power and contentment

Power and ContentmentPower and ContentmentJames Doyle

In a recent article in this journal (PoliticsVol. 17 No. 1), Colin Hay rethinks the radicalconception of power developed by StevenLukes. Hay argues that the failure to keepanalytical and normative questions distinctmeans that Lukes mistakenly con¯ates theidenti®cation and critique of power relations.To circumvent this problem, Hay rede®nesthe concept in terms which remove norma-tive questions from the analysis of power. Inthis article, the contention is that the de®ni-tion proposed by Hay does not meet hisobjective. It is argued that, contrary to Hayand other critics, the radical conception ofpower can be made to work within the termsoriginally articulated by Lukes.

Introduction

In a recent essay, Colin Hay (1997) rethinksthe three dimensional conception of powerdeveloped by Steven Lukes. He argues thatLukes is `forced' to draw a problematic dis-tinction between subjective and objectiveinterests which makes the identi®cation ofthird dimensional power value laden andunscienti®c. It also places the analyst in theuntenable position of being `supreme arbiter'of the interests of the `victims' of power.According to Hay,

Lukes thus resurrects the spectre of falseconsciousness which many had thoughtexorcised from contemporary social andpolitical theory. The problem with such aformulation is the deeply condescendingconception of the social subject as an ideo-logical dupe that it conjures up. Not only isthis wretched individual incapable of per-ceiving her/his true interests, paci®ed as s/he is by the hallucinogenic e�ects of bour-geois indoctrination. But rising above theideological mists which tame the masses isthe enlightened academic who from his/herhigh perch in the ivory tower may lookdown to discern the genuine interests ofthose not similarly blessed (Hay, 1997,pp.47±48).

On the basis of this initial criticism, Hayreformulates the concept of power. He distin-guishes between power as conduct and con-text shaping. The latter is indirect, mediatedand emphasises the ways in which structures,institutions and organisations shape the para-meters of action. The former is direct in thatit is immediate, visible and behavioral. Poweris exercised in the direct sense when A actsto shape the conduct of B. Both direct andindirect power are de®ned by Hay withoutreference to the notion of interests. Thismove is intended to circumvent the problem

Politics (1998) 18(1) pp. 49±56

# Political Studies Association 1998. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UKand 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. 49

James Doyle, Southampton Institute.

of the

ARTState

of objective interests and, in so doing, tomake it possible to draw a sharp distinctionbetween the critique and identi®cation ofpower. Hay says,

In short, the problems of Lukes' formula-tion reside in his failure to di�erentiateclearly between analytical questions con-cerning the identi®cation of power withinsocial and political settings, and normativequestions concerning the critique of thedistribution and exercise of power thusidenti®ed (Hay, 1997, p.50).

In what follows, it will be argued that Hay ismistaken in this criticism of the work ofLukes. Normative questions enter into theanalysis of power not primarily because Lukesis committed to critique, nor because he hasin some sense been careless in allowing inter-ests to creep into his account, but for essen-tially two reasons. First, normative questionsenter into the analysis of power because theyare an integral part of the logical grammar ofthe concept. That is, the concept is embed-ded in a normative and evaluative backgroundfrom which power relations are identi®ed orseen as the speci®c kind of social relationsthey are. It will be argued in the ®rst sectionof this essay that the de®nition supplied byHay simply substitutes a technical for a layinterest as the underlying evaluative basisfrom which to identify power relations. Assuch, Hay is open to the same criticism thathe levels at Lukes.Second, it may come as a surprise to

anyone who has followed the communitypower debate that the notion of `false con-sciousness' can be so easily dismissed by Hay.The problem is that `duping' others is internalto the practical logic of the concept. Thepractice of manipulation, for instance, tradesin deception as well as the creation of falseappearances and a distinction between pre-ferences and real interests. It is argued in thesecond section that if the analysis providedby Lukes is mistaken, it is not because hebuilds distinctions such as these into his

account but because his proposed methodfor locating power is at odds with the prac-tical logic of its exercise. My conclusion isthat contrary to critics such as Benton, Cleggand Hay, the methodological problems gener-ated by the radical view can be successfullyaddressed within the analytical framework ori-ginally set out by Lukes.

