preliminary hazard analysis groundwater treatment …
TRANSCRIPT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
GROUNDWATER TREATMENT PLANT
ORICA AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
BOTANY INDUSTRIAL PARK, NSW
Prepared by: Dean Shewring
8 November 2004
Pinnacle Risk Management Pty LimitedABN 83 098 666 703
PO Box 5024 Elanora HeightsNSW Australia 2101
Telephone: (02) 9913 7284Facsimile: (02) 9913 7930
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Disclaimer
This report was prepared by Pinnacle Risk Management Pty Limited (PinnacleRisk Management) as an account of work for Orica Australia Pty Ltd (Orica).The material in it reflects Pinnacle Risk Management’s best judgement in thelight of the information available to it at the time of preparation. However, asPinnacle Risk Management cannot control the conditions under which thisreport may be used, Pinnacle Risk Management will not be responsible fordamages of any nature resulting from use of or reliance upon this report.Pinnacle Risk Management’s responsibility for advice given is subject to theterms of engagement with Orica.
Preliminary Hazard Analysis,Groundwater Treatment Plant, Orica
Australia Pty Ltd, Botany Industrial Park
Rev Date Description Reviewed By
A 5/7/04 Draft for Comment Orica
B 4/10/04 Orica Comments Included Orica
C 8/10/04 Draft EIS Issue Orica
D 18/10/04 Revised Orica
E 28/10/04 Revised Orica
F 8/11/04 Revised Orica
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CONTENTS
CONTENTS ............................................................................................................II
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................................................ I
GLOSSARY............................................................................................................II
1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 1
1.1 Background ..................................................................................... 1
1.2 Objectives ........................................................................................ 1
1.3 Scope................................................................................................ 2
1.4 Methodology .................................................................................... 3
1.5 Findings and Recommendations ................................................... 3
2 SITE DESCRIPTION......................................................................................... 5
3 PROCESS DESCRIPTION ................................................................................. 9
3.1 Background to the Groundwater Contamination.......................... 9
3.2 Plant Description........................................................................... 10
3.3 Groundwater Composition ........................................................... 14
3.4 SEPP 33 Evaluation Information .................................................. 15
4 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION.............................................................................. 17
4.1 Hazardous Materials...................................................................... 17
4.2 Potential Hazardous Incidents ..................................................... 20
4.3 Safety Management Systems ....................................................... 32
4.3.1 Safety Software in Risk Assessment ............................................... 35
5 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS............................................................................ 37
5.1 Scenarios Modelled....................................................................... 40
5.2 Release Sources............................................................................ 40
5.3 Release Rates ................................................................................ 40
5.4 Release Duration ........................................................................... 41
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5.5 Meteorological Data ...................................................................... 41
5.6 Terrain Effects and Degree of Confinement................................ 41
5.7 Consequence Results ................................................................... 42
5.7.1 Pipes or Vessels Failures Leading to Gas Plumes.......................... 42
5.7.2 Recovered Waste EDC Liquid Isotainer Events .............................. 46
5.7.3 Natural Gas Line Failures................................................................ 51
5.7.4 Thermal Oxidiser Explosion............................................................. 53
5.7.5 Caustic Scrubber Failure ................................................................. 54
5.7.6 Thermal Oxidiser Feed / Product Exchanger Failure....................... 55
5.8 Calculation of Fatality Due to Fires, Explosions and ToxicReleases................................................................................................... 55
6 FREQUENCY / LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS............................................................ 57
6.1 Generic Equipment Failure Frequencies..................................... 57
6.2 BLEVE Likelihood.......................................................................... 58
6.3 Thermal Oxidiser Internal Explosion Likelihood ........................ 58
6.4 Caustic Scrubber Failure Likelihood ........................................... 58
6.5 Domino Incidents .......................................................................... 59
7 RISK ANALYSIS ........................................................................................... 61
7.1 Risk Criteria ................................................................................... 61
7.2 Mitigating Features for Off-site Individuals................................. 62
7.3 Risk Results................................................................................... 62
7.3.1 Individual Fatality Risk..................................................................... 62
7.3.2 Injury Risk........................................................................................ 62
7.3.3 Irritation Risk ................................................................................... 63
7.3.4 Property Damage ............................................................................ 64
7.3.5 Cumulative Risk............................................................................... 64
7.4 Transport Risk ............................................................................... 65
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7.5 Risk from Combustion Products.................................................. 65
8 RISK TO THE BIOPHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT..................................................... 67
8.1 Escape of Materials to Atmosphere............................................. 67
8.1.1 HCl and Chlorine ............................................................................. 67
8.1.2 Dioxins............................................................................................. 67
8.2 Escape of Materials To Soil, Waterways or Sewerage System.. 70
9 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS......................................................... 73
10 REFERENCES .............................................................................................. 74
LIST OF FIGURESFigure 1 – BIP Site............................................................................................ 7
Figure 2 – GTP Layout ..................................................................................... 8
Figure 3 – Proposed Groundwater Extraction Well Locations ................... 11
LIST OF TABLESTable 1 – Plants on the BIP Site......................................................................... 5
Table 2 – Material Summary – SEPP 33.......................................................... 15
Table 3 – Health Information for some of the Groundwater Contaminants....... 18
Table 4 – Hazard Identification Word Diagram................................................. 22
Table 5 - Summary of Safety Related Procedures ........................................... 34
Table 6 – GTP Neighbouring Industries ........................................................... 38
Table 7 – EFFECTS Release Cases................................................................ 39
Table 8 – Scenarios Modelled .......................................................................... 40
Table 9 – Thermal Oxidiser Feed Stream, Dispersion Modelling ..................... 43
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Table 10 – Thermal Oxidiser Exit Stream, Dispersion Modelling...................... 46
Table 11 - Radiant Heat Impact........................................................................ 48
Table 12 – Layout Considerations – Tolerable Radiant Heat Levels................ 49
Table 13 – Radiant Heat vs Distance – Pool Fire Scenarios............................ 49
Table 14 – Large Recovered Waste EDC liquid Pool (9 m diameter), DispersionModelling .......................................................................................................... 50
Table 15 –Natural Gas Jet Fires....................................................................... 51
Table 16 – Effects of Explosion Overpressure ................................................. 52
Table 17 – Natural Gas Vapour Cloud Explosions and Flash Fires.................. 53
Table 18 – Distance to Specified Levels of Explosion Overpressure for PotentialInternal Thermal Oxidiser Explosion Scenario.................................................. 54
Table 19 - Generic Equipment Failure Frequencies ......................................... 57
Table 20 - Risk Criteria, New Plants................................................................. 61
Table 21 – Fire Plume Rise Modelling.............................................................. 66
Table 22 – Water Discharge Hazard Identification Word Diagram ................... 71
LIST OF APPENDICESAppendix 1 – GTP Process Flow Diagrams.
Appendix 2 – Typical Groundwater Composition.
Appendix 3 – Selected MSDS’s.
Appendix 4 – Description of EFFECTS
Appendix 5 – Meteorological Data
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Orica Australia Pty Ltd (Orica) at the Botany Industrial Park (BIP) is proposingto build a Groundwater Treatment Plant (GTP). Some of the groundwater atand around the BIP is contaminated with chlorinated hydrocarbons (CHCs).The primary contaminant is ethylene dichloride (EDC or 1,2 dichloroethane). Itis proposed to pump contaminated groundwater to the BIP and treat thegroundwater at the proposed GTP on the BIP. The GTP will be designed toremove and destroy the CHCs such that all emissions and wastes from theplant will comply with the EPA requirements.
To assess the risk associated with the GTP and associated operations, apreliminary hazard analysis (PHA) has been performed. This report details theresults from the analysis.
The risk associated with the proposed GTP and associated operations at theBIP has been assessed and compared against the DIPNR (Department ofInfrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources) risk criteria.
The results of this PHA show that the risk associated with the proposed GTPcomplies with DIPNR guidelines for tolerable fatality, injury, irritation andsocietal risk. Also, transport risk, risks to biophysical environment, the risk ofpropagation and the impact on cumulative risk in the Port Botany / Randwickarea from releases from the GTP and associated operations are broadlyacceptable. These conclusions apply to both off-site (e.g. residential areas) andon-site (i.e. neighbouring industrial facilities) risk.
The primary reason for the low risk levels is that significant consequentialimpacts from potential hazardous events associated with the GTP andassociated operations do not reach the nearest site boundary or, for theneighbouring industrial facilities, their likelihood is acceptably low.
As with most PHA’s, limited detailed design information is currently available.Correspondingly, some of the analysis in this report is based on assumedconditions. The assumptions made in this analysis are to be reviewedthroughout the project design stage and updated in the Final Hazard Analysis.Therefore, no specific recommendations are made.
It is assumed that the GTP and associated operations will be reviewed via theHAZOP methodology.
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GLOSSARY
AS Australian Standard
BIP Botany Industrial Park
BLEVE Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion
CHC Chlorinated hydrocarbon
CTC Carbon tetrachloride
DG Dangerous Goods
DIPNR Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources
DNAPL Dense non-aqueous phase liquids
DTL Dangerous toxic load
EDC Ethylene dichloride
EPA Environmental Protection Authority
ERPG Emergency Response Planning Guideline
FHA Final hazard analysis
FTA Fault tree analysis
GTP Groundwater Treatment Plant
HAZOP Hazard and operability study
HCB Hexachlorobenzene
HCl Hydrochloric acid
HIPAP Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper
IDLH Immediately dangerous to life and health
LEL Lower explosion limit
ML megalitres (or 1,000,000 litres)
MSDS Material safety data sheet
NCUA Notice of Cleanup Action
ORP Oxidation reduction potential
PCA Primary containment area
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PHA Preliminary hazard analysis
PIC Products of incomplete combustion
P&ID Piping and instrumentation drawing
PCE Tetrachloroethene
ppb Parts per billion (e.g. 0.001 mg/kg)
ppm Parts per million (e.g. 1 mg/kg)
PPE Personnel protective equipment
QRA Quantitative risk assessment
RO Reverse osmosis
SCA Secondary containment area
scm Standard cubic metres (corrected to 15°C and 1 atmosphere pressure)
SEPP State Environmental Planning Policy
SHE Safety, health and environment
SIF Safety Instrumented Function
SIL Safety Integrity Level
SLOT Specified level of toxicity
SSU Steam stripping unit
STEL Short term exposure limit
TCE Trichloroethene
TNO Dutch organisation specialising in risk software
UVCE Unconfined vapour cloud explosion
VC Vinyl chloride
VOC Volatile organic carbons
VRA Voluntary Remediation Agreement
WHB Waste heat boiler
wt weight
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REPORT
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
Orica Australia Pty Ltd (Orica) at the Botany Industrial Park (BIP) is proposingto build a Groundwater Treatment Plant (GTP). Some of the groundwater atand around the BIP is contaminated with chlorinated hydrocarbons (CHCs).The primary contaminant is ethylene dichloride (EDC or 1,2 dichloroethane). Itis proposed to pump contaminated groundwater to the BIP and treat thegroundwater at the proposed GTP on the BIP. The GTP will be designed toremove and destroy the CHCs such that all emissions and wastes from theplant will comply with the EPA requirements.
The groundwater to be treated is to be pumped from three locations:
From the Primary Containment Area (Blocks 1 and 2 of Southlands, tothe south west of the BIP);
From the Secondary Containment Area down gradient of the PrimaryContainment Area, along Foreshore Road; and
From the DNAPL (dense non-aqueous phase liquids) containment linealong the western perimeter of the BIP.
As part of the Environmental Impact Statement for this project, a preliminaryhazard analysis (PHA) is required in accordance with the guidelines publishedby the Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources (DIPNR)NSW Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper (HIPAP) No 6 (Ref 1). Theneed for a PHA to be prepared was found by application of SEPP 33 (Ref 2), aprocess for evaluating whether proposed developments will be potentiallyhazardous and hence whether some form of hazard analysis is required. Asummary of the SEPP 33 determination information is included in Section 3.4 ofthis report. The requirement for a SEPP 33 analysis was part of the Director-General’s Requirements for the EIS (Ref 3).
Orica has appointed Pinnacle Risk Management Pty Ltd (Pinnacle RiskManagement) to prepare this preliminary hazard analysis report.
1.2 OBJECTIVES
The main aims of this PHA study are to:
Address the Director-General’s requirements for the PHA;
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Identify the credible, potential hazardous events associated with theproposed GTP and associated operations;
Evaluate the level of risk associated with the identified potentialhazardous events from the GTP and associated operations tosurrounding land users, including other BIP companies and theiroperations, and compare the calculated risk levels with the risk criteriapublished by DIPNR in HIPAP No 4 (Ref 4);
Review the adequacy of the existing safeguards; and
Where necessary, submit recommendations to Orica to ensure that theproposed GTP and associated operations are operated and maintainedat acceptable levels of safety and effective safety management systemsare used.
1.3 SCOPE
This PHA assesses the credible, potential hazardous events and correspondingrisks associated with the GTP and associated operations.
The assessment includes:
The GTP process operations;
Material storage;
Pumping and transport of groundwater through pipelines to the GTP;
Pumping and transport of treated water through pipelines from the GTP;
Road transport of recovered waste EDC liquid from storage at theTerminals Pty Ltd facility at Port Botany; and
Pumping and transport of salty waste water (water treatment byproduct)via an existing unused pipeline from the GTP to a stormwater channeldischarging to Brotherson Dock.
It does not include any aspects of the storage and handling of recovered wasteEDC liquid at the Terminals Pty Ltd facility at Port Botany, as this facility isowned by a third party and covered by its own planning approvals, whichinclude storage and handling of waste chlorinated hydrocarbons such as therecovered waste EDC liquid.
As with most PHA’s, limited detailed design information is currently available.Correspondingly, some of the analysis in this report is based on assumedconditions. The assumptions made in this analysis are to be reviewedthroughout the project design stage and updated in the Final Hazard Analysis.
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1.4 METHODOLOGY
In accordance with the approach recommended by DIPNR in HIPAP 6 (Ref 1)the underlying methodology of the PHA is risk-based, that is, the risk of aparticular potentially hazardous event is assessed as the outcome of itsconsequences and likelihood.
The PHA has been conducted as follows:
The design and location of the GTP and associated operations werereviewed to identify credible, potential hazardous events;
The frequency and consequence of each significant potential hazardousevent were estimated;
The risk results have been quantified by combining the frequency andconsequence for each event and summing to give total (cumulative) riskas appropriate; and
The risks associated with the facility are compared to the criteria inHIPAP 4 (Ref 4).
1.5 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The results of this PHA show that the risk associated with the proposed GTPand associated operations complies with DIPNR guidelines for tolerable fatality,injury, irritation and societal risk. Also, transport risk, risks to biophysicalenvironment, the risk of propagation and the impact on cumulative risk in thePort Botany / Randwick area from releases are broadly acceptable. Theseconclusions apply to both off-site (e.g. residential areas) and on-site (i.e.neighbouring industrial facilities) risk.
The primary reason for the low risk levels is that significant consequentialimpacts from potential hazardous events associated with the GTP operation donot reach the nearest site boundary or, for the neighbouring industrial facilities,their likelihood is acceptably low.
The significant hazardous events identified and quantitatively analysed are:
Pipes or vessels failures leading to gas plumes;
Recovered waste EDC liquid Isotainer events, e.g. BLEVE and toxicimpact from plumes emanating from large pools;
Natural gas line failures;
Thermal oxidiser explosion; and
Caustic scrubber failure.
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As with most PHA’s, limited detailed design information is currently available.Correspondingly, some of the analysis in this report is based on assumedconditions. The assumptions made in this analysis are to be reviewedthroughout the project design stage and updated in the Final Hazard Analysis.Therefore, no specific recommendations are made.
It is assumed that the GTP and associated operations will be reviewed via theHAZOP methodology.
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2 SITE DESCRIPTION
A map of the area showing the location of the Botany Industrial Park site andthe GTP in the context of its surroundings is presented in Figure 1.
The BIP site is bounded to the north by Corish Circle, the east by Denison St,the south by Beauchamp Rd and to the west by the Botany Goods railway lineeasement. The land around most of the BIP site perimeter is zoned commercialand industrial. The exception is land adjacent to part of the eastern boundary ofthe site, which has significant residential areas along Denison Street, andbeyond. The nearest public road to the proposed GTP is Denison St, adistance of approximately 325 m.
There have been some changes relating to ownership of the various chemicalplants operating on the BIP site. The BIP land was wholly owned by Orica(previously ICI Australia) until late 1998, when changes resulting in the sale ofsome Orica plants or formation of joint venture companies occurred. The sitewas subsequently subdivided (in 1999) to form the Botany Industrial Park (BIP).There are now six main industrial complexes on the site, operated by threedifferent companies, Orica, Qenos (a joint venture between Orica and ExxonMobil) and Huntsman as shown in Table 1 below.
Table 1 – Plants on the BIP Site
Plant Operator Description
Olefines Qenos Manufactures ethylene from ethane feedstock foruse in downstream plants
Alkathene Qenos Manufactures high density polyethylene plastics
Alkatuff Qenos Manufactures low density polyethylene plastics
Site Utilities Qenos Supplies steam, nitrogen, cooling water etc. tovarious plants at the site
Surfactants Huntsman Manufactures a range of materials such asdetergents etc largely based on ethylene oxide
Chlorine andDerivatives
Orica Manufactures chlorine, hydrochloric acid, causticsoda, ferric chloride and sodium hypochlorite
The location of the GTP is on Orica land on the plot formerly occupied by theSilicates Plant on 10th Avenue - see Figure 2 for details of the plant layout. Asthe GTP is part of the Orica ChlorAlkali facility, there are in effect twoboundaries to consider in this PHA. The first is the boundary with neighbouringindustrial land users, the nearest being the other (non-Orica) BIP sitecompanies, referred to as on-site. The second is the boundary with theresidential land users external to the BIP site, referred to as off-site.
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Where associated operations required for the GTP Project such as wells,pipelines and road transport are located outside the BIP, then the relevantboundaries for risk assessment are the land users adjacent to, and nearby,these operations.
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Figure 1 – BIP Site
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Figure 2 – GTP Layout
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3 PROCESS DESCRIPTION
3.1 BACKGROUND TO THE GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION
From Ref 5, ICI Australia (now Orica) manufactured chlorinated hydrocarbons(CHCs) at its Botany Site from approximately 1945 to 1994. A range ofchlorinated solvents including carbon tetrachloride (CTC), tetrachloroethene(known as PCE) and trichlorethene (TCE) were produced until 1991. Theirmanufacturing processes involved other chlorinated hydrocarbon intermediates.Ethylene dichloride (EDC) was produced from 1966 to 1994 as an intermediatefor production of vinyl chloride monomer, subsequently polymerised to poly vinylchloride (PVC).
Leaks of chlorinated materials may have occurred over the years fromproduction, waste storages, effluent systems and other underground lines, drumstorage areas (once stored on unbunded bare ground) and storage tanksystems.
The Botany Industrial Park is constructed on the Botany Sands Aquifer, whichprovided the original potable water supply for Sydney and has been usedextensively as a source of industrial water. The Botany Industrial Park islocated close to Botany Bay, where the Botany Sands Aquifer discharges to thesea. There are peaty layers in the sands, with a general layer present at 8 to10m below ground surface (bgs) that divides what are referred to as the shallowand deep aquifers.
The chlorinated solvents are all heavier than water and thus sink ingroundwater. They are all only slightly soluble in water and as pure or mixedliquids are referred to as Dense Non-Aqueous Phase Liquids (DNAPL). DNAPLwill slowly dissolve and sink until they reach less permeable layers where theymay form pools and/or move following the topography of the low permeabilitylayer.
Some material will, however, remain trapped within soil pore spaces due tocapillary and surface tension effects; this form of DNAPL is termed "residualDNAPL". Groundwater flows through and past the DNAPL source zones, slowlydissolving CHCs into dissolved contaminant plumes. The CHCs from thedissolved plume can then sorb to soil as they move with groundwater. There isa wide variety of properties of the CHCs (key parameters include watersolubility, volatility, density, surface tension, soil adsorption) and aquifercharacteristics (permeability, geology, groundwater velocity etc) that affect themovement of contaminants in groundwater.
The CHCs are in general toxic chemicals to human health. In particular, EDC isone of the most soluble and least absorptive of the CHCs; it dissolves andmoves rapidly in groundwater compared with lower solubility, highly absorptivematerials such as PCE, TCE and CTC.
Orica has been investigating the groundwater issues since 1989 under variousregulatory regimes (most recently a Voluntary Remediation Agreement (VRA)
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under the Contaminated Land Management Act). Under the VRA, Orica’sproposed remediation approach is the widespread application of in situenhanced bioremediation and reactive iron barriers where bioremediation is notapplicable. Accordingly Orica are currently implementing field trials ofbioremediation and are progressing studies on reactive iron barrier installation.Should bioremediation trials prove ineffective, Orica's fallback was hydrauliccontainment and ex situ treatment.
Recent detection of higher than expected concentrations in an extraction boreclose to residential locations, combined with concerns about the rate ofmovement of the most concentrated contaminant plume, led to issue of a Noticeof Cleanup Action (NCUA) by the NSW EPA, (now part of the Department ofEnvironment and Conservation, DEC). As required, Orica has produced aGroundwater Cleanup Plan (GCP) for the EPA's consideration. The EPAsubsequently authorised Orica to implement the GCP.
The NCUA requires hydraulic containment and remediation of the extractedgroundwater, including the use of ex situ treatment technology. Orica’sbioremediation trials have proved less successful than hoped, and hydrauliccontainment and ex situ treatment is being used for all contaminant containmentduties.
3.2 PLANT DESCRIPTION
From Ref 6, the three areas from which the groundwater will be extracted are asfollows:
From the Primary Containment Area (PCA - Blocks 1 and 2 ofSouthlands, to the south west of the BIP);
From the Secondary Containment Area (SCA) down gradient of thePrimary Containment Area, along Foreshore Road; and
From the DNAPL (dense non-aqueous phase liquids) containment linealong the western perimeter of the BIP.
The locations of these three areas are shown in Figure 3.
The GTP will be designed to treat groundwater from all three extraction areasas a common feed.
Due to time constraints imposed on the GCP by the NCUA, some groundwaterwill be extracted and treated prior to the operation of the GTP. Thisgroundwater will be sourced either from the PCA, the SCA or a combination ofboth. The groundwater will be treated by the recommissioned Steam StrippingUnit (SSU) located on BIP. It is proposed that pipelines will be constructed totransfer the groundwater from Southlands and Foreshore Road to the SSU fortreatment.
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Figure 3 – Proposed Groundwater Extraction Well Locations
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Treated water from the SSU will be discharged to sewer and/or re-used on theBIP, while the recovered waste EDC liquid will be transported to Port Botanyand stored in existing tanks. Once the GTP is operational, this recovered wasteEDC liquid will be transported to the GTP site in Isotainers, for destruction in theGTP thermal oxidiser.
The GTP is being designed to treat 15 ML/day. The plant life will depend on therate of cleanup of the contaminated groundwater and source areas. At thisstage, the plant is expected to operate for up to 30 years.
Process flow diagrams showing the main items of equipment for the GTP andassociated operations are given in Appendix 1.
Feed Handling
Groundwater will be pumped via submersible pumps in bores and connectingpipework from the containment areas as noted above to a groundwater feedtank on the GTP plot. The pressure in the feed tank will be atmospheric.Hydrochloric acid (recovered from the GTP – refer to Air Treatment below) isdosed into the feed tank to reduce the pH to approximately 2.7. This reducesthe chance of fouling in the air strippers.
The feed tank is nitrogen padded to reduce the risk of explosions.
The acidified water is then pumped to the air stripping section.
Stored recovered waste EDC liquid will be transported by road in an Isotainerfrom Port Botany to the GTP. The expected average delivery frequency isapproximately once every two weeks. Recovered waste EDC liquid will beinjected at a low rate into the thermal oxidiser (see below).
Air Stripping
The air strippers are modular design tray towers specifically designed for easycleaning in fouling service. Air stripping is performed by drawing ambienttemperature air up through a falling column of water, transferring almost all thevolatile chlorinated hydrocarbons such as EDC from the water to the air. Thewater and air are then treated separately.
The air stripper is designed to achieve a very low EDC concentration of< 0.003 mg/L in the stripped water bottoms.
Components which are less volatile than EDC will be present in the strippedwater. These consist mainly of phenol and chlorinated phenols with a totalconcentration of approximately 200 ppb. Of these, some components (e.g.phenol) are present in excess of their identified removal target values and sorequire further treatment.
The stripped water is pumped to activated carbon adsorber beds which "polish"(remove) almost all the remaining hydrocarbons, so achieving treated water tothe required standards (see below).
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Air Treatment
Contaminated air from the air strippers is drawn by an induced draught fan to athermal oxidation unit where the stream is heated to a high temperature in thepresence of air to break down the contaminants to form carbon dioxide, watervapour, hydrochloric acid and chlorine.
Initially, the air from the air strippers is preheated by heat exchange with thethermal oxidation unit’s product gas stream. Further heating is provided byburning natural gas within the thermal oxidation unit, as well as heat releasedfrom the contaminant destruction. This heat input maintains the correcttemperatures for the oxidation process to work. Recovered waste EDC liquidwill be injected directly into the thermal oxidiser at low rates using a speciallydesigned nozzle that will atomise the liquid to ensure effective destruction. Therecovered waste EDC liquid will be added once the contaminant load in thegroundwater falls with time, so that the total EDC load on the thermal oxidiserdoes not exceed the original design value.
Thermal oxidation operates at a relatively high temperature (approx 1,000°C) toensure effective destruction of chlorinated hydrocarbons (>99.99%).
