pozieres presentation slide show pozieres.pdf · 12/09/2019 3 •artillery & lewis guns...
TRANSCRIPT
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Pozières1916
The ruin of Pozières windmill which lies here was the centre of the struggle in this part of the Somme battlefield in July and August 1916. It was captured on August 4th by Australian troops who fell more thickly on
this ridge than on any other battlefield of the war.
C E W Bean
Pozières – Australian Folklore
“Pozières Ridge is more densely sown with Australian sacrifice than any other place on earth. The field of Pozières is more consecrated by Australian fighting and more hallowed by Australian blood than any field which has ever existed or likely to exist.” C E W Bean
Pozières was a battle with devastating losses that were the result of incompetent and uncaring British Generals making poor decisions
Pozières was a battle fought by infantry
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The Battle of the Somme
• Pozières was really a part of the Battle of the Somme that commenced on 1 July 1916
• The battle was planned and undertaken by the British forces in France to assist the French and their defence of Verdun by trying to draw off German forces to the British sector
• Verdun (Feb – Dec 1916) was an increasingly costly action that would eventually cost the French 163,000 killed & 216,000 wounded
• 8 day preliminary bombardment by 1,500 guns. Unprecedented at that time but:
• Spread over 2 Armies & 20 mile front and objective 4,500 yard deep• Majority shrapnel not HE – minimal destructive effect• Very poor ammunition quality with very large number of ‘duds’ (30%)• Little disruption to wire or German trenches, machine guns and artillery
• 1 July attack by nine corps of British 3rd & 4th Armies and French 6th
• Some success in some areas and none in others but 60,000 casualties.
• Reflects an emphasis on Manpower rather than Firepower
• Greatest success where lifting barrage used
• Perilous state of Verdun meant that Somme operation could not be called off
• Another costly attack on 14 July was successful but uncovered more German lines of defence, fresh machine gun positions and better defensive positions
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• Artillery & Lewis Guns – Manpower to Firepower• At Battle of Amiens the 4th Army could call on 2,000 guns over 15 miles and in 1918
Monash had 1,386 ‐ 18 pounders/howitzers – or about one every 22 yards of front plus 4th Army deployed 684 heavy guns
• These guns gave more accurate and highly targeted counter battery fire. Also by 1918 highly developed counter battery observation ie on 8 Aug 1918 504 out of 530 German guns facing 4th Army identified and suppressed by highly effective counter‐battery fire
• On 8 August 4th Army fired 279,699 18 pounder rounds (153,358 shrapnel, 113,764 HE & 12,577 smoke), 60,500 4.5” howitzer shells 57,329 6” howitzer shells
• AIF battalions in 1916 were about 1,000 men but by Aug 1918 were about 500 in 1918 had 30 lewis guns and 8 light trench mortars compared to 4 lewis guns & 2 trench mortars in 1916
• These ‘big’ attacks lead to British forces over the next 4 months conducting small‐scale attacks against local objectives.
• The bulk of the Somme effort was borne by the 4th Army
• However after 2 July the Reserve Army (later 5th Army) moved from reserve to take some of the load off and support 4th Army
• This is where the 1st ANZAC Corps’ operations fit in as the Reserve Army area of operations was in the northern part of the Somme sector that had witnessed the worst of the casualties on 1 July
• Initially Reserve Army was to support 4th Army, on its right flank, if 4th
Army broke through the German lines, by attacking towards Bapaume
• The Pozières village and ridge were extensively fortified by the Germans using huge trench and communications trench systems and very deep reinforced redoubts. Extensive use of machine guns and artillery had already started to create a torn up and heavily cratered landscape. This especially affected the allied trenches that did not have the permanence of the German trenches
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• The German defences around Pozières included the main trenches OG1 & OG2 that followed the ridge line
• In front of these trenches was Pozières with its series of deep trenches and the fortified bunkers in the ruins and cellars of Pozières village
• Although 4th Army had made significant advances to & through the main German lines, little advance had been made at Pozières
• By 14 July the German lines were just in front of the village of Pozières and the main German forward trench being Pozières Trench, with the British line being established in a trench called Sunken Road Trench
• German artillery around Pozières was very numerous and more was brought forward to this important sector
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The fortified village of Pozières
Pozières
• Village of Pozières sits on Pozières Ridge and gave view of British Lines and the areas behind the lines including the flashes from hidden artillery batteries. But could also see behind German lines.
• The ridge is quite low but because of the view it gave was of great importance.
• Village itself sat astride the Albert‐Bapaume Road (a dead straight old Roman Road)
• Although the village was pretty well destroyed, the Germans were well established in the ruins & deep bunkers in cellars with an established trench system and many comms trenches back to the main German Lines (OG1 & OG2).
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1st ANZAC Corps
Lt Gen Sir William BirdwoodGOC 1st ANZAC Corps
1st ANZAC Corps
• In July 1916 1st ANZAC Corps was composed of largely untried formations• 1st AIF Division plus 4th Brigade were the main Australian troops used at Gallipoli (with the Australian Light Horse)
• After withdrawal from Gallipoli in December 1915 the AIF received very large numbers of reinforcements allowing it to grow significantly. In January 1916 the transition from 2 infantry divisions to a 5 infantry divisions, + Light Horse.
• At Gallipoli the majority of the recently formed 2nd Division had not been sent or used in the fighting, except 18th Bn
• The 1st Division (and the 4th Brigade) was seasoned from Gallipoli, 2nd Division was fully formed but as yet had not completed training. The 3rd Division was being raised in Australia and would complete its training in England.