Lukes and the problem ofinterests

The ®rst question which needs to be asked isthis: why does Lukes incorporate the notionof interests into his conception of power?Lukes begins his analysis with the claim thatthe common core to all conceptions ofpower is that A in some way a�ects B. Simplea�ecting is the notion which links di�erentconceptions of power together. Had Lukesnot extended his analysis beyond this corenotion, he would have provided a de®nitionof power which, if not identical, is at leastcompatible with the notion of conduct shap-ing proposed by Hay. That is, the scope ofthe concept could have been expanded toinclude all forms of a�ecting irrespective ofthe interests of the parties involved. There isa sense, therefore, in which Hay is providinglittle which is not already there in the work ofLukes. The relevant question, however, is this:why does Lukes not take the option toexpand the scope of the concept? To answerthis question, it may be useful ®rst to con-sider an example.Suppose that the telephone rings and you

instantly stop whatever you are doing and getup to answer it. In doing so, your conduct(or behaviour) has been shaped or a�ectedby the caller. A counterfactual conditional isentailed since in responding to the call, youdid something that you would not otherwisehave done. Had the caller not phoned, theclaim is that you would not have stoppedwhat you were doing at least, that is, toanswer the phone. Given, therefore, that yourconduct has been shaped or a�ected, it fol-

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# Political Studies Association 199850

lows that the caller has exercised power overyou according to the de®nitional criterionadvanced by Hay.The problem with this conclusion for

Lukes is as follows. To refer to this kind ofa�ecting or conduct shaping as an exercise ofpower over someone is at odds with the wayin which the locution `power over' is nor-mally used. In other words, Lukes is struck bythe fact that in ordinary usage, not all formsof a�ecting or conduct shaping are normallyreferred to, or evaluated as, exercises ofpower. From this observation, it follows thatsome criterion in addition to a�ecting or con-duct shaping is at work when people talkabout exercising power over others. It is thiswhich explains why simple a�ecting is anecessary but not su�cient criterion and whylanguage speakers distinguish as they seem todo between those cases in which the use ofthe phrase `power over' is appropriate andthose in which it is not. But what precisely isthis additional criterion?For Lukes, this criterion is evaluative. That

is, the a�ecting in question must be sig-ni®cant in the sense that it is contrary to theinterests of some individual or group. Thepoint most relevant to this discussion, how-ever, is that evaluative criteria are essentialnot because Lukes wants to import theminto the analysis for purposes of critique butbecause they form an integral part of thelogical grammar of the concept. In otherwords, Lukes can claim to provide a de®ni-tion which acknowledges and is sensitive tothe diversity of ordinary usage. The thesis ofessential contestability is based upon astraightforward philosophical and sociologicalre¯ection that the use of the concept variesbecause what counts as signi®cant a�ectingis evaluated and judged di�erently within thelanguage community. The identi®cation ofpower relations, therefore, is not the samefor everyone.When viewed from this standpoint, the

argument provided by Hay is stuck between aconceptual rock and an evaluative hard place.On the surface, Hay appears to banish value

judgments from the analysis and identi®cationof power. To do this, however, he mustignore any lay conception in which the locu-tion `power over' is not coextensive with allforms of conduct shaping and in which anevaluative distinction is drawn between theappropriate and inappropriate use of the con-cept. This move places Hay in a positionwhich is at least potentially condescendingand at odds with the diversity of usage withinthe community. In other words, Hay's rede®-nition of the concept is open to the samecharge that he levels against Lukes.To remain consistent, Hay must insist that

something as apparently trivial as an ordinarytelephone call is an exercise of power oversomeone even when those in the communitywho do not share his `technical' interest inthe concept would deny that this is so. Thepoint is that the `common language' referredto by Hay is not particularly common giventhat his de®nition presupposes a value judg-ment which is not widely shared. This judg-ment is simply that all forms of conductshaping (or a�ecting) should be equallycounted or valued in the identi®cation ofpower relations.In contrast, the de®nitional strategy adop-

ted by Lukes places the social scientist in aposition which is sensitive to the diversity ofvalues dwelling within the community. Thissensitivity is essential to both the interpreta-tion and the location of power relations. Themethodological claim in the radical view isthat the value pluralism underwriting compet-ing conceptions of power is compatible withthe independent location of values dwellingobjectively within power relations. Themethod adopted by Lukes entails that valuepluralism is not incompatible with realism.It will be argued in the next section that,

contrary to the critics of Lukes, this methodo-logical strategy can be made to work. Myclaim is that the controversy which hasengulfed the radical view rests upon a confu-sion between realism and objectivism in thelocation of human interests. To the extentthat the analysis developed by Lukes is mis-

