control in Municipalities)
France
78 35
National
(Health Department of the armed
Forces)
Germany**
Greece 15
15
10
4
National (Directorate of Animal Health)
National (Directorate of Public Health)
Hungary*
Ireland*
Italy 385
374
188
607
National (ICQ)
Regional (RPS)
99 An additional 155 staff classed as National and Regional
100 A further 3,204 staff employed in “delegated competencies” where the level of authority is unknown.
101 Total figure excludes data which was included in Table A5.151 but where the level of employment was
unknown.
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Latvia**
Lithuania
Luxembourg 33.25 22 All levels
Malta
Netherlands*
Poland 1,600 648
Regional/ District (Voivodship
Inspectorate of SPHSIS + Field Units)
Portugal*
Romania**
Slovakia**
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
*Based on FVO published prior to 2008. **No country profile available.
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A5.6 Information on control activity from Regulation 882/2004 Annual Reports for four EU Member States
The information provided in this section is intended to demonstrate the range of information
available and quality of reporting in the Regulation 882/2004 Annual Reports. The four
countries represented here are chosen because they illustrate this range of quality and
information and they are also case study countries. The information presented is laid out
according to the categories of control activity within the scope of this study. The goal of this
exercise was to determine if information on control activity and the number of FBOs
inspected could be identified in a consistent manner for a significant number of Member
States in order to inform the analysis in this study. The study team’s conclusion is that the
information is not presented uniformly and often is not even understandable as an English
language document.
A5.6.1 Finland
The Finnish report was difficult to understand; it appears that it was translated directly from
Finnish into English by an automatic programme. Where it has been impossible to
understand the text, but it appears that it is likely to be relevant, it has been copied directly
from the report.
A5.6.1.1 Total control activity
Table A5.153 Total control activity
Authority and action Monitoring,
control and
surveillance
Monitoring
implementation
of transposition
Total
Control
TOTAL - Evira 203 217 420
Kasvint. conditions and kasvinterv 76 56 132
Animal health and welfare 62 10 72
Food Safety 65 151 216
TOTAL - Centres 0 51.5 51.5
Kasvint. conditions and kasvinterv 0 45.3 45.3
Animal health and welfare 0 6.2 6.2
TOTAL - Provincial governments 16.1 10.6 26.7
Animal health and welfare 8.8 7.6 16.4
Food Safety 7.3 3 10.3
TOTAL - Localities 0 490 490
Kasvint. conditions and kasvinterv 0 7 7
Animal health and welfare 0 230 230
Food Safety 0 253 253
TOTAL - Customs 2 73 75
Kasvint. conditions and kasvinterv 2 14 16
Animal health and welfare 0 1 1
Food Safety 0 58 58
TOTAL – Valvira 0 0.8 0.8
Food Safety 0 0.8 0.8
TOTAL – Defense 0 2.5 2.5
Food Safety 0 2.5 2.5
TOTAL – Aland 0 5.2 5.2
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Kasvint. conditions and kasvinterv 0 0 0
Animal health and welfare 0 0.2 0.2
Food Safety 0 5 5
TOTAL – Authorised inspectors 0 47.3 47.3
Kasvint. conditions and kasvinterv 0 39 39
Animal health and welfare 0 0.3 0.3
Food Safety 0 8 8
TOTAL CONTROL ACTIVITY 221.1 897.9 1119
Adapted from: Annual Report 2008 under Regulation 882/2004 - Finland
Table A5.154 Food Control Checks - 2009
On-the-spot
inspections
Primary
producers
Manu-
facturers
& packers
Distri-
butors &
trans-
porters
Retailers Service
sector
Manu-
facturers
(selling is
primarily
a retail
basis)
TOTAL
Number of
establishments
1,300 3,212 3,267 12,854 32,384 288 53,305
Number of
establishments
inspected
150 2,020 967 4,730 16,039 92 23,998
Number of
inspections
210 6,541 1,873 9,821 23,219 120 41,784
Adapted from: Annual Report 2008 under Regulation 882/2004 - Finland
A5.6.1.2 Animal health
[Study team note: text selected directly from the 882 report]
EU animal health checks toteumaprosentti was quite satisfactory (85%).EU-el
äinsuojeluvalvontojen coverage continued to improve after the sheep and goats under
control and omissions of these species were found more frequently than average.Val-
vontakohteista 75% of the selected risk basis, the other sample. EU-el
äinsuojelutarkastuksia were 561 livestock farm and neglect was found 19% of the farms
(22% v.2008).Serious laiminly öntejä (ESL § 44) was found in two tilal la.Ep äilyyn based on
the results of inspections and responded to in previous years, were control plans based on
the results of a clear sti worse.Ä typical causes of failures are the high cost of compliance
and increased productivity in the sector requirements, including lack of awareness may be
the reason yksittä istapauksissa.El äinkuljetusten EU-live insuojelutarkastuksia was 275
pcs.Laiminly öntejä checks were found on the previous year (27%, 11% in 2008), the majority
of the deficiencies related to documentation.
Veterinarians production and use of medicines and medical surveillance records in 2009 can
not be regarded as sufficient. El äinlääkäreiden for itself, all designed in 19 TELLU cables
checks were conducted, but sample-based controls were only two county area, a total of 14
pieces (48 pcs v.2008). In addition, the suspicion, based on yet another vet checked status
and three veterinarians.El äinlääkäreistä the majority were found to have certain points of un
inspections.Deficiencies were, however, were generally mild and drug records.Lis concerned
being the health of future outbreaks of reserve holdings when supplying medicines
luovuttamisehtojen tymisessä were shortcomings in the transposition.One case was
transferred to Evira k äsiteltäväksi, because the language ytyi vet check.L for the others, by
the governments of veterinarians gave guidance to remedy the deficiencies.
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A5.6.1.3 Animal welfare
[Study team note: text selected directly from the 882 report]
Cross-compliance in the control was taken into account by the Commission in 2008 repairs
necessary criteria, as reflected in a country Rin control results.The control of the rest of the
changes implemented in 2010, when the national control settings have been changed. T
äydentävien the terms of the supervision of animal health and welfare policy entity (animal
registration and subscription ID, ie, animal welfare, salmonella control, prohibited
substances, animal communication) goals were reached, but all valvontoja not been
completed at the end during 2009.Altogether premises were inspected in 1401 pcs (1125 (ID)
and 276 (others).Support for proposed cuts of about 10% of the sample were of the
premises.N äistä 2% of the field of animal welfare cent.El äinten registration and labeling of
cross-compliance under the supervision of omissions (including the later s 0%) were found in
14% of the sample areas (farm 162).Change came through the knowledge of the authorities
of cases (the so-called extension of ten), the aid cuts proposed in 76% of premises
inspected (total 47 pieces).N äistä most concerned the welfare of live intensity.ID-control
laajennusval-vonnat eivä t been known for writing the report.K Ayton banned substances or
animal as regards the notification did not reveal any deficiencies.
