Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka The Sinhalese and Tamils ___________________

Practical Solutions for a

Pressing Problem

Duke University Talent Identification Program Global Dialogues Institute

July 2005

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Table of Contents

I. Introduction 2

II. Executive Summary 3

III. History of the Conflict 5

IV. Current Political Climate 12

V. Effects of the Tsunami 16

VI. Terrorism Tactics and their Consequences 23

VII. Role of Children in the Conflict 27

VIII. Long-Term Political Solutions 33

IX. Ensuring Long-Term Social Stability 41

X. Bibliography 50

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I. Introduction This report is the work of 26 high school students who attended the Duke University Talent Identification Program’s Global Dialogues Institute at Wake Forest University in July 2005. The Global Dialogues Institute takes as its core premise the idea that education’s foremost purpose is to study and offer practical solutions for the urgent challenges facing the world today. With that principle in mind, each year the program seeks to gather together gifted educators, students, and leading guest lecturers for cooperative, intellectually challenging sessions that explore a current global problem of international significance. The goal of the session is a collaborative student-written document that proposes a practical solution to the session’s theme, to be shared with the public at the end of the session. This year's theme was titled “Ethnic Conflicts”. The opinions expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Duke University Talent Identification Program or its staff. We offer this report with great hope for the future.

Students Adina Appelbaum Richard Archer Brandon Bedford Brian Bloodworth Lesley Brindle Joseph (Tripp) Callaway Alexander Chan Merritt Chesson Sarah Clark Bradford Crawford Thomas Davis Mary Dozier Sarah Duzyk Heather Hoffman Amanda Kalmutz William Leonard Forrest McConnell Leah Mintz Victoria Moore Greg Nigro Kevin O’Hara Hannah Pakray Jonathan Tarleton Angelina Upshaw Colum Weiden Angela Yenca

Faculty Noah Bopp Matt Fehrs Krista Wiegand Jessica Roeger Kimberly Roller Katharine Mitchell For more information Duke TIP Global Dialogues Institute c/o Matt Fehrs 17307 Rose Garden Lane Durham, NC 27707 noah.bopp@world.oberlin.edu

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II. Executive Summary The current ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka demands the attention of the international community. The continued disagreement has caused turmoil and dramatic polarization within the Sri Lankan state. Acts of terrorism from both the Tamils and Sinhalese have escalated the situation, instilling fear and a sense of instability in all factions of the Sri Lankan population. As the recent tsunami brings newfound media coverage to the area, more consideration should be directed toward the ethnic conflict. If channeled correctly, this exposure could help to bring about a future of peace and cooperation that will benefit Sri Lanka and the rest of the world. With the international community backing the effort, Sri Lanka will turn into a success story for countries plagued by ethnic conflict and will serve as a model for such nations to emulate. The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka dates back to the fifth century BC when the first Sinhalese migrated from North India to the island. A thousand years later, the Tamils came from South India with a totally different language and religion. From the beginning, territorial disputes caused tension between the ethnic groups. Later, the Dutch, Portuguese, British, and American intervention in Sri Lanka influenced political, educational, and religious developments within the island, each country showing favoritism to either the Tamils or the Sinhalese. After Sri Lanka gained independence from Great Britain in 1948, discrimination toward Tamils increased through government policies and led to resistance. In the late 1970s, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) materialized after nonviolent resistance groups failed to raise awareness for their cause. The formation of the LTTE began the present day conflict between the Sinhalese and the Tamils of Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese fighting to maintain control of Sri Lanka and the Tamils fighting for an end to discrimination and for representation in political affairs. The Sri Lankan government and the LTTE signed a peace agreement in 2002 with the mediation of the Norwegian foreign minister, Erik Solheim. The cease-fire lasted for a year and a half, at which point the LTTE pulled out of peace negotiations citing reasons the treaty was biased. Currently, the LTTE urges the implementation of a Tamil Interim Self-Governing Authority in which the Tamils of northeastern Sri Lanka would have autonomy for a limited time. A LTTE head commander, Colonel Karuna, formed a separatist faction and joined the Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front. The Marxist People’s Liberation Front (JVP) formerly was allied with Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga, a moderate socialist. This alignment ended, but the JVP continues to influence the government’s policies against the Tamils. While the damage of the tsunami has created some national unity, it also has resulted in increased political dissention. After the December 2004 tsunami hit the coast of Sri Lanka, the political culture of the nation was disrupted severely. The relief process turned into a political struggle over who could most effectively handle the aftermath. Many minority parties used the tsunami to gain political support within the nation. The Tamils, along with the Marxist JVP, were able to capitalize on their efforts, and both gained international respect for handling the situation soundly. The tsunami opened the peace process between the Tamils and the government, yet the Marxists have walked out of the government in protest of the President’s offer to share aid with the Tamils. The tsunami devastated the nation and brought the global community to its shores. The way in which

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the Tsunami Relief Council, composed of Tamil and government leaders, distributes the relief funds will be a significant predictor of the future political structure of the nation. A primary characteristic of the conflict in Sri Lanka has been the use of terrorist tactics. Mostly practiced by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), terrorism has caused death and fear throughout the state. The Sinhalese government has used violence as a tactic as well, violating the human rights set forth in the Geneva Conventions. Being one of the foremost users of terrorism in the world, the LTTE has served as a model for other terrorist organizations. Therefore, the terrorism in Sri Lanka not only poses a threat to the people of the country, but also the people of the world. To combat further terrorist activities, funding and military support should be cut off from outside sources. Children in Sri Lanka currently are recruited by the LTTE to serve as members of the militia, despite past pledges by the group to demobilize child soldiers and halt the recruiting of children. Though some children volunteer to serve in the LTTE, many are coerced, threatened, and kidnapped. While in the LTTE, children participate in rigorous physical activity, and suffer emotional and psychological damage. Once released, children face numerous obstacles in the process of reintegrating into society.

The political instability in Sri Lanka complicates the peace process and impedes the determination of long-term political solutions. The Tamils need to be included in the government, and the Sri Lankan government must work to convince the Marxists that the Tamils are a legitimate authority on the island. The recent tsunami has created turmoil throughout the country, and many groups in the country are dissatisfied with governmental action. President Kumaratunga has sworn to pursue a course of action that will lead the country to peace. In order to accomplish her goal, the government must be permanently altered. The options include a federalist system, enhancing local governments, or a gradual fusion of local governments into a national federalist system. We have concluded the third choice would be most effective in solving the long-term demands of the ethnic groups in the country. The funds acquired from the agreement by several nations to give increased aid if peace is achieved would serve to fund the new municipal governments of the Tamils. After years of peace and stability, the Tamils will gain national representation and equal political rights. The government will be united, and the peace process will be finished.

The long-term social solutions to the current conflict involve the reconciliation of the two peoples, the development of the public education system, and the advancement of the Sri Lankan economy. The government, primarily through the media, should support the creation of a national identity to supersede ethnicity. English should become the third national language and the primary language to be used in education. A system of public libraries would give rural regions access to literacy and electronic resources. A free trade shipping zone should be created in the Northern Region, and Free Trade agreements should be created with developed nations such as the U.S. Furthermore, Sri Lanka should develop its own national apparel brand to compete on the global market, and the country should privatize industry.

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III. History of the Conflict The conflict between the Tamil Tigers and the Sinhalese has grown during the past couple of decades on the island of Sri Lanka. In order to understand how to address the problem, it is necessary to be familiar with the past. Throughout the following sections, we hope to introduce you to the island of Sri Lanka and the history of its people. The Original Settlers Though many tribes and clans from predominantly southern India gradually populated the island, the most powerful and dominating of settlers were the Sinhalese. The Sinhalese are customarily brown-skinned people who originated from northern India.1 Upon their arrival, which historians have calculated to be in the fifth century BC, the Sinhalese were probably able to share the island and have great influence because of their intermarriage and relations with the aboriginal peoples. By 200 BC, the Sinhalese occupied most of Sri Lanka, and Sinhalese kingships and royal families governed various regions of the island.2 The Sinhalese people, though they were the majority, lived peacefully with the non-Aryan populations of the island. According to historian K.M. De Silva,

Sri Lanka, in the first few centuries after the Aryan settlement, was a multi-ethnic society (a conception which emphasizes harmony and a spirit of live and let live) rather than a plural society (in which tension between ethnic or other distinctive groups is a main feature).3

The Sinhalese also came to share beliefs with the aboriginal peoples of Sri Lanka. During the reign of Devanampiya Tissa, (250BC to 210 BC) the Mauryan Buddhist mission came to Sri Lanka and preached to a receptive audience. With the help of Devanampiya Tissa’s conversion, Buddhism quickly spread throughout the island and became a crucial part of Sinhalese culture and life in Sri Lanka.4 Arrival of the Tamils The Tamils tend to have darker skin than the Sinhalese and originate from the southern part of India. They speak Tamil which is a Dravidian language commonly spoken in South India; Tamil is a language totally different from the language of the Sinhalese and is derived from Sanskrit in North India.5 The Tamils are also predominantly Hindu, while the Sinhalese preserve their orthodox Buddhist beliefs. While it is hard to tell when the Tamils came to Sri Lanka, historian S.A. Pakeman states,

1 Zeylanicus, Ceylon between Orient and Occident (Great Britain: Elek Books Limited, 1970), 23. 2 C.W. Nicholas, A Concise History of Ceylon (Colombo: Ceylon University Press, 1961), 21. 3 K.M. De Silva, A History of Sri Lanka (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1981), 13. 4 De Silva, 11. 5 Zeylanicus, Ceylon between Orient and Occident (Great Britain: Elek Books Limited, 1970), 24.

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There is ample historical evidence that well before the beginning of the Christian era, invasions from south India had begun, and that these continued sporadically all through the history of Ceylon [Sri Lanka] up to the coming of the Portuguese early in the sixteenth century.6

Various tribes from southern India invaded and settled in northern parts of the island, spreading down the northeast and northwest coasts. The northern peninsula of Sri Lanka, Jaffna peninsula, became a principal settlement of the Tamils. During the nineteenth century, they designated the peninsula as the Tamils’ independent kingdom. Due to the differences in religion and language and tensions over land rights, the Tamil Kingdom of Jaffna was often at war with Sinhalese kings until the coming of the Portuguese. 1505-1948: European Colonialism and Sri Lanka European colonialism laid the foundation for the political, economic, social, and religious infrastructure that now defines post-colonial Sri Lanka. Though Sri Lanka is positively identified for having its own unique and distinct characteristics, 443 years of European domination cannot be overlooked, as it had profound implications on the island’s development, growth, and eventual transformation into a modern nation state. Most notable is the rise of various European colonial powers, their impact, and the reaction of the Sinhalese, Tamils, and various indigenous groups to the island during each of the three European nations’ colonial reigns. Portuguese and Dutch Colonization: In 1505, the Portuguese landed on Sri Lanka and successfully negotiated a trade agreement with the Sinhalese Kingdom of Kotte.7 The Portuguese continued to rule Sri Lanka until the Dutch forced them out in 1658. The Dutch were considered far more tolerant than the Portuguese, even though they took complete control of the spice trade, and asserted their religious affiliation of Protestant Christianity on the populace. The Sinhalese Kingdom of Kandy continued to exist with autonomy8 under the Dutch, but the Tamil Kingdom and remnants of the Kotte and Sitawake Kingdoms remained under colonial rule. The colony remained firmly in Dutch hands until the middle of the 18th century, when British imperial ambitions in India brought Britain to Sri Lanka in attempt to drive the Dutch from the Indian subcontinent. From around 1756 until 1795, conflicts around Sri Lanka were frequent between the Dutch and British.9 British Colonization: The British took the major east coast port of Trincomalee in 1796, and effectively took the island from the Dutch in 1797. Once again, the dominant Sinhalese kingdom, Kandy, pursued a trade agreement and autonomy treaty with Great Britain, which was doomed to fail from the beginning. The British did not intend to keep Ceylon (as they called it), but assumed that with

6 S. A. Pakeman, Ceylon (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), 20. 7 Steven Kemper, The Presence of the Past: Chronicles, Politics, and Culture in Sinhala Life (Ithaca: Cornell University Press) 104. 8 Richard Nyrop, Area Handbook for Sri Lanka, http://lcweb2.loc gov/frd/cs/sri_lanka/lk_bibl.html (U.S. Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.) The Portuguese. 9 De Silva, 146.

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the cessation of hostilities with the Dutch, it would be returned.10 However, it was not, and Ceylon became the first Crown Colony (literally a colony of the Crown), meaning that it was under direct British rule. Peace lasted no more than a year. The ensuing war lasted from 1803-1815, but resulted in absolute British domination of Sri Lanka.11 When the British assumed control of the island, the main economic activity was subsistence farming and limited plantation agriculture. The British built the island’s society around plantation agriculture, and initially began with the main crop being cinnamon. However, as a result of various agricultural disasters throughout the 19th century, the keystone crop changed many times from cinnamon to coffee, cocoa, tea, and rubber. Some of these required more labor than the island could initially provide, so the British brought in the ethnically similar Indian Tamils to work on plantations. These Tamils were considered to be different by Tamils who had lived in Sri Lanka for 900 years. The British effectively created a new ethnic rivalry on the island.12 Generally, the Sinhalese and the Tamils had lived in peace (with occasional territorial disputes), but now with the introduction of this third but ethnically similar group, a critical imbalance in representation on the political level severed 900 years of Sinhalese and Tamil coexistence.13 With the implications of the Charter of Justice, there was an opportunity for some Ceylonians to advance to the new middle class. Traditionally in Ceylonian society, there was a caste system in place that did not permit a middle class, only classes for the leaders and the poor. As a result, the education field took off, and the English literacy rate rose dramatically. The British undertook education of the Sinhalese, limiting their attempts to educate the Tamils. American missionaries educated the Tamils, and actually gave them a better education, resulting in Tamils receiving more roles in the civil service of the empire, and in turn gaining a tremendous amount of influence.14 World War I was a critical point in Ceylonian history. Ceylon entered the war with the British Empire in 1914, and provided primarily economic and agricultural commodities to the British war effort. In light of strong British sentiment, Britain’s own propaganda worked against them in fueling the then-underground independence movement with its ideals of nationalism and patriotism.15 In 1919, all the major Sinhalese and Tamil political organizations banded together to form the Ceylon National Congress. This new congress immediately submitted a proposal for a new constitution that would increase local control over the Executive Council and the budget.16 These demands were not met, but instead led to a new constitution in 1920. Amendments in 1924 led to greater Ceylonian representation on the Executive Council. This momentous reform, gave Ceylon tremendous autonomy under the empire, and yet strengthened its ties with Britain in the upper classes, and lessened the overall nationalistic movement.

