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Post-Growth in the Global South:The Emergence of Alternativesto Development in Latin AmericaRebecca HollenderPublished online: 05 Mar 2015.

To cite this article: Rebecca Hollender (2015) Post-Growth in the Global South: TheEmergence of Alternatives to Development in Latin America, Socialism and Democracy,29:1, 73-101, DOI: 10.1080/08854300.2014.998472

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Post-Growth in the Global South:

The Emergence of Alternatives to

Development in Latin America

Rebecca Hollender

I. Introduction

The concept of sustainable development1 has been weakened andeven rejected after decades of failed attempts to meet environmentaland social objectives. This rejection comes from diverse actorsranging from civil society movements to academic sub-disciplinesincluding post-development (PD), political ecology, and de-growth.While the international sustainable development agenda has madeprogress in some areas, in most regions of the world social inequalityand poverty have worsened, and a global environmental crisis is immi-nent. Despite myriad attempts to make the development system moreinclusive, representative, and sustainable, the root causes of social andenvironmental problems have not been addressed.

As a result, a gradual exhaustion and shifting away from officialdevelopment processes is taking place among civil society groupsaround the world. Instead of continuing efforts to improve andchange the development system from within, alternatives are beingdeliberately elaborated outside of the system. Alternatives to Develop-ment (A2D) proposals were born from the PD school of thought, whichcites the current development model as a root cause of social inequalityand environmental problems, reflecting four decades of failed pre-scriptions designed to promote economic growth (Gudynas 2012;Escobar 2010; Esteva 2013; Lang 2013). PD questions much of develop-ment’s underlying logic about participation, decision-making, hierar-chy, human-nature relationships, governance structures, the(economic) value of nature, etc. PD sees the development system as a

1. Sustainable development, as defined by the UN, is development that meets the needsof the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet theirown needs.

Socialism and Democracy, 2015Vol. 29, No. 1, 73–101, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08854300.2014.998472

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tool employed by capitalism in order to fulfill its constant need forexpansion and domination over other forms of economic and socialorganization.

A2D are concrete proposals for transitioning toward an environ-mentally sustainable, post-capitalist society. They address the urgentneed to limit economic activity to within the biophysical limits of theplanet. Broadly labeled as “post-growth,” they posit: (1) that currentgrowth patterns cannot be sustained; and (2) that the primacy of econ-omic growth in public policy must be undone. Post-growth recognizesthat growth patterns will inevitably change and proposes transitionmeasures that could mitigate a complete economic crisis and/or eco-logical collapse.

A2D originate in the Global South and thus hold a unique placewithin post-growth thinking, because their analysis takes intoaccount the poverty, inequality, and environmental problems ofSouthern societies, thereby involving different audiences and policyframeworks than proposals constructed in the Global North. Thedevelopment lens allows for an analysis of the expansion of thegrowth-based economy (including current extractive models) fromthe standpoint of the Global South, whose encounter with moderneconomic globalization has been most often mediated through devel-opment policy. It is striking that in their efforts to address unique,local circumstances, A2D are tracing the root of their problems to aglobal system; they recognize that the capitalist system is the rootcause of ecological and social crises, and view the developmentsystem as part and parcel of the problem.

This article will examine the context of A2D discussions and initiat-ives in Latin America, and reveal some of the processes underlyingA2D proposals. Section II will examine four interrelated political,social, and economic processes that are helpful in understanding therise in popularity of A2D. These include: (1) the return to an extractivedevelopment model in the region; (2) disillusionment by civil societywith progressive governments’ promises to bring forth alternatives;(3) obstacles facing regional integration; and (4) regional geopoliticsand the rise of Brazil as regional hegemon. Section III will outline thetheoretical approaches to A2D in Latin America and summarizethree prominent examples: post-extractivism, Buen Vivir, and solidar-ity economies. It will introduce some of the most influential actorsand processes involved in the construction of A2D in the region, aswell as the wider civil society networks from which they drawsupport. Section IV will explore the feasibility of A2D and widerpost-growth frameworks, as well as the significant challenges they

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face. Section V will review the experience of post-extractivism advo-cates in Peru in order to illustrate the obstacles to implementing A2Dagendas. The conclusion will highlight the potential of A2D for trans-forming the embedded assumptions, structures, processes, and pol-icies of the development model, and reveal the linkages betweenefforts in Latin America and global movements for change.

II. Contextualizing the rise of alternatives to development in LatinAmerica

A2D in Latin America emerge out of multiple political and sociallandscapes, which are tied together by a common trend: the return toeconomic dependence on the export of primary natural resources andenergetic commodities (Gudynas 2013; Villegas 2013; Webber 2012a;Cerezal 2013 etc.). A closer examination of four regional trends willhighlight their role in perpetuating the region’s subordinate economicposition and its devastating social and environmental conditions.

Expansion of the extractive development modelDespite seven decades of development, many countries in Latin

America never moved away from their colonial legacy of providingprimary materials to fuel foreign industrialization. In recent years,this legacy has been reinforced,2 with the continued expansion offoreign direct investment (FDI) in natural resources, energy, andextractive projects (CEPAL 2012).3

The extractive model has changed, however, from earlier decadesand colonial times. A2D authors label the current model “predatoryextractivism” for a number of reasons. For one, its reach hasmoved beyond hydrocarbons and minerals to agriculture, forestry,and fishing,4 and also to foreign control of arable land and water

2. The current trend has been called the “reprimarization of Latin America” by some(Algranati 2012; Lopez and Vertiz 2012) and the “commodities consensus” byothers (Svampa 2012).

3. In 2012 FDI patterns in South America showed a preference for natural resourcesectors, which captured 51 percent of total FDI, comprising the largest share of FDIincome in the region. An example is the 250 percent increase of FDI in mining inLatin America from 2003 to 2011 (Algranati 2012). Of the total FDI in the regionsince 2000, 39 percent has gone to natural resources and 37 percent to manufacturing.