• The decision was made to use the AIF’s two unattached brigades (4th and 8th) as the basis for 2 new divisions and to use 1st Division and 4th Brigade troops to form the nucleus of the four new brigades that were needed. 16 new battalions were needed and 16 battalions participated in the ANZAC landing & had significant Gallipoli experience.
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AIF Expansion Feb/Mar 1916Division Brigade Battalion Battalion Brigade Division Brigade Battalion Division Brigade Battalion
1st Div
1st Bde
1st Bn 53rd Bn
14th Bde
5th Div
8th Bde
29th Bn
3rd Div
9th Bde
33rd Bn
2nd Bn 54th Bn 30th Bn 34th Bn
3rd Bn 55th Bn 31st Bn 35th Bn
4th Bn 56th Bn 32nd Bn 36th Bn
2nd Bde
5th Bn 57th Bn
15th Bde 10th Bde
37th Bn
6th Bn 58th Bn 38th Bn
7th Bn 59th Bn 39th Bn
8th Bn 60th Bn 40th Bn
3rd Bde
9th Bn 49th Bn
13th Bde
4th Div
11th Bde
41st Bn
10th Bn 50th Bn 42nd Bn
11th Bn 51st Bn 43rd Bn
12th Bn 52nd Bn 44th Bn
Unattached old NZ & A
Div4th Bde
13th Bn 45th Bn
12th Bde 4th Bde
13th Bn
14th Bn 46th Bn 14th Bn
15th Bn 47th Bn 15th Bn
16th Bn 48th Bn 16th Bn
Expansion of AIF – Jan 1916Division Brigade Battalion To Division Brigade Battalion To From
1st
1st1st NSW 53rd NSW
4th
4th13th NSW 45th NSW
2nd NSW 54th NSW 14th Vic 46th Vic3rd NSW 55th NSW 15th QT 47th QT4th NSW 56th NSW 16th SW 48th SW
2nd5th Vic 57th Vic
12th45th NSW 13th NSW
6th Vic 58th Vic 46th Vic 14th Vic7th Vic 59th Vic 47th QT 15th QT8th Vic 60th Vic 48th SW 16th SW
3rd9th Qld 49th Qld
13th49th Qld 9th Qld
10th SA 50th SA 50th SA 10th SA11th WA 51st WA 51st WA 11th WA12th TWS 52nd TWS 52nd TWS 12th TWS
2nd5th 17th to 20th NSW
5th
8th29th Vic
6th 21st to 24th Vic 30th NSW
7th25th Qld 31st Qld26th QT 32nd SW27th SA
14th
53rd NSW 1st NSW28th WA 54th NSW 2nd NSW
3rd9th 33rd to 36th NSW 55th NSW 3rd NSW
10th 37th to 39th Vic 56th NSW 4th NSW
40th Tas
15th57th Vic 5th Vic
11th41st to 42nd Qld 58th Vic 6th Vic
43rd SA 59th Vic 7th Vic44th WA 60th Vic 8th Vic
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• Artillery was even more raw – 3,000 men for a division had 150 trained officers & men –rest infantry & light horse
• When formed 4th Div artillery did not have 1 regular artillery officer• 2 of these divisions (1st & 2nd) were to form 1st ANZAC Corps with 1st New Zealand Division with Lt Gen Sir William Birdwood as its GOC and Maj Gen Cyril Brundell White as its BGGS. 4th and 5th Divisions were allocated to 2nd ANZAC Corps under Lt Gen Godley, but in early July 1916 4th and NZ Divisions swapped as Gen Godley was GOC NZ troops
• 5th Div (commanded by Maj Gen James McCay) were used in the poorly planned and futile attack on Fromelles on 19/20 July, suffering 5,533 casualties
• Although Birdwood was in command of 1 ANZAC Corps, it was generally recognized his administration and organisation were weak and his tactical acumen suspect. BrundellWhite was responsible for running the Corps and brought the capabilities that compensated for Birdwood’s shortcomings
Enter the Reserve Army & 1st ANZAC Corps• 4th Army had shouldered the major effort (and casualties) of the opening of the Battle of the Somme on 1 July as well as the subsequent attack on the night of 14 July
• Consequently the decision was taken to shorten its front and insert the Reserve Army (later 5th Army) under Gen Gough, including 1st
ANZAC Corps being allocated on 18 July
• Reserve Army’s role was seen as secondary to 4th Army and support in nature but Gen Gough would not be restrained. He received orders that included the option of attacking Pozières to support an attack by 4th Army and he grabbed it with gusto.
• Gough intended to use 1st ANZAC Corps to undertake the attack but there were a few issues
• Many previous attacks on Pozières made little or no headway
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Lt Gen Sir Hubert Gough
• A cavalry man and confidante of Douglas Haig
• 1914 3rd Cavalry Brigade then promoted Maj Gen
• 1915 GOC 7th Div then Lt Gen & GOC 1st Corps at Loos
• Thrusting and impetuous and not given to detailed planning
1st ANZAC Corps to Pozières• On 18 July Ist ANZAC Corps was just finishing a short period of time in the “nursery sector” of Belgium. Most of 1st Div had arrived in the Somme but its artillery was still en route and would not arrive until 20 July
• The artillery would need at least 2 days to register targets• 1st Corps HQ had not arrived nor had 2nd and 4th Divs• Gen Gough circumvented these problems by allocating the capture of Pozières to 1st Div and taking corps responsibilities into his HQ (with no real complaint from Gen Birdwood)
• On 18th July Gough told GOC 1st Div, Maj Gen Harold Walker “I want you to go in and attack Pozières tomorrow night”
• Walker however was no pushover and pointed out to Gough he had no artillery and need time for it to register its guns and further time for preparation by the infantry.
