Summary..............................................................................................................................2Horizontal Inequalities in Cyprus.........................................................................................3

Text Box 1....................................................................................................................4Table 1..........................................................................................................................6Table 2..........................................................................................................................8Table 3..........................................................................................................................9

European Court of Human Rights Decision of March 2010.................................................9Analysis of ECHR Decision..................................................................................................11

Key Finding.................................................................................................................12Key Finding.................................................................................................................13

Greek Cypriot Reaction to ECHR Ruling.............................................................................13Addressing Vertical Dilemmas on Both Sides of the Island...............................................15Conclusion..........................................................................................................................18Biblography........................................................................................................................20

1

Summary

The case of the Cyprus conflict differs radically from many other “conflicts” which are analyzed

using post-conflict analysis because, unlike conflicts in places like Sri Lanka and El Salvador, the

conflict in Cyprus is a frozen conflict which has devolved into a situation where two populations,

Greek and Turkish Cypriot, live in separate states – one recognized internationally, the other a

pariah state with no international recognition other than that of its patron – Turkey. The two

states are almost completely mono-ethnic and their existence represent the end result of the

use of population exchanges as a method of halting, if not ending, conflict based on religion or

ethnicity.

When analyzing the Cyprus conflict’s peacebuilding phase we are therefore left with a situation

which defies the neat analysis applied to other conflicts. Today a situation like the one is Cyprus

exists nowhere in the world (excepting perhaps Abkhazia and South Ossetia). The Cyprus conflict

is not an active, on-going conflict involving hostilities, it is not a conflict ended by the military

victory of one side or by a peace treaty acceptable to both sides. Because the conflict has lasted

so long (since 1963 and in its most modern iteration, since the Turkish invasion of 1974) it has

become not only a frozen conflict but one which is also stale1 – lacking in new ideas, energy and

initiatives engendered to bring about a permanent solution to the problems underlying the

situation. Analyzing the conflict, therefore, proves difficult within the context of contemporary

peacebuilding models such as those used by the World Bank, the United Nations or other

multilateral institutions.

1 I will elaborate on the delineation of “stale” vs. “frozen” later in the report.

2

This report will identify and analyze horizontal inequalities and vertical dilemmas present in the

Cyprus conflict. Following the identification and analysis portions suggestions will then be

offered for remediation of horizontal inequalities as well as vertical dilemmas. In keeping with

the restricted nature of the analysis the report will try and focus on the human security and

international political economy dimensions of the Cyprus conflict and in particular focus on the

issue of property rights and ownership on both sides of the divided island. This report will focus,

in particular, on the European Court of Human Rights’ recent decision on property rights within

Cyprus and explore the ability of the decision to act as a “warming agent” on the conflict –

leading to the settlement of long outstanding issues which have kept the conflict frozen for

decades up until today.

Horizontal Inequalities in Cyprus

When the Turkish army began its invasion and subsequent partition of Cyprus in 1974 the island

had only experienced, at that point, a little longer than one decade of independence. But much

like the partition and frozen conflict that were to follow the independence of Cyprus was also

afflicted with frozen dynamics, both horizontal and vertical.

The period after the 1960 independence declaration was supposed to usher in an era of

consocialistic governance and peace between the two constituent communities on Cyprus.

Instead, because the Turkish Cypriot community exercised their minority veto so consistently

the Cypriot government made a conscious choice to remove minority protections in the

constitution in favor of majority rule (Zink 594).

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This decision acted to lock into place the horizontal inequalities which pre-existed

independence. Almost every dimension Frances Stewart references in “Policies Towards

Horizontal Inequalities in Post-Conflict Resolution” were present in both pre and post

independence Cyprus – including the areas of participation in government and the army and

police, the issue of land holdings and income disparity, the use of resources and both private

and public unemployment. Turkish Cypriots were underrepresented in all of these spheres and

in some weren’t represented at all – namely participation in the government, especially after

the abrogation of the 1960 constitution (Stewart 6).

Text Box 1Horizontal inequalities are more likely to lead to conflict when:

They’re durable. They widen over time. Boundaries between groups are “relatively impermeable.” When groups are cohesive enough for collective action to emerge. When leaders are not coopted into the ruling system and are instead marginalized. When the government is irresponsive or violently repressive.

