Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

 

G.R. No. L-35766 July 12, 1973

LIBERATO V. CASALS, and JOSE T. SUMCAD, petitioners, vs.HON. VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, BR. 1, REBECCA T. PALANCA and GRECAN CO., INC., respondents.

Ortile Law Office for petitioners.

Delante, Orellan and Associates for private respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

 

TEEHANKEE, J.:

The Court imposes a three-months suspension from the practice of law upon counsel of respondents for improper conduct and abuse of the Court's good faith by his acts in the case at bar manifesting gross disrespect for the Court's processes and a willful disregard of his solemn duty to conduct himself with all good fidelity to the Court and tending to embarrass gravely the administration of justice.

Upon the filing on November 2, 1972 of the petition at bar for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the Court as per its resolution of November 9, 1972 resolved, without giving due course to the petition, to require respondents to comment thereon within ten days from notice and to issue a temporary restraining order restraining respondent court inter alia from proceeding with the hearing of the case 1 pending before it below.

Under date of December 8, 1972, Atty. Leonido C. Delante as counsel for respondents, stating that while he had received on November 15, 1972 notice of the Court's resolution of November 9, 1972, "no accompanying copy of the petition has been attached thereto, hence the undersigned counsel would not be able to prepare the comments of the respondents as directed in said resolution without said copy." filed his first motion for a ten-day extension of time from receipt of such petition within which to submit respondents' comment. The Court granted such first extension per its resolution of December 15, 1972.

Under date of December 14, 1972, Atty. Primo O. Orellan on behalf of Delante, Orellan & Associates as counsel for respondents filed a verified second motion for extension of ten days from December 15, 1972 within which to submit respondents' comment on the ground "2. That Atty. L.C. Delante, counsel of record, got sick on December 6, 1972 and had not reported to work as yet" as per verified medical certificate attached to the motion and "3. That Atty. Delante has just recovered from his

ailment, and has requested the undersigned to specially make this motion for another extension of TEN (10) days in order to enable him to finish the comments for the respondents."

Under date of December 28, 1972, Atty. Leonido C. Delante filed a third motion for "a last extension of fifteen days from December 29, 1972 to submit the required comment, stating "That the undersigned counsel has already prepared the final draft of the desired comments, but due to pressure of work in his office and matters occasioned by the Christmas season, the same has not been finalized and typed out in a clean copy," for filing by the expiry date on December 28, 1972.

The Court per its resolution of January 15, 1973 granted the said extensions totalling twenty-five days. Having noted respondents' failure to file their comment notwithstanding the numerous extensions sought by and granted to their counsel, which expired on January 12, 1973, the Court as per its resolution of April 12, 1973 resolved to require Atty. Delante as counsel for respondents to explain and show cause within ten days from notice why they failed to file the required comment.

Atty. Delante filed in due course his explanation dated May 7, 1973, wherein he claimed for the first time that "in view of (his) pressing professional commitments," he requested his clients "to have the answer ... prepared by another lawyer for which reason (respondents) took delivery of the records of the said case from his office and contracted the services of Atty. Antonio Fernandez."

Atty. Delante goes on to claim that it was only upon receipt of the Court's resolution of April 12, 1973 requiring his explanation that he learned that Atty. Fernandez who had contracted "to prepare an answer, underwent a surgical operation," attaching a copy of Atty. Fernandez' affidavit together with a medical certificate which certified however to the latter's confinement at the Davao Doctors' Hospital only from "Dec. 23-26, 1972" and "(D)aily follow up: Dec. 26, 1972 Jan. 15, 1973." Atty. Fernandez in his affidavit however stated that after his services had been retained by respondents "sometime on December 12, 1972" he "had been confined in the Davao Doctors' Hospital and subsequently operated on for sinusitis" (on December 23-26, 1972) and that Gregorio Cañeda, president of respondent Grecan Co. Inc. "saw me in the hospital and asked from me the answer and I told him that I may not be able to proceed and prepare the answer because of the operation that I just had, hence he got the records of the case G.R. No. L-35766 from me."

Atty. Delante further submitted the so-called "affidavit" dated May 5, 1973 of Gregorio Cañeda, president and general manager of respondent Grecan Co. Inc. supporting his belated claim now that their corporation contracted the services of Atty. Fernandez "to prepare the answer to meet the deadline" and delivered the records of the case to the latter. The so-called "affidavit" is however not sworn to before any official authorized to administer oaths but merely carries the statement "(T)hat the foregoing facts are true and correct as what actually transpired" under the signature of one Rebecca T. Palanca (Secretary-Treasurer)."

Atty. Delante pleads that "it is far from (his) intention to cause any undue delay in the disposition of the above-entitled case," and "(T)hat this is the first time it happened to him, and that if given an opportunity to prepare the answer, he will try his best to do it within the period granted by this Honorable Tribunal, and that he assures this Honorable Tribunal that there would be no repetition of this similar incident in the future." He prays that his explanation be accepted and without blinking an eye — notwithstanding that the required comment has long been overdue for almost four months at the time — that he "be given an opportunity to prepare the necessary answer for the respondents."

Counsel for petitioners promptly filed their comments dated May 11, 1973 citing the inconsistencies and contradictions in Atty. Delante's explanation, opposing his plea to still be allowed to file respondents' comment after his "gross and inexcusable negligence" and praying that the petition be considered submitted for resolution by the Court.

In an earlier resolution of July 9, 1973, the Court took action on the petition and dismissed the same for insufficient showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent court in denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the case below and appeal in due course from any adverse decision on the merits being the merits being the proper and adequate remedy.

The present resolution concerns Atty. Delante's explanation which the Court finds to be unsatisfactory.

Atty. Delante's present explanation that his failure to file respondents' comment is due to the failure of the other lawyer, Atty. Fernandez, contracted by his clients at his instance because of his pressing professional commitments "to do so, because of a surgical operation," is unworthy of credence because it is contrary to the facts of record:

— In his previous motions for extension, he never mentioned his belated allegation now that another lawyer had been retained to file the required comment, and no other lawyer, much less Atty. Fernandez, ever entered an appearance herein on behalf of respondents;

— In his second motion for extension, supra, Atty. Delante's law office cited as reason the fact that he had gotten sick on December 6, 1972 and had just recovered and needed the additional 10-day extension "in order to enable him to finish the comments for the respondents;"

— In his third motion for a last 15-day extension, Delante assured the Court "that (he) has already prepared the final draft of the desired comments" and cited "pressure of work in his office" and the Christmas Season for not having "finalized and typed out (the comments) in a clean copy" — which comments never came to be submitted to this Court;

— His present explanation is not even borne out by Atty. Fernandez' medical certificate which shows that he was confined in the hospital for sinusitis only from December 23-26, 1972 and therefore had sufficient time and opportunity to submit the comments by the extended deadline on January 12, 1973;

— Atty. Fernandez' own affidavit as submitted by Atty. Delante belies the latter's claim that the records of the case had been given to the former, for Atty. Fernandez swore therein that when Gregorio Cañeda of respondent corporation saw him at the hospital (sometime between December 23-26, 1972) he advised Cañeda of his inability to prepare the "answer" and Cañeda got back the records of the case from him;

— He submits no explanation whatsoever, why if his "final draft of the desired comments" was "already prepared" since year-end of 1972 and only had to be "finalized and typed out" he utterly failed to submit the same notwithstanding the lapse of over six months — and worse, in his "explanation" of May 7, 1973 asked yet for "an opportunity to prepare the anser [which] he will try his best to do it within the period granted by the Honorable Tribunal" when he had utterly ignored and disregarded the numerous extensions granted him which lapsed on January 12, 1973; and

— He likewise submits no explanation for his gross neglect in not seeing to it, assuming that Atty. Fernandez was to prepare the required comment, that the required comment was filed within the last extension (that expired on January 12, 1973) secured by him from the Court on his assurance that the final draft was ready and did nothing for three months until after he received the Court's resolution of April 12, 1973 requiring his explanation.

The Court thus finds unsatisfactory Atty. Delante's explanation for his having allowed his extended period to lapse without submitting the required comment nor extending to the Court the courtesy of any explanation or manifestation for his failure to do so. His inaction unduly prevented and delayed for a considerable period the Court's prompt disposition of the petition. Worse, when this was noted and the Court required his explanation, he gave an explanation that is devious and unworthy of belief since it is contradicted by his own previous representations of record as well as by the "supporting" documents submitted by him therewith, as shown hereinabove.

Furthermore, notwithstanding the lapse of over six months which he let pass without submitting the required comment which according to his motion of December 28, 1972 was "already prepared" by him and was only to be typed in clean, Atty. Delante in his explanation still brazenly asked the Court for a further period to submit respondents' comment which supposedly had been readied by him for submittal six months ago. His cavalier actions and attitude manifest gross disrespect for the Court's processes and tend to embarrass gravely the administration of justice.

In Pajares vs. Abad Santos 2 the Court reminded attorneys that "There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court which provides that "the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay" and expressly admonishes that "for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action."

It should also not be necessary to remind attorneys of their solemn oath upon their admission to the Philippine Bar, that they will do no falsehood and conduct themselves as lawyers according to the best of their knowledge and discretion good fidelity to the courts and their clients.