• By constantly standing his ground Walker was able to hold off Gough and get a date for the attack of 23 July – still a very short preparation time
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Maj Gen Sir Harold “Hooky” Walker
GOC 1st AIF Division
• Born 1862 and commissioned into British Army 1884
• Served Sudan, India, South Africa and Ireland
• 1915 Chief of Staff of Birdwood’s new ANZAC Corps
• Landed ANZAC 0800 on 25 April and took command of NZ Inf Brigade then 1st Aust Brigade (after death of Col MacLaurin)
Maj Gen Sir Harold “Hooky” Walker
• July 1915 assumed command 1st AIF Div after death of Maj Gen Bridges. Remained in command until July 1918, when senior AIF commands were “Australianised”
• Oversaw transformation of 1st Div from an inexperienced formation to one equal to the best in the British Army
• Capable and astute, Walker often stood up to senior commanders and looked out for the well‐being of his men, especially where he considered operational plans to be dangerously inappropriate
• Highly regarded by his men, Walker was finally replaced in 1918 much to the regret of his officers and men
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Attack by the 1st Division• Although Gough impatiently wanted the attack on Pozières to commence Hooky Walker resolutely argued for time to allow his artillery to arrive and register its guns and for his infantry to prepare
• Finally Walker agreed to 23rd July for the attack, even though it was still a very short preparation time
• Plan from Reserve Army had one big difference to previous attempts to take Pozières. Previous attacks had taken the axis along the Roman road to Bapaume – Both Gough and Walker have taken this decision as their own.
• However this did create difficulties – The OG lines on the right of the jumping off trench (Sunken Road Trench) and the lack of room behind the trench (4th Army boundary) and the need to progressively feed troops along the Black Watch Alley – right hand troops had to move up to a mile along Black Watch (really just potholes and bodies) with no real features to show when to turn left into ops area
The change of direction in attack at Pozières
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• Gen Walker’s plan was to use 2 Brigades (1st & 3rd) to advance under cover of a “lifting artillery barrage” planned by Reserve Army HQ with input from Corps HQ.
• This was 1st Div’s first major Western Front operation & there was a reliance on the British advice
• The artillery barrage would have 3 lifts:• Opening – 3 minutes fire on Pozières Trench (2 to 5 rounds/gun/minute of shrapnel)
• 1st Lift of 400 yards to back enclosures of main road (30 minutes of 2 rounds/gun/minute of shrapnel & HE)
• 2nd Lift of 450‐500 yards on main road (30 minutes of 2 rounds/gun/minute of shrapnel & HE)
• 3rd Lift of 400‐600 yards north of Albert‐Bapaume Road (30 minutes of 2 rounds/gun/minute of shrapnel & HE)
• The advance of the infantry would be governed by the artillery• The attack was a strict limited‐objective exercise to the Albert‐Bapaume Road and no further without specific orders
Artillery lifts for the 1st Australian Division attack 23 July 1916
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• Gen Walker placed 1st Brigade on the left and 3rd on the right and each was to attack on a 2 battalion front with the other 2 in support
• 2nd Brigade would be in support but would be some 2 to 3 miles behind the front line• The two brigades received the same orders for a set‐piece attack with a strict timetable and detailed list of targets – basically an infantry plan linked to the artillery plan:
• Each brigade to have a 2 battalion front• So 8 companies were to rush the first objective as the barrage lifted and then remain and consolidate
• Another 8 companies plus engineers, pioneers and at least 4 Vickers follow behind and move on the second objective when the barrage lifts to the third objective
• A third, similar, wave follows the second wave and passes through to attack the fourth objective as the third lift occurs
• But the two brigades had quite different approaches putting this plan into action• Brigadiers Nevill Smyth VC (1st Brigade) and Ewan Sinclair‐Maclagan (3rd Brigade) issued very different orders
Infantry dispositions for the 1st Australian Division attack 23 July 1916
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• Smyth structured his orders on the waves rather than the battalions with the waves being ordered to take and consolidate a single objective
• Sinclair‐Maclagan focused on the lines within waves and sometimes giving tasks to lines from one wave that belonged to another wave. So while each objective was to be rushed by the first line of a wave with the second line coming behind to consolidate the simple nature of this became complicated and confused by the differing orders/objectives for the lines (2nd objective to be taken by 3rd & 4th lines supported by 5th & 6th lines if necessary and then consolidated by 3rd, 4th & 5th – but they are from 2 different battalions and decision making became horribly confused)
• The attack commenced at 0028 on 23 July with a furious barrage of HE & shrapnel• But even Smyth’s simple plan did not survive down to the battalion level:
• The CO of the leading battalions (2nd Lt Col Arthur Stevens and 1st Lt Col James Heane) would retain overall command of both battalions as the second battalion passes through (4th Lt Col Iven Mackay & 3rd Lt Col Owen Howell‐Price)
• This worked well with 1st & 3rd Battalions with Heane & Howell‐Price joining HQs and Heane leaving Howell‐Price to command the sector while he moved forward to overcome poor comms and sort out difficulties
• But things did not work well with 2nd & 4th Battalions with Stevens not talking to or consulting Mackay with a consequent impact on performance
• The situation with 3rd Brigade was similarly confused with potentially more dire consequences
• Initially a small unsupported attack by 2 parties from 9th Battalion on the night of 21 July was made to try and capture the parts of OG 1 & 2 on the right flank. These were not supported by artillery and were unsuccessful and Div & Brigade Commands did nothing else except allocate the task to a company of 9th Battalion to undertake as part of the major attack at 0030 on 23 July, with no extra artillery assistance. This attack was unsuccessful and the OG lines to the village were not taken for 3 more days
• The first two waves of both 11th & 9th Battalions went forward taking the first 2 objectives but instead of consolidating they raced forward engaging parties of Germans and running into the Australian artillery barrage. Things were particularly confused with troops having great difficulty identifying objectives or trenches that allied artillery had virtually obliterated
• 3rd Brigade and Battalion HQs were having little control or were not in contact with forward areas and effective control was only re‐established by a group of 11th Battalion junior officers sent forward to replace casualties.