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# Political Studies Association 1998 51

taken, the argument is that it is not for thereasons given by Hay and others.

The methodology of powerand contentment

From a methodological standpoint, there areat least six dimensions of power implicit inthe work of Lukes. If we adopt the de®ni-tional criterion of an observable con¯ict ofinterest as the underlying evaluative basisupon which to empirically locate an exerciseof power, then these dimensions can be sket-ched in turn. In the ®rst and second dimen-sions, con¯ict is observable in one sense oranother and can be elicited directly from theparties to a power relation. I intend to focusmore closely, however, upon those problemswhich arise in the move beyond the ®rst andsecond dimensions.Since Lukes fails to distinguish between

thought and action, we can add a third andfourth dimension. In the third dimension, acon¯ict of interest exists in the thinking ofthe a�ected party but not in action (beha-viour) or expression. For example, an inmatefacing a prison inspection may be unwillingto report to inspectors a con¯ict with prisonauthorities because he has been intimidatedand fears the consequences of speaking hismind. In this case, a con¯ict exists but it isprivate and not re¯ected publicly in action orbehaviour. That is, the con¯ict is con®nedexclusively to the thinking of the inmate and,consequently, there is no behaviour, action orexpression which is publicly available to serveas the subjective indicator necessary to locatethe power relation in question.It is possible to understand from this

example why Lukes thinks that an unre¯ectivebehaviourism is unable to locate certain kindsof power relations. The point is that anymethod of inquiry which digs no deeper thanwhat is immediately available in the inter-pretation of behaviour may overlook what isdeliberately concealed or hidden from publicview. This is not to say, however, that the

position developed by Lukes is not ultimatelybehavioural. It is to say only that concealmentis an element of the practical logic of powerrelations and that behaviourism must dealwith that logic if it is to penetrate the surfaceof social relations. Indeed, Lukes erects hiscritique of the pluralist notion of consensusalmost entirely on this basis. Because indivi-duals can conceal what they are thinking, itcannot be straightforwardly concluded fromthe apparent absence of grievance or con¯ictwithin a population that a consensus exists.It is also possible to see from this way of

framing the problem why Lukes thinks thatthe notion of a situation of relative autonomyis a methodological instrument consistentwith locating the power relation outlinedabove. If the inmate can be placed in a situa-tion where he need not fear the power ofprison authorities, then there is a logical basisfrom which to expect that the con¯ict mightbe expressed thereby furnishing a subjectiveindicator which is publicly available. I say`might' because altering the situation of theinmate provides no guarantee in itself that thecon¯ict will be revealed to a third partyobserver. As such, the method needs to bedeveloped. The point, however, is that themethod developed by Lukes is not, at least inthis example, inconsistent with the logic ofthe power relation it is meant to locate.It is worth noting, however, that the con-

sistency of the method is a function of theinterest an a�ected party has in concealmentas opposed to revelation. For instance, asituation of relative autonomy might prove ablunt methodological instrument in cases ofparental child abuse where revealing a con-¯ict is embarrassing and painful to the childas well as injurious to the relationshipbetween parent and child. There is littlereason to expect, therefore, that simply alter-ing the situation of the child (or inmate) orremoving the immediate e�ect of a powerrelation will help to elicit the necessary indi-cator. The point is that the thinking behindthe notion of a situation of relative autonomybecomes inconsistent in any case where the



interests of the a�ected party militate againstrevelation. This is not to say, however, thatthere are no cases in which revelation is con-sistent with a situation of relative autonomy.The fourth dimension is distinguished from