The product gas stream from the thermal oxidation unit is cooled in a wasteheat boiler (i.e. steam is raised) and then by heat exchange with the incomingair stream. After this heat exchanger, the product stream is quenched withweak hydrochloric acid (HCl) solution (5 wt%) to approximately 70oC. Thequenched stream then passes through the acid absorber where the hydrogenchloride (HCl) generated in the thermal oxidiser is recovered as a 5 wt% HClsolution. The recovered hydrochloric acid (5 wt%) will be used in the feedhandling unit for acidification of the feed.
The air stream then continues to the caustic scrubber for further treatment toremove other acid gases and chlorine to meet emission specifications. Air exitsthe plant via a 20 m high stack at about 67°C. The scrubber feed (46 wt%caustic soda solution) is pumped from the existing ChlorAlkali plant. Sodiummetabisulphite is also added to reduce the level of free chlorine in the scrubbereffluent.
Water Treatment
Stripped water from the air strippers is treated with caustic soda solution toraise the pH to approximately 8 to precipitate iron compounds. These will beremoved using a filter, dewatered and sent to landfill.
Filtered water from the iron removal stage passes through an ion exchangesystem to remove organic acids, an activated carbon filter to remove phenol,organochlorides and other residual matter not removed in the air stripper andthen through a breakpoint chlorination unit to reduce ammonia levels.
A portion of this water will then enter a Reverse Osmosis (RO) unit. The ROunit will remove dissolved solids (salts), producing water to the quality
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standards required. Treated water from the RO unit is recycled to the absorberor scrubber, or exits the GTP for distribution to users.
Treated Water Reuse
Treated water discharged from the GTP will be processed to meet the requiredstandards for re-use on BIP process plants and other industrial users in theBotany area. Initially, this water will be distributed throughout the BIP for use asprocess water, for example, as cooling tower make-up water and feed to thedemineralisation plant for steam generation. The treated water will first bedischarged to a buffer tank on the GTP site to allow approximately 2 hoursresidence time before distribution throughout BIP.
Most of the treated water will be consumed by process operations around theBIP. As additional users of recycled water are found, the flow to the RO plantwill increase to its full capacity of 15ML/d. Until that time, the balance of thewater not required for polishing by the RO unit for re-use will be discharged withthe salty waste water stream through an existing pipeline to an existing channelwhich discharges into Botany Bay at Brotherson Dock. The pipeline will beupgraded with an internal ‘plastic sleeve’ to minimise corrosion.
In the event that process operations on BIP and other users cannot use all theavailable treated water from the GTP, the unused treated water will bedischarged to Botany Bay via the above pipeline. Other potential uses for thetreated water are being investigated.
Operation
The GTP and most of the associated operations will be controlled by anautomated monitoring and control system in a dedicated control room. In theevent of an abnormal condition being detected, the plant will be automaticallyshut down, isolating all feeds and stopping all discharges. The GTP andassociated operations will be designed to be a robust and effective process,and the technical design specification includes a 95% availability with maximummaintenance shut-down period of a week, to ensure that control of thegroundwater movement and associated plume of EDC is maintained.
When groundwater treatment is no longer required, the plant will be shut-downand decommissioned.
3.3 GROUNDWATER COMPOSITION
A typical groundwater composition to the GTP is shown in Appendix 2. As canbe seen from this data:
EDC is the primary contaminant;
The concentration of the bulk of the contaminants is relatively low; and
The total concentration of contaminants is less than 1%.
This information confirms current site practice when dealing with thegroundwater via excavation work etc, i.e. releases of the groundwater will only
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impact those personnel near the point of release as the concentrations of thecontaminants are not high enough to generate modest to high concentrationplumes in the atmosphere. This was also a finding from the PHA conducted onthe steam stripping unit operation (Ref 7).
3.4 SEPP 33 EVALUATION INFORMATION
SEPP 33 (Ref 2) requires a summary of the potentially hazardous materials forthe proposed development to be compiled and evaluated. This materialsummary is shown in Table 2. Some non-hazardous materials are included forinformation.
Table 2 – Material Summary – SEPP 33
Material Class Quantity ExceedsSEPP 33Criterion
?
Location
5 wt% hydrochloric acid Corrosive - 8(PG II)
40 m3 Yes On the GTP plot
46 wt% caustic soda Corrosive - 8(PG II)
30 m3 Yes On the GTP plot
Recovered waste EDCliquid (Isotainer)
FlammableLiquid - 3 (Toxic
- 6.1) (PG II)
20 m3 Yes (toxiccriterion)
On the GTP plot
Groundwater - 15 ML/day NA Piped to and onthe GTP plot
Natural Gas Flammable gas- 2.1
Negligible No In piping to thethermal oxidiseronly
Nitrogen Non-flammable,non toxic gas -
2.2
Negligible NA In piping
Sodium metabisulphite(33 wt%)
Corrosive - 8 4.5 m3 No On the GTP plot
Sodium hypochlorite Corrosive - 8 5 m3 No On the GTP plot
Various water treatmentchemicals
Corrosive - 8 Low No On the GTP plotand/or broughton-site forequipmentcleaning and thenremoved
Flocculant - 6 m3 NA On the GTP plot
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Material Class Quantity ExceedsSEPP 33Criterion
?
Location
Salty waste water - Negligible NA Pipeline fromGTP toBrotherson Dock
Steam - Minor NA On the GTP plot
Given the above information, the GTP and its associated operations isconsidered a potentially hazardous facility by the SEPP 33 process andtherefore a PHA is required.
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4 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
4.1 HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
Groundwater
The following MSDS’s (material safety datasheets) are given in Appendix 3:
Southlands groundwater;
Southlands groundwater – Central Plume;
GTP groundwater;
Recovered waste EDC liquid; and
EDC (the main contaminant).
The bulk of the groundwater is water; greater than 99 wt%.
Depending on the source of the groundwater:
EDC is less than 0.02%;
Trichloroethene (TCE) is less than 0.001%;
Carbon tetrachloride (CTC) is less than 0.002%;
Tetrachloroethene (PCE) is less than 0.002%; and
Vinyl chloride (VC or VCM – vinyl chloride monomer) is less than0.001%.
Some groundwater contaminants may cause cancer. Groundwater is notcombustible although some of the components in the pure form are flammable,e.g. EDC and VC.
Table 3 lists some of the exposure levels for the common groundwatercontaminants.
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Table 3 – Health Information for some of the Groundwater Contaminants
Component ShortTerm
ExposureLevel
(STEL),ppm
IDLH(ppm)
ERPG 1(ppm)
ERPG 2(ppm)
ERPG 3(ppm)
EDC - 50 50 200 300
TCE 200 1,000 100 500 5000
CTC 10 200 20 100 750
PCE 150 150 100 200 1000
VC - - 50 5,000 20,000
Chloroform - 500 notappropriate
50 5,000
Notes for Table 3: - = not recorded due to insufficient data
IDLH = Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health
The American Industrial Hygiene Association's Emergency Response PlanningGuidelines (Ref 8) provide data on "injury" toxic exposure levels for a fewindustrial chemicals for exposure periods of one hour. Three sub-fatal toxicexposure levels are defined by the American Industrial Hygiene Association(AIHA). The definitions are as follows.
Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPGs) are values intended toprovide estimates of concentration ranges above which one could reasonablyanticipate observing adverse health effects; see ERPG-1; ERPG-2; ERPG-3.The term also refers to the documentation that summarises the basis for thosevalues. The documentation is contained in a series of guides produced by theEmergency Response Planning Committee of the American Industrial HygieneAssociation (Ref 8).
ERPG-1: The maximum airborne concentration below which nearly allindividuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencingmore than mild, transient adverse health effects or withoutperceiving a clearly defined objectionable odour.
ERPG-2: The maximum airborne concentration below which nearly allindividuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencingor developing irreversible or other serious health effects orsymptoms that could impair an individual's ability to takeprotective action.
ERPG-3: The maximum airborne concentration below which nearly allindividuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencingor developing life-threatening health effects.
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In terms of effects, the ERPG-1 and ERPG-2 definitions seem to approach mostclosely the "Irritation" and "Injury" guidelines suggested by DIPNR, howeverwith a 1 hour rather than “relatively short exposure period”. The use of thesevalues for this PHA are considered conservative as the release durations will berelatively short (see Section 5.4).
Whilst EDC is present in the groundwater, it is also present in the recoveredwaste EDC liquid stored in the Isotainer that is loaded at Port Botany. Thecomposition of this liquid is expected to typically be:
Component Percentage by mass
EDC 95.1Vinyl Chloride 1.6Water 0.3Benzene 0.1Other CHCs balance
Note that the flammability limits for EDC are 6.2 to 16 vol%.
Hydrogen Chloride
Hydrogen chloride is produced in the thermal oxidation unit and is present in theexit stream to the acid absorber. Hydrogen chloride is a corrosive gas whichcan impact people, property and the environment. The health impact data forhydrogen chloride is as follows:
ERPG 1 3 ppm
ERPG 2 20 ppm
ERPG 3 150 ppm
IDLH 50 ppm
Note that chlorine is also present in the thermal oxidiser off-gas but only atconcentrations much lower than hydrogen chloride.
Natural Gas
The thermal oxidation unit burns natural gas for additional heat input. This gasis the same as is used in domestic situations, e.g. household water heaters andstoves. Natural gas is a flammable gas. It is not toxic. Releases of natural gascan lead to fires and/or explosions if ignition occurs.
Corrosives
The two bulk corrosive fluids proposed to be handled and/or stored at the GTPare hydrochloric acid (5 wt%) and caustic soda (sodium hydroxide; 46 wt%).Also stored at the GTP and used are sodium metabisulphite solution (used as areducing agent in the caustic scrubber, 4.5m3 storage as 33% solution, 18 te as100% annual consumption) and sodium hypochlorite solution (for ammonia
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removal, 5m3 storage as 12% solution, 220 te as 100% annual consumption).Other minor quantities of corrosive materials may be stored on a permanent ortemporary basis to enable cleaning and maintenance of GTP equipment,especially the equipment in the treated water plant area. These are not yetspecified in detail.
Releases of these materials can affect those who are exposed to the liquidand/or vapour above the liquid, as well as affect the environment if allowed toflow to soil and/or waterways.
Nitrogen
Nitrogen is non-toxic (it is the major constituent of air) but it presents the hazardof asphyxiation to those on-site personnel who may enter a tank which containsnitrogen or a reduced oxygen content due to dilution by nitrogen.
Oxides of Sulphur and Nitrogen
Oxides of sulphur and nitrogen (SOx and NOx) are formed in small quantities inthe thermal oxidation unit. The impact of normal release of these materials isanalysed separately in the project EIS.
Salty Waste Water
This is the waste stream produced as part of the water treatment process. Itcontains the chlorides removed from the main treated water stream in order tomeet the specifications for supply of treated water to other users. It is not aDangerous Good or a Hazardous Material.
Steam
Medium pressure (around 1000kPag) steam is produced in the waste heatboiler which is part of the thermal oxidation unit. Its hazards of hightemperature and pressure could have local effects only.
4.2 POTENTIAL HAZARDOUS INCIDENTS
In accordance with the requirements of Guidelines for Hazard Analysis, (ref 1),it is necessary to identify hazardous events which could be caused by the GTPand associated operations. As recommended in HIPAP 6, the PHA focuses on“atypical and abnormal events and conditions. It is not intended to apply tocontinuous or normal operating emissions to air or water”. The latter arediscussed elsewhere in the EIS.
Potential hazardous events for the GTP have been identified by the followingmeans:
Hazard studies involving design and operating personnel;
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Operational experience;
Literature reviews;
Checklists; and
Historical incident reviews.
In keeping with the principles of PHAs, credible, hazardous events with thepotential for off-site effects have been identified. That is, “slips, trips and falls”type events are not included nor are non-credible situations such as an aircraftcrash occurring at the same time as an earthquake.
Where abnormal events are assessed as having potentially chronic effects,these are discussed elsewhere in the EIS. As stated above in accordance withthe required methodology, the PHA itself only discusses acute effects.
The large majority of the specific release scenarios are generic equipmentfailures, e.g. failures of vessels, pipes etc, from previous industrial events.These are supplemented by process incidents due to other abnormal modes ofoperation, control system failure and human error.
The credible, significant incidents identified are summarised in the HazardIdentification Word Diagram following (Table 4). The diagram presents thecauses and consequences of the events, together with major preventative andprotective features that are included as part of the design.
A column showing which scenarios are included in the quantified riskcalculations is included in the hazard identification table. Only the events withthe potential for significant consequences have been included in the quantifiedrisk assessment described in subsequent sections of the report (i.e. “yes” infinal column of Table 4).
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Tabl
e 4
– H
azar
d Id
entif
icat
ion
Wor
d D
iagr
am
Item
No.
Even
tC
ause
sPo
ssib
le C
onse
quen
ces
Prev
entio
n/Pr
otec
tion
Ris
kQ
uant
ified
?
1.
Rel
ease
of
vapo
urs
from
the
grou
ndw
ater
feed
tank
vap
our
spac
e
Indu
ced
drau
ght f
an s
huts
dow
n so
can
't dr
aw ta
nkov
erhe
ad v
apou
rs (t
anks
are
not p
ress
uris
ed)
Chl
orin
ated
hyd
roca
rbon
vap
our
from
sto
rage
tank
s es
cape
s to
atm
osph
ere
Loca
l im
pact
onl
y
No
haza
rdou
s co
nseq
uenc
es to
adja
cent
indu
stria
l or r
esid
entia
lar
eas
Filli
ng o
f the
gro
undw
ater
feed
tank
tobe
sto
pped
dur
ing
a sh
utdo
wn
Vap
ours
to b
e ve
nted
aw
ay fr
omop
erat
iona
l sta
ff. T
he fe
ed ta
nk w
illve
nt to
the
ther
mal
oxi
dise
r or b
e“b
oxed
in” i
f the
ther
mal
oxi
dise
r is
unav
aila
ble.
If th
ere
is a
larg
ete
mpe
ratu
re c
hang
e in
the
feed
tank
,so
me
vapo
ur m
ay b
e di
scha
rged
to a
sepa
rate
, act
ivat
ed c
arbo
n, v
apou
rco
llect
ion
syst
em. S
pent
car
bon
wou
ldbe
rege
nera
ted
or s
ent t
o ap
prov
eddi
spos
al.
No
2.
Dis
char
ge o
fav
aila
ble
chlo
rine
e.g.
sodi
umhy
poch
lorit
e(N
aOC
l) or
chlo
rine
(Cl 2)
Dis
char
ge fr
om c
aust
icsc
rubb
ing
tow
er (n
orm
al d
esig
nco
nditi
on)
The
disc
harg
e st
ream
join
s th
em
ixed
site
effl
uent
The
pote
ntia
l exi
sts
for r
eact
ions
tooc
cur i
n th
e m
ixed
effl
uent
from
site
(e.g
. chl
orof
orm
cou
ld b
e pr
oduc
ed)
and
henc
e di
scha
rge
limits
may
be
exce
eded
No
haza
rdou
s co
nseq
uenc
es to
adja
cent
indu
stria
l or r
esid
entia
lar
eas
Des
ign
of a
cid
abso
rber
and
cau
stic
scru
bber
sys
tem
to a
void
exc
essi
vefo
rmat
ion
of a
vaila
ble
chlo
rine.
Are
duci
ng a
gent
(sod
ium
met
abis
ulph
ite)
will
be
adde
d to
the
caus
tic s
crub
ber
Mon
itorin
g of
dis
char
ge a
nd s
iteef
fluen
t stre
ams
No
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Item
No.
Even
tC
ause
sPo
ssib
le C
onse
quen
ces
Prev
entio
n/Pr
otec
tion
Ris
kQ
uant
ified
?
3.
Non
-com
plia
nce
with
Syd
ney
Wat
ersu
spen
ded
solid
ssp
ecifi
catio
n
Bac
kwas
h of
san
d fil
ters
will
caus
e hi
gher
sus
pend
ed s
olid
sflo
ws
to p
lant
effl
uent
Sus
pend
ed s
olid
s le
vels
indi
scha
rge
vary
dep
endi
ng o
nba
ckw
ash
met
hods
, fre
quen
cyet
c
Exc
eed
perm
itted
leve
ls in
BIP
site
efflu
ent
No
haza
rdou
s co
nseq
uenc
es to
adja
cent
indu
stria
l or r
esid
entia
lar
eas
Sys
tem
to b
e de
sign
ed to
ens
ure
com
plia
nce
Mon
itorin
g of
dis
char
ge a
nd s
iteef
fluen
t stre
ams
No
4.
Emis
sion
s of
diox
in fr
om th
eth
erm
al o
xidi
ser
Ther
mal
oxi
dise
r doe
s no
tpe
rform
to s
peci
ficat
ion
unde
ral
l req
uire
d co
nditi
ons
Dio
xins
may
be
prod
uced
with
impa
ct to
peo
ple
and
faun
a
Chr
onic
impa
ct
Con
trol a
nd M
onito
ring
Sys
tem
will
shu
tdo
wn
the
plan
t und
er a
bnor
mal
cond
ition
s, i.
e. s
top
the
air s
tripp
er a
ndsh
ut d
own
the
feed
to th
e th
erm
alox
idis
er. R
egul
ar te
stin
g w
ill oc
cur t
opr
ove
good
ope
ratio
n
Yes
–ch
roni
cef
fect
sas
sess
ed in
hum
anhe
alth
risk
asse
ssm
ent
5.
Fire
or e
xplo
sion
from
ele
ctric
alfa
ults
Elec
tric
mot
ors
on fa
ns a
ndpu
mp
Pla
nt d
amag
e; p
ossi
ble
igni
tion
ofan
y fla
mm
able
vap
ours
Loca
l im
pact
onl
y
No
haza
rdou
s co
nseq
uenc
es to
adja
cent
indu
stria
l or r
esid
entia
lar
eas
Det
erm
ine
haza
rds
and
desi
gn to
the
appr
opria
te e
lect
rical
sta
ndar
dsN
o
Pinn
acle
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Item
No.
Even
tC
ause
sPo
ssib
le C
onse
quen
ces
Prev
entio
n/Pr
otec
tion
Ris
kQ
uant
ified
?
6.
Loss
of
cont
ainm
ent o
fgr
ound
wat
erfro
m th
e fe
edta
nk o
rco
nnec
ting
pipi
ng
Leve
l con
trol f
ailu
re le
adin
g to
an o
verfi
ll
Wat
er h
amm
er
Tank
or p
ipe
failu
res
Dra
in v
alve
s le
ft op
en
Rel
ease
of g
roun
dwat
er
Loca
l im
pact
onl
y
No
haza
rdou
s co
nseq
uenc
es to
adja
cent
indu
stria
l or r
esid
entia
lar
eas
Pre
vent
ativ
e m
aint
enan
ce o
fin
stru
men
tatio
n an
d ta
nk
App
ropr
iate
mat
eria
ls o
f con
stru
ctio
nfo
r the
tank
and
pip
ing
Bun
d fo
r con
tain
ing
any
spills
Slo
w c
losi
ng v
alve
s to
avo
id w
ater
ham
mer
Pro
cedu
res
and
oper
ator
trai
ning
No
7.
Aci
d ta
nk fa
ilsU
ndilu
ted
hydr
ochl
oric
aci
d(H
Cl)
adde
d in
to ta
nk w
ithin
suffi
cien
t wat
er
Aci
d sp
lash
es o
n ex
pose
d ta
nkco
mpo
nent
s ca
usin
g se
vere
corro
sion
Tank
dam
age;
tank
fails
Loca
l im
pact
onl
y
No
haza
rdou
s co
nseq
uenc
es to
adja
cent
indu
stria
l or r
esid
entia
lar
eas
Inte
rlock
s on
aci
d pu
mp
Bun
d fo
r con
tain
ing
any
spills
No
8.
Sam
pled
mat
eria
ls m
ayco
ntai
n ac
ids
and
chlo
rinat
edhy
droc
arbo
ns
Loss
of c
onta
inm
ent d
urin
gsa
mpl
ing
Hea
lth e
ffect
s on
ope
rato
rs
Cor
rosi
ve m
ater
ials
dam
age
drai
nsor
nea
rby
stru
ctur
es/e
quip
men
t
Loca
l im
pact
onl
y
No
haza
rdou
s co
nseq
uenc
es to
adja
cent
indu
stria
l or r
esid
entia
lar
eas
Des
ign
of s
ampl
ing
poin
ts to
min
imis
eth
e lik
elih
ood
of lo
sses
of c
onta
inm
ent
Com
plia
nce
with
Wor
kpla
ce H
azar
dous
Sub
stan
ces
cont
rols
PPE
Firs
t-aid
, eye
was
h, s
afet
y sh
ower
s
No
9.
Pip
ing
from
the
strip
per t
o th
eth
erm
al o
xidi
ser
fails
Pip
es c
an fa
il du
e to
a n
umbe
rof
reas
ons,
e.g
. des
ign
and
man
ufac
turin
g er
rors
, cor
rosi
onan
d im
pact
Loss
of c
onta
inm
ent o
f air
stre
amco
ntai
ning
the
grou
ndw
ater
impu
ritie
s. P
oten
tial t
o im
pact
peop
le a
nd th
e en
viro
nmen
t
Des
ign
and
prev
enta
tive
mai
nten
ance
proc
edur
es
Pip
e pr
otec
tion
from
traf
fic e
tc
Yes
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No.
Even
tC
ause
sPo
ssib
le C
onse
quen
ces
Prev
entio
n/Pr
otec
tion
Ris
kQ
uant
ified
?
10.
N
atur
al g
as je
tfir
e im
ping
ing
onst
ored
reco
vere
dw
aste
ED
Cliq
uid,
oth
erpl
ant a
nd/o
rpe
ople
Rup
ture
of n
atur
al g
as li
ne o
rle
ak fr
om v
alve
s w
hich
isig
nite
d
Fire
; pos
sibl
e B
LEV
E, o
f the
reco
vere
d w
aste
ED
C li
quid
Isot
aine
r; pl
ant d
amag
e, in
jury
tope
ople
, env
ironm
enta
l im
pact
s
Des
ign
and
mai
nten
ance
pro
cedu
res
for t
he n
atur
al g
as s
uppl
y lin
e
Fire
pro
tect
ion
equi
pmen
t for
emer
genc
y re
spon
se
Isol
atio
n of
the
natu
ral g
as li
ne a
t the
plan
t bat
tery
lim
it
Yes
11.
N
atur
al g
assu
pply
line
failu
re
Mec
hani
cal i
mpa
ct
Cor
rosi
on
Wel
d de
fect
Gas
ket l
eak
Rel
ease
of n
atur
al g
as to
atm
osph
ere
- fire
, UVC
E if
igni
ted
EIV
(em
erge
ncy
isol
atio
n va
lve)
on
feed
line
to p
lant
plu
s m
anua
l iso
latio
ns
Des
ign
and
prev
enta
tive
mai
nten
ance
proc
edur
es fo
r the
nat
ural
gas
sup
ply
line
Fire
pro
tect
ion
equi
pmen
t for
emer
genc
y re
spon
se
Yes
12.
G
as b
urne
rm
anag
emen
tsy
stem
fails
unsa
fely
Non
-com
plia
nce
with
gas
supp
lier r
equi
rem
ents
Com
pone
nt fa
ilure
s
Exp
losi
on in
side
the
ther
mal
oxi
dise
r
Fata
litie
s or
inju
ries
to o
pera
tors
;pl
ant d
amag
e
The
ther
mal
oxi
dise
r bur
ner
man
agem
ent s
yste
m is
to c
ompl
y w
ithth
e A
GL
requ
irem
ents
Yes
13.
Th
e th
erm
alox
idis
er d
oes
not o
pera
teco
rrect
ly
Bur
ner p
robl
ems,
poo
r gas
qual
ity, b
urne
r man
agem
ent
syst
em fa
ulty
, air
flow
prob
lem
s, fe
ed fl
ow p
robl
ems
Off
gas
is n
ot in
spe
cific
atio
n
Pot
entia
l chr
onic
and
acu
te e
ffect
son
peo
ple
and
the
envi
ronm
ent
Stri
ppin
g sh
ould
not
occ
ur if
the
ther
mal
oxi
dise
r is
not o
pera
ting
corre
ctly
, e.g
. cor
rect
tem
pera
ture
or
fan
stop
ped.
Ala
rms
and
trips
are
prop
osed
to b
e us
ed to
avo
id in
corr
ect
oper
atio
n
Yes
–ch
roni
cef
fect
sas
sess
ed in
hum
anhe
alth
risk
asse
ssm
ent
Pinn
acle
Ris
k M
anag
emen
t
Oric
a G
TP
PH
A R
epor
t Rev
F.D
oc8
Nov
embe
r 20
0426
Item
No.
Even
tC
ause
sPo
ssib
le C
onse
quen
ces
Prev
entio
n/Pr
otec
tion
Ris
kQ
uant
ified
?
14.
P
lant
wat
erdi
scha
rges
not
in c
ompl
ianc
ew
ith E
PA
licen
ces
Inad
equa
te w
ater
was
te s
tream
mon
itorin
gW
ater
dis
char
ges
are
not i
nsp
ecifi
catio
n; E
PA is
sues
No
haza
rdou
s co
nseq
uenc
es to
adja
cent
indu
stria
l or r
esid
entia
lar
eas
Ala
rms
and
trips
are
pro
pose
d to
be
used
to a
void
inco
rrect
ope
ratio
nN
o
15.
U
ndet
ecte
dre
leas
e of
ED
Cet
c fro
m s
tack
Hol
e in
ther
mal
oxi
dise
r fee
d /
prod
uct h
eat e
xcha
nger
allo
win
g un
treat
ed v
apou
r int
oth
e th
erm
al o
xidi
ser e
xhau
st
Noz
zle
re-in
ject
ing
reco
vere
dw
aste
ED
C li
quid
mal
func
tions
and
reco
vere
d w
aste
ED
Cliq
uid
is n
ot fu
lly a
tom
ised
Env
ironm
enta
l im
pact
Effe
ct o
n pe
ople
If no
zzle
mal
func
tions
, lar
ger t
han
desi
gn li
quid
ED
C d
ropl
ets
will
ent
erth
e th
erm
al o
xidi
ser
Onl
ine
stac
k m
onito
ring
of E
DC
Noz
zle
is s
elf-c
lean
ing.
