poxpey.1957.the washington-du bois controversy and its effects on the negro problem

8/2/2019 Poxpey.1957.the Washington-Du Bois Controversy and Its Effects on the Negro Problem.

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THE WASHINGTON-DUBOIS CONTROVERSY AND ITSEFFECT ON THE NEGRO PROBLEM*C. Spencer Poxpey

One of the most pressing problems in the United Statestoday is that of the Negro; and two of the leading figures, ad-mired by some and maligned by others, are Booker T. Wash-ington and William E. B. DuBois.This problem, with roots buried in the early growth ofour country as a result of two and one-half centuries of en-forced slavery, has always preyed upon the conscience ofAmericans, in the South as well as the North. Although slav-ery was accepted in both sections, it nevertheless plagued theinnermost thinking of Americans, because it did not squareitself with the basic tenets underlying the American creed.Following the Civil War, it became one of the foremostproblems. The fifty year period, from 1865 until 1915, mark-ed an era in which the pendulum swung from one side to theother, with progress slowly but perceptibly being made. Evenamong Negroes themselves, it was, and still is today, a mat-er of not inconsiderable difference as to the means of bring-ing about improvement, if not the solution.One of the most relentless and bitter controversies onthese aspects occurred between 1895 and 1915 between Wash-ington and DuBois, two opposites in every respect. It is doubt-ful that even if they had agreed they could have worked har-moniously together, and it is about these two men and theirdifferences that this article is written.There are certain limitations inherent in the investiga-tion of a controversy involving two persons who believed insubstantially the same goals, especially when one is still liv-ing, and has had the opportunity to reassess his earlier posi-tion. Another limitation is that the body of material dealingwith their differences is personal and therefore subjective.However, an attempt will be made to check facts other thanthose from the protagonists themselves. There is a third lim-itation also. That is the fact that the views of one, acceptednow, in the opinion of many may tend to discredit the other.

*Reprinted in revised form from TheBulletin, Minnesota Councilfor the Social Studies, Fall, 1957.128


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THE WASHINGTON-DUBOIS ONTROVERSY 129Because of these limitations, the scope of this article,while naturally touching the present, will deal mainly with thetwo decades when both men faced each other in life. Howeveran attempt will be made, through the studyof other sources, toassess the past as well as the present evaluation of their ef-forts in regard to the cultural, economic, and intellectual lifeof those for whom they worked.The nature of the controversy itself and the depth towhich it sank may well be told in a look at the two men them-selves. No two persons were more unlike than they, in train-ing, temperament and in rearing. Perhaps their only commonfactors were that they were human, able, and members of thesame race.

Washington, born a slave in Virginia, walked from hishome at Haleford to HamptonInstitute, established to train Ne-groes in vocational education, and was graduated from thatschool. He so impressed the officials with his industry andpunctuality that, upon graduation-a feat of considerable mo-ment for an ex-slave boy at that time-he was chosen to foundand direct a similar school in the black belt of Alabama. Hefounded Tuskegee Institute in 1881, four years after the Com-promise of 1877, which saw the Negro problem left almostentirely to the South. He was not yet twenty-four years old.By nature he was observant, kindly disposed, and a goodlistener. Althoughan able orator and able to meet people well,he seldom expressed himself until he knew to whom he wastalking and what their position was on the matter being dis-cussed.' Polite in manners, tactful in approach and diploma-tic in discourse, he was able to get along with the best or theworst of both races, a quality necessary for the times, andfor that matter, any time.Born a slave, spending much of his early manhood dur-ing the years of one of the world's costliest wars and the trag-ic reconstruction period, Washington knew as well as anyonethe southern scene. He knew, as DuBois could not know, theantipathies of the leading class and the lower whites who wereto take over and make worse the Negro problem. He knew byexperience the problems faced by the Negroes, the vast ma-jority of whom were living in a section where the stresses and

'W. E. B. DuBois,Dusk of Dawn(New York: Harcourt,Brace &Co.,1940), 79.


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130 HISTORY OF EDUCATION JOURNALstrains were at the breaking point. He knew where the pointsof conciliation were; indeed, he was an integral part of thatsociety. He had first-hand knowledge of the high illiteracy ofboth the whites and the Negroes, which one author places at35%and 77%respectively. 2DuBois' background and training were just the opposite.Born in Massachusetts of free parents in 1868, trained at ahigh school where there was no racial discrimination, the eru-dite and scholarly youngster attended Fisk University, Nash-ville, Tennessee, and later Harvard University, where he re-ceived his doctor's degree in history, the first of his race todo so. His firsthand knowledge of the problem came in 1885when it was decided that he should attend Fisk. Of this hesaid, "I was going into the South; the South of slavery, rebell-ion, and blackfolks; and above all I was going to meet coloredpeople of my own age and education, and of my own ambi-tion." Thus trained, at two universities whose courses of studyat that time and to an extent now, leaned heavily toward thearts and sciences, coupled with a background of living in acommunity which had no legal discriminatory practices, it isobvious that DuBois would approach the problem of the Negrodifferently. However, he recognized that not all Negroesshould be trained in the vocations.Unlike Washington, DuBois was and is blunt, to the pointand outspoken. Never lacking in ability to express himself,and fearless almost to the point of being foolhardy, he was notthe type to move with ease among those whom he consideredbelow him. Thus he was not able to speak "The Language"of the southerners, white or Negro. Of himself he has this tosay concerning an interview with Washngton, one of the fewas far as we could find out they every had: "I was quick, fasttalking and voluble [and] ... found at the end... I had doneall the talking."4That both men were able and brilliant, no one can deny;that both wanted to improve the lot of the four million Ne-groes, just out of slavery and who were ushered into a society

' Harvey Wish, Society and Thought n ModernAmerica (New York:Longmans, Green and Co., 1952), 34.DuBois, Dusk of Dawn, p. 22.'Ibid., p. 80.