Source: Stewart 4.

The invasion of Turkey acted to separate the two sides of the islands in a partition enforced by

UN peacekeeping forces with one side of the island recognized as the legal ‘Republic of Cyprus’

and the other seen as a pseudo-state, a blank spot on the island of Cyprus occupied by Turkish

forces and completely cut off from the legally-recognized Republic of Cyprus (Theophanous 55).

Horizontal inequalities which were present on Cyprus were then magnified by the situation –

with one side availing itself of its legal recognition to develop a modern, European welfare state

while the other, unable to gain access to the same resources as their neighbor to the south,

relied heavily on Turkey for support and also on a number of shady enterprises such as

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gambling, off-shore banking and more overtly illegal activities like the use of northern Cyprus as

a transshipment point for human trafficking and drug and gun-running (CIA World Factbook).

The TRNC is often referred to as a “sleepy” state which due to an ECHR ruling in 1994 which

forbade exports from the unrecognized state, was forced to find other means of income. Yet this

synopsis is incorrect – the Turkish community in Cyprus has long been alienated, even before

the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey in 1974. The most recent iteration is but a continuation of the

long-term horizontal inequalities between the two states (Bryant and Hatay 3).

The two community’s perceptions of horizontal inequalities, in particular the economic

disparities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, speaks to the importance of these issues in

contributing to and prolonging the conflict between the two sides of the island. A recent poll

conducted in Cyprus amongst both communities indicated that 58% of Greek Cypriots and 67%

of Turkish Cypriots agreed that social and economic inequalities have contributed to the

creation and perpetuation of the conflict (Hadjipavlou 26). The higher percentage of Turkish

Cypriots agreeing indicated the less privileged position of the Turkish Cypriot community before

the conflict began – as well as the continuation of that status after the Turkish invasion in 1974.

The cessation of hostilities between two or more parties is supposed to be marked by peace

milestones. These include the following:

Cessation of hostilities and violence Signing of peace agreements Inception of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration Return of Refugees Establishment of the foundations for a functioning state Initiation of reconciliation and societal integration Startup of economic recovery.

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Source: World Bank

Table 1Action Turkish/Greek Cypriot

Implementation?End Result

Cessation of hostilities and violence

Yes, Ceasefire signed Ceasefire remains in place today. No active hostilities since 1975

Signing of peace agreement No, attempted but failed Frozen conflictInception of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration

No No demobilization, no disarmament and no reintegration between either side in Cyprus.

Return of refugees No – exchange of refugees Both sides are now nearly monoethnic states.

Establishment of the foundations of a functioning state

Yes – separately. Both sides developed separate states, locking in the inequalities which existed before the 1974 Turkish invasion

Horizontal inequalities (HI) based around economic assets, incomes and employment and social aspects strengthened.

Initiation of reconciliation and societal integration

No, some small private efforts but no official efforts.

The two sides remain separated by a great distance.

Startup of economic recovery In Greek Cyprus – Yes. In Turkish Cyprus – No.

HIs remain strong between the two sides.

In the Cyprus conflict these seven peace milestones never fully developed and only three were

partly implemented between the two sides (Greek and Turkish Cypriots). A peace agreement

wasn’t signed – a cease-fire agreement was. Refugees weren’t returned – they were exchanged

between the two sides of the islands – creating monoethnic states on each side of the Green

Line and additional massive displacement of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. And each state

began to set up its own administrative and statebuilding tools on each side of the island –

further increasing the distance between the two sides.

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Because of the pseudo-state status of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) reliable

statistics on its economic performance are difficult to come by. Nonetheless data does exist

which shows wide variances between the two sides of the divided island in GDP growth, public

vs. private sector employment and unemployment rates (Theophanous 28). The skewed

economic situation in Cyprus has preserved and exacerbated the horizontal inequalities present

before and after independence and the Turkish invasion in 1974. While the Republic of Cyprus is

well integrated into the European and global economies the TRNC remains locked out of both

and heavily dependent on Turkey for trade and budgetary support.2

Much of what is seen on Cyprus today is also seen in other core-periphery conflicts within the

European theater – specifically the conflict in the north of Ireland which was solved with the

Good Friday Peace Agreement of 1998 (Zink 583). While the Republic of Cyprus through its

international recognition and membership in the European Union has been drawn into the core

of Europe its northern part – the TRNC, remains (along with Turkey) on the periphery. The old

horizontal inequalities pre-dating the Turkish invasion remain. Actors in the conflict on both

sides of the island have interests which are threatened by the possibility of peace and many

have become defenders of the status quo.