Noz
zle
back
pre
ssur
e w
ill be
mon
itore
dto
che
ck fo
r nor
mal
ope
ratio
n. R
egul
arvi
sual
obs
erva
tion
and
rout
ine
mai
nten
ance
Any
unb
urnt
ED
C w
ill be
con
dens
edpo
st th
e qu
ench
uni
t and
ther
efor
e no
tre
leas
ed to
atm
osph
ere.
The
cond
ense
d E
DC
will
be
pres
ent i
n th
eac
id a
bsor
ber a
nd c
aust
ic s
crub
ber
blee
d st
ream
s w
hich
are
man
ually
and
auto
mat
ical
ly m
onito
red
Yes
–ch
roni
cef
fect
sas
sess
ed in
hum
anhe
alth
risk
asse
ssm
ent
16.
In
adeq
uate
scru
bbin
gC
ircul
atio
n pu
mp
failu
re
Floo
ding
of a
bsor
ber o
rsc
rubb
er
Inad
equa
te le
vel o
f circ
ulat
ing
abso
rben
t che
mic
als
Loss
of l
iqui
d fro
m a
bsor
ber o
rsc
rubb
er
Atm
osph
eric
em
issi
ons
toen
viro
nmen
t exc
eed
licen
cere
quire
men
ts
Env
ironm
enta
l im
pact
, effe
ct o
npe
ople
Pla
nt s
hutd
own
due
to a
larm
s an
d tri
pson
the
abso
rbin
g an
d sc
rubb
ing
tow
ers,
e.g.
diff
eren
tial p
ress
ure
for f
lood
ing,
corre
ct re
flux
flow
rate
s, p
ump
oper
atio
n, s
ump
leve
l, ci
rcul
atin
g liq
uid
com
posi
tion
Onl
ine
HC
l mea
sure
men
t
Yes
Pinn
acle
Ris
k M
anag
emen
t
Oric
a G
TP
PH
A R
epor
t Rev
F.D
oc8
Nov
embe
r 20
0427
Item
No.
Even
tC
ause
sPo
ssib
le C
onse
quen
ces
Prev
entio
n/Pr
otec
tion
Ris
kQ
uant
ified
?
17.
Fa
ilure
of
abso
rber
Inad
equa
te o
pera
tion
ofqu
ench
resu
lting
in h
igh
tem
pera
ture
exi
t gas
to th
e ac
idab
sorb
er
Hig
h te
mpe
ratu
re le
ads
to fa
ilure
of
the
acid
abs
orbe
r res
ultin
g in
rele
ase
of to
xic
gase
s
Trip
pro
tect
ion
for q
uenc
h fa
ilure
Yes
18.
Lo
ss o
fco
ntai
nmen
tfro
m th
ere
cove
red
was
teE
DC
liqu
idst
orag
e or
deliv
ery
syst
emto
ther
mal
oxid
iser
Mec
hani
cal f
ailu
res
Hum
an e
rror
Bun
d fir
e if
igni
ted
lead
ing
to d
amag
eto
the
grou
ndw
ater
trea
tmen
t pla
nt,
inju
ry to
peo
ple,
toxi
c co
mbu
stio
npr
oduc
ts.
BLE
VE
of t
he Is
otai
ner i
sa
poss
ibili
ty
Isot
aine
rs a
re o
f rob
ust d
esig
n an
d ar
eus
ed fo
r tra
nspo
rting
milli
ons
of to
nnes
of D
ange
rous
Goo
ds e
ach
day
thro
ugho
ut th
e w
orld
Haz
ardo
us a
rea
desi
gn a
ndpr
ecau
tions
Fire
figh
ting
equi
pmen
t and
pro
cedu
res
Loca
tion
is a
dequ
atel
y pr
otec
ted
from
vehi
cle
impa
ct
Slo
ped
bund
floo
r (dr
ain
liqui
d aw
ayfro
m th
e Is
otai
ner)
Yes
19.
C
orro
sion
of
pipe
fitti
ngs
Wet
reco
vere
d w
aste
ED
Cliq
uid
hydr
olys
es in
sto
rage
,cr
eatin
g ac
idic
chl
orid
es
Cor
rosi
on o
f pip
es e
tc re
sults
inle
aks
or d
amag
e to
pla
nt o
r Iso
tain
erA
ppro
pria
te m
ater
ials
of c
onst
ruct
ion
Spi
ll co
ntai
nmen
tY
es –
par
tof
Item
No.
18
20.
B
LEV
EP
ool f
ire in
bun
d en
gulfs
reco
vere
d w
aste
ED
C li
quid
Isot
aine
r
Tran
spor
t tru
ck fi
re
Fire
ball
Pos
sibl
e fa
talit
ies
and
dam
age
tosu
rrou
ndin
g ar
ea
As
per I
tem
No.
18
Yes
Pinn
acle
Ris
k M
anag
emen
t
Oric
a G
TP
PH
A R
epor
t Rev
F.D
oc8
Nov
embe
r 20
0428
Item
No.
Even
tC
ause
sPo
ssib
le C
onse
quen
ces
Prev
entio
n/Pr
otec
tion
Ris
kQ
uant
ified
?
21.
E
xpos
ure
toch
lorin
ated
hydr
ocar
bon
mix
ture
in th
ere
cove
red
was
teE
DC
liqu
idIs
otai
ner
Rec
over
ed w
aste
ED
C li
quid
cont
aini
ng V
C le
aks
from
hos
ew
hen
disc
onne
cted
from
Isot
aine
r
Per
sonn
el in
jury
from
toxi
c fu
mes
;pr
olon
ged
/ fre
quen
t exp
osur
e co
uld
caus
e ch
roni
c pr
oble
ms,
e.g
. can
cer,
from
VC
Loca
l im
pact
s on
ly
No
haza
rdou
s co
nseq
uenc
es to
adja
cent
indu
stria
l or r
esid
entia
lar
eas
Com
plia
nce
with
Wor
kpla
ce H
azar
dous
Sub
stan
ces
cont
rols
Cor
rect
PPE
Cor
rect
pro
cedu
res
and
mai
nten
ance
Firs
t Aid
Dry
bre
ak c
oupl
ing
to b
e pr
ovid
ed a
tho
se c
onne
ctio
n fro
m Is
otai
ner t
oun
load
ing
pum
p
No
22.
S
tore
d sp
ent
carb
on s
tore
dca
tche
s fir
e
Spe
nt c
arbo
n be
com
espy
roph
oric
Pla
nt d
amag
e; to
xic
fum
es
Loca
l im
pact
onl
y
No
haza
rdou
s co
nseq
uenc
es to
adja
cent
indu
stria
l or r
esid
entia
lar
eas
Pro
cedu
res
for w
aste
han
dlin
g, s
tora
gean
d di
spos
al
Fire
figh
ting
No
23.
O
ff sp
ecifi
catio
ndi
scha
rge
from
strip
ped
wat
ertre
atm
ent u
nits
(e.g
. rev
erse
osm
osis
(RO
)un
it)
RO
failu
re a
nd b
reak
thro
ugh,
prob
lem
with
iron
rem
oval
uni
t,io
n-ex
chan
ge o
pera
tion,
activ
ated
car
bon
or b
reak
poin
tch
lorin
atio
n (e
.g. c
hlor
ides
,iro
n, a
mm
onia
etc
)
Dis
char
ge o
ff sp
ecifi
catio
n to
cust
omer
s, B
otan
y B
ay o
rst
orm
wat
er
Loca
l im
pact
onl
y
No
haza
rdou
s co
nseq
uenc
es to
adja
cent
indu
stria
l or r
esid
entia
lar
eas
Mai
nten
ance
of p
roce
ss u
nits
Onl
ine
mea
sure
men
t of k
ey p
aram
eter
s
Ala
rms
on a
bnor
mal
ope
ratio
n of
proc
ess
units
Buf
fer t
ank
for s
tora
ge c
apac
itanc
e
Pla
nt w
ill be
put
into
recy
cle
mod
eup
on d
etec
tion
of p
robl
em
No
24.
Tr
ansp
ort
Inci
dent
Bad
wea
ther
con
ditio
ns
Driv
er e
rror
Truc
k fa
ilure
Pot
entia
l for
loss
of c
onta
inm
ent o
fre
cove
red
was
te E
DC
liqu
id.
This
can
igni
te w
ith im
pact
to p
eopl
e an
dth
e en
viro
nmen
t
Rec
over
ed w
aste
ED
C li
quid
trans
porte
d in
inte
rnat
iona
lly u
sed
Isot
aine
rs
DG
regu
latio
ns fo
r driv
ers
and
truck
s
Em
erge
ncy
resp
onse
for a
ccid
ents
No
- see
Sec
tion
7.4
Pinn
acle
Ris
k M
anag
emen
t
Oric
a G
TP
PH
A R
epor
t Rev
F.D
oc8
Nov
embe
r 20
0429
Item
No.
Even
tC
ause
sPo
ssib
le C
onse
quen
ces
Prev
entio
n/Pr
otec
tion
Ris
kQ
uant
ified
?
25.
A
irpla
ne C
rash
Bad
wea
ther
con
ditio
ns
Pilo
t erro
r
Pla
ne fa
ilure
Des
truct
ion
of th
e gr
ound
wat
ertre
atm
ent p
lant
. Fi
re fr
om th
e pl
ane
cras
h w
ould
be
mor
e ha
zard
ous
than
prop
agat
ion
even
ts fr
om th
ede
stro
yed
grou
ndw
ater
trea
tmen
tpl
ant
Site
is n
ot u
nder
maj
or fl
ight
pat
hs
Air
indu
stry
regu
latio
ns re
gard
ing
pilo
ttra
inin
g an
d pl
ane
safe
ty
No
- see
Sec
tion
6.5
26.
S
abot
age
/Te
rror
ism
Dis
grun
tled
empl
oyee
or
intru
der
Pos
sibl
e re
leas
e of
gro
undw
ater
,re
cove
red
was
te E
DC
liqu
id, H
Cl,
caus
tic s
oda
or o
ther
Dan
gero
usG
oods
with
con
sequ
ence
s as
abo
ve
Rec
over
ed w
aste
ED
C li
quid
rele
ases
hav
e th
e po
tent
ial t
o im
pact
on a
djac
ent r
esid
entia
l are
as
The
grou
ndw
ater
trea
tmen
t pla
nt is
tobe
loca
ted
on th
e B
IP.
Exi
stin
gse
curit
y m
easu
res
are
deta
iled
inS
ectio
n 4.
3
Con
sequ
en-
ces
of w
aste
ED
C li
quid
rele
ases
anal
ysed
as
per I
tem
Nos
18
to21
27.
In
cide
nt o
nad
jace
nt p
lant
sE
mer
genc
y si
tuat
ions
resu
lting
in fi
res,
exp
losi
ons
or to
xic
rele
ases
Fire
s an
d ex
plos
ions
hav
e th
epo
tent
ial t
o pr
opag
ate
the
inci
dent
on
the
grou
ndw
ater
trea
tmen
t pla
nt.
Toxi
c ga
ses
may
be
draw
n in
to th
eai
r int
ake
to th
e st
rippe
rs
The
cons
eque
nces
of p
ropa
gatio
nev
ents
in th
e G
TP a
re a
s pe
r the
abov
e G
TP s
cena
rios
Dem
atch
ed s
ite re
duce
s ch
ance
s of
igni
tion
Cla
ssifi
ed h
azar
dous
are
as re
duce
chan
ces
of ig
nitio
n
Em
erge
ncy
resp
onse
act
ions
tosh
utdo
wn
the
grou
ndw
ater
trea
tmen
tpl
ant p
lus
deal
with
the
emer
genc
y at
the
adja
cent
pla
nt
As
abov
e
Pinn
acle
Ris
k M
anag
emen
t
Oric
a G
TP
PH
A R
epor
t Rev
F.D
oc8
Nov
embe
r 20
0430
Item
No.
Even
tC
ause
sPo
ssib
le C
onse
quen
ces
Prev
entio
n/Pr
otec
tion
Ris
kQ
uant
ified
?
28.
Lo
ss o
fco
ntai
nmen
t of
grou
ndw
ater
from
the
pipi
ngsy
stem
supp
lyin
g th
eG
TP, i
nclu
ding
DN
AP
L, p
rimar
yan
d se
cond
ary
cont
ainm
ent
pipe
lines
Third
par
ty a
ctiv
ity, e
.g.
exca
vato
r, es
peci
ally
in n
on-
BIP
are
as
Sab
otag
e
Pip
ing
and
equi
pmen
t fai
lure
s,e.
g. c
orro
sion
Loss
of c
onta
inm
ent o
f gro
undw
ater
at th
e le
ak p
oint
. Lo
cal i
mpa
ct o
nly.
Pot
entia
l to
affe
ct th
ose
who
are
expo
sed
to th
e gr
ound
wat
er.
Odo
urw
ill oc
cur l
ocal
ly
No
haza
rdou
s co
nseq
uenc
es to
adja
cent
indu
stria
l or r
esid
entia
lar
eas
Pip
ing
and
equi
pmen
t to
be p
ositi
oned
and
secu
red
to m
inim
ise
loss
es o
fco
ntai
nmen
t. S
igna
ge to
war
n of
unde
rgro
und
pipe
s an
d eq
uipm
ent
Sec
onda
ry c
onta
inm
ent w
ith le
akde
tect
ion
Incl
uded
in ‘D
ial B
efor
e Y
ou D
ig’
syst
em
No
29.
Lo
ss o
fco
ntai
nmen
tfro
m p
ipin
g an
dpu
mpi
ng o
f sal
tyw
aste
wat
er
Third
par
ty a
ctiv
ity, e
.g.
exca
vato
r, es
peci
ally
in n
on-
BIP
are
as
Sab
otag
e
Pip
ing
and
equi
pmen
t fai
lure
s,e.
g. c
orro
sion
As s
alty
was
te w
ater
mee
ts A
NZE
CC
disc
harg
e gu
idel
ines
, the
re w
ill be
min
imal
impa
ct to
wat
erw
ays
from
any
leak
age
No
haza
rdou
s co
nseq
uenc
es to
adja
cent
indu
stria
l or r
esid
entia
lar
eas
Pip
ing
and
equi
pmen
t to
be p
ositi
oned
and
secu
red
to m
inim
ise
loss
es o
fco
ntai
nmen
t.
Sig
nage
to w
arn
of u
nder
grou
nd p
ipes
and
equi
pmen
t. In
clud
ed in
‘Dia
l Bef
ore
You
Dig
’ sys
tem
Exi
stin
g pi
pelin
e is
in g
ood
cond
ition
.P
ipe
will
be p
last
ic li
ned
befo
re u
se to
incr
ease
inte
grity
for s
alty
was
te w
ater
No
30.
Lo
ss o
fco
ntai
nmen
tfro
m tr
eate
dgr
ound
wat
erdi
strib
utio
nsy
stem
Third
par
ty a
ctiv
ity, e
.g.
exca
vato
r
Sab
otag
e
Pip
ing
and
equi
pmen
t fai
lure
s,e.
g. c
orro
sion
As
wat
er is
trea
ted,
wor
st o
utco
me
islo
cal f
lood
ing/
eros
ion.
No
heal
th o
ren
viro
nmen
tal i
mpa
cts.
No
haza
rdou
s co
nseq
uenc
es to
adja
cent
indu
stria
l or r
esid
entia
lar
eas
Rou
tine
mai
nten
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4.3 SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
Safety management systems are intended to minimise the risk from potentiallyhazardous installations by a combination of hardware (i.e. design) and softwarefactors (managements systems such as procedures, policies, plans, trainingetc). To ensure safe operation of the groundwater treatment plant, both thehardware and the software systems must be of high standard.
Orica personnel, having operated chlorine and derivative plants for manydecades at the Botany site, are well aware of the hazardous nature of proposeddangerous goods and hazardous materials. However, it is acknowledged thatthe proposed groundwater treatment plant will necessitate changes to theexisting safety management system.
In general, the Orica procedures, guidelines etc are modified to suit the localsite conditions where required. It is noted that the Orica safety managementsystem is widely used by many companies. The system is typically bought bythese companies and then modified to suit their specific requirements. As such,it is widely regarded as a well prepared, robust system which is suitable for themanagement of safety, health and environmental issues for hazardous industry.
The safety management system is built in layers, as shown below:
Vision and Values
Policy
SH&E Standards
SH&E Model Procedures
Local SH&E Procedures
Operating Procedures / Work Instructions
Senior management define the company's Vision and Values, SH&E Policy andStandards. For Orica and its group companies, there are 19 SH&E Standardsto be followed. SH&E Model Procedures are developed to further detail keyrequirements for control of the company's operations and to provide a model formanagement of SH&E risks and for implementation of the company's SH&EPolicy and Standards. There are currently 117 SH&E Model Procedures.
Local procedures and work instructions are developed to define additionalrequirements to, as far as practicable, control the risks arising from theoperation of each facility and to assure compliance with the company's statutoryOH&S obligations, SH&E Policy and Standards, and the key requirements ofthe SH&E Model Procedures.
The range and detail of local procedures and work instructions are consistentwith the complexity of the activity, the level of risk involved, and the skills andtraining of the people performing the activity.
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Sufficient records of activities and events are retained in a secure, retrievablemanner to demonstrate compliance with, and the effectiveness of, localprocedures and to capture adequate information regarding the company'sSH&E impacts.
A Letter of Assurance is prepared annually, detailing the level of compliancewith each of the SH&E Standards and action plans to close any gaps.
The suitability, adequacy and effectiveness of the company SH&E Policy,Standards and SH&E Model Procedures and local SH&E management systemsis reviewed at least every two years.
Given the strength and reputation of the Orica safety management systems, it isexpected that modification of the existing safety management system toaccommodate the groundwater treatment plant should present little difficulty.
For information, some of the more critical procedures associated with the safetymanagement systems at Orica are summarised in Table 5.
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Table 5 - Summary of Safety Related Procedures
PROCEDURE PURPOSE
Operations andMaintenance Manuals
To clearly define the method of operations of the plant.
To ensure that accurate information about important aspects of the plantdesign and its operations are available and up to date.
To define for the operators and maintenance team the methods by whichsections of the plant may be safely and efficiently withdrawn from service,repaired and restored to safe efficient operating condition.
To ensure that protective systems are in a good state of repair and functionreliably when required. This includes scheduled testing of trips and alarmsand relief devices.
Operator Training,including safety andemergency training
To enable operators to run the plant to meet objectives safely.
To enable trades personnel to carry out maintenance work so that they arethemselves safe and do not jeopardise the plant safety systems or thesafety of others.
To provide personnel with an understanding of possible hazardoussituations and the ability to respond appropriately.
To provide an understanding of and practice in the use of basic emergencyequipment that might be needed in tackling an emergency (e.g. self-contained breathing apparatus, safety showers).
Permit to Work To safeguard tradesmen (and others) and the plant by ensuring than thatthe plant is safe to work on, that the correct job is done using the rightequipment, that any safety procedures are understood and adhered to, thatoperators know which parts of the plant are being worked on and that theplant is returned to safe condition before being returned to service.
Control of PlantModifications
To ensure that proposed changes to both equipment and operating methodsachieve the desired benefits without any unforeseen and undesirable sideeffects.
Unusual IncidentReporting andInvestigation
To learn from "unusual incidents" that may or may not have had ahazardous outcome, but could have under different circumstances, to beproactive in preventing their occurrence.
EmergencyProcedures
To facilitate effective response to emergencies. To prevent or minimise theeffect of potentially hazardous events by being prepared.
ScheduledManagement Auditingof Procedures
To ensure that operating management is continually aware of how well thedefined procedures and systems affecting safety and loss prevention arebeing followed in practice. To enable corrective action to be taken toimprove adherence to procedures.
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Safety management systems in addition to those listed in Table 4 and Table 5are described below.
a. Security
The BIP site is a secure site, with all vehicle entry controlled through thegatehouse at Gate 3, which is manned 24 hours per day.
Security of the site is also achieved by site personnel vigilance, security patrolsby security guards and cameras. In addition, the plant has lighting throughoutthe night to aid observation, the site is fully fenced (adequate construction) andnon-operating gates are locked (e.g. Gate 1 at the south-eastern corner of thesite).
All vehicle access is via Gate 3, either by presenting security passes or bysigning in as a visitor / contractor.
Security personnel are site inducted, have a checklist of areas to inspect andreport (to BIP staff) on unusual incidents.
b. Emergency Response
An audible alarm alerts plant operators if an emergency occurs. Emergencyprocedures exist for the site and are routinely tested via simulated emergencies.
c. Safety Related Procedures
In addition to those procedures listed in Table 5, the following procedures arealso critical to safe operation of the Orica plants:
Replacement materials are tightly specified to ensure the newcomponents are made from compatible materials of construction;
Hazardous areas classification are defined and the site is dematched;and
All critical service hoses are recorded on the hose register and areroutinely inspected and tested.
4.3.1 Safety Software in Risk Assessment
In risk assessments, incidents are assessed in terms of consequences andfrequencies, leading to a measure of risk. Where possible, frequency datacomes from actual experience. However, in many cases, the frequencies usedare generic, based on historical information from a variety of plants andprocesses with different standards and designs.
The quality of the management systems (known as "safety software") in place inthese historical plants will vary. Some will have little or no software, such aswork permits and modification procedures, in place. Others will have exemplarysystems covering all issues of safe operation. Clearly, the generic frequencies
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derived from a wide sample represent the failure rates of an "average plant".This hypothetical average plant would have average hardware and softwaresafety systems in place.
If an installation with below average safety software is assessed using genericfrequencies, it is likely that risk will be underestimated. Conversely, if a plant isabove average, the risk will probably be overestimated. However, it isextremely difficult to quantify the effect of software on plant safety.
Therefore, Pinnacle Risk Management adopts a policy which does not attemptto quantitatively account for the presence of and quality of software safetysystems unless specific information is available. It is assumed that the genericfailure frequencies used apply to installations which have safety softwarecorresponding to accepted industry practice. It is believed that this assumptionwill be conservative in that it will overstate the risk from well-managedinstallations such as the Orica sites. Therefore, any quantitative approach isvalid (i.e. conservative) if the safety management within the operation beingassessed is of a high standard.
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5 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
GTP
The assessment of risks to both the public as well as to operating personnelaround an industrial development requires the application of the basic stepsoutlined in Section 1.4. Normally, the methodology uses probabilistic risktechniques to determine the likely incident scenarios and leak mechanisms, andthese are outlined in later sections. The use of reliable fluid outflow and jetdispersion models allows the determination of gas discharge rates andconsequent flammable gas cloud sizes.
The typical methodology attempts to take account of all credible, significanthazardous situations that may arise from the operation of processing plants.This is done by first taking a probabilistic approach to vessel and pipe failure forall vessels containing hazardous materials. Specific incidents, identified by avariety of techniques, are then added and the combined data used to generatecomposite risk contours which can be used for both the public and plantpersonnel.
"Specific incidents" are those which are felt or known to be likely in installationsof this kind. Historical information, gathered from similar installationsthroughout the world, is a major source for such incidents. Other potentialincidents (and the way in which they could develop) have been identified via theuse of Hazard Study workshops.
The consequences of an incident are calculated using standard correlations andprobit-type methods which assess the effect of fire radiation, explosionoverpressure and toxicity to an individual, depending on the type of hazard.
Having assembled data on possible incidents, risk analysis requires thefollowing general approach (for individual incidents which are then summatedfor all potential recognised incidents):
Risk = Likelihood x Consequence
In this PHA, however, the approach adopted is to assess each credible,significant hazardous event (i.e. scenario) for its consequential impacts. If it isshown that the GTP does not impose unacceptable consequential impact levelsat the site boundary then, by default, the corresponding risk is broadlyacceptable. If, however, the consequential impact at the nearest site boundaryexceeds values normally associated with irritation, injury and fatality then thescenarios are evaluated for their contribution to off-site risk.
The GTP location is a significant distance from the nearest residential area(approximately 325 m away), so many incidents would not have consequenceswhich would reach as far as this, and hence would have no effects onresidential areas.
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In addition to off-site residential risk, there is also risk imposed to theneighbouring industries on the BIP. This risk is also estimated in this PHA andcompared to the HIPAP 4 values (Ref 4). The following information details theneighbouring facilities and the distances involved.
Table 6 – GTP Neighbouring Industries
Direction Company / Area Distance, m
North Qenos (Alkatuff) 25 m (from scrubber)
East Huntsman (drum, IBC storage area) 40 m (from the thermal oxidiser)
South Huntsman (ethylene oxide and surfactants) 70 m (from the thermal oxidiser)
West Qenos (Site Utilities) 50 m (from the thermal oxidiser)
The consequence calculations for this PHA were carried out using commerciallyavailable risk software, TNO’s EFFECTS. The consequence models usedwithin EFFECTS are well known and are fully documented in the TNO YellowBook (Ref 9). A listing of the models is also given in Appendix 4. A briefexplanation and discussion of the consequence modelling follows.
Essentially, for each scenario defined by the analyst, an appropriate releaserate equation is selected based on the release situation and initial state of thematerial. Various outcomes (e.g. jet or flash fires and explosions) are thencalculated based on parameters such as the ease of ignition of the material andamount released. The consequential impact value of interest at a particularlocation can be obtained from the results.
The scenarios modelled in this PHA from Section 4 were chosen based on theability for a release from a pipe and/or vessel to cause adverse effect both on-site and off-site (fatality, injury or irritation).
Outcomes for various types of release cases are modelled within EFFECTS asshown in Table 7. For each release case, probabilities of immediate ignition(leading to jet or pool fires) and delayed ignition (leading to flash fires orexplosions) are calculated for each flammable material depending upon thematerial’s characteristics.