A5.6.1.4 Animal feed
[Study team note: the report did not provide any relevant information]
A5.6.1.5 Animal by-products
[Study team note: the report did not provide any relevant information]
A5.6.1.6 Live animals and live animal products
[Study team note: text selected directly from the 882 report]
Live animals and animal food in the contaminant monitoring program was about 4 300
samples of nearly 20 000 animals in research production of banned substances, authorized
veterinary medicinal products and kontaminanttijää Mie show.Residue control program was
found only two of the äytettä who were qualified, they contain ystenvastaisia
kokkidiostaattijää Mie result.M ääräystenvastaisia results were less than 0.5%, which
corresponds to the target.The EIV ät included in the results of moose and reindeer in the
internal organs, which stated the rule in accordance with some of the cadmium-
overruns.Control program, the results are the same level as in previous years, and they
show ett ä animal medicine-related legislation has been complied with in Finland very much.
A5.6.1.7 Meat and meat products
[Study team note: text selected directly from the 882 report]
Meat inspection was carried out in slaughterhouses Evira control plan in accordance with the
laws in force in accordance with.Meat inspection was carried out Altogether, 18:
Preparedness in the control of the slaughterhouse.N äistä 14 is a red meat slaughter
rastamoja and 4 poultry slaughterhouse.Preparedness plants supervised by the pass this
year äksyttiin 2009 283 485 334 kg of red meat and 94 of the 248 132 kg of poultry meat.Mp
ätyn the quantity of meat followed the previous years level.Meat inspection audited tietyilt ä
respect and audits will continue in 2010.
The 2009 statistics show that enforcement has been inadequate.Preparedness to carry out
meat inspection and sampling of the studies have been carried out in accordance with the
plan well, and meat inspection findings in respect of previous years the line.
A5.6.1.8 Imports
[Study team note: text selected directly from the 882 report]
Of veterinary border inspection posts were made in 2009, a total of 2 548 at the border
control in the EU who lose lots of which batches of products (food and by-products) had a
total of 1 457Kauttakulkuerille (food and by-products), which is usually m ääränpää Russia,
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543 inspections were made.All of Finland, Finnish or through other price of EU countries
imported product and eläväeläinerä t checked 100%.Ä rejected various ti-linpäätö svuonna
0.7%.More clubs were concerned being actively RAFF declarations and all the product
items, which had been RAFF declaration, later studied in P.Border controls were slightly less
than the previous year.Erist s still more left to the internal market, through a number of
shipments declined by 259 lot.
A5.6.1.9 Unapproved food establishments
[Study team note: the report did not provide any relevant information]
A5.6.1.10 Fish, fish products and aquaculture
[Study team note: the report did not provide any relevant information]
A5.6.1.11 Dairy products, eggs and egg products
[Study team note: text selected directly from the 882 report]
Preparedness inspectors made of milk for EU aid for private storage of butter in the control
of export and storage (a total of 2.0 million. Kg) of 48 controls and the intervention milk
powder (a total of 1.5 million. Kg) controls 16
A5.6.1.12 Hygiene
[Study team note: text selected directly from the 882 report]
Food-borne outbreaks in humans the number decreased in 2009 from the previous year,
salmonella, campylobacter and listeria infections, and increased slightly for yersinia
infections. Serious pathogens of EHEC infection m Erm clear sti ve increased compared to
prior years.Mit reads the common factor is motivated by EHEC infection demonstrated
exceptionally infection was suspected of mordant also directly intiloilla live.Food-borne
outbreak was reported in 1962, of which 60 were elintarvikev ä-flat (about 1 800 persons
became ill) and two domestic water-mediated epidemic (about 200 people became ill).Polish
pakastevadelmat were the cause of more than 20 s, causing an epidemic of more than 1 000
people ill.Evira stressed importers of their responsibility as part of the food chain to ensure
the safety of raspberries. Evira asked the European Commission's measures in the Finnish
consumers' health.Polish authorities, according to k äsittelyhygieniaan particularly in primary
production will continue to pay attention.
National salmonella control program, results showed further that in Finnish production
animals in the salmonella contamination was minimal (<1%) and the qualifications required
for the presence of strategic objectives with.Good än salmonellatilanteem-me because for
Finland to the EU accession guarantees issued in connection with the special permit tight
against salmonella later s import of meat and eggs.Non-EU countries to Finland imported el
äimistä salmonella in food is not found at all.Ensisaapumisvalvonnassa taken from the
authority AYT-tract salmonella was found on two specific guarantees covered by a lot (pork
and duck).Salmonella is reflected in the measures taken to combat human infections ko
timaassa obtained in quantities which remained t still low.My öskään the spring of 2009
linked to animal feedstuffs Salmonella Tennessee, the epidemic was not associated with any
cases of sick people, but the situation was effectively controlled surveillance, laboratory
testing laboratories and industry in close collaboration.
The incidence of EHEC bacteria teurasnaudoilla responded to earlier (0.6%). Positive of
slaughter came from seven farm.EHEC: s i studied in an exceptional manner in addition to
the five cattle from the farm to human suffering in order to determine the source of the
cases.Patients pauksista only one connection mode could be detected in
cattle.Campylobacter surveillance program surveyed broiler batches of 6% were
positive.Bacteria Rin replied to the incidence level of previous years.
In 2009, through the Commission's request for fresh herring histamiinikartoitus.All the
number were äytteet ystenmukaisia.Mapping shows the presence of histamine-ett s herring
is probably very low.
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In 2008, started to vacuum-packed fish listeria project was completed. L. mono-cytogenes-
positive samples had a large proportion, 31%, but the samples, however, only a small
fraction, less than 2% above the EU law's requirement (100 cfu / g).Recurring l öydösten of
local supervisors checked the Finnish fish sectors listeria control and began the necessary
steps.
Evira instructed local authorities to control the re-adoption of the institutions in
matters.Supervisory authorities concerned being reminded lis Evira body of data reporting in
order to register a national body to keep up to date again a good k-symiseen related to major
changes. Plants uudelleenhyv äksymi-tion was päätö kseen the majority of
municipalities.Preparedness to pass this äksymien slaughterhouses re-adoption was
finalized during 2009.
Department of social control audits, the development of regional governments have started
with. Preparedness and the provincial government working group to prepare audits for the
procedure with all necessary instructions and lomakkeineen raporttipohjineen to be followed
in the year 2010 audi-toinneissa inoculation.
Preparedness approved hygiene skills testers for nearly 2 000 across the Finnish end of
2009. Evira started testers the knowledge audit.Audits of the basic basis was given plenty
of comments and suggestions to correct operation.Five part-mistestaajan äksyntä pass this
had to be canceled.Hygiene proficiency certificates, ns. hygiene passports, Finland is my
önnetty the end of 2009 more than 600 000 pcs.
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A5.6.2 Netherlands
It is unclear whether the number of inspections reported independent of total control activity
are reported in hours or units of inspection. The inspection data provided does not total to
figures in Table A5.20. In addition, where control activity is reported outside the scope of
this study’s remit (as agreed with the Commission, see Table 2.1) they were excluded from
breakdowns in subsequent sections.
A5.6.2.1 Total control activity
In 2007 the VWA’s planning and responsibility changed from inspections based on numbers
to inspections based on standardised hours. Based on a comparison of the two approaches,
the VWA concluded that its work processes had improved, leading to an increased number
of inspections each year.