4. While FDI trends in agriculture and agro-industry vary significantly by country andit is difficult to find statistics for the region as a whole, CEPAL notes that FDI in agri-cultural sectors has grown significantly in certain countries from 2005–2010 (includ-ing Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Uruguay). In addition, CEPAL notes the

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resources.5 The current form of extractivism also involves the use ofincreasingly risky technologies (such as fracking and deep-sea dril-ling), and reduced regard for ecosystem integrity and social rights(as extractive activities have expanded into protected areas and indi-genous territories). The new legal environment and cast of players,including multilateral trade organizations like the WTO and transna-tional corporations, result in the decreased bargaining capacity andweakened sovereignty of Latin American states. The new “GreenEconomy” agenda taken up by the UN development system, whichfavors market mechanisms as a way to achieve sustainability, is seenas promoter and accomplice of the expansion of extractivism.6

The renewed investment in primary export activities represents adeepening of the process of “accumulation by dispossession,” originallytheorized by Harvey (2003). The shift of FDI in Latin America from themanufacturing to the primary sector reflects in part the rise of Chinaand other Asian industrial countries (Zibechi 2013; Cesarin 2013;Gudynas 2013). For example, China, whose three main developmentbanks comprise the biggest source of lending to Latin America (totalingmore than World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and USEximbank combined in 2010), issued two thirds of its loans from 2005–2013 as “loans-for-oil” (Gallagher et al. 2012). Although the provisionof primary materials by Latin America to China has sheltered theregion from global economic decline, it has also resulted in the continueddependence of Latin American economies on the export of price-volatilecommodities. Another reason for the shift in FDI is the increasing finan-cialization of capital, which facilitates quick capital flows and allows forenormous profits to be made on speculative activities, for example oninternational currency and commodities markets (Algranati 2012).

The negative impacts of the new wave of extractivism arewidely documented. Economic ills include: Dutch disease;7 increased

increasing involvement of transnational corporations in agriculture and agro-indus-try (CEPAL 2012).

5. According to the World Bank, from 2008–2009 over 56 million hectares of land wereeither sold or rented in countries of the Global South (Algranati 2012 ).

6. A series of development institutions and international treaties like the UN Frame-work Convention on Climate Change and UN Conference on Sustainable Develop-ment promote the commercialization and control of natural resources andecosystem services via their backing of Green Economy, carbon markets, carbon off-setting, biofuels, and other market based-proposals (Langer 2011; Moreno 2012;Algranati 2012; Svampa 2012; etc.).

7. Dutch disease refers to the decline in non-resource sectors of a country due to theappreciation of the real exchange rate that frequently results from the rise in valueof natural resource exports.

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consumption of imported goods; deteriorating terms of trade; the con-solidation of export enclaves with low connectivity to local productionchains; denationalization of the economy and consolidation of foreigncontrol; exit of profits; vulnerability to volatile commodity-prices;failure of macroeconomic policies to adjust to boom and bust cycles,leading to overspending and debt; low employment in extractivesectors; increased opportunity for predatory rent-seeking; and failureto diversify the economy (Acosta 2012). Environmental and socialimpacts include: loss of self-sufficiency in food production; environ-mental contamination, loss of biodiversity, and climate change; the dis-possession of land, resources, and territory from local communitiesand reversal of progressive land reform programs; the overriding ofparticipatory, democratic decision-making and legal consultation pro-cesses; increased pressure on governments to modify social andenvironmental legislation to create attractive investment environ-ments; increased conflict; increased economic inequality; the monetiz-ing of nature, ignoring intrinsic, cultural, spiritual, and ecosystemvalues, etc. (Svampa 2012).

A2D thinkers argue that extractivist approaches disregard theproven failure of GDP growth to necessarily translate into quality oflife improvements. In addition, they point out that current growth pat-terns are dependent on non-renewable resources and the irreversiblealteration of natural ecosystems, which will eventually lead to resourcedepletion, ecological collapse, and stagnation.

Abandoned agendas and popular disillusionmentProgressive Latin American governments took the international

spotlight in the early 2000s with promises to transition away fromthe destructive, unjust, and economically unstable extractive model.The campaign platforms of Evo Morales in Bolivia and Rafael Correain Ecuador were firmly rooted in such promises, which were centralfor garnering the wide indigenous and civil society support thatbrought them into power. Early on in their administrations, the inter-national environmental community heralded Morales and Correa forincorporating Buen Vivir and Rights of Mother Earth into their consti-tutions. However, this initial step of inserting indigenous principlesinto policy texts did not translate into the adoption of progressiveagendas. Instead, these governments have promoted predatory extra-ctivism. They have opened national parks and indigenous territoryto fossil fuel exploration, exploitation, and pipelines, reversedcommunity-based land reforms to favor private interests and largelandholders, inaugurated new open-pit mining and hydroelectric

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projects without appropriate consultation, and have weakened if notdisregarded social and environmental legislation and safeguards(Bjork-James 2013; Villegas 2013; Webber 2012a, 2012b).

However, as extractive activities flourish in Bolivia and Ecuador,the governments employ a series of rhetorical and political tools tomask the implications of the model and their betrayal of political prom-ises. First, reforms taken in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela to nationa-lize resources, increase state involvement and control over extractiveprojects, and redistribute natural resource rents, have resulted in econ-omic growth and widely publicized social programs that are used tojustify extractive activities.8 Indeed, economic growth statistics inBolivia have received attention from the IMF (Neuman 2014), butbelie rising social discontent with the government. The incorporationof indigenous concepts, styles of dress, rituals, and language into thegovernments’ promotion and celebration of new extractive projects isanother manipulative and contradictory tool (Bjork-James 2013: 257).A third example is denunciation by progressive governments of thedangers of subscribing to environmental agendas allegedly imposedfrom the North (Svampa 2012). By denying the validity of “environ-mentalisms of the poor,”9 these governments contradictorily denydiverse citizen groups autonomy in defining their priorities while sim-ultaneously employing cultural-historical concepts like Buen Vivir intheir political platforms.10 These tactics serve to minimize the impor-tance of environmental criteria in decision-making and distract fromthe fact that current budget booms are based on finite resources.

The state-heavy, nationalistic model is being called “new extracti-vism” because although it appears to offer a unique “Latin Americanpathway” to development, it ultimately sustains the subordinate roleof extractivist states in the global economy with minor social gains

8. Social programs include subsidized school breakfasts (Bono Juancito Pinto inBolivia), infant and mother healthcare (Bono Juana Azurduy in Bolivia), andpublic housing (Mision Vivienda Venezuela). They have been criticized for theirinsufficiency in meeting human development indicators (Svampa 2012) and forunsustainability (Gudynas 2012).

9. Environmentalisms of the Poor refers to a set of political interventions that “contestassumptions that environmental alliances and tactics are a middle-class privilege”(Chatterton et al. 2012; see also Martınez-Alier 2002).

10. The labeling by Evo Morales of Northern environmentalism as a new “predatorycolonialism” at the UN “Rio+20” Conference and in other international forumshas resulted in mixed messages to the international environmental community.See articles in Bloomberg (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-21/bolivia-s-morales-calls-environmentalism-predatory-colonialism.html) and at ejolt(http://www.ejolt.org/2013/10/full-belly-environmentalism-of-lead/)

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and no environmental improvements. Also, new extractivism hassparked costly, internal economic and political problems. As local popu-lations find their livelihoods and environments disrupted, civil unresthas grown, revealing disillusion with once popular leaders, as well asspurring organization for transformation. Many conflicts between gov-ernments, companies, and civil society, such as the TIPNIS highwaycontroversy, have attracted global attention due to their magnitude.11

Public discontent with the devastating impacts of the extractive modelis not limited to progressive countries, but is a regional phenomenon.A recent study ranks Latin America as having the highest number ofpublic protests from 2006–2013, with the highest concentrationrelated to environmental justice12 (Ortiz et al. 2013).

