possible worlds in narrative space

I M P A C T

I M P A C T

an electronic journal on formalisation in text, media and language http://www.impact.hum.auc.dk

Department of Communication, Aalborg University Krohgstraede 3, 9220 Aalborg East, Denmark

03.01.2002

ISSN: 1600-6917

Possible Worlds in Narrative Space

Henrik Schärfe

Department of Communication, Aalborg University Denmark

[email protected]

Abstract. A narrative is a specific kind of discourse characterized by the possibility of incorporating an ontological construction that may or may not be identical to that of the physical world. Under this perspective, a narrative can be seen as a set of at least one possible world in which actions can take place according to the rules of that world. This paper is an attempt to establish an ontological description of the modal structure of possible worlds in narrative discourse, by a close examination of the ‘modal structure of narrative universes’, proposed by Marie-Laure Ryan, and combining it with the theory of diegetic levels.

1. Introduction.

In modern theory, the idea of possible worlds originates from the work of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1712), who coined the term as an instrument for dealing with the theodicy aporia; the problem of pain. According to Leibniz, there exists an infinite number of possible, but not actualized worlds, in the mind of God, and from this potential, God has chosen the best of all possible worlds in creating what we perceive as real (Hartnack and Sløk: 1991). During the last century, the theory of possible worlds was reinvented by a number of logicians, whose contribution in this context was not of metaphysics, but of logic. In the works of Kripke, Hintikka, Creswell, and Lewis, possible worlds are not seen as residing in an omnipresent mind,

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but as a construct of human thought1. In the words of Kripke: ‘Possible worlds are stipulated, not discovered by powerful telescopes’ (Kripke: 1972: 44), Italics in original. See also (Doležel: 1998: 787).

By separating the idea of possible worlds from the Leibnizian metaphysics, the theory became an attractive instrument of literary theorists concerned with the not so easily exhausted problem of distinguishing between different types of discourse, including the theoretical and philosophical division of fact and fiction. It seems only natural that narrative itself can be comprehended as a set of at least one possible world, and that the description of narratives can benefit from the conceptual systems facilitated by the achievements of modal logic. A number of prominent scholars, including Umberto Eco, Lubomir Dolezel, Tzvetan Todorov, Lucia Veina, and Marie-Laure Ryan have contributed to the understanding of narratives by means of the theory of possible worlds. The focus of this paper is to examine one of the must influential contributions in this area: The modal structure of narrative universes, proposed by Ryan in: ‘Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence, and Narrative Theory’ (Ryan: 1991); a significant exponent of what has been called a possible-worlds narratology (Jahn: 1999: 169).

2. The Modal Structure of Narrative Worlds

In the ‘modal structure’, Ryan distinguishes between the ‘Actual World’ (AW) in which the author and reader are situated, and the ‘Textual Actual World’ (TAW) in which the characters are situated. As an instrument of describing the inhabitants of TAW, Ryan posits four ‘Authentic worlds’; each accounting for certain features in regard to the (mental) capacities of the characters in question. Following a catalog proposed by Dolezel, Ryan assigns a modal system to three of them (Ryan: 1991: 111). The authentic worlds are:

- K-World (Knowledge World) describing the characters’ knowledge of their actual world,including knowledge of other characters. K-worlds are assigned the epistemic system with the operators: knowledge, ignorance, and belief.

- O-World (Obligation World) accounting for commitments and prohibitions resulting from cultural rules and moral principles. O-worlds are assigned the deontic system with the operators: permission, prohibition, and obligation.

- W-World (Wish World) according to which the individual assigns the predicates good, bad and neutral to propositions based on personal desires. W-worlds are assigned the axiological system, operated by concepts of goodness, badness, and indifference.

- I-World (Intend World) describing plans and goals.

In addition, Ryan proposes the notion of Fiction Universes or ‘F-Universes’, a term that covers phenomena such as dreams, hallucinations, and fictions that have an inhabitant of TAW as their agent. Based on this description, Ryan formulates a modal structure that paves the road for a number of very interesting analyses of plot structures. From my point of view, this modal structure is interesting for a number of reasons, of which the most obvious are the strong foundation for further analysis of ‘planning’ and ‘intending’ in narratives, and also the very

1 This does not necessarily entail an abandoning of metaphysical concerns, but the part of the theory that has bearings on the matter before us, must be detached from an overall metaphysic framework.

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An electronic journal on formalisation in text, media and language http://www.impact.hum.auc.dk

Possible Worlds in Narrative Space 3

elegant way in which the important theory of diegetic levels proposed by Genette / Bal2 can be

incorporated into the theory of possible worlds. Note for example that the introduction of a F-universe activates a new Global universe. The merging of the theories of possible worlds and diegetic levels is not dealt with in Ryan’s book, but an attempt will be made in this paper, to fuse these two perspectives on narratives. Ryan does, however, have a notion of embedded narratives, which she presents as ‘stacks’ (chapter 9), referring to Douglas Hofstadter as the first to apply this concept to narratology. In (Hofstadter: 1979) the author examines a case of embedded narratives to illustrate the phenomenon of recursive structures, (chapter 5), but without the crucial distinction between author, narrator, and character, already at that time common to narratologists. The notion of a ‘stack’ is a metaphor fetched from the jargon of computer programming. This thought is elaborated in (Ryan: 1999). Ryan’s proposal reads as follows:

Global universe → TAW, characters’ domains TAW → Region 1 (Region 2) (Region 3?) Characters’ domain → Authentic worlds → Pretended worlds → Alternative universes (F-universes) Authentic worlds → K-world → O-world → W-world → I-world Pretended worlds → Mock K-world → Mock O-world → Mock W-world → Mock I-world K-world → AW, other characters’ domains O-world → Credits, debts W-world → Desired states, feared states I-world → Goals, plans Mock worlds → [Same structure as authentic counterparts] F-universes → Dreams Fantasies Hallucinations Fictions Dreams, Fantasies, Hallucinations, Fictions → Global universe (Ryan: 1991: 123)

Ryan’s ‘modal structure’ is a significant contribution to narratology, because it allows the analyst to distinguish between different kinds of strategies among the inhabitants of a narrative universe. Furthermore, a theoretical distinction between a character’s knowledge, obligations, wishes and intentions, makes it possible in great detail to analyze the plot structure of a narrative.

But the ‘modal structure of narrative universes’ also gives rise to a number of questions, not easily answered. In the context of possible worlds semantics, it is not very clear exactly what Ryan means by the term ‘world’. Especially Ryan’s ‘K-world’ proves difficult to pin down. In

2 The theory of diegetic levels is originally proposed by Genette, and later refined by Mieke Bal. In this analysis I shall follow the clarifying terminology proposed by Bal, M. (1991). On Storytelling. Polebridge Press..

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the work of Kripke and many others who have contributed to modal logic, a ‘possible world’ is a state or history of the entire world, and not the world as it is perceived by a character.

“’Possible worlds’ are total ‘ways the world might have been’, or states or histories of the entire world.” (Kripke: 1972: 18) Italics in original.

Kripke’s frequently used descriptions of ‘possible world’ as ‘state’ or ‘history’, is commonly understood as a state that holds in it the entire history (previous states and events) of that state. This also implies that the possible futures of some world differ from the possible futures of other possible worlds. Turning to Ryan’s modal structure, it is of course possible to distinguish between obligations, wishes and intentions in terms of possible worlds, but it is not obvious how a clear line should be drawn between these three ‘authentic worlds’ and a K-world, since mere knowledge of some state does not constitute a series of events. Furthermore, obligations, wishes, and intentions are not detached from a corpus of knowledge – they depend on it. Moreover, it is not exactly clear why these four ‘authentic worlds’ are labeled ‘worlds’ and not ‘domaindescriptions’ or something similar. If we are to see a ‘world’ as a series of events, it becomes meaningless to apply the epistemic modal system to a set of ‘objectively true propositions’ authenticated by the author, as it is the case in Ryan’s description of the K-world.

These objections reveals the overall terminology proposed by Ryan to appear a bit ‘blurry’ instead of rendering a clear picture of the advantages that comes from seeing narratives as collections of possible worlds. However, for the remains of this section, and throughout section 4, I will employ Ryan’s terminology in order to avoid confusion.

In the further investigation of this theory, I will be revolving around two questions, not necessarily releasing the full potential of what I believe is an important approach to narratology, but hopefully contributing to the understanding of this area. The questions are:

What is the relation between the four ‘Authentic worlds’ (K, O, W, I)?

What is the relation between Authentic worlds, Pretended worlds, and F-universes?

This analysis will be used to account for the ontological structure of possible worlds in, what I shall call Narrative Space. Genette and others have used the term, ’narrative space’ as a metaphor for mental operations regarding reading, but in this paper, Narrative Space is the overall narrative, with the capacity to contain several narrative universes, which than, in terms, can contain numerous narrative worlds.

3. An example

For the case of the argument I have constructed the following (fragment of a) narrative that will be examined in some detail. Note that although plot, setting, and the overall literary quality of the fragment may seem depressingly tedious, the syntactic and semantic principles applied here are quite ordinary, and could (perhaps) be published as a part of a short story.

The Restaurant Scene

Paul invited Mary to dinner at a fancy restaurant. As he was about to pay the rather large bill, John entered the vicinity and was seated at a table for one. Paul had borrowed a great deal of money form John, but being nearly broke, he had been somewhat reluctant to repay him. In the spur of the moment, Paul started planning a getaway through the

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kitchen, but the prospect of a sudden end to an otherwise pleasant evening with Mary paused him. ‘I wish I could just morph into a fly and buzz out of here’, he thought. Mary used to date John before she met Paul, but she never told him. Once again in the same room as John, she eyed an opportunity to assert herself, by displaying her new – and better off – companion. Had Paul know then what we know now, he properly would have fled down the coward-trail through the kitchen, swallowing his pride as a second dessert - only he didn’t.