The unsatisfactory explanation given by Atty. Delante as against the pleadings of record in the case at bar evinces a willful disregard of his solemn duty as an attorney to employ in the conduct of a case "such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead" the courts "by an artifice or false statement of false statement of fact or law." 3

The Court has ever stressed that a lawyer must do his best to honor his oath, as there would be a great detriment to, if not a failure of the administration of justice if courts could not rely on the submissions and representations made by lawyers in the conduct of a case. As stated by the Court in one case, "Time and time again, lawyers have been admonished to remember that they are officers of the court, and that while they owe their clients the duty of complete fidelity and the utmost diligence, they are likewise held to strict accountability insofar as candor and honesty towards the court is concerned." 4

Hence, the Court has in several instances suspended lawyers from the practice of law for failure to file appellants' briefs in criminal cases despite repeated extensions of time obtained by them, (except to file the missing briefs), with the reminder that "the trust imposed on counsel in accordance not only with the canons of legal ethics but with the soundest traditions of the profession would require fidelity on their part."

Considering, however, that counsel's record shows no previous infractions on his part since his admission to the Philippine Bar in 1959, the Court is inclined to act in a spirit of leniency.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby suspends Atty. Leonido C. Delante from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months effective from his receipt of notice hereof, with the warning that repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. The clerk of court is directed to circularize notice of such suspension to the Court of Appeals and all courts of first instance and other courts of similar rank.

Let copies of this resolution be filed in his personal record and furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

 

G.R. No. L-22962 September 28, 1972

PILAR N. BORROMEO, MARIA B. PUTONG, FEDERICO V. BORROMEO, JOSE BORROMEO, CONSUELO B. MORALES and CANUTO V. BORROMEO, JR., petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE A. VILLAMOR, (Deceased) Substituted by FELISA VILLAMOR, ROSARIO V. LIAO LAMCO, MANUEL VILLAMOR, AMPARO V. COTTON, MIGUEL VILLAMOR and CARMENCITA VILLAMOR, respondents.

Filiberto Leonardo for petitioners.

Ramon Duterte for private respondents.

 

FERNANDO, J.:p

The point pressed on us by private respondents, 1 in this petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals in the interpretation of a stipulation which admittedly is not free from ambiguity, there being a mention of a waiver of the defense of prescription, is not calculated to elicit undue judicial sympathy. For if accorded acceptance, a creditor, now represented by his heirs, 2 who, following the warm and generous impulse of friendship, came to the rescue of a debtor from a serious predicament of his own making would be barred from recovering the money loaned. Thus the promptings of charity, unfortunately not often persuasive enough, would be discredited. It is unfortunate then that respondent Court of Appeals did not see it that way. For its decision to be upheld would be to subject the law to such a scathing indictment. A careful study of the relevant facts in the light of applicable doctrines calls for the reversal of its decision.

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals follow: "Before the year 1933, defendant [Jose A. Villamor] was a distributor of lumber belonging to Mr. Miller who was the agent of the Insular Lumber Company in Cebu City. Defendant being a friend and former classmate of plaintiff [Canuto O. Borromeo] used to borrow from the latter certain amounts from time to time. On one occasion with some pressing obligation to settle with Mr. Miller, defendant borrowed from plaintiff a large sum of money for which he mortgaged his land and house in Cebu City. Mr. Miller filed civil action against the defendant and attached his properties including those mortgaged to plaintiff, inasmuch as the deed of mortgage in favor of plaintiff could not be registered because not properly drawn up. Plaintiff then pressed the defendant for settlement of his obligation, but defendant instead offered to execute a document promising to pay his indebtedness even after the lapse of ten years. Liquidation was made and defendant was found to be indebted to plaintiff in the sum of P7,220.00, for which defendant signed a promissory note therefor on November 29, 1933 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum, agreeing to pay 'as soon as I have money'. The note further stipulates that defendant

'hereby relinquish, renounce, or otherwise waive my rights to the prescriptions established by our Code of Civil Procedure for the collection or recovery of the above sum of P7,220.00. ... at any time even after the lapse of ten years from the date of this instrument'. After the execution of the document, plaintiff limited himself to verbally requesting defendant to settle his indebtedness from time to time. Plaintiff did not file any complaint against the defendant within ten years from the execution of the document as there was no property registered in defendant's name, who furthermore assured him that he could collect even after the lapse of ten years. After the last war, plaintiff made various oral demands, but defendants failed to settle his account, — hence the present complaint for collection." 3 It was then noted in the decision under review that the Court of First Instance of Cebu did sentence the original defendant, the deceased Jose A. Villamor, to pay Canuto O. Borromeo, now represented by petitioners, the sum of P7,220.00 within ninety days from the date of the receipt of such decision with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the expiration of such ninety-day period. That was the judgment reversed by the Court of Appeals in its decision of March 7, 1964, now the subject of this petition for review. The legal basis was the lack of validity of the stipulation amounting to a waiver in line with the principle "that a person cannot renounce future prescription." 4

The rather summary and curt disposition of the crucial legal question of respondent Court in its five-page decision, regrettably rising not too-far-above the superficial level of analysis hardly commends itself for approval. In the first place, there appeared to be undue reliance on certain words employed in the written instrument executed by the parties to the total disregard of their intention. That was to pay undue homage to verbalism. That was to ignore the warning of Frankfurter against succumbing to the vice of literalism in the interpretation of language whether found in a constitution, a statute, or a contract. Then, too, in effect it would nullify what ought to have been evident by a perusal that is not-too-cursory, namely, that the creditor moved by ties of friendship was more than willing to give the debtor the utmost latitude as to when his admittedly scanty resources will allow him to pay. He was not renouncing any right; he was just being considerate, perhaps excessively so. Under the view of respondent Court, however, what had been agreed upon was in effect voided. That was to run counter to the well-settled maxim that between two possible interpretations, that which saves rather than destroys is to be preferred. What vitiates most the appealed decision, however, is that it would amount not to just negating an agreement duly entered into but would put a premium on conduct that is hardly fair and could be characterized as duplicitous. Certainly, it would reflect on a debtor apparently bent all the while on repudiating his obligation. Thus he would be permitted to repay an act of kindness with base ingratitude. Since as will hereafter be shown, there is, on the contrary, the appropriate construction of the wording that found its way in the document, one which has all the earmarks of validity and at the same time is in consonance with the demands of justice and morality, the decision on appeal, as was noted at the outset, must be reversed.

1. The facts rightly understood argue for the reversal of the decision arrived at by respondent Court of Appeals. Even before the event that gave rise to the loan in question, the debtor, the late Jose A. Villamor, being a friend and a former classmate, used to borrow from time to time various sums of money from the creditor, the late Canuto O. Borromeo. Then faced with the need to settle a pressing obligation with a certain Miller, he did borrow from the latter sometime in 1933 what respondent Court called "a large sum of money for which he mortgaged his land and house in Cebu City." 5 It was noted that this Miller did file a suit against him, attaching his properties including those he did mortgage to the late Borromeo, there being no valid objection to such a step as the aforesaid mortgage, not being properly drawn up, could not be registered. Mention was then made of the late Borromeo in his lifetime seeking the satisfaction of the sum due with Villamor unable to pay, but executing a document promising "to pay his indebtedness even after the lapse of ten years." 6 It is with such a background that the words employed in the instrument of November 29, 1933 should be viewed. There is nothing implausible in the view that such language renouncing the debtor's right to the prescription established by the Code of Civil Procedure should be given the meaning, as noted in the preceding sentence of the decision of respondent Court, that the debtor could be trusted to pay even after the termination of the ten-year prescriptive period. For as was also made clear therein, there had been since then verbal requests on the part of the creditor made to the debtor for the settlement of such a loan. Nor was the Court of Appeals

unaware that such indeed was within the contemplation of the parties as shown by this sentence in its decision: "Plaintiff did not file any complaint against the defendant within ten years from the execution of the document as there was no property registered in defendant's name who furthermore assured him that he could collect even after the lapse of ten years." 7

