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Natural Hazards 32: 89–110, 2004.© 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

89

Poverty and Disasters in the United States: AReview of Recent Sociological Findings

ALICE FOTHERGILL1 and LORI A. PEEK2�

1Department of Sociology, University of Vermont; 2 Department of Sociology, University ofColorado, 327 UCB, Boulder, CO 80309-0327, U.S.A.; �Author for correspondence (e-mail:[email protected])

(Received 15 October 2002; accepted in final form 30 April 2003)

Abstract. This article synthesizes the literature on poverty and disasters in the United States andpresents the results from a wide range of studies conducted over the past twenty years. The findingsare organized into eight categories based on the stages of a disaster event. The review illustrates howpeople of different socioeconomic statuses perceive, prepare for, and respond to natural hazard risks,how low-income populations may be differentially impacted, both physically and psychologically,and how disaster effects vary by social class during the periods of emergency response, recovery,and reconstruction. The literature illustrates that the poor in the United States are more vulnerable tonatural disasters due to such factors as place and type of residence, building construction, and socialexclusion. The results have important implications for social equity and recommendations for futureresearch and policy implementation are offered.

Key words: natural disasters, poverty, social equity, socioeconomic status, United States

1. Introduction

Natural disasters have often been overlooked as a site of social stratification be-cause they were viewed as indiscriminate “acts of God” that affected communitiesrandomly. In fact, due to this notion of randomness, disasters were believed to be“status levelers” or events that democratized the social structure. While a disasterdoes indeed threaten everything in its path, and for a brief period of time duringand immediately following the event there is a loss of “culturally derived discrim-inations and social distinctions” (Fritz, 1961, p. 685), disasters do not affect allmembers of society equally. Disaster scholars, and to a lesser extent the generalpublic, have acknowledged that disasters do not indiscriminately distribute risk andvulnerability or eliminate pre-existing systems of stratification (Couch and Kroll-Smith, 1985; Fordham, 1999; Morrow, 1997). As Blaikie et al. (1994) argue, therehas been a false separation of hazards and the social system because of the lackof widespread recognition of connections between the daily risks people face andthe reasons for their vulnerability to hazards and disasters. Indeed, disasters are theproducts of the social, political, and economic environment, as well as the naturalevents that cause them (p. 3).

90 ALICE FOTHERGILL AND LORI A. PEEK

Poor people around the world suffer the greatest disaster losses and have themost limited access to public and private recovery assets, both in developing so-cieties as well as wealthy industrialized nations like the United States (see forexample, Blaikie et al., 1994; Peacock et al., 1997). Socioeconomic factors playa significant role in all areas of social life, including in disasters, as they, too, aresocial phenomenon. Sociological scholarship demonstrates that one’s location inthe social strata often determines one’s life experiences, relationships, opportun-ities, and overall life chances. At issue here is how being poor or disadvantagedaffects one’s experiences in a disaster, from risk perception, to the post-disasterreconstruction of lives and communities.

During the early 1990s, social scientists who study disasters began examiningissues of vulnerability. Vulnerability, in the disaster context, is a person’s or group’s“capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the impact of a naturalhazard” (Blaikie et al., 1994, p. 9). Scholars have found that vulnerability maybe increased due to factors such as a person’s age, gender, social class, race, andethnicity (Aptekar and Boore, 1990; Morrow and Enarson, 1998; Peacock et al.,1997). Some disaster researchers now use a “socio-political ecology of disasters” asa theoretical framework to study disasters, as such an approach includes the criticalanalysis of minority, gender, and inequality issues in disasters (see for example,Bates, 1993; Hewitt, 1983; Peacock with Ragsdale, 1997).

To continue this critical analysis, this article takes stock of what is known onthese issues of differential vulnerability. Past articles have reviewed the literatureconcerning how gender (Fothergill, 1996) and race and ethnicity (Fothergill et al.,1999) play a role in disaster vulnerability in the United States, but no such reviewhas been done on the literature on poverty, inequality, and disasters.1 By examiningwhat is known on the topic of poverty and disasters in the United States, this reviewcan assist in identifying gaps and thus help direct future scholarship on the topic.2

This paper reviews and synthesizes the literature on poverty and disasters anddiscusses the noteworthy findings, paying particular attention to research doneon U.S. populations over the last 20 years. The findings are organized into eightcategories utilized to delineate the literature review findings.3 The categories arebased on the following stages of a disaster: risk perception; preparedness behavior;

1 In 1986, Thomas Drabek published Human System Responses to Disaster, a thorough reviewof the disaster literature. In this important book, he reviews data from research on socioeconomicfactors in disasters through the early 1980s. This review is designed to pick up where he left offin 1986, as well as to elaborate briefly on some findings that he reported – when they assist in thediscussion of more recent research on poverty and disasters.

2 The authors recognize that gender, race, and class are interconnected and they have com-plex effects on human social behavior. The authors also understand the problems with separatingthese dimensions for literature reviews. Given space limitations, when possible and applicable, theintersections are explicated in the review.

3 This model has been used by many hazards researchers, but also criticized by some (see forexample, Neal, 1997). While not dismissing their concerns, for this review, it makes the most sensefor clarity and consistency to use the same model that was used with the gender and disasters literat-

POVERTY AND DISASTERS 91

warning communication and response; physical impacts; psychological impacts;emergency response; recovery; and reconstruction. In the review, an attempt ismade to be as exhaustive as possible, citing all the studies, diverse in size andmethodology, that could be located. Within these studies, authors use a range ofsocial labels for individuals and groups that are disadvantaged. For example, someresearchers use “low socioeconomic status,” while others use “the poor,” “workingclass,” or “low-income,” and they measure these concepts in somewhat different(but not contradictory) ways. When possible we use the original terminology, inan effort to stay close to the authors’ intentions and measurements. However, wetreat the terms as similar concepts, all of which are trying to describe those wholive with the fewest monetary and social resources in the United States. The paperconcludes with policy and research recommendations.