3.1 The problem of granularity

Whenever concerned with formal representation of knowledge, the question of granularity arises. In the theory and analyses conducted by Ryan, there is no formal discussion of this question, but from the analyses it becomes apparent that she is largely concerned with elements of the plot (and possible developments of the plot), understood as sequences of actions tied together in causal and chronological chains (see for instance (Ryan: 1991: 161). I find this approach fruitful, yet not completely satisfying. The reason is, that sometimes plot-relevant information is conveyed in terms of description rather than through action. In the ‘Restaurant Scene’, it is central to the plot that Paul and Mary are at a restaurant, but the fact that it is a fancy restaurant is not a part of the plot. The information is plot-relevant, though, because it adds to the frustration experienced by Paul. Furthermore, if the attribute of the restaurant were described solely when referring to Paul or Mary, the literal distribution of information given in this narrative would restrain us from assigning the knowledge to John. (It would be difficult to infer that this information should be a part of his K-world.) The solution is to represent plot-relevant information in statements along with statements representing kernels of the plot. It could be argued, that the attribute ‘fancy’ is a private observation or verdict, that should only be applied to the K-world of Paul – and possibly to Mary, but since the information is given by the author, and not by Paul, it pertains to the entire setting, and should therefore be considered a part of a common or general knowledge.

In narratology, there is a long tradition of working with minimal thematic units – motifs – as the constituent elements of the plot (Tomashevsky: 1965), (Barthes: 1975). Motifs are usually divided into ‘bound motifs’ or ‘free motifs’. Bound motifs are “logically essential to the narrative action and cannot be eliminated without destroying its causal-chronological coherence” (Prince: 1987: 10), whereas free motifs are logically inessential to the plot. In this case, the fact that ‘John enters the restaurant’ is a bound motif, while the fact that ‘he is seated at a table for one’ is a free motif. Once again, however, the information is provided by the author, and is therefore par se considered to be of importance to the overall plot structure.

3.2 Narrative Clauses

By extracting plot elements and plot-relevant information from the text, we arrive at a description that can be stated in the following 16 Narrative Clauses (NC), corresponding to the actual content of the narrative:

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i. Paul and Mary are together at a restaurant (P, M)

ii. The restaurant is fancy (P, M, J)

iii. Paul pays the bill (P, M)

iv. The bill is large (P)

v. John arrives at the restaurant (P, M, J)

vi. John is seated at a table for one (P, M, J)

vii. Paul owes John money (P, J)

viii. Paul is nearly broke (P)

ix. Paul has neglected to pay John back (P, J)

x. Paul plans to leave through the kitchen to avoid John (P)

xi. Paul reconsider his plan in order to stay with Mary (P)

xii. Paul wants to fly away (P)

xiii. Mary used to date John (M, J)

xiv. Mary wants to assert her self (M)

xv. Mary thinks that Paul is better off than John (M)

xvi. Paul would have been better off leaving through the kitchen. (-)

(The parenthesis indicates to whom this knowledge is available)

The last NC is a comment made by the author, and therefore not available to any of the characters. The Narrative Clauses encapsulated all the knowledge available to the reader (through the text), and therefore it is the only basis for determining the content of the four authentic worlds.

4. The ‘Authentic Worlds’

In Ryan’s theory, the available knowledge can be thought of as distributed into a description of four ‘authentic worlds’, pertaining to different aspects of the knowledge in question.

4.1 K-world

Since all of the above mentioned NCs are established as true by the author (the highest narrative authority), a K-world consists of these facts, and a relation between a character and each member of this set of facts. According to Ryan, the relation can be described in terms of:

- + Correspondence (x holds p firmly for true), - Conflict (x holds p for false, while p is true), - 0 Absence (p is unknown to x), or - i Incertainty (x is uncommitted to the truth of p).

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From this it follows that the K-world of the characters can by represented as a the total set of Narrative Clauses (NC) attributed with a binary relation of the character in question: (x) and the truth value of that clause: (+, -, 0, i):

{K-world (x)| NC(x,+), NC(x,-), NC(x,0), NC(x,i)}

Paul Mary John

i. + + 0

ii. + + +

iii. + 0 0

iv. + 0 0

v. + + +

vi. + + +

vii. + 0 +

viii. + - i

ix. + 0 +

x. + 0 0

xi. + 0 0

xii. + 0 0

xiii. 0 + +

xiv. 0 - 0

xv. 0 0 0

Table 1 Truth value of NCs from ‘the Restaurant Scene’

Table one represents the K-worlds of Paul, Mary and John in the Restaurant Scene In order to describe a character’s K-world, a relation of truth-value must be assigned to each of the NCs. Since obligations, wishes and intentions all depend on some sort of knowledge, and since the NCs represent the sum of knowledge available to the characters, each of these worlds must necessarily be developed from subsets of the total set of NCs. Yet the knowledge represented in the NCs is not sufficient to account for all these matters, simply because NCs are concerned with what happened and not what could happen. Since obligations, wishes and intentions all

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depend on some sort of knowledge, and since all relevant knowledge of the characters is accounted for in the NCs, O-worlds, W-worlds, and I-worlds must necessarily be developed from subsets of the total set of NCs, by extending the appropriate NCs with additional information. It can be argued, that knowledge and believe should be separated in this notation. In this structure, it is only possible to identify beliefs that are false, e.g. Mary’s belief that Paul is better off than John, stated as NC-xv. But from an analytical point of view, it is often very difficult to distinguish between knowledge and belief, because the very idea of suspense relies on withholding information about the true nature of things. Also, many narratives start in media res (in the midst of things), which makes it virtual impossible to discern which information is already at this (telling-)time available to a character. What now appears to be a speculative hypothesis may actually already be a proven fact in the told time. In fact, this kind of analysis is largely concerned with mapping different perceptions and perspectives in order to account for the mechanics of the plot-driven narrative.