Less visible than the TIPNIS case are the near daily instances oflocal communities defending their social and environmental rightsfrom extractive projects and policies. The multiple forms of protest,including marches, roadblocks, occupying public spaces, hungerstrikes, etc. embody discontent with the failure of progressive “govern-ments of social movements” to carry out the changes that their initialsupporters expected. These forms of protest, in which indigenousand social movements strive to redefine the state, regain sovereignty,and secure participation in decision-making, meet with varyinglevels of success. They have become so prevalent that they are credited

11. Perhaps the most visible of these is the conflict surrounding the highway project inthe Isiboro-Secure National Park and Indigenous Territory (TIPNIS) in Bolivia. In2008 the Bolivian government signed an agreement with Brazil to finance andbuild a 177 km highway through the legal territory of three indigenous groups(64 communities). TIPNIS is also a national park with globally significant biodiver-sity. The Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) agreed to finance 80 percent of thehighway construction leaving the remaining 20 percent to the Bolivian government.In a questionable bidding process, the Brazilian construction company ConstructoraOAS Ltda., was hired to carry out the project. The deal also included preferentialaccess for Brazil to the phosphates that were to be extracted along with lithiumfrom the Salar de Uyuni, another controversial project (Hollender and Shultz2010). The TIPNIS highway project was approved without consulting local commu-nities, and aroused fierce opposition, including a 65 day, 526 km protest march fromTIPNIS to La Paz. The march met violent government repression resulting in 72–280protesters injured. The highway project was temporarily suspended, but the conflicthas yet to be resolved (see Bjork-James 2013; Villegas 2013; and www.territoriosenresistencia.org).

12. The main policy demands of environmental justice protests include “Policymakersto secure adequate taxation/public revenues from natural resource extraction; Pol-icymakers to solve conflicts related to infrastructure construction with negativesocial and environmental externalities; Policymakers to stop nuclear plants anduse other more environmentally friendly forms of energy” (Ortiz et al. 2013).

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with constituting new, legitimate ways of participating in the politicalprocess in these countries (Bjork-James 2013).

The response of progressive governments to the growing publicoutcry is disconcerting. Oppressive and anti-democratic backlashtactics have marked the second terms of Presidents Morales andCorrea. While these governments rhetorically tout plurinationality,indigenous sovereignty, Buen Vivir, and respect for Mother Earth,their actions resemble a survival-based return to party-politics(Bjork-James 2013). Government backlash tactics include: violentrepression of indigenous protest (such as the TIPNIS march); stigmati-zation of government critics as “counterrevolutionary” or secretlyallied with imperialist powers; deliberate division and weakening ofopposition social movements; and nepotism exercised through politi-cal and material rewards for pro-government counter-mobilizationsthat “defend the process of change.” This unabashed defense of adevelopment model that progressive governments once so vehementlyrejected has fueled the growing recognition that change will not bepossible within the current socioeconomic system. This has been animportant factor in the rising popularity of A2D proposals.

Difficulties and potential of regional integrationGiven the failed efforts of individual states like Ecuador and

Bolivia to reduce economic dependence on extractivism, A2D looksto the necessary role that integration will play in achieving socialand environmental transformation. However, integration has alsofaced difficulties in reducing inequality, improving quality of life,and sustainably managing natural resources.

Since the 1960s, Latin America has embarked on a series of effortstoward regional integration, which have been instrumental in definingregional identity, shaping relationships and cooperation, and deter-mining economic success. Of the early integration initiatives, theAndean Community (CAN) was the only one to incorporate a socialagenda along with economic measures. The social benefits werelimited to the area of migration, by allowing free movement of citizensbetween countries (Cerezal 2013). More recently a new wave ofadvances in regional integration aim at a more democratic and partici-patory integration process, and include a wider agenda of social rights,economic equality, and environmental sustainability. They include theBolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), defeat ofthe Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (ALCA) in 2005, and the cre-ation of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) in 2006 andCommunity of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) in 2011.

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This renewed political cooperation marks an important recovery ofpositive expectations for Latin America after the decades lost toimport-substitution industrialization (ISI) and neoliberalism (Cesarin2013). However, these initiatives face a series of difficulties as aresult of structural and political barriers at national levels (Cerezal2013; Gudynas 2013; Cesarin 2013).

Another concern surrounds the opposite pathways taken by differ-ent groups of Latin American countries. While some countries opt forregional integration (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay,Uruguay, and Venezuela), others opt for an outward looking economicagenda based on free trade and transpacific agreements. The mostrecent of these, the Pacific Alliance, was founded in 2011 by the fourcountries that hold free trade agreements with the US (Colombia,Chile, Mexico, and Peru). Some analysts believe that the Pacific Alli-ance was created to undercut the regional hegemony of Brazil,whose proposed zero customs duties trade agreements are prohibitedby UNASUR (Zibechi 2013). Others believe that the Pacific Alliancewas a response to stagnation in MERCOSUR, disputes between itsfounding members (Argentina and Brazil), and its failure to increasecommerce between member states. Regardless of the motives, differ-ences of opinion exist as to whether the two strategies are ultimatelyincompatible and what they mean for the future of regional integration.

The future of Latin American integration is uncertain, not onlybecause of the difficulties it faces and its clash with free trade strategies,but because of open-ended questions about how the expanding extra-ctivism in the region will play out. A2D authors emphasize integrationas an instrument for selectively delinking the region from the exploita-tive patterns of globalization. They believe that as long as some LatinAmerican countries maintain their dependence on primary resourceswhile others have more diversified economies, asymmetries willpersist in the region and Latin America will not be able to overcomeits inferior place in the global economy, let alone improve quality oflife for its citizens (Cerezal 2013; Gudynas 2013). Cases such asBolivia and Ecuador make it clear that escaping dependence onnatural resource exports will involve more than individual countryefforts. To illustrate this point Gudynas (2014) predicts that therecent fall in commodity prices will be detrimental to primary exportbased economies as well as to regional integration in two ways: (1)by raising competition between producers of the same primary com-modities; and (2) by providing an incentive for countries to enterinto bilateral treaties independently of regional agreements, in orderto keep economies afloat.