10 De Silva, 148. 11 Lennox A. Mills, Ceylon Under British Rule: 1795-1932, (London, Charles Birchall & Sons, 1933) 133. 12 Jonathon Spencer, Sri Lanka: History and the Roots of Conflict, (New York, Routledge, 1990) 177. 13 De Silva, 231. 14 Mills, 195. 15 Spencer, 189. 16 Mills, 221.

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In 1927, a royal commission under the Earl of Donoughmore visited Ceylon to ascertain why a representative government as chartered by the 1924 constitution had not succeeded and to suggest constitutional changes necessary for the island’s eventual self-rule.17 This resulted in a new constitution, known as the Donoughmore Constitution, which was designed to address the grievances and failures of the previous 1924 Constitution. This failed to produce anything more than a splintering of more nationalist groups and movements, for example, the Great Council of the Sinhalese (Sinhala Maha Sabha), founded in 1937.18 These groups were intended to attract attention to the growing Ceylonian/Sri Lankan nationalism in an attempt to spark change. Their failure led to the creation of more radical leftist groups during that decade. These groups never gained significant political weight, but they nonetheless proved a nuisance to the greater political machine in Ceylon/Sri Lanka. In 1945, Great Britain agreed to grant Ceylon independence. Before independence was granted, Lord Soulbury was sent with a commission to examine a new constitutional draft that the Sri Lankan minister had proposed. The commission made recommendations that led to a new constitution. The new constitution was known as the Soulbury Constitution. In 1948, Ceylon was granted independence with a parliamentary system implementing a bicameral legislature. A House of Representatives was directly elected by popular vote. The upper house, known as the Senate, had its members elected through the House and partly by the governor general, who was the primary figurehead. The most powerful man in the new government was the Prime Minister. All seemed well, and a bright future seemed to guarantee a prosperous nation. But history has a way of making itself fail to adhere to our assumptions. 1948-1978: The Rise of Tamilese Nationalism The rise of Tamil nationalist groups, including the Tamil United Liberation Front, can be attributed in part to the significant discrimination the Tamil people encountered in the immediate post-colonial years, from 1948 up through 1978. The British colony of Ceylon gained independence from Britain in 1948 after passage of the Ceylon Independence Act. In 1948, the people of Ceylon elected the first Prime Minister, Don Stephen Senanayake, a member of the United National Party.19 Senanayake immediately passed legislation to disenfranchise and even deny citizenship to many estate Tamils who were brought to Ceylon from India by the British.20 This can be shown in the Ceylon Citizenship Act of 1948, the Indian and Pakistani Residents Act No. 3 of 1948, and the Ceylon Parliamentary Elections Amendment Act No. 48 of 1949.21 Senanayake carried out these actions to ensure that he, claiming to be a descendant of the original Buddhist monarchs, preserved the Sinhalese hegemony. This angered the Tamil people because they wanted representation in the new

17 Nyrop, The Donoughmore Commission. 18 Spencer, 235. 19 Russell R Ross ed., Sri Lanka: A Country Study (Washington DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress 1990) http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gdc/cntrystd.lk. 20 David Little, Sri Lanka The Invention of Enmity (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press 1994), 56. 21 Russell R Ross ed., Sri Lanka: A Country Study (Washington DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress 1990) http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gdc/cntrystd.lk.

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government also. In 1949, the Tamil people formed the Tamil Federal Party and wished to create a Tamil state on Ceylon. Tension continued between the Sinhalese-sponsored Sri Lankan Freedom Party and the Tamil Federal Party for many years. In 1956, Ceylon elected a new Prime Minister, Solomon West Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike, partly under the pretense that he claimed to be the “protector of Buddhism.”22 In 1957, the new Prime Minister and the leader of the Tamil Federal Party, S.J.V. Chelvanayagam, created the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact, a document drafted to repeal the disenfranchisement legislation of estate Tamils and allow Tamil to be the official language of the Northern and Eastern provinces of Ceylon. The legislators of Ceylon never passed this document. In 1959, a group of bhikkhus, radical Buddhist monks, assassinated Prime Minister Bandaranaike.23 The following year, the people of Ceylon elected his wife, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, as the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, the first female Prime Minister in the world. Discrimination against the Tamil people continued as Sirimavo continued to promote Sinhalese hegemony. At this point, the Tamil people took action and started a series of non-violent protests in response to the discrimination. In 1972, a new constitution for Ceylon was drafted that changed everything. It started by renaming Ceylon as Sri Lanka and even contained a bill of rights that ensured religious freedom. This is quite significant since there was no bill of rights in the original constitution of Ceylon. However, the Tamil people still were not given the right to speak their language. The Tamils talked of secession and quickly realized that their non-violent tactics were not working to create any sort of change. Soon after, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) formed in May of 1976 and declared they were apart of a new independent state, Tamil Eelam. In the 1977 elections, the people of Sri Lanka elected UNP representative, J.R. Jayawardene, as head of state. He helped draft the 1978 constitution which is still used today. The constitution included the use of Tamil and English as official languages, allowed the Tamils to have representatives in proportion to their population, and ensured easier access to education. Although this may seem to be a step towards resolving the discrimination against the Tamil people, the basic freedoms outlined in this constitution have never been enforced for a variety of reasons. The best explanation of this lack of enforcement is stated by David Little: “[T]he possibility of improved ethnic relations was… undermined by the government’s failure to implement its policies wholeheartedly.”24 In addition to this, legislative groups had less authority than assumed and were limited by budget cuts and corruption to enforce such legislation.25 1978 - 2002 Between the years 1978 and 1983, the terrorist group known as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the strongest of the militant Tamil separatist groups materializing from the former Tamil Students’ Movement, was responsible for approximately 265 bombings, robberies,

22 Little, 66. 23 Little 71-72. 24 Little 86-87. 25 Little, 87.

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assaults, and other various crimes. Coincidentally, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) was gaining political control of the northern and eastern sections of the country. The TULF had long been pursuing the creation of a separate Tamil state, to the great aversion of the government. The country’s first popular election of a president was in 1982. The TULF encouraged its followers to boycott the election because its candidates were not allowed to run. The United National Party (UNP) incumbent, Junius Richard Jayewaredene, won the election.26 In 1983, separatist movements were declared unconstitutional, and thus the TULF lost representation in the government.27 The Indian government’s interest in Sri Lankan affairs increased from 1983 through 1987. Numerous attempts at mediation between the Sinhalese and the Tamils failed. The impetus for such intervention was most likely the pressure from the many citizens of Tamil Nadu who were related to the Tamils in Sri Lanka. The Indian government decided that military intervention was necessary. However, a practical reason was needed to avoid international scorn.28 The Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Accord of 1987 was the Indian government’s way of satisfying its own Tamil citizens and the Sinhalese government in Colombo. The accord stated that the Indian government never would allow a separate Tamil state; however, it did recognize the northern and eastern areas as “areas of historical habitation”29 by Tamil-speaking Sri Lankans and that “Sinhalese shall be the official language of Sri Lanka. Tamil and English will also be official languages.”30 Sinhalese was first, but Tamil and English were equal to Sinhala, satisfying the Tamils. The Indian Army moved in to help restore order to the north and east. The Indians, not knowing how to distinguish guerillas from citizens, killed 2,000 Tamil civilians and caused significant property damage.31 The Indian Peace Keeping Force withdrew in March, 1990. In 1993, President Premadasa, elected in 1988 after the creation of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, was assassinated. A young boy with explosives strapped to his body ran his bicycle into the President’s May Day parade. Prime Minister Dingiri Banda Wijetunge was sworn in to finish out Premadasa’s term. 32 The people elected Chandrika Kumaratunga to the presidency in 1994. She immediately began peace talks with the LTTE. An initial peace package was accepted by the LTTE under four conditions:

1. The embargo of food, gas, and other supplies to the North was to be lifted. 2. Tamil fishermen should be allowed to fish in the North. 3. A military camp should be removed from the North.

26 Robert N. Kearny, “Ethnic Conflict and the Tamil Separatist Movement in Sri Lanka,” Asian Survey 25, no. 9 (1985): 906-910 27 Shantha K. Hennayake., “The Peace Accord and the Tamils in Sri Lanka,” Asian Survey 29, no. 4 (1989): 402. 28 Hennayake, “The Peace Accord,” 407. 29 Hennayake, “The Peace Accord,” 408. 30 Hennayake, “The Peace Accord,” 409. 31 Hennayake, “The Peace Accord,” 410-412. 32 Molly Moore, “Suicide Bomber Kills Leader of Sri Lanka; President Slain During May Day Celebration in Island Nation,” Washington Post, May 2, 1993, sec. A.

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4. LTTE members should be able to carry guns in the government-controlled East.33 The first two demands were agreed upon, but it was difficult to enforce the lift of the embargo. The LTTE was not satisfied and decided to extend the March 1995 deadline for the terms to be met. However, in April 1995, the LTTE backed out of the agreement. The Tigers blew up two ships in an east coast harbor and subsequently blew up almost a quarter of the Sri Lankan navy, including airplanes and military personnel.34 The LTTE continued to commit various terrorist acts throughout the 1990s. The government would then retaliate against Tamil citizens, and the cycle would go on. In 1999, President Kumaratunga escaped a suicide bomber and was reelected President. The millennium saw failed attempts at ceasefires and negotiating.35 Finally in 2002, a formal ceasefire was declared between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government, moderated by the Norwegian government.36 33 Marshall R. Singer, “Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict: Have Bombs Shattered Hopes for Peace?” Asian Survey 36, no. 11 (1996): 1150. 34 Singer, “Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict,” 1150-1151. 35 MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, Sri Lanka: 1999 Overview, http://www.tkb.org/MorePatterns.jsp?countryCd=CE&year=1999. 36 MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, Sri Lanka: 2001 Overview, http://www.tkb.org/MorePatterns.jsp?countryCd=CE&year=2001.

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IV. Current Political Climate The Sri Lankan conflict between the Sinhalese government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam is still present, but ever changing. Due to increased violence that occurred at the turn of the twenty-first century, the international community has begun to take notice of the instability in Sri Lanka. 2002 Sri Lankan Cease Fire In 2000 and in 2001, the LTTE repeatedly called for a cessation from hostilities with the Sri Lankan army and the beginning of peace talks with the Sri Lankan government. In 2002, the Sri Lankan government accepted the idea of peace talks with the Tamil rebel group, as long as the talks were mediated by a third party. The Norwegian government offered to be the third party and sent its foreign minister, Erik Solheim, to be the chief envoy in the Sri Lankan peace talks.37 The LTTE and the Sri Lankan government successfully brokered a cease-fire during the 2002 peace talks. Sri Lankan government officials and representatives from the LTTE signed a truce that promised to end hostilities between the two ethnic groups. The truce specifically made clear in article 1.2 that “neither party shall engage in any offensive military operation.”38 The truce continued to elaborate on the measures that were needed to restore a peaceful atmosphere between the two ethnic groups throughout the state of Sri Lanka. By the end of the negotiations, a lasting peace agreement appeared attainable. The British Broadcasting Company (BBC) reported, “The Tigers dropped their demand for independence and said they would settle for regional autonomy, a major concession. The government also gave ground and agreed to share power with the Tamil Tigers.”39 The 2002 peace accords held in place with minimal violence for about a year and a half. In 2003, the fragile peace process dissolved when the LTTE announced that its group was pulling out of peace negotiations with the Sri Lankan government until further notice. They felt the Sri Lankan government was “sidelining” the Tamil people.40 Politics of the LTTE Despite the near two and a half year success of the 2002 ceasefire, the LTTE has refused to reinstitute peace talks with the Sinhalese government. The LTTE continues to urge the implementation of a Tamil Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA). The ISGA is an experimental government, comprised solely of Tamils that would have their own government in northeastern Sri Lanka for a limited time.41 The Sinhalese government refuses to accept the ISGA proposal; the LTTE views the ISGA as the only grounds on which peace negotiations can 37The Associated Press, “Norwegian envoy to push for Sri Lanka peace negotiations,” International Herald Tribune, February 22, 2005, http://www.iht.com/bin/print_ipub.php?file=/articles/2005/02/21/news/srilanka.html. 382002 Sri Lanka Peace Accords (Colombo, 2002), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1836198.stm. 39“Q&A: Sri Lanka Crisis,” BBC World News, April 2003, http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2405347.stm. 40 “Q&A: Sri Lanka Crisis,” BBC World News, April 2003, http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2405347.stm. 41Amnesty International, “Sri Lanka,” Amnesty International, http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/lkasummary-eng.

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resume, therefore halting the delicate reconciliation process between the two groups. In addition to the deteriorating peace talks, there has been a significant fracture within the LTTE organization. One of the LTTE’s head commanders, Colonel Karuna, broke off relations with the LTTE over the issue of ruling the eastern portion of Sri Lanka, as well as the idea of negotiating with the Sinhalese government.42 When the heads of LTTE spoke against this rule by Karuna, he and several thousand militiamen disbanded, forming their own separatist faction. Karuna and his men have allied themselves with the Eelam Nation Democratic Liberation Front (MEP) against the government and mainstream Tamil Tigers. Many Sri Lankans suspect that Colonel Karuna and his supporters are responsible for the recent violence; however, the government continues to blame the LTTE for the violence.43 The splitting of the LTTE into two separate organizations continues to threaten the peace process between the mainstream LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. The Sri Lankan Government Since 1948, when Sri Lanka gained its independence from the British Empire, the Sinhalese ethnic group has been in complete control of the Sri Lankan government; the Tamils, on the other hand, have had little representation in the Sri Lankan government. The current Sri Lankan government is comprised of a coalition of leftist interest groups that make up a 225-seat Parliament. Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga is a moderate socialist. Kumaratunga’s political party used to be aligned in a political coalition with the Marxist People’s Liberation Front (JVP).44 This political coalition between Mrs. Kumaratunga’s party and the JVP led to Kumaratunga’s first presidential election success in 1994 and her subsequent election in 1999. However, very recent political bickering between the two parties has caused this coalition to collapse. The MEP is another significant political party within Parliament, and Buddhist and Muslim socialist parties with limited political power hold the remaining seats. As discussed in previous sections, the Sri Lankan government has a long history of strong anti-Tamil sentiment, with the past adoption of anti-Tamil legislation. On several occasions, the JVP has made an effort to disrupt the President’s political agenda because of their anti-Tamil sentiment. The JVP opposed both the President’s oil and electricity distribution plans because resources were to be distributed to both Tamil and Sinhalese districts.45 The frequent and often violent terrorist attacks by the Tamil Tigers in recent years did nothing to reverse this tendency in the government. Many Sinhalese leaders in the government refuse to recognize the plight of the Tamil people; these leaders believe that the rights of the Sinhalese people must be upheld at all costs. This mindset, along with a historically deep seated fear of Tamil infiltration and cultural takeover are still the viewpoints of the majority of those in government, resulting in very few Tamil political and social rights.