4.2 O-world

In narratives, obligations are of interest because of what they presuppose, and because of what they entail. Obligations can be used to explain or evaluate a character’s actions in a retrospect manner. E.g. ‘He did what de had to do’, ‘it was only fair that she…’. Thus Paul’s action of planning a getaway (NC-x) can be explained by the obligations stated as facts in NC-vii and NC-ix, and the action of reconsidering the plan (NC-x) can be explained under reference to the fact stated in NC-i. In this capacity, O-worlds are useful for describing the present situation, by referring to what is already the case.

But O-worlds can also incorporate a sense of anticipation of things to come. If we were only concerned with the present or past, there would be little point on talking about obligations in the first place. In this capacity, an O-world is in fact a description of a possible world – engaged upon by an agent – that may or may not be realized, since not all debts are paid and not all promises are kept.

To distinguish between these two aspects of O-worlds, it becomes necessary to address the matter of narrative order before a formal description can be reached. Narrative Clauses can only be stated in a specific temporal order. They occur always as a description of a narratological ‘now’, a description of what is now the case, and an account of what information is now available to the reader and the characters. NCs are concerned with new knowledge, and therefore they leave no room for sufficient reference to prior stated NCs with relevance to the present one. This matter is left for the reader. Further research may prove it possible to design rules of inference, that will allow a computer system to keep track of these relations, since they are not arbitrary, but tied together in chrono-logical order. An algorithm perusing this goal should follow rules of iterating queries, similar to those proposed in (Scharfe and Øhrstrøm: 2000). For now, the concern should be limited to reach a formal description of the relevant modal aspects of possible worlds. From the remarks above it follows, that O-worlds are to be regarded as possible worlds at the time they can be established as NC’s.

Is can be argued, that since O-worlds are in fact possible worlds, the description of the NCs in question, should be extended by means a set of Possible World Clauses (PWC). This, however, will not only prove to be an overwhelming, but also irrelevant undertaking. The reason is, that when an obligation becomes relevant, it will unavoidably (re-)appear as a Narrative

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Clause. This may at first seem a inattentive account, but since the facts represented as NCs are necessary in order to understand the plot, any narrative development must at some point be grounded in textual facts in order to appear plausible. McCarthy refers to this kind of coherence as a ‘proper narrative’ in (McCarthy: 2000).

Furthermore, we should differentiate obligations with respect to their instigator. Obligations can be of cultural nature, or they can arise as direct consequences of actions performed by a character, such as giving a promise or lending money. In narratives, these two aspects of obligations can be identified by who reports them. The former (cultural) type of obligation will always be introduced (authenticated) by the author, and the latter always requires an agent. I will call these two aspects of deontic requirement obligation1 and obligation2, respectively, referring to the narrative level at which they are introduced. This distinction will be elaborated in section 5 and 6.

In the Restaurant Scene, the O-world of Paul is depicted in regards to Mary as well as to John. From NC-i – iii, we learn that Mary has a ‘debt’ to Paul. (Assuming that Paul pays for her meal.) From NC-vii and NC-ix, we learn that Paul has a debt to John. The obligation mentioned in NCviii, is based on the (neutral) knowledge NC-vii, as well as the knowledge of a possible repercussion to appear later on. Thus O-worlds can be formalized as a set of ternary relations between the subject: (x), another – or several others – characters or actants3: (y), (z)…, and the nature of that obligation: credit: (+) or debt (-).

{O-world (x)| NC(x,y,+), NC(x,y,-), NC(x,z,+), NC(x,z,-)}

4.3 W-world and I-world

According to Ryan, ‘the constitutive propositions of a W-world are of the form: x considers state / action p to be good / bad for x.’ (Ryan: 1991: 117). But if we apply this formula to the 16 NCs above, it becomes clear that deciding which clauses belongs to the W-world is not an easy matter. Applied to NC-i, we get:

“Paul considers the state p: ‘Paul and Mary are together at a restaurant’ to be good for Paul”,

which is properly true, but does not directly provide any information about the hopes and wishes of Paul. At the time Paul chose that particular restaurant, it is possible that his choice was somehow connected to a specific wish, e.g. he might have wanted to impress Mary, but from the narratological ‘now’ we cannot state this as a fact.

This may seem to be a trivial matter, but the real problem is that W-worlds (and I-worlds) must contain a certain kind of information that is not necessarily included in the Narrative Clauses, but nevertheless belongs to the narrative potential being discussed. Consider NC-x, which must be an indicator of a W-world: ‘Paul plans to leave through the kitchen to avoid John.’ This clause naturally presupposes that Paul wants to avoid John, but this does not become clear by using the formula:

3 I use the term ‘actant’ to indicate that relations regarding debts and credits are not confined to a personal sphere. Moral and cultural codes makes it possible to e.g. owe something to a society.