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Recent initiatives like ALBA, UNASUR, and CELAC are encoura-ging in that they are based on wider visions and principles of solidar-ity, social rights, sustainability, and redistribution. However, they facesignificant challenges to overcoming the structural inequalities main-tained by globalization, such as the prices of primary materials, rulesof commerce and capital flow, and governance structures that priori-tize the rights of corporations and capital over those of states and citi-zens (Cerezal 2013; Gudynas 2013). The institutions and mechanismsdeveloped by recent initiatives including condition-free finance mech-anisms (Banco del Sur, Banco del ALBA, and national developmentbanks/funds) and common currency regimes (Sucre and regionalpayment systems developed by ALADI, MERCOSUR, and ALBA)are still in incipient phases and at risk of becoming conventional instru-ments of economic development, especially until participatory mech-anisms are activated. In order to transition away from extractivism,countries will have to accept supranational obligations with regardto social and environmental norms, regional food sovereignty, andenergy policies (Gudynas 2013), as well as for labor laws, social secur-ity, and education (Cerezal 2013). Brazil’s role in expanding extracti-vism further illustrates the difficulties and potential of LatinAmerican integration.

Regional geopolitics and the rise of Brazil as regional hegemonAs co-founder of MERCOSUR and supporter of UNASUR and

CELAC, Brazil has been a key player in the push for Latin Americanregional integration. However, Brazil has been criticized for using inte-gration initiatives to strengthen its own role as a regional and globalpower. Related accusations against Brazil range from its catering toUS military and economic interests (Boron 2013) to its reproducingcapitalist patterns of accumulation by dispossession (Algranati 2012).This section will examine how regional integration takes a backseatwhen Brazil’s own economic interests are at stake. It will also showhow Brazil plays an important role in expanding the extractive devel-opment model in Latin America.

Like many countries in Latin America, Brazil’s economy hasbecome increasingly tied to China. Brazil is one of four Latin Americancountries that together received 91 percent of all Chinese lending to theregion since 2005 (Gallagher et al. 2012).13 Chinese investors sustainBrazil’s iron and steel industries, agribusinesses, and technologysectors. Chinese loans to Brazilian steel industries gained attention

13. The other countries are Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela.

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for their incomparably low interest rates, made possible by Chinesegovernment subsidies to international lending banks. The role ofChinese lenders and investors in Brazil gives them significant influencein dictating the country’s market conditions (Cesarin 2013). Inaddition, Brazil depends on Chinese demand for its own commoditiesexports. In 2009, 85 percent of lending to Brazil went to a massive off-shore oil project that used Chinese drilling equipment. This 10 billion$USD loan was a commodity-backed loan, guaranteeing the sale of Bra-zilian oil to China at market prices, which results in China receiving asupply of oil far greater than the loan’s original value. China also putspressure on its main trading partners, like Brazil and Peru, to promoteenergy and transportation infrastructure integration efforts (Cesarin2013). Such efforts are in obvious contradiction to the socially transfor-mative integration ideals put forth by A2D. In addition, Chinese socialand environmental investment standards are greatly lacking whencompared with those of Western countries and lenders, which hasalready resulted in documented negative impacts in Brazil and else-where (Gallagher et al. 2012).

However, while China is important to Brazil’s foreign policy, its roledoes not explain Brazil’s regional behavior. Long before China’s rise inimportance to the Brazilian economy, Brazil faced grave social andenvironmental problems, and ranked among the most unequalcountries in the world. In addition, the country has developed asym-metric relationships in the region. One well-known example is Brazil’spromotion of the Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructureof South America (IIRSA).14 Brazil is the primary beneficiary of IIRSA:Brazilian construction companies design and build infrastructure; Bra-zilian banks provide loans to other South American countries so thatthey can carry out the projects; loans are conditioned on preferentialaccess by Brazil to primary commodity supplies and market access forBrazilian manufactured goods; the transoceanic infrastructure allowsBrazil to cut costs in exporting soy and other primary goods out of thecontinent, as well as for the transportation of imports from primetrading partners like China; energy infrastructure, such as mega hydro-electric projects in neighboring Bolivia, will provide energy to Brazil’scities and industries while damaging natural ecosystems and

14. IIRSA is a series of continent-wide transportation and energy mega-projects that hasbeen vehemently opposed by Latin American and global civil society for concerns ofthe impact of IIRSA on nation sovereignty, social rights, and environmental devas-tation. See www.iirsa.org for project details.

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dislocating thousands of communities, etc. (Villegas 2013).15 This briefsummary illustrates the economic, social, and environmental threatsposed by the project, and contextualizes the fierce civil society resist-ance. The urgency of these threats has provided impetus for the devel-opment of alternative proposals, including A2D.

Brazil’s involvement in IIRSA is both a symptom and effect of theexpansion of the extractive model in the continent (Algranati 2012). Theexpansion of extractivism in Brazil is made evident by the increase in per-centage of primary commodity exports from 42 percent of total exports in2000 to 63 percent in 2010 (Gudynas 2013: 135). The extractive model isdetrimental to the people and ecosystems of Brazil, but it is the pressureapplied by Brazil to expand this model across the region that has resultedin accusations of regional hegemony and neo-imperialism. Despite claim-ing to be a progressive country, Brazil replicates the center-peripherymodel of capitalist production at a regional level, by looking to neighbor-ing countries for cheap primary and energetic inputs in order to manufac-ture value-added products at home, allowing it to compete with otherindustrial economies on a global scale.16 The regional replication byBrazil of the extractive model that maintains Latin America’s role as pro-vider of primary materials is ironic as Brazil itself becomes increasinglyrelegated to this role it its relationship with China. In response, A2D pro-posals offer an option to escape these patterns, via policies to graduallydelink the continent from the global socioeconomic system.

III. Introducing alternatives to development – concepts, processes,and actors

The first part of this section will introduce the types of A2Dapproaches that are present in Latin America and outline three

15. See the TIPNIS highway example (note 11). TIPNIS is directly related to IIRSA. TheTIPNIS highway would provide an essential link from Brazil’s most rapidly expand-ing region of soy production to Pacific Ocean ports, enabling easier export to China(see Villegas 2013).

16. Examples of such behavior include: rejection of supranational regional integrationpolicies in favor of its own bilateral trade agreements, credit agencies, and localprivate investments (Zibechi 2013); the expansion of Brazilian extractive industriesto other countries (agroindustry, mining, and hydrocarbons) via transnational cor-porations including Vale, Petrobras, and Odebrect; the influence of Brazilian corpor-ations in neighboring country legislation in order to loosen protectionist policiesand undermine social and environmental norms; and provision of governmentloans by Brazil’s development bank (BNDES) to controversial infrastructure projectsin the region (for example, hydroelectric projects and the TIPNIS highway inBolivia) (Gudynas 2013; Villegas 2013).