Table A5.155 Total control activity 2006-2008 (inspections)
Sector 2006 2007 2008
Inspection
numbers
Inspection
hours
Inspection
numbers
Inspection
hours
Food/feed safety 61,460 136,184 63,291 159,742
Beverages, catering,
tobacco
25,832 57,235 27,799 59,581
Inspection of cattle
transportation/meat/animals
(welfare)
26,636 26,706 26,548 17,354
Product safety 11,754 38,664 9,761 45,647
Import/external border
inspection posts
N/A102
9,835 3,461 11,790
Fish 2,761 7,428 4,071 2,896
Animal feed 3,391 8,900 3,061 12,345
Other 453 2,156 516 12,358
TOTAL 132,287 287,108 138,508 321,713
Adapted from: Annual Report 2008 under Regulation 882/2004 - Netherlands
Table A5.156 Total control activity 2006-2008 (samples)
Sample type 2006 2007 2008
Microbiology 51,366 66,151 41,703
Chemistry 75,312 61,995 33,263
Special samples 1,219 1,187 5,403
TOTAL 127,897 129,333 80,369
Adapted from: Annual Report 2008 under Regulation 882/2004 - Netherlands
A5.6.2.2 Animal health
Table A5.157 Size of control stocks - 2008
Holding type Number of holdings (approximate)
102 In 2006, import inspections were included with the other inspection groups
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Sheep and goats 46,000
Poultry 6,990
Pigs 19,430
Cattle 40,300
TOTAL 112,720
Adapted from: Annual Report 2008 under Regulation 882/2004 - Netherlands
Table A5.158 Control activity related to animal health (identification and registration) - 2008
Category Number of inspections
Sheep and goats 1,400
Poultry N/A103
Pigs N/A104
Cattle 2,150
TOTAL 3,550105
Adapted from: Annual Report 2008 under Regulation 882/2004 – Netherlands
A5.6.2.3 Animal welfare
Table A5.159 Number of operators subject to controls - 2008
Cattle transporters Number of transporters
Short-distance transport 1,317
Long-distance transport 156
TOTAL 1,473
Adapted from: Annual Report 2008 under Regulation 882/2004 – Netherlands
Table A5.160 Control activity related to animal welfare (checks at fresh meat establishments and on live animals during transport) - 2008
Inspection type Number of inspections
Welfare of hooved animals in slaughterhouses 433
Travel journals 8,769
A5.6.2.4 Animal feed
Table A5.161 Number of holdings subject to controls - 2008 (as of 1 Jan 2009)
Holding type Number of holdings
Primary holding (pen animals) 5,550 (approximate)
103 No information provided
104 Included in the checks on animal welfare; pig checks are not reported separately under either animal health or
welfare 105
This total refers only to the inspections on sheep and goats and on cattle as reported in the Annual Report. No information is provided on poultry inspections for animal health. Pigs are inspected for health with animal welfare inspections and these are not reported separately from other animal inspections in any case. Some checks were performed on horses, but no numbers were provided – the report indicates that a limited number were performed because compliance had been good in previous years.
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Primary holding (grazing animals) 35,000 (approximate)
Compound feedstuff holdings approved 79
Premix/additive holding approve 81
Other registered holdings 1,016
Carriers 860
Sheep 1,715
Traders 453
Approved holdings for animal proteins 84
Third countries for representatives 16
TOTAL 44,854
Adapted from: Annual Report 2008 under Regulation 882/2004 – Netherlands
Table A5.162 Control activity related to animal feed - 2008
Inspection type Number of inspections
VWA Inspections at approved/registered
holdings
1,715
VWA Samples/analyses (national plan for animal
feeds (analyses))
3,960
AID Animal feed inspections, basis, tracing,
reports
626 (87 of which are for reports)
AID Samples/analyses (animal feed) 1,543 (samples = 393; analyses = 1,150)
TOTAL 7,844
Adapted from: Annual Report 2008 under Regulation 882/2004 – Netherlands
A5.6.2.5 Animal by-products
Table A5.163 Number of holdings subject to controls - 2008
Holding type Number of holdings
Primary holding (grazing animal holding) 35,000 (approximate)
Primary holding (pen animal holding) 5,500 (approximate)
Intermediate holdings 278
Storage holdings 69
Incinerators and co-incineration plants 29
Category 1/ category 2 processing businesses 1
Petrochemical businesses 1
Biogas installations 77
Composting businesses 37
Category 3 processing businesses 22
Technical businesses 124
Collection centres 13
Animal By-Products (ABP) usage authorisations
(Article 23)
354
Approvals for alternative processing methods 5
TOTAL 41,510
Adapted from: Annual Report 2008 under Regulation 882/2004 – Netherlands
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Table A5.164 Control activity related to animal by-products - 2008
Inspection type Number of inspections
VWA inspections at approved holdings 1291
VWA inspections of original businesses 1986
VWA inspections for destination checks 427
VWA stream guarantee inspections 266
VWA fur-bearing animal clinical testing
inspections
195
Provision of authorisations (Articles 8 and 23) 107
Samples/analyses (microbiological) 196
AID inspections of Destruction Basis 546
AID inspections of Intermediate holdings 77
AID inspections of Processing businesses 19
AID inspections of Anadest (compliance
measurement) – poultry
39
TOTAL 5149
Adapted from: Annual Report 2008 under Regulation 882/2004 – Netherlands
A5.6.2.6 Live animals and live animal products
Table A5.165 Number of holdings subject to controls - 2008
Holding type Number of holdings
Export collection centres for pigs 17
Export collection centres for bovine animals 51
Export collection centres for sheep/goats 40
Washing points 168
Sperm extraction stations (SES) 59
Embryo teams 26
Traders 1,132
Approved establishments under Directive
92/65/EEC
9
Quarantine stations for birds, import from third
countries
38
Quarantine of birds 11
Approved poultry holdings 920
Staging posts 4
Registered circuses 1
TOTAL 2,476
Adapted from: Annual Report 2008 under Regulation 882/2004 – Netherlands
Table A5.166 Control activity related to live animals and live animal products - 2008
Inspection type Number of inspections
VWA inspections of export collection centres 102
VWA inspections of washing points 2,034
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VWA inspections of SES and embryo teams 121
VWA inspections of approved establishments
under Directive 92/65/EEC
10
VWA inspections of approved poultry holdings 695
VWA inspections of staging posts 0
VWA inspections of quarantine stations for birds 5
VWA inspections of circus registration 1
VWA destination checks 4,270
TOTAL INSPECTIONS 7,238
TOTAL INSPECTION HOURS 71,000 (approximate)
Adapted from: Annual Report 2008 under Regulation 882/2004 – Netherlands
A5.6.2.7 Meat and meat products Table A5.167 Number of holdings subject to controls - 2008
Holding type Number of holdings
Slaughterhouse for domesticated hoofed animals 241
Slaughterhouse for poultry 36
Slaughterhouse for cultivated game 23
Processing establishment for free game 22
Cutting plants for all types of meat 916
Meat product holdings 582
Meat preparations, minced meat and separator
meat
854
Processing establishments for processed
stomach, bladders and intestines, animals fats