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“Paul considers the state p: ‘Paul plans to leave through the kitchen to avoid John’ to be good for Paul”,

because the output is not concerned with the propositional content – only with the clause as a whole. A possible objection to this argument is that the NC is not sufficiently specific, but the point is, that ‘Paul avoids John’ is not a fact; ‘Paul wants to avoid John’ is. Therefore the formula can only be used to decide whether or not it is good or bad that Paul wants something. The same goes for NC-xiv, although it can be argued, that Mary’s wish to assert herself is of such intrinsic nature, that further explanation is irrelevant.

As it appears, the need to distinguish between the illocutionary act, and the propositional content of that act, is evident. In (Scharfe and Øhrstrøm: 2000) an attempt is made to construct a knowledge base that makes it possible to isolate possible worlds (e.g. wishes) from actualized events, by making ‘utterance’ a primitive, which links a locutor to a proposition. Below here a conceptual graph corresponding to the sentence: “Paul says: ‘I wish the bill is small.’ “

[uttr]-

->(agent)->[person: Paul],->(chrc)->[wish],->(thme)->[proposition:

[bill]->(attr)->[small]].

It can be argued, that not all wishes concern possible futures, and that the notion of ‘wish’ should be applied to the broader concept of alternative possible worlds, thereby including such phenomena as counterfactuals; e.g.: ‘I wish I had chosen another restaurant’. But since we at the present are concerned with wishes related to intentions, I will regard a wish as per se related to a not (yet) actualized future, leaving counterfactuals to be dealt with as an alternation of an agents epistemic system. This approach is described in section 6. Therefore I submit, that a formal description of a W-world must relate a given NC to a possible future that cannot be described as Narrative Clauses, but as Possible World Clauses (PWC). Since PWCs are not necessarily actualized, they can only be understood in relation to the NC they elaborate, and should therefore be written as an extension of that NC, e.g.: x. Paul plans to leave through the kitchen to avoid John (P)

a. Paul goes to the kitchen b. Paul leaves the restaurant c. Paul avoids John d. Paul interrupts pleasant evening with Mary

But in fact there is no reason to believe that Paul wishes to go to the kitchen (PWC-x-a), or to perform PWC-x-b or PWC-x-d. He only wants to avoid John (PWC-x-c). So x-c is the goal, and x-a+b is a possible goal path to achieve x-c, leaving x-d as side effect, in this case an undesirable one. The NC-xii (Paul wants to fly away) has a similar structure. Once again he envisages a possible world that allows him to avoid the confrontation with John.

As it appears, a W-world in intrinsically joined to an I-world. The reason is, that in order to establish a goal (which is part of an I-world) the agent must first ascertain whether or not that goal is an improvement over the present situation, according to the rules of the W-world. From this it follows, that a character’s W-world and I-world could be treated as one descriptive entity:

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a possible future, and it seems tempting to simply posit that W-worlds are end-states of I-worlds, leaving them without their own formal description. However, the distinction made by Ryan between wishes and intentions – though not founded in two different modal systems – are of great value when it comes to actual analysis of narratives, because W-worlds and I-worlds are not satisfied in the same way. If Paul could find another way of avoiding John than by leaving through the kitchen or turning into a fly, the W-world stated in PWC-ix-c would be satisfied, where as the I-world stated in PWC-x-a+b, would not. As a consequence of the PWC’s relation to the NC in question, a set of PWC is only accessible by characters that are in epistemic correspondence with this particular NC. In the case of Paul wanting to leave through the kitchen, the K-world must satisfy: {K-world (x)| NC-x(x,+) ...}, which is only true for Paul. An I-world for a character (x) consists of a set of at least one PWC connected to a given NC (y) if the character (x) is in epistemic correspondence with the NC (y):

{I-world (x)| PWC(NC-y)⊃ NC-y(x,+)}

A W-world for a character (x) consists of I-world clauses that imply a desirable situation (s).

{W-world (x)| PWC(NC-y) ⊃ NC-y(x,+) ∧ PWC(NC-y)→ Result(NC-y,s)}.

5. The relation between ‘Authentic worlds’ and ‘Pretended Worlds’

In Ryan’s theory, the character’s domains consist of ‘Authentic worlds’, ‘Pretended worlds’, and ‘F-universes’. In addition, Ryan distinguishes between the ‘Actual world’ (AW) which is home of the author, and a ‘Textual Actual World’ (TAW), which is home of the characters. Furthermore, Ryan introduces a ‘Textual Alternative Possible World’ (TAPW), signifying an alternative possible world introduced by an inhabitant of TAW. To this important taxonomy, a number of clarifications can be made.