42 Amnesty International, “Sri Lanka,” Amnesty International, http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/lkasummary-eng. 43 Amnesty International, “Sri Lanka,” Amnesty International, http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/lkasummary-eng. 44PTI News Agency, “Sri Lankan president criticizes Marxist coalition allies,” The Hindu/BBC, June 12, 2005, http://web.lexisnexis.com/universe/document?_m=ae2334a71c8e5f9e1d6b2427f477105f&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkVA&_md5=952fb4f07890ccb8b8077551ac883998. 45 PTI News Agency, “Sri Lankan president criticizes Marxist coalition allies,” The Hindu/BBC, June 12, 2005, http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=ae2334a71c8e5f9e1d6b2427f477105f&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtz

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Political Ramifications of the Tsunami The tsunami has caused a severe backlash in Sri Lankan peace efforts, as well as the entire political scheme of the government. The international community has collected over three billion dollars in humanitarian aid for Sri Lanka. However, the distribution of this money has caused great political dissent. President Kumaratunga, along with many international observers, suggests that a plan to distribute tsunami aid to the Sri Lankan people be instituted.46 This “joint mechanism” would consist of advisors from multiple ethnic groups to distribute the aid needed to all Sri Lankans. Many view the tsunami as another possible opportunity to build peaceful relations between the two ethnic groups. Often, groups unify and ignore certain differences when there is a great foreign threat or disaster. As a result, many regard the natural disaster as a stepping-stone towards peace.47 However, this does not accurately apply to Sri Lanka because the issue of aid distribution and the peaceful experience that could be gained by a “joint mechanism” has sparked violent opposition from other political groups. The Marxist People’s Liberation Front (JVP) launched their sternest opposition to the government agenda over this issue, refusing any cooperation with Tamil people. The JVP is strongly against the idea of giving aid to the ravaged Tamil people in the northeast. Despite the strong opposition from her coalition partner, President Kumaratunga has said in defense of the joint aid program: “The government may fall…I might lose the presidency, but those things are not of national interest unlike bringing last peace to the county.”48 The JVP has effectively renounced the government over the issue of the aid program that was passed in late June 2005, leaving behind thirty-nine seats in Parliament. The loss of these seats from her coalition has left President Kumaratunga’s political party as a minority in Parliament, making it all the more difficult to get her agenda pushed through.49 In addition, the Muslims in Parliament feel that they are not adequately represented in the aid mechanism that primarily centers on Sinhalese and Tamils. According to analysts on Sri Lankan politics, “Muslims feel they may be marginalized in that process while nationalists fear the tsunami-aid deal gives legitimacy to the Tamil Tigers’ demands for a separate homeland in the north and east.”50 The Muslims responded to their perceived lack of representation in the deal by deciding to withdraw all their Mahajana Eksath Peramuna Party (MP) representatives from Parliament as well. Buddhists, feeling underrepresented in the joint aid program, have left their seats in government in protest as well and threaten violent attacks against the current regime. The Buddhists have allied themselves with the JVP and are violently protesting the aid deal. In less than ten days, seven political parties associated with three different ethnic groups have pulled out of President Kumaratunga’s government in protest. The MEP that still remains contains an active

46“Sri Lanka leader gambles on tsunami aid,” BBC World News, June 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr//1/hi/world/south_asia/4628125.stm. 47Simon Gardner, “Aid pact may help S.Lanka peace, but pitfalls remain,” Reuters, June 27, 2005, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/SP71606.htm. 48“President vows Sri Lanka aid deal,” BBC World News, June 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/south_asia/4511765.stm. 49“Sri Lanka ruling coalition splits,” BBC World News, June 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr//1/hi/world/south_asia/4080564. 50 “Muslims strike over Sri Lanka aid,” BBC World News, June 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/south_asia/4626551.stm.

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militant wing that has been accused of carrying out politically targeted killings in the last six months.51 The belief that the renegade Tamil Tiger, Colonel Karuna, is launching a series of political and civilian killings in June 2005 after siding with the MEP only serves to further complicate the current situation. According to Human Rights Watch, “while the perpetrators of the killings are not yet known, it is widely believed that they were carried out by forces loyal to Colonel Karuna, who broke away from the LTTE in March.”52 E. Kaushalyan, who was the political head of the LTTE, was murdered on February 8, 2005 along with several other Tigers. Among these men were the former parliamentarian, C. Ariayanayagam, and a member of LTTE human rights body. These killings disrupt the now fragile ceasefire agreement and add yet another dangerous element to Sri Lanka’s unstable atmosphere. There is now more strife among the Sinhalese people about how to act towards the Tamils than there is actual ethnic strife between the two groups. Current developments in the Sri Lankan conflict indicate that the conflict is changing from ethnic strife between the Sinhalese and the Tamils, to a nationwide political struggle with a potentially violent future.

51 Amnesty International, “Sri Lanka,” Amnesty International, http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/lkasummary-eng. 52 Human Rights Watch, “Sri Lanka: Killings Highlight Weaknesses in Ceasefire,” Human Rights Watch, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/02/11/slanka10162.htm.

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V. Effects of the Tsunami On the morning of December 26, tragedy struck the South Asian coastlines. One of the hardest-hit nations was Sri Lanka. Over three-fourths of the island nation’s coastline was hit by a massive tidal wave, and over 31,000 were reported dead while half a million were displaced. The economy was wrecked, inert, and the homeless roamed the streets, scavenging. But not even a day after the tsunami struck, Tamil liberation forces were gathering bodies, hauling off debris and searching for survivors while the government struggled to regain order. When national aid reached Sri Lanka, the rebel group and the government reached a state of tentative cooperation to distribute relief equally throughout the country. Relief Efforts Both the Sinhalese Government and the Tamil Tigers have organized relief efforts in Sri Lanka; however the Tigers have been far more successful in their efforts. As a result of being prepared for the challenges they face everyday within their country, the Tigers were able to respond with organized relief efforts and aid distribution.53 In the area controlled by the Buddhist Sinhalese, supplies must first be sorted out to the politicians and other high-ranking officials. By these means, immediate relief to the general population is delayed and obstructed. However, in the area controlled by the Tamil minority, relief has been distributed quickly and efficiently due to the lack of hierarchy within the organization. The Tamil relief efforts were led by the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO). Tamils divided into groups, some of which recovered bodies, assisted injured or ushered survivors to refugee centers they set up in homes and schools.54 Tamils had cleared bodies and debris from Tamil-controlled area before the end of January.55 According to Dr. P. Judyramesh Jeyakumar, head of mental health and surgery at Kilinochchi District Hospital, “They were organized. They set up field hospitals. They did triage. They sent people here with IVs and bandages. That’s why we managed so well.”56 The foreign workers who aided the region also offered praise for the organization of the Tigers’ efforts.57 A group of Tamil expatriates also contributed to the cause by flying to Sri Lanka and designing temporary local housing from local material that could later be used to rebuild homes. According to one expatriate who was a chartered engineer from London, the homes were designed because the tents provided by a U.N. agency “[were] a quick fix that did not meet the local people’s needs.”58

53 Bay Fang, “Keeping A War On Hold?; A Rare Visit to Rebel Tamil Tigers Territory in Sri Lanka Following the Tsunami’s Carnage,” U.S. News and World, January 24, 2005, 24. http://www.proquest.com. 54 Kim Barker, “Rebel Group Uses Its Discipline, Organization to Help Tsunami Victims,” Chicago Tribune, January 7, 2005, http://www.proquest.com. 55 Fang. 56 Barker. 57 Ibid. 58 Marwaan Macan-Markar, “Tsunami Impact: Tamils Building Cool Shelters to Replace Hot Tents,” Global Information Network, February 16, 2005, http://www.proquest.com.

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The Tigers initially received support from the Tamil Diaspora, but argued more aid was needed. U.S. marines were unable to contribute aid to the northern areas controlled by the Tigers due to the fact that the Tigers have been designated a terrorist organization by the United States. They were, however, able to assist the southern areas.59 While there have been many reports of the success of the Tigers and their will to help their people, there are also reports that the Tamils have refused aid offered to them.60 Foreign militaries were not welcomed to the region,61 and according to Jeya Kularaja, deputy director of health services in Mullaittivu, a group of Australian physicians were turned down when they offered their services to the north.62 Additionally, the Tigers have been accused of burning a refugee center located in Tamil territory because refugees living there accepted food and clothing from the Sri Lankan army. A Tigers spokesman denied this.63 The Sinhalese government has also contributed to the aid distribution in Sri Lanka. According to Ryan Anderson, the World Food Program coordinator, “The government is involved in our program…It pays for all the transportation costs, the storage costs…In regards to food aid, in terms of investment, they’ve invested quite a lot.”64 When interviewed about the response to the tsunami, Oxfam America’s President Raymond C. Offenheiser stated:

I think one of the advantages of the response in Sri Lanka was they had the kind of infrastructure, government presence, and institutional capacity to be able to respond… In this case the response was good. And this was true from what I could tell up and down that east coast; we also saw this in the south.65

There has been conflict over aid and how to distribute it from the beginning. The Tigers originally tried to distribute all relief throughout the north and east using their own aid organization. They claimed the government was allowing more aid to be distributed to southern areas. The Sri Lankan government designated the military to run the refugee camps, including those located in Tamil controlled land.66 Both sides have made accusations that the other was not prepared to offer a satisfactory response to the situation.67 The government maintains that they have not withheld aid from the north deliberately. According to government spokesman Niranjan de Soysa, “It’s possible the government wasn’t allowed into certain areas. It’s possible it was our own inefficiencies that didn’t get us to certain areas. But we have never actively discriminated against anybody.”68 59 Fang. 60 Ibid. 61 Barker. 62 Fang. 63Barker. 64 Melissa Tjota, “Sri Lanka and the Fight for Peace,” The Harvard International Relief, (June 26, 2005): http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1306/. 65 Raymond C. Offenheiser, Interview by Chris Hufstader, Oxfam America, http://www.oxfamamerica.org/whatwedo/emergencies/asian_floods_2004/latest_news/tsunami_analysis March 29, 2005. 66 Fang. 67 Tjota. 68 Fang.

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There are also reports that the tsunami has brought the two opposing groups together. S. P. Thamiselven, a Tamil leader, stated, “This new tragic situation has laid the foundation for both parties to come together and work towards closing the division between the two parties.”69 As will be discussed later, the recent signing of the Tsunami Relief Council and the formation of the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) have provided new hope for peace between the two groups. Tsunami Relief Council/ P-TOMS Days after the tsunami on December 26th, 2004, the idea of forming a joint management structure between the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and LTTE is proposed. Six months after intensive negotiations, the two parties, under pressure from the international community, signed a draft Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on June 24 for the establishment of a Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS). P-TOMS, or the Tsunami Relief Council, is an opportunity for the GOSL and the LTTE to work together in an administrative structure to provide equally distributed relief and reconstruction work to tsunami effected regions of Sri Lanka.70 However, this joint coalition and the stability of the GOSL are being threatened by opposition to the MOU joint coalition document. Muslims, who represent about 7.5% of the 19.5 million Sri Lankans, oppose the MOU because they are not a signatory in the deal. The Muslims feel underrepresented in the tsunami relief efforts, despite their representation on the tsunami-aid council.71 Mr. Ibrahim, secretary of the Federation of Amparai district Mosques, told BBC, “It is shocking. The present deal would not give any real power to our representatives. We are totally opposed to this arrangement.”72 The National Unity Alliance (NUA), a major Muslim party, is considering extracting its two MPs out of the ruling coalition.73 The Muslims’ opposition endangers the GOSL and the effectiveness of P-TOMS. In addition to the threat of the Muslim opposition, the opposition from the nationalist People’s Liberation Front (JVP) heightens the country’s political instability. The JVP fears that the Tsunami Relief Council gives the LTTE too much power, and that the rebels will be able to use the tsunami funds to boost their armory.74 The JVP also fears that the joint coalition lends legitimacy to the LTTE’s demands for an independent state in the north and east.75 Because of these misgivings, the JVP withdrew its 39 members from Sri Lanka’s 225-member Parliament. This leaves President Kumaratunga with a fragile minority government composed of 66 members from Kumaratunga’s

69 Tjota 70 Ethirajan Anbarasan, “Sri Lanka Leader Gambles on Tsunami Aid,” BBC Tamil Service, June 27, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4628125.stm 71 “Muslims Strike Over Sri Lanka Aid,” BBC News, June 27, 2005, http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4626551.stm. 72Ethirajan Anbarasan, “Muslim Anger Over Sri Lanka Deal,” BBC Tamil Service, May 1, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/412100.stm. 73 “Muslims Strike Over Sri Lanka Aid.” 74 Anbarasan, “Sri Lanka Leader Gambles on Tsunami Aid.” 75 “Muslims Strike Over Sri Lanka Aid.”