2. The Findings

2.1. RISK PERCEPTION

This section reviews the literature on how people have perceived the threats andrisks of hazards and disasters, and the ways in which income and resources affectsuch perceptions. The research findings of how socioeconomic status affects hazardand disaster risk preparation, while minimal, show that poor individuals perceivethreats as more serious. The specific studies on these issues follow.

Some research has revealed that low-income individuals have greater risk per-ceptions. Flynn et al. (1994) found that people of lower socioeconomic statusexperience heightened levels of risk perception, which the researchers argued maybe because poorer people have little control over their lives, and hold little powerin the world. In a study of California residents and their views on technologicalhazards, the results showed that low-income individuals, women, and less educatedgroups reported the highest levels of concern (Pilisuk et al., 1987). While “experts”claimed these groups’ concerns were due to technological ignorance, the authorsargued that the concerns were legitimate and should not be discounted. The authorsalso discussed the relative lack of power of the poor, women, and the less-educatedwhen considering risk perception and communication, and called for improvedmechanisms for public participation of these marginalized groups. In their studyof culture and risk perception, Palm and Carroll (1998) found that lower incomegroups tended to worry more about the loss of their homes to earthquakes thanhigher income groups.

Some have suggested that hazard and risk perception vary by occupation (Lam-son, 1983). People who are of a lower socioeconomic status are more likely to beinvolved in higher risk or more hazardous occupations, and thus are more likelyto employ coping mechanisms to deal with the daily risks they face. For example,

ure review (Fothergill, 1996) and the race, ethnicity, and disasters literature review (Fothergill et al.,1999).


Vaughan (1995, p. 174) found that lower socioeconomic status has been associatedwith denial or minimization of chronic risks, particularly when economic concernsare salient. Other researchers have found that while people may be engaged inhazardous occupations and aware of the risk they “. . . tend not to define day to dayexposure as continually life threatening” (Beach and Lucas, 1960). Research hasnoted that logging near Mt. St. Helens provided a source of livelihood for workingclass families who lived in the immediate area of the volcano, and residents in thearea had difficulty in seeing volcanic activity as a real threat to them (Greene et al.,1981, p. 53).

Older research, however, posited that socioeconomic factors play no role in riskperception. White (1974, p. 5) argued that variances in hazard perception was notrelated to common socioeconomic indicators such as age, education, and income.

Although researchers may disagree on the degree that socioeconomic factorsplay in risk perception, it is widely recognized that those living in poverty havedifferent social and risk event histories, as well as differential access to economicand other resources that may be relevant in any particular risk situation. Thus,a characteristic such as socioeconomic status should be considered as a possiblecontributor to, and predictor of, how risks are perceived and interpreted (Vaughan,1995).

2.2. PREPAREDNESS BEHAVIOR

Preparedness behavior includes a variety of actions taken by families, households,and communities to get ready for a disaster. Preparedness activities may includedevising disaster plans, gathering emergency supplies, training response teams, andeducating residents about a potential disaster (Mileti, 1999). The limited researchrecord, which shows that there is a relationship between socioeconomic status(SES) and preparedness, follows.

Researchers have concluded that various socioeconomic indicators appear tobe related to preparedness levels. Turner et al. (1986) revealed that education,income, and ethnicity are related to earthquake preparedness. They discovered thatpreparedness increases steadily with income levels. Further, they reported that edu-cation combats fatalism and thereby fosters preparedness, but only up to the levelof entering college. Vaughan (1995) noted that people living in poverty or thosewith inadequate resources may be less likely to perform prescribed or necessaryactions to mitigate the effects of hazardous agents because of a lack of a sense ofpersonal control over potential outcomes.

Additional studies concur. Research conducted by Nigg (1982, p. 94) indicatedthat the “level of acceptance of disaster planning . . . varies directly with socioeco-nomic status.” Palm and Carroll (1998) reported that income level was particularlyimportant in the adoption of some of the more costly earthquake mitigation meas-ures, such as purchasing earthquake insurance, strengthening of the home, andpurchasing fire extinguishers. Fothergill (2004) discovered that poorer residents


could not afford flood insurance, even though they were aware of its availabilityand benefits. Research on Hurricane Andrew (Gladwin and Peacock, 1997) alsoestablished some relationships between income and preparedness. The research-ers found that income levels were not associated with preparation times. In otherwords, poorer residents did not start preparing for the storm, such as buying bottledwater or placing shutters on windows, any earlier or later than wealthier residents.

2.3. WARNING COMMUNICATION AND RESPONSE

The warning communication and response phase entails receiving formal warningsignals, such as emergency broadcasts and flood sirens, or other risk commu-nication of an immediate danger and taking action with some type of responseto the warning, such as evacuation. Most of the literature demonstrates thatsocioeconomic status is an important variable in this stage.

The Panel on the Public Policy Implications of Earthquake Prediction concludedthat groups of people with lower socioeconomic status were especially likely not toreceive, understand, or believe earthquake warnings (1975, p. 52). Indeed, warningbelief, or definition of situational danger, is directly related to whether individualsand groups respond to and comply with warning messages (Mileti et al., 1975).Moore (1958) reported that lower income groups were less likely to believe thatwarnings of impending natural disasters constituted an issue which should be takenseriously. Similarly, Mack and Baker (1961, p. 49) found that low-education, low-income respondents were less likely to interpret a warning signal as valid thanindividuals of moderate education and income (passage from Perry, 1987, pp. 148–149).