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Table 7 – EFFECTS Release Cases
Type of Release Subsequent Event (Note 1)
Gas release Flash fire / explosion
Jet fire
Toxic impact
Instantaneous gas release Flash fire / explosion
Toxic impact
Liquid release Flash fire / explosion
Pool fire
Toxic impact
Instantaneous liquid release Flash fire / explosion
Pool fire
Toxic impact
Pressurised liquefied gas release Flash fire / explosion
Jet fire
Pool fire
Toxic impact
Instantaneous pressurised liquefied gas release Flash fire / explosion
Toxic impact
BLEVE Fireball
Note 1: Safe dispersal is another possible outcome
Assumptions made for the purposes of consequence calculations are alsodescribed in the following sections.
Associated Operations
A different approach was required for analysing risks for the GTP Project’sassociated operations.
Transport risks of the recovered waste EDC liquid are discussed in Section 7.4.
In assessing pipeline and pumping risks it is important to note that the materialshandled (groundwater, salty waste water) are non-hazardous. Therefore risksassociated with any potential releases were confined to potential effects on thebiophysical environment. These are discussed in Section 8. Any risksassociated with these operations will be managed as an integral part of Orica’sSafety Management System which has been described in detail in Section 4.3.
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5.1 SCENARIOS MODELLED
The scenarios modelled in this PHA are shown in Table 8. These scenarioswere chosen based on the ability for a release from a pipe and/or vessel tocause significant adverse effect (fatality, injury and/or irritation). As thematerials are flammable and/or toxic, consequence modelling involves thesimulation of various types of fires, explosions and atmospheric dispersion.
Table 8 – Scenarios Modelled
Equipment Item Material Potential Impact
Pipes or vessels from the air stripper tothe plant exhaust vent
EDC or HCl in air Toxicity
Recovered waste EDC liquid Isotainerand transfer system including connectingpiping and hose
EDC Pool fires, toxicity,BLEVE
Natural gas line Natural gas (methane) Fires, UVCE, flash fire
Thermal oxidiser explosion Natural gas (methane) Confined explosion
Caustic scrubber (loss of reflux flow) HCl in air Toxicity
5.2 RELEASE SOURCES
Scenarios involving piping failures have been modelled using three failurecases, corresponding to full pipe fracture, 50mm and 13mm holes. Gasketfailure is likely to result in a gap equivalent to the area between two flange bolts.This has been modelled as a hole with an equivalent diameter of 13mm. Vesselfailures have been modelled as catastrophic rupture and leaks of 50mm, 25mmand 13mm.
These generic failure cases are comparable to those used in a number ofpublished risk assessment studies and described in Lees (Ref 10).
Where the consequential impacts from larger release cases are shown to benegligible, then the smaller release cases are not included in the modelling, asthey will have no contribution to the risk being assessed.
5.3 RELEASE RATES
Release rates were calculated for each release scenario using standardequations based on hole size, pressure, temperature and material state (withinEFFECTS). The maximum release inventory was limited to the contents of theplant equipment plus the amount lost over the duration of the leak (variabledepending on the leak rate).
In case of a liquid loss of containment, part of the material may initially flash offand evaporate, with any remaining liquid evaporating at a lower rate due to
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cooling of the liquid spill. Flash and evaporation rate calculations wereperformed by EFFECTS.
5.4 RELEASE DURATION
The assumed time taken to stop and control a release is based on a cautiousbest-estimate of a typical release scenario, rather than always the worst-case(in accordance with quantitative risk assessment principles).
The proposed plant will be highly automated and monitored by instruments. Inthe case of major upset conditions, it will be designed to trip (shut down) quicklyand safely. Many upset conditions would be expected to initiate an automatictrip within 1 minute. Other conditions could occur for approximately 5 or 20minutes depending on the scenario, speed of operator response and type ofoperator response. The selected time for each scenario is defined in therespective consequential analyses.
5.5 METEOROLOGICAL DATA
The meteorological data is comprised of six wind/weather combinations (windspeed/Pasquill stability category) have been used as the basis for all dispersioncalculations. The probability of each combination of wind/weather category andwind direction (data is split into 12 directions) is used in the calculation of clouddrift. The meteorological data used for the risk assessment is contained inAppendix 5.
5.6 TERRAIN EFFECTS AND DEGREE OF CONFINEMENT
Ground roughness affects the turbulent flow properties of wind, hencedispersion of a released material. Terrain effects are taken into account tosome degree in dispersion modelling by use of a parameter known as surfaceroughness length.
A surface roughness factor of 1m was used, corresponding to an area withdensely located low buildings or an industrial area with low structures such asthe BIP site (Ref 11).
As described in Appendix 4, EFFECTS requires the degree of confinement forexplosion calculations. Essentially, this is the proportion of the total mass in thecloud used in the explosion calculation. For example, if 2,000 kg is entered asa total mass and 50% as confinement then 1,000 kg is used in the explosioncalculation.
For this QRA, the following percentage confinement values have been used:
25% for open plant area; and
10% for the natural gas pipeline.
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5.7 CONSEQUENCE RESULTS
The following consequence results were obtained via EFFECTS (TNO)modelling.
5.7.1 Pipes or Vessels Failures Leading to Gas Plumes
Thermal Oxidiser Feed Piping
The groundwater containing the EDC and other impurities is pumped to the airstripper. A fan on the inlet to the thermal oxidiser draws air through the airstripper which contacts the groundwater to remove (strip) the impurities. Thesuction side of the fan is under vacuum. If any pipe or vessel on the fan suctionfails whilst the fan is running then air will be drawn in through the holes etc.Hence, the impurities will not be released and a plume will not form.
The discharge pressure of the fan is approximately 7.5 kPag. This low pressurewill limit the flowrate from any holes in piping and vessels. The pressure profileacross the rest of the plant drops to 0 kPag at the exit of the caustic scrubber.
To model potential releases from holes in piping and vessels, the releasedstream is modelled as air and the concentrations of the components of interestare estimated based on the concentration at the point of release.
For the stream entering the thermal oxidiser from the fan, the principlecontaminants are EDC and other chlorinated paraffins and olefins(approximately 660 ppm vol/vol). EDC is the primary contaminant. Itsconcentration in the thermal oxidiser feed is over an order of magnitude morethan the next significant group of contaminants, i.e. carbon tetrachloride andtetrachloroethene. The other components of significance are grouped asaromatics and organic acids, approximately 4 and 580 ppm (vol/vol),respectively. The total flow is 2,124 kmols/hr (50,300 scm/hr).
Neutral gas dispersion modelling of this stream at weather / wind conditions, F2,(i.e. stable weather conditions, F class, and a wind speed of 2 m/s; typicalconditions for modelling maximum plume travel) shows that the ground levelERPG 1 EDC concentration (50 ppm) for a release from a 50 mm hole (at 7.5kPag) travels no further than approximately 10 m from the point of release. Thisis for a release duration of 20 minutes.
The reasons for these relatively short distances are due to the lowconcentration of contaminants in the air stream and the low driving force forleaks from a 50 mm hole. Based on these results, further assessment ofreleases from potential holes (50 mm and smaller) in the thermal oxidiser feedpiping is not warranted, i.e. there will be no fatalities, injuries or irritation effectseither on-site or off site. It is reasonable to expect odour only near the plant.
Note that EDC is the chosen material of interest for the dispersion modelling asits concentration is the highest and its ERPG values are amongst the lowest ofthe stream components.
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For catastrophic pipe failure on the discharge of the fan, where the entireflowrate through the fan is released, it is assumed that for such major plantdisturbances, the automatic plant system will detect such conditions (i.e. no flowthrough the plant) and automatically shutdown the process, including the fanbefore the thermal oxidiser. Therefore, a release duration of 1 minute ischosen.
Neutral gas dispersion modelling of this full flow stream at the various weather /wind conditions (Appendix 5) is shown in Table 9.
Table 9 – Thermal Oxidiser Feed Stream, Dispersion Modelling
Wind / Weather Pattern Maximum Distance (m) to:
EDC ERPG 1 EDC ERPG 2
2.3 B 66 31
3.8 D 110 49
5.3 D 89 39
2.3 E 230 92
0.9 F 440 230
2.3 F 390 160
As can be seen from the above data, potential off-site residential impact (i.e. at325 m or further) is limited to a few combinations of wind / weather patterns. Noinjury risk is predicted (i.e. by use of ERPG 2). Irritation (ERPG 1) is onlyexpected for the more stable wind / weather patterns. The risk of EDC irritationimpact on off-site personnel is assessed later in Section 7 of this report.
Note that there are no criteria set in HIPAP 4 (Ref 4) for the risk of toxic irritationand/or injury to personnel on adjacent industrial facilities, i.e. other BIP landusers or neighbouring industries.
With respect to the probability of fatality from releases from the thermal oxidiserfeed pipe, the HSE UK land use planning (LUP) SLOT (specified level oftoxicity) value for EDC is used as there is no widely accepted fatality probitavailable for EDC, the main component of interest.
The HSE has defined the LUP SLOT as:
Severe distress to almost every one in the area;
Substantial fraction of exposed population requiring medical attention;
Some people seriously injured, requiring prolonged treatment; and
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Highly susceptible people possibly being killed.
Typically, SLOT values define the toxic load which will result in 1% mortality(Ref 10).
These criteria are fairly broad in scope, reflecting the fact that:
1) There is likely to be considerable variability in the responses of differentindividuals affected by a major accident;
2) There may be pockets of high and low concentrations of a toxic substance inthe toxic cloud release, so that not everyone will get exactly the same degree ofexposure; and
3) The available toxicity data are not usually adequate for predicting precisedose-response effects.
The toxicity expressed by a given substance in the air is influenced by twofactors, the concentration in the air (c) and the duration of exposure (t). Afunctional relationship between c and t can be developed, such that the endproduct of this relationship is a constant:
f(c,t) = constant
This constant is known as the Toxic Load. In the HSE, the Toxic Load relatingto the LUP SLOT is known as the SLOT Dangerous Toxic Load or SLOT DTL.For a number of gases, the relationship between c and t is simple:
Toxic Load = c x t
This relationship is sometimes known as the Haber law. As an example, animaltoxicity data for methyl isocyanate indicates that the LUP SLOT is produced byeach of these c and t pairs:
t (min) 5 10 30 60 120
c (ppm) 150 78 25 12 6
In this example the constant, or SLOT DTL, is 750 ppm.min (that is 150 x 5, 25x 30, etc.).
However, the equation c x t = constant does not apply to all substances, so thefollowing general equation has been developed:
Toxic Load = cn.t
For methyl isocyanate, n in the cn.t relationship is 1. In the case of sulphurdioxide, n = 2 and animal toxicity data suggest that the following pairs of c and twill each produce the LUP SLOT:
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t (min) 5 10 30 60 120
c (ppm) 965 682 394 279 197
Here, the constant, or SLOT DTL, is 4.6 x 106 ppm2.min (that is 9652 x 5 or3942 x 30).
For EDC, the HSE LUP SLOT constant is 9 x 104 (where n = 1).
For a 1 minute release, the concentration of EDC in air required to effect aprobability of fatality of 1% is 90,000 ppm. For a 5 minute release, thecorresponding concentration is 18,000 ppm. For a 20 minute release, theconcentration further decreases to 4,500 ppm. As the concentration of EDC inthe thermal oxidiser feed stream is less than these values (up to 660 ppm) thenno fatalities either on-site or off-site from piping failures can be expected, i.e.there is no fatality risk from these dilute emissions.
Thermal Oxidiser Outlet Piping
The stream from the thermal oxidiser has the following flow / composition data:
Mass Rates: Molar Rates:(kmol/hr)
PPM:(vol/vol)
Total Flow 66,070 sm3/hr 2,793 NA
VOCs (as EDC) 1.46 kg/hr 0.014 5
HCl 114.6 kg/hr 4.32 1,550
Chlorine 2.25 kg/hr 0.032 11
Notes: VOC = volatile organic carbon
Neutral gas dispersion modelling of this stream at weather / wind conditions, F2,shows that the ERPG 1 HCl concentration (3 ppm) for a release from a 50 mmhole (at 5 kPag) travels no further than approximately 55 m from the point ofrelease. This is for a release duration of 20 minutes.
Again, the reason for these relatively short distances are due to the lowconcentration of contaminants in the air stream and the low driving force (lowpressure in the pipe) for leaks from a 50 mm hole (estimated leak rate is 0.11kg/s, i.e. relatively low). These calculations show that for the scenariosconsidered, the concentrations to cause concern (ERPG 1) only occur close tothe release, and do not travel far enough to effect neighbouring plants orresidences. Based on these results, further modelling of releases from potentialholes in the thermal oxidiser outlet piping is not warranted, i.e. there will be nofatalities, injuries or irritation effects off site.
Again, note that there are no criteria set in HIPAP 4 (Ref 4) for the risk of toxicirritation and/or injury to personnel on adjacent industrial facilities, i.e. other BIPland users or neighbouring industries.
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For catastrophic pipe failures (i.e. full bore pipe ruptures) where the entireflowrate from the thermal oxidiser is released, again, it is assumed that for suchmajor plant disturbances, the automatic plant system will detect such conditions(i.e. no flow through the plant) and automatically shutdown the process,including the fan before the thermal oxidiser. Therefore, a release duration of 1minute is again chosen.
Neutral gas dispersion modelling of this full flow stream at the various weather /wind conditions (Appendix 5) is shown in Table 10. The component of interestis HCl (chlorine is present at a low concentration, i.e. 11 ppm).
Table 10 – Thermal Oxidiser Exit Stream, Dispersion Modelling
Wind / Weather Pattern Maximum Distance (m) to:
HCl ERPG 1 HCl ERPG 2
2.3 B 310 100
3.8 D 560 180
5.3 D 490 150
2.3 E 860 360
0.9 F 1,330 610
2.3 F 1,310 580
As can be seen from the above data, off-site impact (i.e. at 325 m or further) isexpected to occur for most of the wind / weather pattern combinations. The riskof HCl irritation and injury impact on off-site personnel is assessed later inSection 7 of this report.
For HCl, the HSE LUP SLOT constant is 2.37 x 104 (where n = 1).
For a 1 minute release, the concentration of HCl in air required to effect aprobability of fatality of 1% is 23,700 ppm. For a 5 minute release, thecorresponding concentration is 4,740 ppm. For a 20 minute release, theconcentration further decreases to 1,185 ppm. As the concentration of HCl inthe thermal oxidiser exit stream is 1,550 ppm and full flow release durations willbe limited to approximately one minute then given dispersion and consequentdilution of this stream no fatalities either on-site or off-site from the thermaloxidiser exit piping failures can be expected, i.e. there is no fatality risk fromthese HCl emissions.
5.7.2 Recovered Waste EDC Liquid Isotainer Events
EDC has a low vapour pressure at ambient temperature (8 kPa at 20oC). Thenormal boiling point is 83oC. Accidental releases of recovered waste EDC liquid
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from the Isotainer (e.g. due to vessel or pipe failure, or operator error) will formpools in the bunded area where the Isotainer is kept. Over time, EDC vapourwill be evolved and hence a toxic plume is generated. If the pools are ignited,however, a pool fire will result.
Prolonged pool fires could propagate to a BLEVE (boiling liquid expandingvapour explosion). For this event, the heat from the pool fire raises thetemperature and hence pressure of the Isotainer contents. The Isotainer safetyrelief valve will lift and material will escape. The Isotainer wall mechanicalintegrity will reduce over time, particularly where flames impact on the vesselwall where EDC vapours are present on the inside. At some point in time(historically greater than 10 minutes), the vessel wall will fail and a catastrophic(i.e. vessel rupture) release will occur. The released material vaporisesinstantaneously, ignites and forms a fireball.
The event generates three significant consequential effects:
Radiant heat from the fireball;
Explosion overpressures from the release of stored energy; and
Missiles can be formed.
As the distance to significant radiant heat levels exceeds the distance tosignificant levels of overpressure, BLEVE models estimate radiant heat onlydue to its dominance in effect distances.
Data used for calculating the effects from an Isotainer BLEVE (fireball) are asfollows:
Quantity of recovered waste EDC liquid 20 te
Vessel burst pressure (PSV setting) 16.8 barg
Recovered waste EDC liquid temperature 20oC
The results from the BLEVE simulation show that the predicted fireball radius isapproximately 81 m. Therefore, the radiant heat levels from a potentialrecovered waste EDC liquid Isotainer BLEVE will not cause any significantimpact on residential occupants but may impact (burn) personnel involved inrunning the GTP and adjacent plants on the BIP (i.e. on-site fatality may occur).The risk of this occurring is analysed in Section 7.
Pool Fires:
Release cases from the recovered waste EDC liquid Isotainer and connectingtransfer system will vary in quantity. Catastrophic vessel failures will releasethe entire Isotainer contents (approximately 20 te) into the bunded area.Releases from transfer system failures will involve smaller quantities andcorrespondingly smaller pool fires. As radiant heat from pool fires is dependenton the size of the pool and hence limited by the bund design, two pool fire
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scenarios are modelled, i.e. the entire bund full of recovered waste EDC liquidand a 3 m equivalent diameter pool is chosen for the smaller releases.
Given the location of the GTP and the size of the bunded area, it is notexpected that radiant heat from these scenarios will impact people who are off-site or personnel involved in running the adjacent plants on the BIP. Thesecalculations are included for completeness of the study only.
For the two chosen pool fire calculations, equivalent pool diameters of 9 m and3 m are used. The percentage of combustion energy emitted as radiant heat istaken as 10% and 31% for the 9 m and 3 m cases, respectively (Ref 10).
The values of interest for radiant heat (DIPNR, HIPAP No. 4 and ICI HAZANCourse notes) are shown in Table 11.
Table 11 - Radiant Heat Impact
HEAT FLUX(kW/m2)
EFFECT
1.2 Received from the sun at noon in summer
2.1 Minimum to cause pain after 1 minute
4.7 Will cause pain in 15-30 seconds and second degree burns after 30seconds. Glass breaks
12.6 30% chance of fatality for continuous exposure. High chance of injury
Wood can be ignited by a naked flame after long exposure
23 100% chance of fatality for continuous exposure to people and 10%chance of fatality for instantaneous exposure
Spontaneous ignition of wood after long exposure
Unprotected steel will reach thermal stress temperatures to causefailure
35 25% chance of fatality if people are exposed instantaneously.Storage tanks fail
60 100% chance of fatality for instantaneous exposure
For information, further data on tolerable radiant heat levels is shown in Table12.
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Table 12 – Layout Considerations – Tolerable Radiant Heat Levels
Plant Item Tolerable Radiant HeatLevel, kW/m2
Source
Drenched Storage Tanks 38 Ref 10
Special Buildings (Protected) 25 Ref 10
Cable Insulation Degrades 18-20 Ref 10
Normal Buildings 14 Ref 10
Vegetation 12 Ref 10
Plastic Melts 12 Ref 10
Escape Routes 6 Ref 10
Glass Breakage 4 Ref 12
Personnel in Emergencies 3 Ref 10
Plastic Cables 2 Ref 10
Stationary Personnel 1.5 Ref 10
Radiant heat intensity versus distance for each of the pool fire scenarios issummarised in Table 13.
Table 13 – Radiant Heat vs Distance – Pool Fire Scenarios
Pool Fire Scenario: Distance to Specified Radiant Heat Levelfrom the Edge of the Pool Fire, m
23 kW/m2 12.6 kW/m2 4.7 kW/m2 2.1 kW/m2
9 m Diameter - 1 8 11
3 m Diameter - 1 4 6
Note that the predicted surface emissive power (radiant heat flux of the flames)is approximately 17 kW/m2. Therefore, no figure exists for the distance to23 kW/m2.
For assessment of the effects of radiant heat, it is generally assumed that if aperson is subjected to 4.7 kW/m2 of radiant heat and they can take cover withinapproximately 20 seconds then no serious injury, and hence fatality, isexpected. However, exposure to a radiant heat level of 12.6 kW/m2 can resultin fatality for some people for limited exposure durations.
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As can be seen from the results given in Table 13, the radiant heat levels frompotential pool fires will not cause any significant impact on people who are off-site or personnel involved in running the adjacent plants on the BIP.
Toxic Releases:
If the same pools of recovered waste EDC liquid are formed in the Isotainerbund as per the above pool fire analysis but not ignited, evaporation of the EDCand subsequent atmospheric dispersion may cause significant concentrations ofEDC off-plot.
A 20 minute evaporation period is assumed. It is assumed that within this time,emergency response action can be taken to mitigate the EDC evaporationand/or dispersal. This may include covering the bund with foam or use of fogsprays from monitors etc.
Neutral gas dispersion modelling of this plume for the full bund case at thevarious weather / wind conditions (Appendix 5) is shown in Table 14. Thepredicted EDC evaporation rate is 0.13 kg/s.
Table 14 – Large Recovered Waste EDC liquid Pool (9 m diameter),Dispersion Modelling
Wind / Weather Pattern Maximum Distance (m) to:
EDC ERPG 1 EDC ERPG 2
2.3 B 46 21
3.8 D 72 31
5.3 D 59 25
2.3 E 146 63
0.9 F 521 202
2.3 F 276 100
As can be seen from the above data, off-site impact (i.e. at 325 m or further) islimited to a one combination of wind / weather (0.9F for irritation effect). Noinjury risk is predicted (i.e. by use of ERPG 2). The risk of EDC irritation impacton off-site personnel is assessed later in Section 7 of this report.
Note that there are no criteria set in HIPAP 4 (Ref 4) for the risk of toxic irritationand/or injury to personnel on adjacent industrial facilities, i.e. other BIP landusers or neighbouring industries.
By application of the HSE land use planning EDC SLOT, again, no off-sitefatalities would be expected from a plume emanating from a pool of recoveredwaste EDC liquid in the Isotainer bund. The dispersion models also show that
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the EDC concentration drops below 4,500 ppm (the SLOT value for a 20 minuteexposure duration) within 25 m for the various wind / weather combinations.Hence, neither off-site nor on-site fatalities are expected from this scenario.
For a 3 m diameter pool of recovered waste EDC liquid, the distance to theERPG 1 value for 0.9F is predicted to be 36 m. Therefore, no residential off-siteirritation (or injury) can be expected for any of the wind / weather combinationsfor a plume emanating from a small recovered waste EDC liquid pool. Thepredicted EDC evaporation rate is less than 0.02 kg/s for this case (i.e.relatively low).
5.7.3 Natural Gas Line Failures
Failures associated with the natural gas feed line to the thermal oxidiser willrelease the natural gas to atmosphere and, if ignited, it can form a jet fire, aflash fire and/or an explosion.
The analysis of the potential jet fires from the natural gas feed line to thethermal oxidiser is shown in Table 15. The natural gas pressure is 5 barg(ambient temperature). The line is approximately 80 m long.
Table 15 –Natural Gas Jet Fires
Stream EstimatedLength of Jet,
m
Full bore failure (80 mm) 12
50 mm hole 10
13 mm hole 4
Notes: Jet flames modelled using methane.
As expected for these size jet fires, no adverse radiant heat levels will beimposed off-site or on adjacent operating plants.
Potential vapour cloud explosions and flash fires can occur from the natural gasline failures, i.e. delayed ignition.
The effects from explosion overpressures (Ref 4) are summarised in Table 16.
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Table 16 – Effects of Explosion Overpressure
OVERPRESSURE, kPa PHYSICAL EFFECT
3.5 90% glass breakage
No fatality, very low probability of injury
7 Damage to internal partitions & Joinery
10% probability of injury, no fatality
14 Houses uninhabitable and badly cracked
21 Reinforced structures distort, storage tanks fail
20% chance of fatality to person in building
35 Houses uninhabitable, rail wagons & plant items overturned.
Threshold of eardrum damage, 50% chance of fatality for a personin a building, 15% in the open
70 Complete demolition of houses
Threshold of lung damage, 100% chance of fatality for a person in abuilding or in the open
For flash fires, any person inside the flash fire cloud is assumed to be fatallyinjured. As flash fires are of limited duration (typically burning velocity is 1 m/s,Ref 13) then those outside the flash fire cloud have a high probability of survivalwithout serious injury.
The analysis of the potential vapour cloud explosions and flash fires from thenatural gas pipe failures is shown in Table 17. The mass calculated in theflammable range is assumed to be 100% confined, i.e. all this gas is involved inthe explosion calculations. As methane is not a high reactive flammable gasand the quantities involved are relatively small then a weak deflagration isassumed in the explosion calculations (multi-energy method – TNO).
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Table 17 – Natural Gas Vapour Cloud Explosions and Flash Fires
Stream Mass ofNatural Gas
in theFlammableRange, kg
Radius ofFlash Fire, m
Distance (m)to 14 kPaExplosion
Overpressure
Distance (m)to 7 kPa
ExplosionOverpressure
Full bore failure (80 mm) 11 < 10 m < 10 m < 10 m
50 mm hole 6 < 10 m < 10 m < 10 m
Notes: 1. Pipeline failures assumed to be isolated within 20 minutes.
2. Radius of flash fires calculated to be the distance to 70 kPa overpressure (assumingthe cloud had exploded, Ref 13)
3. 13 mm holes not modelled as they are too small to generate gas clouds of anysignificant size.
For these releases of natural gas, choked flow exists and rapid jet mixing withair occurs. The result is a relatively small vapour cloud size with limitedconsequential impacts if ignited. The 20 minute release duration also has nosignificant impact on the release. Steady state conditions are reached soonafter the release occurs (i.e. the distance to the LEL does not change at steadystate dispersion conditions). The maximum distance to the LEL for the full borefailure is less than 50 m.
Given these results for the natural gas vapour cloud explosions and flash fires,no adverse consequential impacts will be imposed off-site or at neighbouringplants.