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Freedom Party and other smaller allied parties; 68 parliament members are from the opposition United National Party. 76 Even with opposition of several political fractions, the P-TOMS agreement was signed and employed on Friday June 24, 2005. President Kumaratunga stated, “The Government is unshaken… but there is no instability. We will be short of 20 or 30 votes in parliament but that will not be a problem to implement our policies.”77 The main focus of P-TOMS is to plan and implement relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development to the coastal communities in the six districts of Ampara, Batticaloa, Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, and Trincomalee. The MOU will be in operation for one year, but this time frame can be extended if the parties involved form a consensus. P-TOMS consists of three main subcommittees which include GOSL, LTTE and Muslim representatives: The Post-Tsunami Costal Reconstruction Committee (the “High Level Committee” or HLC), The Post-Tsunami Costal Reconstruction Committee for the Six Districts (The “Regional Committee” or RC), and the Post Tsunami Costal Reconstruction Committees for each of the Ampara, Batticaloa, Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, and Trincomalee districts (the “Districts Committee” or DC). The HLC has the ability to formulate policies for the equal distribution of donor funds in the Tsunami Disaster Zone (TDZ). This allocation is based on the needs assessment submitted to the HLC and is in proportion to the number of affected persons and the extent of damage. The HLC also has a prerequisite of advisory services and is in charge of monitoring the functions of P-TOMS. Members of the HLC include one nominee by the GOSL, LTTE, and the Muslim parties. The mission of the RC is to develop strategies for the execution and prioritization of post-tsunami emergency relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development measures. It is also in charge of overall monitoring of projects and fund management. Its members include two nominees by the GOSL, five nominees from the LTTE, and three members nominated by the Muslim parties. The DC’s main functions incorporate identifying and prioritizing needs, generating, receiving, appraising, and prioritizing project proposals from stakeholders, and submitting recommendations to the RC. The DC must also monitor and report on the project process to the RC. All parties will be represented to varying degrees as part of the DC. 78 The international community, which donated $3 billion dollars to the Tsunami Relief Council, lobbied for a joint mechanism so funds did not have to be directly channeled to the LTTE; many countries list the LTTE rebel group as a terrorist organization.79 Conversely, the LTTE stated that the tsunami aid was not being equally distributed to Tamil controlled regions in the north.80 In response to these allegations, the GOSL replied that the funds had not yet been channeled to those areas. The Tsunami Relief Council represents the first time the rebel group and the Sri

76 “S. Lanka Government Nears Collapse,” CNN, June 16, 2005, http://www.cnn.com /2005/WORLD/asiapcf/06/16/srilanka.government/index.html. 77 “Sri Lanka Split ‘Not a Disaster,” BBC News, June 16, 2005, http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4100974.stm. 78 Government of Sri Lanka, “Sri Lanka: Tsunami Aid Deal Between Govt. and LTTE Signed,” June 24, 2005, Quoted by Relief Web, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/VBOL-6DNHUA?OpenDocument. 79 “Sri Lanka Tsunami Aid Deal Signed,” BBC News, June 24, 2005, http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4617917.stm. 80 “Sri Lanka: A Motion Against the Government – Tamil Agreement for Post-Tsunami Aid,” Asian News, June 27, 2005, http://www.asiannews.it/view.php? l=en&art=3596.

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Lankan Government have come together to work towards a common goal. Many, including President Chandrika Kumaratanga, believe that this council is the first step in resuming the peace process, which stalled in 2003. D.B.S. Jeyaraj, a Sri Lankan political analyst, states, “The most important thing is, despite the stalemate in the peace process, the president has ensured that full-scale hostilities will not return for a while.” The LTTE even has a chance to prove that they are not only a military force, but also an organization capable of governing and improving the well-being of the Tamil people. If all goes well during the duration of P-TOMS there is a possibility of reconciliation between the LTTE and the GOSL and a permanent resolution to the ethnic conflict.81 Aid and the International Perspective The tsunami joint mechanism is an agreement between the Sinhalese government and the Tamil Tigers to facilitate aid to the survivors. In the past several months of aid and relief distributions to the tsunami survivors, the Tamil Tigers have gained positive public exposure including a newfound approval from the United Nations. Because of party tensions, peace is hard to facilitate, especially between two ethnic groups who have been warring for twenty years. It came as a surprise to the international community that the enemies largely put aside their differences for the tsunami relief effort. "They [the Tamil Tigers and the Sinhalese government] have done the right thing in placing people's needs first," said U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan.82 As a result of their efficiency, the Tamil Tigers have adopted a public relations campaign that alters the international community’s view of the confirmed terrorist group. Since the launch of the Tamils’ media crusade to bring international attention to their country’s plight and their call for relief aid, the rebel group gained more international credibility. Before the tsunami, the world perceived the Sinhalese government as the legitimate party while the Tamils retained their reputation as a terrorist organization. In the aftermath of the tsunami, the Sinhalese government showed its instability and the Tamils proved themselves to be politically able to compromise and employ an efficient organization in times of dire need. Despite the technical cooperation, the antagonistic attitudes that dominated the Sinhalese and Tamil groups still surface, such as in official arrangements concerning the relief effort for survivors of the tsunami. SP Thamilselvan, the head of the rebels’ political wing, said, "We [the Tamil Tigers] have agreed to sign the document [tsunami aid deal], but the government is delaying it.”83 Numerous world powers have taken a newfound interest in the coalition between the Tamil rebels and the Sri Lankan government, including India. India’s external ministry spokesman

81 Anbarasan, “Sri Lanka Leader Gambles on Tsunami Aid”. 82 “Annan Welcomes Sri Lanka's Tsunami Aid Management Accord,” Kyodo News, June 25, 2005, http://asia.news.yahoo.com/050624/kyodo/d8au5kdo2.html. 83 “Tamil Rebels in Tsunami Aid Talks,” BBC News South Asia, June 22, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4118178.stm.

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Navtej Sarna said, “Considering the scale of tragedy, it is important that the relief is made available to all victims regardless of their religion or ethnicity."84 The statement by a foreign official is crucial in indicating how the world views Sri Lanka in direct aftermath of the Tsunami. India previously maintained a “posture of disinterest or neutrality”85 in terms of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. With its renewed interest in the condition of Sri Lanka, other countries should follow suit. Japan also plays an important part in the reconstruction of Sri Lanka. In the aftermath of the tsunami, Japan loaned the island nation a total of nearly $100 million that will have to be repaid within 40 years.86 China also abandoned its past silence with its recent donation of 270 tons of canned fish for the homeless of Sri Lanka.87 In effect, the aftermath of the tsunami has shown that the Tamil Tigers are a viable organization in terms of the management of Sri Lanka. With this fact, the international community has come to view the Tamil Tigers as more than a terrorist group, and perhaps a future boon to avert crisis in the south Asia seas. Effects of the Tsunami It is clear that this disaster served as a catalyst for more communication and cooperation between Tiger rebels and the Sri Lankan government. The P-TOMS agreement recently signed by both parties has allowed for the peace process to continue. In the process of signing this agreement, over thirteen drafts were discussed between the rebels and the government.88 According to Norwegian Foreign Minister Jan Petersen, “This is the first time in over two decades of armed conflict that the parties have agreed to cooperate in a political-administrative structure that comprises the national, regional and district levels.”89 Both the government and the Tamil Tigers have turned much of their focus on relief efforts, and have even put forth the effort to ease their trade barriers against each other.90 The international community has also promised 4.5 billion dollars for tsunami aid if another peace agreement is signed between the two parties.91 This may very well help push both groups to look for peace in order to gain this aid. With the establishment of cooperation, negation, and communication, the tsunami’s devastation may allow for political peace. Many believe that war cannot erupt due to the fact that the country is

84 “India Supports Tsunami Aid to Victims in Sri Lanka,” PTI news agency, New Delhi, June 24, 2005 http://news.monstersandcritics.com/mediamonitor/article_1021581.php/India_supports_tsunami_aid_to_victims_in_Sri_Lanka. 85 P. Ramasamy. “The Tamil National Question,” Tamil Canadian Services, June 30, 2005, http://www.tamilcanadian.com/pageview.php?ID=3360&SID=40. 86 “Japan Gives $100 mn in Aid to Lanka,” Sify News, June 8, 2005, http://sify.com/news/fullstory.php?id=13867313. 87 Mendaka Abeysekera. “China Donates 270 Tons of Canned Fish to Sri Lanka,” Asian Tribune, June 30, 2005, http://www.asiantribune.com/show_news.php?id=14916”. 88 “Sri Lanka Aid Deal with Rebels,” Sri Lanka Source, June 25, 2005, http://story.srilankasource.com/p.x/ct/9/id/4e194e1d04f84f6d/cid/119937e494dd663e. 89 Ibid. 90 John Lancaster. “Tamil Tiger Guerrillas Directing Aid Efforts,” Washington Post Foreign Service, January 4, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A45028-2005Jan3.html. 91 “Asia: A Glimpse of Peace; Sri Lanka,” The Economist, June 25, 2005, 74. www.proquest.com.

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already in ruins, and both the rebels and the government know that the country cannot afford such a conflict.92 Even with these positive effects predicted, many experts feel as though the tsunami may harm the political process. According to a report in The Economist, “The tsunami in fact seemed to bring renewed war closer.” After the disaster, arguments erupted across the country on how aid supplies should be shared and distributed. As the Sri Lankan population struggles, both the rebels and the Sinhalese government have accused each other of distributing aid to areas that have a larger majority of their party. The government was also reluctant to pass the aid agreement due to the fact that it may give the rebels international recognition.93 With mixed views coming from the international community, the effect of the tsunami on the conflict is yet to be seen. While the two groups are now communicating, their disagreements within their dialogues do not predict a peaceful outcome. It may be possible to use the money from tsunami donations toward finding a peaceful solution. It is not clear, though, that this is acceptable.94 No matter how the conflict is affected by the tsunami, the tsunami’s wrath will certainly play some role in the conflict’s future. Recommendations

• Both parties should focus on maintaining the communication that they established after the tsunami.

• Both the government and the Tamil Tigers should use the tsunami as a common ground for cooperation.

• The cooperation between the two groups concerning the tsunami aid should not be viewed as simply a humanitarian agreement. Both parties should view it as the first steps to peace.

92Lancaster 93 “Asia: A glimpse of peace; Sri Lanka”. 94 Mr. Brenden Varma, Phone call to UN, June 29, 2005.

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VI. Terrorism Tactics and their Consequences As in many ethnic conflicts, terrorism plays a pivotal role in the current Sinhalese/Tamil dispute in Sri Lanka. Considered a terrorist organization by the United States since 1999,95 the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), also known as the Tamil Tigers, has evolved into a widely known terrorist group since its formation in 1976. Although the group has made strides toward recognition as a political faction, the LTTE still resorts to terrorist actions. Connections have also been made between terrorist acts and the Sri Lankan government.96 This violence may impede the peace efforts and for this reason the terrorist operations must be addressed if diplomatic negotiations are not successful. Organization The LTTE has proven itself an organized and sophisticated group. LTTE Chief Velupillai Prabhakaran leads a governing committee that oversees the two branches of the group: political and military. The military department is divided into a series of different groups including the Sea Tigers, a maritime operation wing; the Air Tigers, an airborne operation wing; the Charles Anthony Regiment, a combat wing; the Black Tigers, a suicide bombing wing; and an extremely secretive intelligence wing. Anton Balasingham, considered to be a top political advisor and mind behind the LTTE, also under the control of the governing committee, heads the political department.97 Funding The LTTE receives funding and military support from many sources, mainly by Tamils in other nations. According to Rohan Gunaratna, a professor specializing in LTTE research at St. Andrew’s University in Edinburgh, “the Tigers are on the cutting edge of arms trafficking”98 as well. Indian Tamils once contributed a majority of the LTTE’s external funds. As the death toll and human rights violations rose within the conflict, however, most Indians ceased to back the terrorist group. The loss of Indian support did not hurt the Tigers.99 The LTTE soon began to rely on a large population of expatriates in countries such as Canada, Britain, Switzerland, and Australia for funding. Tamils in these countries are said to donate approximately $1 million U.S. a month.100 LTTE supplies, such as surface-to-air missiles, assault rifles, and grenade launchers, have been traced to Cambodian generals and the Khmer Rouge.101 Ukraine has come onto the

95 National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, “Patterns of Global Terrorism: Sri Lanka: 1999 Overview,” MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base. http://www.tkb.org/MorePatterns.jsp?countryCd=CE&year=1999. 96 Chris Smith, “South Asia’s Enduring War,” in Creating Peace in Sri Lanka, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 36. 97 “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),” South Asia Terrorism Portal. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/terroristoutfits/LTTE.HTM. 98 Raymond Bonner, “Tamil Guerrillas in Sri Lanka: Deadly and Armed to the Teeth; A WORLD OF ARMS: The Colombo Connection,” New York Times, March 7, 1998, http://www.proquest.com. 99 Robert I. Rotberg, “Sri Lanka’s Civil War: From Mayhem toward Diplomatic Resolution,” in Creating Peace in Sri Lanka, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 9. 100 Bonner, “Tamil Guerrillas in Sri Lanka.” 101 Ibid.

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scene as a growing source of LTTE military equipment by providing approximately sixty tons of explosives to the rebels.102 The LTTE also receive arms directly from the Bulgarian and North Korean governments, along with dealers from Hong Kong, Singapore, Lebanon, and Cyprus.103 Former Tamil Tigers have given accounts that the group had two American Stinger missiles at one point, apparently acquired from Afghan Mujaheddin rebels. There have also been hints that organized crime groups in Russia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Afghanistan, and Mozambique are supporting the LTTE. Although the LTTE tends to receive most funding and arms from external sources, it also has internal projects to provide for itself. By the mid 1980s, the group had already started its own arms program. In addition, the LTTE runs a number of small businesses such as gas stations, restaurants, and shops in Sri Lanka and elsewhere in the world to fund their cause.104 The Tamil Rehabilitation Organization, which raises money for tsunami relief, has been accused of being a front for the LTTE that funds the terrorist organization with money raised for tsunami relief. The LTTE has denied the claim.105 Tactics and Targets Credited as being the “deadliest terrorist group in the world until September 11,”106 the LTTE uses a variety of techniques but mainly relies on suicide bombers from their Black Tiger wing. According to the New York Times, “the Tigers did not invent the suicide attack, but they proved the tactic to be so unnerving and effective for a vastly outmanned fighting force that their methods were studied and copied, notably in the Middle East.”107 The group also developed special devices for suicide bombings including bodysuits and protective equipment that make the act more effective. The LTTE was credited with over half of the suicide bombings worldwide in 2003.108 According to the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, the group has been responsible for 70 attempted killings since 1968. Twenty-eight percent of these attacks were aimed at Sri Lankan government officials. Other significant targets include military personnel, airports and airlines, businesses, ships, police, and transportation devices. Five of these incidents have been acts of international terrorism. All the international attacks were against Indian government officials and occurred between 1984 and 1995. Since then, the LTTE has not attacked outside Sri Lanka.109 Sinhalese Violence Though not as extreme as the LTTE in its violent tendencies, the Sinhalese government has also committed unjustifiable, brutal acts. In particular, it often seems to resort to violations of the 102 Ibid. 103 Ibid. 104 Rotberg, “Sri Lanka’s Civil War, 9. 105 Stewart Bell, “Terrorists behind Tamil fundraising group, RCMP says: Seeking charity status: 'Front' controlled by Tamil Tigers, expert testified in 1999,” National Post, January 19, 2005, http://www.lexisnexis.com. 106 Amy Waldan, “Masters of Suicide Bombing: Tamil Guerrillas of Sri Lanka,” New York Times, January 14, 2003, http://www.proquest.com. 107 Ibid. 108 Ibid. 109 National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Terrorist Group Profile: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=3623.