Beyond belief of warning messages, another important factor for considerationis whether all groups receive warning messages. In his study of the 1987 tornadothat hit Saragosa, Texas, Aguirre (1988) discovered that many of those who diedwere residents at a Head Start graduation ceremony who had not received anywarning messages. These victims most likely did not receive the warnings be-cause of language and cultural barriers. However, Roy Popkin (pers. comm., 2002)noted that since the early 1990s, warnings (as well as recovery information aftera disaster) have been released in as many languages as practical in most disastersituations in an effort to reach increasingly diverse populations.

Research following Hurricane Andrew provides more information on warningcommunication and response. For example, Morrow and Enarson (1996) foundthat poor women heard the storm warnings, but were unable to take action be-cause they did not have enough money for supplies or transportation. In their studyof warnings and evacuation for Hurricane Andrew, Gladwin and Peacock (1997)reported that people with lower incomes were less able and thus less likely toevacuate. This was mostly due to constraints caused by a lack of transportation andaffordable refuge options. Morrow (1997) stated that before Hurricane Andrew hit,there were reports of public housing residents being left to walk or hitchhike out of


evacuation zones. Similarly, in her study of the Red River Valley Flood, Enarson(1999b) discovered that homeless, unemployed, and low-income women were lessable than more affluent women to evacuate to alternative shelters.

Some studies found no relationship between socioeconomic status and warningresponse. Bourque et al. (1993) discovered that socioeconomic status, as measuredby household income and completion of a college degree, was not associated withevacuation behavior in the emergency response phase following the Loma Prietaearthquake. Perry and Lindell (1991) also reported no significant difference inevacuation compliance between SES groups.

2.4. PHYSICAL IMPACTS

The physical impacts stage is concerned with who is hit hardest in a disaster, whosuffers from the most serious immediate consequences, and what patterns emergein rates of mortality, morbidity, and injury. The data show that socioeconomic statusis important in this phase of a disaster.

According to Aptekar (1991), disaster loss is more pervasive for those withlower SES. This is largely due to the types of housing that people of low socioeco-nomic status occupy. Low-cost, affordable housing exposes the residents to greaterrisks of hazards because of lower quality construction (Austin and Schill, 1994;Bolin, 1986; Greene, 1992; Phillips, 1993; Phillips and Ephraim, 1992). Comerioet al. (1994) reported that in California, low- and moderate-income rental hous-ing units tended to be older, and thus more vulnerable to disaster, particularlyto seismic and fire damage. Difficulties emerge in earthquake disasters becauseof the damages to low-rent and unreinforced masonry (URM) buildings, whichare primarily inhabited by residents having lower SES. Mobile homes, also mostoften occupied by lower and working class groups, are the most dangerous typesof buildings in a tornado. In 1994, almost 40% of all tornado fatalities occurredin mobile homes (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1995). While Bolin and Bolton(1986) acknowledged that living in beachfront property exposes all residents, re-gardless of SES, to the risks of hurricanes, Bolin and Stanford (1991) affirmedthat victims with the lowest incomes experience the greatest proportionate lossesto their housing.

Another immediate impact of a disaster is the number of newly homeless whoare present following an event. For example, Phillips (1998) reported that the LomaPrieta earthquake was most likely to displace the elderly, the already homeless,and low-income Latinos living in Santa Cruz County. In South Carolina, 60,000people, many of whom were low-income and ethnic minority residents, were re-ported to have become homeless as a result of Hurricane Hugo (Federal EmergencyManagement Agency, 1990).

Aguirre (1988), in his study of a 1987 Texas tornado, found that less powerfulgroups, such as the poor, faced higher disaster impacts, such as injury and death.Research by Rossi et al. (1983) on loss from natural hazards in the U.S. from


1970 to 1980, further confirmed that lower income households experience higherrates of injuries in disaster than more affluent households. The difference was mostpronounced in floods and earthquakes, where none of the higher income groupssuffered any injuries. Fires showed a slight tendency for lower income householdsto suffer more injuries (p. 102).

In a Midwest heat disaster in 1980, there were 148 heat related deaths and mostof the victims were from the inner-city, elderly, and from a low socioeconomicbracket (U.S. House of Representatives Testimony, 1980). Many of the victims,poor and on fixed incomes, were afraid of high utility bills so they did not turn onfans, many of which had been given to them for free as part of emergency reliefmeasures (p. 3). In another heat wave disaster in Chicago in July 1995, 739 peopledied, the majority of whom were low-income (Klinenberg, 2002).

Another, albeit understudied, physical impact of disaster is the consequenceof domestic violence. While domestic violence affects women across all socialand class lines, resources may make a difference for victims of domestic violencefollowing a disaster. In the 1997 Grand Forks flood, there was limited evidence thatmiddle class women may have had more financial, educational, and occupationalresources available to them to leave and stay away from abusers, while poor womendid not have the same resources and thus had a more difficult time leaving andstaying away from abusers (Fothergill, 1999).

2.5. PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACTS

This section examines work on the emotional stress, trauma, and other psycho-logical impacts of a disaster event. The research available indicates that socioeco-nomic status influences who experiences and reports more emotional problems anddistress following a disaster.