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THE WASHINGTON-DUBOISONTROVERSY 131where their critics were manyandhelpers few, is unquestioned;and that each one in his own way contributed much to whatDuBois now terms the "Dusk of Dawn" and biracial uplift isunchallenged.Their difference lies in their approach to the ultimateand best means of educating the Negro on terms of ability andcompetence which would make him accepted in America as acitizen. Apparently there was no serious difference betweenthe two men until after the turn of the century, when, inDuBois' words, Tuskegee had become "The Negro capital ofthe United States."5

It is well at this point to put the basis of this contro-versy into proper perspective. Our country had just emergedfrom a bitter and long war-a war which saw kin fightingagainst kin and in which the end result, no matter what theoutcome, was to leave scars which would take a long time toheal. The causes of this war need not concern us here, ex-cept to mention that the South believed most strongly in thejustice of its cause. Because the South was the loser and be-cause of this belief-mainly that it had the right to withdrawand govern itself as it chose-the enormity of the problem ofthe South's restoration and adjustment to the newly freed Ne-gro was increased. Whatever the results of the war, the un-biased judgment of history prior to 1860 must hold with theSouth , as John C. Calhoun and others held, that it could se-cede. But it is another story after Appomatox-a story whichmany southerners even today do not want to believe is true.Generally there were three classes of people in the South afterthe war, two white classes and the Negro. The landholdingclass and the Negroes tended to work harmoniously with eachother. For our purposes we shall refer to the landholdersgenerally as the Gentry. The other class, whose hatred of theNegro was of long duration, even during the days of slavery,was the poorer group. Few had ever had slaves; most ownedlittle property and had had even less to do with the actual pol-itical affairs of the South. This class we will call the Bour-bons. They were to come to power in the late 1890's and it isthey with whom the four million freedmen were to deal. There

SDuBois, Dusk of Dawn, p. 86.


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132 HISTORY OF EDUCATIONJOURNALwas a close relationship between the Gentry and the Negroes,while the Bourbons hated both.sThis emnity increased after 1863 when President Abra-ham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation orderingthe slaves in those states still fighting freed. For this classsaw in the Negro an economic competitor and a political allyof the Gentry, which might indeed be the crux of the problemtoday. Moreover, it furnished, if the Gentry and the Negroeswould combine their vote, the continued domination by thosewhom Washington called "'The better white people". As amatter of fact, this hastened the inevitable defeat of the Southafter Gettysburg, for the bulk of the poor whites saw little tobe gained in continuing the fight.The end of the war brought four or five results, whichwill be mentioned here only because they helped to illuminatethe background of the controversy. Firstly, it establishedmore firmly the authority of the national government, and laidto rest the doctrine of legal secession, although sections ofthe South are today using all their powers to raise it from itsgrave. Secondly, it vetoed the Jeffersonian concept of an eco-nomy based on agriculture and small cities and accepted theHamiltonian concept of industrialism based on free labor anda bountiful government. Thirdly, it freed the Negro slaves,and finally established the basis of making our government"one nation indivisible, with liberty and justice for all."The plans of reconstruction need not concern us in anydetail here. The Lincoln "go-in-peace-and-sin-no-more"plan was most lenient, but his death cut short his efforts be-fore the real problem came. It is indeed doubtfulwhether theycould have been carried out had he lived. President AndrewJohnson's plan, at first tougher, was nullified under the Con-gressional dictatorship of the radicals, led by Senator CharlesSumner and Thaddeus Stevens.Briefly, three of Johnson's proposals must be mentioned,for it is in the execution of these plans that the problem reallybegan. It provided that the states must hold constitutionalconventions, accept the Thirteenth and later the Fourteenthand Fifteenth amendments, repudiate all debts made under theConfederacy and elect such officers as had been pardoned byCongress. When the South rebelled, stronger measures wereused. The setting up of military districts and the appointing

'C. VannWoodward,Origins of the New South(Baton Rouge: Lou-isiana State University Press, 1951), 210.


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THE WASHINGTON-DUBOISONTROVERSY 133of governors, although necessary at the time, proved to bemost disunifying.Force is never a good determinant in the long run.While the southerners generally accepted the terms as thequid pro quo for getting back into the union, it was done main-ly in words but not in spirit.The carpetbag rule in the South, of which much has beenand will continue to be written as time passes, left many deepscars on the South and on the nation. It came at a time whenAmerica was experiencing growing pains, when the full weightof the industrial revolution was bearing heavily on the old in-stitutions, and when moral depravity was at its height, politi-cally and economically.To the victor go the spoils, and many unprincipled per-sons, northern and southern, Negro and White, used this per-iod as a means of lining their pockets with whatever was insight. This was the eve of the era of "rugged individualism"or "Darwinian Socialism." Competition was rife in both sec-tions of the nation. A good case in point is that of a militarygovernor in Louisiana who came South all but penniless, andafter four years in office was a millionaire.8 These governorsand their coherts used the freedmen, uneducated and withouttraining and wholly unprepared, as office holders, a movewhich was to contribute greatly toward the disfranchisementpolicies of the Bourbons. The radicals were "enforcing"civil rights, much to the detriment of both the Negro and thewhite.The disputed Hayes-Tilden election of 1876, in whichthe North began its nearly seventy-year "retirement" fromthe Negro problem provides the basic prop in the setting ofthis controversy. The Compromise of 1877, four years beforeWashington was to establish Tuskegee Institute, was made atthe Wormley's Hotel, on a strictly partisan vote of 8-7, de-cided not to go behind the disputed election returns but to ac-cept as valid the reports of the Republican Canvassing Boardsin the three states in question. With the presidency upper-most in their minds, the leaders of the Republican Party,among whom were Senator John Sherman of Ohio and Con-gressman James Garfield, President-to-be, made an agree-ment with leaders of the Democratic Party which, in effect,abandoned the Negro as a national problem and left him to the

eClaude Bowers, The Tragic Era (New York: Literary Guild ofAmerica, 1929), 363.