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human rights of Tamil civilians when combating the LTTE. Other allegations of Sinhalese violence also represent the government’s destructive nature.110 As a result of the state of emergency that the government of Sri Lanka imposed in July of 1997, thousands of Tamil civilians were detained without charges. Furthermore, thousands more civilians simply disappeared. Most of these detainees are suspected Tamil sympathizers or supporters; while lawful detentions of suspected terrorists are acceptable, illegitimate imprisonments infringe on human rights, and they should therefore be considered acts of state terrorism.111 In 1990, the government of Sri Lanka, frustrated by the presence of Indian peacekeepers that, it believed, were meddling in Sri Lankan affairs, again resorted to state sponsored bloodshed in an attempt to remove the Indian troops. Ironically, the group that the government sponsored was the organization that they hoped to fight after the withdrawal of the Indians: the LTTE. The resulting arms shipments to the Tamil Tigers allowed them to put increasing pressure on the peacekeeping force. By the end of 1990, the Indian army had completely withdrawn its troops from Sri Lanka, thus allowing the fighting to continue between the Tamils and the Sinhalese.112 After the removal of the Indian peacekeeping force, fighting again erupted in Sri Lanka between state troops and the LTTE. Using brutal strategies that they had learned during conflicts against JVP socialist guerillas, the government troops waged total war against the Tamil people. Execution squads killed anyone associated with the LTTE. In addition, the Sinhalese decimated several areas of the countryside and persisted in treating the Tamil people inhumanely.113 Repercussions The violent events and organizations associated with the Sri Lankan conflict have affected the United States, as well as other nations, and will continue to do so until the conflict is brought to an end.114 For example, as a result of the splintering of the Tamil people into different groups, intra-ethnic violence among the Tamils has occurred throughout Sri Lanka and other countries across the globe. Perhaps the most obvious manifestations of such bloodshed are the assassinations of enemy Tamils in Europe, North America, and the southern region of Asia.115 In addition to assassinations, the LTTE also influences the United States and other nations in other, more peaceful ways that may not be in the states’ best interest. For example, the LTTE used a public relations firm to lobby the United States Congress in order to prevent the acceptance of a bill that restricts terrorist operations. It has taken similar steps in other nations, especially Canada, where much of the group’s funding originates.116 The LTTE not only takes measures that directly affect other nations, but also pursues strategies that indirectly affect other conflicts, often causing them to become more deadly. For example, the group claims an incredible number

110 Chris Smith, “South Asia’s Enduring War,” in Creating Peace in Sri Lanka, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 36. 111Ibid, 36. 112 Rotberg, “Sri Lanka’s Civil War,” 9. 113 Ibid., 9. 114 Rohan Gunaratna, “International and Regional Implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil Insurgency,” International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=57 (accessed June 28, 2005). 115 Ibid. 116 Ibid.

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of suicide bombings.117 Such a large number of bombings could have inspired other terrorist groups to follow similar procedures in the past and may continue to encourage such groups in the future. Furthermore, the LTTE’s use of child soldiers may encourage rebel armies in Africa and other regions of the world to recruit more children to fight because of the LTTE’s relative success as a terrorist organization. The group’s expanding influence in Africa may further impact such organizations. One example of such expansion is the LTTE’s recent opening of an office in Botswana. Finally, the group’s growing ties with other terrorist organizations may prove to increase their influence in the international terrorist community as a whole.118 Recommendations The following suggested solutions for the Tamil/Sinhalese conflict are primarily geared towards the disarmament of LTTE. While a diplomatic victory is ideal, the situation suggests that solutions involving propaganda, military operations, and economic actions may be more practical. These suggestions stem from this realization.

• The Sri Lankan government, with the support of moderate Tamils, should strongly urge nations with significant Tamil populations to ban their population’s donations to the LTTE. The government should make this request to the United Nations but other countries must fulfill this suggestion using their own free will.

• The government should effectively use the media inside and outside of the country to sway popular support against the LTTE.119 Without the support of the Tamil people inside and outside of Sri Lanka, the group will find it much more difficult to recruit combatants and fund its operations. Such results would seriously cripple the LTTE.

• The government should further educate its population and diplomats about the complexities of the LTTE and other groups associated with it. 120 Such education is critical in the diplomats’ endeavors to rally foreign governments’ support for the campaign against the LTTE. Better education on the subject would also be invaluable in attempts to urge Tamils in Sri Lanka and other nations to cease their support of the LTTE.

• In order to limit arms procurement, the Sri Lankan government should request that nations improve their enforcement of laws banning black market arms sales. This request should especially be made to nations that are known suppliers of LTTE weapons. Hopefully, nations such as the United States would back this request in order to aid their own anti-terrorism agendas. Such a request could be made to the United Nations.

• Finally, the government should improve the Sri Lankan military and intelligence systems by teaching both organizations about effective methods of cooperation and information sharing. In addition, training them more rigorously in strategies of unconventional guerilla warfare would improve their chances of military victories against the Tamil Tigers.121

117 Waldan, “Masters of Suicide Bombing: Tamil Guerrillas of Sri Lanka,” New York Times, January 14, 2003, http://www.proquest.com. 118 Gunaratna, “International and Regional Implications.” 119 Ibid. 120 Ibid. 121 Ibid.

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VII. Role of Children in the Conflict The involvement of Sri Lankan children in the LTTE calls for immediate action towards deterring future recruitment as well as helping children already affected by warfare. Following the 2004 tsunami and the civil war, the children of Sri Lanka have become increasingly prone to participation in the military wing of the Tamil Tigers. The tsunami resulted in the displacement of more than 550,000 persons122 while the nineteen-year civil war in Sri Lanka resulted in the displacement of 800,000 people, one third of whom were children.123 Orphaned children often become targets of the Tamil Tigers organization, which is located in the area where the tsunami hit the country the hardest; thus those orphaned by the tsunami are particularly at risk for abduction and recruitment by the LTTE.124 In 2004, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) formulated an action plan in accordance with numerous organizations such as the Ministry of Social Welfare, Tamils Rehabilitation Organization (TRO), Save the Children in Sri Lanka, and the United Nations to address the situation and improve the lives of Sri Lankan children affected by war. This plan called for the LTTE to cease all recruitment of children and release all child soldiers. This plan instructed the Sri Lankan government to take action to rehabilitate the basic infrastructure within the country. Additionally, this plan called for the UN and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to accelerate and improve their implementation of programs related to children affected by war and child rights in this region.125 As of October 31, 2004, UNICEF documented 3,516 new cases of child recruitment since the cease-fire signed in February of 2002. Only 1,206 children were formally released by the Tigers, according to UNICEF. As of November 2004, UNICEF files hold documentation of 1,395 child soldiers within the Tamil Tigers. According to UNICEF these numbers most likely remain low due to the fact that:

Some families may be unaware of the possibility of registering, may be afraid to do so, or may have difficulty reaching a UNICEF office…this suggests that the total number of children remaining with the LTTE may be as much as four times higher than the 1,395 figure suggests.126 Recruitment and Re-Recruitment

The LTTE uses a number of tactics to recruit children. The LTTE has an advanced propaganda campaign which, according to Human Rights Watch, “regularly exposed Tamil children throughout the North and East [of Sri Lanka] to special events honoring LTTE heroes, parades of

122 Indian Ocean Earthquake Tsunami Disaster, http://www.idpproject.org/tsunami.htm. 123 UNICEF, At a Glance: Sri Lanka,www.unicef.org/infobycountry/srilanka_901.html. 124 Mayank Chhaya, “Biggest Victims Are Children: A journalist grieves for orphaned children, focus on psychological trauma.” News-India Times, January 14, 2005, http:// www.proquest.com. 125 UNICEF, Call to increased action for Sri Lanka’s war affected children, UNICEF http://www.unicef.org/media/media_19036.html. 126 Human Rights Watch, Living in Fear: Child Soldiers and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, http://hrw.org/reports/2004/srilanka1104/.

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LTTE cadres, public displays of paraphernalia, and speeches and videos, particularly in schools.”127 The poverty in North and East Sri Lanka, especially in the East, along with a “lack of vocational and educational opportunities”128 causes many children to volunteer. The Los Angeles Times reported that the LTTE contests the accusations that they recruit children, saying, “many youngsters lie about their age to join the group.”129 However, according to a report by Amnesty International, “[t]he Tamil Tigers are increasingly turning to threats and violence in a recruitment drive for child soldiers.”130 A number of children have been abducted while walking to or from school or work and others have been taken by force from their homes or public places. Families often do not resist because they fear retaliation from the LTTE. In a report from the BBC, a former child soldier said that “he was picked up by the rebels while going to pluck yams from the palm trees to sell to support his family.”131 The LTTE does not discriminate when it comes to the gender of the child either. UNICEF has reported that 40 percent of all child recruits for the LTTE are girls, and girls have carried out numerous attacks throughout Sri Lanka.132 Orphans are also prime targets for recruitment by the LTTE. The Toronto Star reported, “since the tsunami disaster, UNICEF has recorded more than 40 cases of child recruitment, including several cases from relief camps for tsunami survivors.”133

The LTTE not only recruits new child soldiers, but they also re-recruit many former child soldiers. In April 2004, a faction group of LTTE adult and child soldiers lead by Colonel Karuna dispersed, and between 4,000 and 6,000 soldiers returned to their homes. According to a Human Rights Watch report, of those soldiers returning by early August 2004, UNICEF registered 1,800 children. By June, extreme LTTE forces had begun a large campaign to re-recruit those soldiers who had returned to their homes in the East. This included the re-recruitment of many child soldiers. The extreme LTTE forces used many of the same tactics for re-recruitment as they had used for the original recruitment, except that violent tactics were used more regularly. Girls are even more susceptible to re-recruitment because as former members of the LTTE they are easily identified by the short haircuts that they received when they became members.134

Even though the LTTE has agreed to end all recruitment of children and stop using children as part of its forces, the rebel group has failed to do so. In 2003, the LTTE, along with the Sri Lankan government, agreed on and signed an Action Plan for Children Affected by War. The LTTE pledged to stop the recruitment and use of children, but figures from UNICEF show that even though a large number of children have been released, almost twice as many have been recruited.135

127 Living in Fear, 5. 128Ibid. 129 “Rebels Recruiting Children, U.N. Says,” Los Angeles Times, January 15, 2005, http://www.proquest.com. 130 Amnesty International, Sri Lanka: Tamil Tigers beating up families to recruit child soldiers, Amnesty International, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA370022004?open. 131 Frances Harrison, “Hope for Sri Lanka’s child soldiers,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2289944.stm. 132 Living in Fear, 6-7. 133 Namini Wijedasa, “Saving Child Soldiers,” The Toronto Star, March 21, 2005, http://www.lexisnexis.com. 134 Living in Fear, 37-47. 135 Living in Fear, 7.

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Life as a Child Tamil Tiger Similar to other military groups, the Tamil Tigers use a process of basic training followed by advanced training, which eventually leads to actual combat. Basic training lasts between three and five months with more specified or advanced training lasting around six months. Basic training consists primarily of rigorous physical exercise and both military and weaponry education. Morning sessions focus on building strength and endurance training through such exercises as “weight lifting, jumping, running, crawling over sharp terrain, karate, rope climbing and practice in climbing heights.” Those who are unable to keep up are forced to do more difficult exercises in greater amounts and are sporadically hit and kicked.136 Afternoon sessions focus on training of special skills such as map reading and code breaking, as well as educating the children on Tamil Tiger history and war tactics. A girl recruited at age 13 commented that she “had training on war tactics: if there is an army camp, how to approach, kill, plan the attack…if you get too tired and can’t continue, they will beat you.”137 Advanced training is more specialized and the children are placed in units based on officers’ assertions of their strengths. Areas of specialization range from intelligence, security divisions to protect higher officers, and specified training on specific weapon systems such as landmines and bombs, to non-military skills like medicine and administration. The more educated a child is the greater the opportunity to work in non-combat fields; those who are less educated, often the youngest children, train for combat. Combat training includes preparation by “attacking unprotected or weakly defended border villages.” Hundreds of people have been killed in these attacks by the child soldiers armed with automatic weapons being led by older, experienced fighters.138 The cease-fire agreement signed in February of 2002 between the Tigers and the Sri Lankan government has caused a reduction in children in actual combat, though recruitment and training persist.139 Training also consists of an emphasis on the importance of securing Tamil information and of giving one’s own life if necessary; that is, the children are taught to fear the Sri Lankan government and are told that if they are caught they will be brutally beaten and killed. Thus, the children wear cyanide capsule necklaces that they are instructed to swallow if they are ever in imminent danger of being caught. During their time in the military children are not allowed to have contact with their parents with the exception of Martyr’s Day (Hero’s Day) on November 27th. On this day Tamils revere those killed in war and celebrate their attempt to gain liberation from the Sri Lankan government. Parents have sacrificed their lives in search of their children’s location and have been turned away by Tamil leaders after several days of waiting in hopes of speaking to their children. The leaders tell the

136 Keairns, Yvonne E., Ph.D, The Voices of Girl Child Soldiers. Quaker United Nations Office (New York, 2002), 30. http://www.geneva.quno.info/pdf/QUNO%20Child%20soldiers%20report.pdf. 137 Living in Fear, 28. 138 Gunartna, Rohan, “LTTE Child Combatants”. Jane’s Intelligence Review. July 1998. 3. http://www.operationsick.com/reports/20011025_lttechildcombatantsinsrilanka.htm 139 Living in Fear, 28.