and dripping, gelatine, collagen
54
TOTAL 2,728
Adapted from: Annual Report 2008 under Regulation 882/2004 – Netherlands
Table A5.168 Control activity related to meat and meat products - 2008
Inspection type Number of inspections
VWA inspections for granting approvals 2,149
VWA HACCP system supervision inspections 3,933
VWA HACCP system supervision audits 1,063
TOTAL VWA INSPECTIONS 7,145
TOTAL INSPECTION HOURS 213,606
Samples/analyses – microbiological 56,047
Samples/analyses – trichinas 153,871
TOTAL SAMPLES/ANALYSES 209,918
AID meat-based inspections 382
AID report inspections 78
TOTAL AID INSPECTIONS 460
Adapted from: Annual Report 2008 under Regulation 882/2004 – Netherlands
A5.6.2.8 Imports
Table A5.169 Number of centres subject to controls - 2008
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Centre type Number of centres
Inspection centres (belonging to a BIP) 15
Adapted from: Annual Report 2008 under Regulation 882/2004 – Netherlands
Table A5.170 Control activity related to imports
Inspection type Number of inspections
Checks on number of import batches of animal
products
53,774
Checks on number of specific laboratory tests of
animal products
1,494
Checks on positive laboratory results of animal
products
26
TOTAL CHECKS ON IMPORTS OF ANIMAL
PRODUCTS
55,294
TOTAL INSPECTION HOURS 11,790
TOTAL SAMPLES/ANALYSES 4,642
Adapted from: Annual Report 2008 under Regulation 882/2004 – Netherlands
A5.6.2.9 Checks on hygiene of foodstuffs at food establishments other than those approved in accordance with Regulation 853/2004
Compound products
Table A5.171 Number of businesses subject to controls - 2008
Business type Number of businesses
Food factory (unapproved) 2,480
Importer, wholesale trade, food storage
(unapproved)
3,929
TOTAL 6,409
Adapted from: Annual Report 2008 under Regulation 882/2004 – Netherlands
Table A5.172 Control activity related to unapproved food establishments - 2008
Inspection type Number of inspections
System audits 39
System inspections 4,146
TOTAL 4,185
Adapted from: Annual Report 2008 under Regulation 882/2004 – Netherlands
A5.6.2.10 Catering and non-industrial production
Table A5.173 Number of businesses subject to controls - 2008
Business type Number of businesses
▪ Catering (excluding businesses no engaged
in preparation)
▪ Retailers (bakers, butchers, etc.)
▪ Supermarkets
▪ Institutional kitchens
100,000 (approximate)
TOTAL 100,000
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Adapted from: Annual Report 2008 under Regulation 882/2004 – Netherlands
Table A5.174 Control activity related to catering and non-industrial production establishments - 2008
Inspection type Number of inspections
TOTAL INSPECTIONS 61,657
TOTAL SAMPLES/ANALYSES 13,696
Adapted from: Annual Report 2008 under Regulation 882/2004 – Netherlands
A5.6.2.11 Fish, fish products and aquaculture
Table A5.175 Number of businesses subject to controls - 2008
Business type Number of businesses
Treatment and processing plant for fisheries
products
629
Factory ship 188
Freezer ship 18
Fish market 14
Wholesale market 13
Dispatch centre 39
Treatment centre 23
Nursery for salmonids, eel, etc 119
Nursery/farm for shellfish and crustaceans 98
TOTAL 1,141
Adapted from: Annual Report 2008 under Regulation 882/2004 – Netherlands
Table A5.176 Control activity related to fish, fish products and aquaculture - 2008
Inspection type Number of inspections
VWA inspections 3,192
TOTAL INSPECTIONS 3,192
Samples/analyses – chemical 3,799
Samples/analyses - microbiological 532
TOTAL SAMPLES/ANALYSES 4,492
Adapted from: Annual Report 2008 under Regulation 882/2004 – Netherlands
A5.6.2.12 Dairy products, eggs and egg products
Table A5.177 Number of businesses subject to controls - 2008
Holding/business type Number of holdings/businesses
Laying hen farmers 1,258
Packing stations 92
Collectors 24
Wholesalers 111
Slaughterhouses 20
Cutting plants 166
Retailers 806
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Factory producers (dairy producers) 184
Subsequent cheese producers 121
Small-scale producers and farm-based dairy
producers
324
Home sales (dairy products) 123
Storage sites for dairy products 28
Dairy farms 20,746
Goat dairy farms 652
Sheep dairy farms 100
TOTAL 24,755
Adapted from: Annual Report 2008 under Regulation 882/2004 – Netherlands
Table A5.178 Control activity related to Dairy products, eggs and egg products - 2008
Inspection type Number of inspections
VWA inspections of COKZ quality assurance 5
VWA inspections of CPE quality assurance 13
Egg marketing inspections (poultry farmers) 1,225
Egg marketing inspections (packing
stations/collectors)
378
Egg marketing inspections (wholesalers) 29
Egg marketing inspections (retailers) 806
Poultry-meat marketing standards of Article 11
holdings
40
Poultry-meat marketing standards of
slaughterhouses/cutting plants
188
Control supervision 69
COKZ inspections of dairy holdings 960
TOTAL INSPECTIONS 3,713
COKZ Samples/analyses – microbiology 2,778
COKZ Samples/analyses – residues and
contaminants
2,649
TOTAL SAMPLES/ANALYSIS 2,778
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A5.6.3 Poland
The Polish report contains extensive information on the number of “checks” conducted as
part of control activity. The report does not provide information on the number of controls
performed, or the time associated with these controls. Information relevant to the controls
listed in Table 2.1 was selected to create the tables below.
A5.6.3.1 Total control activity Table A5.179 Number of supervised businesses and number of checks conducted by the
Veterinary Inspection, by property type, 2009
Type of property Supervised Checked
Sections leading the slaughter of
domesticated ungulates (SI)
599 579
Meat-cutting departments engaged in
domesticated ungulates (SI)
767 749
Meat-processing sections domesticated
ungulates (S VI)
617 610
Sections leading the slaughter of poultry
and / or lagomorphs (S II)
176 173
Conducting cutting-sections of poultry meat
and / or lagomorphs (S II)
328 312
Sections of poultry meat processing and / or
lagomorphs (S VI)
141 139
Sections leading the slaughter of wild
animals, farmed (S III)
2 2
Sections leading cutting meat from wild
animals farmed (S III)
2 2
Meat-processing sections of wild animals
farmed
0 0
Engaged in sections cutting venison (S IV) 17 17
Sections leading processing venison (S IV) 10 10
Establishments exclusively engaged in
approved meat processing (S VI)
95 93
Establishments approved processing of
fishery products (S VIII)
248 238
Approved milk processing establishments
(S IX)
309 302
Sections leading the slaughter of ungulates 496 461
Sections leading cutting meat of ungulates 628 902
Sections leading meat processing
ungulates
641 606
Sections leading the slaughter of poultry
and lagomorphs
47 43
Conducting cutting-sections of poultry meat
and / or lagomorphs
63 59
Sections leading poultry meat processing,
and / or lagomorphs
13 10
Adapted from: Integrated Multi-Annual Control Plan for the Polish; Annual Report 2009 under Regulation 882/2004 – Poland
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Table A5.180 Number of objects covered by the supervision of the State Sanitary Inspection in 2009.