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134 HISTORYOF EDUCATIONJOURNALtender mercies of what at that time was a Southern leader-ship not adverse to allowing the Negroes to keep his basicpolitical and civil rights.The Wormley's Hotel agreement, later formalized inthe office of the U.S. Attorney General, and approved by Pres-ident Grant, stipulated that the South, in exchange for the with-drawal of Federal troops, the withholding of national supportfrom the Republican regimes and the leaving of the Negro tothe South, would use its influence to continue the count of theElection Commission (which assured the Republicans the oc-cupancy of the White House), would respect the civil rights ofall citizens, including the freedmen, and would refrain fromthe use of violence.9Meanwhile, when President Rutherford B. Hayes beganto carry out the measures of the compromise, which gave himthe presidency, there developed a serious struggle for politi-cal power in the South. The Gentry, who had consummated thecompromise and who were expected by the Republicans to liveup to their end in regard to the Negro, had the edge, and werewell satisfied that they could live up to the agreement. PaulBuck states: "The Compromise of 1877 pleased those north-erners who still dreaded the prospects of a national Demo-cratic administration by placing Hayes in the White House topurify the Republican party. [It] implied a surrender to thosewho had insisted upon a thorough establishment of nationalismand complete equality as a result of the war." 10However, when the South was restored and the Unionarmy left the scene, there was a determined spirit-an un-yielding obsession-to blame all of the ills of the area on theNegro. While they went through the motions of according himhis "place" on paper, the hostility of the masses was mostintense. Cash observes that "The Yankee was to retire fromthis thirty year conflict in what amounted to abject defeat....It was still a world in which the principle of the Old was pre-served virtually intact; a world in which the Negro was still,'mud-sill' and in which the white man, any white man, was insome sense a master.""

'Paul Hayworth, The Hayes- Tilden Disputed Election (Indianapolis:Bobbs-Merrill & Co., 1906), 285-286.1'Paul Buck, Back to Reunion (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1937),100-101."W. J. Cash, The Mind of the South (New York: Doubleday & Co.,1941), 117.


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THE WASHINGTON-DUBOISONTROVERSY 135The economic conditions in the South were such that allthree classes were at odds. The only things they had in com-mon were poverty and depravity. Reconstruction measures hadreduced the land of the Gentry who became, in fact, a land-holding class without capital. The other class of whites, worseoff because they had no direct entre for getting loans from theNorth, and who were the eternal enemy of the Negro, hadneither the money nor the political power at the time to fightthe Gentry. But they did have more land they they had beforethe war. Thus the Negroes, always close to the Gentry, alliedthemselves with that class who tended to exploit him and the

poor whites.This exploitation was to have a telling effect on the Ne-gro and on the enmity which developed between the Gentry andthe Bourbons. Cash states: "The common whites were de-prived of their former liberties and, in large numbers, broughtwithin the scope of direct exploitation... They (the Gentry)came to use white tenants only through the operation of raceloyalty and old paternalism." 12One of the strangest facets of this study and one whichis equally baffling today, is why both the Negro and the poorwhites, suffering generally at the hands of the wealthier class,who used both groups to keep itself in power andpitted oneagainst the other to such an extent thathatred multiplied, couldnot then and cannot now find common and mutual ground fortheir own betterment. Perhaps it is well to take a closer lookat the Negro and the poor whites of that period, for it is theiranimosities, fed and nurtured by poverty and ignorance on thepart of both, a fact which Washingtonseems to appreciate andunderstand far better than DuBois, which led to the schism.The South had a few, if any, public schools for the gen-eral use of Negroes or poor whites. The Gentry believed inlight taxation and private education for their children. As aresult, both the Negro and the poor white were very nearlyilliterate, and thus were easier to exploit. Therefore, it waseasier to fan the fires of race hate and intolerance betweenthem. Whatever one may say about the carpetbag rule in theSouth, one must admit that it did give direction to the estab-lishment of public schools for Negroes and whites. Apologists

lbid., pp. 172-173. It must be pointed out that Cash himself, asoutherner from SouthCarolina, was of this poorer class, and may indeed bea bit biased.


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136 HISTORY OF EDUCATIONJOURNALfor the South do not always want to admit this fact, but, forexample, Florida's public school system was begun in 1874under carpetbag rule, with Jonathan Gibbs, a man of color,serving as state superintendent. Buck observes that "It seemsbeyond a doubt that in including the principle of the commonschool safely in the state constitutions, the carpetbag govern-ments established a principle which henceforth remained un-assailable." 13The period from 1880 to 1890, when the Gentry lost po-litical control of the South, was one of utmost significance, iffor no other reason than the fact that the real leaders, thebetter class of whites, really made an effort to make the Southin fact a part of the nation. Led by such men as Wade Hamp-ton, George Washington Cable, Sidney Lanier, Woodrow Wil-son, Joel Chandler Harris, Henry Grady, Henry Q.C.Lamar,Alexander Stephens, Tom Watson and others in each state,many gains were made toward easing the tensions. It was dur-ing this period that Negro education received its greatest im-petus from the South as well as the North. It appeared as ifthe Negro was indeed to be accepted.