Thus the question must be – how can these horizontal inequalities be remediated within the

context of peacebuilding based on a European perspective and utilizing the resources of the

main actor in the region: the European Union? It is a fact that the European Union’s body of law

and regulations which all members must adapt, the acquis communautaire, is applicable to all of

2 Much has been made of the TRNC’s high growth rates during the early part of the decade, which averaged 10% per year compared to the Greek Cypriot state, which was closer to 2.6%. The TRNC’s figures are misleading because they were mostly the product of a building boom predicated on illegal expropriation of Greek Cypriot properties in the north. Much like the rest of the world the TRNC is now experiencing a deep recession brought on by a bust in property values.

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Cyprus but has been suspended in the TRNC (Nathan Associates 9). From the point of view of

the ease of application of law the European theater must be the one which takes precedence in

the amelioration of the conflict in Cyprus (Mavrommatis 14). A recent decision by the European

Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on property rights within the TRNC will be focused on in this

paper as a valuable tool towards the resolution of the issue of property rights on both sides of

the island – this is one of the most key issues in attempting to bring about a settlement between

the two sides and one where both sides, as of now, have the widest divergence in expectations

of what a peace agreement can and will achieve. The issue of landownership, in particular the

ambiguous status of property rights in the TRNC is also one of the greatest horizontal

inequalities present in Cyprus. Perceptions regarding property rights immediately after the

defeat of the Annan plan in 2004 and continuing through today are critical in deciding how to

approach this issue.

Table 2Perceptions in April 2004 Scope for perceptions to evolve

North South North South

Perceived Fear of Negative view Improved prospects This remainseffect on disruption from on credibility with local remedy a major (and nowproperty movements of proposed tougher) hurdle.settlement deal

Source (Wilson 266)

The table above is provided to show the perceptions and scope for perceptions to evolve around

the issue of property settlement or restitution.

8

TYhe matrix below, created by the United States State Department, provides a useful tool for

focusing more intently on the issue of property rights as a symptom and means of remediating

horizontal inequalities.

Table 3Initial Response Transformation Fostering Sustainability

Evaluate existing laws pertaining to land rights, registration of the property, and collateralization of movable and immovable property.

Take immediate steps where needed to establish process to resolve property issues.

Establish procedure to resolve property rights for land and subterranean resources.

Draft laws and codes to establish or strengthen property rights including customary or traditional concepts where appropriate.Establish process to reconcile and address claims of expropriations.

Adopt appropriate laws regulations and codes.

Ensure equitable implementation of laws, regulations and codes.

Source: US State Department

Utilizing this matrix the report will next focus on the European Court of Human Rights decision

in March 2010 which will be used as a major focus for remediation of horizontal inequalities

based around property rights in Cyprus.

European Court of Human Rights Decision of March 2010

In March of 2010 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights issued a ruling on

the matter of a number of property claims by Greek Cypriots. I intend to examine this ruling in

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detail and use its legal reasoning and the structures it put in place as a base from which to

examine and compel settlement of outstanding land claims in Cyprus – the outstanding status of

which has contributed to horizontal inequalities and the lack of human security on the island.

At issue in the case was the matter of the status of properties left behind by Greek Cypriot

refugees who had fled the north of the island in advance of invading forces from Turkey in 1974.

Members of the Greek Cypriot community had brought the case forward in hopes of being

awarded compensation from the court – whose decisions cannot be appealed and which are

binding on its members, which include 47 states (including Turkey and Cyprus) which are

members of the Council of Europe.

All of the applicants in this case were claimants of immovable property in the TRNC. All brought

forward their claims because they felt the domestic remedies provided by the TRNC did not

provide an effective remedy for their claims. Their specific claims were offered under Article 8 of

the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which states the

following:

1. Everyone has the right to respect for his home.2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except

in accordance with the law is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country.