5.7.4 Thermal Oxidiser Explosion
An internal thermal oxidiser explosion is possible due to a failure of the burnermanagement system. For these events to occur, a flammable gasconcentration occurs within the thermal oxidiser whilst it is off-line and a sourceof ignition ignites it. This is a known hazard with burners, boilers etc and thecontrol and start-up systems include prevention measures such as purging theinternal space prior to ignition.
Internal explosions have the potential to cause harm through overpressures andpossibly missiles. TNO (Ref 9) has developed a methodology for estimatingoverpressures from internal explosions and it is used as follows.
For an internal thermal oxidiser explosion to occur, the gas inside the unit mustbe in the flammable range, i.e. between the lower and upper explosion limits.The entire volume of the thermal oxidiser is assumed to contain flammable gas.For some internal explosions, this will be a conservative assumption.
Therefore, the scenario modelled is an internal explosion of 200 m3 (i.e. theinternal volume of the unit).
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From the explosion modelling, the distances to specified overpressure levels forthe thermal oxidiser internal explosion scenario are shown in Table 18.
Table 18 – Distance to Specified Levels of Explosion Overpressure forPotential Internal Thermal Oxidiser Explosion Scenario
Distance to Specified Overpressure, m
70 kPa 35 kPa 21 kPa 14 kPa 7 kPa 3.5 kPa
ThermalOxidiser < 10 14 19 25 42 80
It was also estimated that the explosion overpressure for this event at thenearest residential areas to the GTP (about 325 m away) would not exceed0.7 kPa. At this low overpressure, there would be expected to be no injuriesand only very minor building damage, if any.
Given the site layout and the location of the thermal oxidiser (approximately50 m from neighbouring industrial BIP facilities), no fatalities or significanteffects from this explosion scenario are expected to people who are off-site oron adjacent plants.
As with the Isotainer BLEVE case, it is possible that missiles could begenerated from an internal thermal oxidiser explosion. The risk of theseexplosion events is analysed in Section 7.
5.7.5 Caustic Scrubber Failure
Should the caustic scrubber fail to absorb the HCl carryover from the HClabsorber, e.g. loss of reflux flow and the plant does not trip, then the thermaloxidiser outlet stream will be vented with HCl mist. The exhaust vent height is20 m.
From Section 5.7.1, the stream from the thermal oxidiser (70oC) has thefollowing flow / composition data:
Mass Rates: Molar Rates:(kmol/hr)
ppm:(vol/vol)
Total Flow 66,070 scm/hr 2,793
VOCs (as EDC) 1.46 kg/hr 0.014 5
HCl 114.6 kg/hr 4.32 1,550
Chlorine 2.25 kg/hr 0.032 11
Notes: VOC = volatile organic carbon
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The HCl absorber will be designed for a 75 wt% recovery, i.e. 28.7 kg/hr of HClwill flow to the caustic scrubber. This is approximately 281 ppm HCl in the gasstream.
Neutral gas dispersion modelling of this stream being vented from the causticscrubber at weather / wind conditions, F2 and E2.3, shows that the ERPG 1 HClconcentration (3 ppm) does not form at ground level due to the elevated point ofdispersal. The ERPG 1 concentration will exist for approximately 400 mdownwind of the plant vent only at heights greater than 15 m above the ground.This is for a release duration of 5 minutes (manual shutdown from response toplant alarms expected). Consequently, there would not be any off-site or on-site impacts.
Note that if the HCl absorber has failed, a subsequent failure of the causticscrubber will vent gas with essentially the same composition as the thermaloxidiser outlet gas as per the analysis in Section 5.7.1. The difference for thiscase, however, will be the elevation of the vent pipe as compared to acatastrophic pipe failure exit the thermal oxidiser at potentially a lower elevation.This means that the ground level HCl concentration in this case would be evenlower and would therefore be below the ERPG 1 criterion.
5.7.6 Thermal Oxidiser Feed / Product Exchanger Failure
This scenario involves a failure of the thermal oxidiser feed / product exchanger,i.e. a hole allows feed gas to pass directly to the product gas which is vented viathe HCl and caustic scrubbers. Given the results from the elevated vent case inSection 5.7.5, the low driving force for feed gas to pass into the product gas, theability of the scrubbers to knock-out some feed gas impurities and that the holesize is, historically, most likely to be small then this scenario is not included inthe consequence modelling.
5.8 CALCULATION OF FATALITY DUE TO FIRES, EXPLOSIONS AND TOXICRELEASES
The following methodologies are used by TNO for the calculation of fatality:
Flash Fires: 100% fatality within the diameter of the fireball and no fatalityeffect outside of the fireball (due to the short duration).
Jet Fires: 100% fatality within the dimensions of the flame. The flame ismodelled as a rectangle. Outside the flame, heat radiation levelsare calculated at particular points using the view factor method.Fatality is calculated using the probit equation below with anexposure duration of 20 seconds:
Probit = -36.38 + 2.56 ln(tQ1.33)
t exposure duration (sec)
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Q heat flux (W/m2)
Note that this probit is only valid for very short exposure durations(less than 1 minute). For the purposes of this risk assessment it isassumed a person has 20 seconds to escape from heat radiation(i.e. an exposure duration of 20 seconds).
Pool Fires: 100% fatality within the diameter of the pool fire. Effects past theedge of the pool fire are calculated via the probit above for jetfires.
Explosions: Riskcurves explosion fatality by first calculating a flash fire andthen assuming 100% fatality within the fire diameter. Theexplosion fatality effects are taken into account by assuming anaverage 1.25% fatality up to the 10 kPa radius. The 1.25%method is based on an analysis of fatalities that occurred in theLPG Mexico City disaster in 1984 where the majority of peoplewere in fact killed by falling rubble etc.
BLEVE: 100% fatality within the diameter of the fireball. As for explosions,overpressure effects can cause an additional 1.25% fatality up tothe 10 kPa overpressure radius. However, for BLEVEs the peakoverpressure is normally within the fireball radius so overpressureeffects do not actually contribute to the fatality calculations.
Toxic Impact:As per the description given in Appendix 4 using probit equations.
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6 FREQUENCY / LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS
The frequency of an event is defined as the number of historical occurrences ofthe event over a specified time period; with the period in risk analysis generallybeing taken as one year. Likelihood is the expected number of events for afuture time basis.
Two approaches have been used to estimate the frequencies of hazardousevents. The first method is to use statistical data relating to failure of wholesystems or equipment items. Secondly, complex events can be broken downinto contributing factors and the overall event likelihood estimated from theknown frequencies of the smaller events using techniques such as fault treeanalysis. In this PHA, previous fault trees exist for specific events and henceare not reconstructed here.
Assumptions made for the purposes of likelihood calculations are describedbelow.
6.1 GENERIC EQUIPMENT FAILURE FREQUENCIES
For piping and equipment failures, frequencies have been estimated either fromdata compiled and published by ICI (Ref 14) or from frequency estimatespublished by the Institution of Chemical Engineers (Ref 15).
Table 19 - Generic Equipment Failure Frequencies
Type of Failure Failure Rate (x 106) per year
Pipelines
13 mm hole
50 mm hole
3 mm gasket (13 mm hole equivalent)
Guillotine fracture (full bore):
< 50 mm
> 50 mm but < 100 mm
> 100 mm
3 / m
0.3 / m
5 / joint
0.6 / m
0.3 / m
0.1 / m
Vessels
13 mm hole
25 mm hole
50 mm hole
Catastrophic failure - Pressure Vessel
6
3
3
1
Hoses
Hose failure – moderate to large leak 4 x 10-6 per hour (Ref: TNO, Riskcurves UserManual)
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6.2 BLEVE LIKELIHOOD
Detailed calculations by ICI Engineering for ethylene oxide storages and OricaEngineering (Ref 16) into the causes and likelihoods of a BLEVE show that thelikelihood of a BLEVE for an unprotected vessel is in the order of 10-7/yr. Thatis, a fire occurs (e.g. from a leak in connecting piping which is ignited andimpinges on the vessel to cause the BLEVE) and no mitigation is available. Forprotected vessels (e.g. fire insulation and/or a water spray system are installed)the likelihood of a BLEVE is in the order of 10-8/yr.
For the recovered waste EDC liquid Isotainer, a BLEVE likelihood of 10-7/yr isincluded in the modelling work (i.e. no specific allowances for protectivesystems are included).
6.3 THERMAL OXIDISER INTERNAL EXPLOSION LIKELIHOOD
Explosions involving combustion systems do occur and can result in multiplefatalities. For example, the gas feed systems to boilers fail and an explosivemixture within the boiler is subsequently ignited. During the 1970’s and early1980’s, the likelihood of explosions involving these types of systems was in theorder of 1 every 1,000 years (ICI Mond Reliability Data, Ref 14). However, withthe advent of more robust burner management systems, conformance to gassupply codes and standards, and the use of nitrogen for purging lines, thefrequency of incidents has reduced in recent years.
Analysis of burner explosions was performed by Orica Engineering for the HCBPHA (Ref 17). It was concluded that for a similar type of burner managementsystem, the likelihood of internal explosions was approximately 5 x 10-6 peryear. This value is consistent with the performance of modern designs and isused in this study.
6.4 CAUSTIC SCRUBBER FAILURE LIKELIHOOD
The likelihood of the caustic scrubber failure is approximated as no detaileddesign is available. A simple layer of protection analysis (Ref 18) is performedas follows:
Expected demand likelihood, e.g. loss of reflux flow, say, once per year
Estimated probability of failure for a redundant, diversifieddesigned, high integrity, trip system in this application 0.0001 (based on
Ref 19)
Probability of vent analyser failure 0.1 (Ref 19)
Probability of unsuccessful fast operator response 0.5 (Ref 19)
Therefore, the caustic scrubber failure case is approximated as five times every100,000 years (or once every 20,000 years).
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6.5 DOMINO INCIDENTS
A potentially hazardous event within a plant can cause further incidents in thesame plant, or in some cases in other plants. The secondary event is called adomino event. With any large site there is potential for a severe incident in onearea to cause a knock-on or domino incident in another area.
From the analysis conducted in Section 5, radiant heat and overpressures frompotential hazardous events are not sufficient to cause propagation to nearbyadjacent operating plants. For the BLEVE case, the duration is approximately11 seconds, hence propagation to other piping and vessel failures within thistimeframe is unlikely.
Missiles from the BLEVE could cause propagation, however, the low likelihoodof 1 x 10-7 per year for the BLEVE event is further reduced when the probabilityof a missile hitting a selected target is considered. Therefore, the risk ofpropagation is broadly acceptable. Emissions of gas streams will not cause anysignificant propagation events.
It is also possible that an event in the neighbouring plants may cause a knockon event in the GTP operations. However, as shown in Section 5, theconsequences of many of these potential hazardous events associated with theGTP operations will not have any off-site impact. The risk of these events is,however, estimated in Section 7 of this report.
The proposed facility is close to Sydney's Kingsford Smith Airport and there ispotential for aircraft impact on the BIP site. In 1990, the Australian Centre ofAdvanced Risk and Reliability Engineering Ltd (ACARRE) considered the risksassociated with increased operations at Kingsford Smith Airport due to the thirdrunway. The ACARRE study examined the likely frequency of aircraft crashingonto various sites within the Port Botany region, including the Botany site (thenICI Australia Pty Ltd). The result from the ACARRE study was used todetermine the risk from aircraft crashes with a potential for knock-on effects atthe Botany site (Ref 20). The conclusion was that a low level of risk exists forthis event.
Earthquake events may also cause plant damage sufficient to cause a release.Frequencies and consequences of these events have also been estimated inRef 20 and again, the conclusion being a low level of risk exists for this event.
Generally, other external events that may lead to propagation of incidentsinclude:
Subsidence Landslide
Burst Dam Vermin/insect infestation
Storm and high winds Forest fire
Storm surge Rising water courses
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Flood Storm water runoff
Breach of security Lightning
Tidal waves Forest fire
None of these contributory events pose any significant risk to the GTP or itsassociated operations (note: security issues as previously discussed in Section4.3).
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7 RISK ANALYSIS
7.1 RISK CRITERIA
The risk criteria applying to new developments in NSW are summarised inTable 20 below (from Ref 4).
Table 20 - Risk Criteria, New Plants
Description Risk Criteria
Fatality risk to sensitive uses, including hospitals, schools, aged care 0.5 x 10-6 per year
Fatality risk to residential and hotels 1 x 10-6 per year
Fatality risk to commercial areas, including offices, retail centres,warehouses
5 x 10-6 per year
Fatality risk to sporting complexes and active open spaces 10 x 10-6 per year
Fatality risk to be contained within the boundary of an industrial site 50 x 10-6 per year
Injury risk - incident heat flux radiation at residential areas should notexceed 4.7 kW/m2 at frequencies of more than 50 chances in amillion per year or incident explosion overpressure at residentialareas should not exceed 7 kPa at frequencies of more than 50chances in a million per year
50 x 10-6 per year
Injury risk - frequency at which toxic concentrations in residentialareas should not exceed a level which would be seriously injurious tosensitive members of the community following a relatively shortperiod of exposure
10 x 10-6 per year
Irritation risk - frequency at which toxic concentrations in residentialareas should not cause irritation to eyes or throat, coughing or otheracute physiological responses in sensitive members of thecommunity
50 x 10-6 per year
Property damage risk – incident heat flux radiation at neighbouringpotentially hazardous installations or at land zoned to accommodatesuch installations should not exceed 23 kW/m2 at frequencies ofmore than 50 chances in a million per year
50 x 10-6 per year
Property damage risk – incident explosion overpressure atneighbouring potentially hazardous installations, at land zoned toaccommodate such installations or at nearest public buildings shouldnot exceed 14 kPa at frequencies of more than 50 chances in amillion per year
50 x 10-6 per year
The risk associated with the proposed GTP and associated operations will beestimated in the following sections and compared to the above criteria.
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7.2 MITIGATING FEATURES FOR OFF-SITE INDIVIDUALS
By convention in Australia, mitigation factors are not taken into account in theestimation of individual fatality risk. An individual is considered to be locatedpermanently at a particular location, and no scope for shelter or escape isfactored into the calculations. The risk results are essentially the risk at alocation, not necessarily to a particular individual and are therefore consideredhighly conservative.
7.3 RISK RESULTS
7.3.1 Individual Fatality Risk
Off-site:
From the consequence analysis in Section 5, there are no identified events thathave the potential to cause off-site fatality. Therefore, the risk to sensitive landusers, residential areas, commercial areas, sporting areas and open spaces islower than the DIPNR HIPAP 4 criteria. Correspondingly, societal risk is alsonegligible.
On-site:
From the consequence analysis in Section 5, the one event which may possiblylead to fatalities on the BIP is a BLEVE of the recovered waste EDC liquidIsotainer. As the likelihood for this event is taken as 1 x 10-7 per year, given a100% chance of fatality (conservative), then the corresponding industrial risk toother BIP users is below 50 x 10-6 per year. Therefore, the fatality risk to bothBIP and other neighbouring industries is lower than the DIPNR HIPAP 4criterion.
Missiles:
There are two possible events that could generate missiles, i.e. a recoveredwaste EDC liquid Isotainer BLEVE and an internal thermal oxidiser explosion.The likelihood of each event is 1 x 10-7 per year and 5 x 10-6 per year,respectively. The combined likelihood is thus 5.1 x 10-6 per year. As theprobability of missile generation for an explosion event is generally taken as 0.1or lower (Ref 10), then the risk of fatality from any potential missiles will be lessthan 1x 10-6 per year and hence is considered broadly acceptable. Note thatthis does not include the probability of a person being struck by a missile if itwas generated (i.e. conservative).
7.3.2 Injury Risk
Off-site:
From the consequence analysis in Section 5 and using the ERPG 2 value forinjury risk due to exposure to HCl (conservative given the duration of exposure
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expected), the catastrophic failures associated with the piping and equipmentdownstream of the thermal oxidiser have the potential for off-site injury for wind/ weather classes 2.3E, 0.9F and 2.3F.
The likelihood of these failures occurring is estimated as follows:
There are four vessels (thermal oxidiser recuperator, quench, acid absorber andcaustic scrubber) and approximately 55 metres of piping. Therefore, thelikelihood of catastrophic failures occurring is estimated to be (from Table 19):
= (4 x 1 x 10-6) + 55 x 0.1 x 10-6 per year
= 10 x 10-6 per year
The probability of the three wind / weather conditions existing and blowing froman arc from northwest to southwest (i.e. a 90o arc such that the wind is blowingin the direction of the residential area along Denison Street) is estimated to be10% (see Appendix 5 for the wind / weather probability data).
Therefore, the likelihood of injury from HCl emissions is 1 x 10-6 per year. Thisis lower than the DIPNR HIPAP 4 criterion.
On-site:
There is no on-site criterion for injury risk in HIPAP 4.
7.3.3 Irritation Risk
Off-site:
From the consequence analysis in Section 5 and using the ERPG 1 value forirritation risk due to exposure to HCl (conservative given the duration ofexposure expected), the catastrophic failures associated with the piping andequipment downstream of the thermal oxidiser have the potential for off-siteirritation for wind / weather classes 3.8D, 5.3D, 2.3E, 0.9F and 2.3F.
Also, off-site irritation is possible from catastrophic failures associated with thepiping entering the thermal oxidiser (i.e. EDC releases) for wind / weatherclasses 0.9F and 2.3F and from a plume emanating from a bund spill ofrecovered waste EDC liquid (release from the recovered waste EDC liquidIsotainer and transfer system) for 0.9F only.
The likelihood of these failures occurring is estimated as follows:
Firstly, as above, there are four vessels (thermal oxidiser recuperator, quench,acid absorber and caustic scrubber) and approximately 55 metres of piping afterthe thermal oxidiser.
Secondly, there is approximately 30 metres of piping from the air blower to thethermal oxidiser.
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Lastly, it is assumed that only large releases from the Isotainer have thepotential to fill the bund. If a fault in the transfer system occurs, it is assumedthat the loss of flow will be detected and operator response will prevent a largerelease occurring (e.g. by isolating the valve at the Isotainer outlet).
Therefore, the likelihood of catastrophic failures occurring is estimated to be(from Table 19):
= (4 x 1 x 10-6) + 55 x 0.1 x 10-6 per year plus
30 x 0.1 x 10-6 per year plus
(1 x 10-6 + 3 x 10-6 + 3 x 10-6), i.e. Isotainer catastrophic failure, 50 mmand 25 mm holes
= 20 x 10-6 per year
This value is below the HIPAP criterion for residential irritation likelihood(without even taking into consideration the probability of the relevant wind /weather conditions existing such that the wind blows in the direction of DenisonStreet).
On-site:
There is no on-site criterion for injury risk in HIPAP 4.
7.3.4 Property Damage
Given the explosion overpressure and radiant heat analyses in Section 5 of thisreport, the risk of property damage due to propagation is negligible, i.e. thepredicted explosion overpressures at the neighbouring facilities are less than14 kPa and the predicted radiant heat at the neighbouring facilities is less than23 kW/m2 (the latter takes into consideration the likelihood of a recovered wasteEDC liquid Isotainer BLEVE being approximately 1 x 10-7 per year).
7.3.5 Cumulative Risk
Cumulative risk within the Botany/Randwick Industrial Complex was consideredby the Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources (then theDepartment of Planning) in 1985, and was updated in 1999. Subsequent tothis, an overview report on the Botany / Randwick Industrial Area was issued byDIPNR in 2001. The calculated risk levels presented in this PHA will have onlya minor impact on the cumulative risk results formerly calculated for theBotany/Randwick area. This can be expected given the relatively fewpotentially hazardous events that can significantly affect off-site risk.
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7.4 TRANSPORT RISK
It is proposed to transport an Isotainer containing recovered waste EDC liquidfrom storage at Port Botany (at Terminals Pty Ltd) to the GTP, on average,once every two weeks. The proposed route is:
From the Terminals facility, turn right onto Friendship Road, travel toBumborah Road and then left onto Botany Road
Turn right into Beauchamp Road
Turn left into Denison Street
Turn left into the BIP at Gate 3
In 1995, ICI Engineering (Ref 21) performed a transport risk assessment forliquid EDC movements in the reverse direction, i.e. from the BIP site toTerminals Pty Ltd. This transport risk assessment reviewed the risk associatedwith 2,500 road tankers (i.e. not Isotainers which are more robustly designed)per year. This figure considerably exceeds the proposed GTP recovered wasteEDC liquid Isotainer movements of approximately 25 per year.
The 1995 transport risk assessment included potential hazardous eventsassociated with loading and unloading activities as well as incidents along thetransport route. Both fires and toxicity impacts were considered.
The results of the 1995 transport risk assessment found that the risk associatedwith the movement of EDC via 2,500 road tankers per year was broadlyconsidered acceptable. Given that the GTP transport of recovered waste EDCliquid involves significantly less movements via the identical route then it isconcluded that the risk from recovered waste EDC liquid transport for thisProject is also broadly acceptable.
7.5 RISK FROM COMBUSTION PRODUCTS
There is a potential risk to those attending a fire emergency (and possibly off-site) of effects from toxic products of combustion from a recovered waste EDCliquid fire, e.g. carbon oxides, HCl and smoke, as well as vaporised EDC (i.e.not combusted).
Impact from toxic products of combustion will only be significant, generally, localto the fire. As stated in Lees (Ref 10):
“The hot products of combustion rising from a fire typically have a temperaturein the range 800-1200oC and a density a quarter that of air.”
Hence, a buoyant plume is formed (as seen when smoke is emitted from achimney) and the combustion products rise and are dispersed as per theprevailing wind / weather conditions. Several runs of the Brigg’s Plume Model(Ref 9) for various combinations of weather / wind conditions and fire
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temperatures show that the plume rises from a recovered waste EDC liquidbund fire to at least one hundred metres and then disperses via passivedispersion in the down wind direction. Momentum effects continue to cause theplume to rise whilst it is dispersing. The results are shown in Table 21. Theresults also show that plume rise is insensitive to fire temperature variations of800oC +/- 100oC (not shown).
Table 21 – Fire Plume Rise Modelling
Wind / Weather Initial Height ofPlume, m
5.3 D 102
2.3 E 235
0.9 F 600
2.3 F 235
Unless a temperature inversion exists where reverse atmospheric currents canoccur (i.e. air slumps to the ground as opposed to air eddies that rise), no effectat ground level is expected. Note that dispersion models best account fortemperature inversions by using F class stability (i.e. typically when theadiabatic lapse rate is positive). The models, however, do not include theprovision for air slumping to ground.
It is noted that if a temperature inversion exists where the combustion productscan return to the ground, emergency response may be required to clear /control the area. Given the low likelihood of recovered waste EDC liquidreleases calculated in this PHA (approximately 7 x 10-6 per year), the probabilityof ignition of flammable liquids being less than 10% (Ref 15) and the probabilityof a temperature inversion occurring in the Sydney area (less than 19%, Bureauof Meteorology information provided to Pinnacle Risk Management), the risk ofirritation from products of combustion is broadly considered acceptable, as thetotal risk is less than the residential irritation criterion, even after adding theirritation effects from Section 7.3.3.
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8 RISK TO THE BIOPHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT
The main concern for risk to the biophysical environment is generally witheffects on whole systems or populations. Whereas any adverse effect on theenvironment is obviously undesirable, it is difficult to envisage an incidentscenario at the GTP that would threaten a whole system or population. For thisproposal, the risk to people in the vicinity is the main concern.
For completeness, risks to the biophysical environment due to loss ofcontainment events are summarised below.
8.1 ESCAPE OF MATERIALS TO ATMOSPHERE
The likelihood of releases of gas and products of combustion were estimated aspart of the risk assessment and shown to be low. For any release of theprocess air stream, the contaminant’s concentrations are low and hencesignificant environmental impact is not expected. Certainly, from the analysis inthis report, no incident scenarios were identified where whole systems orpopulations could be affected by a release to the atmosphere.
8.1.1 HCl and Chlorine
Failures of the HCl column would include loss of circulation and loss ofinventory (make-up). Alarms and trips would be installed to protect againstthese failures. A sudden increase in the HCl load on the system from thethermal oxidiser beyond the design case is not feasible given the constantgroundwater feed rate.
Failure of the correct operation of the caustic scrubbing column could lead to arelease of HCl and chlorine, although as shown in Section 5 of this PHA, thechlorine rate is very low. Performance failure could be due to loss of circulation,failure of good contacting due to a problem with the packing or loss of availablecaustic in the scrubber.
Failure detection would initiate a shutdown of the GTP. Detection would be bylow circulation flow, pressure drop across the column and by ORP meter tocheck caustic strength. In addition, an HCl meter would be installed in the stackto provide a further protection against system failure.
8.1.2 Dioxins
There has been significant review by the project team members re thepossibility of dioxins forming immediately downstream of the thermal oxidiser.Pinnacle Risk Management understands that the approach taken by the projectteam members is to select a process where the possibility of dioxins forming isminimised. The chosen technology, as Pinnacle Risk Managementunderstands, is accepted by authorities such as the USA and GermanGovernments as being acceptable with respect to dioxin targets being met. Thefollowing discussion details the possibility of dioxin formation.
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Incorrect Temperature in the Thermal Oxidiser:
The temperature in the thermal oxidiser will be controlled by measuring thetemperature in an appropriate spot and adjusting the fuel gas to maintain thesetpoint. If the temperature in the thermal oxidiser gets too high or low thethermal oxidiser will shut down. This will be measured by multiple (2)independent devices and performed by the independent Safety InstrumentedSystem. This system will be designed to meet the requirements of IEC 61508and IEC 61511. With a thermal oxidiser operating temperature of 1000°C, it isenvisaged that there would be alarms at 975oC and 1,025oC, with trip points at950oC and 1050oC, respectively. There will also be a carbon monoxide monitoron the exit gas which is used to indicate good reaction conditions.
The consequences of too high a temperature will be equipment damage withthe potential for loss of containment.