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• These officers set about organizing troops to consolidate and re‐establishing comms with HQ. Capt Ferdinand Medcalf being awarded both an MC and DSO
• But while 3rd Brigade could not advance more than the second objective it did at least put in place consolidation efforts in preparation for German counter‐attacks
• Dawn found varied success with the co‐operative 1st & 3rd Battalions advancing more than anyone else
• 2nd & 4th Battalions faced less resistance than 1st & 3rd but in spite of poor co‐operation by Lt Col Stevens there was enough cohesion for Gibraltar to be captured (later in the day by 2nd Battalion)
• However 1st & 3rd had to a large degree ‘dragged’ the others along with it.• Attack was a divisional attack in support of further, unsuccessful, attacks by 4th Army
and so was the only successful one. But a divisional attack implies 12,000 men while only 8 battalions were used and with the use of waves on a 4 battalion front it was really an attack by 1,000 men each wave on a front of about 1500 yards
Situation at daybreak 23 July 1916
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• German reaction was not long coming. As this was the only successful attack by the British with the Germans determined to regain/hold Pozières
• Three early counterattacks were repelled (British art & poor ground)• IV German Corps switched most of its artillery on Pozières & Aust positions• Methodical eg 1 battery of 5.9” howitzers fired on one Aust trench by the
main road using 4 rounds per minute breaking down the sides, burying men and by night parts could not be found by relief company
• The Germans continued to throw in reinforcements to undertake increasingly strong counter‐attacks and also increased the already strong artillery presence so that a continual heavy and broad bombardment kept battering the Australian lines and rear areas (Div HQ at Tara Hill about 2 – 3 miles behind lines) was subjected to regular shellfire
• Men were always in danger of being buried – hopefully to be dug out again• But it was decided to renew the attack and finish capturing all of the village
as well as taking the OG lines
• On the afternoon of 23 July 8th Battalion was brought forward and attacking from 1st Brigade’s forward area secured the rest of the village forward of the main road
• Orders from 1st Div HQ were then issued on the evening of 24 July to secure the northern & western edges of the village (K trench) & establish a perimeter plus secure the OG lines
• Orders appeared to detail the attack to begin early in the morning of 26 July when in fact the intent was early 25 July
• The confusion was only sorted out by 0130 on 25 July and the attack commenced after furious and confused activity to try and get troops in place under very heavy artillery fire with heavy casualties being suffered during this period compounded by trenches and landmarks no longer visible having been obliterated
• 5th Battalion captured OG1 but many troops raced on to OG2 in a disorganized manner so OG1 was only thinly held
• 1st Brigade performed much better as a result of their better comms and co‐operation and 4th & 8th Battalions seized K trench and Pozières Cemetery, linking up with 48th Div
• This all took place under German gunfire laying constant barrages on the narrow approaches to Pozières and the front line
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1st Division’s situation 25 July 1916
• Reserve Army then directed that the Windmill & high ground around OG1 & 2 needed to be taken to gain observation ability and deny it to the Germans
• 1st Division however was exhausted having suffered 5,285 casualties so on 27 July was relieved by 2nd Division commanded by Maj Gen James Legge
• 2nd Div took over a cauldron that was being continually bombarded by increasing German artillery regiments and desire of Germans to regain the village
• GHQ ordered Reserve Army to make preparations for a major attack on the front River Ancre and Serre. To do this the OG lines needed to be broken through to cut off the garrison at Thiepval
• This was seen as increasingly important by GHQ and the Pozières area started to receive increasing proportion of supplies
• II Corps’ 12th Div, on ANZAC’s west, were to move along the ridge north of Thiepval and then hook back, cutting off the garrison
• 2nd Division were ordered to attack the OG lines to meet the GHQ requirement “the capture of Pozières… is an important gain, but the Windmill N(orth) E(ast) of it and the high ground about OG 1 and 2 must be secured in order to obtain observation for ourselves and to deny it to the enemy.”