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examples of A2D proposals that are rising in popularity at local levelsand gaining recognition from international academic and policy audi-ences. The second part will map some of the most influential stake-holders and processes involved in the construction of A2D in LatinAmerica.

Theoretical approaches to alternatives to development in Latin AmericaAlthough A2D groups differ in their claims, processes, and goals,

they agree that: (1) development is grounded in a universal conceptu-alization of modernity and progress that mimics Northern models ofindustrialization, consumption, and economic growth: which (2)necessitates the use of top-down, coercive, forceful, or hegemonicimplementation mechanisms and the elimination or cooptation ofalternatives; (3) development policy furthers the global embedding ofcapitalist systems, norms, and institutions that serve and protect theinterests of powerful elites; and (4) development directly clasheswith its own stated environmental and social goals (Gudynas 2012;Escobar 2010; Esteva 2013; Lang 2013; Pieterse 1996).

A2D theories question development’s underlying logic about par-ticipation, decision-making, hierarchy, human-nature relationships,governance structures, the economic valuation of nature, etc. New fra-meworks for imagining alternatives include conviviality, super-strongsustainability, biocentrism, deep ecology, feminist critique, the careeconomy, dematerialization of the economy, degrowth, intercultural-ism, pluralism, relational ontologies, expanded forms of citizenship,etc. (Gudynas 2012: 33). A wide range of themes are being exploredby A2D groups that involve restoring and incorporating diverse epis-temologies, including indigenous and gender-based knowledge, intolongstanding discussions of transformation:

. Reframing historic debates about the roles of states and marketsusing marginalized lenses and practices, such as barter, reciprocity,self-sufficiency, gift, etc.;

. Building practical ways to delink development, economic growth,consumption, and well-being, for example via new indicators thatgo beyond material and individualistic measurements of well-being to include collective, spiritual, and ecological dimensions;

. Exposing and overcoming the false dichotomy between environmentand “development” by recognizing intrinsic values of Nature andquestioning the role of technology in environmental problem-solving;

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. Reexamining definitions, relationships, and processes of politics,citizenship, and justice. (Gudynas 2012: 36–37)

In practice, the construction of A2D initiatives involves diverseactors, including communities, NGOs, academics, and policymakers.They form a vast web of activity that extends beyond the GlobalSouth to interact with wider transformational processes, such as theglobal climate justice movement. The most three most visibleexpressions of A2D in Latin America are post-extractivism, BuenVivir, and solidarity economies.

Post-extractivismPost-extractivism proponents link the dependence of resource-rich

countries on natural resource extraction to a conventional developmentagenda that has failed to address the structural causes of poverty andenvironmental crisis. They propose a series of transitions, includingeconomic policies, education programs, and public participation,aimed at moving from the current, “predatory” extractivist model toan initial “sensible” extractivism and a final “indispensable” extractivismphase. The characteristics of sensible extractivism include the deliber-ate selecting of extractive projects that meet strong environmental andsocial criteria, such as those outlined in national and internationallegislation. Extractive projects that risk irreversible environmentaldamage or species loss should be immediately halted. During thisphase a country would implement additional macroeconomicreforms such as price correction for primary materials, tax androyalty reforms, subsidy reductions, etc. The transition to an indispen-sable phase of extractivism involves eliminating all extractive activitiesthat cannot be directly linked to human needs and quality of lifeimprovements. Each policy phase would require complementarysocio-cultural measures to facilitate the gradual transformation of con-sumption patterns and materialistic values (Gudynas 2012).

Reducing the dependence of countries on the export of extractivegoods involves reforms and transformations across society andeconomy, which must be applied in coordination across nationalborders. The joint implementation of post-extractivism policies isnecessary due to the highly competitive nature of globalized capitalismand the financialization of capital, which allow for the easy relocationof investment to the most auspicious economic climates. The post-extractive proposal includes strong national-level regulations forenvironmental and social control, price correction to include external-ities, the elimination of subsidies and redistribution of royalties from

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extractivism, the diversification and expansion of other economicsectors (agriculture, tourism, services, manufacturing, etc.), regulationson markets and capital, strengthening of solidarity economies, recog-nition of non-monetary values of nature, resources, and quality oflife, selective decoupling from globalization, dematerialization of pro-duction, changes in consumption patterns, etc. Post-extractivismauthors highlight the need for parallel cultural changes, social partici-pation, regional coordination, and democratization in order for tran-sitions to be effective. They also acknowledge that the process ofchange will be lengthy and diverse.

In summary, post-extractive policy proposals aim at gradual tran-sitions away from the current development model and eventually fromthe capitalist system, in which the structural drivers of extractivism arerooted. While they do not deny the positive contributions of reformistpolicies to improving transparency, income distribution, consumerawareness, and production practices, post-extractivist proponentsseek above all to transform the growth-based development model.Until this is done, social and environmental problems will only deepen.

Buen VivirThe literal translation of Buen Vivir is “Good life.” It was originally

made popular by Kichwa, Quechua, and Aymara populations in theAndes, but similar concepts can be found in diverse indigenous cosmo-visions around the world. Unlike post-extractivism, which offers con-crete policy proposals, Buen Vivir has become a political ideology,used as the basis for progressive agendas in South American countriesincluding Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela.

There is no single definition of Buen Vivir. As Gudynas and Acosta(2012) show, Buen Vivir incorporates a plurality of concepts, allowingfor an intersection of indigenous and occidental knowledge. BuenVivir focuses on human well-being, the “fullness of life,” the need tocoexist with Nature, recognize its intrinsic value, and respect its phys-ical limitations. Buen Vivir also focuses on the need to change themarket’s role, position, and mechanisms, and the way in whichhumans relate to each other economically.

The electoral platforms of presidents Correa and Morales broughtBuen Vivir into regional and international spotlights. Correa andMorales promised to construct a new socio-political-economic systembased on Buen Vivir and to reject the destructive model that enabledthe opulence of industrialized countries. The incorporation of BuenVivir into legislation implies an emphasis on food security and sover-eignty; autonomy in education, governance, and justice; making

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Mother Earth a subject with rights, etc. Buen Vivir has also found itsway into the discourses of other Latin American governments (Cuba,Venezuela, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Peru) and regionalintegration organizations like ALBA, UNASUR, and CELAC (Rodrı-guez 2013) and has become a unifying concept for different groupsworking on A2D.17

Solidarity economiesThe term Social Solidarity Economy was coined in Lima, Peru 1997

at the First International Meeting for the Globalization of Solidarity. Itwas originally defined as “all economic activities and practices with asocial finality, which contribute to building a new economic paradigm”(RIPESS 2013). Currently, the umbrella of Solidarity Economies encom-passes the myriad alternative approaches towards sustainability, self-sufficiency, and economic independence that are being practiced atlocal scales around the world. Examples include communal resourceownership and management, local/regional production and consump-tion of organic foods, fair trade, harnessing renewable energies, therevaluation and use of traditional and ancestral knowledge, non-mon-etary barter, community networks of mutual support based on localneeds and the provision of basic services (education, health, childcare,domestic work, etc.), the formation of community cooperatives forindustry and financial services, and, more generally, recognizing thevalue of traditionally unpaid services, such as care-based activities,natural resources, and ecosystem services (Perkins 2007).