The court, after walking through the particulars of the case and referencing past judgments,

issued its ruling.

The following is a broad overview of the court’s ruling and focuses on key issues germain to the

focus of this report:

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The court found that the claimants had failed to avail themselves of a suitable domestic

remedy for their claims – which is the Immovable Property Commission (IPC).

The IPC is a body established by an act of the TRNC parliament. It is composed of 7 members, two of which are required to be non-citizens or residents of either the TRNC, the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Britain or Turkey. It has the power to order compensation and as of November, 2009 had awarded over 47 million Euros in compensation and adjudicated 361, 493 square meters of property (ECHR 9).

What marked this decision as so momentous in the issue of the mitigation of horizontal

inequalities relating to property in Cyprus is that for the first time in the history of the court

hearing cases on the subject it ruled that an effective legal remedy now existed and that the

claimants should avail themselves of that remedy before coming to the ECHR for remedy. The

court’s reasoning is as follows:

The Court cannot emphasize enough that it is not a court of first instance. In the present applications, some thirty-five years have elapsed since the

applicants lost possession of property in northern Cyprus in 1974. Generations have passed. The local population has not remained static.

Accepting the functional reality of remedies is not tantamount to holding that Turkey wields internationally-recognized sovereignty over Cyprus…

The Court considers that there is an effective remedy for their [the claimants] provided under the auspices of the respondent government. The court finds that the [IPC] provides an accessible and effective framework of redress in respect of complaints about interference with the property owned by Greek Cypriots

For these reasons the Court decides unanimously to join the applications; and declares by a majority the applications inadmissible.

Analysis of ECHR Decision

By ruling that the TRNC had established a suitable and in the court’s estimation, impartial

method of adjudicating property claims in the TRNC the court had firmly set barriers around an

issue which previously had appeared open-ended and whose insolvability had plagued the

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Cyprus issue from 1974 onwards. As shown from polling data the issue of horizontal inequalities,

including property, has been shown to be of strong concern to both communities. The Greek-

Cypriot community in particular has indicated that it out of a list of 11 possible challenges to

peace in Cyprus the 3rd most indicated answer is “poverty of the Turkish community

overburdening the Greek Cypriot community” (Georgiades 580).

Key Finding

The decision of the ECHR should therefore be cast as a major part of the solution to the issue of poverty in the north by finally solving the outstanding issues of property claims (proper ownership of land and immovable property being a necessary perquisite for any capital-based economy) and removing a barrier to growth in the north as well as forcing the full financial responsibility for payment of property claims in the north directly onto the TRNC and Turkey.

It is not only Greek Cypriots who are impacted by the ambiguous state of property in the north.

Turkish Cypriots are also well aware of the difficulties the ambiguous situation of the TRNC

represent:

Annan Planı'nın Kıbrıs sorununa çözüm getirmesi beklenirken, arazi parçaları gibi gayrımenkul mülkler ile diğer gayrımenkul mülk konuları daha da karmaşık ve içinden çıkılması hayli zor bir hale gelmiştir. Bu sebepten ötürü, Kıbrıs'taki sorunlar adada yaşayan vatandaşlar için de oldukça karmaşık bir görünüm kazanmıştır.

Also because of the Annan Plan failed, which was supposed to resolve the Cyprus issue, the real estate properties such as a parcel of land, and the other real estate property issues get complicated and obscured in Cyprus. The reasons for this are the problems in Cyprus, which are too complicated actually for the citizens (translated from Turkish by report author) (Tefik 142).

The issue of property therefore now has the potential to be transformed within the minds of

both communities, moving from one which was previously static to one which is now dynamic,

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from one which was previously viewed as a possible costly hindrance on the south and whose

solution could act as a catalyst for solving the overall problem of the division of Cyprus, only one

aspect of which is horizontal inequalities (Berutti 27).

Key FindingFor the north the decision can act to resolve the ambiguities over property which have plagued

domestic and international ownership for so long. The frozen dynamics of Cyprus, which

includes a lack of support from elites on both sides of the island for a comprehensive

settlement, could be warmed by the utilization of the decision to provide movement forward in

negotiations.