the third in that no con¯ict of interest existsin either the thought or action of the a�ectedparty. A paradigm case, much discussed inpolitical theory, is that of the contented slavewho, precisely because he or she is content,harbours no con¯ict of interest with slavery ineither thought or action. In this case, themethod developed by Lukes appears to be atodds with the logic of the power relation it isintended to locate. That is, the methodcannot get something from nothing. If thenecessary con¯ict of interest does not exist inthe thought or action of the slave, then it isdi�cult to see how it can be elicited exceptby deprogramming which compromises theindependence of the indicator and constitutesan exercise of power in its own right. Analternative strategy available to Lukes is toclaim that the slave does not know what hisor her interests are. However, this claim pre-supposes objectivism which compromises theindependence of the indicator since the inter-ests of the slave are imputed or ascribedrather than located empirically. This strategyalso contradicts the value pluralism under-lying the de®nition of power supplied byLukes.It is at this point that many commentators

abandon the method developed by Lukes inthe radical view. However, I want to resist thisconclusion for two reasons. First, it is a mis-take to look solely to the thought and actionof B, the a�ected party, for the con¯ict ofinterest necessary to locate a fourth dimen-sion power relation. Second, the notion of`dimensions' of power lacks speci®city. Thereare a variety of power relations consistentwith this dimension but which nonethelesscall for di�erent investigatory methods sincetheir exercise does not entail the same prac-tical logic. On the other hand, the notion ofdimensions is useful as an organising conceptand it is possible to provide examples of

fourth dimensional power consistent with themethod developed by Lukes. Consider, forinstance, the following example of manipula-tion.Suppose that A and B are business partners

and that A wants to manipulate B against hisinterests in order to gain sole control of thebusiness. And suppose that A is more wealthythan B, can a�ord to sustain what to him is amodest ®nancial loss while B cannot andknows privately of an investment opportunitywhich is unsound. What if, then, A employsindirect means to make B aware of the`attractiveness' of the investment and even-tually gets him to invest. Let us say that A fur-ther disguises the manipulation by sacri®cingsome of his own funds to the investment andeventually succeeds in gaining control of thebusiness through what appears to be thejoint misfortune of A and B.This example meets the speci®cation of a

fourth dimension exercise of power. No con-¯ict exists in either the thought or action of Band yet A is manipulating him contrary to hisinterests. As far as B is concerned, losingcontrol of the business presents no con¯ictwith A since this e�ect appears to be theresult of bad luck rather than manipulation. Acon¯ict of interest is, however, an immanentfeature of the relation between A and B sinceit is built into the practical logic of themanipulative act. That is, A must disguise hisintention because his e�orts to bring aboutthe misfortune of B are against B's interests.Indeed, it is this which explains why themanipulation is for A both necessary andconcealed. Moreover, it is also part of thelogic of this act that A must produce in B aconscious belief which is false. In otherwords, the act trades in the `duping' of B andthere is an immanent basis, therefore, for thedistinction drawn by Lukes between the pre-ference and real interest of B. Given, then,that the analytical categories provided byLukes are consistent with the practical logicof the act, what is the problem with his pro-posed method for locating it?The practical logic of this kind of act tells



us not only what kind of social relationmanipulation is but also how to go about®nding it. The ®rst methodological problem isthis: how does an observer locate an actwhich is deliberately concealed? For instance,one could imagine an ideal case of manipula-tion in which the existence of the act isentirely subjective and private and theresimply is no evidence. It might be argued,then, that it is impossible to locate a perfectlyexecuted manipulative act. I shall not pursuethis argument, however, since for my pur-poses it is enough to say two things.First, acts of manipulation very often do

produce independent evidence in a variety offorms ranging from testimony to documenta-tion. Second, given that this is the case, themethod developed by Lukes is consistent withlocating such an act. In other words, giventhat a con¯ict of interest is built into the logicof the act, it is consistent in principle toexpect that either A or B are able to con®rmthis con¯ict although there is an inbuilt pre-sumption that revelation is against the inter-ests of A. The point is that an epistemic basisexists from which to locate a manipulative actin evidence which is independent of anobserver. That is, the values underwriting theidenti®cation and location of this kind ofpower relation are those held by parties tothe act and, as such, do not have to be impu-ted or ascribed.Two points follow which take the analysis