2. There is much to be said then for the contention of petitioners that the reference to the prescriptive period is susceptible to the construction that only after the lapse thereof could the demand be made for the payment of the obligation. Whatever be the obscurity occasioned by the words is illumined when the light arising from the relationship of close friendship between the parties as well as the unsuccessful effort to execute a mortgage, taken in connection with the various oral demands made, is thrown on them. Obviously, it did not suffice for the respondent Court of Appeals. It preferred to reach a conclusion which for it was necessitated by the strict letter of the law untinged by any spirit of good morals and justice, which should not be alien to legal norms. Even from the standpoint of what for some is strict legalism, the decision arrived at by the Court of Appeals calls for disapproval. It is a fundamental principle in the interpretation of contracts that while ordinarily the literal sense of the words employed is to be followed, such is not the case where they "appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the contracting parties," which "intention shall prevail."  8 Such a codal provision has been given full force and effect since the leading case of Reyes v. Limjap, 9 a 1910 decision. Justice Torres, who penned the above decision, had occasion to reiterate such a principle when he spoke for the Court in De la Vega v. Ballilos 10 thus: "The contract entered into by the contracting parties which has produced between them rights and obligations is in fact one of antichresis, for article 1281 of the Civil Code prescribes among other things that if the words should appear to conflict with the evident intent of the contracting parties, the intent shall prevail." 11 In Abella v. Gonzaga, 12 this Court through the then Justice Villamor, gave force to such a codal provision when he made clear that the inevitable conclusion arrived at was "that although in the contract Exhibit A the usual words 'lease,' 'lessee,' and 'lessor' were employed, that is no obstacle to holding, as we do hereby hold, that said contract was a sale on installments, for such was the evident intention of the parties in entering into said contract. 13 Only lately in Nielson and Company v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, 14 this Court, with Justice Zaldivar, as ponente, after stressing the primordial rule that in the construction and interpretation of a document, the intention of the parties must be sought, went on to state: "This is the basic rule in the interpretation of contracts because all other rules are but ancillary to the ascertainment of the meaning intended by the parties. And once this intention has been ascertained it becomes an integral part of the contract as though it had been originally expressed therein in unequivocal terms ... ." 15While not directly in point, what was said by Justice Labrador in Tumaneng v. Abad 16 is relevant: "There is no question that the terms of the contract are not clear on the period of redemption. But the intent of the parties thereto is the law between them, and it must be ascertained and enforced." 17 Nor is it to be forgotten, following what was first announced in Velasquez v. Teodoro 18 that "previous, simultaneous and subsequent acts of the parties are properly cognizable indicia of their true intention." 19

There is another fundamental rule in the interpretation of contracts specifically referred to in Kasilag v. Rodriguez, 20as "not less important" 21 than other principles which "is to the effect that the terms, clauses and conditions contrary to law, morals and public order should be separated from the valid and legal contract when such separation can be made because they are independent of the valid contract which expresses the will of the contracting parties. Manresa, commenting on article 1255 of the Civil Code and stating the rule of separation just mentioned, gives his views as follows: 'On the supposition that the various pacts, clauses, or conditions are valid, no difficulty is presented; but should they be void, the question is as to what extent they may produce the nullity of the principal obligation. Under the view that such features of the obligation are added to it and do not go to its essence, a criterion based upon the stability of juridical relations should tend to consider the nullity as confined to the clause or pact suffering therefrom, except in cases where the latter, by an established connection or by manifest intention of the parties, is inseparable from the principal obligation, and is a condition, juridically speaking, of that the nullity of which it would also occasion.' ... The same view prevails in the Anglo-American law as condensed in the following words: 'Where an agreement founded on a legal consideration contains several promises, or a promise to do several things, and a part only of the things to be done are illegal, the promises which can be separated, or the promise, so far as it can be separated, from the illegality,

may be valid. The rule is that a lawful promise made for a lawful consideration is not invalid merely because an unlawful promise was made at the same time and for the same consideration, and this rule applies, although the invalidity is due to violation of a statutory provision, unless the statute expressly or by necessary implication declares the entire contract void. ..." 22

Nor is it to be forgotten that as early as Compania Agricola Ultramar v. Reyes, 23 decided in 1904, the then Chief Justice Arellano in a concurring opinion explicitly declared: "It is true that contracts are not what the parties may see fit to call them, but what they really are as determined by the principles of law." 24 Such a doctrine has been subsequently adhered to since then. As was rephrased by Justice Recto in Aquino v. Deala: 25 "The validity of these agreements, however, is one thing, while the juridical qualification of the contract resulting therefrom is very distinctively another." 26 In a recent decision, Shell Company of the Phils., Ltd. vs. Firemen's Insurance Co. of Newark, 27 this court, through Justice Padilla, reaffirmed the doctrine thus: "To determine the nature of a contract courts do not have or are not bound to rely upon the name or title given it by the contracting parties, should there be a controversy as to what they really had intended to enter into, but the way the contracting parties do or perform their respective obligations, stipulated or agreed upon may be shown and inquired into, and should such performance conflict with the name or title given the contract by the parties, the former must prevail over the latter." 28 Is it not rather evident that since even the denomination of the entire contract itself is not conclusively determined by what the parties call it but by the law, a stipulation found therein should likewise be impressed with the characterization the law places upon it?

What emerges in the light of all the principles set forth above is that the first ten years after November 29, 1933 should not be counted in determining when the action of creditor, now represented by petitioners, could be filed. From the joint record on appeal, it is undoubted that the complaint was filed on January 7, 1953. If the first ten-year period was to be excluded, the creditor had until November 29, 1953 to start judicial proceedings. After deducting the first ten-year period which expired on November 29, 1943, there was the additional period of still another ten years. 29 Nor could there be any legal objection to the complaint by the creditor Borromeo of January 7, 1953 embodying not merely the fixing of the period within which the debtor Villamor was to pay but likewise the collection of the amount that until then was not paid. An action combining both features did receive the imprimatur of the approval of this Court. As was clearly set forth in Tiglao v. The Manila Railroad Company: 30 "There is something to defendant's contention that in previous cases this Court has held that the duration of the term should be fixed in a separate action for that express purpose. But we think the lower court has given good reasons for not adhering to technicalities in its desire to do substantial justice." 31 The justification became even more apparent in the latter portion of the opinion of Justice Alex Reyes for this Court: "We may add that defendant does not claim that if a separate action were instituted to fix the duration of the term of its obligation, it could present better proofs than those already adduced in the present case. Such separate action would, therefore, be a mere formality and would serve no purpose other than to delay." 32 There is no legal obstacle then to the action for collection filed by the creditor. Moreover, the judgment of the lower court, reversed by the respondent Court of Appeals, ordering the payment of the amount due is in accordance with law.

3. There is something more to be said about the stress in the Tiglao decision on the sound reasons for not adhering to technicalities in this Court's desire to do substantial justice. The then Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion expressed a similar thought in emphasizing that in the determination of the rights of the contracting parties "the interest of justice and equity be not ignored." 33 This is a principle that dates back to the earliest years of this Court. The then Chief Justice Bengzon in Arrieta v. Bellos, 34 invoked equity. Mention has been made of "practical and substantial justice," 35 "[no] sacrifice of the substantial rights of a litigant in the altar of sophisticated technicalities with impairment of the sacred principles of justice," 36 "to afford substantial justice" 37 and "what equity demands." 38 There has been disapproval when the result reached is "neither fair, nor equitable." 39 What is to be avoided is an interpretation that "may work injustice rather than promote justice." 40 What appears to be most obvious is

that the decision of respondent Court of Appeals under review offended most grievously against the above fundamental postulate that underlies all systems of law.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of March 7, 1964 is reversed, thus giving full force and effect to the decision of the lower court of November 15, 1956. With costs against private respondents.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

 

G.R. No. L-27072 January 9, 1970

SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD, ET AL., petitioners, vs.HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL ETC., ET AL., respondents, In Re: Contempt Proceedings Against Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto, Graciano C. Regala and Associates, Erlito R. Uy, Juanito M. Caling; and Morton F. Meads.

R E S O L U T I O N

 

SANCHEZ, J.:

After the July 31, 1968 decision of this Court adverse to respondent MacArthur International Minerals Co., the Solicitor General brought to our attention statements of record purportedly made by Vicente L. Santiago, Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala, and Jose Beltran Sotto, members of the Bar, with the suggestion that disciplinary action be taken against them. On November 21, 1968, this Court issued a show-cause order.

The following statements, so the Solicitor General avers, are set forth in the memoranda personally signed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto:

a. They (petitioners, including the Executive Secretary) have made these false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur International. Such efforts could be accurately called "scattershot desperation" (Memorandum for Respondents dated March 27, 1968, pp. 13-14, three lines from the bottom of page 13 and first line page 14).

b. Such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays bare the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners. (Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum and Reply to Petitioner's Memorandum Brief, dated April 13, 1968, p. 16, last two lines on bottom of the page).

c. The herein petitioners ... opportunistically change their claims and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case. (Respondents'

Supplemental Memorandum, Ibid., p.17, sixth, seventh and eighth lines from bottom of the page).

MacArthur's third motion for reconsideration signed by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, on his behalf and purportedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala and Associates, and Jose B. Sotto, the Solicitor General points out, contain the following statements:

d. ... ; and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked the applicable law due to the misrepresentation and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel. (Last sentence, par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).

e. ... Never has any civilized, democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick (referring to the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public, a government agency or just plain fraud ... and it is thus difficult, in the light of our upbringing and schooling, even under many of the incumbent justices, that the Honorable Supreme Court intends to create a decision that in effect does precisely that in a most absolute manner. (Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).

The motion to inhibit filed on September 21, 1968 — after judgment herein was rendered — and signed by Vicente L. Santiago for himself and allegedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, and Graciano Regala and Associates, asked Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves from considering, judging and resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion charges "[t]hat the brother of the Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous and illegal decision dated January 31, 1968" and the ex parte preliminary injunction rendered in the above-entitled case, the latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this case even before the joining of an issue. As to the Chief Justice, the motion states "[t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in this case." The appointment referred to was as secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, and makes a number of side comments projecting what is claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It enumerates "incidents" which, according to the motion, brought about respondent MacArthur's belief that "unjudicial prejudice" had been caused it and that there was "unjudicial favoritism" in favor of "petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party directly benefited by the said decision." The "incidents" cited are as follows:

(a) said decision is in violation of the law, which law has not been declared unconstitutional.