Greek Cypriot Reaction to ECHR Ruling

While originally caught off-guard by the ECHR decision the government of the Republic of

Cyprus seems have settled on an position of urging its citizens to ignore the ruling and asking

them not to apply to the IPC for remediation of their cases.

“The government does not favour seeking recourse to the so-called commission, especially now during the negotiations,” government spokesman Stefanos Stefanou said. “The property issue will not be solved in the courts; it will be solved on the negotiating table.”

Stefanou said the ECHR decision did not take away any of the political and legal arguments supporting the Greek Cypriot positions concerning the property issue that were submitted in the negotiations (Cyprus Mail).

Yet the government of the Republic of Cyprus failed to mention that the IPC in the TRNC is not

open-ended. The commission has expiration date – November 2011. While the government’s

position is that its citizens should not avail themselves of the remedies the IPC offered, it has not

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(nor could it – legally) prevented its citizens from doing so. The statement also represents the

continued manipulation of the desire of refugees to return to their homes. This occurs from

within the political elites on both sides of the island and is itself a refusal to accept the reality of

framework documents and high-level agreements since 1977, which all state that the return of

every refugee to their property is impossible (Hadjipavlou 67).3

As the Department of State essential tasks matrix shows the issue of property rights can be

transformed through establishing procedures, laws, codes and processes designed to establish

the principles of egalitarianism and justice in dealing with the issue. The IPC commission meets

these standards and thus fulfills this role in alleviating horizontal inequalities in Cyprus related to

property claims. The issue, therefore, is moved from the sphere of the political (dealing with

claims through the negotiation and bargaining process – as in the Annan plan) to that of the

judicial (ameliorating the issue through the use of the IPC).

The final portion of the matrix is designed to create long-term objectives to achieve

sustainability in post-conflict reconstruction. Strengthening the rule of law is a key portion of

sustainability in post-conflict situations like that of Cyprus (United Nations 3). The

recommendation in this report on the utilization of the IPC is designed with the short and

medium-term interests of the situation in Cyprus in mind. Longer-term the requirements of the

situation will include a more permanent and cohesive set of initiatives to strengthen the rule of

law within the TNRC and align its legal system with that of the south and the European Union.

To accomplish this it is then recommended that the TRNC begin the process of adopting the

European Union’s acquis communautaire (Melakopidis 191). When Cyprus was admitted to the

3 Furthermore the manipulation of the expectations of refugees has been a powerful tool used by elites on both sides of the island to win elections. We see this in other frozen conflicts as well – Palestine and Western Sahara are two prime examples of this.

14

European Union the acquis communautaire was suspended in the north. By beginning the

process of adopting the acquis communautaire the TRNC will show it is serious about its future

as a European Union member and signal to the south that the destiny of the two states is

beginning to converge. The TRNC should also work to make sure the EU-Turkey Customs Union

is implemented fully. The Customs Union has been held up by the refusal of Turkey to open its

ports and airspace to Greek Cypriot ships and aircraft. The TRNC can act as a mediator in this

dispute and signal its willingness to compromise by privately urging Turkey to follow through on

its commitments to the European Union (Turk 105).

Addressing Vertical Dilemmas on Both Sides of the Island

Within Cyprus there has never been an elite-masses consensus on the issue of reunification.

While horizontal inequalities have and continued to exist there also exist vertical dilemmas

which must be mitigated for any successful strategy on reunification to be implemented

successfully. As the defeat of the Annan plan showed us – without the support of elites the

masses will not follow. Completely lacking in the 2004 referendum was a comprehensive

strategy for dealing with this issue – particularly within the Greek-Cypriot community where an

almost entirely united front (excepting the trade unions and a few civic society-based actors)

opposed the Annan plan with devastating consequences for the agreement. Actors in the TRNC

were more varied in their responses but as the recent election of an anti-agreement president in

the TRNC shows us the previously amenable position of Turkish Cypriots is in danger of changing

for the worse.

In order to address the issue of vertical dilemmas in Cyprus it is recommended that two-track

diplomacy be utilized in order to involve all elements of society in the process of conflict

15

transformation (Sisk 245). Negotiations in Cyprus have traditionally followed the “top down”

approach as seen below:

Source: Source: Hemmer, Garb, Philips and Graham.