back to the arguments provided by Hay. The®rst is that the value laden notion of interestsdoes not, contra Hay, pose a problem forLukes. Hay is right to argue that Lukes mustavoid making a value judgment in the senseof imputing or ascribing the interests of thea�ected party. But if the above analysis is cor-rect, then the method developed by Lukes isconsistent with this objective. That is, eitherthe con¯ict does dwell independently withinthe power relation or it does not. In each ofthe examples discussed above, there is a logi-cal basis for claiming that the requisite con-¯ict exists independent of the investigator andcan be found without imputing the interests

of B. As such, these examples specify powerrelations the location of which is consistentwith the method articulated by Lukesalthough that method is less than fully devel-oped as it stands.The second point is that contrary to the

opinion of Benton, Clegg, Hay and other crit-ics, the paradox of emancipation implicit inthe contented slave example does not posean insurmountable methodological problemfor Lukes. The problems arising from thisexample rest upon a confusion between thepresence and the existence of a con¯ict ofinterest. If we take contentment to mean theabsence of con¯ict, and if the absence ofsomething means that it does not appear tobe present in an empirical sense, then it doesnot follow from the fact that something is notpresent to the conclusion that there is noindependent basis for asserting its existence.To expand upon this point, however, it isnecessary to look more closely at the practicallogic implicit in the contented slave example.Lukes de®nes what he calls this most insi-

dious dimension of power in terms of A get-ting B to want or desire what A wants B towant or desire. But if B genuinely wants whatA wants him to want, then there is no con¯ictof interest and this is compatible with sayingthat B is content (or, at least not discontent).The methodological problem, then, is nothow an observer is to deal with the content-ment or absence of con¯ict which is theintended e�ect of the power relation. Instead,the problem is how to deal with A `getting' Bto want what A wants him to want such thatcontentment prevails and there is no con¯ict.In other words, the logic of this act is suchthat it cannot be the case that B just happens,as a matter of contingent historical fact, toshare the same wants, desires and interests asA. The point is that A must do something toproduce or `get' the contentment of B. If thecontentment (or absence of con¯ict) hasalways existed as a feature of the historicalrelation between A and B, then there is noidenti®able act (or acts) on the part of Awhich can be said to have produced it.



It follows that evidence for this kind ofpower relation must be historical. That is, themethodological problem is to make a casethat A produced a transformation or conver-sion in the wants, desires and interests of Bfrom a position of con¯ict to that of content-ment. In this way of looking at the powerrelation, the contentment of B ceases to posea methodological problem and becomesinstead a necessary but not su�cient indicatorof the e�ectiveness of the power of A. Lukeswould be mistaken, therefore, to expect thatan authentic con¯ict of interest will be pre-sent in the thought or action of the contentedslave but he would not be mistaken to expectindependent evidence of the existence of acon¯ict. The point is that the interests of Bhave an ontogenesis. It is consistent to expectthe necessary indicator to be obtained from Bbut what is overlooked by Lukes, Benton,Clegg, Hay and others is that it must be anhistorical B. That is, it must be a B who, insome as yet unspeci®ed sense, exists sub-jectively but is no longer present as an identi-®able contemporaneous agent. What isrequired, therefore, is oral evidence of anauthentic con¯ict of interest from a past Bwhose identity exists intrasubjectively but isno longer present.While Benton (1981) is right to argue that

the identity of B-past and B-present is not thesame, nothing of positive methodological sig-ni®cance follows from this claim. This claimdemonstrates only that Lukes is mistaken toexpect that in a situation of relative autonomythe contented slave will authentically possessthe interests of someone who, at present, heor she no longer happens to be. However,there is nothing about the claim made byBenton which entails that a con¯ict of interestis unavailable intrasubjectively via the memoryof the slave or from some other form ofindependent evidence. If we focus on theformer, the important point to keep in mindis that the slave does not have to be in moralagreement with the necessary con¯ict of inter-est in order to provide independent evidenceof its real historical existence.