Type of premises inspected Number
Food production facilities. 222,956
Food market facilities. 22,485
Transport food. 72,866
Catering establishments open. 33,368
Catering establishments closed type. 2451
Label objects and places of service marketing. 178,68
Adapted from: Integrated Multi-Annual Control Plan for the Polish; Annual Report 2009 under Regulation 882/2004 - Poland
A5.6.3.2 Animal health
The Polish annual report records the inspection of farms related to the presence of correct
identification and registration documentation. Identification and registration are core
components of the Polish plan to combat infection diseases of animals.
Table A5.181 Checks on the identification and registration, 2009
Controls at farm level Number
Cattle
Whole herds of registered premises on Polish
territory at the beginning of the reporting / review
713,697
Whole herds of cattle inspected premises 48,784
All checks made 49,409
Whole cattle registered in the Polish territory at
the beginning of the reporting / review
622,8185
Whole cattle herds visited the premises 875,743
Sheep and goats
All the seats in sheep and goats registered on
Polish territory at the beginning of the reporting /
control
17725
Whole herds of locations visited 647
All checks made 682
Whole pieces of sheep and goats registered on
Polish territory at the beginning of the reporting /
review
327491
Whole pieces of sheep and goats
inspected the premises in stocks
31956
Adapted from: Integrated Multi-Annual Control Plan for the Polish; Annual Report 2009 under Regulation 882/2004 - Poland
A5.6.3.3 Animal welfare Table A5.182 Animal welfare inspections at slaughterhouses by the Veterinary
Inspection , 2009
Administrative level Number of inspected
slaughterhouses
Number of checks
District level 1114 2,775
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Provincial level 139 141
Total 1,253 2,916
Adapted from: Integrated Multi-Annual Control Plan for the Polish; Annual Report 2009 under Regulation 882/2004 - Poland
A5.6.3.4 Animal feed
A5.6.3.5 Frequency of inspections at feed establishments by the Veterinary Inspection, 2009
Type of activity under scrutiny Frequency of periodic inspection
Category 1 rendering plant 1 time / month
Rendering plant categories 2 and 3 4 times / year
Intermediate plants 2 times / year
Incineration 2 times / year
Entities transporting service animal materials 1 time / year
Operators using by-products of animal origin
referred to in Article. 23 of Regulation 1774/2002
1 time / year
Entities engaged in the manufacture of pet food 2 times / year
Plants use a technical by-products of animal
origin
1 time / year
Operators using meat meal - bone as soil
improvers
after analyzing the risks, not less often than once
every two years
Operators using the processed animal protein in
the manufacture of animal feed for farm animals
Following the recommendations of the National
Programme for Control of Animal Nutrition
Entities nutrition collective (catering waste) 1 time / year with Sanitary Inspectorate after the
conclusion of the District Veterinary Officer of the
relevant agreement with the Inspectorate
Border Inspection Posts (BIP) One time / years
Slaughterhouses, cutting plants and processing
of red meat, white fish, eggs and dairy plants
2 times / year - carried out by inspectors' s food
hygiene
Adapted from: Integrated Multi-Annual Control Plan for the Polish; Annual Report 2009 under Regulation 882/2004 - Poland
*This is the minimum frequency; the actual frequency is determined by the local inspector based on a risk
assessment and their knowledge of the establishment.
Table A5.183 Number of feed businesses subject to official controls, and number of inspections performed, 2009
Type of feed industry Number of business
operators to feed
Number of entities subject
to official control
inspection.
Manufacturers of feed materials 24627 893
Storage of feed materials 79 38
Manufacturers of additives, and
premixes bioprotein
. .
Manufacturers of compound
feed
362 337
Manufacturers of medicated
feeds
53 43.
Importers and representatives 9. 4.
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of companies in third countries
Agents, distributors and
retailers
5884 4449
Livestock 506109 18857
Manufacturers of pet food 160 148
Other activities on feed 687 112
Total 538014 24925
Adapted from: Integrated Multi-Annual Control Plan for the Polish; Annual Report 2009 under Regulation 882/2004 – Poland
A5.6.3.6 Animal by-products
[Study team note: the report did not provide any relevant information]
A5.6.3.7 Live animals and live animal products
[Study team note: the report did not provide any relevant information]
A5.6.3.8 Meat and meat products
[Study team note: the report did not provide any relevant information]
A5.6.3.9 Imports
There are 12 border inspection posts in Poland.
Table A5.184 Number of points examined, at import, by veterinarians 2009
Type of check Number of items
Consignments of products 10,658
Inspection of consignments of animals 498
Shipments of animals under transit (including the
transit from the temporary storage in customs
warehouses)
1,655
Number of points examined by veterinarians
shipments made in 2009 under the reimportu.
98
Number of points examined by veterinarians
shipments in 2009. under the export procedure
5,506
Adapted from: Integrated Multi-Annual Control Plan for the Polish; Annual Report 2009 under Regulation 882/2004 - Poland
A5.6.3.10 Checks on hygiene of foodstuffs at food establishments other than those approved in accordance with Regulation 853/2004
[Study team note: the report did not provide any relevant information]
A5.6.3.11 Catering and non-industrial production
[Study team note: the report did not provide any relevant information]
A5.6.3.12 Fish, fish products and aquaculture
[Study team note: the report did not provide any relevant information]
A5.6.3.13 Dairy products, eggs and egg products
[Study team note: the report did not provide any relevant information]
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A5.6.4 United Kingdom
The annual report for the UK contains limited information about controls associated with the
meat sector; it does include information about the number of inspections of the dairy sector,
animal welfare and animal feed businesses. Information relevant to the controls listed in
Table 2.1 was used to create the tables below.
A5.6.5 Total control activity
Table A5.50 lists the number of Food Business Operators (FBO) subject to official controls in
the UK in 2009.
Table A5.185 Number of FBOs subject to official control in the UK, 2009
Business type Approximate number
Food businesses operators 600,000
Primary production holdings 195,000
Feed businesses 140,000 (including farms)
Adapted from: Single integrated national control plan for the United Kingdom January 2007 – 2011: Progress report in 2009 towards implementation – report for the European Commission
A5.6.5.2 Animal health
Animal Health is responsible for veterinary controls in the area of animal health in Great
Britain. The role is undertaken by DARD in Northern Ireland. Enforcement of legislation is
mainly the responsibility of local authorities.
Table A5.51 provide details of the Animal Health and DARD Veterinary Service inspections
carried out during 2009.
Table A5.186 Animal health inspections in Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 2009
Disease Number of inspections
Great Britain Northern Ireland
Bovine TB (surveillance herd
tests)
57,853 23,031
BSE 47 notifications
(no data on routine tests)
105,233
Scrapie 54 suspected cases
investigated with 2 day target
(no data on routine tests)
1,518
Salmonella 1,354 adult laying flocks
127 adult broiler flocks
259 breeding flocks
150 laying flocks
32 broiler flocks
Artificial insemination (bulls and
boars)
113 7 approved facilities, inspected
every 6 months
Animal by-products controls 6,734 (of 9,780 scheduled) 217
Brucella abortus in cattle - 23,135
Adapted from: Single integrated national control plan for the United Kingdom January 2007 – 2011: Progress report in 2009 towards implementation – report for the European Commission
A5.6.5.3 Animal welfare
[Study team note: the report did not provide any relevant information]
A5.6.5.4 Animal feed
There are approximately 140,000 feed businesses in the UK connected with the supply of
feeding stuffs for food producing animals. Table A5.52 breaks these businesses down by
type.