If the temperature is too low, then there is the possibility of reduced destructionefficiency. This in turn could lead to emission of contaminants, such as EDC,VC and benzene. It is also possible, that there could be products of incompletecombustion (PIC). In turn, these are associated with the potential for dioxinformation. The likelihood of dioxin formation will increase depending on otherconditions, such as correct quench operation. If the quench is operatingproperly (i.e. rapid quench through the temperature range 450oC to 250oC), theneven if there are PICs, there is a reduced chance of dioxin formation.
De Novo Dioxin Generation:
There are three main routes for the release of dioxins from a thermal oxidiser:
1. If dioxins enter the thermal oxidiser (some thermal oxidisers are used fordestroying material containing dioxins) and if they are not destroyed, thensome may leave. Note that there are no dioxins in the feed to the GTP.
2. If there are solids involved (e.g. municipal waste destruction), then the ashparticles present in the reaction zone can act as catalytic sites for theformation of dioxins. For the GTP, there are no solids in the feed to thethermal oxidiser.
3. The third mechanism involves the formation of dioxins de novo due to therecombination of molecules after the reaction zone. This is thought to ofteninvolve PICs but may not require them. However, if the gases spend toolong in the temperature range 450oC to 250oC, particularly in the presence ofsome metals such as copper which act as catalysts, then dioxins may beformed.
To protect against this, temperatures will be measured through the gas coolingtrain, to ensure that the gas enters the quench system at greater than 600oC,and that the exit from the quench is less than 100oC. Events that may lead toexcessive cooling pre-quench may include the steam system running at too lowa temperature (pressure) due to a control failure (alarms and trips in place) or afailure of the off-gas preheater (a steam preheater on the off-gas stream before
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the recuperator to ensure that cold spots are not formed in the recuperatorwhich could lead to corrosion, again protected with alarms and trips). Anotherevent is a steam tube failure in the waste heat boiler (WHB). This could lowerthe temperature of the off-gas. A serious tube failure would cause pressureloss in the steam and be detected as above, a smaller steam leak would dropthe temperature and be detected by low exit temperature from the WHB.
Burner Issues:
If the burner does not operate properly, then there could be poor combustion.The burner is designed to operate for extended periods without maintenance(self-cleaning) and would be checked on a routine basis. The fuel and airsupply are both clean and should not cause any fouling problems. Further, thecarbon monoxide measurement previously mentioned would warn of decreasesin burner performance.
The recovered waste EDC liquid would be injected into the burner as a liquidfuel for atomisation and reaction. The dual fuel (gas plus liquid) is a standardapplication. If the liquid injection performance decreases, then this would beobserved through changes in the backpressure and by routine visualobservation of the flame. The nozzle would be subject to routine maintenance.
A poorly performing liquid nozzle may lead to droplets in the reaction zone andpotentially PICs. This may be associated with carbon monoxide and bealarmed, or may be observed visually. As per the above discussion, even ifPICs were present, then as long as the quench system is performing well, thenthere is a reduced chance of dioxin formation.
To approximate the likelihood of possible dioxin formation, a simple layer ofprotection analysis (Ref 18) is performed as follows. It is noted that only limitedthermal oxidiser design and safety systems information is available at thisstage.
Expected demand likelihood, e.g. temperature controlfailure, burner upset or steam system malfunction, say, 1 in every 5 years
Estimated probability of failure for a redundant designed,high integrity, temperature trip system in this application 0.001 (based on
Ref 19)
Probability of inadequate quench operation 0.05 (Ref 19)
Probability of unsuccessful operator responseto abnormal offgas composition alarm 0.1 (Ref 19)
Therefore, the possibility of dioxin formation is approximated as once every1,000,000 years if due to quench maloperation and once every 50,000 years ifoccurring before the quench. Whilst the figures are low, they should bereviewed once further thermal oxidiser design and protection system details areknown.
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8.2 ESCAPE OF MATERIALS TO SOIL, WATERWAYS OR SEWERAGESYSTEM
Spills of liquids at the GTP or associated operations, e.g. ground water, HCl,caustic and recovered waste EDC liquid from tanks and the recovered wasteEDC liquid Isotainer, will be contained in bunded areas. Should these spillsoccur then they can be neutralised / controlled and pumped away from therelevant bunded area as appropriate. Ground water spills can be rerun throughthe plant.
The likelihood of releases from the extraction wells and connecting pipelines isminimised by covered pits, underground pipes, signage and some materials areto be corrosion resistant whilst others will include allowances for corrosion. Ifany spills occur, the impact will be local to the spill site, as the contaminantconcentrations are low (less than 1% in total).
GTP Water Discharge:
Water will discharge to the environment once it has been cleaned. To ensurethat no environmental damage occurs, the water will need to have adequateremoval of volatile material in the air stripping system, iron removal, non-volatileorganic removal, and nutrient removal.
Failures of these systems might be due to incorrect air or water flows, lowgroundwater temperature, loss of caustic or flocculent addition, exhaustion ofthe carbon beds or incorrect sodium hypochlorite addition.
If a failure is detected, the water system will automatically go into recycle mode,so that product water is fed into the groundwater feed tank and then no freshgroundwater is admitted into the system. Protection against failure of thesesystems will be by measuring correct air and water flows and temperatures inthe air stripping system; checking for correct pH adjustment and flows of causticand flocculent in the iron removal stage, ORP measurement and sodiumhypochlorite flow in the nutrient removal stage. These automatic systems willbe supplemented by regular laboratory analysis of key performance indicators.
Further, there will be online pH measurement (with alarm and tripping) as a finalcheck of discharge water.
As with releases to the atmosphere, no incident scenarios were identified wherewhole systems or populations (or even part thereof) could be affected by arelease to the soil, waterways or sewerage system at the GTP. A summary ofthe types of potential hazardous events, their causes and safeguards,associated with the water discharge systems is shown in Table 22.
Pinn
acle
Ris
k M
anag
emen
t
Oric
a G
TP
PH
A R
epor
t Rev
F.D
oc8
Nov
embe
r 20
0471
Tabl
e 22
– W
ater
Dis
char
ge H
azar
d Id
entif
icat
ion
Wor
d D
iagr
am
Item
No.
Even
tC
ause
sPo
ssib
le C
onse
quen
ces
Prev
entio
n/Pr
otec
tion
Com
men
ts
1.
Loss
of
cont
ainm
ent f
rom
the
disc
harg
e lin
e
Cor
rosi
on, t
hird
par
tyda
mag
e, m
echa
nica
lfa
ilure
Leak
s in
to g
roun
d ar
ound
the
pipe
(pip
e is
mai
nly
unde
rgro
und)
Pip
e tra
vers
es in
dust
rial a
reas
and
road
s
Effl
uent
wat
er s
peci
ficat
ion
conf
orm
s to
AN
ZEC
C m
arin
edi
scha
rge
guid
elin
es s
obi
olog
ical
impa
ct w
ill be
low
,m
ain
effe
ct is
from
slig
htly
salty
wat
er
Pip
e is
cas
t iro
n w
ith in
tern
al p
last
icsl
eeve
, exi
stin
g be
nds
will
bere
plac
ed b
y ne
w fi
breg
lass
ben
dsw
hich
will
hav
e ex
tern
al s
teel
slee
ves
Pip
e w
ill b
e hy
drot
este
d pr
ior t
o us
e
Pip
e w
ill b
e in
clud
ed in
'Dia
l Bef
ore
You
Dig
' sys
tem
Pip
e w
ill h
ave
stan
dard
cat
hodi
cpr
otec
tion
agai
nst c
orro
sion
Fibr
egla
ss b
ends
nee
d to
be fi
tted
to a
llow
inse
rtion
of
plas
tic s
leev
e
No
know
n th
reat
ened
or
enda
nger
ed p
lant
or a
nim
alsp
ecie
s lik
ely
to b
e af
fect
edby
und
ergr
ound
leak
s in
indu
stria
l are
as
2.
Out
of s
peci
ficat
ion
disc
harg
e - t
oosa
lty
Mal
func
tion
of w
ater
treat
men
t sys
tem
Mor
e sa
lty th
an n
orm
al w
ater
ente
rs th
e do
ck
Pos
sibl
e ef
fect
s on
mar
ine
spec
ies
from
ove
rly s
alty
wat
er- l
ocal
& a
cute
effe
cts
only
Vio
latio
n of
per
mitt
eddi
scha
rge
leve
ls
Wat
er tr
eatm
ent c
ontro
l, al
arm
and
trip
syst
ems
Unl
ikel
y to
be
mor
e sa
lty th
an s
eaw
ater
due
to n
atur
e of
pro
cess
No
know
n th
reat
ened
or
enda
nger
ed s
peci
es li
kely
to b
e af
fect
ed b
y th
ese
flow
s in
to d
ock
wat
ers
3.
Out
of s
peci
ficat
ion
disc
harg
e -
too
dilu
te
Mal
func
tion
of w
ater
trea
tmen
t sys
tem
Mor
e di
lute
than
nor
mal
wat
eren
ters
the
dock
No
effe
ct -
sim
ilar
effe
cts
tost
orm
wat
er fl
ows
in c
hann
el
Wat
er tr
eatm
ent c
ontr
ol, a
larm
and
trip
sys
tem
s
Pinn
acle
Ris
k M
anag
emen
t
Oric
a G
TP
PH
A R
epor
t Rev
F.D
oc8
Nov
embe
r 20
0472
Item
No.
Even
tC
ause
sPo
ssib
le C
onse
quen
ces
Prev
entio
n/Pr
otec
tion
Com
men
ts
4.
Out
of s
peci
ficat
ion
disc
harg
e -
exce
ssam
mon
ia
Mal
func
tion
of w
ater
trea
tmen
t sys
tem
Am
mon
ia n
ot r
emov
ed in
wat
er tr
eatm
ent
Man
y m
arin
e or
gani
sms
sens
itive
to a
mm
onia
Cou
ld h
arm
or
kill
mar
ine
orga
nism
s lo
cal t
o th
edi
scha
rge
poin
t if
conc
entr
atio
n at
dis
char
gehi
gh e
noug
h (a
cute
effe
cts
only
)
Vio
latio
n of
per
mitt
eddi
scha
rge
leve
ls
Wat
er tr
eatm
ent c
ontr
ol, a
larm
and
trip
sys
tem
sN
o kn
own
thre
aten
ed o
ren
dang
ered
spe
cies
like
lyto
be
affe
cted
by
thes
eflo
ws
into
doc
k w
ater
s
5.
Out
of s
peci
ficat
ion
disc
harg
e, i.
e.
Exc
ess
sodi
umhy
poch
lorit
e or
othe
r ch
emic
als
harm
ful t
o m
arin
eor
gani
sms
Wro
ng p
H
Mal
func
tion
of w
ater
trea
tmen
t sys
tem
Mal
func
tion
of m
ain
plan
t cau
sing
brea
kthr
ough
of
chem
ical
s no
rmal
lyre
mov
ed u
pstr
eam
of
wat
er tr
eatm
ent
Exc
essi
ve w
ater
trea
tmen
tch
emic
als
disc
harg
ed
Wat
er d
isch
arge
too
acid
ic o
rto
o al
kalin
e
Cou
ld h
arm
or
kill
mar
ine
orga
nism
s lo
cal t
o th
edi
scha
rge
poin
t if
conc
entr
atio
n at
dis
char
gehi
gh e
noug
h (a
cute
effe
cts
only
)
Vio
latio
n of
per
mitt
eddi
scha
rge
leve
ls
Mai
n pl
ant a
nd w
ater
trea
tmen
tco
ntro
l, al
arm
and
trip
sys
tem
s
Car
bon
filte
rs in
wat
er tr
eatm
ent
plan
t will
red
uce
conc
entr
atio
ns o
fm
ost c
hlor
inat
ed s
peci
es
No
know
n th
reat
ened
or
enda
nger
ed s
peci
es li
kely
to b
e af
fect
ed b
y th
ese
flow
s in
to d
ock
wat
ers
Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica GTP PHA Report Rev F.Doc8 November 200473
9 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The risk associated with the proposed GTP and associated operations at theBIP and environs has been assessed and compared against the DIPNR riskcriteria.
The results of this PHA show that the risk associated with the proposed GTPand associated operations complies with DIPNR guidelines for tolerable fatality,injury, irritation and societal risk. Also, transport risk, risks to biophysicalenvironment, the risk of propagation and the impact on cumulative risk in thePort Botany / Randwick area from releases are broadly acceptable. Theseconclusions apply to both off-site (e.g. residential areas) and on-site (i.e.neighbouring industrial facilities) risk.
The primary reason for the low risk levels from operation of the GTP is thatsignificant consequential impacts from potential hazardous events do not reachthe nearest site boundary or, for the neighbouring industrial facilities, theirlikelihood is acceptably low.
For the pumping wells and pipeline operations associated with the GTPoperation, the primary reason for the negligible risk levels is that the materialshandled are non-hazardous. Nevertheless, as described in detail in the PHA,considerable effort will be made to minimise the chances of leaks from thesesystems.
As with most PHA’s, limited detailed design information is currently available.Correspondingly, some of the analysis in this report is based on assumedconditions. The assumptions made in this analysis are to be reviewedthroughout the project design stage and updated in the Final Hazard Analysis.Therefore, no specific recommendations are made.
It is assumed that the GTP and associated operations will be reviewed via theHAZOP methodology.
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Appendix 1
GTP Process Flow Diagrams
Preliminary Hazard Analysis, GroundwaterTreatment Plant, Orica Australia Pty Ltd,
Botany Industrial Park
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Appendix 2
Typical GroundwaterComposition
Preliminary Hazard Analysis, GroundwaterTreatment Plant, Orica Australia Pty Ltd,
Botany Industrial Park
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Appendix 2 – Typical Groundwater Composition.
Note that the following groundwater composition is indicative data used fordesign purposes only.
NameFeedwater
Compositionmg/L
NameFeedwater
Compositionmg/L
pH 4.5 - 6 Mid = 5 Magnesium 16.59
1.1.1.2-Tetrachloroethane 0.001 Chloride 617.0
1.1.2.2-Tetrachloroethane 1.46 Sulphate 184.2
1.1.2-Trichloroethane 0.82 Alkalinity as CaCO3 57.3
1.1-Dichloroethane 0.53 Reactive Silica 10.2
1.1-Dichloroethene 0.47Total Hardness asCaCO3 194.0
1.2-Dichloroethane 169.3 Arsenic 0.018
Carbon disulphide 4.12 Cadmium 0.00015
Carbon tetrachloride 15.8 Chromium 0.0017
Chloroethane 0.001 Copper 0.0013
Chloroform 5.01 Iron 13.5
Chloromethane 0.001 Iron (FSRIB) 43.9
cis-1.2-Dichloroethene 1.29 Lead 0.00010
Methylene chloride 0.08 Mercury 0.0000087
Tetrachloroethene 13.6 Nickel 0.0018
trans-1.2-Dichloroethene 0.24 Zinc 0.017
Trichloroethene 7.22 Ammonia as N 10.6
Vinyl chloride 5.98 Nitrate as N 0.05
Hexachloroethane 0.053 Nitrite as N 0.03
Hexachlorobutadiene 0.023Total Phosphorus asP 0.95
Benzene 1.17 BOD 72.5
Toluene 0.0035 Sulphide 5.54
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NameFeedwater
Compositionmg/L
NameFeedwater
Compositionmg/L
2-Methylphenol 0.0005Suspended Solids(SS) 0.50
3- & 4-Methylphenol 0.0032 Selenium - Filtered 0.02
Chlorobenzene 0.0016Manganese -Filtered 0.14
1.2-Dichlorobenzene 0.043 Fluoride 0.080
1.3-Dichlorobenzene 0.0010 Bromide 0.35
1.4-Dichlorobenzene 0.031 Formic acid 2.00
2.4-Dichlorophenol 0.10 Acetic Acid 45.6
2.6-Dichlorophenol 0.030 Propionic Acid 0.36
1.2.4-Trichlorobenzene* 0.001 Butyric Acid 10.4
2.4.5-Trichlorophenol 0.001 Valeric Acid 0.00
2.4.6-Trichlorophenol 0.02 Hexanoic Acid 5.44
2-Chlorophenol 0.01 2,4-D 0.083
Phenol 0.002Aluminium -Filtered 1.21
Sodium 395.9 Barium - Filtered 0.10
Potassium 9.37 Cyanide (Free) 0.000023
Calcium 50.33 Silver - Filtered 0.00029
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Appendix 3
Selected MSDS’s
Preliminary Hazard Analysis, GroundwaterTreatment Plant, Orica Australia Pty Ltd,
Botany Industrial Park
Product name: EDC Substance Key: 000030703003
Issued: 29.09.1999 Version: 1.2 Page: 1 of 7
0DWHULDO�6DIHW\�'DWD�6KHHW
1. IDENTIFICATION OF THE SUBSTANCE/PREPARATION AND THECOMPANY/UNDERTAKING
Product name: EDC
Synonyms: EDC1,2-Dichloroethane, Ethylene dichlorideCAS-No.: 107-06-2
Molecular Formula: C2-H4-Cl2
Supplier: Orica Australia Pty LtdACN: 004 117 828Street Address: 1 Nicholson Street
Melbourne 3000Australia
Telephone: + 61 3 9665 7111Facsimile: + 61 3 9665 7937
Emergency telephone number: 1 800 033 111 (ALL HOURS)
2. COMPOSITION/INFORMATION ON INGREDIENTS
Recommended use: Production of vinyl chloride, solvent, metal degreasing, paint and varnish remover.
Appearance: Clear, colourless liquid. Chloroform-like odour.
3. HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION
Hazardous according to criteria of Worksafe Australia.
Hazard CategoryT ToxicXi Irritant
R-phrase(s)R11 Highly flammable.R22 Harmful if swallowed.R36/37/38 Irritating to eyes, respiratory system and skin.R45(2) May cause cancer.
Classified as Dangerous Goods by the criteria of the Australian Dangerous Goods Code (ADG Code) fortransport by road or rail.Class: 3 Flammable LiquidSubsidiary Risk 1: 6.1 Toxic
Poisons Schedule (Aust)/Toxic Substance (NZ): S6
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This material is a Scheduled Poison S6 and must be stored, maintained and used in accordance with therelevant regulations.
4. FIRST AID MEASURES
Poison Information Centres in each State capital city can provide additional assistance for scheduled poisons.
Ingestion: Immediately rinse mouth with water. Give water to drink. Do NOT induce vomiting. Seekimmediate medical assistance.
Eye contact: Immediately irrigate with copious quantities of water for at least 15 minutes. Eyelids to be heldopen. Remove clothing if contaminated and wash skin. Seek immediate medical assistance.
Skin contact: Immediately wash contaminated skin with plenty of soap and water. Remove contaminatedclothing and wash before re-use. If swelling, redness, blistering or irritation occurs seek medical advice.
Inhalation: Remove victim from exposure - avoid becoming a casualty. Remove contaminated clothing andloosen remaining clothing. Allow patient to assume most comfortable position and keep warm. Keep at rest untilfully recovered. If breathing laboured and patient cyanotic (blue), ensure airways are clear and have qualifiedperson give oxygen through a face mask. If breathing has stopped apply artificial respiration at once. In eventof cardiac arrest, apply external cardiac massage. Seek immediate medical advice.
Notes to physician: Treat symptomatically. DO NOT give stimulants. Symptoms may include cyanosis, fall of blood pressure, vomiting, diarrhoea, cardiovascular collapse, and coma. If exposure is severe, these rapidly progress to pulmonary oedema and respiratory difficulty. Renal and hepatic failure are possible complications.
5. FIRE-FIGHTING MEASURES
Specific hazards: Highly flammable liquid. May form flammable vapour mixtures with air. Avoid all ignitionsources. Flameproof equipment necessary in area where this chemical is being used. Nearby equipment mustbe earthed. Vapour may travel a considerable distance to source of ignition and flash back.
Fire fighting further advice: Highly flammable liquid. On burning will emit toxic fumes including those ofhydrogen chloride and phosgene. Heating can cause expansion or decomposition leading to violent rupture ofcontainers. If safe to do so, remove containers from path of fire. Keep containers cool with water. Fire fightersto wear self contained breathing apparatus if risk of exposure to vapour or products of combustion.
Suitable extinguishing media: Water fog (or if unavailable fine water spray), foam, dry agent (carbon dioxide,dry chemical powder).
6. ACCIDENTAL RELEASE MEASURES
Avoid inhalation of vapours. Work up wind or increase ventilation. Shut off all possible sources of ignition. Cleararea of all unprotected personnel. Wear protective equipment to prevent skin and eye contamination andinhalation of vapours. Contain - prevent run off into drains and waterways. Use absorbent (soil, sand or other
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inert material). Collect and seal in properly labelled drums for disposal. Wash area down with excess water.Material MUST BE thoroughly dispersed and diluted with excess water before allowing any entry to drains. Usewater spray to disperse vapour. If contamination of sewers or waterways has occurred advise local emergencyservices.
7. HANDLING AND STORAGE
Storage: Store in a cool place and out of direct sunlight. Store in a well ventilated area. Store away fromoxidising agents, acids, alkalis and foodstuffs. Store away from sources of heat or ignition. Keep containersclosed at all times - check regularly for leaks.
This material is a Scheduled Poison S6 and must be stored, maintained and used in accordance with therelevant regulations.
8. EXPOSURE CONTROLS / PERSONAL PROTECTION
National occupational exposure limits
TWA STEL Carcin-ogenCategory
Notices
10 ppm 40 mg/m3
As published by National Occupational Health and Safety Commission (Worksafe Australia).
Exposure Standard (TWA) is the time-weighted average airborne concentration over an eight-hour working day,for a five-day working week over an entire working life. According to current knowledge this concentration shouldneither impair the health or, not cause undue discomfort to, nearly all workers.
These Exposure Standards are guides to be used in the control of occupational health hazards. All atmosphericcontamination should be kept to as low a level as is workable. These Exposure Standards should not be usedas fine dividing lines between safe and dangerous concentrations of chemicals. They are not a measure ofrelative toxicity.
Engineering measures: Ensure ventilation is adequate to maintain air concentrations below ExposureStandards. If inhalation risk exists, use with local exhaust ventilation or while wearing organic vapour respiratoror air supplied mask. Vapour heavier than air - prevent concentration in hollows or sumps. DO NOT enterconfined spaces where vapour may have collected. Keep containers closed when not in use.
Personal protection equipment: Orica Personal Protection Guide No.1, 1998: H - OVERALLS, SAFETYSHOES, CHEMICAL GOGGLES, GLOVES (S), RESPIRATOR.
Avoid skin and eye contact and inhalation of vapour. Wear overalls, chemical goggles and impervious gloves.Use with adequate ventilation. If inhalation risk exists wear organic vapour respirator meeting the requirementsof AS/NZS 1715 and AS/NZS 1716.Available information suggests that gloves made from Teflon (TM) (not neoprene or rubber) should be suitablefor intermittent contact. (6) However, due to variations in glove construction and local conditions, a finalassessment should be made by the user. Always wash hands before smoking, eating, drinking or using thetoilet. Wash contaminated clothing and other protective equipment before storage or re-use.
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9. PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL PROPERTIES
Form / Colour / Odour: Clear, colourless liquid. Chloroform-like odour.
Solubility: Slightly soluble in water.
Specific Gravity : 1.26 @ 20 °C Relative Vapour Density : 3.4 @ 20 °C Flash point : 13 °C CC Boiling Point : 83.5 °C Vapour Pressure (20 C) : 8.1 kPa Decomp. Point (C) : N Av Flammability Limits (%) : 6.2-16 pH : N App Autoignition Temp (C) : 440 Viscosity : N Av % Volatile by volume : 100 Evaporation Rate : N Av Solubility in water (g/L) : 8.7 @ 20C (n-Butyl acetate=1) (Typical values only - consult specification sheet) N Av = Not available N App = Not applicable
10. STABILITY AND REACTIVITY
Stability: Avoid contact with oxidising materials, acids and alkalis. Attacks many metals in the presence ofwater. Attacks many plastics. Can produce toxic fumes (hydrogen chloride and phosgene) on contact with hotsurfaces or under the influence of electrostatic charges.
11. TOXICOLOGICAL INFORMATION
Main symptoms: No adverse health effects expected if the product is handled in accordance with this SafetyData Sheet and the product label. Symptoms that may arise if the product is mishandled are:
Ingestion: Swallowing can result in nausea, vomiting and central nervous system depression. If the victim isuncoordinated there is a greater likelihood of vomit entering the lungs and causing subsequent complications.
Eye contact: An eye irritant.
Skin contact: Contact with skin will result in irritation. Will have a degreasing action on the skin. Repeated orprolonged skin contact may lead to irritant contact dermatitis.
Inhalation: Vapour is irritant to mucous membranes and respiratory tract. Inhalation of vapour can result inheadaches, dizziness and possible nausea. Inhalation of high concentrations can produce central nervoussystem depression, which can lead to loss of co-ordination, impaired judgement and, if exposure is prolonged,unconsciousness.
Long Term Effects: Evidence from animal tests indicates the repeated or prolonged exposure to this chemicalcould result in liver, kidney and central nervous system disorders. Animal studies (rat and mouse) haveindicated this chemical to be carcinogenic by oral administration, while inhalation studies have beeninconclusive. There is no adequate evidence for carcinogenicity in humans, however in view of the animal datathe material should be considered a possible human carcinogen.