Now this class with whom Washngton, not DuBois, wasin closest contact, was moderate in its approach to the pro-blem. It did not propose to accept the Negro as an equal, butit did insist that he be given an opportunity to prove himselfas a citizen. It insisted upon fair treatment at the polls and ingeneral intercourse between the races. These were the bettereducated leaders, who felt that in time the Negro would provehimself as a citizen. Wade Hampton, in 1885, expressed thegeneral view of this group, which, it must be admitted, wasfast losing its influence as a political and economic factor inthe South. "The Negro belongs to a subordinate role, but heneed not be ostracized. He is inferior, but that does not fol-low that he should be segregated or publicly humiliated. Ne-gro degradation is not a necessary corollary of white supre-macy." 14This was paternalistic, and there was no way possiblefor DuBois to accept such a statement of that sort, even if itwere made during a political campaign. Nevertheless, the Ne-gro became the focal point in the political battle throughoutthe"SBuck,op. cit., pp. 163-164."Quotedin C. VannWoodward,The Strange Case of Jim-Crow (NewYork: OxfordUniversity Press, 1955), 30-31.


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THE WASHINGTON-DUBOISONTROVERSY 137South, with the Bourbons, using intimidation and even resort-ing to overt acts of violence, greatly disapproved by the Gen-try, who were powerless to stop them. The Ku Klux Klan, or-ganized in 1867 at Pulaski, Tennessee, became so violent thatGeneral Nathan Bedford Forrest, its first national head, re-signed and ordered it dissolved. It did disappear for a while,but was revived on a local level by the Bourbon demagogues,who saw in the disfranchisement of the Negro their ascent topower and the double elimination of the twin objects of theirvenom at the time, the aristocratic Gentry and the Negro.The Gentry had had their day and were overthrown bythis poorer, less educated class which was to isolate the Southfrom the rest of the nation for nearly fifty years. From thisclass came Benjamin "Pitchfork Ben" Tillman of South Caro-lina, who walked out of the Democratic National Conventionin 1936 when a Negro offered prayer; Hoke Smith of Georgia,who opened the way for the Talmadges, father and son; W. K.Vardaman of Mississippi, whose place was taken by TheodoreGilmore Bilbo; and now James Eastlund. There is comfort,however, in the fact that although still potent, this group issmall and fast disappearing.During the first decade of power, from 1890 to 1900,1,111 Negroes were lynched in the South.15 By legal and ex-tra-legal methods, the Boubons had all but nullified whatevergains had been made by the Negro since Appomattox. It wasduring the middle of this decade that Washingtonmade his nowfamous "Atlanta Compromise" address, which was to providethe fuel for.the Washington-DuBois controversy.The Bourbons were in the saddle, but the gentry werenot yet through. Largely through the efforts of Grady, who hadgone north to preach the gospel of nationalism, a new Southsought full partnership in the nation as an equal. In an impas-sioned speech at Boston, he pleaded for financial aid in termsof investments in a section which had an abundanceof laborand all the land and resources necessary to be fully a part ofthe growing industrialism which was enveloping the North.He did much to convince the North that the South was indeedwilling and ready to embrace this new industrial movement,and invited investors to come to Atlanta to the exposition, to

iSCash, op. cit., p. 301.


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THE WASHINGTON-DUBOISONTROVERSY 139that he was taking the Negro out of politics and had acceptedthe disenfranchisement of the Negro at this time. DuBois,while not going so far as to say Washingtonhad accepted thisstand, does accuse him of soft-pedaling the political rightsand aspirations of Negroes. 16At the time of Washington's speech, there was a moveon foot, supported by many well-thinking whites and Negroes,that the best thing for the Negro was deportation. DuBois wasnot among this group. This move hadandhad had earlier somesupport in congressional circles. Indeed, Lincoln and Johnsonboth seriously discussed this possible move; the former evenhad sent some Negroes to Haiti, while the latter asked for areport as to the cost of transporting millions there. 17 Thismove reached great proportions under the leadership of Mar-cus Garvey at the turn of the century, when his "Back to Afri-ca Movement" resulted in many Negroes going back"Home". 18 However, through the efforts of Washington andDuBois and others, it was stopped cold and did not arise againuntil immediately after World War I, when Ku Klux Klanismbecame rampant.

To this group, Washington said: "To those of my racewho depend uponbettering their conditions in foreign lands, orunderestimate the importance of cultivating favorable rela-tions with the Southern white man... I would say 'Cast downyour bucket' where you are-cast it down in making friends inevery manly way of the peoples of all races by whom you aresurrounded. Cast it down in agriculture, mechanics, in com-merce, in domestic service and in the professions."This phase of the speech was to bring content to theBourbons, who left out his reference to the professions andinterpreted it to mean that the Negro was to have only thosejobs at the bottom. It is this phase, also, which DuBois attack-ed with unremitting vehemence in his program of "The Tal-ented Tenth", about which we will have more to say later.Recognizing, but lightly touching, the evils being perpe-trated in the South against the Negro, and recognizing the slow

1"W.E. B. DuBois, The Souls of the Black Folk (Chicago: A. C.McLung&Co., 1903), 53.1tW. E. B. Dubois, Black Reconstruction (New York: Harcourt,Brace, 1937), 267.18Roi Ottley, New WorldA-Comin' (Boston: Little, Brown, 1943),66-72.