The importance of Solidarity Economies to A2D lies in their poten-tial to transition society beyond capitalism “to a fairer and more sus-tainable society based on popular mobilization to meet local needs”(Amin 2009: 16). Mance (2007) and Gibson-Graham (2006) characterizesolidarity economies as post-capitalist because they are based on theredistribution of wealth, not the accumulation of capital. The compat-ibility with post-extractivism and Buen Vivir is striking.

Certain examples of Solidarity Economies are well known becauseof their role in responding to dramatic economic crises, such as the 170“recovered” firms which employed more than 9000 workers in Argen-tina in 2003, and the explosion of barter groups with between two tofive million participants in response to the Argentine currency crisis.In Brazil it is estimated that 1.2 million workers are involved insolidarity economy and over 1250 worker-owned enterprises exist. In

17. Influential authors include Gudynas (2012, 2013), Davalos (2008), Acosta (2012),Sousa Santos (2007), Ibanez (2012), and Boff (2009).

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Venezuela, Brazil, and Mexico, there are vast networks of communitybanks that issue local currencies (Mance 2007). In many Latin Ameri-can countries, Solidarity Economies have grown so much that theyhave become a sector in themselves, influential enough to warrantthe creation of government departments and legislation, such asSpecial Administrative Unit for Solidarity Organizations in the Colom-bian Ministry of Labor.

International organizations like the Intercontinental Network forthe Promotion of Social Solidarity Economy (RIPESS), Grassroots Econ-omic Organizing (GEO), and International Co-operative Alliance (ICA)track the spread of the Solidarity Economy movement and mentionthousands of initiatives on their websites. In 2013 the UN foundedthe Inter-agency Task Force on Social and Solidarity Economy withthe aim of promoting international and national political frameworkshospitable to Solidarity Economies. The mainstreaming of SolidarityEconomies into national and international governance structures mayeventually undermine A2D principles, insofar as they are co-opted orreoriented to fulfilling capitalist objectives of accumulation, profit,and growth. This progression will be important to monitor andevaluate.

An overview of participants and processesGiven the A2D understanding that a truly effective approach to

wellbeing, equality, and sustainability requires diverse epistemologiesand methodological pluralism, it is appropriate that the participantsinvolved in the transformation span a wide range of actors.

The multitude of communities, associations, NGOs, and grassrootsorganizations working on A2D in Latin America is too large to map.They range from isolated communities to national, regional, and inter-national networks. Social movements, such as indigenous and peasantmovements, mobilizing thousands of people across the continent andbeyond, have been extremely influential in the promotion and spreadof A2D theories, proposals, and practices, as well as challenging domi-nant oppressive systemic structures (Zibechi 2012, 2014). In addition,many of the leading voices in A2D come from Latin American univer-sities and research institutes, bringing ideas from PD, political ecology,post-growth, post-capitalism, and decolonial theory into practical dis-cussions and the development of A2D proposals at both communityand policy levels (see the example from Peru, below). Finally, ahandful of foreign donors and NGOs have been influential inshaping the movement around A2D, through funding, linking actors,and providing guidance for advocacy strategies.

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The support and resources provided by international NGOs anddonors is highly debated within grassroots, academic, and politicalcircles. The debate examines the level to which foreign involvementbuilds democratic processes or threatens sovereignty. On one hand,foreign donors, such as European development cooperation agencies(including IBIS-Danida, MISEREOR, and Broederlijk Delen), privatefoundations (such as the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation), and NGOs(Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, ICCO, the Transnational Institute, andPachamama Alliance) offer funds, legal and technical advice, facilitatenetworking, and disseminate information that support indigenous andsocial movement resistance to extractivism. For example, they enablelocal actors to host and assist national and international meetings,maintain websites, publish and diffuse print information, carry outpublic and government-targeted advocacy campaigns, etc. On theother hand, there are some cases in which they may have violatedstate sovereignty, for example by involvement in protests, “politicalmeddling” in state policy, increasing local dependence on foreign aidin order to weaken or undermine the legitimacy of local movements,and creating complicity in foreign intervention. Such practices, or thesuspicion of them, have made foreign donors and NGOs the targetsof backlash and expulsion by the governments of Bolivia, Ecuador,and Venezuela (Bjork-James 2013; Villegas 2013; Gustafson 2013).18

Very few political actors in Latin America have taken up an A2Dagenda in practice. Those who have done so are most commonlyinvolved with environmental ministries, country delegations to inter-national conventions, and regional integration organizations such asUNASUR, CELAC, and ALBA. Regional and international forumsprovide essential meeting spaces for different stakeholders to consoli-date efforts on A2D. Alternative spaces shadow UN, G20, G8, WTO,and other intergovernmental negotiation processes. However,popular groups are increasingly establishing their own forums, suchas the World Social Forum, World Peoples Conference on Climate

18. The debate about whether backlash against foreign NGOs, funders, and develop-ment agencies is justified requires case-by-case analysis. In some cases governmentshave provided evidence of foreign interference, such as the involvement of US-based agencies and NGOs in the failed April 2002 coup against Chavez (Golinger2006). However, in other cases, such as Bolivia’s expulsion of Danish DANIDAfor alleged interference in conflicts between anti-extractivist indigenous groups,CONAMAQ and CIDOB, and the state, no specific evidence was produced.CONAMAQ and CIDOB claim that the expulsion of DANIDA was a way of punish-ing them for attempting to delegitimize the political claims of the governing party(Gustafson 2013).

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Change, Peoples Summit on Sustainable Development, and myriadcivil society thematic conferences.

Along with the diversity of A2D actors, processes, and approachescome conflicting ideas about the most appropriate and effective pro-cesses and strategies. Perhaps the most visible of these debates isover the role of the state in achieving popular objectives. However,given the urgency of addressing the climate crisis, and given theextreme measures increasingly taken by capital to preserve its struc-tures and systems, some A2D groups reject a totalizing strategy andinstead advocate a pluralistic approach, recognizing the benefits andlimitations of both “inside” and “outside” struggles, at least until thefuture becomes clearer (Midnight Notes Collective and Friends 2009).