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Table A5.187 Registered and approved feed businesses in the UK, 2008
Type of feed business Number of businesses
Primary producers 111,000
Manufacturers and packers 1,277
Importers 55
Distributors / transporters 1,037
Adapted from: Single integrated national control plan for the United Kingdom January 2007 – 2011: Progress report in 2009 towards implementation – report for the European Commission
A5.6.5.5 Inspection of feed, including imported feed
Inspections of feed business operators’ premises are conducted on a frequency of between
12 to 36 months. The main objective of the inspections are to ensure the appropriate quality
of feeding stuffs containing veterinary medicinal products and specified feed additives has
been achieved.
Table A5.53 lists the controls undertaken by the Animal Medicine Inspectorate in 2009. This
includes physical inspection of premises and equipment and taking and analysis of feed
samples. Visits are classified as:
▪ Scheduled: those planned, based on the number of feed business operators and current
inspection frequencies.
▪ Special/follow-up: those approved feed business operators’ premises for enforcement
purposes or to check that non-compliances noted at a scheduled inspection have been
rectified.
▪ Other: those to non-approved feed business operators’ premises for enforcement
purposes e.g. the unlawful incorporation of veterinary medicinal products into feeding
stuffs.
Table A5.188 Summary of official controls undertaken by AMI, 2009
Control type Number
Scheduled inspections 552 (of a total of 498 planned)
Special / follow-up visits 19
Feed safety incident investigations 15
Samples 119
Adapted from: Single integrated national control plan for the United Kingdom January 2007 – 2011: Progress report in 2009 towards implementation – report for the European Commission
A5.6.5.6 Animal by-products
Compliance with the transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE)-related livestock feed
controls in Great Britain is monitored by Animal Health through the National Feed Audit
(NFA). In Northern Ireland, these controls are carried out by DARD.
The inspection programme is risk-based in accordance with Regulation (EC) No.882/2004.
The risk assessment establishes the level of visits needed to audit feed production and
handling standards throughout the feed supply chain. Feed samples are tested for
prohibited animal proteins. The number of inspections is provided in Table A5.54.
Table A5.189 Summary of 2009 inspection programme for controls of animal protein in animal feed in Great Britain
Stage Number of inspections comprising checks
on the presence of processed animal
proteins
Import of feed materials 30
Storage of feed materials 37
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Feed mills 580
Home mixers/mobile mixers 226
Intermediaries of feeding stuffs 21
Means of transport 25
Farms keeping non-ruminants 67
Farms keeping ruminants 693
Farms keeping both ruminants and non ruminants 858
Total 2537
Adapted from: Single integrated national control plan for the United Kingdom January 2007 – 2011: Progress report in 2009 towards implementation – report for the European Commission
A5.6.5.7 Live animals and live animal products
[Study team note: the report did not provide any relevant information]
A5.6.5.8 Meat and meat products
Internal Veterinary Auditors carried out routine audits in approved establishments in order
to assess and report on the effectiveness of arrangements and procedures
established by the Meat Hygiene Service (MHS) to ensure operator compliance with relevant
legislative requirements. The number and type of audits are listed in Table A5.55.
Table A5.190 Meat Hygiene Service audits of approved establishments in 2009
Audit Number of establishments
HACCP Follow up 17
Post-mortem inspection and collection and communication
of inspection results
24
Assessment of the implementation of the MHS enforcement
policy and procedures
20
New TSE rules for over-30 month and over-48 month bovines 21
Technical advice to support official and lead veterinarians 20
MHS Tuberculosis sampling and submission trials 5
Step 3 Changes to SRM controls 24
Adapted from: Single integrated national control plan for the United Kingdom January 2007 – 2011: Progress report in 2009 towards implementation – report for the European Commission
A5.6.5.9 Imports
[Study team note: the report did not provide any relevant information]
A5.6.5.10 Checks on hygiene of foodstuffs at food establishments other than those approved in accordance with Regulation 853/2004
[Study team note: the report did not provide any relevant information]
A5.6.5.11 Catering and non-industrial production
[Study team note: the report did not provide any relevant information]
A5.6.5.12 Fish, fish products and aquaculture
[Study team note: the report did not provide any relevant information]
A5.6.5.13 Dairy products, eggs and egg products
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Animal Health Dairy Hygiene (AHDH), on behalf of the Food Standards Agency (FSA), is
responsible for hygiene controls at milk production holdings in England and Wales.
Department of Agriculture and Rural Development for Northern Ireland Quality Assurance
Branch (DARD QAB) is responsible for milk hygiene controls on behalf of the FSA in
Northern Ireland and local authority food law enforcement services are responsible for
controls in Scotland.
During 2009 there were approximately 11,200 milk production holdings in England and
Wales, 3674 in Northern Ireland and 1,236 in Scotland. In Northern Ireland, DARD QAB,
on behalf of FSANI, is also responsible for hygiene controls at liquid milk processing
establishments, of which there were 10 in 2009.
The numbers of primary inspections and secondary inspections (to check on correction of
non-compliances) carried out in 2009 by AHDH, DARD and local authorities in Scotland
are given in Table A5.56.
Table A5.191 Summary of hygiene controls on milk production holdings in England Scotland and Wales, and liquid milk processing establishments in Northern Ireland, 2009
Primary inspections Secondary inspections
Milk production holdings
Animal Health and Dairy Hygiene 10,572 2218
Local Authorities in Scotland 275 78
Department of Agriculture and Rural
Development for Northern Ireland,
Quality Assurance Branch
3,383 1,769
Liquid milk processing establishments
Department of Agriculture and Rural
Development for Northern Ireland,
Quality Assurance Branch
4 21
Adapted from: Single integrated national control plan for the United Kingdom January 2007 – 2011: Progress report in 2009 towards implementation – report for the European Commission
Controls at egg production units are carried out on behalf of the FSA by the Egg Marketing
Inspectorate in England and Wales. In Scotland they are done by the Scottish
Government's Rural Payments and Inspections Directorate, and in Northern Ireland by
DARD QAB. The number of inspections in 2009 is listed in Table A5.57.
Table A5.192 Summary of hygiene controls at egg production holdings and egg packing establishments in Northern Ireland in 2009
Country Primary inspections Secondary inspections
England and Wales 611
(target for 2009, of 1,884
registered egg production
sites)
Scotland 28
(of 285 registered egg
production sites)
Northern Ireland 96 31
Adapted from: Single integrated national control plan for the United Kingdom January 2007 – 2011: Progress report in 2009 towards implementation – report for the European Commission
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Annex 6 Reporting cost estimates regarding financing of official controls
A6.1 Data from the survey
This Annex provides further detail on the methodology employed in order to develop a
Standard Cost Model (SCM) to measure the administrative burdens imposed on industry
through the legislative framework for official controls. The results of the SCM are shown in
Annex 1 and analysed in Section A1.1.7.
The data required in order to develop the SCM were collected through a combination of the
Competent Authority (CA) survey and analysis of data on official controls obtained directly
from Member State’s CAs.