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THE WASHINGTON-DUBOIS ONTROVERSY 141dustrialists could go full speed ahead with their program, un-hindered by the threat of racial strife.The Gentry read in Washington's speech a programwhich would bring the Southfully back into the nation, back toeconomic solvency and back to political importance, with theNegro playing a not inconsiderable role. Indeed, the continuedenfranchisement of the Negro was of inestimable importanceif the Gentry were to keep their position--a position whichthey were fast losing, if they had not already lost it.The Negroes generally, DuBois included, saw in theCompromise a ray of hope it if were heeded. DuBois, at thetime a sociology professor at Atlanta University, observedthat "Here might be the basis of a real settlement between thewhite and the blacks in the South, if the South opened to theNegro the doors of economic opportunity and the Negroes ofthe Southcooperated with the Southin political sympathy.,"2The Bourbons looked at it differently. They saw in thespeech a possible wedge to break the hold of the Gentrythrough the complete disfranchisement of the Negro. Bol-stered by the Plessey vs. Ferguson Decision, in which theUnited States Supreme Court enunciated the famous "separatebut equal" doctrine in 1896, they made short work of anyattempt to insure civil rights for the Negroes.The position of the Bourbons was further strengthenedby the Supreme Court two years later in the Williams vs.Mississippi Case, in which the Mississippi plan for the use ofthe "white primary" was validated (not to be reversed untilthe Gaines vs. Texas Case of 1942). Although the plan wasworked out in Mississippi, it was under Tillman that SouthCarolina was actually the first to use the plan in 1896, oneyear after the "Atlanta Compromise." By 1915 it was in usein eleven other states.However, Washington's address was well received; itmade him indeed the spokesman for the Negro and the NewSouth on racial matters; and it is at this point that the envy ofDuBois was kindled. The speech also kindled the enmity ofmany whites, especially the Bourbons, who did not look kindlyon the fact that here was a Negro who was to advise with thepresidents and with leading industrialists on problems of theSouth,

21 uBois, Dusk of Dawn, p. 55.


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142 HISTORY OF EDUCATIONJOURNALIt is worth noting some of the observations of the nation-al press in regard to this address at that time. The AtlantaConstitution the next day hailed it "a platform upon whichblacks and whites can stand with full justice to each other." 22The New York World editorially commented that "a NegroMoses stood before a great audience of white people and de-livered an address that marks a new epoch in the history ofthe New South."23 The Boston Transcript declared that theaddress "seemed to have dwarfed all other procedings. . .thesensation it has created in the press, North and South has nev-er been equalled.''24Let us now turn to the position advanced by DuBois.First of all, he was and is one of the most scholarly men inAmerica. He has had two or three careers, and has had theopportunity to revise and reappraise his position in the lightof present conditions. But we are concerned primarily herewith his theory of the Talented Tenth, postulated in 1898. Thistheory later led to the Niagara Movement of 1905, which form-ed the basis for the organization of the National Associationfor the Advancement of Colored People in 1909, and culmin-

ated in the publication of The Crisis, the organ of that organi-zation, in 1910.DuBois a social scientist, held that there are in allraces individuals who have exceptional abilities, and that thereal and only differences between races are due mainly to en-vironment and opportunity. From these exceptional persons,who should be trained in the arts and sciences, should comethe leaders of the Negro race. "I believed in the higher edu-cation of a Talented Tenth, who through their knowledge ofmodern culture could guide the American Negro into highercivilization.. .a leadership which could be trusted to bring thisgroup into self-realization and to the highest cultural possibil-ities."25DuBois feared and did not trust the white man to do this,and held that the Negro should be trained at all levels and inwhatever lines his capacity would follow. He held that, in or-der to do this, special colleges and universities, staffed by22The Atlanta Constitution, September 18, 1895.The New York World, September 18, 1895.24The Boston Transcript, September 20, 1895.asDuBois, The Dusk of Dawn, p. 70.


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THE WASHINGTON-DUBOISONTROVERSY 143college-trained Negroes, should be set up to instruct this Tal-ented Tenth. As a starting point, he insisted "The Negro inconscience [feel] bound to ask three things [now]: First, theright to vote; second, civic equality and third, the education ofyouth according to ability."t26It will be noted that both Washington, while he did notshare DuBois' mistrust of the better whites, and DuBois madeno mention of social equality at that time. Both implied intheir positions that such was a personal matter, and theirmain difference was in approach rather than ends. Neither oneopposed the basic educational views of the other, for Washing-ton, who sent his daughter to college, asked in the AtlantaCompromise that Negroes enter the "professions". DuBoiswanted only those of exceptional talent to enter college. Nei-ther expected full acceptance of the Negro to come immedi-ately. At this point, it would seem to an impartial observer,looking over the record after nearly fifty years, that one mustlook elsewhere for the real reasons for the controversy. In-deed, the masses of Negroes, with a backgroundof little or noformal training, did need to start at the bottom, as Washing-ton believed; but that did not imply that they should have toremain there. Certainly there were some, though not many atthat time, who should have been trained in the higher branchesof knowledge; but it did not follow that leaders necessarilyhave to come from such a class. There were many outstand-ing leaders who came up from the ranks without attending col-lege. Amongthese was Washington.In developing his theory of the Talented Tenth, DuBoisdelivered a series of lectures, one of which was published as:"Of Mr. Washingtonand Others." In it he accused Washingtonpersonally. Recognizing the serious problems of the South andand much that was good in the Atlanta Compromise, he ob-jected to "indiscriminate flattery" and to what he implied wasa "continually belittling and ridiculing themselves." The wayto gain their just rights, said DuBois "is not be voluntarilythrowing them away and insisting that they do not want them."Instead Negroes must demand them constantly. Mr. Washing-ton's propaganda," he said, left the impression: "First, thatthe South is justified in its present attitude toward the Negro

26DuBois, TheSouls of Black Folk, p. 53.