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parents that their children do not wish to see them. Letter writing and phone calls are also prohibited. 140 The Tamil Tigers often practice collective punishment for child soldiers. In this type of punishment, the entire group is punished for an individual’s mistakes, which often results in children resenting their peers for their actions. Those that try to escape are beaten in front of their unit to discourage others from attempts. Nirmala, recruited at age fourteen, told Human Rights Watch that “Some children die. If you do it twice, they will shoot you. In my wing, if someone escaped, the whole group was lined up to watch them get beaten.”141 Alcohol use and sexual activity are punished and the children are forbidden to comfort each other through physical touch or emotional support. Throughout training the children receive adequate amounts of food and sleep to ensure their physical growth. The children receive uniforms as well as a pair of jeans, a few shirts, and shoes. During menstruation girls receive necessities. Girl soldiers commented that “When sick or injured they were taken care of and given medicine. They would be taken to see the doctor and may even be sent to a camp hospital.”142 The basic problem is that while the children are mistreated physically as well as psychologically, their physiological needs are often met much more as a soldier than they would be in their poverty stricken homes; thus one can see the enticing nature of the Tamil Tigers to youth.

Psychological Effects of Child Warfare As a result of their exposure to warfare, children in Sri Lanka suffer from numerous detrimental psychological results. After being exposed to the atrocities of war, enduring a rigorous training schedule, or following strict codes of conduct under the control of the Tamil Tigers, the children of Sri Lanka face psychological problems significantly hindering their adolescent growth and development.143 In addition to the possibility of death and injury, time with the Tamil Tiger army often results in a multitude of psychological consequences. Children observed after their time spent with the Tamil Tigers portrayed signs of mental conditions such as depression and post-traumatic stress disorder, which “leave children as complete psychological and social wrecks.”144 Children are exceptionally vulnerable and impressionable and therefore a child’s time with the Tamil Tiger army can result in permanent damage to their mental health.145 According to Daya Somasundaram, professor of Psychiatry at University of Jaffna in Jaffna, Sri Lanka:

In the civil war that has been in progress in northeast Sri Lanka for almost two decades children have been traumatized by common experiences such as shelling,

140 Ibid. 141 Living in Fear. 27. 142 Voices of Girl Child Soldiers, 22. 143 The Voices of Girl Child Soldiers, 2. 144 Daya Somasundaram, Child Soldiers: Understanding the Context, http//bmj.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/full/324/7348/1268. 145 Ibid.

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helicopter strafing, round ups, cordon and search operations, deaths, injury, destruction, mass arrests, detention, shootings, grenade explosions and landmines.146 Somasundaram later concludes that exposure to war situations cause children to experience psychological effects that may significantly hinder their development. A large percentage of children who studied at a school in Vaddukoddai, Sri Lanka, a region particularly exposed to the ethnic warfare, experienced numerous psychological consequences, including sleep disturbances and irritability. These students also portrayed significant decline in school performance and increased violent use of war vocabulary and practice of war games.147 During their time spent in the Tamil Tiger army, children miss out on childhood experiences crucial to their development. UNICEF representative Ted Chaiban acknowledges the important aspects of childhood that child soldiers miss when he discusses their reintegration back into their communities, saying, “For too long these children have had to live as soldiers and have been denied the rights of other children to learn, play, and live in the security of a family environment.148 When children are released from the LTTE, there are numerous issues which they and their families must face, including security, education, vocational training, and psychosocial problems. A hindrance to reintegrating children back into society is the result of a prevalent fear of re-recruitment. Many children will not leave their homes for school or vocational training for fear of being taken away and forced back into the LTTE. According to Human Rights Watch, “The LTTE threatened families that they would take children by force if they did not return, or they would take other children or parents in their stead.”149 Upon returning to school, former child soldiers are years older than the children at their educational level, as the soldiers have not received formal education since their recruitment. Sri Lanka’s education system is competitive, and often former children soldiers are unable to catch up. Additionally, these children are not as receptive to discipline in their schools. Angie Peltzer, founder of Go M.A.D. international volunteer organization, states, “There can be difficulties in discipline…as the child has gone from a leader, militant to being treated as a student.”150 According to one writer, girls have a particularly difficult time:

As an alternate to returning to school, children attend vocational training. However, even after they receive vocational training, there are few jobs open for females. Girls are not readily accepted into jobs that are traditionally for males. This creates a situation in which females are left without a place in society.151

146 Ibid. 147 Ibid. 148UNICEF, “Close to 150 soldiers released by the LTTE,” United Nations, http://www.unicef.org/media/media_20399.html. 149 Living in Fear , 37 150 Angela Peltzer, e-mail to author, June 29, 2005. 151 Rachel Brett, Girl Soldiers: Challenging the Assumptions, http://www.geneva.quno.info/pdf/Girl_Soldiers.doc.pdf.

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Recommendations In response to the need within the Tamil community to prevent LTTE use of child soldiers as well as to provide care for those children that have already been affected, we propose the following:

• As an international community, work with NGOs to develop after-school social programs within Tamil areas to establish a sense of community and provide children with an alternative to volunteering for the LTTE. Programs could include sports and activities based on art, education, and community building to provide youth with a sense of accomplishment and belonging separate from that of the LTTE.

• Educate youth on the illegality of joining the LTTE as a minor. This information could be presented on such items as posters, flyers, and various school supplies such as erasers and pencils. NGOs would need to fund the purchase, shipping, and distribution of such items.

• Through an organized campaign, raise awareness among the international Tamil community of the continued recruitment of child soldiers in hope of discouraging their funding of the LTTE. Promote the funding of NGOs working towards furthering education, vocational training, and economic stability among the Tamil community.

• Encourage children and their families to walk together to and from school to decrease the occurrence of kidnappings. By encouraging neighborhood protection and watch, children will experience a safe and a more close-knit environment.

• Provide meals within the school system to encourage children to attend. Meals would be funded through NGOs in hope that schools would serve as a nurturing environment to ensure mental stability.

• Provide vocational training for both boys and girls through funds set up by UNICEF and other NGOs. Training could be in computer use, mechanics, medicine, carpentry, and textiles. Training would offer the children lifestyle opportunities separate from the LTTE.

• Maintain a presence of UN observers within Tamil communities and in governmental buildings where Tamil families are able to report missing children. The international community should provide translators so that the Tamil families can communicate with the government. Women should be encouraged to travel together when reporting missing children. The international community should encourage the UN to work closely with the Sri Lankan government to ensure the safety of families that report.

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VIII. Long-Term Political Solutions Recognizing the fragility of the Sri Lankan government, significant changes must be made in order to ensure a peaceful and successful state in the future. Recent developments have proven that the leaders of the Sri Lankan government are willing to cooperate with the Tamil rebels, yet the Marxists’ protest of the government’s decisions regarding tsunami aid complicates the peace process. The Tsunami Relief Council will be a vital component in the political process and it will help determine the future of the peace process. Furthermore, according to a BBC News report, “Sri Lanka's minority Muslims have gone on strike to protest for a greater role in a deal to distribute billions of aid dollars for December's tsunami victims.”152 The tsunami has created complex relationships inside of the country that have to be mended in order to preserve the peace process. President Kumaratunga’s resolve to form an agreement with the Tamil rebels will be a main factor in determining the future of the Sri Lankan government. If Kumaratunga follows her current plan, peace between the Sinhalese and the Tamils will be a possibility. This is the essential aspect of solving this conflict, despite the growing animosity between the Marxist faction and the government. Under a new governmental plan, the Sri Lankan government will have the ability to bridge the gap between the Tamil rebels and the government which has been preventing peace for twenty years. The Tamils have expressed their preference for regional autonomy and with compromise, this gap can be mended and peace can be reached. Perhaps the paramount reason to form a coalition is to capitalize on promised donations if a peace agreement is reached: “Sri Lanka has been promised about $3 billion in tsunami relief, on top of $4.5 billion promised in reconstruction help to follow a peace settlement.”153 This monetary offer will accelerate reconstruction plans and help develop the Sri Lankan government. This aids the peace process by giving the government incentive to form an agreement. The most important component of the peace process is tsunami aid. This topic will determine the future of cooperation between various groups in the country. The largest obstruction to peace is the nationalist Marxist party. The Tamils and Kumaratunga’s People’s Alliance have expressed their wish to distribute the $3 billion in tsunami aid yet the Marxists refuse to recognize the Tamils as a legitimate party.154 While forming a peace agreement, the Sri Lankan government will have to convince the Marxists to support a peace process that will inevitably involve sharing tsunami aid. Essentially, the Sri Lankan government must be altered in order to settle this long conflict that has taken so many lives. The tsunami opened the peace process once again and this opportunity must not be missed. There are many strategies that can be analyzed to ensure peace. We will present three and recommend one we feel will be the most effective.

152 BBC News, Muslims Strike Over Sri Lanka Aid, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4626551.stm 153 Stanley Samarasinghe, “Can Donors Broker Peace in Sri Lanka,” Far Eastern Economic Review 168, no.2 (2005): 38-40. 154 BBC News, Sri Lanka’s growth turns upwards, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4636981.stm.

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Partitioning In a geographically defined ethnic conflict, many in the international community have advocated the separation of the groups involved into their own “home” areas under their own governments. However, as has been the case in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the notion of two independent states within what was a larger state is impractical in setup and implementation, and potentially damaging in the long-term given the current situation and past tensions in Sri Lanka. Despite these facts, some in the international community consider partitioning Sri Lanka to be the most timely and practical plan to end the conflict in Sri Lanka. Therefore, we propose the following principal arguments against a divided Sri Lanka:

First, as described in the Current Situation section, the current conflict in Sri Lanka is not limited to the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. Parts of Sri Lanka’s Muslim community have been attacked by the LTTE, and Muslim groups have attacked the LTTE. Additionally, the Marxist JVP party has, for the time being, left the governing coalition and is currently attempting to form a new political coalition. Several smaller Muslim political parties have pledged to join the new JVP coalition. Furthermore, the JVP views any government cooperation with the LTTE as a violation of Sri Lankan sovereignty and collaborating with a terrorist organization, and has vowed to defend Sri Lanka against such violations. It would be unwise to underestimate the possible backlash from the JVP, Muslims, and other strongly anti-Tamil parties.

Second, the process would place immense stress on the currently strained balance of powers in the Sri Lankan government and could result in a coup attempt by the anti-Tamil political parties, such as the JVP. In addition to the JVP pull out and new coalition with the opposition and Muslim parties, a handful of Buddhist monks in Parliament have used their influence in the Sri Lankan government to oppose cooperation with the LTTE. The President’s support for the joint mechanism agreement, P-TOMS, and the Memorandum of Understanding has served to simultaneously attempt to resume dialogue with the LTTE and alienate her anti-Tamil allies. These events have made the possibility of a vote of no confidence from Parliament a real threat to the current powers in the government, and such a motion could result in a strong executive reaction. A series of events of this nature would most likely result in utter political turmoil in Sri Lanka and cause further damage to the already-stalled peace process with the LTTE.

Third, the geographic distribution of Sri Lanka’s ethnic groups would cause major problems for the partitioning process. For example, there are sizable Muslim communities in what would most likely become LTTE controlled territory in the north. There are large pockets of Tamils in the south-central part of the island which would likely fall under Sri Lankan control. Conversely, the predominately Sinhalese city of Trincomalee on the northeastern coast would likely fall under LTTE control.155 Furthermore, the Sri Lankan government, which would be under intense political pressure from anti-Tamil organizations, and would be unlikely to concede any additional land which could lead to yet another deadlocked peace process.

155University of Texas at Austin: PCL Map Collection, Sri Lanka (Ethnic communities and religions, Population density, Land use and economic activity) 1976, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/islands_oceans_poles/sri_lanka_charts_76.jpg

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Fourth, the distribution of natural resources in Sri Lanka and its location relative to India would likely cause further bickering among negotiators. A likely point of contention would be the relative lack of natural resources in the LTTE-controlled northeast. The LTTE would have a valid point on the resource issue due to the fact that many of Sri Lanka’s leading exports, specifically diamonds, emeralds, and rubies,156 would be in Sri Lankan territory.157 The Sri Lankans would likely be unwilling to forfeit these resources located in the middle of their territory. Conversely, the LTTE would get an economic advantage of its own out of partitioning. While Sri Lanka does not have any roads or rail lines connecting it to India, there is a major ferry between Dhanushkodi, India and Mannar Island, Sri Lanka on Sri Lanka’s northwest coast.158 The ferry route serves as an entry and exit point for cargo bound for Sri Lankan railways and roads. It is unlikely that the Sri Lankan government would willingly concede this location of strategic and economic importance.

Finally, the formal separation of the Tamil and Sinhalese people could have a damaging impact on the perceptions of future generations and breed future conflict due to the centuries-old suspicion and tension between the two groups, and the distinct possibility of cultural isolation between the two states. Additionally, any act of violence against either government would lead to an increase in the tension between the two states and could spur citizens to call for a counter-attack. The delicate balance of peace between the two states would be an easy target for extremists from Sri Lanka and the LTTE, and could be used to further the extremists’ agendas. By inciting a cycle of violence on a small yet ever growing level, the terrorists could set the new states against each other in an armed conflict where both sides claim they are acting in self defense, much like the current situation.

Given the inherent impracticality of implementing a partition plan for Sri Lanka and the indisputable potential for future conflict and instability on the island we must recommend a solution other than partitioning Sri Lanka along ethnic lines. Therefore, we propose two possible solutions, each relying on a reintegrated government with protection and representation for all who call Sri Lanka home. The two approaches differ primarily in the level of government they impact. One solution focuses on a strong federal system, while the other focuses on community-minded local governments to unite Sri Lanka’s ethnic groups.