More general social psychological research has shown that socioeconomicstatus is a critical factor to consider for emotional vulnerability, yet relativelylittle disaster-specific research has been conducted on this topic (Aptekar, 1990).Overall, however, the studies that have been done show that higher-income victimsof disaster suffer fewer psychological impacts than lower-income victims (Bolin,1993). Aptekar (1990) stated that the working class were embittered by the lossesthey sustained following Hurricane Hugo and the Loma Prieta earthquake. Fur-thermore, if these residents knew they were not going to be compensated for theirlosses, they were said to have been less likely to reach psychological resolutions.Another study found that poorer people and those with larger families were morelikely to report emotional problems following a disaster (Bolin and Bolton, 1986).Fothergill (2004) discovered that poorer residents reported greater stress over thepossibility of losing their jobs after a flood disaster. While middle- and high-incomesalaried professionals found that collecting paychecks throughout the crisis allevi-ated stress, those paid hourly wages, such as those in most service-oriented jobs,were not paid during the crisis.


It is important to note that psychological impacts could be caused by thepoverty, the disaster, or a combination of the two. Yet, no matter if the povertycauses the psychological conditions, the disaster undoubtedly exacerbates the situ-ation. Muller and Mulhern (1977) found many victims of the Big Thompson floodin Colorado were in the “lost hope” stage after they lost their homes. The victims,most of whom were over 55 and had no jobs and no income, felt enormous despairand were more vulnerable to strokes and heart attacks. Garrison (1985) also foundthat the financial devastation of the disaster created mental stress. She explainedthat after a disaster, people generally have increased debt burdens. Poor peoplewere more likely to be financially devastated by the disaster and subsequent relo-cation than were wealthy or middle class people, thus increasing the likelihood ofmental stress for those of low SES. Moreover, the poor were less likely to haveaccess to physical resources and mental health care than middle- or upper-classindividuals, further exacerbating emotional vulnerability. In a study of the “tentcities” that were established as temporary housing following Hurricane Andrew,Yelvington (1997) reported that a number of post-traumatic stress disorder caseswere evident. Many camp residents, most of whom were poor or working-classethnic minorities, reported psychological depression and strained familial relations.

2.6. EMERGENCY RESPONSE

The post-impact, emergency response stage of a disaster is characterized as theimmediate aftermath of a disaster, typically including the first hours or days, per-haps up to one week, depending on the event. The emergency response stage of adisaster provides a unique opportunity to observe social patterns, roles, processes,and behaviors. Socioeconomic factors appear to be significant in some ways duringthe immediate post-impact stage.

In a study of disaster relief officials from a variety of organizations in the UnitedStates, one of the major conclusions was that the poor are one of the groups mostlikely to “fall through the cracks” during emergency relief operations (ColoradoState University, 1985). Rubin and Popkin (1990) studied response problems toHurricane Hugo. They discovered that many of the victims had special needsbecause of extreme poverty, high illiteracy rates, physical isolation in rural com-munities, fear and distrust of government officials, and lack of electronic media forweeks following the storm. These issues resulted in members of service agenciesreporting that providing assistance to the rural poor following the hurricane wasunusually difficult and time consuming. Indeed, Miller and Simile (1992), in theirinvestigation of the effect of Hurricane Hugo on poor residents of South Carolina,found that being poor was a significant factor in the response phase. Due to thetotal lack of pre-storm interface with the rural poor, emergency programs were notreaching these people. Many of the poor in the area studied were “invisible” untilthe hurricane hit, living in unmarked homes, on unmapped roads, or hidden behindlarge estates. One rescue worker reported that he had never heard of the dirt road


where people lived and were in need of assistance. Emergency response workerscommented that until the storm, they had no idea of the extent of the poverty intheir own neighborhoods. One remarked that “. . . there was poverty here all of thetime, but after the storm I saw what I’ve been living around for 34 years” (p. 11).4

Subervi-Velez et al. (1992) reported that following the Loma Prieta earthquake,community-based organizations invited the Red Cross to work with them to dooutreach in low-income and non-English speaking communities, but the Red Crossdeclined.

Research has shown that in the United States, those with lower SES levels aremore likely to seek refuge in mass shelters (Bolin and Bolton, 1986; Mileti et al.,1992; Yelvington, 1997). Roy Popkin (pers. comm., 2002) noted that in many dis-asters those who utilized shelters could not afford gasoline to drive long distancesor pay for a motel room. After the Loma Prieta quake, Bolin and Stanford (1990)discovered that sheltering was complicated by the presence of a significantly largepopulation of chronically homeless persons who also sought shelter at Red Crossfacilities. Furthermore, evidence suggested that poorer victims tended to remain inemergency, temporary shelters longer after Loma Prieta (Bolin, 1993). After tor-nadoes hit two Texas towns in 1979, those victims with lower incomes spent moretime in temporary mobile homes provided by the Federal Emergency Manage-ment Agency (FEMA) (Bolin, 1982). Fothergill (2004) found that higher-incomefamilies were less likely to stay at mass evacuation shelters than lower-income in-dividuals and families after the Grand Forks flood of 1997. In addition, people withmore money usually do not need the FEMA mobile homes because they typicallyhave more extensive social support networks (Roy Popkin, pers. comm., 2002).