Benton supplies no argument to suggestthat there is anything to prevent an individualin a post conversion state of mind fromremembering a con¯ict either in the sense ofrecalling it or in the sense of putting togethera coherent narrative account of a previousidentity. On condition that such an account isobtained from the slave without prejudice onthe part of an observer, my claim is that itconstitutes an independent basis, consistentwith the method developed by Lukes, fromwhich to locate the con¯ict necessary toidentify the power relation in question. It isworth reiterating, however, that a con¯ict eli-cited from the memory of the slave is no lessindependent simply because the slave in hisor her present state of mind happens to bein moral disagreement with it. The fact thatthe slave has resolved a con¯ict or contra-diction between a past and present identitydoes not in itself compromise the reality ofthe con¯ict or its independence as a sub-jective indicator.The argument, then, is that the radical view

of power can be made to work. Indeed, thereis nothing to prevent this method from beingdeveloped in a way which is both transsub-jective and transhistorical. In his empiricalstudy in the United States, John Gaventa(1980) produces a convincing oral and doc-umentary history of how powerful miningcompanies in an Appalachian valley managedto convert con¯ict with local communitiesinto quiescence across a period spanningmore than a century. What would be incon-sistent with this methodological strategy, how-ever, is any power relation in which thememory (individual or collective) of the a�ec-ted party is severely impaired. Were this thecase, the a�ected party would be unable toraise the con¯ict intrasubjectively and sowould be unable to supply the necessary sub-jective indicator. In cases such as these, aninvestigator would have to ®nd independenthistorical evidence to corroborate the claimthat con¯ict was actively converted into con-tentment.If the fourth dimension of power is about



the active removal of a con¯ict of interestfrom history, then the ®fth dimension isabout the emergence of a con¯ict into his-tory. A brief example consistent with thisdimension is the emergence of a con¯ict ofinterest over the traditional role of women inwestern culture generally and within the mar-ital relation speci®cally. In other words, thedirection of historical movement in thisdimension is reversed. This dimension is con-sistent with poststructuralist conceptions ofpower although it is beyond the scope of thisessay to progress the matter any further. Suf-®ce it to say that a sixth dimension also fol-lows from the distinction between thoughtand action. This dimension is de®ned by thepossibility of con¯ict which is beyond theepistemic reach of human agents.

Conclusion

It has been argued that the radical view ofpower originally articulated by Lukes can bemade to work. It does not follow from theclaim that values underwrite the identi®cationof power relations to the conclusion drawnby Hay and others that no independent basisexists from which to locate the values dwell-ing within those relations. The claim is, there-fore, that the realism implicit in the methoddeveloped by Lukes is not incompatible withthe value pluralism explicit in his de®nition.The problem with the method originallyarticulated by Lukes is not that it incorporatesvalues but that it is insu�ciently developed.

That is, Lukes needs to specify more accu-rately what he is looking for before he canreasonably expect to develop a method cap-able of ®nding it.If this argument is correct, then the critical

social scientist can climb down from his orher perch in the ivory tower since it is unne-cessary to be cast by Hay in the role ofsupreme arbiter of the interests and values ofothers. The method of immanent critique canbe focused exclusively upon the values heldwithin a power relation and, as such, doesnot require a supreme arbiter. My conclusion,therefore, is that the dispute which Hay hasengineered with the radical view is largelymisplaced.

References

Bachrach, P. & Baratz, M.S. (1962) `Two Faces ofPower', American Political Science Review, 56,pp.947±52.

Benton, T. (1981) `Objective' Interests and theSociology of Power, Sociology, 15(2), pp.161±84.

Clegg, S.R. (1989) Frameworks of Power. London:Sage.

Connolly, W.E. (1974) The Terms of Political Dis-course. London: D.C. Heath and Company.

Gaventa, J. (1980) Power and Powerlessness.Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Hampshire, S. (1959) Thought and Action. NewYork: The Viking Press.

Hay, C. (1997) `Divided by a Common Language:Political Theory and the Concept of Power', Pol-itics, 17(1), pp.45±52.

Lukes, S. (1974) Power: A Radical View. London:Macmillan.

Morriss, P. (1987) Power: A Philosophical Analysis.Manchester University Press.



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