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Maj Gen James LeggeGOC 2nd AIF Division
• 53 years old
• Army career of administrative and quartermaster roles
• Served as Australia’s representative on Imperial General Staff before war
• Chief of General Staff since outbreak of war until briefly commanded 1st Div (1 month on Gallipoli)
• Many well placed friends and political clout
• Legge assumed command of the line on 27 July and quickly developed plans • 3 battalions of 7th Brigade would spearhead the attack directed at OG1 & 2 about 900
yards north of the Albert‐Bapaume Road• The attack was to be supported on the left flank by 1 battalion of 6th Brigade attacking at
right angles and on the right flank by 1 battalion of 5th Brigade attacking the OG lines south of the Albert‐Bapaume Road
• Gough (not Birdwood) set Legge 2 days to plan, prepare for & execute the assault ‐ a very, very short time
• But Legge’s plan had severe drawbacks as well• GHQ orders took the same format as for 1st Div at Pozières – 4 lines of infantry attacking
set targets behind a lifting artillery barrage with an emphasis on consolidation• This replicated the 1st Div approach of attack in depth behind artillery firepower• GHQ left the ‘wire cutting, preliminary bombardment and subsequent artillery lifts’ up to
1st ANZAC Corps• Legge, however, tried to change plans to attack without artillery – this was reversed by
GHQ with Haig noting:
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2nd Australian dispositions for the attack on 29 July 1916
• “General Birch in the evening reported that the Australians had at the last moment said that they would attack without artillery support and that “they did not believe machine gun fire could do them much harm”. Birch at once saw Gough who arranged that the original artillery programme should be carried out’
• But the artillery plan developed by 1st ANZAC was totally inadequate• Preliminary bombardment on OG1 to last 1 minute• First wave to leave Tramway before & move close to OG1 without protective artillery• Lift to OG2 for 10 minutes then 2 more lifts within 5 minutes so infantry can rush to
attack OG2 with standing barrage to fall 200 yards beyond OG2• Barrage only 16 minutes in total (93 minutes for 1st Div) at a rate of 2 rounds/min
rather than 2 – 5 rounds/min• Gens Birdwood and Brundell White did nothing to try and increase the length/intensity of
the barrage or to intercede with Gen Gough to allow more time for preparation• All this was in a situation of an intense & accurate German artillery bombardment that
hampered preparations:
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• Pozières at this time “was the centre of an artillery duel that rained shellfire on the village and its immediate vicinity almost constantly.”
• Germans had OPs in the OG lines and the Windmill while overworked 1st Div artillery had trouble establishing OPs in Pozières because of the shellfire and the resultant total lack of comms
• 2nd Div unfamiliar with the ground – no trench maps and lines not connected trenches so often got lost and this impacted on preparations
• Early 2nd Div patrols found the wire destroyed in a few areas but large tracts remained untouched and the wire would be a problem
• Legge continued on in the hope that further activity would increase gaps and make new ones
• Besides the artillery issues Legge’s infantry plans had serious flaws:• 1st Div had 4 waves advanced on 4 staggered objectives and then consolidated• All 4 waves of 2nd Div would start from from Tramway Trench at about the same time
to attack only 2 objectives, OG1 & 2, leaving Tramway at midnight 50 yards apart and move within 150 yards of OG1 before the preliminary barrage, ie each of the 2 formations were 2 to 4 times as dense as 1st Div
• In 1st Div attack a company was in 1 wave in a line across the front• 2nd Div split the companies so A Company, 26th Battalion on 7th Brigade’s extreme left
would form all 4 waves to attack OG1 & 2 on the left.• So 1 platoon was in each wave across a very limited front acting under 2 sets of orders
(OG1 & 2) but having to be controlled by 1 CO. So while half the company was attacking & consolidating OG1 the other half was moving on to attack OG2 with the CO having to be across both – This approach was pressed on all battalions & brigades by Legge
• Reserves also became an issue – 6th Brigade had 22nd Battalion & half of 24th Battalion waiting in Kay Trench as reserves but 7th Brigade (in the centre with most responsibility) placed it reserve (27th Battalion) in Sausage valley – well over half a mile away which was a great distance with the near absence of communications and continuing German heavy bombardment
• 1st Div relied on firepower ‐ a strong barrage with thin but deep infantry formations• 2nd Div’s plans relied on manpower – a quick light barrage with 2 thickly populated lines
of infantry ie an infantry assault not a co‐ordinated combined arms attack• The attack commenced just after midnight on 29th July
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• The attack failed with very large numbers of casualties• The barrage commenced on time and the 4 waves set out on time• But the Germans had seen the troops assembling and were on high alert – they had
many observers who were not inconvenienced by the light barrage• The barrage was too light & short to force the Germans in the trenches under cover
and had not cut the wire except in a few places• The Germans poured out a high rate of accurate machine gun fire also artillery • OG1 was taken in most places as it was lightly defended (but it was ‘very shallow,
only about three feet deep, (which) caused some confusion as to whether it was the real objective or not’ – This was a poor defensive line and gave poor protection from German artillery
• OG2 was held extremely strongly with a great deal of machine gun fire and large numbers of bombs (hand‐grenades) causing huge numbers of casualties and the Australians were forced back to OG1
• On the right the there were no gains and high numbers of casualties for 5th Brigade• There was some success on the left with 6th Brigade making gains but 26th & 25th
Battalions of 7th Brigade were forced back from OG2 and the 26th started to stray
26th Battalion’s manoeuvre to cover the boundary between the 6th and 7th Brigades
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• The perpendicular angle where 6th & 7th Brigades abutted was caused by the OG lines intersecting with Tom’s Cut
• To keep in contact this meant 26th Battalion needed to turn North West as they advanced but they made the angle too large and started to mix with 23rd Battalion of 6th Brigade
• This resulted in other companies of 26th & then 25th straying to the left, leaving an increasingly thinly held line