(b) said decision ignores totally the applicable law in the above-entitled case.

(c) said decision deprives respondent of due process of law and the right to adduce evidence as is the procedure in all previous cases of this nature.

(d) due course was given to the unfounded certiorari in the first place when the appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss was and is neither new nor novel nor capable of leading to a wholesome development of the law but — only served to delay respondent for the benefit of the favored party.

(e) the preliminary injunction issued herein did not maintain the status quo but destroyed it, and the conclusion cannot be avoided that it was destroyed for a reason, not for no reason at all.

(f) there are misstatements and misrepresentations in the said decision which the Honorable Supreme Court has refused to correct.

(g) the two main issues in the said decision were decided otherwise in previous decisions, and the main issue "right to reject any or all bids" is being treated on a double standard basis by the Honorable Supreme Court.

(h) the fact that respondent believes that the Honorable Supreme Court knows better and has greater understanding than the said decision manifests.

(i) the public losses (sic) one hundred and fifty to two hundred million dollars by said decision — without an effort by the Honorable Supreme Court to learn all the facts through presentation through the trial court, which is elementary.

On November 21, 1968, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, again for himself and Attys. Erlito R. Uy and Graciano Regala and Associates, in writing pointed out to this Court that the statements specified by the Solicitor General were either quoted out of context, could be defended, or were comments legitimate and justifiable. Concern he expressed for the fullest defense of the interests of his clients. It was stressed that if MacArthur's attorney could not plead such thoughts, his client would be deprived of due process of law. However, counsel sought to change the words "Chief Justice" to "Supreme Court" appearing on line 7, paragraph 2 of the motion to inhibit. Atty. Santiago also voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 of the said motion, which in full reads:

6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of our judicial authorities believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all matters that come before them, and that no matter what the circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity. Some seem to be constitutionally incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue. Witness the recent absurdity of Judge Alikpala daring to proceed to judge a motion to hold himself in contempt of court — seemingly totally oblivious or uncomprehending of the violation of moral principle involved — and also of Judge Geraldez who refuses to inhibit himself in judging a criminal case against an accused who is also his correspondent in two other cases. What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our government officials are just amoral?

And, in addition, he attempted to explain further subparagraphs (f) and (h) of paragraph 7 thereof.

It was on December 2, 1968 that Atty. Vicente L. Santiago filed his compliance with this Court's resolution of November 21, 1968. He there stated that the motion to inhibit and third motion for reconsideration were of his exclusive making and that he alone should be held responsible therefor. He further elaborated on his explanations made on November 21, 1968.

On December 5, 1968, he supplemented his explanations by saying that he already deleted paragraph 6 of the Motion to Inhibit heretofore quoted from his rough draft but that it was still included through inadvertence.

On March 1, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, as counsel for MacArthur, registered an amended motion to inhibit. While it repeats the prayer that Mr. Chief Justice Concepcion and Mr. Justice Castro inhibit themselves, it left but three paragraphs of the original motion to inhibit, taking out the dissertation on judicial ethics and most of the comments attacking the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968.

On the part of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto, it must be stated that as early as October 7, 1968, he insisted in withdrawing his appearance in this case as one of the lawyers of MacArthur. His ground was that he did not agree with the filing of the motion to inhibit the two justices. According to him, "[t]he present steps (sic) now being taken is against counsel's upbringing and judicial conscience."

In Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto's return of November 29, 1968, he took pains to say that the questioned statements he made were also taken out of context and were necessary for the defense of his client MacArthur. He made the admission, though, that those statements lifted out of context would indeed be sufficient basis for a finding that Section 20(f), Rule 138, had been violated.

On January 8, 1969, additional arguments were filed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. He there averred that the Supreme Court had no original jurisdiction over the charge against him because it is one of civil contempt against a party and the charge is originally cognizable by the Court of First Instance under Sections 4 and 10, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He also stressed that said charge was not signed by an "offended party or witness", as required by law; and that the Solicitor General and his assistants could not stand in the stead of an "offended Party or witness."

We now come to Atty. Graciano C. Regala. In his explanation of December 2, 1968, as further clarified by a supplemental motion of December 27, 1968, he manifested that the use of or reference to his law firm in this case was neither authorized nor consented to by him or any of his associates; that on July 14, 1967, one Morton F. Meads, in MacArthur's behalf, offered to retain his services, which was accepted; that Meads inquired from him whether he could appear in this case; that he advised Meads that this case was outside his professional competence and referred Meads to another lawyer who later on likewise turned down the offer; that in view of the rejection, Meads and he agreed to terminate their previous retainer agreement; that he had not participated in any manner in the preparation or authorship of any pleading or any other document in connection with this case.

On February 4, 1969, Atty. Erlito R. Uy explained his side of the case. In brief, he denied participation in any of the court papers subject of our November 21, 1968 order; claimed that he was on six months' leave of absence from July 1, 1968 to December 31, 1968 as one of the attorneys for MacArthur but that he gave his permission to have his name included as counsel in all of MacArthur's pleadings in this case (L-27072), even while he was on leave of absence.

Hearing on this contempt incident was had on March 3, 1969.

A second contempt proceeding arose when, on July 14, 1969, respondent MacArthur, through new counsel, Atty. Juanito M. Caling who entered a special appearance for the purpose, lodged a fourth motion for reconsideration without express leave of court. Said motion reiterated previous grounds raised, and contained the following paragraphs:

4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders of the Republic of the Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled case — which condition is prohibited by the New Rules of Court — Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote: "Justices; who may take part. — ... . only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and

adjudication ..." This requirement is especially significant in the present instance because the member who penned the decision was the very member who was absent for approximately four months or more. This provision also applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.

xxx xxx xxx

6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons its quest for justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it will inevitably either raise the graft and corruption of Philippine Government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965, required by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of the Surigao nickel deposits, to the World Court on grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation of property and /or to the United States Government, either its executive or judicial branches or both, on the grounds of confiscation of respondent's proprietary vested rights by the Philippine Government without either compensation or due process of law — and invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually, until restitution or compensation is made.

This elicited another resolution from this Court on July 18, 1969, requiring Atty. Juanito M. Caling "to show cause within five (5) days from receipt of notice hereof why he should not be dealt with for contempt of court."

On July 30, 1969, Atty. Juanita M. Caling filed his return. He there alleged that the said fourth motion for reconsideration was already finalized when Atty. Vicente L. Santiago came to his office and requested him to accommodate MacArthur by signing the motion; that he turned down said request twice on the ground that he did not know anything about the case, much less the truth of the allegations stated in the motion; that "the allegations in said motion were subsequently explained to the undersigned counsel together with the background of the case involved by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and by one Morton F. Meads"; that upon assurance that there was nothing wrong with the motion he was persuaded in good faith to sign the same; that he was misled in so signing and the true facts of the allegations were not revealed to him especially the oral argument allegedly made in the case.

Because of the foregoing explanation by Atty. Caling, this Court, on August 4, 1969, resolved "to require Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads to file in writing their answer to the said return [of Atty. Caling] and at the same time to show cause why they, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads, should not be dealt with for contempt of court, on or before August 16, 1969; and ... to direct that the three, Atty. Juanita M. Caling, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, and Morton Meads, personally appear Before this Court on Thursday, August 27, 1969, at 9:30 a.m., on which date the contempt proceedings against all of them will be heard by this Court."

On August 13, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago gave his explanation. He disavowed the truth of Atty. Caling's statement that he (Santiago) convinced Caling to sign the motion. The truth, according to Santiago, is that one day Morton Meads went to his office and asked him if he knew of a lawyer nearby who could help him file another motion for reconsideration, and he (Santiago) mentioned Atty. Caling; he there upon accompanied Meads to Caling, told Caling of Meads' desire and left Meads with Caling. Santiago insists that he never prepared the motion and that he never even read it.

On August 15, 1969, Morton Meads answered. Meads' version is as follows: On July 14, 1969, he went to Atty. Santiago's office with the fourth motion for reconsideration which he himself prepared. Santiago started to read the motion and in fact began to make some changes in Pencil in the first or second paragraph when Meads told him that MacArthur wanted a new lawyer, not Santiago, to file the same. Meads asked Santiago if he could recommend one. They then went to Caling whose office was on the same floor. Santiago introduced Meads to Caling at the same time handing the fourth motion to Caling. While Caling was reading the document, Santiago left. After reading the motion, Caling gave his go-signal. He signed the same after his name was typed therein. The motion was then filed. According to Meads, from the time he entered the office of Santiago to the time the motion was filed, the period that elapsed was approximately one hour and a half. Santiago was with Caling for about three minutes and Meads was with Caling for about fifteen minutes.

In defending himself from the contempt charge, Meads asserts that the quotation from the Rules of Court set forth in the fourth motion for reconsideration has not been taken out of context because said quotation is precisely accurate; that the "xs" indicate that it is not a complete quotation and that it is a common practice in court pleadings to submit partial quotations. Meads further contends that the announced plan to bring the case to the World Court is not a threat. In fact, his answer also included a notice of appeal to the World Court.

On August 27, 1969, this Court heard Attys. Vicente L. Santiago and Juanito Caling and Morton Meads in oral argument with respect to the second contempt incident. We shall now discuss the first and second contempt incidents seriatim.