5.1 Narrative authority

The distinction between AW and TAW – and in terms between TAW and TAPW – corresponds very well to the theory of diegetic levels proposed by G. Genette and refined by Mieke Bal. They propose that a narrative text can be thought of as a hierarchy of enunciation. The author, the highest narrative authority, occupies the hierarchical top. The author has in his power to step aside and leave the scene to someone else, and then – later on – to reclaim the right as the ultimate authority of the narrative. When an author gives way to a narrator, the narrative authority is passed on to him, and he is now free to activate an even deeper level of narration. A classical example of this is the ‘Arabian Nights’, is which the author lets Scheherazade narrate the actual tales, and in the tales, narrative authority is frequently passed on to other narrators and actors. This is referred to as diegetic levels, and each diegetic level, save the top level, consists of a hypo-narrative. Returning to the point of view that a narrative can be seen as a set of possible worlds, it becomes clear that the privileged world (w0) of the author and reader differs from the privileged world of the inhabitants of the Textual Actual World. As the narrative authority – which includes the right to create a deeper diegetic level – is passed on to a

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narrator, the privileged world becomes that TAW to which the narrator belongs. According to this, AW, TAW and TAPW can be understood as three different diegetic levels, which equals three versions of a privileged world because narratives does not necessarily share its ontology with the surrounding world. This means that the narrative authority in the TAW belongs to the author, and at this level he is the only one capable of creating alternative possible worlds (APW). By introducing a narrator or an actor who acts or speech-acts, or a focalizer who sees, the author momentarily abandons the right to create further APWs; this right now belongs to the person introduced. It is now within the power of the introduced narrator / actor / focalizer to create an alternative possible world at this level, and this would be called a ‘Textual Alternative Possible World’ (TAPW) or a F-universe if the world in question requires a different ontology. The distinction between TAPW and F-universes is elaborated in section 5.3 below.

5.2 APW and TAPW

It is possible for the author to create an alternative possible world – NC-xvi is an example of that, but the instant narrative authority is passed on, the APW turns into a TAPW. In other words: APW and TAPW correspond to different diegetic levels, and to different perspectives on the matter of a privileged world. Therefore, they should not be thought of as having the same ontological status in Narrative Space. This matter can be clarified by introducing a distinction between ‘Author-worlds’ (TAW + APW) and ‘Agent-worlds’ (ATPW + F-universes).

Agentworlds

Authorworlds

TAPW F-uni TAW APW

Fig. 1. Relations between Author worlds and Agent worlds

5.3 Alternative Ontologies and F-universes.

From the rules of narrative authority, it also follows, that the author cannot introduce a Funiverse. Dreams, fantasies, hallucinations, and fictions all presuppose the presence of an agent inhabiting a lower diegetic level than that of the author. For the same reasons as mentioned above, a F-universe cannot share its ontological status with an Author-world. A F-

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universe is by necessity a mediated possible world, and therefore in this respect equal to a TAPW. The very notion of F-universes, however, is quite important, since it allows us to distinguish between two types of Agent worlds. F-universes differ from other possible worlds by not sharing the same ontological boundaries. In the example of the ‘Restaurant Scene’, narrative authority is passed on to Paul, which enables him to create a F-universe NC-xii, in which people can morph into flies.

5.4 Accessibility in Author-worlds and Agent-worlds

The distinction between Author-worlds and Agent-worlds is important for two reasons. They correspond to different diegetic levels, and they have different status in regard to accessibility.

Author-worlds are intrinsically attributed with a decided communicational status. TAW is by nature always accessible to all characters present, and it is possible to decide the truth-value of each of the NCs derived from TAW. APWs, on the other hand, are always inaccessible to the characters. Any instance of a NC that is derived from an APW (e.g. NC-xvi above) will have the truth-value of ‘0’ for all characters present.

Due to the nature of the lower diegetic level(s) of Agent-worlds, it is possible to maintain these worlds as private, or to share their content if preferred. In the instance of Paul wanting to fly away (NC-xii), his F-universe is known only to himself, but it would be possible for him to share his thoughts with Mary. Agent-worlds are attributed with undecided communicational status.

Agentworlds

Authorworlds

TAPW F-uni TAW APW

UndecidedCom. status

DecidedCom. status

Fig. 2. Communicational status of textual worlds

TAPWs and F-universes can be constructed from any point within TAW, if the agent in question has access to the NCs or PWCs according to the rules mentioned above. In addition, F-

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universes can be constructed from any TAPW already existing, e.g. if the kitchen boy starts to hallucinate in Paul’s TAPW mentioned in NC-x.

It should also be mentioned, that F-universes activate a new global universe, thus leading the way for an infinite row of new TAPWs and additional F-universes, e.g. if the fly in Paul’s Funiverse, NC-xii, considered to commit suicide in John’s soup, we would have an I-world from a TAPW, embedded in a F-universe, embedded in a W-world from TAW.

6. What, then, is a ‘Narrative World’?

As we have seen, the entire modal structure proposed by Ryan depends on descriptions relating characters to narrative facts, which means that the epistemic system has top rank in this modal structure. Obligations, wishes, and intentions can be extracted from the narrative facts according to their formal description. Based on these observations, I will propose an ontological modal structure of Narrative Space, derived from actualized or alternative modal systems. Each system is equipped to contain one or more narrative worlds. Narrative worlds should comply with the Leibnizian notion of a world, perceived as a sequence of events (Øhrstrøm and Hasle: 1995: 105). In the following I will use the term ‘world’ in this manner, and not extend it to embrace subjective perspectives, as it is the case in Ryan’s ‘K-worlds’. Furthermore, a description of a narrative world should incorporate the observations on author-worlds and agent-worlds in such a way, that the growth-capacities of each world should be made clear.