Moreover, those with low SES also may have more trouble in the responseperiod, due to a bias in disaster reporting by the media. Rodrigue and Rovai (1994)posited that poorer communities were more likely to be vulnerable in disasters,as emergency personnel depend on the media, which is biased towards the afflu-ent, to determine where people are in need and respond to those neighborhoodsor communities. Rovai (1994) found that the media contributed to the commonand incorrect perception that Ferndale, California, a prosperous and affluent town,was more badly damaged than Rio Dell, California, a poorer, more marginalizedtown, following the 1992 earthquakes in Humbolt County. While the towns, bothwith predominantly white populations, suffered similar reported dollar amountsof quake damage (Rio Dell had slightly more), Rio Dell had more condemnedstructures and 300 displaced residents, while Ferndale had none. The researchshowed that 75% of the print media photos were of Ferndale, and the nationalmedia referred to the earthquake as the “Ferndale Earthquake” (Rovai, 1994, p.60). In addition, surveys of damage by officials, such as FEMA representatives andthe governor, mostly took place in Ferndale. As a result, the researcher found that

4 Disaster scholars have long posited that natural disasters reveal social problems that alreadyexisted prior to the catastrophe. Merton (1969: xii), for example, stated that disasters can “bring outin bold relief aspects of social systems that are not so readily visible” in everyday life.


Rio Dell was behind Ferndale in completing all phases of recovery – emergency,restoration, and reconstruction. Rovai determined that Rio Dell’s slower recoverywas evidence of the effect that pre-existing SES structures have on rates of recoveryfrom natural disasters. In essence, Rovai concluded that the media’s bias towardsaffluent communities contributed to disaster management personnel’s perceptionformation. This perception, in turn, contributed to relief assistance decisions. Dashet al. (1997) briefly mentioned a similar case of media bias towards a more affluentMiami community in their study following Hurricane Andrew.

2.7. RECOVERY

The recovery stage, typically the one-year period following a disaster, historicallyhas implied putting a disaster-stricken community back together (Mileti, 1999).This section addresses socioeconomic differences as life returns to a somewhatnormal or improved level during this time of allocating resources, rebuilding, andlifeline repair. The material included below indicates that there are considerabledifferences in this period, especially in regard to housing issues, and that thosewith lower socioeconomic status may face more obstacles.

The ease with which certain groups are able to negotiate bureaucratic systemsmay dictate the success or failure of the recovery process. Following the Humboldtcounty, California, earthquakes in 1992, Rovai (1994) found that the higher-incomeFerndale residents knew how to “work the system, fill out the forms, and acquirethe financial aid they needed,” while lower-income Rio Dell residents did not.Thus, many in Rio Dell did not apply for funds to which they were entitled (p.72). In the 1997 Grand Forks flood, middle- and higher-income disaster victimsfelt more comfortable than low-income ones in negotiating disaster recovery bur-eaucracies for assistance (Fothergill, 2004). Dash et al. (1997) noted that poorervictims encountered more obstacles in making trips to the Disaster Assistance Cen-ters following Hurricane Andrew because of transportation, child care, and workdifficulties. Moreover, some recovery programs have used a nuclear family model,which serves to award funds to the head of the household. However, this typeof model serves to disadvantage poor, minority women, as illustrated followingHurricane Andrew (Morrow and Enarson, 1996). In her examination of women andhousing issues following hurricane and flood disasters, Enarson (1999a) includedan extensive discussion of why the utilization of the traditional nuclear householdmodel has become increasingly problematic for poor women living in the UnitedStates.

Studies have demonstrated that low-income households often lack access to re-sources and income needed to cope following disasters (Bolin and Stanford, 1998;Hewitt, 1997). During the recovery process, those with lower SES had a moredifficult time as they had less insurance, less savings, fewer personal resources,and suffered from the intensification of previous economic stress and problems(Bolin and Bolton, 1986; Cooper and Laughy, 1994; Tierney, 1988). Addition-


ally, working class and middle class women experienced a greater stigma whenreceiving assistance, public and private, after a flood disaster than low-incomeand high-income females. Middle class females who had once lived in povertyor accepted welfare experienced the greatest stigma receiving post-disaster help(Fothergill, 2004). Roy Popkin (pers. comm., 2002) stated that relief agencies havelong accepted an “X” as a signature in Appalachia and elsewhere when workingwith disaster victims who were low-income and illiterate.

Research indicates that many who become homeless after a disaster are froma lower SES (Katayama, 1992; Phillips and Ephraim, 1992). Bolin (1993) dis-covered that after the Coalinga earthquake, Mexican-Americans, with lower SES,had fewer resources and used more federal aid and housing programs than higherSES Anglos. He also reported that Small Business Administration (SBA) loanswere only available to those with above average incomes and/or those with reliableemployment after a California earthquake. Fothergill (2004) found that some low-income families were denied SBA loans because their total family incomes weretoo low. In an examination of the disaster loan process following the 1995 floodingin New Orleans, Childers (1999) found that poor elderly women were three timesless likely than other elderly households to receive low-interest loans, even thoughthese low-income elderly women were over-represented in the population applyingto FEMA for the loans.

Housing is a significant issue for low SES disaster victims. Bolin and Stan-ford (1993) reported that following the Loma Prieta earthquake of 1989, FEMAreceived firm political pressure to provide more housing for low-income victims.In mid-November, 1989, FEMA agreed to provide more than 140 mobile homesin Watsonville and Pajaro, two areas with a lack of low-income housing. FEMAhad been reluctant to provide this type of temporary housing, though, and oneFEMA spokesperson referred to them as “instant slums” (p. B46). There was aformal petition brought against FEMA for the violation of regulations and stat-utes regarding low-income earthquake victims. The petition claimed that FEMAhad unlawfully failed to provide adequate temporary housing assistance for low-income persons, and that FEMA, in the process of distributing relief, discriminatedagainst residential hotel tenants and seasonal workers. Finally, the petition claimedthat FEMA failed to help develop plans for temporary and permanent affordablehousing and to coordinate disaster relief (U.S. Government Hearings, 1990).