• 28th Battalion on the right of 7th Brigade advanced in good order but found thick barbed wire in front of both OG1 & 2 that was untouched forcing men to stand & try & cut paths ‐ heavy casualties resulted from very heavy German rifle, machine‐gun & artillery fire with 1st Div artillery also firing short into them – no gain & severe casualties
• 5th Brigade on the right was in a dire position.• They were allocated none of the artillery support and had to rely on trench mortars• But Aust Light Trench Battery reported it had been ‘placed in reserve, and took no active
part in the operation’. So even this support was minimal• The Germans decimated the first three waves and they failed to reach OG1• Many junior officers were seen to act like Capt Medford of 1st Division’s 3rd Brigade and
try and organize the men while under fire and lead them through the wire but by the end of the operation they had all been killed
7th Brigade’s sector during the operation of 29 June 1916
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• Afterwards Haig stated that some of the divisional generals in 1st ANZAC Corps were ‘so ignorant and (like many Colonials) so conceited, that they cannot be trusted to work out unaided the plans of attack’
• After this failed attack Legge was ‘supervised’ closely by Generals Birdwood and BrundellWhite as well as Gough and even Haig
• Reserve Army then stated that its artillery plans were not to be changed by either 1st
ANZAC Corps or 2nd Division• But Legge remained in place with strong political backing from Australia• Legge was ordered to attack the same objectives of the Windmill and the high ground
parts of OG1 & 2 on 2nd August• Legge timed the attack for 2115 to allow it to occur in the late evening daylight to
minimize confusion but was forced to delay a day to allow approach trenches to be completed – these were crucial as assembly needed to occur in daylight for the 2115 evening attack but without the Germans being aware of the imminent attack
• Gen Brundell White then felt that preparations needed more time and argued strongly with Gen Gough for a further day’s delay so the attack occurred at 2115 on 4th August
Objectives for 2nd Division’s renewed assault, 4 August 1916.
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• The Germans thought the digging of the jump off trench was troops assembling for an attack and the trench had to be completed in 2 days of furious shelling ‐ men were buried, dug out & buried again and trenches disappeared, were dug again , obliterated and dug again – 4th Pioneer Battalion lost 230 men in this activity
• With the trenches dug the 3 brigades were able to assemble on 4th August without detection
• Artillery action for wire cutting seemed to finally be having an impact and Reserve Army had allocated extra ammunition for this purpose with the strict order that it must be expended
• Reserve Army coordinated the preliminary bombardment being sure to include a pattern that would mask the assault
• The barrage for the assault was decided by Army GHQ with strict orders that there was to be no deviation:• 1st barrage on OG1 for 3 minutes• lift to OG2 for 10 minute 2nd barrage while the infantry attacked OG1• 3 lifts of 2 minutes each 100 metres each while OG2 was attacked
• The rate of fire equaled 1st Division’s but the total barrage was 19 minutes & 1st Div’s 90+
Artillery lifts for 2nd Division’s operations of 4 August 1916
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• Each Brigade had to dig its own jumping‐off trench & approach trenches• 23rd Battalion drew this task for 6th Brigade and attempted this during 30 July – 3 August• The task was horrendous given the fearsome barrage the Germans were laying down.• Lt Alec Raws of 23rd Battalion described these attempts:
”Our battalion….had to march for three miles, under shell‐fire, go out into No Man’s Land in front of the German trenches, and dig a narrow trench to be used to jump off from in another assault……We were shelled all the way up, but got absolute hell when passing through a particularly heavy curtain of fire which the enemy was playing on a ruined village (Pozières)……..I would have gladly shot myself, for I had not the slightest idea where our lines or the enemy’s were, and the shells were coming at us from, it seemed, three directions…..Our leader was shot before we arrived, and the strain had sent two other officers mad….I and another new officer took charge and dug the trench…..It was awful, but we had to drive the men by every possible means and dig ourselves…..I took it on myself to insist on the men staying, saying that any man who stopped digging would be shot……We got away as best we could. I was buried twice and thrown down several times – buried with the dead and dying. The ground was covered with bodies in all stages of decay and mutilation……..”
• Raws went on in another letter:“nothing but a churned mass of debris with bricks, stones, and girders, and bodies pounded to nothing. And forests! There are not even tree trunks left, not a leaf or a twig. All is buried and churned up again, and buried again. The sad part is that one can see no end of this. If we live to‐night, we have to go through to‐morrow night, and next week, and next month. Poor wounded devils you meet on the stretchers are laughing with glee. One cannot blame them – they are getting out of this…………We are lousy, stinking, ragged, unshaven, sleepless….I have one puttee, a dead man’s helmet, another dead man’s gas protector, a dead man’s bayonet. My tunic is rotten with other men’s blood, and partly splattered with a comrade’s brains…
• 6th Brigade Chaplains and some men buried several 100s around Dead Mans Road after this night and then a party of 100 men were assigned to a standing fatigue party to continue burying the increasing numbers of dead
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• But the infantry plans were similar to the first 2nd Div attack – 4 lines really 2 waves for 2 objectives
• This was Legge and his HQ repeating their approach and no input from or monitoring by Gen Birdwood and 1st ANZAC Corps HQ – once again a reliance on manpower to advance
• But 4 battalions were being used for the main advance (rather than 3 first time), 3 from 7th
Brigade and 1 from 6th Brigade• From the left they were 22nd (6th Brigade), 26th, 25th & 27th with 18th & 20th Battalions
of 5th Brigade putting an attack on OG1 & 2 in support on the right • 22nd Battalion suffered a large number of casualties on their way to the assembly trench
but the first wave advanced on time and took OG1, the second wave appeared lost but could not get through the communication trenches due to the very large numbers of dead and wounded.