1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for reconsideration, we, indeed, find language that is not to be expected of an officer of the courts. He pictures petitioners as "vulturous executives". He speaks of this Court as a "civilized, democratic tribunal", but by innuendo would suggest that it is not.

In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31, 1968 as "false, erroneous and illegal" in a presumptuous manner. He there charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case prejudiced and predetermined the case even before the joining of an issue. He accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this Court for being interested in the decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his brother is the vice president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the decision, and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was appointed secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments, "a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President, a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered." In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that "it would seem that the principles thus established [the moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority by the Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to itself." He puts forth the claim that lesser and further removed conditions have been known to create favoritism, only to conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro "would be less likely to engender favoritism or prejudice for or against a particular cause or party." Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are insensible to delicadeza, which could make their actuation suspect. He makes it plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were not free from the appearance of impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect their judgment. He points out that courts must be above suspicion at all times like Caesar's wife, warns that loss of confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to happen in our country, "although the process has already begun."

It is true that Santiago voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 which contained language that is as disrespectful. But we cannot erase the fact that it has been made. He explained that, he deleted this

paragraph in his rough draft, which paragraph was included in the motion filed in this Court only because of mere inadvertence. This explanation does not make much of a distinguishing difference; it erects no shield. Not only because it was belatedly made but also because his signature appeared on the motion to inhibit which included paragraph 6. And this paragraph 6 describes with derision "many of our judicial authorities" who "believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all matters that come before them, and that no matter what the circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity." It depicts them as seemingly "incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue." After citing acts of two judges of first instance, he paused to ask: "What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our government officials are just amoral?"

Paragraph 7 also of the motion to inhibit repeated mention of "unjudicial prejudice" against respondent MacArthur and spoke of "unjudicial favoritism" for petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party directly benefited by the decision. Paragraph 8 is a lecture on judicial ethics. Paragraph 9 is a warning to this Court about loss of confidence, and paragraph 10 makes a sweeping statement that "any other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or members of any board-petitioner, or their agents or principals, including the President", should also inhibit themselves.

What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and in law. The slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court. For, inhibition is also asked of, we repeat, "any other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or any members of any board-petitioner or their agents or principals, including the president." The absurdity of this posture is at once apparent. For one thing, the justices of this Court are appointed by the President and in that sense may be considered to have each received a favor from the President. Should these justices inhibit themselves every time a case involving the Administration crops up? Such a thought may not certainly be entertained. The consequence thereof would be to paralyze the machinery of this Court. We would in fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite system of government operating in this country. Counsel is presumed to know this. But why the unfounded charge? There is the not-too-well concealed effort on the part of a losing litigant's attorney to downgrade this Court.

The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern. Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's words are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief. We are thus called upon to repeat what we have said in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer (1967), 20 SCRA 441, 444, as follows: "By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become common place. Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such duty: 'To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.' As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that '[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.' That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against 'unjust criticism and clamor.' And more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be 'with all good fidelity ... to the courts.' Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold.' "

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice."1 His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes

fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice."2 Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people."3 Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice."4

It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the statement that it was necessary for the defense of his client. A client's cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers must always keep in perspective the thought that "[s]ince lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their clients' success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics."5 As rightly observed by Mr. Justice Malcolm in his well-known treatise, a judge from the very nature of his position, lacks the power to defend himself and it is the attorney, and no other, who can better or more appropriately support the judiciary and the incumbent of the judicial position.6 From this, Mr. Justice Malcolm continued to say: "It will of course be a trying ordeal for attorneys under certain conditions to maintain respectful obedience to the court. It may happen that counsel possesses greater knowledge of the law than the justice of the peace or judge who presides over the court. It may also happen that since no court claims infallibility, judges may grossly err in their decisions. Nevertheless, discipline and self-restraint on the part of the bar even under adverse conditions are necessary for the orderly administration of justice."7

The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. And yet, this Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the administration of justice. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules — against improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice8— is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt of court.

2. We next take the case of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. We analyze the statements pointed out to us by the Solicitor General hereinbefore quoted. Sotto accuses petitioners of having made "false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur." He brands such efforts as "scattershot desperation". He describes a proposition of petitioners as "corrupt on its face", laying bare "the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners." He charges petitioners with opportunistically changing their claims and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case. Such language is not arguably protected; it is the surfacing of a feeling of contempt towards a litigant; it offends the court before which it is made. It is no excuse to say that these statements were taken out of context. We have analyzed the lines surrounding said statements. They do not in any manner justify the inclusion of offensive language in the pleadings. It has been said that "[a] lawyer's language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession."9 It is Sotto's duty as a member of the Bar "[t]o abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged." 10

Not far from the case of Atty. Sotto is People vs. Young, 83 Phil. 702, 708, where counsel for the accused convicted of murder made use of the following raw language in his brief : "The accused since birth was a poor man and a son of a poor farmer, that since his boyhood he has never owned a thousand pesos in his own name. Now, here comes a chance for him. A cold fifty thousand bucks in exchange of a man's life. A simple job. Perhaps a question of seconds' work and that would transform him into a new man. Once in a small nipa shack, now in a palatial mansion! This poor ignorant man blinded by the promise of wealth, protection and stability was given to do the forbidden deed." We there held that "[s]uch a plea is a disgrace to the bar and an affront to the court."

It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor General or his assistants may not be considered offended parties in this case. This Court may motu proprio start proceedings of this nature. There should be no doubt about the power of this Court to punish him for contempt under the circumstances. For, inherent in courts is the power "[t]o control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto." 11

We, accordingly, hold that Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto has misbehaved, under Section 3 (a), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties; and that he too has committed, under Section 3 (d) of the same rule, improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice. He is, therefore, guilty of contempt.

3. Not much need be said of the case of Atty. Graciano C. Regala. It was improper for Atty. Santiago to have included the name of the firm of Atty. Regala without the latter's knowledge and consent. Correctly did Regala insist — and this is confirmed by the other lawyers of respondents — that he had not participated in any way in the pleadings of the above-entitled case. Regala did not even know that his name was included as co-counsel in this case. He is exonerated.

4. Last to be considered with respect to the first contempt incident is the case of Atty. Erlito R. Uy. Borne out by the record is the fact that Atty. Uy was not also involved in the preparation of any of the pleadings subject of the contempt citation. He should be held exempt from contempt.

5. We now turn our attention to the second contempt incident. The fourth motion for reconsideration is, indeed, an act of contumacy.

First. It was filed without express leave of court. No explanation has been made why this has been done.

Second. It lifted Section 1. Rule 51, Rules of Court, out of context. Said Section 1 was quoted as follows: "Justices; who may take part. — ... only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication ..." However, the provision in its entire thought should be read thus —

SECTION 1. Justices; who may take part. — All matters submitted to the court for its consideration and adjudication will be deemed to be submitted for consideration and adjudication by any and all of the Justices who are members of the division of the court at the time when such matters are taken up for consideration and adjudication, whether such Justices were or were not present at the date of submission; however, only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication, if the parties or either of them, express a desire to that effect in writing filed with the clerk at the date of submission. 12

Atty. Caling, who was admitted to the Bar in 1966, did not attempt to explain this point.

Meads, however, for his part tried to reason out why such a distorted quotation came about — the portion left out was anyway marked by "XS" which is a common practice among lawyers. Canon 22 of the Canons of Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct with candor and fairness, and specifically states that "it is not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote." While Morton Meads is admittedly not a lawyer, it does not take a lawyer to see the deliberate deception that is being foisted upon this Court. There was a qualification to the rule quoted and that qualification was intentionally omitted.

Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World Court and/or the United States government. It must be remembered that respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to overturn the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so, unnecessary statements were injected. More specifically, the motion announced that MacArthur "will inevitably ... raise the graft and corruption of [the] Philippine government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965 ... to the World Court" and would invoke "the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually ... ."

This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the mind of this Court to decide the case in its favor. A notice of appeal to the World Court has even been embodied in Meads' return. There is a gross inconsistency between the appeal and the move to reconsider the decision. An appeal from a decision presupposes that a party has already abandoned any move to reconsider that decision. And yet, it would appear that the appeal to the World Court is being dangled as a threat to effect a change of the decision of this Court. Such act has no aboveboard explanation.

6. Atty. Caling has not shown to the satisfaction of this Court that he should be exempted from the contempt charge against him. He knows that he is an officer of this Court. He admits that he has read the fourth motion for reconsideration before he signed it. While he has been dragged in only at the last minute, still it was plainly his duty to have taken care that his name should not be attached to pleadings contemptuous in character.

7. As for Morton F. Meads, he had admitted having prepared the fourth motion for reconsideration. He cannot beg off from the contempt charge against him even though he is not a lawyer. He is guilty of contempt.

8. We go back to Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. His insistence that he had nothing to do with the fourth motion for reconsideration and that he had not even read the same is too transparent to survive fair appraisal. It goes against the grain of circumstances. Caling represents before us that it was Santiago who convinced him to sign the motion, who with Meads explained to him the allegations thereof and the background of the case. Caling says that if not for his friendship with Santiago, he would not have signed the motion. On the other hand, Meads states that Santiago began to read the fourth motion for reconsideration and even started to make changes thereon in pencil. We must not forget, too, that according to Meads himself, he spent, on July 14, 1969, quite some time with Santiago before they proceeded to Caling. It is highly improbable that Santiago did not read the fourth motion for reconsideration during all that time.