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Acute toxicity / Chronic toxicity Oral LD50 (mouse): 413 mg/kg; Oral LD50 (rat): 670 mg/kg. (1) Inhalation LC50 (rat): 1000 ppm/7 hr. (1) 1,2-Dichloroethane has been shown to cause nervous system disorders, liver and kidney disease, lung and heart effects. (2) There is sufficient evidence that 1,2-dichloroethane causes cancer in animals (rats and mice) by oral and skin routes. Long term inhalation studies on rats and mice at 150 ppm for 78 weeks have been inconclusive with regards to carcinogenic effects. (2) In view of these cancer findings the possibility of cancer in humans cannot be excluded, however specific evidence associated with inhalation exposure and the occurrence of cancer in humans has not been found in the literature. (2) This material has been classified by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) as a Group 2B agent. Group 2B - The agent is possibly carcinogenic to humans. (3) Positive in IN VITRO mutagenicity assays. (4) Evidence from animal studies suggests that 1,2-dichloroethane probably does not produce birth defects or affect reproduction. (2,5)
12. ECOLOGICAL INFORMATION
Avoid contaminating waterways. LC50 values for fish exposed for 1-4 days ranged between 85 and 550 mg/litre water, with bioaccumulation unlikely. A no observed adverse effect level of 11 mg/litre was found for DAPHNIA MAGNA, following long term exposure. (5)
n-Octanol/Water Partition Coefficient, P: log P = 1.48 (5)
13. DISPOSAL CONSIDERATIONS
Refer to State Land Waste Management Authority. Advise flammable nature. Empty containers must bedecontaminated and destroyed. Normally suitable for incineration by approved agent.
14. TRANSPORT INFORMATION
Classified as Dangerous Goods by the criteria of the Australian Dangerous Goods Code (ADG Code) fortransport by road or rail.
UN-No: 1184Class: 3 Flammable LiquidSubsidiary Risk 1: 6.1 ToxicHazchem code: 2YEEPG: 3A2Packing group: Packing Group 2
Proper shipping name: ETHYLENE DICHLORIDE
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Segregation Dangerous Goods: Not to be loaded with explosives (class 1), flammable gases (class 2.1) ifboth are in bulk, toxic gases (class 2.3), nitromethane (class 3), spontaneously combustible substances (class4.2), oxidising agents (class 5.1), organic peroxides (class 5.2), radioactive substances (class 7), food and foodpackaging in any quantity, however, exemptions may apply.
15. REGULATORY INFORMATION
Hazardous according to criteria of Worksafe Australia.
Hazard CategoryT ToxicXi Irritant
R-phrase(s)R11 Highly flammable.R22 Harmful if swallowed.R36/37/38 Irritating to eyes, respiratory system and skin.R45(2) May cause cancer.
S-phrase(s)S16 Keep away from sources of ignition - No smoking.S23 Do not breathe vapour.S24/25 Avoid contact with skin and eyes.S26 In case of contact with eyes, rinse immediately with plenty of water and seek medical
advice.S29 Do not empty into drains.S45 In case of accident or if you feel unwell, seek medical advice immediately (show label
where possible).S53 Avoid exposure - obtain special instructions before use.
Poisons Schedule (Aust)/Toxic Substance (NZ): S6
16. OTHER INFORMATION
Literary reference
(1), In ’Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances 1999’ (Ed. D. Sweet),KI05250000, (US Dept. of Health & Human Services: Cincinatti 1999). (2), In ’Toxicological Profile for 1,2-Dichloroethane Update’, US Department of Health and Human Services, May, 1994. (3), In ’IARC Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risk to Humans Suppl. 7’ (Eds International Agency for Research on Cancer), (International Agency for Research on Cancer: U.K. 1987). (4), In ’IARC Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risk to Humans Vol 20’ (Eds International Agency for Research on Cancer), (International Agency for Research on Cancer: U.K. 1979). (5), In ’Environmental Health Criteria 62 - 1,2-Dichloroethane’, World HealthOrganization, Geneva, 1987.
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(6), In ’Quick Selection Guide to Chemical Protective Clothing Third Edition’,(Eds. Forsberg, K. and Mansdon, S.Z.), (Van Nostrand Reinhold, New York, 1997). This chemical is listed on the Australian Inventory of Chemical Substances (AICS). This Material Safety Data Sheet has been prepared by SHE Pacific Pty Ltd on behalf of Orica Ltd and its subsidiary companies. Contact Point: SHE Pacific Pty Ltd, MSDS Services Within Australia: Telephone 1 800 624 132 Facsimile (03) 9665 7929 Outside Australia: Telephone +61 3 9665 7500 Facsimile +61 3 9665 7929
Reason(s) For Issue: Five yearly update; Change in First Aid Measures; Change inToxicological Information; Change in Fire-Fighting Measures; Change in Storage andTransport requirements. Safety Data Sheets are updated frequently. Please ensure that you have a current copy.
This MSDS summarises at the date of issue our best knowledge of the health and safety hazard information ofthe product, and in particular how to safely handle and use the product in the workplace. Since Orica Limited andits subsidiaries cannot anticipate or control the conditions under which the product may be used, each usermust, prior to usage, review this MSDS in the context of how the user intends to handle and use the product inthe workplace.
If clarification or further information is needed to ensure that an appropriate assessment can be made, the usershould contact this company.
Our responsibility for product as sold is subject to our standard terms and conditions, a copy of which is sent toour customers and is also available upon request.
Material Safety Data Sheet
This material is hazardous according to criteria of NOHSC.Classified as Dangerous Goods by the criteria of the Australian Dangerous Goods Code (ADG Code) for Transport by Road and Rail.
1. Identification of the substance/preparation and of the company/undertaking
Product Name: WASTE EDC (FROM CONTAMINATED GROUNDWATER)
Supplier: Orica Australia Pty LtdABN: 004 117 828Street Address: 1 Nicholson Street,
Melbourne 3000Australia
Telephone Number: +61 3 9665 7111Facsimile: +61 3 9665 7937
Emergency Telephone: 1 800 033 111 (ALL HOURS)
2. Composition/information on ingredients
Product Description: Waste.
Components / CAS Number Proportion Risk PhrasesEthylene dichloride107-06-2
>60% R11, R22, R36/37/38, Carc.Cat.2 R45
Vinyl chloride75-01-4
<10% R12, Carc. Cat 1 R45
1,1,2-Trichloroethane79-00-5
<10% R20/21/22
Benzene71-43-2
<1% R11, Carc. Cat.1 R45, R48/23/24/25
Chloroform67-66-3
<1% R22, R38, Carc. Cat. 3 R40, R48/20/22
Water7732-18-5
<1% -
1,2-Dichloroethene (E)-156-60-5
<10% R11, R20, R52/53
1,1,2,2-Tetrachloroethane79-34-5
<1% R26/27, R51/53
3. Hazards identification
Risk Phrases: Highly Flammable. Harmful by inhalation, in contact with skin and if swallowed. Irritating to eyes, respiratory system and skin. May cause cancer.
Poisons Schedule: S7 Dangerous Poison.
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4. First-aid measures
For advice, contact a Poisons Information Centre (Phone eg. Australia 131 126; New Zealand 0 800 764766) or a doctor.
Inhalation: Remove victim from area of exposure - avoid becoming a casualty. Remove contaminated clothing and loosen remaining clothing. Allow patient to assume most comfortable position and keep warm. Keep at rest until fully recovered. If patient finds breathing difficult and develops a bluish discolouration of the skin (which suggests a lack of oxygen in the blood - cyanosis), ensure airways are clear of any obstruction and have a qualified person give oxygen through a face mask. Apply artificial respiration if patient is not breathing. Seek immediate medical advice.
Skin Contact: If skin or hair contact occurs, immediately remove any contaminated clothing and wash skin and hair thoroughly with running water and soap. If swelling, redness, blistering or irritation occurs seek medical assistance.
Eye Contact: If in eyes, hold eyelids apart and flush the eye continuously with running water. Continue flushing until advised to stop by the Poisons Information Centre or a doctor, or for at least 15 minutes.
Ingestion: Rinse mouth with water. If swallowed, do NOT induce vomiting. Give a glass of water. Seek immediate medical assistance.
Notes to physician: Treat symptomatically.
5. Fire-fighting measures
Specific Hazards: Highly flammable liquid. Avoid all ignition sources. All potential sources of ignition (open flames, pilot lights, furnaces, spark producing switches and electrical equipment etc) must be eliminated both in and near the work area. Do NOT smoke. May form flammable vapour mixtures with air. Vapour may travel a considerable distance to source of ignition and flash back.
Fire-fighting advice: On burning will emit toxic fumes, including those of oxides of carbon . Heating can cause expansion or decomposition of the material, which can lead to the containers exploding. If safe to do so, remove containers from the path of fire. Keep containers cool with water spray. If safe to do so, remove containers from path of fire. Fire fighters to wear self-contained breathing apparatus and suitable protective clothing if risk of exposure to vapour or products of combustion.
Suitable Extinguishing Media: Foam, dry agent (carbon dioxide, dry chemical powder).
6. Accidental release measures
Shut off all possible sources of ignition. Clear area of all unprotected personnel. Slippery when spilt. Avoid accidents, clean up immediately. Wear protective equipment to prevent skin and eye contact and breathing in vapours. Work up wind or increase ventilation. Contain - prevent run off into drains and waterways. Use absorbent (soil, sand or other inert material). Use a spark-free shovel. Collect and seal in properly labelled containers or drums for disposal. If contamination of sewers or waterways has occurred advise local emergency services.
7. Handling and storage
Handling advice: Avoid skin and eye contact and breathing in vapour. Take precautionary measures against static discharges.
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Storage advice: Store in a cool, dry, well ventilated place and out of direct sunlight. Store away from sources of heat or ignition. Store away from foodstuffs. Store away from incompatible materials described in Section 10. Keep containers closed when not in use - check regularly for leaks.
This material is a Scheduled Poison S7 and must be stored, maintained and used in accordance with the relevant regulations.
8. Exposure controls/personal protection
Occupational Exposure Limits:No value assigned for this specific material by the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission. However, Exposure Standard(s) for constituent(s):
Ethylene dichloride: 8hr TWA = 40 mg/m3 (10 ppm) Vinyl chloride, monomer: 8hr TWA = 13 mg/m3 (5 ppm), Carcinogen Category 1 1,1,2-Trichloroethane: 8hr TWA = 55 mg/m3 (10 ppm), Sk 1,1,2,2-Tetrachloroethane: 8hr TWA = 6.9 mg/m3 (1 ppm), Sk Chloroform: 8hr TWA = 10 mg/m3 (2 ppm), Carcinogen Category 3 Benzene: 8hr TWA = 3.2 mg/m3 (1 ppm), Carcinogen Category 1
As published by the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission.
TWA - The time-weighted average airborne concentration over an eight-hour working day, for a five-day working week over an entire working life.
`Sk' Notice – absorption through the skin may be a significant source of exposure. The exposure standard is invalidated if such contact should occur.
Carcinogen Category 1 – established human carcinogen. There is sufficient evidence to establish a causal association between human exposure and the development of cancer.
Carcinogen Category 3 – substances suspected of having carcinogenic potential. The available information is not adequate for making a satisfactory assessment.
These Exposure Standards are guides to be used in the control of occupational health hazards. All atmospheric contamination should be kept to as low a level as is workable. These exposure standards should not be used as fine dividing lines between safe and dangerous concentrations of chemicals. They are not a measure of relative toxicity.
Engineering Control Measures:Ensure ventilation is adequate and that air concentrations of components are controlled below quoted Exposure Standards. Vapour heavier than air - prevent concentration in hollows or sumps. DO NOT enter confined spaces where vapour may have collected. If inhalation risk exists: Use with local exhaust ventilation or while wearing organic vapour/particulate respirator. Keep containers closed when not in use.
Personal Protective Equipment:Orica Personal Protection Guide No. 1, 1998: H - OVERALLS, SAFETY SHOES, CHEMICAL GOGGLES, GLOVES,
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RESPIRATOR.
Wear overalls, chemical goggles and impervious gloves. Use with adequate ventilation. If inhalation risk exists wear organic vapour/particulate respirator or air supplied mask meeting the requirements of AS/NZS 1715 and AS/NZS 1716. Always wash hands before smoking, eating, drinking or using the toilet. Wash contaminated clothing and other protective equipment before storage or re-use.
9. Physical and chemical properties
Physical state: LiquidColour: ColourlessOdour: PleasantSolubility: Slightly soluble in water.Specific Gravity: ca. 1.2Relative Vapour Density (air=1): >1Vapour Pressure (20 °C): ca. 8 kPaFlash Point (°C): 13 (for Ethylene dichloride)Flammability Limits (%): 6.2-16 (for Ethylene dichloride)Autoignition Temperature (°C): 440 (for Ethylene dichloride)Boiling Point/Range (°C): 83.5 (for Ethylene dichloride)pH: Not applicableViscosity: 0.82 cP @ 20°C
10. Stability and reactivity
Stability: Incompatible with oxidising agents , acids , and alkalis . Attacks metals in the presence of moisture.
11. Toxicological information
No adverse health effects expected if the product is handled in accordance with this Safety Data Sheet and the product label. Symptoms or effects that may arise if the product is mishandled and overexposure occurs are:
Ingestion: Swallowing can result in nausea, vomiting and central nervous system depression. If the victim is showing signs of central system depression (like those of drunkeness) there is greater likelihood of the patient breathing in vomit and causing damage to the lungs.
Eye contact: An eye irritant.Skin contact: Contact with skin will result in irritation. Will have a degreasing action on the skin. Repeated or prolonged
skin contact may lead to irritant contact dermatitis. Component/s of this material can be absorbed through the skin with resultant toxic effects.
Inhalation: Breathing in vapour will produce respiratory irritation. Breathing in vapour can result in headaches, dizziness, drowsiness, and possible nausea. Breathing in high concentrations can produce central nervous system depression, which can lead to loss of co-ordination, impaired judgement and if exposure is prolonged, unconsciousness.
Long Term Effects:Available evidence from animal studies indicate that repeated or prolonged exposure to this material could result in effects on the liver , kidneys , and central nervous system. May cause cancer.
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Material Safety Data Sheet
Toxicological Data:No LD50 data available for the product. For the constituent Ethylene dichloride :
Oral LD50 (rat): 500 mg/kg.Oral LD50 (mice): 413 mg/kg.Oral LD50 (rabbit): 860 mg/kg.
12. Ecotoxicological information
Avoid contaminating waterways.
13. Disposal considerations
Refer to Waste Management Authority. Dispose of material through a licensed waste contractor. Advise flammable nature. Normally suitable for incineration by an approved agent.
14. Transport information
Road and Rail TransportClassified as Dangerous Goods by the criteria of the Australian Dangerous Goods Code (ADG Code) for Transport by Road and Rail.
UN No: 1992Class-primary 3 Flammable LiquidSubrisk 1: 6.1 ToxicPacking Group: IIProper Shipping Name: FLAMMABLE LIQUID, TOXIC, N.O.S. (CONTAINS ETHYLENE DICHLORIDE AND VINYL
CHLORIDE)
Hazchem Code: 3WE
Marine TransportClassified as Dangerous Goods by the criteria of the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG Code) for transport by sea.
UN No: 1992Class-primary: 3 Flammable LiquidSubrisk 1: 6.1 ToxicPacking Group: IIProper Shipping Name: FLAMMABLE LIQUID, TOXIC, N.O.S. (CONTAINS ETHYLENE DICHLORIDE AND VINYL
CHLORIDE)
Air TransportClassified as Dangerous Goods by the criteria of the International Air Transport Association (IATA) Dangerous Goods
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Regulations for transport by air.
UN No: 1992Class-primary: 3 Flammable LiquidSubrisk 1: 6.1 ToxicPacking Group: IIProper Shipping Name: FLAMMABLE LIQUID, TOXIC, N.O.S. (CONTAINS ETHYLENE DICHLORIDE AND VINYL
CHLORIDE)
15. Regulatory information
Classification: This material is hazardous according to criteria of NOHSC.T : Toxic Xi: Irritant
Risk Phrase(s): R11: Highly Flammable.R20/21/22: Harmful by inhalation, in contact with skin and if swallowed.R36/37/38: Irritating to eyes, respiratory system and skin.Carc. Cat. 1. R45: May cause cancer.
Safety Phrase(s): S16: Keep away from sources of ignition - No smoking.S23: Do not breathe vapour/mist/aerosol.S24/25: Avoid contact with skin and eyes.S26: In case of contact with eyes, rinse immediately with plenty of water and seek medical advice.S36/37/39: Wear suitable protective clothing, gloves and eye/face protection.
Poisons Schedule: S7 Dangerous Poison.
All the constituents of this material are listed on the Australian Inventory of Chemical Substances (AICS).
16. Other information
This material safety data sheet has been prepared by SH&E Shared Services, Orica.
Reason(s) for Issue:First Issue Primary MSDS
This MSDS summarises to our best knowledge at the date of issue, the chemical health and safety hazards of the material and general guidance on how to safely handle the material in the workplace. Since Orica Limited cannot anticipate or control the conditions under which the product may be used, each user must, prior to usage, assess and control the risks arising from its use of the material.
If clarification or further information is needed, the user should contact their Orica representative or Orica Limited at the
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contact details on page 1.
Orica Limited's responsibility for the material as sold is subject to the terms and conditions of sale, a copy of which is available upon request.
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Material Safety Data Sheet
This material is hazardous according to criteria of NOHSC.Not classified as Dangerous Goods by the criteria of the Australian Dangerous Goods Code (ADG Code) for transport by Road and Rail.
1. Identification of the substance/preparation and of the company/undertaking
Product Name: SOUTHLANDS GROUNDWATER - CENTRAL PLUME
Supplier: Orica Australia Pty LtdABN: 004 117 828Street Address: 1 Nicholson Street
Melbourne 3000 Australia
Telephone Number: +61 3 9665 7111Facsimile: +61 3 9665 7937
Emergency Telephone: 1 800 033 111 (ALL HOURS)
2. Composition/information on ingredients
Product Description: Contaminated ground water for storage, treatment, and/or experimentation.
Components / CAS Number Proportion Risk PhrasesNon hazardous component(s)-
>99% -
Trichloroethylene79-01-6
<0.1% R36/38, Muta. Cat.3 R40, Carc. Cat.2 R45, R52/53, R67
Vinyl chloride75-01-4
<0.01% R12, Carc. Cat 1 R45
1,1,2-Trichloroethane79-00-5
<0.01% R20/21/22
Ethylene dichloride107-06-2
>0.1-<0.5% R11, R22, R36/37/38, Carc.Cat.2 R45
3. Hazards identification
Risk Phrases: May cause cancer.
Poisons Schedule: S7 Dangerous Poison.
4. First-aid measures
For advice, contact a Poisons Information Centre (Phone eg. Australia 131 126; New Zealand 0 800 764766) or a doctor. Not to be available except to authorised or licensed persons.
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Inhalation: Remove victim from area of exposure - avoid becoming a casualty. Seek medical advice if effects persist.
Skin Contact: If skin contact occurs, remove contaminated clothing and wash skin with running water. If irritation occurs seek medical advice.
Eye Contact: If in eyes, wash out immediately with water. In all cases of eye contamination it is a sensible precaution to seek medical advice.
Ingestion: Rinse mouth with water. If swallowed, do NOT induce vomiting. Give a glass of water. Seek medical advice.
Notes to physician: Treat symptomatically.
5. Fire-fighting measures
Specific Hazards: Non-combustible material.Fire-fighting advice: Decomposes on heating emitting toxic fumes. Fire fighters to wear self-contained
breathing apparatus and suitable protective clothing if risk of exposure to products of decomposition.
Suitable Extinguishing Media: Not combustible, however, if material is involved in a fire use: Extinguishing media appropriate to surrounding fire conditions.
6. Accidental release measures
Slippery when spilt. Avoid accidents, clean up immediately. Contain - prevent run off into drains and waterways. Use absorbent (soil, sand or other inert material). Collect and seal in properly labelled containers or drums for disposal.
7. Handling and storage
Handling advice: Avoid skin and eye contact and breathing in vapour, mists and aerosols.
Storage advice: Store in a cool, dry, well ventilated place and out of direct sunlight. Store away from foodstuffs. Keep containers closed when not in use - check regularly for leaks.
This material is a Scheduled Poison S7 and must be stored, maintained and used in accordance with the relevant regulations.
8. Exposure controls/personal protection
Occupational Exposure Limits:No value assigned for this specific material by the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission. However, Exposure Standard(s) for constituent(s):
Ethylene dichloride: 8hr TWA = 40 mg/m3 (10 ppm) 1,1,2-Trichloroethane: 8hr TWA = 55 mg/m3 (10 ppm), Sk Trichloroethylene: 8hr TWA = 270 mg/m3 (50 ppm), 15 min STEL = 1080 mg/m3 (200 ppm) Vinyl chloride, monomer: 8hr TWA = 13 mg/m3 (5 ppm), Carcinogen Category 1
Product Name: SOUTHLANDS GROUNDWATER - CENTRAL PLUMESubstance No: 000000008892 Issued: 07/10/2003 Version: 1
Page 2 of 5
Material Safety Data Sheet
As published by the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission.
TWA - The time-weighted average airborne concentration over an eight-hour working day, for a five-day working week over an entire working life.
STEL (Short Term Exposure Limit) – the average airborne concentration over a 15 minute period which should not be exceeded at any time during a normal eight hour work day. According to current knowledge this concentration should neither impair the health of, nor cause undue discomfort to, nearly all workers.
Carcinogen Category 1 – established human carcinogen. There is sufficient evidence to establish a causal association between human exposure and the development of cancer.
`Sk' Notice – absorption through the skin may be a significant source of exposure. The exposure standard is invalidated if such contact should occur.
These Exposure Standards are guides to be used in the control of occupational health hazards. All atmospheric contamination should be kept to as low a level as is workable. These exposure standards should not be used as fine dividing lines between safe and dangerous concentrations of chemicals. They are not a measure of relative toxicity.
Engineering Control Measures:Ensure ventilation is adequate and that air concentrations of components are controlled below quoted Exposure Standards. Keep containers closed when not in use.
Personal Protective Equipment:Orica Personal Protection Guide No. 1, 1998: B - OVERALLS, SAFETY SHOES, SAFETY GLASSES, GLOVES.
Wear overalls, safety glasses and impervious gloves. Always wash hands before smoking, eating, drinking or using the toilet. Wash contaminated clothing and other protective equipment before storage or re-use.
9. Physical and chemical properties
Physical state: LiquidOdour: SlightSolubility: Miscible in water.Specific Gravity: ca. 1 @20°CFlash Point (°C): Not applicable.Boiling Point/Range (°C): ca. 100pH: ca. 7 (1% aqueous solution)
10. Stability and reactivity
Stability: The material is stable under normal ambient and anticipated storage and handling conditions of temperature and pressure.
11. Toxicological information
Product Name: SOUTHLANDS GROUNDWATER - CENTRAL PLUMESubstance No: 000000008892 Issued: 07/10/2003 Version: 1
Page 3 of 5
Material Safety Data Sheet
No adverse health effects expected if the product is handled in accordance with this Safety Data Sheet and the product label. Symptoms or effects that may arise if the product is mishandled and overexposure occurs are:
Ingestion: No adverse effects expected, however large amounts may cause nausea and vomiting.Eye contact: May be an eye irritant.Skin contact: Contact with skin may result in irritation.Inhalation: Breathing in mists or aerosols may produce respiratory irritation.
Long Term Effects:May cause cancer.
Toxicological Data:No LD50 data available for the product. However, for constituent(s) Ethylene dichloride :
Oral LD50 (rat): 670 mg/kg.
12. Ecotoxicological information
Avoid contaminating waterways.
13. Disposal considerations
Refer to Waste Management Authority. Dispose of material through a licensed waste contractor.
14. Transport information
Road and Rail TransportNot classified as Dangerous Goods by the criteria of the Australian Dangerous Goods Code (ADG Code) for transport by Road and Rail.
Marine TransportNot classified as Dangerous Goods by the criteria of the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG Code) for transport by sea.
Air TransportNot classified as Dangerous Goods by the criteria of the International Air Transport Association (IATA) Dangerous Goods Regulations for transport by air.
15. Regulatory information
Classification: This material is hazardous according to criteria of NOHSC.T : Toxic
Product Name: SOUTHLANDS GROUNDWATER - CENTRAL PLUMESubstance No: 000000008892 Issued: 07/10/2003 Version: 1
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Material Safety Data Sheet
Risk Phrase(s): Carc. Cat. 2. R45: May cause cancer.
Safety Phrase(s): S45: In case of accident or if you feel unwell, seek medical advice immediately (show the label whenever possible).S53: Avoid exposure – obtain special instructions before use.
Poisons Schedule: S7 Dangerous Poison.
16. Other information
`Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances'. Ed. D. Sweet, US Dept. of Health & Human Services: Cincinatti, 2003.
This material safety data sheet has been prepared by SH&E Shared Services, Orica.
Reason(s) for Issue:Revised Primary MSDSChange in Formulation
This MSDS summarises to our best knowledge at the date of issue, the chemical health and safety hazards of the material and general guidance on how to safely handle the material in the workplace. Since Orica Limited cannot anticipate or control the conditions under which the product may be used, each user must, prior to usage, assess and control the risks arising from its use of the material.
If clarification or further information is needed, the user should contact their Orica representative or Orica Limited at the contact details on page 1.
Orica Limited's responsibility for the material as sold is subject to the terms and conditions of sale, a copy of which is available upon request.
Product Name: SOUTHLANDS GROUNDWATER - CENTRAL PLUMESubstance No: 000000008892 Issued: 07/10/2003 Version: 1
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Material Safety Data Sheet
Based on available information, not classified as hazardous according to criteria of NOHSC.Not classified as Dangerous Goods by the criteria of the Australian Dangerous Goods Code (ADG Code) for transport by Road and Rail.