• But 22nd’s second wave advanced from the communication trenches over open ground and maintained the correct spacing from the first wave and captured a badly damaged OG2
• By dawn the battalion was well consolidated and ready to repel any counter‐attacks
• In the centre 7th Brigade took OG1 relatively easily although 26th Battalion initially strayed left because of confusion with the jumping off trench not being completed. • 25th Battalion moved forward well and took both OG1 & 2 but had a gap on its left
with 26th Battalion that was not filled until dawn • 27th Battalion suffered a large number of casualties forming up that created
confusion in the waves that resulted in OG1 being taken but not OG2• Although 7th Brigade was successful it had suffered many casualties forming up and
more importantly in the consolidation phase. • 5th Brigade on the right was successful in taking both OG1 & 2, actually advancing beyond
the obliterated OG2. Unlike the previous 2 attacks this one had been supported with artillery fire. This advance by 5th Brigade meant that all of both OG1 & 2 south of the Albert – Bapaume Road were in Australian hands
• The failure by 27th Battalion to take OG2 left part of the line in German hands and as a result the Windmill. However at about 0400 when the Germans unsuccessfully counter‐attacked this area troops from both 27th and the supporting 28th were able to follow up and take the remaining OG2 sector. They then were able to establish positions in OG 1 & 2 around the Windmill, making it untenable for the Germans who withdrew
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Consolidation• With the loss of the Windmill the Germans lost their view over the Allied lines and
rear areas and the Australians could now look over green countryside, Courcelette (important for German re‐supply) and Bapaume 5 miles away
• Consolidation of the line was now crucial• It had been recognized that consolidation should occur with few men in the forward
most trenches and defence should be in depth• Battalion COs kept all their men in the OG trenches to help consolidate and when the
Germans laid down very heavy shell fire from all 4 directions (from behind from Thiepval).
• At more than 1 man per yard of trench in each wave the German barrage was particularly effective so this continued reliance on manpower by 2nd Division resulted in a huge casualty rate as the Germans laid down a continuing monstrous barrage from all 4 directions
Counterattack• All during 4th August the Germans made a number of counterattacks to various parts
of the line but although they sometimes gained entry they were all defeated
Relief• By 5th August 2nd Division was exhausted and 4th Division started to relieve it but during
the night of 5th ‐ 6th August the Germans laid down another extreme bombardment and on the morning of the 6th launched a counter‐attack.
• This was seen off and the relief completed but at great cost to both 2nd & 4th Divisions• 2nd Division came out having suffered 6,848 casualties in 12 days• 4th Division had very little front line experience and entered the ultimate ’hot spot’ at
Pozières in a cauldron of constant artillery bombardment
The Salient• Action by 1st & 2nd Divisions had created a pronounced salient to the north of the village• 7th August dawned with 4th Division holding trenches of more than half a mile each side of
the point that flowed through captured German territory back to Reserve Army’s 12th
Division on the left and 4th Army’s 23rd Division on the right• Dangerously exposed to artillery & machine‐gun fire from 3 sides, this salient presented a
strategic problem for Reserve Army & GHQ to ensure it did not continue to squeeze out creating greater danger
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Maj Gen Sir Herbert Cox GOC 4th AIF Division• Aged 57 in 1916, Herbert Cox had graduated from
Sandhurst in 1880
• Prior to the First World war, Cox saw service and action in Afghanistan, Burma, India and in the Boxer Rebellion
• After holding senior appointments in India Cox was given command of 29th Indian Brigade, which he lead at Gallipoli. Wounded at Gallipoli and evacuated, in 1916 Cox was promoted Major General and given command of the newly formed 4th AIF Division
Disposition of the 4th Australian Division, 7 August 1916
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• But Gough issued a memorandum on 3rd August that caused great problems for the men of 4th Division. He urged corps commanders to impress on subordinate commanders to take energetic & offensive action “instead of waiting for orders from above”
• This set the stage for quickly & poorly planned attacks that were in fact counter‐intuitive to a considered broad front approach. He basically removed himself from control.
• This meant that during 4th Division’s first spell of 8 days they took part in 2 larger actions included in more than 6 battalion or larger actions and many smaller ones
• This was also in an environment where the Germans were increasingly anxious to regain ground and launching bigger and more determined counter‐attacks with increasingly vicious artillery support
• So the situation faced by 4th Division was the most critical faced, to date, by any of the three AIF Divisions at Pozières
• Even as the relief was going on the artillery bombardment intensified to what CEW Bean describes as “the crowning bombardment of the whole series.” And that the bulge the Australians had developed “now permitted the enemy artillery to shell them from the rear, Thiepval way, as well as from front and both flanks. A great part of their front line was now completely enfiladed by German batteries and the loss was heavy.”