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144 HISTORY OF EDUCATION JOURNALbecause of the Negroes' degradation; secondly, that the primecause of the Negro's failure to rise more quickly is his wrongeducation in the past; and thirdly, that his future depends pri-marily on his own efforts." Such ideas, declared DuBois,were "dangerous half-truth[s]."27Except for the personal attack on Washington, the tenetsof DuBois' position were not to be seriously disputed. It mustbe admitted that DuBois had set a clear road. However, hewas hardly justified in his charges that Washingtonhad takenthe Negro out of politics or thathe was belittling and ridiculingthe Negro.

There were factors fomenting in the South, winked at,if not condoned by the North, which were to drive Washingtonfurther to the right and DuBois to the left. These were theclash between the Bourbons and the Gentry over political con-trol of the South andthe philanthropic zeal of the North and theSouth in regard to educating the Negro.The Gentry bitterly opposed the Mississippi Plan, al-ready touched upon. It was a losing battle, but they even madepublic statements against it. At the Louisana State Conven-tion in 1898, Washington entered the political area publicly forthe first time and urged that body not to accept the "whiteprimary." He said, "The Negro does not object to an educa-tional or property test; only let the test fall equally on blackand white."Washington entered the Georgia Convention the followingyear, when Tom Watson, the great southern Populist leader,made a final plea for Negro suffrage before Hoke Smith tookover. While it appears that Washington was not enthusiasticabout populism, he wrote many letters to leading figures inthe State, Negro and white, asking them to defeat the Missis-sippi Plan. His lack of response from the Negroes caused himto comment in a private letter to one of his friends that "I amdisappointed with the Coloured people of Georgia. I have beencorresponding with the leaders but cannot stir up a single col-oured man to take the lead in trying to head off this plan."29DuBois was in Georgia at this time; he was certainly a leader.Although it cannot be determined whether or not Washington

27Ibid., pp. 54-55.C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 337.29Ibid., p. 343.


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THE WASHINGTON-DUBOISONTROVERSY 145wrote him, DuBois does not mention such a letter. He doessay, however, that Washington did do a "little" somethingabout the situation in Louisiana and Georgia, which, it wouldseem, would make him hardly guilty of "voluntarily" takingthe Negro out of politics. Althoughthese were the last publicutterances Washington made on the political situation, it iswell to note that he made no public blast at the failure of theNegro leaders of Georgia to assist in stopping, if possible, theMississippi Plan. He was the kind of leader who was mosteffective in working behind closed doors.The efforts of the Bourbons was so complete and relent-less that Washington took the position that the less said thebetter. The Bourbons were taking advantage of any and allutterances and statements made by Negroes and moderatewhites and using them for all they were worth. For example,an editorial in the Charleston News and Courier attempted toreduce the separate but equal thesis to an absurdity, sugges-ing the extent to which such a doctrine might lead. The Bour-bons took up the suggestions and turned them into serious pro-positions. In the next few years every one of the moves wasput into effect in varying forms in all of the states, with theexception of separate counties for Negroes. (As recently as1956 two cities, one in Florida and one in Alabama, passedresolutions to set up separate counties.) After the South hadbecome almost completely segregated, Washington retiredfrom any frontal public attack on the situation and seemed torecognize, if not accept, segregation as an accomplished fact.DuBois severely criticized this position, as he held thatsuch issues should be ever kept before the public. To keepquiet, he argued, was an act of acceptance.DuBois is very pointed in his criticism of Washingtonfor giving opinions relative to political matters and even ac-cuses him of advising philanthropists against supportinghighereducation for Negroes. (If the latter charge is true, Washing-ton was a failure; for Carnegie, Rockefeller, Guggenheim,Duke, Slater, Peabody, Phelps and Stokes must then haveturned a deaf ear to his advice.) DuBois states: "After atime almost no Negro institution could collect funds withoutthe recommendation or acquiescence of Mr. Washington. Fewpolitical appointments were made anywhere in the U.S.(among Negroes) without his consent.""

S0DuBois, The Dusk of Dawn, p. 73.


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146 HISTORY OF EDUCATION JOURNALDuBois went even further, claiming that Washingtonhadcreated a "machine" which sought to keep him impervious toattack by others. He charged that this "machine," supportedby philanthropists, even bought the Negro press, so that Wash-ington and his efforts would be ever kept before the public. Healleged that Washington had "ghost" writers to make out hisspeeches. Neither of these charges could be documented, butthey do shown that bitterness had turned to acrimony.Sensing the discord that was developing among Negroesand the use to which the Bourbons were putting this controver-sy, there came from the philanthropic element a move to get

Washington and DuBois together to stop public bickering. Acommittee met with DuBois and tried to interest him in join-ing Washington at Tuskegee. DuBois and Washingtondid meetto discuss the matter in 1904. This was not the first contactthe two men had had. DuBois had applied for a position atTuskegee earlier, but had accepted the position at Atlanta Uni-versity before hearing from Washington who was favorablyimpressed with DuBois at that time. There is no direct recordof the two meetings of the men in 1904, although in the worksof both there are comments from which some conclusions canbe drawn. DuBois does mention the meetings in a book pub-lished forty years later. Of the last meeting, he wrote: "I gotno clear understanding of just what I was to do. There ensuedlong delays, and it seemed to me I wanted to make my positionclear."'31He went on to attack Washington's ideas in similarvein to those attacks mentioned earlier.Washington made no public statement directly, but hedid attack DuBois by indirection. While not calling any names,he harpooned the "intellectuals" for believing that becausethey were born in the North and were college graduates fromnorthern colleges and universities and were generally livingin the North, that the southerner was incapable of acceptingleadership in racial matters. He delivered a scathing attackon their opposition to attempts to work out the problems withthe white people of the South. In particular, he attacked thebelief that the Negro would remain "uncompromising" andmaintain "relentless antagonism to the South" until all injus-tices were removed. "The truth is," said Washington,"I sus-pect. . . they live too much in the past. They know books, but

Sl3bid., pp. 79-80.