Furthermore, Santiago is a lawyer of record for respondent MacArthur in this case. He has not resigned from his position as such lawyer. He has control of the proceedings. Whatever steps his client takes should be within his knowledge and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics should have reminded him that "[a] lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their relation."

The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather than punishment. The people should not be given cause to break faith with the belief that a judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not yield to the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is a standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause before a court of justice.

9. One last word. It would seem apropos to say again that, if only for one reason, this Court had really no alternative but to decide the main case against respondent MacArthur. As we held in our decision of July 31, 1968, MacArthur did not even adhere to the terms and conditions of the invitation to bid. For, this invitation to bid explicitly warned that "bids not accompanied by bid bonds will be rejected. And We repeat, "[a]dmittedly, the bid of the Company [MacArthur] had been submitted without the requisite bond." 13 It would not require the adroit mind of a lawyer to say that a bid unaccompanied by a bond., contrary to the instructions to bidders, is not entitled to any consideration.

It should be emphasized, too, that because the decision herein was by a unanimous Court, even if the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro had not taken part in the decision on the merits of this case, the result would have been the same: MacArthur's cause would just the same have failed.

For the reasons given, this Court hereby finds:

1. On the first contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto guilty of contempt of court, and fines Atty. Santiago in the sum of P1,000, and Atty. Sotto, P100; and holds Attys. Graciano C. Regala and Associates and Atty. Erlito R. Uy not guilty of contempt of court; and

2. On the second contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, Morton F. Meads and Atty. Juanita M. Caling guilty of contempt of court, and fines Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, an additional P1,000, Morton F. Meads, P1,000, and Atty. Juanito M. Caling, P200.

Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, for whatever action he may deem proper to take in the premises against Morton F. Meads who is an alien.

Let another copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the Solicitor General, for such action as he may deem proper in relation to the disbarment or suspension of Attys. Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Caling.

The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to append a copy of this decision to the personal records of Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Caling. So ordered.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-44627         December 11, 1935

FELIPE SALCEDO, protestant-appellant, vs.FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ, protestee-appellee.

Vicente J. Francisco for appellant.Laurel, Del Rosario and Sabido for appellee.

 

BUTTE, J.:

This is an appeal from a ruling of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas dated October 10, 1935, which is as follows:

AUTO

Considerada la moci6n de 18 de septiembre, 1935, presentada por los abogados del recurrido Francisco Hernandez pidiendo, por las razones en ella expuestas, que este Juzgado se abstenga de todo procedimientoo ulterior en esta protesta electoral declarando la misma sobre seida bajo el fundamento de que el Juzgado ya carece de jurisdiccion para conocer de ella; habiendose concedido a la parte protestante el plazo que pidio su representacion para contestar por escrito a esta mocion y cuyo plazoo ha transurrido con exceso y expirado tambien sin que por dicha parte recurrnete se haya presentado la contestacion que se reservo presentar, quedando asi sin efecto la autorizacion o reserva concedida a la parte recurrida para replicar en su caso a dicha contestacion no presentada.

Estimando los fundamentos alegados en dicha mocion del recurrido; vistas las disposiciones del articulo 479, parrafo 2.o, de la Ley Electoral asi como su interpretacion por la corte Cuprema en el asunto Portillo contra Salvani (54 Jur. Fil., 579), cuya parte pertinente y correspondiente se acota en dicha mocion; y considerando que esta protesta electoral se inicio en este Juzgado en 18 de junio de 1934, ha expirado en 18 de junio de 1935 el plazo de un ano para que el Juzgado pueda dictar validamente cualquiera decision en ella, estando, como esta, prohibido o vedado por precepto mandatorio de dicha Ley.

El Juzgado, accediendo a ella, se abstiene de conocer en ulterior procedimiento del presente expediente de protesta electoral y lo declara sobreseido por falta ya de jurisdiccion para conocer de la misma. Asi se ordena.

For the better understanding of this order, it should be stated that this same election contest was before this court on a former appeal, G.R. No. L-42992, and on rehearsing thereof this court on August 9, 1935, entered the following order:

We have decided therefore to revoke our decision in this cause, promulgated on May 17, 1935, and hereby remand the cause to the Court of First Instance (1) to count the actual ballots found in the ballot boxes in the precincts affected by the protest and counterprotest and determine the validity of any such not heretofore determined; (2) to receive evidence and determine the validity of the thirty six ballots in precinct No. 8 covered by the appellee's second assignment of error and (3) to render another judgment, without special pronouncement as to costs in this instance.

No motion for reconsideration was filed and the cause was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Tayabas for compliance with the said order of August 9, 1935. In that court the protestee-appellee Hernandez thereupon filed a motion to dismiss the protest on the ground that the Court of First Instace has no jurisdiction to make any orders in the case because it is provided in paragraph 2 of section 479 of the Election Law that "All proceedings in an electoral contest shall be terminated within one year", it appearing that the original motion of protest was filed in the Court of First Instance on June 18, 1934.

We are of the opinion that the order of the trial court sustaining this motion and dismissing the protest for lack of jurisdiction was erroneous. The limitation period of one year referred to in said section 479 of the Election Law applies only to proceedings in Courts of First Instance. (Cacho vs. Abad, 61 Phil., 606) It has no application to appeals in election cases pending in the Supreme Court. As to such appeals, section 480 of the Election Law provides as follows: 1awphil.net

SEC. 480. Appeal to Supreme Court in contested election case. — An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court within ten days, from any final decision rendered by the Court of First Instance on contests of elections for provincial governors, or members of the provincial board, or municipal presidents, for the review, amendment, repeal or confirmation of such decision, and the procedure thereon shall be the same as in a criminal cause.

The case of Portillo vs. Salvani (54 Phil., 543), relied upon by the trial court is not in point because that case related to the original trial of an election case in the Court of First Instance which was not terminated within the period of one year as required by section 479 of the Election Law. By way of caution, however, this court in that decision said:

What has been here said is confined to a discussion of the first assignment of error and the arguments of the parties thereon, and does not purport to decide the legal effect of extraordinary remedies instituted in this court against Courts of First Instance as tolling the time and so extending the year within which the proceedings must be concluded, a point not discussed on this appeal.

If we take the view that the lodging of an appeal in this court in an election case tolls the running of the limitation of one year and applying it to the present case, we note that from June 18, 1934, the date of the filing of the protest, to January 4, 1935, the date of the elevation of the case to this court on the first appeal, a period of only six months and seventeen days had elapsed thus leaving a period of five months and thirteen days for further proceedings in the Court of First Instance. The further proceedings to be taken as required by the order of this court of August 9, 1935, fell within the unused portion of the year still available to the Court of First Instance and the trial court erred in interpreting this limitation as including the time the case was pending on appeal in the Supreme Court.1awphil.net

The only limitation with reference to the time of disposition of election case which the Election Law imposes on the Supreme Court is contained in section 481 in the following language:

The Court of First Instance and the Supreme Court shall hear election contest in preference to all other cases and shall try and decide them as soon as possible, whether it be a regular term of court or not." This preference in favor of election cases has been religiously observed in this court, but we do not construe that language nor the language of section 480 as restricting the inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to remand an election case where it is necessary and proper in order to achieve the ends of justice.

It was upon these considerations that this court entered its order of August 9, 1935, aforesaid. It was the duty of the trial court to carry out and not to question the correctness of the order of this court of August 9, 1935.

The order appealed from is reversed and the Court of First Instance of Tayabas is directed to comply without further delay with the order of this court of August 9, 1935, aforesaid. Costs in both instances against the protestee-appellee.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 142440. February 17, 2003]

EL REYNO HOMES, INC., petitioner, vs. ERNESTO ONG and MA. SONIA TAN SOON HA, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CORONA, J.:

The instant petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks a review of the Resolution[1] dated December 15, 1999 of the Court of Appeals (Third Division) in CA-G.R. SP No. 55988 denying petitioners motion for extension of time to file a petition for review, thereby dismissing the case, and the Resolution[2] dated March 10, 2000 which denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration.

It appears that private respondents, Ernesto Ong and Ma. Sonia Tan Soon Ha purchased from petitioner, El Reyno Homes, Inc., Lot 2, Block 9 of subdivision plan PSD-04-001498 situated at the Loyola Grand Villas W-2, Quezon City containing an area of 1,000 square meters initially covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 261758. For its failure to develop and deliver the title to the property, the private respondents filed an action against the petitioner for specific performance and for violation of Sections 19, 20, 25 and 29 of Presidential Decree No. 957[3] on March 22, 1991 with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB for brevity). After conducting the required hearings and an ocular inspection of the property, HLURB Arbiter Cesar A. Manuel, found that:

To this date, the parcel of land, Lot No. 2, Block No. 9 under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 261758 of the Registry of Deeds for Metro Manila District II, sold by the respondent to complainants, is still registered in the name of one Antonio Tuazon, Jr., despite full payment of the lot by the buyers, complainants herein, in violation of Section 25 of PD 957. We are not persuaded by the respondents argument that complainants are not entitled to delivery of title pending their payment of taxes and other assessments (Respondents Answer Par. II). This is in contravention with Section 26 of PD 957 which provides that Real Esate (sic) Tax and assessment on a lot x x x shall be paid by the owner or developer with out (sic) recourse to the buyer for as long as the title has not passed to the buyer; x x x. The only exception to this rule is when the title has passed to the buyer and the latter took possession of and occupied the lot. This is not obtaining in the instant case.