Federalism One solution towards resolving the conflict in Sri Lanka would be establishing a stronger federalist government in the region. Although this federal government would have a centralized authority centered on the president, it would be essential to have representation for many ethnic and political minorities in the region to avoid further escalated conflict. One such way to accomplish a more representative federal government is to change the parliamentary system from a unicameral parliament to bicameral representation with smaller houses and less elected officials. This would provide sufficient representation for the minorities in the area, most 156 United States Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook - Sri Lanka, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ce.html 157University of Texas at Austin: PCL Map Collection, Sri Lanka (Ethnic communities and religions, Population density, Land use and economic activity) 1976 158 University of Texas at Austin: PCL Map Collection, Sri Lanka (Political) 2001, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/sri_lanka_pol01.jpg

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importantly the Tamils, and limit some of the overriding power from the more influential Sinhalese parties. This system would also guarantee more control for the president and prime minister of Sri Lanka, much like the British parliamentary system.159 The two houses in the government would be elected in two different ways, similar to the houses in the United States Congress. The lower house would have proportional representation for the ethnic and political parties who are approved by a higher court in Sri Lanka. This house would not be as influential in the overall governing of the state as the upper house, purely because there are so many different minorities in the region, including the Muslims, who are currently heavily involved in the domestic policies of the government. This house would allow all voices to be heard and therefore attempt to satisfy the Tamils and other minority groups in the region. The upper house would be larger and more influential in the country. The people in predetermined congressional districts would elect this house. The districts would allow the more influential minorities some positions in the larger house, but still allow a majority to make the decisions. The executive branch of the government would also have more authority than the present organization of the government allows. One problem with the current situation in Sri Lanka is the inability of the executive branch to control or influence the legislative branch. Although the president can dissolve the current parliament and call for new elections of the members, this does little to affect the policy that the legislative branch is creating. By having a strong centralized government, the minority as well as the executive branch can feel secure in the power of the government. By creating this security, minorities, especially the Tamils, will have a more prominent influence in the government and not feel alienated by the Sinhalese majority who currently control most aspects of the government. Especially with all the coalitions and private agreements in today’s Sri Lankan politics, minorities are excluded from political decisions unless political alliances are made with more powerful political parties. The stronger centralized government would create a more balanced political spectrum. This is not to say that federalism does not have problems as well as benefits. The likelihood of the majority approving a government that includes its opposition as a more equal party is currently unlikely. The United National Party currently has the most seats in the parliament, but they do not have a majority. The likelihood that they would be willing to voluntarily forfeit their seats in favor of an opposition who resorts to terrorist actions is highly unlikely. The majority of the parliament is not in support of the President’s party. The majority party in the parliament is against the peace talks and cooperation with the Tamil government, which is advocated by the current President of Sri Lanka. In order to maintain a strong executive branch of the government, it would be most beneficial to implement a true British parliamentary system where the majority of the legislative branch supports the prime minister. To insure that this occurs, the prime minister could not be a member of a minority party, which might cause problems with the Tamils and the Muslims.

159 Rohan Edrisinha, ‘Federalism and the Case for Radical Constitutional Reform in Sri Lanka’, in K.M. de Silva and G.H. Peiris, eds., Pursuit of Peace in Sri Lanka: Past Failures and Future Prospects (Kandy: ICES, 2000), pp. 175-78.

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Thus, the prime minister should be elected by the parliament and be a member of the majority party in the parliament; the president should be a member of the opposite ethnicity of the prime minister. This still does not create a strong backing of the prime minister within the government, but it would prevent any feelings that one ethnic group is being ignored by the government. The majority of the population in Sri Lanka is Sinhalese and tends to be against the Tamils in the northern and eastern regions of the island. Having elections on the national scale in the country would also pose potential problems for the Tamils. Without gerrymandering the area to ensure the Tamils got some representation on the national level, it would be difficult to have representation of all or even some of the Tamils in Sri Lanka. The gerrymandering would also anger the Sinhalese majority in the country because they would have more control if measures were not taken to ensure Tamil representation. There is also still a large probability of corruption in the government, especially with having the majority party in control of the more influential house and the executive branch. Discrimination is still a real threat, especially to the Tamils who have experienced limitations of rights in recent history. This could be a hindrance to further negotiations in the region and an eventual reintegration of Tamils into the government. Another major problem with the implementation of a strong federal government with representation of minorities is the lack of bipartisan negotiations in Sri Lankan history. The two main ethnic groups in Sri Lanka have no history of working well in the government, so there might be resistance by both parties when they are expected to share the responsibility of running the government.160 Local Governments The political instability of Sri Lanka over the young nation’s history demands a complex and unique answer, mixing different political theories together to suit Sri Lankan society. The multi-ethnic and multi-religious nature of the nation creates a unique mix of political desires, motives and voices. History shows that nations which have faced similar problems in the past have attempted to solve the problems posed by ethnic conflict by creating a federation state. Some nations have succeeded more than others, and the success of federalism as a model for political progression must be reviewed on an individual basis. Before implementing a federalist government in Sri Lanka, one must weigh the political and social consequences on the indigenous people. Having examined federal experiments in nations experiencing ethnic conflict throughout history, political analyst K.M. de Silva “would rather advocate ‘innovative local government institutions’ because they ‘are likely to be a more appropriate means of recognizing ethnic and religious diversity in areas like the Eastern Province with its mixed population.’”161 This dispersion of power would take place within the current constitutional organization of Sri Lanka and its provinces, allowing the northern Tamils to participate in the political process within the current municipal and provincial systems. The 160 The Economist, “Asia: A Glimpse of Peace; Sri Lanka,” June 25, 2005, 74, http://proquest.umi.com. 161 K.M. de Silva, “The Federal Option and its Alternatives,” in de Silva and G.H. Peiris eds., Pursuit of Peace in Sri Lanka, pp. 203-29

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entire process of political integration of the Tamils would occur under the guidance of the Norwegian government, due to Norway’s historical role as a mediator in the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict. This active political participation by the Tamils would start at the municipal level. Tamil political leadership in their own municipalities would be beneficial in two ways. First, the experience gained by Tamils on a municipal level would give them necessary knowledge and skills to be a peaceful and effective force in provincial and national politics in the future. The Tamil political leaders would be able to effectively administrate their own people in their cities and towns. Second, Tamil representation in their own cities would give them a degree of freedom and autonomy within a greater Sri Lankan state. The next step in the process of Tamil political integration would occur at the provincial level. Having gained legitimate political control of Tamil cities, the northern and eastern provinces containing a Tamil majority would be administered by a coalition of Tamil representatives and Sinhalese representatives. This coalition between the two ethnic groups in provincial governments is necessary in order to prevent the full realization of Tamil self-determination and Tamil Eelam. Similarly, by having the Tamils enter into coalition municipal governments with other ethnic, political or religious groups, a degree of compromise and dialogue would be fostered. Moreover, the increased representation of the Tamils in provincial governments would help to decrease the need for political extremism, including terrorist actions taken by the LTTE. According to the Global Information Network, the LTTE, which now represents a majority of Tamils, has worked to become a legitimate political and social force in Sri Lanka through a number of varied institutions.162 The further legitimization of the LTTE on a national political scale will lessen the need to resort to violence in order to achieve moderate Tamil goals. While this solution is not the Tamil Eelam that the northern and eastern Tamil majority hoped for, it is a step in the right direction. Given the current lack of Tamil representation in the national government, a slow increase of representation from the municipal level to the provincial level is an improvement. The Tamils might oppose the proposed solution because they already have a high level of autonomy, but the possibility of creating their own nation, separate from the current state of Sri Lanka, is very small. Although the history of Sri Lankan independence is extremely bloody and marked by armed disagreements between the government and the LTTE, President Kumaratunga has recently demonstrated that she is willing to deal with the LTTE, especially in distribution of tsunami aid money.163 Some Sinhalese factions, including the JVP and leading Buddhist monks, oppose any concessions to the Tamils at all. Similarly, author Partha Ghosh believes “any ethnic compromise with the Tamils may become difficult given the deep-seated distrust of the Buddhist

162 Marwaan Macan-Marker , “Politics-Sri Lanka: Tigers Forming a Shadow ‘Government’,” Global Information Network Feb. 18, 2005, http://www.proquest.com. 163 Ethirajan Anbarasan, Sri Lanka Leader Gambles on Tsunami Aid, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4628125.stm.

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Sangha vis-à-vis Tamil extremism.”164 These extreme views do not offer any reasonable or viable solutions to solving the current ethnic violence within the nation, and they are hindrances to the progression towards peace. By allowing the entrance of Tamil representatives into municipal and provincial governments, the Sinhalese majority will include the ethnic Tamils in their nation’s politics, instead of forcing the Tamils to advocate self-determination. This process of Tamil representation in provincial coalition governments should take approximately five to eight years. During this time period, the representatives of the minority will have the chance to distribute funds to the people in need equitably, and develop Sri Lankan (not Sinhalese or Tamil) political and social infrastructure in the areas of contention, the north and south. After Tamil integration at the municipal and provincial levels, a true federalist system, uniting all ethnicities and political entities, can be attempted. By this time, the LTTE will have evolved to become a strictly political group. The Tamils will be able to have the adequate representation in the 225 member Parliament as stipulated by local elections. Similarly, the constitution should be modified in order to create an indirect election of the President, giving the Tamil minority proportional representation in executive elections. Recommendations Having explored the options of partitioning Sri Lanka, an immediate federal solution, and evolutionary local government integration, we have decided that the last option is the most beneficial to the people of Sri Lanka and has the greatest chance for long-term success. Therefore, we recommend the following:

• Integration of the Tamil people into government at the municipal level. Beginning immediately, the Tamil people should create nationally recognized municipal governments in order to govern and distribute tsunami aid on a local level. The creation of these governments should ease the Tamils’ demand for regional autonomy and provide the Tamils with a legitimate form of government to distribute aid and serve as a voice for the people in the provincial governments. This process should also satisfy the Sri Lankan government because of the relatively small immediate change and planned immediate peace. The Tamils will form legitimate municipal governments and stay relatively independent from Sri Lankan rule, but within the limits of the Sri Lankan constitution. This precaution is necessary to prevent Sri Lankan aggression and to secure the legitimacy of the new Tamil municipal governments. The funds acquired after the peace agreement is fulfilled should be distributed proportionally among the municipal governments and should be used to reinforce the local governments. This system will operate until advanced integration at a later date when the governments have developed a stable relationship and the peace is maintained. The Tamils can then be included in more advanced levels of government.

• Norway should be asked to oversee the municipal, provincial, and national integration because of its long standing as a mediator in the conflict. Norway is currently the mediator of the peace agreement and a recognized player in the formation of peace.

164 Partha S. Ghosh, Ethnicity Versus Nationalism: The Devolution Discourse in Sri Lanka. (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003), 291.

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Norway has a strong presence in Sri Lanka and is respected by both parties. Foreign intervention is necessary to ensure that an agreement is carried out and fulfilled by both parties and Norway is already dedicated to solving the conflict.

• Following peaceful Tamil integration and assimilation (approximately five years) into government on the municipal level, integration should commence at the provincial level. The Tamil people who comprise the majority of the population in the northern and eastern provinces of the island must first be integrated into municipal governing bodies in order to be efficient representatives on the provincial level. The Tamil politicians should help organize coalition governments on the provincial level with proportional representation of Tamil and Sinhalese leaders. These governing coalitions of the provinces are necessary in order to restrain the Tamil people from seceding from Sri Lanka in order to create their own nation, Tamil Eelam.

• Following peaceful Tamil integration and assimilation (approximately eight years) at the provincial level, national political integration should begin with ongoing Norwegian oversight. The Tamil people will then be incorporated into national politics, following peaceful, successful and efficient administration in provincial coalition governments. The Norwegian government should continue to guide and oversee the integration of Tamil politicians at the national level, as they have done at the municipal and provincial level. The national government would continue to operate as parliamentary system. The integration should include equal representational rights for Tamils and Sinhalese. The Tamil and Sinhalese people should have the right to join any political organization of their choosing.

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IX. Ensuring Long-Term Social Stability When contemplating the future situation in Sri Lanka, one must consider the factors that will influence the development of the nation and its recovery as a post-conflict state. By planning the reconciliation, education, and economic development of Sri Lanka, we can attempt to mitigate repercussions of the conflict. Reconciliation allows the people of Sri Lanka to overcome the psychological effects of their ethnic conflict, while education ensures the next generation will have a secure foundation to become responsible citizens. Improving the economy will give Sri Lankans a sense of national identity and invoke pride for their cooperative achievements. As international peacekeeping analyst Amalendu Misra states, “External powers nursing old grievances or feelings…could undermine the fledging peace process,”165 and therefore must be addressed. While it is necessary to provide social programs for the people, it is also important that Sri Lanka develops into a competitive trading partner in global markets. These factors will be addressed as they are the most pressing and essential to a stable and peaceful Sri Lanka. The recommendations that we propose will address these aspects of the social recovery in Sri Lanka. Reconciliation Before Sri Lanka can fully develop as a stable and financially promising state in the aftermath of its conflict, the people must reconcile and form a new national identity. Misra explains that part of returnees’ “social and psychological insecurities damaged by violence and brutality…could be addressed if the returnees’ physical and material security is assured,” yet the state is not fully “consolidated until the returnees, civil society, and the state form a constructive relationship.”166 Due to the tension caused by Sri Lanka’s conflict, the state would have difficulty uniting in the aftermath. The psychological impact on the people, in addition to the strong ethnic ties that they still feel, will impede reconstruction. The people of Sri Lanka have endured polarization, terrorism, child soldiers, and warfare. According to a Médecins Sans Frontières study, 10 percent of Sri Lankans have witnessed the death of their child, 48 percent have been separated from their family, and 24 percent have had a member of their family attempt suicide.167 Because of their current divisions, there is little opportunity for the Sinhalese and Tamil people to cooperate and develop a shared society. We present solutions to create a society with the potential of being stable and prosperous in the future.

165 Amalendu Misra, “Rain on a parched land: Reconstructing a post-conflict Sri Lanka,” International Peacekeeping 11, no. 2 (2004): 274, http://www.proquest.com. 166 Misra, Rain on a parched land, 280. 167 Kaz de Jong, Maureen Mulhern, Nathan Ford, Isabel Simpson, et al, “Psychological trauma of the civil war in Sri Lanka,” The Lancet 359, no. 9316 (2002): 2, http://www.proquest.com.