The questionnaire asked CAs:
1. On average, what is the average staff cost per hour for those individuals involved in
reporting related to the annual report that is based on Art.44 of the Regulation (i.e. in the
context of the multi-annual national control plans mentioned in Art.41)? Please:
a. Include salary costs, other personnel costs (e.g. pension contributions) and
apportioned overhead costs; and
b. Provide a single figure where possible, averaged across staff roles (e.g.
management, technical, administration). If this is not possible, please distinguish
between staff roles, and indicate the nature of the role (e.g. management).
2. On average, what would be the incremental cost of extending the scope of reporting to
include information regarding the financial resources devoted to official controls each
year? (i.e. reporting through the annual report that is based on Art.44 of the Regulation.
Please indicate:
a. Total staff time required to complete the report; and
b. External costs associated with compiling the report.
3. On average, what would be the cost of making public information on fees, modalities of
payment and other administrative procedures for the official controls for which your
authority is responsible? Please indicate:
a. The total staff time required to make the information public; and
b. External costs associated with making the information public.
The questions asked in the survey were designed to collect data on CA staff costs of data
collection and monitoring related to control activity. Most of the CAs that completed the
surveys, however, did not provide this information. Out of 14 completed CA surveys
returned, only six provided information on staff costs, and only two of these provided
estimates of the incremental costs to report to the Commission on resources devoted to
official controls. Table A6.1 contains the cost information received from CAs through the
survey.
Table A6.193 Data for the SCM obtained through the survey
CA Response
Q1 Q2 Q3
Federal Agency for the Safety of
the Food Chain (FASFC) (BE)
€64.74 / hour Staff time: 836
hours
External costs: 0
Staff time: 836
hours
External costs: 0
Bulgarian Food Safety Agency
(BG)
€1.86 / employee /
hour
n/a n/a
SG Sanidad Exterior (MSPSI);
SG Acuerdos Sanitarios y
Control en Frontera (MARM)
(ES)
€20.42 / hour n/a n/a
Finnish Food Safety Authority
(Evira)
€42 / hour Staff time: 4 FTE
External costs:
€500,000
n/a
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State Food and Veterinary
Service of Republic of Lithuania
(LT)
€3.31 / hour n/a n/a
Department of Agriculture and
Rural Development (DARD) (UK)
OV slaughter:
€42.41 / hour
OA slaughter:
€24.69 / hour
n/a n/a
Direction générale de
l’alimentation (DGAI) – Ministère
chargé de l’agriculture
€29.50/hour n/a n/a
Source: Survey of CAs conducted as part of this study.
A6.1.2 Data from the UK
In addition to the time and cost information obtained through the survey, the UK CA (the
Food Standards Agency) provided a detailed response setting out the implications of
extending the scope of reporting (Q2 above). The FSA provide a baseline (based on current
costs) and three alternative scenarios for controls undertaken by local authorities. Two of
these scenarios include a description of the cost implications of different levels of data
collection, while the third describes potential costs but does not provide an estimate.
Baseline: Current costs of reporting (not incremental).
The FSA currently undergoes work to collate information for its annual accounts. For meat
specifically, this takes approximately 10 working days; split between a Senior Executive
Officer and a Grade 7 equivalent. Using wage rates from the ONS survey control guidance
(Table A6.2), the cost of the 10 working days is estimated to be between approximately
£2,700 and £3,500, including overheads. A range of costs is presented as the FSA does not
have accurate evidence as to exactly how the time is split.
If these figures were required in more detail, in a format different to how they are currently
collected, considerably more time would be required.
Scenario 1: Provision of total resource estimates for the UK as a whole, with no subdivisions.
The FSA estimated that producing the necessary figures for 2009-10 took approximately 5
days. This includes only the costs of collating the information; it does not include any time
for preparing a report. In addition, the 5 days does not include time for putting the
information in a standard format to report to the EU or the public.
The average cost of the time spent analysing and collating the necessary data is estimated
using wage rates from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) Survey control unit guidance.
The estimated split of time is approximately 2 days of a middle manager’s time and 3 days of
a junior manager’s time. Based on the hourly rates of both106
(Table A6.2), the total cost of
extending the scope of reporting to include information regarding the financial resources
devoted to official controls each year would be around £1,500.
Scenario 2: Precise figures of costs based on a flat rate per local authority.
If charges were implemented on a flat rate basis, the local authorities would not be required
to provide any additional information than is currently available. This would lead to no, or at
least limited, incremental costs at the local level.
Under this scenario costs are calculated using the same DCLG data as in Scenario 1, but
supplemented by LEAMS FTE and inspection figures. The FSA estimate that some
additional analysis would be required; it would take approximately 6 days of FSA analyst
time. This would result in a cost to the FSA of approximately £1,600 (Table A6.2).
106 The hourly rates are based on civil service “full economic” pay rates and up-rates each year based on the
Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings inflation rate (ASHE). http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/product.asp?vlnk=13101
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As per Scenario 1, this cost does not include any time required to put the information into a
standard format for the EU or the public. This would require more time than scenario 1 as
the reporting would need to be at a local authority level.
Table A6.194 Civil service ‘full economic’ pay rates in 2010 / 2011
Civil service
grade /
position
FSA grade /
position107
Hourly
wage rate
(£)
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Time
(days)
Cost (£) Time
(days)
Cost (£)
Director Director 91.24
Senior
manager
Grade 5 70.96
Middle
manager
Grade 7 48.99 2 685
Junior
manager
Higher /
Senior
Executive
Officer
37.18 3 780 6 1,606
Clerical Executive
Officer 23.63
Total 1,465 1,606
Source: Provided by the FSA as part of their contribution to the CA questionnaire.
The FSA outlined several caveats and limitations related to these calculations:
▪ DCLG figures are only available for food hygiene and for England. UK and food
standard figures would be estimated by scaling up based on FTEs.
▪ The calculation is based on definitions of food safety expenditure made by DCLG. If
there were precise rules about what to include when calculating costs (and these rules
required significantly different information from what was included by DCLG) it would
require a lot of additional work, for example additional reporting from over 400 local
authorities.
▪ The information currently held by DCLG on sales, fees and charges also includes other
income; precise details of charges to Food Business Operators (FBOs) are not currently
available. Precise figures for charges would require a lot of additional work, including
additional reporting from local authorities.
▪ The number of visits, premises and FTEs only relates to visits reported through LEAMS.
The costs may also include other food safety work undertaken by local authorities.
▪ The ability to provide information about the resources devoted to official controls
assumes that DCLG continues to produce food safety costs and that local authorities
continue to report through LEAMS.
Scenario 3: Precise figures of cost based on actual time spent on each business.
Collecting precise data on costs, based on actual time spent on each FBO, would require:
▪ Enforcement officers, trading standards officers, and administrative staff at local
authorities recording time spent on each visit.
▪ The development of an IT system to capture this information at each local authority and
then report to the FSA.
▪ A large overhead at the FSA to produce reports.
This would all be new activity. Costs are unknown, but they are expected to be
considerable.