IV. Conceptual and practical impediments to post-growth and A2D

The main conceptual dilemma facing post-growth frameworks iswhether the failure to reach sustainability objectives lies in fatalflaws of the capitalist system or in poor policy implementation.Authors who trace the root causes of global environmental problemsto the capitalist system view at least five characteristics of capitalismas being incompatible with sustainability: (1) the tendency towardcommodification (‘marketization of social life’); (2) dependence on con-tinued growth; (3) the tendency towards inequality; (4) the eliminationof other options (‘universalization of economic contexts’); and (5) theamoral nature of capitalism and the pervasion of this into socialnorms.19 Capitalism’s dependence on perpetual growth and expansionof the market creates the basis for continued instability and crisis(Arrighi 1994; McMurtry 1999; Streeck 2011). There is an interestingconvergence between economic stagnation theorists (Gordon 2012;Foster and Magdoff 2009) and post-growth theorists (Heinberg 2011;Miller and Hopkins 2013) who predict the end of capitalist growth.Both call for deliberate steps to transition away from capitalism asthe dominant paradigm.

A contrasting group of reform oriented post-growth proposals donot see sustainability as being incompatible with the capitalist model.Post-growth proposals, such as Herman Daly’s (1997) Steady StateEconomy and Jackson’s (2009) Prosperity without Growth, do not chal-lenge the fundamental organization and characteristics of capitalism,but call for reforms to decouple throughput from growth. These

19. See, inter alia, Arrighi 1994; Beckert 2012; Gibson-Graham 2006; Hodgson 2001;Lang 2013; McMurtry 1999; Posner 2010; Reich 2007; Streeck 2011.

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authors argue that ecological concepts such as the source and sinkfunctions of ecosystems, carrying capacity, adaptation, and resilienceshould be used to calculate appropriate limits for human activity andeconomic growth (Daly 2005). This viewpoint clashes with the PDview, which argues that while reforming the system from withinmay bring initial benefits (e.g. incorporating principles like partici-pation, gender, and sustainability into development), they are ulti-mately limited by the overarching logic of capitalist accumulation(Blauwhof 2012).

Post-growth approaches face considerable challenges due to thepervasiveness of growth across social, political, and economic struc-tures and processes. Post-growth claims note the limitations of usingGDP as the universal measurement for success and giving economicgrowth primacy over social and environmental priorities. The negativeeffects of the economic influence over politics are widely recognized.However, financial resources cannot be replaced with idealistic post-growth principles. The daily lives of nearly every person on Earthare structured around meeting their financial needs for survival. Inaddition, public institutions, especially in the Global South, areseriously lacking the financial resources they need in order toprovide basic services, infrastructure, and social programs. Blanketde-growth prescriptions will not be acceptable. The point is to placestrict criteria on where growth is allowed to happen.

Perhaps the biggest challenge facing post-growth frameworks isthe way that growth has become embedded in cultural norms,values, and behaviors.20 A2D authors including Escobar (2010),Gibson-Graham (2006), Gudynas (2012), and Sousa Santos (2007)emphasize the importance of making visible the myriad alternativeapproaches towards sustainability, self-sufficiency, and independencethat are already being implemented at local scales around the world.Feminist authors promote the use of feminist economics as a bridgeto sustainability, and cite numerous examples of communities recog-nizing the value of unpaid inputs into local economies, such as care-based activities, natural resources, and ecosystem services (Perkins2007). However, it is not clear how locally generated solutions willachieve the scale necessary for global sustainability (Harvey 2008).Moreover, it is uncertain whether local initiatives can spread fastenough to match the urgency of the problem.

20. Some authors note that the pervasiveness of growth has even influenced child-rearing methods (Streeck 2011).

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Another key issue is redistribution policy, which is an importantcomponent of any post-growth strategy. Originally championed byChenery et al. (1974) for use within conventional growth-centereddevelopment, redistribution has taken on many forms in different pol-itical economic contexts and has resulted in criticism on economic andethical grounds, in both North and South (Pieterse 1996: 19). Its impor-tance in the post-growth debate stems from the question of whetherredistribution policy (either within or between countries) is an effectiveand appropriate substitute for economic growth, whether it is politi-cally feasible, and whether it is even possible without continuedgrowth. The current model of the “compensatory state,” exemplifiedby redistribution programs in Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela,is critiqued as a way for Southern states to gain legitimacy throughcash-transfer and social bonds without having to address underlyingclass structures. The social gains from these programs are used tojustify increasingly predatory forms of extractivism, further embed-ding the very models that A2D initiatives seek to dismantle (Webber2012a; Gudynas 2012; Harvey 2003).

In addition, Barnet (2004: 530–531) argues that post-growth propo-sals are not fully developed and may have unacceptable economic sideeffects. Additionally, he is pessimistic about solutions that involveputting too much faith in the UN or multilateralism, such as thosefound in alternatives to globalization proposals (Cavanagh andMander 2004). This concern is also relevant for A2D proposals, dueto the heavy reliance they place on regional integration. Given theradical nature of post-growth alternatives, Barnet doubts that manyof these changes are likely to happen, but believes they are worthconsidering.

Echoing this concern, Svampa (2012) states that a major challengefacing post-growth proposals, and post-extractivism specifically, is the“horizon of desirability” of such proposals in terms of lifestyles andquality of life. She calls for redefining human and social needs in away that supports sustainability as well as cultural diversity. Shesuggests three possibilities for re-framing human requirements includ-ing: (1) the human needs approach (Max-Neef 1993), which includesthe process by which human needs are fulfilled; (2) the economy forlife approach (Hinkelammert et al. 2005), which requires that theorganization and social division of work allow for the reproductionof life over time; and (3) the ethics of care approach of eco-feminists(Aguinaga et al. 2012; Perkins 2007; etc.), which places the culture ofcare at the center of a sustainable society. Svampa’s proposal for rede-fining human needs, while necessary for the sweeping cultural

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transformation called for by post-growth, will not be easily accepted.This will pose a significant impediment to the possibility of post-growth.

A final concern with the feasibility of post-growth strategies refersto their reliance on intensive political intervention and public regu-lation, which clash with the increasing corporate drive toward dereg-ulation (Reich 2007; Shutt 1998). Blauwhof (2012) points out twoobstacles to state-interventionist approaches: (1) the state is directlydependent on financial capital, which makes acting against economicgrowth directly counter to its interests; and (2) reforms that limit thegrowth prospects of businesses will eventually be evaded, overturned,or co-opted in order to return to growth. Streeck (2011) echoes Blau-whof’s arguments, stating that whereas the state’s response to capital-ist crisis is increased regulation, capitalism cannot function under anyrestrictions on growth and expansion. This dynamic is exemplified inthe expansion of extractivism by the progressive governments ofEcuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela, despite their stated intentions to dootherwise.