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THE WASHINGTON-DUBOIS CONTROVERSY 147they know almost nothing about the Negro," especially theneeds of the Negro in the South. 32Needless to say, DuBois and Washington were never toget together to work as a team, although except for generalstatements, the attack on Washingtonwas lessened and event-ually stopped. It gave him contact with the whites who reallywere not concerned with civil rights for Negroes. This ishardly true, but it is worth looking into.Having seen the Negro all but completely disfranchisedby the use of the white primary and made a second class cit-izen by the "separate but equal" doctrine, the liberal elementfrom the North and the moderates of the South made a movewhich was to bring DuBois and Washington to the real partingof the ways but which was to contribute to a climate of opinionwhich today may lead to the elevation of Negroes to first classcitizenship, even in the South. That was the education throughphilanthropy. While no attempt will be made here to recountin any detail the monumental effort put forth in this regard, ageneral statement is necessary to focus attention on the finalbreak between Washington and DuBois and to show how thebreach was healed in private.Men of wealth began to pour millions of dollars intosouthern education, Negro and white, for all types of schoolsand colleges-those for the vocations and those for the "Tal-ented Tenth." Many individuals likewise contributed. It issafe to say that without this impetus, southern education couldhardly have got moving, and the fate of the Negro would havebeen bad indeed. It is true that these funds and donors madeno attempt to dictate the policies of the South in regard to po-litics and civil rights, but they did insist that states, if theyused such funds, must make honest efforts to educate the Ne-gro. The philanthropy of these individuals, hardheaded bus-iness men who made their millions through ingenuity and com-petition, was more than charity. It was purposeful giving, mo-tivated by their sense of the trusteeship of wealth. Contactshad to be made with the leading men of the South, Negro andwhite. From whom among the Negroes wouldthey seek advice?Certainly not DuBois; although they recognized the great work

3Booker T. Washington, My Larger Education (New York: Double-day & Page, 1911), 112, 127.


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148 HISTORY OF EDUCATIONJOURNALhe was doing, they knew that his position was less acceptableto the Bourbons than was Washington's. It was less a questionof whether they accented vocational education as against col-lege education, more a question of having someone in the Southwho could talk with both moderates and Bourbons. (It mightbe noted that their funds were used for Atlanta University,Morehouse, Spellman and Bennett for women, and Fisk, toname a few colleges which were offering courses designed totrain the "Talented Tenth.") The philanthropists, it wouldseem, felt that time would dissipate prejudices through educa-tion, and the less said on the matter the better in the long run.

It was the influence Washingtonhad with philanthropistsand moderates and indeed with presidents that concerned Du-Bois. William McKinley came to visit Tuskegee. Washingtonwas to dine with Theodore Roosevelt-an incident which infur-iated the Bourbons and contributed greatly to the solidarityof the Democratic Party in the South. (One southerner is re-ported to have said, "The Republicans under Lincoln gave theNigra political equality and now under Teddy Roosevelt wantto give him social equality.") William HowardTaft had con-ferences with Washington. None of this pleased DuBois ormany Negroes who deprecated Washington's lack of a collegeeducation. Extremest attacks by Bourbons on all those whodared question their actions finally chased DuBois from hischair at Atlanta University and completely silenced Washing-ton. However, the attacks gained support and sympathyfor thecause of the Negro generally. Moreover, it brought DuBoisand Washingtoncloser together.A look at these events is revealing. Dr. Andrew Sledd,a professor at Emory College, near Atlanta, Georgia, pub-lished an article deploring lynching and Jim-Crowism; he wasfired. Later he was hired by the University of Florida wherehe eventually became president. John Spencer Bassett, whowas to gain fame as an historian, was severely criticized forpublishing in the Atlantic Monthly the comment that next toRobert E. Lee, Washington was the greatest man to come outof the South in a century. Althoughthe Board of Directors ofTrinity College, now Duke University, did not fire Bassett, hefound southern hospitality to be such that he left. Enoch Banks,a native Georgian, was dismissed from the University of Flo-rida in 1911 for saying in a magazine that the North was rela-tively right and the South relatively wrong in the Civilar.A3

3sCash, op. cit., pp. 324-325.


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THE WASHINGTON-DUBOIS CONTROVERSY 149It had become wrong to dissent in public in the South.With this as a backdrop and with the Atlanta riots of 1905echoing in his ear, DuBois severed his relations with AtlantaUniversity. He went to Buffalo, NewYork,where he and twenty-eight others organized the Niagara Movement. It was formal-ly incorporated in Washington,D. C. in 1906 with an eight-pointprogram. Generally, these points called for free speech andpress, manhood suffrage, dignity of labor, abolition of distinc-tions based on race, and the right of all men to receive any typeof education and training their abilities would permit. It calledon the Federal Government to see that such a program wascarried out. 34The Niagara Movement created quite a sensation in 1906when close to one hundred members marched barefooted inthe streets of Harper's Ferry, Virginia, on their way to theplace where John Brown had made his raid. This movement,while it aroused many Negroes to the acuteness of the raceproblem, did not attract any whites to its membership.In 1908 an incident in Springfield, Illinois focused atten-tion on just how bad race relations really were. A Negro was

lynched there and one of his kin came to New York and gavesome details to a group of liberal whites and Negroes. A com-mittee was formed of both races, with DuBois as a member,out of which was formed the National Association for the Ad-vancement of Colored People in 1909. DuBois was named di-rector of publication and research.Recognizing the contributions of both DuBois and Wash-ington and taking note of the position of the Negro both Southand North, it was decided that DuBois wasto continue his "re-search" in the safer confines of the North and that he refrainfrom engaging in any personal attacks upon Washington. Itseemed that the NAACPconsidered the better part of valor notto have the two leading Negroes feuding with each other overa matter, the end results of which both were in full agree-ment. Those closest to both DuBois and Washingtonknew thatboth wanted the best for their race and that both could harmtheir cause by their differences. Thus the verbal controver-sy ended, as far as the public knew.