• On the night of 6th August the bombardment was so heavy and the trenches so completely destroyed that the men basically sheltered in the old German deep dugouts as a means of survival. OG2 was only being lightly held by small outposts
• But the Germans launched a counter‐attack at 0700 on 7th August on the front being held by 4th Brigade and passed through OG2, over the deep dugouts in OG1 capturing Australians and advancing towards Pozières village
• Lt Albert Jacka was and 8 men were sheltering in one of the dugouts in OG2 and the Germans had passed over in the barrage, thrown a bomb down and posted a guard
• Jacka climbed the stairs and shot the guard. He then led his men in line and attacked the Germans from the rear. Other isolated men joined and as the Germans turned in confusion the captured Australians joined in and then the neighbouring 48th Battalion joined in.
• The surviving Germans were captured, the lost ground retaken (plus more) and the counter‐attack to re‐take Pozières heights failed.
• But the cost was great – in 2 days of artillery and counter‐attack 48th Battalion lost 598 men, 45th Battalion lost 345 and Jacka’s company in 14th Battalion lost 150 men
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• CEW Bean in his Official History describes the relief of 2nd Division as the end of the Battle for Pozières Heights and the entry of 4th Division as the beginning of the ‘Advance to Mouquet Farm’
• But the reality is that the advance to Mouquet Farm was in response to an attempt by Reserve Army to encircle Thiepval from the north (by V Corps) and the south (by II Corps and 1 ANZAC Corps)
• The 1 ANZAC Corps advance would be undertaken by 4th Brigade initially and then 13th
Brigade with 12th Brigade allocated a defensive/holding role on the right• The 8 days the 4th Division were in the line their 8+ attacks were at brigade then battalion
levels that took place in an environment of continuing heavy enfilading artillery and machine gun fire and and increasingly disconnected relationship between infantry and artillery plans and reality
• Altogether these 17 days (plus the 8 of 4th Div) was incredibly costly with the three divisions suffering 16,780 casualties (5285, 6846 & 4649)
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Disposition of the 4th Australian Division, 7 August 1916
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Some Lessons & Observations• Gen Gough – poor leadership
• Trying to rush 1st Div (unsuccessfully) & 2nd Div (successfully)• “Withdrawal from Control” memo dated 3rd August• Allowing an increasingly exposed salient to develop• Did provide good artillery plans
• Gen Birdwood (& Gen Brundell White)• Showed little strategic or tactical leadership• Did nothing to try and widen the salient or appear to understand the need for a
combined attack on a wider front than 1 brigade• Did not protect divisions from Gough• Did not properly supervise Gen Legge and allowed him to continue poor planning
• Gen Walker• Performed very well
• Gen Legge• Showed poor capability to plan and control and poor appreciation of the reality of
battle and impact of enemy artillery and machine guns• No real understanding of use of artillery
GENERALLY• This was a series of operations that attracted a huge continuous rain of artillery fire• 1 ANZAC Corps was the only really successful formation at these times and drew more
and more artillery attention as a result• The great majority of wounds sustained and deaths occurred as a result of shell fire rather
than bullets or bayonets• A good percentage of casualties were sustained digging trenches, bringing up supplies
and bearing wounded out (including wounded being re‐wounded) as a result of the enfilading fire directed at the salient
• Bean observed: “The German shells came from front, flank and rear. Yet by this route food, water and stores had to come up. Trenches changed their shape under bombardment. The whole area was flayed and pounded into a veritable sea of shell‐craters. In rain, which fortunately only fell once or twice – the area became a bog. Often neither the attacking troops nor their leaders could recognize the landmarks they reached; at one time, when the heavy artillery was about to bombard a trench, the 3rd Battalion staff felt sure its men were in that trench, the brigade staff felt sure they were 200 yards behind it, and the divisional staff felt sure they were in a third position.”
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• The battalion CO, Lt Col Howell‐Price stood on the only identifiable landmark to prove the battalion was correct.
• And finally CEW Bean probably sums it up: ‐
On that crowded mile of summit the three Australian divisions engaged lost 23,000 officers and men in less than seven weeks. The Windmill site, bought later by the Australian War Memorial Board – with the old mound still there – marks a ridge more densely sown with Australian sacrifice than any other place on earth.
In those forty‐five days Australians had launched nineteen attacks – all except two being on a narrow front, and sixteen at night. They knew their constant advance during a time of deadlock would compare with any other achievement on the Somme. Under bombardment, of intensity and duration probably unsurpassed, they had held every trench once firmly captured.
With thanks to and acknowledging:
• CEW Bean ‐ The Official History of Australia in the War 1914 – 1918 Vol III – The A.I.F. in France
• CEW Bean ‐ ANZAC to Amiens• Peter Brune ‐ Our Great Hearted Men – The Australian Corps and the 100 Days• Peter Edgar ‐ To Villers‐Bretonneux (Brig‐Gen William Glasgow & 13th AIF Brigade)• Peter Fitzsimons ‐ Fromelles & Pozières – In the Trenches of Hell• Meleah Hampton ‐ 1st Anzac Corps and the Battle of Pozières Ridge, 1916 (Doctoral
Thesis)• Meleah Hampton ‐ The Battles of Pozières (Australian Army Campaign Series – 22)• David Holloway ‐ Combat Colonels of the AIF in the Great War• Graham Keech ‐ Australians on the Somme 1916 Pozières• Michael Lawriwsky ‐ Hard Jacka• Ray McNab ‐ Pozières Phase 1 & 9th Battalion – Supplementary Note• Christopher Wray ‐ Pozières Echoes of a Distant Battle
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Finally
Tara Hill
Casualty Corner
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