Up to now, post-growth policies (including A2D) either have notyet been implemented, or face significant obstacles to implementation,or have not been in place long enough. Also, little has been done toevaluate the specific proposals put forth by groups who argue thatgrowth must be limited or halted. The discussion about the technical,political, and popular feasibility of post-growth proposals is moredeveloped for the Global North than for the Global South. Additionalwork is needed to explore Southern-oriented policy proposals and,when possible, analyze their outcomes. Such work must take up thequestion of political will. The case study below on post-extractivismin Peru provides an initial attempt.

V. Alternatives to development in practice: post-extractivism inPeru

In 2011 a Peruvian civil society network, the RedGE (PeruvianNetwork for a Balanced Globalization – Red peruana por una Globali-zacion con Equidad), composed of academic institutions, NGOs, socialmovements, and trade unions, presented a proposal to the Peruviangovernment outlining a set of policy measures for transitioningtoward a post-extractivist economy (Alayza and Gudynas 2011). Theproposal responded to the need for Peru to adopt more economically,environmentally, and socially sustainable activities and includedmeasures for sustainable land use, strengthened environmental

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regulation, economic diversification, and the right of local people to beconsulted (Svampa 2012). The group bolstered its proposal with calcu-lations of the economic benefits of adopting the recommended policies,which were outlined in a study by Peruvian economists Sotelo andFrancke (2011). They also provided empirical evidence of the economicbenefits that resulted from the previous application of a similarmeasure in Chile.

Sotelo and Francke examined the viability of transitioning awayfrom dependence on extractive industries by looking at the principalcontributions of primary-extractive activities to employment, publicrevenue, and external sectors of the national economy. They then pre-dicted the effects that applying strong restrictive policies on extractiveindustries would have on each of these sectors. First, they found thatthe extractive sector was not a significant source of employment(only 1.5 percent of the economically active population). This sup-ported their recommendation for promoting high-employmentsectors such as labor-intensive agriculture, tourism, construction, andindustry. Second, they found that extractive activities were an impor-tant source of public revenue streams (22 percent of direct internalearnings and 42 percent of total tax earnings), but that these werehighly vulnerable due to price volatility of commodities. Finally, theyfound that extractive activity revenues were most significant for theexternal sector, with primary exports making up 70 percent of allexports and with investment in the extractive sector making up 34percent of total FDI.

Sotelo and Francke examined three different scenarios of restrict-ing extractive activity. The first, a complete halt in mining, oil, andgas, was rejected because of the detrimental impacts it was predictedto have on political, economic, and social stability. The second scenario,a suspension of mining, oil, and gas projects that began operationsfrom 2007–11, found a much less dramatic result, with only slightdeteriorations in the balance of payments and decrease of foreignreserves. The third approach, which combined the second one with atax on extractive industry profits, yielded optimal results. The taxincrease would be more than sufficient to offset the earnings lost bythe reduction of exports. The authors showed how a similar taxreform was successful in Chile. The benefits from scenario threeincluded a positive balance of payments, increased foreign reserves,and increased capacity of the central bank to respond to exchange-rate appreciation. They concluded that a gradual suspension of extrac-tive activities combined with a tax on extractive industry profits is aviable step for transitioning away from extractive sector dependence.

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However, the Peruvian government has not been receptive to thisproposal. Peru remains dedicated to expanding extractive activities. Inaddition, unlike Bolivia and Ecuador, Peru’s version of extractivism isnot the new-extractivist model of heavy state involvement in decision-making, industry shareholding, and greater receipt and distribution ofprofits. Rather, Peru follows the conventional concession model, whichrelinquishes state regulatory control and offers preferential treatmentto private businesses. As Monge (2011: 89 ) explains, this model isnot limited to mining, oil, and gas sectors, but includes fishing, agricul-ture, and energy sectors as well. Private concessions are granteddirectly by the central government without consulting local popu-lations and governments or environmental authorities. The socialand environmental impacts of extractivism will continue to fuel con-flict and protest.

VI. Conclusion

Regardless of whether A2D are born out of the necessity to surviveor from ideological convictions, they have important potential in con-tributing to wide-scale socioeconomic transformation, far beyond LatinAmerica. A2D are just one example of a series of post-growth frame-works that are burgeoning on every continent in response to increasingrecognition of the inevitability of change and/or collapse of the currentgrowth-based global economy. The quantity of post-growth initiativesaround the world is striking. It is also significant that diverse localinitiatives recognize the systemic roots of local problems. Thegrowing global concern is reflected by the steady increase in protestsevery year, especially since the onset of the 2008 financial crisis. A2013 study (Ortiz et al.) of 843 protests in 84 countries from 2006–2013 identified four main causes of outrage: (1) economic injusticeand austerity; (2) failure of political representation; (3) global (includ-ing environmental) injustice; and (4) human rights violations. Theacceptance of plurality or “otherness” is a central component in thebuilding of A2D, and a marked contrast to the top-down, one-size-fits all tools of the growth-based development paradigm.

Among the obstacles to A2D, perhaps the least thoroughly dis-cussed are those involving the issue of consumption. The growingmiddle class in countries of the Global South will soon surpassmiddle-class populations in the Global North. A2D thinkers believethat a mix of strict policies and popular education has the potentialto catalyze change, but this debate requires a much deeper practicaland logistical examination.

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Continued political analysis and development of advocacy strat-egies by A2D groups will be just as important as fine-tuning technicalproposals and garnering public support. While many A2D initiatives,such as Solidarity Economies and the Zapatista movement, haveenjoyed successes while skirting the traditional policy process, thiswill not be possible for all A2D approaches. Even if A2D are taken upat national levels, few Latin American countries have sufficient geopo-litical clout to have an impact in international arenas. This is yet anotherreason why A2D thinkers emphasize the importance of strengtheningregional integration initiatives (Gudynas 2013; Cerezal 2013).

Despite the failure of Latin American governments to reverse thesubordinate position of their countries in the global economy, the pol-itical climate of the region continues to offer interesting possibilities forchange. The progressive environmental legislation in Bolivia andEcuador, such as recognizing Mother Earth as a subject of rights thatcan be fought for legally, is an important step towards eventuallyadopting sustainable policies, even if it has not yet resulted in changingpriorities on the ground. In addition, the mission, discourse, and politi-cal experiments taking place among different integration bodies suchas CELAC and UNASUR offer potential spaces to advance innovativeregional policy frameworks, such as those developed by post-extracti-vism. Although the transformations envisioned by A2D thinkers willnot take place in the short-term, the political environment in LatinAmerica is certainly more conducive to alternatives than that ofother regions. Despite the barriers, work on A2D continues toexpand in Latin America and beyond. The magnitude of the changeneeded to reach sustainability and equality warrants the total commit-ment of civil society.

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