Quarantelli (1994, pp. 76–77) reported that middle class families do not like touse mobile homes as temporary housing and that those with a higher SES preferrental assistance. Higher-income evacuees, he observed, obtain the surplus housingavailable in a community and thus there is almost always a problem finding rentalhousing for low-income victims (p. 77). Comerio et al. (1994) posited that in post-disaster repair and rebuilding, the services are geared toward homeowners and legaltenants and not towards multi-family and affordable housing units, which are oc-cupied by low-income tenants. The researchers found that except for the homeless,very low-income renters were the least likely of all households to receive short-


term emergency assistance, and the least likely to have their units repaired (p. 7). Inaddition, they reported that the FEMA and SBA assistance programs, in particular,were not as effective for affordable housing units as they were for middle-classhomeowners. Following Loma Prieta, there were several one-time solutions to getaffordable housing funds, but none of the solutions became institutionalized. Theresearchers concluded that the current recovery programs were wholly inadequateto meet the needs of multi-family and affordable housing recovery (p. vii).

Greene (1992), who also examined housing issues following the Loma Prietaearthquake, agreed that low-income housing was at risk. The U.S. Department ofHousing and Urban Development, Greene noted, estimated that it takes 3 to 8 yearsto replace low-income housing, thus illustrating the need for temporary housing forlow-income residents for that time period. Following Loma Prieta, the AmericanRed Cross and local community groups provided grants for the rebuilding of low-income housing and/or shelters for the homeless. Greene reported the most seriousproblem with low-income housing replacement was that agencies that provide low-income housing in non-disaster times are unable to keep up with the demand in aroutine or normal environment. Thus, they operate in a crisis mode all of the time,and are “completely overwhelmed” after an earthquake (p. 13).

Following Hurricane Hugo, researchers Miller and Simile (1992) found thatchurches, government programs, and some business community service programscame to the aid of the rural poor. The church volunteers built and repaired homes,and provided food, transportation, and medical care. The government, after one oftheir rescue workers accidentally found a starving family, extended their services tothe rural poor, who were mainly illiterate, isolated, and without transportation. Thegovernment opened centers aimed at distributing relief to immobile populations.Many of the public officials had never been to the poverty stricken areas of theircommunities before Hugo, and were not aware of the extent of the problem. Theauthors noted that the churches, the community service programs, and the govern-ment workers were not interested in dealing with the larger problems of poverty andwanted to limit their assistance to Hurricane Hugo damage. One outreach workersaid:

I am still doing Hugo relief, but in all honesty, many of the things that we aredoing are things that pre-existed. You cannot replace a roof on a wall that isrotted, and those types of things we ran into frequently because of the level ofpoverty (p. 11).

Another recovery worker added:

I try very hard not to call things Hugo that are not Hugo. That does not meanthat we did not repair walls that were rotted, we had to do that; but I would flatout say to anybody you can call this Hugo, but most of it is really not Hugo(pp. 11–12).


Most of the recovery workers, agencies, and programs were careful only torespond to problems thought to be caused by Hugo, not by poverty. One countyworker explained:

We had a lot of things where you’d look at the homes and you couldn’t tell ifit was Hugo damage or not – they were just shacks. You had to make somedecisions there about whether or not they qualified for help (p. 15).

Indeed, Bolin and Stanford (1990) noted that the presence of disadvantaged per-sons, already living in marginal housing, presents disaster service providers withdemands that are often unanticipated within the provisions of routine shelter andhousing programs.

Furthermore, following Hugo, workers were suspicious of “free riders” and feltthat there were many people who were trying to get assistance for problems thatwere not related to the disaster. One worker expressed: “I don’t care what disasteryou had, you’re always going to have somebody that’s going to try to get somethingfor nothing . . . ‘’ (Miller and Simile, 1992, p. 15). The church and the governmentrelief work ceased when they felt they had dealt with all the storm damage. Millerand Simile noted that the recovery agencies and programs were not interested indealing with the cause of poverty, only the immediate needs from the hurricane(pp. 5–19). Roy Popkin (pers. comm., 2002) stated that while many officials didnot know the poor were there, when they were “discovered,” there were effortsto help them. For example, FEMA hired a civil rights organization to work withthe affected community (most of whom where descendants of freed slaves) due tothe populations’ general distrust of government workers and agencies (Rubin andPopkin, 1990).

Finally, Bolin (1993) found that in the 1987 Whittier-Narrows earthquake,which occurred on the first day of the month, many low SES victims were evictedfor late payment of rent. Due to the timing of the disaster, the landlords were ableto avoid the rent-control regulations, evict the tenants, raise the rent, and therebycontributed to the housing crisis for low-income renters. Bolton et al. (1993)discovered, in work on low-income Latinos in the Whittier-Narrows earthquake,that there was a shortage of low-income housing before the quake, and this issuebecame even worse afterwards. They also reported on the problematic situation,for low-income renters, of the earthquake occurring on the rent-due day. Somelandlords, it was reported, lied to tenants about the buildings’ conditions so theywould leave. In one instance, a building evacuation notice had been removed andplaced on an undamaged building for the same purpose (p. 245).

2.8. RECONSTRUCTION

Reconstruction is the final stage in the disaster cycle, and hypothetically may occurfrom one year after the disaster to many years later. This stage includes restoringcommunity services, finding assistance, locating permanent housing, and resuming


a more normal life and routine. This final section examines the significance ofsocioeconomic factors during reconstruction. The literature shows that those withlower socioeconomic status may be more likely to have trouble during this time,particularly in the areas of housing and relocation.