6.1 Epistemic systems

A modal structure must at its top have an actualized epistemic system (ES) comprising all the facts stated as true by the author. This corresponds roughly to Ryan’s TAW. Every narrative world must directly or indirectly be rooted in this world. Any reference to the future made from this world will be characterized as prolepsis, and will by necessity occur, because they are evoked by the highest narrative authority imaginable.

The author can choose to establish an Alternative Epistemic System (AES), conveying information that is not accessible to the characters situated in ES. This world can contain counterfactual statements (past possible futures), as well as speculations on several possible – but not necessary – future developments.

Alternative epistemic systems (AES) can be grown from any epistemic system (including other AESs), in addition, AESs may occur as modifications of axiological systems or deontic systems, provided that this is of the type DS2

(see below). Author-worlds must be either ES or AES, or deontic systems grown from these. Agents can remodel and elaborate their epistemic systems by processing information made available by the author of their world. This is frequently done in narratives with a split temporal structure such as detective novels4. In addition, agents can create AESs ad libitum. These worlds include counterfactuals and other speculations such as anticipations of events not (yet) actualized. Epistemic systems of author-

4 For further elaboration on this matter, see for instance Todorov, T. (1988). The Typology of Detective Fiction. In: D. Lodge, (ed.) Modern Criticism and Theory. Longman.

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worlds will be marked as ES1 or as AES1. Epistemic systems of agent-worlds will be marked as ES2

or as AES2, thus indicating that they occur at a lower diegetic level.

6.2 Deontic systems

Deontic systems can be grown from any epistemic or axiological system.

In author-worlds, deontic systems can only be established as part of an epistemic system, because obligations at this level is restricted to be of the type ‘obligation1’, described in section 4. This means that Deontic systems (DS1) comprising conditions and obligations regarding inhabitants of the diegetic level immediately below can be stated by the author, provided that the information is conveyed as description. All information regarding a character’s actual knowledge and obligation is contained in top-level author-worlds. In agent-worlds, deontic systems (DS2) can be established as part of epistemic, or axiological systems equally, because derived knowledge e.g. the result of deductions, may lead to obligations, as well as intentions may entail commitment.

6.3 Axiological systems

While the author can only revise the epistemic system, agents have the ability to alter axiological, deontic, and epistemic systems, as well as to create entirely new global universes. Axiological systems are always agent-worlds. Agents can create axiological systems (AS) containing for example wishes and intentions, as well as alternative axiological systems (AAS) containing matters such as hypothetical intentions. In agent-worlds, axiological systems can be established from any epistemic, or deontic system.

7. The ontological modal structure of Narrative Space

By combining the theory of diegetic levels with Ryan’s ‘modal structure’, it now becomes possible to sketch an ontological structure of Narrative Space, without using the notion of ‘worlds’ as a metaphor. By restraining from talking about epistemic worlds, an ontological structure can be devised in which epistemic, deontic, and axiological systems can hold descriptions of event structures. Each of these event structures are possible worlds in the sense that they may or may not be actualized, with the sole exception of ES1, which is always actualized. The recursive relationship between deontic systems and axiological systems, along with the fact that any epistemic system can grow an alternative epistemic system, renders the model principally infinite. However, figure 3 represent the total of basic world types in Narrative Space.

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ES1DS1

AES1DS1

ES2DS2

AS AAS

AS AAS

DS2

DS2

AES2DS2

AS AAS

AS AAS

DS2

DS2

F-uni = ES’

Author-worlds

Agent-worlds

Fig. 3. Basic world types

To distinguish between different types of deontic and axiological systems, I propose the following notation:

Author-worlds: ES1

ES1 (DS1) AES1

AES1 (DS1) Agent-worlds: ES2

ES2 (DS2) ES2 (DS2 (AS)) ES2 (DS2 (AAS)) etc.

Finally it should be noted, that F-universes activates a new global epistemic system, called ES’, which allows the entire modal structure to be repeated, including the possibility to create yet another F-universe at a lower diegetic level.

7.1 The restaurant revisited

Even though the number of modal systems principally is infinite, many narratives (narrative situations) are likely to utilize only a few of the possibilities. Another look at ‘the Restaurant Scene’ from section 3 reveals that only seven types of systems are brought into play.

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ES1

DS1 DS1

F-uni

Author-worlds

Agent-worlds

{NC-i, NC-ii, NC-iii, NC-iv, NC-v, NC-vi, NC-vii, NC-viii, NC-ix, NC-xii}

O(m,p) O(p,j)

AES2 {NC-xvi}

Paul Mary

{NC-xii}

ES2

AS AES2

{NC-x}

{NC-xi}

AES2 {NC-xv}

ES2

AS {NC-xiv}

Fig. 4. Modal analysis of ‘the Restaurant Scene’

The two distinct deontic systems connected to ES1, are noted as relating Mary to Paul and Paul to John by means of an obligation. Because of the narrative necessity to repeat the obligation, should it later become relevant (see section 4), the details of the obligation are not required at this stage. Note that the misconception of Mary (NC-xv) is now classified as belonging to an alternative epistemic system: AES2 (Mary): (NC-xv). This seems intuitively to be an improvement over the approach mentioned in section 4: {K-world (m)| NC-xv(m,-)}, because the information on Mary’s erroneous confidence has now been isolated in the modal description of the narrative. Likewise, Paul’s reconsideration regarding his escape plan is now clearly described as belonging to (embedded in) an axiological system. ES2 (Paul): (AS: NC-x (AES2 :NC-xi)). However, the F-universe introduced by Paul seems to be problematic. It is not clear from the diagram in figure 4, that NC-xii is in fact a wish. A possible solution to this problem is to notate the narrative clause as a part of an axiological system as well as part of a F-universe. The dotted line between the two systems in figure 5 indicates that it is the same clause.