1. Identification of the substance/preparation and of the company/undertaking
Product Name: SOUTHLANDS GROUND WATER
Supplier: Orica Australia Pty LtdABN: 004 117 828Street Address: 1 Nicholson Street
Melbourne 3000 Australia
Telephone Number: +61 3 9665 7111Facsimile: +61 3 9665 7937
Emergency Telephone: 1 800 033 111 (ALL HOURS)
2. Composition/information on ingredients
Product Description: Contaminated ground water for storage, treatment or experimentation.The major proportion of this material comprises of water. However, there are organic and inorganic contaminants at trace levels. The major contaminants of concern have been listed below:
Components / CAS Number Proportion Risk PhrasesEthylene dichloride107-06-2
<0.1% R11, R22, R36/37/38, Carc.Cat.2 R45
Carbon tetrachloride56-23-5
<0.05% R23/24/25, Carc. Cat.3 R40, R48/23, R52/53, R59
Tetrachloroethylene127-18-4
<0.025% Carc. Cat. 3 R40, R51/53
Vinyl chloride75-01-4
<0.02% R12, Carc. Cat 1 R45
Trichloroethylene79-01-6
<0.005% R36/38, Muta. Cat.3 R40, Carc. Cat.2 R45, R52/53, R67
Chloroform67-66-3
<0.005% R22, R38, Carc. Cat. 3 R40, R48/20/22
3. Hazards identification
Poisons Schedule: S7 Dangerous Poison.
4. First-aid measures
For advice, contact a Poisons Information Centre (Phone eg. Australia 131 126; New Zealand 0 800 764766) or a doctor.
Product Name: SOUTHLANDS GROUND WATERSubstance No: 000000001802 Issued: 22/03/2004 Version: 2
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Material Safety Data Sheet
Not to be available except to authorised or licensed persons.
Inhalation: Remove victim from area of exposure - avoid becoming a casualty. Remove contaminated clothing and loosen remaining clothing. Allow patient to assume most comfortable position and keep warm. Keep at rest until fully recovered. If patient finds breathing difficult and develops a bluish discolouration of the skin (which suggests a lack of oxygen in the blood - cyanosis), ensure airways are clear of any obstruction and have a qualified person give oxygen through a face mask. Apply artificial respiration if patient is not breathing. Seek immediate medical advice.
Skin Contact: If skin or hair contact occurs, remove contaminated clothing and flush skin and hair with running water. If irritation occurs seek medical advice.
Eye Contact: If in eyes, wash out immediately with water. In all cases of eye contamination it is a sensible precaution to seek medical advice.
Ingestion: Rinse mouth with water. If swallowed, do NOT induce vomiting. Give a glass of water. Seek medical advice.
Notes to physician: Treat symptomatically.
5. Fire-fighting measures
Specific Hazards: Non-combustible material.Fire-fighting advice: Non-combustible material.
Suitable Extinguishing Media: Not combustible, however, if material is involved in a fire use: Extinguishing media appropriate to surrounding fire conditions.
6. Accidental release measures
Slippery when spilt. Avoid accidents, clean up immediately. Contain - prevent run off into drains and waterways. Use absorbent (soil, sand or other inert material). Collect and seal in properly labelled containers or drums for disposal.
7. Handling and storage
Handling advice: Avoid skin and eye contact and breathing in vapour, mists and aerosols.
Storage advice: Store in a cool, dry, well ventilated place and out of direct sunlight. Store away from foodstuffs. Keep containers closed when not in use - check regularly for leaks.
This material is a Scheduled Poison S7 and must be stored, maintained and used in accordance with the relevant regulations.
8. Exposure controls/personal protection
Occupational Exposure Limits:No value assigned for this specific material by the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission. However, Exposure Standard(s) for constituent(s):
Carbon tetrachloride: 8hr TWA = 0.63 mg/m3 (0.1 ppm), Carcinogen Category 2, Sk
Product Name: SOUTHLANDS GROUND WATERSubstance No: 000000001802 Issued: 22/03/2004 Version: 2
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Material Safety Data Sheet
Chloroform: 8hr TWA = 10 mg/m3 (2 ppm), Carcinogen Category 3 Ethylene dichloride: 8hr TWA = 40 mg/m3 (10 ppm) Perchloroethylene: 8hr TWA = 340 mg/m3 (50 ppm), 15 min STEL = 1020 mg/m3 (150 ppm), Carcinogen Category 3 Trichloroethylene: 8hr TWA = 270 mg/m3 (50 ppm), 15 min STEL = 1080 mg/m3 (200 ppm) Vinyl chloride, monomer: 8hr TWA = 13 mg/m3 (5 ppm), Carcinogen Category 1
As published by the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission.
TWA - The time-weighted average airborne concentration over an eight-hour working day, for a five-day working week over an entire working life.
STEL (Short Term Exposure Limit) – the average airborne concentration over a 15 minute period which should not be exceeded at any time during a normal eight hour work day. According to current knowledge this concentration should neither impair the health of, nor cause undue discomfort to, nearly all workers.
`Sk' Notice – absorption through the skin may be a significant source of exposure. The exposure standard is invalidated if such contact should occur.
Carcinogen Category 1 – established human carcinogen. There is sufficient evidence to establish a causal association between human exposure and the development of cancer.
Carcinogen Category 2 - probable human carcinogen. There is sufficient evidence to provide a strong presumption that human exposure may result in the development of cancer. This evidence is generally based on appropriate long term animal studies, limited epidemiological evidance or other relevant information.
Carcinogen Category 3 – substances suspected of having carcinogenic potential. The available information is not adequate for making a satisfactory assessment.
These Exposure Standards are guides to be used in the control of occupational health hazards. All atmospheric contamination should be kept to as low a level as is workable. These exposure standards should not be used as fine dividing lines between safe and dangerous concentrations of chemicals. They are not a measure of relative toxicity.
Engineering Control Measures:Ensure ventilation is adequate and that air concentrations of components are controlled below quoted Exposure Standards. Keep containers closed when not in use.
Personal Protective Equipment:Orica Personal Protection Guide No. 1, 1998: B - OVERALLS, SAFETY SHOES, SAFETY GLASSES, GLOVES.
Wear overalls, safety glasses and impervious gloves. Always wash hands before smoking, eating, drinking or using the toilet. Wash contaminated clothing and other protective equipment before storage or re-use.
9. Physical and chemical properties
Physical state: LiquidOdour: SlightSolubility: Partially miscible with water.
Product Name: SOUTHLANDS GROUND WATERSubstance No: 000000001802 Issued: 22/03/2004 Version: 2
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Material Safety Data Sheet
Specific Gravity: 1 @20°CRelative Vapour Density (air=1): Not applicableVapour Pressure (20 °C): Not applicableFlash Point (°C): Not applicableFlammability Limits (%): Not applicableAutoignition Temperature (°C): Not applicableBoiling Point/Range (°C): 100pH: 7 (1% aqueous solution)
Freezing Point/Range (°C): 0
10. Stability and reactivity
Stability: The material is stable under normal ambient and anticipated storage and handling conditions of temperature and pressure.
11. Toxicological information
No adverse health effects expected if the product is handled in accordance with this Safety Data Sheet and the product label. Symptoms or effects that may arise if the product is mishandled and overexposure occurs are:
Ingestion: No adverse effects expected, however large amounts may cause nausea and vomiting.Eye contact: May be an eye irritant.Skin contact: Repeated or prolonged skin contact may lead to irritation.Inhalation: Breathing in mists or aerosols may produce respiratory irritation.
Long Term Effects:No information available for the product.
Toxicological Data:No LD50 data available for the product.
12. Ecotoxicological information
Avoid contaminating waterways.
13. Disposal considerations
Refer to Waste Management Authority.
14. Transport information
Road and Rail TransportNot classified as Dangerous Goods by the criteria of the Australian Dangerous Goods Code (ADG Code) for transport by Road and Rail.
Product Name: SOUTHLANDS GROUND WATERSubstance No: 000000001802 Issued: 22/03/2004 Version: 2
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Material Safety Data Sheet
Marine TransportNot classified as Dangerous Goods by the criteria of the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG Code) for transport by sea.
Air TransportNot classified as Dangerous Goods by the criteria of the International Air Transport Association (IATA) Dangerous Goods Regulations for transport by air.
15. Regulatory information
Classification: Based on available information, not classified as hazardous according to criteria of NOHSC.Poisons Schedule: S7 Dangerous Poison.
16. Other information
This material safety data sheet has been prepared by SH&E Shared Services, Orica.
Reason(s) for Issue:5 Yearly Revised Primary MSDS
This MSDS summarises to our best knowledge at the date of issue, the chemical health and safety hazards of the material and general guidance on how to safely handle the material in the workplace. Since Orica Limited cannot anticipate or control the conditions under which the product may be used, each user must, prior to usage, assess and control the risks arising from its use of the material.
If clarification or further information is needed, the user should contact their Orica representative or Orica Limited at the contact details on page 1.
Orica Limited's responsibility for the material as sold is subject to the terms and conditions of sale, a copy of which is available upon request.
Product Name: SOUTHLANDS GROUND WATERSubstance No: 000000001802 Issued: 22/03/2004 Version: 2
Page 5 of 5
Material Safety Data Sheet
Based on available information, not classified as hazardous according to criteria of NOHSC.Not classified as Dangerous Goods by the criteria of the Australian Dangerous Goods Code (ADG Code) for transport by Road and Rail.
1. Identification of the substance/preparation and of the company/undertaking
Product Name: GTP GROUNDWATER
Supplier: Orica Australia Pty LtdABN: 004 117 828Street Address: 1 Nicholson Street,
Melbourne 3000Australia
Telephone Number: +61 3 9665 7111Facsimile: +61 3 9665 7937
Emergency Telephone: 1 800 033 111 (ALL HOURS)
2. Composition/information on ingredients
Product Description: Waste material. Opaque liquid, with a slight chlorinated hydrocarbon odour.
Components / CAS Number Proportion Risk PhrasesOther ingredient(s)-
to 100% -
Ethylene dichloride107-06-2
<0.1% R11, R22, R36/37/38, Carc.Cat.2 R45
3. Hazards identification
Poisons Schedule: None allocated.
4. First-aid measures
Inhalation: Remove victim from area of exposure - avoid becoming a casualty. Seek medical advice if effects persist.
Skin Contact: If skin contact occurs, remove contaminated clothing and wash skin with soap and water. If irritation occurs, seek medical advice.
Eye Contact: If in eyes, wash out immediately with water. In all cases of eye contamination it is a sensible precaution to seek medical advice.
Ingestion: Immediately rinse mouth with water. If swallowed, do NOT induce vomiting. Give a glass of water. Seek immediate medical assistance.
Notes to physician: Treat symptomatically.
5. Fire-fighting measures
Product Name: GTP GROUNDWATERSubstance No: 000000019161 Issued: 05/10/2004 Version: 1
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Material Safety Data Sheet
Specific Hazards: Non-combustible material.Fire-fighting advice: Decomposes on heating emitting toxic fumes. Fire fighters to wear self-contained
breathing apparatus and suitable protective clothing if risk of exposure to products of decomposition.
Suitable Extinguishing Media: Not combustible, however, if material is involved in a fire use: Water fog (or if unavailable fine water spray), foam, dry agent (carbon dioxide, dry chemical powder).
6. Accidental release measures
Wear protective equipment to prevent skin and eye contact and breathing in vapours/dust. Cover with damp absorbent (inert material, sand or soil). Collect and seal in properly labelled containers, bags or drums for disposal or re-use. Wash area down with excess water.
7. Handling and storage
Handling advice: Avoid skin and eye contact and breathing in vapour.
Storage advice: Store in a cool, dry, well ventilated place and out of direct sunlight. Store away from incompatible materials described in Section 10. Keep containers closed when not in use - check regularly for spills.
8. Exposure controls/personal protection
Occupational Exposure Limits:No value assigned for this specific material by the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission. However, Exposure Standard(s) for constituent(s):
Ethylene dichloride: 8hr TWA = 40 mg/m3 (10 ppm)
As published by the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission.
TWA - The time-weighted average airborne concentration over an eight-hour working day, for a five-day working week over an entire working life.
STEL (Short Term Exposure Limit) – the average airborne concentration over a 15 minute period which should not be exceeded at any time during a normal eight hour work day. According to current knowledge this concentration should neither impair the health of, nor cause undue discomfort to, nearly all workers.
These Exposure Standards are guides to be used in the control of occupational health hazards. All atmospheric contamination should be kept to as low a level as is workable. These exposure standards should not be used as fine dividing lines between safe and dangerous concentrations of chemicals. They are not a measure of relative toxicity.
Engineering Control Measures:
Product Name: GTP GROUNDWATERSubstance No: 000000019161 Issued: 05/10/2004 Version: 1
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Material Safety Data Sheet
Ensure ventilation is adequate and that air concentrations of components are controlled below quoted Exposure Standards. Use with local exhaust ventilation or while wearing organic vapour respirator. Keep containers closed when not in use.
Personal Protective Equipment:Orica Personal Protection Guide No. 1, 1998: G - OVERALLS, SAFETY SHOES, SAFETY GLASSES, GLOVES, RESPIRATOR.
Wear overalls, safety glasses and impervious gloves. If risk of inhalation exists, wear organic vapour respirator meeting the requirements of AS/NZS 1715 and AS/NZS 1716. Wash contaminated clothing and other protective equipment before storage or re-use. Always wash hands before smoking, eating, drinking or using the toilet.
9. Physical and chemical properties
Physical state: LiquidColour: OpaqueOdour: Slight Chlorinated HydrocarbonSolubility: Miscible with water.Specific Gravity: ca. 1.0 (water=1)Relative Vapour Density (air=1): Not availableVapour Pressure (20 °C): Not availableFlash Point (°C): Not applicableFlammability Limits (%): Not applicableAutoignition Temperature (°C): Not applicableMelting Point/Range (°C): ca. 0Boiling Point/Range (°C): ca. 100Decomposition Point (°C): Not availablepH: Not available
10. Stability and reactivity
Stability: Stable under normal conditions of use.
11. Toxicological information
No adverse health effects expected if the product is handled in accordance with this Safety Data Sheet and the product label. Symptoms or effects that may arise if the product is mishandled and overexposure occurs are:
Ingestion: Swallowing can result in nausea, vomiting, diarrhoea, and abdominal pain.Eye contact: May be an eye irritant.Skin contact: Contact with skin may result in irritation. Repeated or prolonged skin contact may lead to irritation.Inhalation: Breathing in vapour may produce respiratory irritation.
Long Term Effects:No information available for the product.
Toxicological Data:No LD50 data available for the product.
Product Name: GTP GROUNDWATERSubstance No: 000000019161 Issued: 05/10/2004 Version: 1
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Material Safety Data Sheet
12. Ecotoxicological information
Avoid contaminating waterways.
13. Disposal considerations
Refer to Waste Management Authority.
14. Transport information
Road and Rail TransportNot classified as Dangerous Goods by the criteria of the Australian Dangerous Goods Code (ADG Code) for transport by Road and Rail.
Marine TransportNot classified as Dangerous Goods by the criteria of the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG Code) for transport by sea.
Air TransportNot classified as Dangerous Goods by the criteria of the International Air Transport Association (IATA) Dangerous Goods Regulations for transport by air.
15. Regulatory information
Classification: Based on available information, not classified as hazardous according to criteria of NOHSC.Poisons Schedule: None allocated.
All the constituents of this material are listed on the Australian Inventory of Chemical Substances (AICS).
16. Other information
This material safety data sheet has been prepared by SH&E Shared Services, Orica.
Reason(s) for Issue:First Issue Primary MSDS
This MSDS summarises to our best knowledge at the date of issue, the chemical health and safety hazards of the
Product Name: GTP GROUNDWATERSubstance No: 000000019161 Issued: 05/10/2004 Version: 1
Page 4 of 5
Material Safety Data Sheet
material and general guidance on how to safely handle the material in the workplace. Since Orica Limited cannot anticipate or control the conditions under which the product may be used, each user must, prior to usage, assess and control the risks arising from its use of the material.
If clarification or further information is needed, the user should contact their Orica representative or Orica Limited at the contact details on page 1.
Orica Limited's responsibility for the material as sold is subject to the terms and conditions of sale, a copy of which is available upon request.
Product Name: GTP GROUNDWATERSubstance No: 000000019161 Issued: 05/10/2004 Version: 1
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Orica GTP PHA Report Rev F.doc8 November 2004A4.1
Appendix 4
Description of EFFECTS
Preliminary Hazard Analysis, GroundwaterTreatment Plant, Orica Australia Pty Ltd,
Botany Industrial Park
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Orica GTP PHA Report Rev F.doc8 November 2004A4.2
Appendix 4 – Description of EFFECTS
EFFECTS is a software package developed by TNO to perform consequentialimpact calculations. The programme performs consequence calculations foruser defined hazardous incident / release scenarios.
Consequence models in EFFECTS are based on the models in the well-known"Yellow Book" (Ref A4.1). The models used by EFFECTS are fully described inthe Yellow Book and are also described briefly below.
A4.1 Release Rates
EFFECTS can model release behaviour for compressed gas, liquid or 2-phasereleases from vessels, pipelines or total vessel rupture. Data supplied by theanalyst includes the type of release, location of release with respect to vesselgeometry, pipe lengths etc. and initial conditions of the fluid (i.e. before release).The maximum spreading area of a pool is also supplied by the analyst, as is thesubstrate material (i.e. concrete, sand, water etc).
A4.2 Atmospheric Conditions
Meteorological data used in the dispersion calculations is input by the user.The weather data is divided into 6 Pasquill stability classes and averagewindspeeds, with 12 directional probabilities for each windspeed / stability classcombination.
A4.3 Dispersion
The dispersion model used is selected by the analyst, depending on releaseconditions and behaviour, e.g. velocity, density of fluid.
For passive dispersions, a Gaussian plume dispersion model is used.
The SLAB model is used for dense gas dispersion calculations. Dispersionfrom a ground level evaporating pool, a horizontal or vertical jet or aninstantaneous release can be treated. The model predicts dispersion behaviourby solving the conservation equations for mass, momentum and energy. Thecloud is treated as a steady state plume, a transient "puff" or a combination ofthe two, depending on the release duration.
In the case of a finite duration release, cloud dispersion is initially describedusing the steady state plume model as long as the source is active. Once thesource has been shut off, subsequent dispersion is calculated by the transientpuff model. For instantaneous releases, the transient puff model is used for theentire calculation.
The input to the dispersion model is the release rate calculated by the releaserate and / or pool evaporation models. In the case of a time varying release, therelease rate is averaged over the release duration. Alternatively, the analystmay choose to use a time varying release rate as an input to the calculation(this lengthens the calculation time). For this study the release rates have been
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Orica GTP PHA Report Rev F.doc8 November 2004A4.3
averaged over the release duration for the most part, however if a significantreduction in release rate occurs over the release duration, the time step optionhas been used.
A4.4 Toxic Impact
The effect of exposure to toxic materials is predicted using probit equations.The calculated probit can be mathematically transformed (using the errorfunction), allowing a probability of fatality to be predicted for a particular dose.EFFECTS contains a set of default probits for common toxic materials, howevera user defined probit may also be used. The equations are of the form:
Probit = A + B ln(cnt)
t exposure time (min)
c concentration (ppm)
Probability of fatality = 12 (1 + erf
Pr −520.5 )
The dispersion results are presented in terms of dose rather than concentration.Dose is calculated within EFFECTS by integrating the concentration at aparticular location over the exposure duration. The concentration may vary overtime. The duration is the lesser of the time taken for the cloud to pass or themaximum exposure duration (a parameter set by the analyst). Typically, amaximum exposure duration of 1 hour is set.
A4.5 Fires and Heat Radiation
Heat radiation effects are calculated based on flame surface emissive power(which is dependent on the quantity of material, its heat of combustion, flamedimensions and the fraction of heat radiated). The heat flux at a particulardistance from a fire is calculated using the view factor method. The view factortakes into account the distance from the flame to the target, the flamedimensions and the orientation angle between the flame and the target.
The effect of heat radiation on a person is calculated from the probit equationand the probability of fatality predicted by transforming the probit as for toxicimpact calculations. However in this case the dose is a thermal dose ratherthan toxic dose.
Probit = -36.38 + 2.56 ln(tQ1.33)
t exposure time (sec)
Q heat flux (W/m2)
Note that this probit is only valid for very short exposure durations (less than 1minute). For the purposes of this risk assessment it is assumed a person has20 seconds to escape from heat radiation (i.e. an exposure duration of 20seconds).
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Orica GTP PHA Report Rev F.doc8 November 2004A4.4
A4.6 Explosion and Overpressures
The Multi Energy method is used to predict the overpressures from flammablegas explosions. The key feature of the Multi-Energy method is that theexplosion is not primarily defined by the fuel air mixture but by the environmentin which the vapour disperses.
Partial confinement is regarded as a major cause of blast in vapour clouddeflagrations. Blast of substantial strength is not expected to occur in openareas. Strong blast is generated only in places characterised by partialconfinement while other large parts of the cloud burn out without contributing tothe blast effects. The vapour cloud explosion is not regarded as an entity but isdefined as a number of sub-explosions corresponding to various sources ofblast in the vapour cloud, i.e. each confined part of the cloud is calculated as aseparate vapour cloud explosion.
The initial strength of the blast is variable, depending on the degree ofconfinement and on the reactivity of the gas. The initial strength is representedas a scale of 1 to 10 where 1 means slow deflagration and 10 meansdetonation. For explosions in process plant environments, the initial strength isthought to lie between 4 to 7 on the scale.
The TNT equivalence model has traditionally been used to predict explosioneffects. For comparison, applying the Multi-Energy method with a blast strengthof 10 will give similar overpressures as application of the TNT method to theobstructed part of the cloud with an efficiency factor of 20%.
References
A4.1 "The Yellow Book", Methods for the Calculation of the Physical Effects ofthe Escape of Dangerous Material, CPR 14E, Parts 1& 2, Committee forthe Prevention of Disasters, 3rd edition 1997
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Appendix 5
Meteorological Data
Preliminary Hazard Analysis, GroundwaterTreatment Plant, Orica Australia Pty Ltd,
Botany Industrial Park
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Orica GTP PHA Report Rev F.doc8 November 2004A5.2
Appendix 5 – Meteorological Data
Six typical Botany wind/weather combinations (wind speed / Pasquill stabilitycategory) have been used as the basis for all dispersion calculations. Theprobability of each combination of wind/weather category and wind direction(any of 12 directions) is used in the risk modelling.
The wind/weather data used is a consolidated (reduced) version of a detailedstudy of prevailing wind/weather conditions at Botany carried out by P Zib andassociates. The data was reduced in conjunction with DIPNR some years agoto the typical wind/weather categories (wind speed / Pasquill stabilityconditions).
Direction WindFrom
Windspeed (m/s) / Stability Class
2.3 B 3.8 D 5.3 D 2.3 E 0.9 F 2.3 F
346-015 3.91 4.44 1.72 7.63 10.38 8.15
016-045 6.85 7.77 11.07 9.69 5.09 8.89
046-075 9.74 8.00 10.98 6.76 3.60 4.34
076-105 6.98 7.70 3.84 4.09 4.23 4.76
106-135 5.08 7.50 3.73 6.24 4.27 5.42
136-165 8.26 10.40 8.38 7.51 4.46 6.78
166-195 10.02 12.21 23.72 7.31 4.93 3.49
196-225 6.31 4.52 8.51 3.32 4.96 2.16
226-255 7.86 6.48 8.00 6.33 9.50 5.00
256-285 20.86 14.04 17.18 15.12 8.56 14.81
286-315 9.56 12.26 2.66 19.17 12.74 24.87
316-345 4.62 4.76 0.60 6.71 26.85 11.04
Sum (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100
Proportion (%) 5.3 39.2 29.8 14.3 3.8 7.6
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10 REFERENCES
1 Department of Urban Affairs & Planning (NSW) Hazardous IndustryPlanning Advisory Paper No 6 – Guidelines for Hazard Analysis, 1992
2 Department of Urban Affairs & Planning (NSW), Applying SEPP (StateEnvironmental Planning Policy) 33
3 DIPNR, Director-General’s Requirements for Groundwater TreatmentPlant EIS, 2004
4 Department of Urban Affairs & Planning (NSW) Hazardous IndustryPlanning Advisory Paper No 4 – Risk Criteria for Land Use SafetyPlanning, 1992
5 Aker Kvaerner, Orica Australia Pty Ltd, Project Definition Study forBotany Groundwater Treatment Plant, Rev P1, February 2004
6 URS, Background Paper, Botany Groundwater Project, ProposedGroundwater Treatment Plant at Botany Site, 25 May 2004
7 KBR, Preliminary Hazard Analysis, Steam Stripping Unit, Orica Australia,2004
8 http://www.aiha.org/Committees/documents/erpglevels.pdf, AIHA ERPGwebsite, 2004
9. Yellow Book, Methods for the Calculation of the Physical Effects of theEscape of Dangerous Material, CPR 14E, Parts 1& 2, Committee for thePrevention of Disasters, TNO, 3rd edition 1997.
10 Lees F.P., Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 2nd Edition 1996
11 Gas Dispersion, Process SHE Guide No 20, 10th November 1998, ICIEngineering UK
12 TNO, Methods for the Determination of Possible Damage (The GreenBook), 1992
13 ICI HAZAN Course Manual, 1997
14 ICI Engineering Department, Process Safety Guide 14 - Reliability Data,ICI PLC (UK)
15 A W Cox, F P Lees and M L Ang, Classification of Hazardous Locations,Institution of Chemical Engineers, 1990
16 Orica Engineering, Elgas, Victoria, Quantitative Risk Analysis, 2002
17 Orica Engineering, Preliminary Hazard Analysis for the HCB DestructionPlant, 2003
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18 AIChE CCPS, Layer of Protection Analysis, 2001
19 ICI, Process SHE Guide Number 4
20 SHE Pacific, Final Hazard Analysis, Replacement Chloralkali Plant,Orica Australia Pty Ltd, Botany Industrial Park, NSW, 9 March 2000
21 ICI Engineering, Risk Assessment, Transport of Ethylene Dichloride fromICI Botany Site to Terminals Pty Ltd, September 1995