107 The allocation of FSA grades across the five civil service positions is an assumption.
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A6.1.3 Data from Finland The Finnish CA (Evira) stated that it would cost €500,000 and 4 FTEs to collect and submit information about the resources spent by CAs in the execution of official control activities. During interview, Evira stated that the €500,000 represents an initial investment to set up an IT system capable of collecting the necessary data at a local (municipal) level. Once the system was up and running, they estimated that it would require 4 FTEs on an ongoing basis. Both the Finnish and UK official control systems are highly decentralised. It is reasonable to assume that the cost of Scenario 3 above for the UK may be similar to Finland’s estimate.
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Annex 7 Participants in the consultation
A7.1 Summary of responses received
At the time of writing, the research team had received 39 completed questionnaires. 11 responses were received from Competent Authorities in the
Member States and one was submitted by a Competent Authority in an Associated Country (Norway). The evaluators received 27 responses from trade
associations and other representative groups, of which one was an international organisation, 9 operated at the EU level and the remaining 17 were
national level associations. Respondents have also completed 29 options scorecards (Table A1). Tables A2 to A5 list all respondents by respondent type
(Competent Authorities and trade associations) and level of operation (international, EU level and national). Four respondents did not submit responses
to questionnaires, but presented written notes or comments. Where interviews have been conducted, these are indicated.
Table A7.195 Breakdown of responses received by questionnaire type
Questionnaire type Number of responses
received
Competent Authority Questionnaire 12
Other Stakeholders Questionnaire (for trade
associations and other representative groups)
27
Options Scorecard 29
Table A7.196 Competent Authority respondents
Respondent MS Interview Questionnaire returned Scorecard
returned
Written
comments
Imports only
Bulgarian Food Safety Agency BG
SG Sanidad Exterior (MSPSI); SG Acuerdos
Sanitarios y Control en Frontera (MARM)
ES N/A
Association of Finnish Local and Regional
Authorities (representing Municipal local
Authorities)
FI
Finnish Food Safety Authority Evira FI Scheduled
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Respondent MS Interview Questionnaire returned Scorecard
returned
Written
comments
Imports only
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Finland FI
Agence nationale de sécurité sanitaire (ANSES) FR Anticipated Anticipated Anticipated
Institut de Veille Sanitaire FR N/A Anticipated Anticipated
Ministère de l'Agriculture, de l'Alimentation, de la
Pêche, de la Ruralité et de l'Aménagement du
territoire
FR Anticipated Anticipated Anticipated
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food IE
Ministry of Health – Department for Veterinary
Public Health, Nutrition and Food Safety
IT
State Food and Veterinary Service of Republic of
Lithuania
LT
VWA Voedsel en Waren Autoriteit (Food and
Consumer Product Safety Authority)
NL
Agricultural and Food Quality Inspection
Authority*
PL
Norwegian Food Safety Authority NO**
Swedish National Food Administration (HC) and
Swedish Board of Agriculture (NHC)
SE
Department of Agriculture and Rural
Development, Northern Ireland (DARDNI)
UK
*Response sent to questionnaire for trade associations and other representative groups
**Associated country of the European Union (not a Member State)
Table A7.197 International Industry Associations and Other Stakeholder responses
Respondent Interview Questionnai
re returned
Scorecard
returned
Written
comments
Imports
only
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The Grain and Feed Trade
Association (GAFTA)
Table A7.198 EU-level Industry Associations and Other Stakeholder responses
Respondent Interview Questionnai
re returned
Scorecard
returned
Written
comments
AVEC
AIPCE-CEP Anticipated Anticipated* Anticipated*
CELCAA N/A Anticipated Anticipated
CES/ETUC N/A Anticipated Anticipated
CIAA N/A Anticipated* Anticipated*
CLITRAVI
Confederation of the Food
and Drink Industries of the
EU (CIAA)
COPA-COGECA
European Dairy Association
(EDA)
European Federation of the
Trade in Dried Fruit, Edible
Nuts, Processed Fruit &
Vegetables,
Processed Fishery Products,
Spices, Honey and Similar
Foodstuffs (FRUCOM)
EuroGroup for Animals
European Feed
Manufacturers’ Federation
(FEFAC)
Federation of Veterinarians of
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Respondent Interview Questionnai
re returned
Scorecard
returned
Written
comments
Europe (FVE) – UEVH
FEDIAF Anticipated Anticipated Anticipated
FESASS N/A Anticipated Anticipated
Nutreco
UEAPME N/A Anticipated Anticipated
UGAL Anticipated Anticipated Anticipated
*Questionnaire has been circulated to the association members. GHK may receive a direct response from the organisation.
Table A7.199 National Industry Associations and Other Stakeholder responses
Respondent MS Interview Questionnai
re returned
Scorecard
returned
Written
comments
Federal Association of
Food and Agricultural
Trades
AT
Eurogroup for Animals BE
Febev BE
Metro Group DE
Verband der
Fleischwirtschaft e. V.
DE
Dansk Erhverv
(Danish Chamber of
Commerce)
DK
Danske Slagterier,
S.A. (Danish Bacon &
Meat Council)
DK
SEEDYZ –
Association of Greek
EL
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Respondent MS Interview Questionnai
re returned
Scorecard
returned
Written
comments
Traders and Exporters
of Grain and Animal
Feed and Byproducts
ANAFRIC-GREMSA ES
Association Laitiere
Francaise (ALF)
FR N/A Anticipated Anticipated
Association Nationale
des Industries
Alimentaires (ANIA)
FR Anticipated Anticipated Anticipated
Confédération
Française de la
Boucherie Charcutiers
et Traiteurs (CFBCT)
FR Anticipated Anticipated Anticipated
Confédération
Nationale des
Charcutiers-Traiteurs
de France (CNCT)
FR N/A Anticipated Anticipated
Fédération des
Industries Avicoles
(FIA)
FR Anticipated Anticipated Anticipated
Fédération Nationale
de l'Industrie et des
Commerces en Gros
des Viandes
(FNICGV)
FR Anticipated Anticipated
Syndicat national des
inspecteurs en santé
publique vétérinaire
(SNISPV)
FR
Finnish Food and
Drink Industries'
Federation
FI
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Respondent MS Interview Questionnai
re returned
Scorecard
returned
Written
comments
Finnish Veterinary
Association
FI
Kesko Food Ltd. FI
Dutch Meat
Association (COV)
NL
Productboard for
Horticulture
NL
Frugi Venta NL
Agricultural Industries
Confederation (AIC)
UK
Association of
Independent Meat
Suppliers (AIMS)
UK
British Meat
Processors
Association
UK
Chartered Institute of
Environmental Health
UK
Food Solutions UK
NFU Scotland UK
Veterinary Public
Health Association
(VPHA)
UK
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Annex 8 References
▪ Lepistö, O., Nevas, M. and Hänninen, M. 2010. Application of EU Legislation Concerning Food
Control Fees in Finland. Archiv für Lebensmittelhygiene, Vol. 61(5) pp.189-194.
▪ FVO, 2007. Final Country Profile of Poland; on food and feed safety, animal health, animal welfare
and plant health. European Commission, Directorate General for Health and Consumers, Food
and Veterinary Office.
▪ FCEC, 2008. Study on fees or charges collected by the Member States to cover the costs
occasioned by official controls. Final report. Part two: case studies. Food Chain Evaluation
Consortium. European Commission, Directorate General for Health and Consumers.