F-uni

Paul

{NC-xii}

ES2

AS AES2

{NC-x}

{NC-xi}

{NC-xii}

Fig. 5. Modal ambiguity

This approach may also prove useful in dealing with instances of more than one agent referring to the same possible world, e.g. two persons planning a course of action together. In this particular case, the F-universe of Paul is a private world, but if he decided to communicate

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his considerations to Mary, it would be possible for her to participate in the construction of the fantasy.

7.2 Modal logic and reasoning in contexts.

The (semi-) formal presentation of the modal structure outlined in this paper may make it possible to conduct a more comprehensive analysis of narrative modal structures. Since narratives basically are concerned with change, the concept of temporal logic is likely to contribute to the understanding of possible worlds in Narrative Space. Further investigations of the modal ontology proposed in section 7 could be carried out by applying the perspective of branching time (Øhrstrøm and Hasle: 1995: chapter 2.6).

The notion of Possible World Clauses calls for a formalism that allows sub-narratives to be merged into an overall narrative sequence. McCarthy has designed a formalism called: ‘Situation Calculus’, which has ‘been used to represent and reason about a changing world’ (McCarthy: 2000). This work dates back to 1963, and includes a rather large number of papers of which the latest and most prominent is referred to here. The Situation Calculus may prove very suitable for dealing with PWCs because it is ‘elaboration tolerant’ i.e. designed to incorporate new knowledge into an existing knowledge representation at a very low cost.

Besides handling the problem of PWCs being merged into a representation of NCs, it may be possible to use the Situation Calculus to combine and compare different perspectives on a matter of interest. This would be an elaborate approach to the problem of agents ‘sharing’ possible worlds, mentioned at the end of section 7.

8. Conclusion

From the analysis of the ‘modal structure of narrative worlds’ proposed by M-L Ryan, it follows that a number of clarifications and alterations can be made in order to refine the presentation of modalities in narratives. The basis of this refinement is the vocabulary that comes from fusing the theory of possible worlds with the notion of diegetic levels. I have proposed an ontological modal structure that, though in principle infinite, enumerates the basic world types needed to account for modal structures in narratives. I believe, that the structure presented in section 6 remains true to the intentions and to the analytical capacity of Ryan’s work, and at the same time elaborates the scope of this kind of narrative analysis.

Reference

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Barthes, R. (1975). An Introduction to Structural Analysis of Narrative. In: New Literary History. 6: 237-262.

Doležel, L. (1998). "Possible Worlds of Fiction and History." New Literary History 29(4): 785-809.

Hartnack, J. and Sløk, J. (1991). De store tænkere - Leibniz. Munksgaard, Rosinante.

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Hofstadter, D. (1979). Gôdel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid. Vintage Books.

Jahn, M. (1999). "Speak, friend, and enter": Garden paths, Artificial Intelligence, and Cognitive Narratology. In: D. Herman, (ed.) Narratologies: New Perspectives on Narrative Analysis. Ohio State University Press: 167-194.

Kripke, S. (1972). Naming and Necessity. Basil Blackwell.

McCarthy, J. (2000). Elaboration Tolerance. Available at: http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/elaboration.html.

Prince, G. (1987). A Dictionary of Narratology. University of Nebraska Press.

Ryan, M.-L. (1991). Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence, and Narrative Theory. Indiana University Press.

Ryan, M.-L. (1999). Cyberage Narratology: Computers, Metaphor, and Narrative. In: D. Herman, (ed.) Narratologies: New Perspectives on Narrative Analysis. Ohio State University Press: 113-141.

Scharfe, H. and Øhrstrøm, P. (2000). Computer Aided Narrative Analysis using Conceptual Graphs. In: G. Stumme, (ed.) Working with Conceptual Structures - Contributions to ICCS 2000. Shaker Verlag: 16-29.

Todorov, T. (1988). The Typology of Detective Fiction. In: D. Lodge, (ed.) Modern Criticism and Theory. Longman.

Tomashevsky, B. (1965). Thematics. In: L. T. Lemon and M. J. Reis, (eds.) Russian Formalist Criticism. University of Nebraka Press: 61-95.

Øhrstrøm, P. and Hasle, P. (1995). Temporal Logic - From Ancient Ideas to Artificial Intelligence. Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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possible worlds in narrative space

Documents

lower diegetic level

highest narrative authority

ryans modal structure

ontological modal structure

diegetic levels proposed

alternative epistemic system

textual actual world

aas ds2 ds2