As to the issue of non-development, the above quoted ocular inspection speaks for itself.

We are not also convinced with the argument of respondent that it is physically and legally impossible for it at this point in time to force before the development of the property as it may result in violence and bloodshed x x x (Respondents Opposition par. 1, sub-par. b, citing its par. 7 of its Answer). This principle which is enriched under Articles 1266 and 1267 of the Civil Code does not apply in the instant case for the simple reason that in order for the said principle to apply, it is a condition sine qua non that the prestation constituting the object of the obligation must have become legally or physically impossible of compliance without the fault of the obligor and before he has incurred in delay. (Jurado, Comments and Jurisprudence on Obligations and Contracts, 1983 Edition, p. 249)[4]

Hence, the HLURB arbiter rendered the following judgment:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondent EL REYNO HOMES, INC., within thirty (30) days from finality hereof to:

1. To deliver immediately the title to the complainants;

2. Complete the development of the said subdivision in accordance with the approved subdivision plan such as to:

a. construct the road going to the property of the complainants;

b. construct the drainage and/or sewer pipe serving the said subject lot;

c. provide and/or construct water distribution line;

d. provide electrical power supply;

3. Pay to this Board an administrative fine of P10,000.00 for violation of Sections 20 and 25 in relation to Section 38 of PD 957.

4. Pay to the complainant the sum of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees.

Finding the respondents counterclaim without merit, the same is hereby dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[5]

From the said decision, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the HLURB Board of Commissioners (Board for brevity) on March 11, 1992 which subsequently issued an Order on April 3, 1992 requiring the parties to file their respective memoranda within 10 days from receipt thereof.

In an urgent motion filed on April 30, 1992, petitioner El Reyno Homes, Inc. requested that it be given an extension of 15 days from May 1, 1992, or

until May 16, 1992, to file its memorandum of appeal which was granted by the Board on May 8, 1992.

However, the petitioner failed to file its memorandum of appeal within the extended period prompting the private respondents to file a motion to dismiss the appeal. Despite the filing of a memorandum of appeal[6] by the petitioner on May 22, 1992, or six (6) days after the expiration of the period of extension on May 16, 1992, the Board issued an Order[7] on December 16, 1992 dismissing the appeal of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:

Considering the foregoing, respondents (herein petitioner) appeal is hereby declared ABANDONED and hence DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

On January 26, 1993, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Board in an Order[8] dated May 4, 1993.

On May 24, 1993, the petitioner timely filed a notice of appeal with the Office of the President which subsequently issued an Order dated May 28, 1993 requiring the said petitioner to file its memorandum of appeal.

The petitioner filed its memorandum of appeal on July 20, 1993 while the respondents filed their reply memorandum on August 10, 1993.

On October 27, 1999, the Office of the President rendered a decision[9] dismissing the appeal of the petitioner. On November 25, 1999, the petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for an extension [10] of 15 days within which to file a petition for review counted from December 1, 1999, or until December 16, 1999.

On December 9, 1999, which was within the requested period of extension, the petitioner filed a petition for review[11] with the Court of Appeals.

In the questioned Resolution dated December 15, 1999 however, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for extension of time to file a petition for review for not having been accompanied by an affidavit of service, consequently dismissing the case. The motion for reconsideration of the questioned resolution was denied by the appellate court on March 10, 2000.

Hence, the instant petition[12] with the following assignments of error:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN DISMISSING THE CASE ON PURE TECHNICALITY THEREBY DENYING THE PETITIONER ITS DAY IN COURT AND IN EFFECT AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD WHICH GROSSLY ERRED IN CONSIDERING

THE APPEAL AS HAVING BEEN ABANDONED INSTEAD OF DECIDING THE CASE.

2. THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES WAS MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE AND WITHOUT LEGAL OR FACTUAL BASIS.

The petitioner claims that the delay in filing its memorandum of appeal with the Board was due to the sudden and unexpected absence without official leave of Attorney Herenio Martinez on May 15, 1992 to whom the instant case was allegedly assigned. The absence of Attorney Martinez, who remained in possession of the records of this case, was beyond the control of the petitioner, such that a rigid application of the rules would defeat substantial justice especially since the said petitioner filed its memorandum of appeal, albeit 6 days after the expiration of the extended period.Besides, Section 2 of the HLURB rules provides for a liberal construction thereof in order to promote public interest and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action, application or other proceedings.

Likewise, according to petitioner, the Court of Appeals erred when it denied petitioners motion for extension of time to file a petition for review because of its failure to attach an affidavit of service.The private respondents were furnished a copy of the motion for extension of time to file a petition for review by registered mail posted on November 24, 1999 at Greenhills Post Office, San Juan, Metro Manila under Registry Receipt No. 15088 addressed to their counsel, Atty. Edito A. Rodriguez, at 16 CRM Rhia Street, BF Almanza, Las Pias City. The pleading was actually received by the counsel of private respondents on November 29, 1999 per certification[13] of the Las Pias Post Office dated January 5, 2000. The purpose of the rule on service of pleadings, to ensure that the other party was properly notified of the pleading, had thus been served. Moreover, petitioner filed the petition for review with the Court of Appeals on December 9, 1999 which was well within the extended period prayed for in its motion for extension of time to file a petition. Invoking the ruling of this Court in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals, [14] the petitioner opined that the Court of Appeals should have decided the petition on the merits rather than on mere technicality in order to promote substantial justice.

Additionally, petitioner argues that the award of attorneys fees by the HLURB arbiter had no factual nor legal basis. It alleges that the private respondents still had obligations to settle under the contract, thus, the petitioner was not yet in default nor bound to deliver the title to the lot to the said private respondents.

In their comment,[15] the private respondents contend that, while the rules of procedure may be liberally construed, such liberality should not apply in case of wanton disregard of said rules or if it will only cause needless delay. Respondents point out that petitioner was silent until the motion for extension of time to file its petition for review was denied and the case was dismissed by the appellate court, before it exerted effort to comply with the requirements. They claim that the petitioner was advised of its failure to attach the affidavit of service on the same day that it filed its said motion. [16] They also maintain that the award of attorneys fees is justified by the circumstances of the case, praying that it be increased because the case is now on appeal to the Supreme Court.

By way of reply,[17] the petitioner insists that its failure to attach the required affidavit of service to its motion was not a wanton disregard of the rules nor intended to cause needless delay in the administration of justice. It also reiterates the alleged lack of factual or legal basis for the award of attorneys fees in favor of the private respondents.

We deny the instant petition.

In not a few instances, we relaxed the rigid application of the rules of procedure to afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits. This is in line with the time-honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection should thus not serve as basis of decisions. In that way, the ends of justice would be better served.[18] For, indeed, the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration of justice.[19]

However, as correctly pointed out by the private respondents, such liberality in the application of rules of procedure may not be invoked if it will result in the wanton disregard of the rules or cause needless delay in the administration of justice. It is equally settled that, save for the most persuasive of reasons, strict compliance is enjoined to facilitate the orderly administration of justice.[20]

The HLURB Board of Commissioners considered the appeal filed by the petitioner from the adverse decision of the HLURB arbiter as abandoned after it failed to file the required memorandum of appeal within the extended period prayed for by the petitioner itself. The delay was allegedly brought about by the failure of its counsel to turn over the records before his sudden and unexpected absence without official leave on May 15, 1992. This unsubstantiated allegation of the petitioner is far from convincing. The record

shows that the petitioner was represented by Atty. Emiliano L. Tamboan, Jr. throughout the trial of the case before the HLURB arbiter and subsequently by Atty. Aristotle Q. Sarmiento. No Atty. Herenio Martinez ever entered his appearance at any stage of the proceedings in this case. It is obvious that this tale of abandonment by its supposed counsel was merely concocted by the petitioner in its desperate attempt to evade the legal effects of failure to file timely appeal.

After its motion for reconsideration was denied by the Board, the petitioner filed an appeal with the Office of the President but this was denied on October 27, 1999. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to file a petition with the Court of Appeals. Apparently unmindful of its previous mistake, the petitioner this time failed to attach to its said motion for extension of time the required affidavit of service. And in an attempt to cover up the grave consequences of its second mistake, the petitioner, in its subsequent motion for reconsideration, contended that the purpose of this particular procedural requirement had anyway been served already when the private respondents counsel actually received a copy of its motion on November 29, 1999, as shown by the certification of the Las Pias Post Office.

We agree with the appellate court that the failure of the petitioner to attach the required affidavit of service warranted outright denial of the motion for extension of time to file its petition for review.Consequently, the judgment sought to be appealed from became final after the lapse of the original period within which the petition should have been filed. The subsequent compliance by the petitioner with the required attachment of affidavit of service did not cure the defect.