As discussed in the recovery section, housing is a significant issue for poordisaster victims. The problem may continue throughout the reconstruction phase.In their study of flood disasters in the United States and United Kingdom, Enarsonand Fordham (2001) found that structural factors increasing women’s poverty andeconomic insecurity placed women at higher risk than men after the disasters, aspoor women had a harder time withstanding material losses and rebuilding theirhomes. Comerio et al. (1994) reported that following the Loma Prieta earthquake,the low-income victims had a more difficult time with housing in the reconstructionperiod. Nearly three-quarters of the units destroyed in San Francisco were rentalunits. One year after the disaster, the single family homes were rebuilt, but of themulti-family units, 90% were still out of service. Four years later, 50% of the multi-family units remained unrepaired or unreplaced. The authors explained that theprojects that were the most vulnerable and the slowest to recover were those thatwere occupied by very low-, low-, and moderate-income renters (p. 5). Accordingto the report, the economics of private housing markets hindered the post-disasterreconstruction of low- and moderate-income rental units, as the tenants were low-income so the landlords could not raise rents for rebuilding costs, and they alsocould not afford earthquake insurance. In addition, replacement units for low- andmoderate-income households were in short supply. Similarly, two years after Hur-ricane Andrew, thousands of poor families headed by minority women were stillliving in substandard temporary housing (Morrow and Enarson, 1996)

Greene (1992) reported that in the Loma Prieta reconstruction, existing socialproblems were exacerbated. Therefore, problems of homelessness and low-incomehousing shortages became magnified following the disaster. Earthquakes, dispro-portionately damage and destroy older, and thus more often, low-income, housing(Bolin and Stanford, 1990; Greene, 1992; Phillips, 1998). Residents of very low-income housing, such as single room occupancies (SRO’s), do not easily qualifyfor assistance programs. FEMA states that its temporary housing assistance pro-gram is designed for those who had “stable housing” prior to the earthquake, andtherefore SRO residents, who did not live continuously in their rooms, did not qual-ify (Greene, 1992, p. 14). The result, Greene concluded, was that the earthquakepushed some of these residents into the ranks of the permanently homeless. Wright(1988, 1989) referred to groups of people who live in doubled-up and tripled-uphousing as the “marginally homeless.” He also contended that a disaster is likely todisplace large numbers of the mostly hidden and marginally homeless population.

Affordable housing appeared in numerous studies as a major long-term prob-lem. After Hurricane Andrew, there was reluctance to rebuild low-income housing.As a result, more than two years after the event, 280 families still needed afford-able housing assistance (Morrow, 1997). Examining the reconstruction after three


California earthquakes, Bolin and Stanford (1991) also discovered that low-incomeresidents were faced with a housing crisis. As there was a shortage of low-incomehousing prior to the disaster, the problem of housing was exacerbated when theearthquakes damaged much of what was available for low-income residents. Theauthors argued that these housing processes in reconstruction were largely influ-enced by existing social dynamics. Bolin and Stanford posited that earthquakes,more than other disasters, affect low-income people negatively due to class-baseddifferences in housing type, quality, and location. In Watsonville, FEMA providedmobile homes as temporary housing for low-income families. Because the mobilehomes were better quality housing than what some of the families had pre-disaster,the recipients wanted the temporary homes to be a permanent solution. However,research has shown that the situation is different for different social classes. Afterthe Grand Forks flood, some middle class victims were offended that FEMA be-lieved that they wanted to stay permanently in the FEMA mobile homes. They weretold they could be there for a year, but started receiving calls from FEMA just amonth or two after they moved in, asking them when they were leaving (Fothergill,2004).

Rubin and Popkin (1990) found that two years after Hurricane Hugo, the so-cial class disparities that had existed prior to the disaster were as apparent inthe communities as they had been before. However, on a more optimistic note,some communities used the disaster as an opportunity to improve living conditions.After Hurricane Andrew there was some indication that replaced or restored publichousing units were better than the ones there before the storm, and new communityprojects were implemented to improve poor neighborhoods (Morrow, 1997). Afterthe Loma Prieta earthquake, the city of Watsonville made a concerted effort to cre-ate affordable housing for farm workers and low-income families. They establisheda variety of redevelopment projects and adopted a housing ordinance requiring that25% of housing built after the disaster be affordable. While not without problems,these efforts have helped create more affordable housing options for low-incomeresidents (Charles Eadie, pers. comm., 2003).

3. Conclusions and Recommendations

The review shows that socioeconomic status is a significant predictor in the pre-and post-disaster stages, as well as for the physical and psychological impacts. Thepoor are more likely to perceive hazards as risky; less likely to prepare for hazardsor buy insurance; less likely to respond to warnings; more likely to die, sufferinjuries, and have proportionately higher material losses; have more psychologicaltrauma; and face more obstacles during the phases of response, recovery, andreconstruction. These differences are significant, and they illustrate a systematicpattern of stratification within the United States.

Some findings may seem contradictory, such as the fact that most lower-incomegroups find disaster threats more serious and risky, possibly due to a lack of power


and control over many things in their lives, and yet low-income groups may be lesslikely to prepare for disasters and to evacuate. However, these findings also makesense in that many preparedness activities and the ability to evacuate require accessto economic and social resources that the poor may not readily possess.

Clearly, disasters often reveal larger societal inequities. Researchers are nowrecognizing and documenting how disaster vulnerability is rooted in pre-existingpatterns of community settlement and development (Morrow, 1999). Moreover,the literature shows us that the underlying issue is one embedded in our socialstructures, which dictate access to resources, power, and information. Given thisknowledge, disasters may be viewed as opportunities to witness, understand, andthus remedy pre-existing social problems. Many disaster scholars have written onthe possibility of social change as a result of disasters, while others note that thecrisis heightens past problems and solidifies the community’s inequities.