3DuBois, Dusk of Dawn, pp. 88-89.


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150 HISTORY OF EDUCATION JOURNALIt would seem that many of the charges and counter char-ges attributed to both men were without real foundation. Whocould deny that the basic educational needs of the Negro then,and possibly now, lay in vocational pursuits? Who could denythat there was then and is now a need for Negroes trained in theprofessions, the sciences, and the arts? Washingtondid not op-pose the latter nor DuBois the former. Whocan deny that theNegro then was not qualified to hold offices of government gen-erally, but that there was no reason to deny him the right tovote? Who could deny that there was then and is now a need formen who can get along with all the elements in the population as

well as those who can and will spell out boldly the true roadwhich leads to citizenship and justice for all? Washingtonbe-lieved this.35 DuBois believed this.Then what of the controversy itself? There are norecords, which could be found here, in the absence of theirpersonal papers, to show that after the NAACPwas formed therewere any attacks made by either man on the other. It is notknown, for example, whether Washingtonever joined thatorgan-ization. But of his approval of it, we are certain. In 1911 heasked publicly for its support, and from then until he died heworked with all organizations which sought to improve relationsbetween the races. True American that he was, he took no partin those extreme movements which sought to take the Negrofrom the United States. Not only did he support the NAACP, buthe worked even harder with the National Urban League, feelingthat the latter, which had more support in the South, would tendto ease the rather acute situation there. 36

People today, especially many youthful Negroes, judgingthe gains being presently made by the Negro throughoutthe na-tion and especially in the South, tend to besmirch or at leastcriticize some aspects of Washington's position. But they for-get that their judgment is based on conditions in Mid-TwentiethCentury United States. Two generations and two global warshave come and gone; there are today better educated whites andNegroes who are more tolerant of each other. Even DuBois ad-mits that much of the opposition to Washingtonwas "envy".

3sFranklin, op. cit., p. 390.MSamuel Spencer, Booker T. Washington and the Negro's Place inAmerican Life (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1955), 177.


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THE WASHINGTON-DUBOIS CONTROVERSY 151Admittedly, Washington did hedge here and there and ac-cepted the half loaf, not as a permanent solution as some wantedto believe, but as a means toward which the whole loaf could beobtained later on. To criticize this move is not only baseless,but is to assume that Washingtonhad a choice in the matter. Itwas just as simple as this--the half loaf or nothing. He did whathe had to do at the time, what was possible for him to do underthe circumstances, and did it with utmost skill and diplomacy.His work was and is indeed as much responsible as that of any-one else for the break in the racial clouds.Nor is DuBois, who today is subjected to much adverse

criticism, to be censured for his basic position then. His ef-forts did kindle and quicken the Negro to a realization of his la-tent possibilities. It was not a tragedy, it would seem, that sucha controversy existed; for the efforts of both men prove thatthere was then and is now a need for the tolerant respect of di-vergent opinions on the same problem; that there was then andis now a need for both types of leaders. One must wonder ifthere is today such a balance of leadership among Negroes onthe means of achieving full recognition and acceptance as thetype and class of citizen that both Washington and DuBois en-visioned and for whom they worked.Looking back over the controversy and judging it by thetime of its setting and placing its implications on the presentracial situation, these conclusions seem inescapable:1. The controversy was more personal than ideological, withthe weight of pettiness falling far more heavily on DuBoisand his group than on Washington and his group. The endresults tended to retard rather than aid the problem of the

South.2. Both men were sincere in their efforts, but tended to viewthe problem in too narrow a circle, and were far more optim-istic about its immediate improvement than conditions of thetimes warranted.3. Washington was far more realistic in his approach to theimmediate needs of the Negro and in dealing with the peoplewho had to be handled in order to bring about this improve-ment.4. The breach, though considered wide and sharp, revealed thatbest results in social, racial, and economic matters cannotbe obtained through rushing and that the basic tenets of theAmerican Creed are so deeply ingrained in the conscience of


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152 HISTORY OF EDUCATION JOURNALthe nation that the cause of justice and fair play will inevit-ably come to the deserving.5. The sincerity of the efforts of both Washington and DuBoisproved to the Negro in general and the nation at large that,given time and opportunity, Negroes could and would provethemselves worthy of the best there is in America.6. The publicity given to their differences, while it retardedracial progress somewhat in the South, did bring the Negroproblem into sharper focus nationally, thereby helping tohasten the creation of the present climate of public opinionso favorable to the improvement of conditions of all minori-ties.7. Finally, it revealed that there were and are many persons ofgood will throughout the nation who believe in fair play. TheWashington-DuBois Controversy did help and is helping toprovide conditions leading to improved race relations.

CONTRIBUTORSTO THIS ISSUE

Edgar B. Wesley is visiting professor of the history ofeducation at the University of Michigan. C. Spenser Poxpeyis an administrator in the public schools in Delray Beach,Florida.

poxpey.1957.the washington-du bois controversy and its effects on the negro problem

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