The petitioner has no one to blame but itself for its failure to attach the required affidavit of service to its motion. In fact, it did not even exert enough effort to comply with this particular procedural requirement as soon as practicable. Its counsel waited indifferently until the motion for extension was denied and the case was eventually dismissed on December 15, 1999 despite having been advised on the day it filed the motion for extension on November 25, 1999 of such failure to attach the required affidavit of service.

As if it were not enough, the explanation regarding the mode of service used in the instant petition was left unsigned by the counsel of the petitioner.[21] It should be pointed out that herein petitioner filed the instant petition with this Court as an appeal from the adverse resolutions[22] of the Court of Appeals. We emphasize that the right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege. Not being a natural right or a part of due process, the right to appeal may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the rules

provided therefore. Failure to bring an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by the rules renders the judgment appealed from final and executory.[23]

The case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals[24] which was relied upon by the petitioner does not apply squarely to the case at bar. In that particular case, the Solicitor General filed the record on appeal 6 days late. This Court suspended the rules on perfection of appeal as its strict application would have resulted in the States loss of close to 300 hectares of prime sugarland which a private individual had apparently succeeded in registering in his name through fraudulent misrepresentation and machination.

On the other hand, herein petitioner has failed to convince the Court that an extremely compelling reason exists to justify suspension of the strict application of the rules and to avert the commission of grave injustice. A review of the questioned decision of the HLURB arbiter does not show any reversible error in its appreciation of the facts and its application of the pertinent laws. No development of roads, drainage and water system has as yet been introduced by the petitioner to the subject property in violation of Section 20[25] of P.D. No. 957. The petitioner cannot seek refuge in its gratuitous claim that the property was invaded by squatters for its failure to introduce the required development. As found by the HLURB arbiter, the same was due to the fault of the said petitioner and that the squatters entered the property after petitioner was already in delay. Likewise, title to the property has not been delivered up to the present despite full payment of the price of the lot in contravention of Section 25[26] of the same decree.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED and the questioned resolutions of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 164668. February 14, 2005]

ASIAN SPIRIT AIRLINES (AIRLINE EMPLOYEES COOPERATIVE), petitioner, vs. SPOUSES BENJAMIN AND ANNE MARIE BAUTISTA, KARL BAUTISTA and GLORIA POMERA, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissing the appeal of the petitioner herein in CA-G.R. CV No. 79317 and its resolution in the same case denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration of its first resolution.

The Antecedents

The Spouses Benjamin and Anna Marie Bautista filed a complaint, in behalf of their son Karl Bautista and Gloria Pomera, against the Asian Spirit Airlines in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City for breach of contract and damages. After trial, the court rendered a decision on March 24, 2003 in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS and AGAINST THE DEFENDANT ordering the latter to pay the former:

1. P5,000.00 as temperate damages;2. P200,000.00 as moral damages;3. P150,000.00 as exemplary damages;4. P50,000.00 as attorneys fees;5. P18,371.25 as litigation expenses.

Defendants counterclaim is DISMISSED.[2]

Its motion for the reconsideration of the decision having been denied by the trial court,[3] the defendant appealed. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 79317. On December 10, 2003, the appellate court directed the defendant-appellant to file its brief as appellant within forty-five (45) days from notice thereof.[4] The defendant-appellant received its copy of the resolution on December 17, 2003. Thus, it had until January 31, 2004 within which to file its brief. However, the defendant-appellant failed to file its appellants brief. On March 3, 2004, the plaintiffs-appellees filed a Manifestation and Motion [5] for the dismissal of the appeal of the defendant-appellant for its failure to file its brief.

On March 10, 2004, the defendant-appellant filed an unverified Motion to Admit Attached Appellants Brief.[6] The plaintiffs-appellees opposed the motion.[7] On April 23, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution[8] denying the motion of the defendant-appellant and granting the motion of the plaintiffs-appellees,

and ordered the appeal of the defendant-appellant dismissed. The defendant-appellant filed a motion for the reconsideration of the said resolution but on July 16, 2004, the appellate court denied the said motion for lack of merit.[9]

The defendant-appellant, now the petitioner, filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court assailing the resolutions of the CA and asserting that:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN STRICTLY APPLYING THE PROVISIONS OF THE RULES OF COURT ON DISMISSAL OF APPEAL TO HEREIN PETITIONERS APPEAL WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE MANDATED PRECEPT OF LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION EXPLICITLY PROVIDED FOR IN THE RULES AND SANCTIONED BY JURISPRUDENTIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONERS APPEAL BELOW IS BASED AND FOUNDED ON VERY MERITORIOUS GROUNDS THE DENIAL OF WHICH WILL DEFINITELY RESULT TO PREJUDICE TO PETITIONERS SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS AND DENIAL TO IT OF ITS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.[10]

The petitioner avers that the late filing of its brief did not cause material injury or prejudice to the respondents and the issues raised by it in its brief require an examination of the evidence on record.

The petitioner prays that we set aside the assailed resolution of the CA and order the appellate court to reinstate its appeal for further proceedings. In their comment on the petition, the respondents submit that:

The Court of Appeals was evidently not satisfied with the explanation by the petitioner. Its action in this regard is not subject to review, for the Supreme Court cannot interfere with the discretion of the Court of Appeals.

It is necessary to impress upon litigants and their lawyers the necessity of a strict compliance with the periods for performing certain acts incident to the appeal and the transgressions thereof, as a rule, would not be tolerated; otherwise, those periods could be evaded by subterfuges and manufactured excuses and would ultimately become inutile. (Don Lino Gutierrez & Sons, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. L-39124, Nov. 15, 1974).

This Honorable Court will be setting a bad example if it accepts the excuse of the Petitioners counsel that he instructed his secretary to file the motion for extension who, in turn, forgot to file it. Logic dictates that the Secretary cannot release the request without the lawyers signature but still the basic and simple prudence to follow

it up by counsel leaves much to be desired. Every lawyer may soon adopt this reasoning to justify non-filing of the brief on time.[11]

The petition has no merit.

Under Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, as amended, an appeal may be dismissed by the CA on its own motion or that of the appellee for failure of the appellant to file its brief within the time provided by Section 7, Rule 44 of the said Rules. The petitioner had until January 31, 2004 within which to file its brief but failed to do so. It was only on March 10, 2004, after receipt of respondents motion filed on March 3, 2004, praying for the dismissal of the petitioners appeal for its failure to file its brief, that the petitioner filed its brief appended to an unverified motion to admit the said brief. The only excuse of the petitioner for its failure to file its brief was the claim of its counsel in the said Motion for Leave to Admit, thus:

1. The filing of the Appellants Brief is due on January 31, 2004. The notice from the Honorable Court was received on December 17, 2003 and because of the holiday season at that time, the undersigned counsel gave instruction to his Secretary to file the usual Motion for Time asking for forty-five (45) days from January 31, 2004 or until March 16, 2004.

2. The undersigned started to prepare the Appellants Brief bearing in mind the new deadline.

3. It was only when the undersigned received the Manifestation of plaintiffs on March 5, 2004 that he inquired with his secretary if the Manifestation of counsel is true and she readily admitted that she failed to prepare and file the Motion for Time.[12]

The excuse contrived by the petitioners counsel is totally unacceptable. We note that the motion of the petitioner is unverified. Neither did the petitioner bother appending to its motion an affidavit of its counsels secretary containing his/her explanation why he/she failed to file the said motion for extension if there was such a motion in the first place. The petitioner did not even bother appending to its Motion to Admit its motion for extension to file brief which its counsels secretary allegedly failed to file in the CA. Blaming its counsels unidentified secretary for its abject failure to file its brief is a common practice for negligent lawyers to cover up for their own negligence, incompetence, indolence, and ineptitude. Such excuse is the most hackneyed and habitual subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to observe the procedural requirements prescribed by the Rules of Court.[13] It bears stressing that it is the duty of counsel to adopt and strictly maintain a system that

insures that all pleadings should be filed and duly served within the period therefor and, if he fails to do so, the negligence of his secretary or clerk to file such pleading is imputable to the said counsel.[14]

We agree with the petitioners contention that the rules of procedure may be relaxed for the most persuasive reasons. But as this Court held in Galang v. Court of Appeals:[15]

Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a partys substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.[16]

In an avuncular case,[17] we emphasized that:

Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are, thus, enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. The instant case is no exception to this rule.

In the present case, we find no cogent reason to exempt the petitioner from the effects of its failure to comply with the Rules of Court.

The right to appeal is a statutory right and the party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost. More so, as in this case, where petitioner not only neglected to file its brief within the stipulated time but also failed to seek an extension of time for a cogent ground before the expiration of the time sought to be extended.[18]

In not a few instances, the Court relaxed the rigid application of the rules of procedure to afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits. This is in line with the time-honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection should, thus, not serve as basis of decisions. In that way, the ends of justice would be better served.[19] For, indeed, the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application

of justice to the rival claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration of justice. [20] In this case, however, such liberality in the application of rules of procedure may not be invoked if it will result in the wanton disregard of the rules or cause needless delay in the administration of justice. It is equally settled that, save for the most persuasive of reasons, strict compliance is enjoined to facilitate the orderly administration of justice.[21]

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.