3.1. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

We believe it is important to take the findings on poverty and vulnerability indisasters, albeit incomplete, and make some concrete changes. First, we recom-mend more widespread inclusion of members of the lower and working classesin disaster professions and in the research community. Second, national agenciessuch as FEMA and the Red Cross and other groups that respond to disaster on alarge scale need to continue to be educated on the diversity of various communitiesand plan accordingly. We also recommend that these national agencies developindependent study courses for local emergency managers, students, and other in-terested individuals. FEMA currently offers college courses on social vulnerabilityand other related topics, but these courses need to be expanded to a wider, non-classroom audience to better disseminate this vital information. The media alsoneeds to coordinate with emergency managers, public officials, and disaster reliefworkers to better understand disaster events. This will likely lead to more accuratereporting and inclusion of all groups impacted, not just the affluent.

Further, housing is a significant issue in understanding the vulnerability of thepoor in disasters, and thus represents an area that policy changes could signific-antly impact. Research has shown that older, low-cost housing that is brought upto safety standards often becomes unaffordable, thus creating a situation wherebylow-income families cannot find housing that is both safe from natural disastersand affordable. We recommend that policies be initiated that deal with this issue.One idea is to create ordinances so that it is mandatory for landlords to makethe improvements, or ensure that they do it voluntarily by offering subsidies ortax breaks substantial enough to make it worth the owners’ while. In addition,cities must establish and enforce rent control policies. Another recommendationregarding housing concerns mobile home units. As the gap between the wealthyand the poor increases in the United States, and all indicators show that it willcontinue to widen in this century, there will be more low-income residents in


risky housing situations, particularly mobile homes. We propose, therefore, thatthis situation be remedied by enforcing and subsidizing programs to improve thestrength of mobile homes in high winds. Moreover, we recommend requiring allmobile home park owners provide tornado shelters for their residents. Disasters arealso an opportunity for communities to address the larger issue of a general lack ofaffordable housing. The town of Watsonville, California, is a good example of howa community can use the political momentum after a disaster to make change forlow-income residents.

Finally, we recommend that public and private institutions make a commitmentto improving the conditions of the most vulnerable to disasters. The aforemen-tioned recommendations cannot take place without a significant commitment toexternal resources. Given political pressures from various interest groups, thischallenge to protect the vulnerable with public funding is a difficult one. Yet theresidents in URM buildings or mobile homes cannot afford to make their residencessafer, so as a nation the United States must decide that it is important enough toallocate time, energy, and resources to such endeavors.

3.2. RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS

Another important goal of this analysis is to offer recommendations for the disasterresearch agenda. Our first suggestion is that research be developed in conjunctionwith practitioners working in communities. As a community invested in reducingthe vulnerability of marginalized groups, researchers need to work with people inthe field to find out what needs to be known. Also, researchers need to follow upwith practitioners to see how research findings are, or are not, being implementedin the field. Second, we recommend that we begin to fill the holes that emergedwith this research review. For example, we propose that researchers conduct in-depth, comparative studies regarding vulnerability issues in different regions in theUnited States, as well as from the impacts of different disasters. Another gap that isworthy of research attention is how forms of diversity – including age, gender, raceand ethnicity, religion, and social class – affect vulnerability. Also, as is obviousfrom the literature review sections above, much research has been conducted onthe immediate response and recovery phases of disasters. However, more researchis warranted regarding how low-income communities perceive risk, prepare fordisasters, and respond to warning communications. Thus, although it is widelyrecognized that the poor and other marginalized groups are typically more at riskto disasters than other citizens in the United States, there is still very little empir-ical research regarding risk perception, preparation, and response for low-incomepopulations.

Fourth, we suggest research be pursued in the area of family violence. Soci-ological research on violence in families demonstrates that there is a connectionbetween stressful situations, such as poverty, and family violence (Gelles andCornell, 1985). More research is warranted regarding how a disaster event may


further exacerbate domestic violence situations. Fifth, we recommend that barriersto a timely and safe evacuation for marginalized groups be further explored. Wealso recommend that research be conducted on the impact of mitigation efforts onpoverty and sustainable development. The research community has called for mit-igation efforts for sustainable development (Mileti, 1999), yet there has been littleempirical research that has examined the actual outcome of mitigation projects thathave been implemented. Finally, we suggest that a similar review of the literaturebe completed on global poverty and the implications for disasters and other crisisevents. While a global review was beyond the scope of this article, we believe itwould be an important undertaking for future research.

The poor are living in crisis before a disaster strikes. Thus, when a disaster doesoccur, it must be recognized that those already living in poverty are impacted indifferent and significant ways as compared to other members of society. They havelarger problems than just post-disaster recovery and reconstruction so that they canreturn to “life as normal.” Thus, we conclude by emphasizing the need to pursuethe aforementioned policy and research recommendations, in an effort to decreasethe vulnerability of those living in poverty.

Acknowledgments

This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation, Grant Num-ber CMS-9312647, which is gratefully acknowledged. The authors wish to thankJacquelyn Monday, Mary Fran Myers, Brenda Phillips, and Roy Popkin for provid-ing suggestions on an earlier draft of this manuscript. The authors also wish tothank the two anonymous reviewers who offered detailed comments, and TadMurty and Wouter van der Velde who assisted throughout the submission andrevision process. However, only the authors are responsible for the interpretationsand conclusions made in this paper.

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