The top-down approach as illustrated above has been destructive to attempts to bring both

sides of the island together. In particular UNFICYP, the United Nations peacekeeping force on

Cyprus, has acted as a guarantor of separation between the two communities (Fisher 261) when

in reality UNFICYP is probably the best-placed actor on the island to work to achieve the

mitigation of vertical dilemmas because it is perceived as a neutral party and it already has a

long record of working with elites on both sides of the island. The top-down approach has also

enabled elites who may have an interest in perpetuating the frozen state of negotiations on the

island.

The role of UNFICYP should be modified. The UN Security Council (UNSC), when next renewing

the mission of UNFICYP, should change its mandate from one of peacekeeping to one of

peacebuilding. UNFICYP already peripherally carries out peacebuilding activities in the Cyprus by

16

bringing together both sides on issues relating to the dividing line – these meetings usually take

place in Nicosia in the Ledra Palace Hotel. By broadening and strengthening its mandate the

UNSC can act to utilize UNFICYP as a warming agent on the frozen conflict in Cyprus. After nearly

40 years on the island the United Nations should re-think the “peacekeeping in perpetuity”

approach and move forward on the utilization of its mission to build and strengthen the mission

of peace in Cyprus.

Source: Hemmer, Garb, Philips and Graham.

The image above is used to illustrate the role UNFICYP could play in negotiations between the

two sides in Cyprus. By acting as a track two diplomacy organization UNFICYP could fulfill the

role of warming agent in the frozen conflict. Possible other actors in this role could include the

European Union or the Non-Aligned Movement. But because UNFICYP is viewed as a neutral

agent by both sides it would be the ideal candidate for this role.

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Conclusion

This report has recommended two courses of action on Cyprus in order to “unfreeze” or “warm”

the frozen conflict. In addition Cyprus is characterized as not just a frozen conflict but one which

is “stale,” stale being the opposite of ripeness as articulated in the second report on this issue.

“Staleness” means that the conflict requires aggressive new approaches in order to inject energy

into negotiations as well as the penumbra surrounding negotiations – the “aura” of citizen and

civic society activity which surrounds any negotiation process. Staleness coupled with

frozenness is an extremely dangerous combination because it means not only are negotiations

surrounding the conflict trapped in a dead-end of repetitive policy recommendations and

endless negotiations but that no new activity is taking place around and from within the society

involving the negotiating parties. Examples of this include the Greek Cypriot refusal to accept

the IPC as a solution to their long-held demand for justice on property rights or the previous

refusal of the Turkish Cypriots to engage in good-faith negotiations with the European Union

unless they were treated as a state on equal footing with the south side of Cyprus.

By proposing the utilization of the IPC to mitigate the impact of long-term horizontal inequalities

this report is recommending action, specifically the amelioration of the issue of property rights,

which were a large factor in the defeat of the Annan plan in 2004. By acting on the issue of

frozen dynamics in negotiations and utilizing UNFICYP to ameliorate the role of vertical

dilemmas this report is proposing to create momentum forward with new agents and a “bottom

up” approach to stalled negotiations and peacebuilding on the island.

Ameliorating and reversing the corrosive effects of staleness in frozen conflicts is difficult.

Positions have hardened and generations have become locked into their view of the “other.”

But peacebuilding requires risk and it demands initiative and creativity on the part of all parties.

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By seeking to unfreeze and ripen the conflict in order to push it more aggressively towards

settlement the recommendations within this report are acting within the best traditions of

peacemakers and peacebuilders. The long-frozen conflict in Cyprus demands creative,

innovative and original thinking. Beginning with a campaign to convince Greek Cypriots to utilize

the IPC and continuing with creating a multi-track approach to diplomacy using United Nations

personnel already on the ground in Cyprus this report and its recommendations are moving

beyond the stale rhetoric and actions of the past.

Utilizing the recommendations of Frances Stewart, which include political and/or economic

entitlements designed to ameliorate the impact of long-standing horizontal inequalities on

conflict situations, while at the same time avoiding the earlier mistakes of post-independence

Cyprus, which saw the consocialistic arrangement become a source of conflict vs. a solution to it,

this report is designed to encourage a remediative approach to the horizontal inequalities

through economic, specifically property rights, which have long plagued Cyprus.

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