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It is necessary that the people of Sri Lanka adopt a policy of “rehumanization… and incorporate other people’s perceptions, to see the experience with their eyes.”168 They must try to identify with their enemies and look at them through an unbiased perspective. Only then can they begin to “rebuild emotional connectedness” and strive to lessen their hostility.169 The Sri Lankan government can use education as a tool to gradually form similar beliefs, as in Moroccan schools, which emphasized the common heritage of both Arabs and Berbers to help smooth the path for a new identity.170 The media is also a way to spread shared ideas of a new Sri Lankan identity, possibly through news stations or even in cartoons for future generations to witness. Essentially, the message of Sinhalese and Tamils existing peacefully together must be presented as feasible and as the most beneficial way to live. Besides education and financial incentives, the people must feel a strong connection to their new identity of being a Sri Lankan, and modify their classification of being either a Sinhalese or a Tamil to further develop coexistence. In the past, the groups existed peacefully together in Sri Lanka for many years and DNA tests have shown that the two ethnicities may come from the same area. It is therefore possible for the groups to eventually coexist again. “The sense of community…has to grow from within,” for the “reconstruction project will not take off until complete trust is established between the parties.”171 One possible way of developing nationalism for the people is to celebrate Sri Lanka’s Independence Day and other holidays of both the Sinhalese and Tamil people, as is done in Lebanon by different religious groups to celebrate their multicultural society. Most importantly, the government could support the equal treatment of Sri Lankans. Community based programs, with an emphasis on psychological consequences of violence, can help alleviate painful war memories and counsel Sri Lankans to learn to understand each other. According to Jong, et al., activities, including “increasing awareness, community strengthening, and reinforcing coping-strategies, can help people find positive solutions to their difficulties.”172 Finding the will to forgive would allow Sri Lankans to succeed past their ethnic conflict and the ramifications of the conflict on their nation’s stability. Future disagreements would only result if current tensions and divisions continue. The people of Sri Lanka can escape continual clashes by trying cooperation and addressing effects of the ethnic conflict. Education In order to create a new generation of responsible, informed, successful Sri Lankans, the Sri Lankan government needs to modify and expand its current education system.

168 Jodi Halpern and Harvey M. Weinstein, “Rehumanizing the Other: Empathy and Reconciliation,” Human Rights Quarterly 26, no. 3 (2004): 3, http://www.wwwproquest.com. 169 Halpern “Rehumanizing the Other,” 3. 170 Daniel L. Byman, Keeping the Peace (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 122. 171 Misra, “Rain on a Parched Land,” 285 172 Jong, Mulhern, Ford, Simpson, et al, Psychological trauma of the civil war in Sri Lanka, 3

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Although the 1997 adult literacy rate was 92 percent, a figure near those of most industrialized nations, the functional literacy of both the Sinhalese and the Tamils is severely lacking. Since the Central Bank calculates this figure by considering a literate person one who can read and write a simple sentence, it is clearly misleading.173 The Sri Lankan government created General Education Reforms to promote functional literacy after realizing the difficulties of a population with poor literacy. However, the language currently promoted by the government of Sri Lanka is Sinhalese. The programs initiated by the Sri Lankan government are encouraging literacy in only the Sinhalese language. We propose to use language, a former boundary between the Sinhalese and the Tamils, as a uniting factor for the Sri Lankan people. Because English is the language of commerce, it is important that all Sri Lankans possess functional literacy in their native language and also in English.174 In addition to aiding Sri Lankans in the private sector of business, learning English would also grant the Tamil people access to areas such as politics and education, which are currently restricted to the Sinhalese alone. While the education system would be run on a system of local autonomy, the core curriculum would be nationally written and in English. The textbooks in the primary schools would involve dual languages, English and either Sinhalese or Tamil, but by the secondary level of education all texts would be written entirely in English. By teaching English nationally, children from all economic levels would be given an equal opportunity for advancement and competition for the myriad jobs requiring literacy in the English language.175 In order for all children to receive the benefits of education, school attendance would no longer be voluntary but would become mandatory for all children under the age of fourteen. The current education system of Sri Lanka does not use examinations to assess the quality of education. While this method of evaluation allows the focus of education to be on the individual child,176 national examinations would allow the basic knowledge of Sri Lankan students to be assessed. These examinations would include a literacy test in English and either Sinhalese or Tamil in addition to a math test on basic algebra and a geography test on world states. The years to administer the tests would be decided by the Sri Lankan government and the passing of the exams would be required for advancement within the school system. The Sri Lankan government would be able to use the examinations as a way to unify its citizens with their common value of education. The exams would invoke a healthy sense of competition between students for academic reasons rather than the current ethnic causes. The exams would also enable the students to be promoted on a basis of merit instead of ethnicity.

173 Pradeepa Wijetunge, “The role of public libraries in the expansion of literacy and lifelong learning in Sri Lanka,” New Library World 101, no.1155 (2000): 104, http://www.proquest.com. 174 Bruce Matthews, “University education in Sri Lanka in context: Consequences of deteriorating standards,” Pacific Affairs 68, no.1 (1995): 77, http://www.proquest.com. 175 Siddharth Dube, “The prospect of peace,” The Chronicle of Higher Education 41, no.33 (1995): A65-7, http://www.proquest.com. 176 Seth Spaulding, “Changing Schools from Within: A Management Intervention for Improving School Functioning in Sri Lanka,” Comparative Education Review 45, no. 2 (2001): 280, http://infotrac.galegroup.com

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One method to increase functional literacy is creating a system of rural public libraries. A vital component of the new libraries would be literature, written in English, teaching a combination of Sinhalese and Tamil folklore. Written by Sri Lankans for the children of Sri Lanka, the folk tales would emphasize the common history of both peoples that dates back to before either migrated from India. Such children’s books would emphasize “national identity [as] a means of promoting the idea that despite what separates [the Sinhalese from the Tamils] there is much more that unites [them as Sri Lankans].177 Books that unify Sri Lankan folklore would complement the project currently in place by the United Nations Children’s Fund. The project focuses on booklets telling current tales of people crossing ethnic and religious boundaries in order to aid one another in a time of crisis. Sybil Wettesinghe, the author of the booklets, describes the project by stating that “through a well-told tale, with interesting and easily identifiable characters and colorful illustrations, any message can be got across to a child.”178 Common folklore would communicate a message of compassion and cooperation to the children of Sri Lanka and would create a future absent of ethnic conflict.

Libraries would also serve as a way for printed information to become available in regions where access to electronic resources is rare or entirely unavailable. In addition to being more physically accessible than electronic resources, libraries would allow the general populace, not just those in the higher economic levels, to have access to relatively expensive books. Programs in rural libraries would serve as a way to promote literacy and would also provide communities with a Selective Dissemination of Information (SDI), a program in which libraries work with their surrounding neighborhoods to invest in resources that would cater to the people’s needs. SDI serves as a way of fueling “the lifelong learning of the community.” Author Pradeepa Wijetunge gives the example that “in a region where brass industry is common, the public library can provide useful information in SDI form. . . [such as] newspaper cuttings, trade opportunities, product designs, market survey information, insurance and safety measures.”179 In addition to providing written information, the libraries of Sri Lanka, in conjunction with the public schools around which they would be built, would be a part of the growing organization Schools Online. Founded in 2001 by Kamran Elahian, Schools Online is a nonprofit agency which sets up Internet Learning Centers, each of which contains the electronic equipment necessary to introduce people of all ages to the world of technology. Elahian states that the most valuable part of her organization is its ability to “allow students to communicate and learn from each other. They learn the value of knowledge, tolerance, and cooperation. This new outlook will change the future."180

Another issue to be addressed is the source of the instructors of these new academic institutions. According to Albert Aime, senior education planner at the World Bank, “Sri Lanka has more teachers than needed, despite shortages in poor areas. However, a large 177 Meni Kanatsouli and Theodora Tzoka, “Embracing Multiculturalism through Understanding ‘Greekness’,” Bookbird 43, no.2 (2005): 38, http://www.proquest.com. 178 Vijita Fernando, “Arming children with peace education in Sri Lanka,” India in New York 3, no. 4 (1999) : 33, http://www.proquest.com. 179 Wijetunge, “The role of public libraries,” 104. 180 Diane Mailey, “Project Brings Internet to Schools in So. Asia,” India West 26, no.2 (2000): B18, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=495884841&sid=8&Fmt=3&clientId=

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number are untrained, or often inadequately trained on outdated programs.”181 Because the Sri Lankan government did not end its ban on English education until 1998, there are several generations of university graduates who are not proficient in English. According to Mr. Lakshman, the leader of the drive to reinstate English into the Sri Lankan education system, “it will take years before the country has enough qualified teachers to expand English-language instruction to all high-school students and to universities.”182 Because of the imminent need of English teachers and the lack of English-fluent university graduates, several thousands of teachers would need to be supplied through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Peace Corps. The English teachers brought in to Sri Lanka would work alongside the native teachers, thus both instructing the next generation of Sri Lankans and training the current educators. Additional English-teaching volunteers would be needed to hold night classes for the Sri Lankan population not yet functionally literate in English. The classes would take place in the newly built libraries and be open to the general public. The Sri Lankan government would give businesses incentives to have their employees participate in English classes and the employees themselves would be given advancement opportunities upon completion of such courses and the passing of an English fluency examination. The funding for such a system would come from NGOs in addition to the World Bank, which pledged $64.1 million credit to Sri Lanka in 1996 but has not yet fulfilled this promise.183 Even if outside funds for incentives were lacking, it would still be beneficial to the businesses themselves to fund such an endeavor. By having English-literate employees, Sri Lankan corporations would have an advantage in the global community where English is the primary languages of commerce.

At the university level, several reforms need to occur in order to create equal opportunities for enrollment and advancement. Scholarships should be made available to low-income students, the funding of which would come from international aid. College classes would be conducted primarily in English but fluency in English would not be a requirement for admission. The universities would be required to provide English classes for those students not yet fluent. One of the obstructions to joint university education of Tamils and Sinhalese is the “standardization” formula invoked by the Sinhalese government in 1973 which limited the enrollment of Tamils into universities by requiring them to score higher on entrance examinations.184 Mr. Uyangoda, a professor of political science at the University of Colombo, states that “one way to resolve the conflict is to enable Tamil and Sinhalese to study together.”185 Classes would provide an open environment in which the different ethnicities could learn to peacefully interact through discussion and shared experiences.

181 “World Bank Aids Lanka Teacher Training,” India Abroad 26, no.42 (1996): 28, http://www.proquest.com. 182 Marion Lloyd, “Ban on English-language teaching haunts college students in Sri Lanka,” The Chronicle of Higher Education 45, no.6 (1998) : A51, http://www.proquest.com. 183 “World Bank,” 28. 184 Siddharth Dube, “Higher education a key issue in armed conflict between Sinhalese and Tamils in Sri Lanka,” The Chronicle of Higher Education 41, no. 33 (1995): A66, http://www.proquest.com. 185 Lloyd, “Ban on English-language,” A50

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In the non-arable soil of the Tamil territory, education is the mark of high society and thus is highly valued. One Tamil academic (who requested anonymity) commented that due to “the Jaffna Tamil's worship of education. . . . the guerrilla fighters seem perfectly quiet during examination periods."186 The Tamils demonstrated their commitment to education by ceasing terrorist activities in response to the academic schedule. Likewise, the importance of education in the Sinhalese culture is evident through the fact that the government of Sri Lanka has continued its support of the University of Jaffna despite the fact that the institution is run and attended strictly by Tamils.187 The common devotion of the Sinhalese and the Tamils to quality education can be utilized as a uniting force against ethnic conflict.

Economic Development

In order to stabilize the economy, bring about economic cooperation, and ensure that ethnic violence does not again erupt, we offer two proposals. The first proposal is the establishment of a national apparel or clothing brand because Sri Lanka’s top exports are apparel and textiles. Similar to the manner in which Samsung was established in South Korea as a competitive, nationally produced product, this project would be a national endeavor and the work force would be composed mainly of Sri Lankans. This would also allow the Sri Lankan economy, or at least this particular industry, to gain strength in the global market. Since this is also a national endeavor, it will also create new jobs for the Sri Lankan people. Open employment practices would be beneficial in this business and English will be used to promote global involvement and foster unity. These two factors would allow the firm to employ both the Tamil and Sinhalese people. Since this will tie the economic futures of the two people together it will decrease the likelihood of future conflict. As some scholars have proposed,

In order to gain a competitive edge during the process of internationalization or globalization, firms have attempted to develop their brands on a global scale. The benefits of developing such brands include high quality and prestige perceived by local customers, ease in attracting potential employees and partners overseas along with cross-border learning and cultural benefits, all of which result in cost efficiencies of marketing strategies and facilitate international market entries.188

In this case the reasoning will be different than that described by the scholars. Instead of the company creating an industry based on a single nation to better its own status in the global economy, the goal of this industry would be to benefit the overall economy of the country as well as end the ethnic conflict. The stabilization of the economy and its status as a competitor on the global market would prevent future ethnic conflict. Economically

186 Dube, “Higher education,” A66. 187 Dube, “Higher education,” A66. 188 Cheng, Julian Ming-Sung and others. “A Stage Model of International Brand Development: The perspectives of manufacturers from two newly industrialized economies” South Korea and Taiwan Industrial Marketing Management, Volume 34, Issue 5 , July 2005, Pages 504-514. http://www.proquest.com

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there would be too much at stake for either group to risk any violent action against the other, and thus the children would grow without conflict, allowing the new generations to be free from tensions.

The other idea that we propose is the creation of a free-trade port in the north in the Jaffna peninsula region. This would be beneficial, as it would capitalize on Sri Lanka’s location, which according to the CIA World Factbook has a “strategic location near major Indian Ocean sea lanes.”189 By creating a port where countries can place goods to be transported elsewhere, free of duties, numerous jobs will be created in the northern region. Thus the Tamil region will have a stable industry that will provide economic stability for the poverty-stricken north. After the peace settlements, Sri Lanka would receive an additional $4.5 billion dollars of aid. This would be beneficial; as one analyst states, “the financial stakes are high. Sri Lanka has been promised about $3 billion in tsunami relief, on top of $4.5 billion promised in reconstruction help to follow a peace settlement.”190 A larger portion of this aid should be given to the north. Although this seems controversial the government has already acknowledged that the north is lacking in infrastructure and needs rebuilding. The government stated in a 2003 letter of intent to the IMF that

The challenges arising in securing lasting peace are two-fold—immediately, the relief, rehabilitation, and reconciliation (RRR) process will need to be advanced, while in the medium-term, the destroyed infrastructure and institutions in the North and the East have to be reconstructed and the regions reintegrated to the rest of the country. Significant resources will be needed to meet these challenges.191

We call upon the Sri Lankan government to uphold and advance this and other economic programs discussed in this letter. This aid will allow for the construction of transportation, communication, various other infrastructure, and the proposed port regions in the north. Thus the port already has the potential funds necessary for construction. After construction the economy will prosper more and the region will become a viable location for foreign investment. One other aspect of the economy that must be addressed further is privatization of the economy.

Prior to 2003, the government of Sri Lanka requested aid from the IMF. In doing so they wrote a letter of intent to the IMF which outlined the economic intentions of the government through the year 2006. The government claims some privatization, but in order to have a successful and stable economy it needs to have complete privatization of industry. In the letter the government states

189 CIA online, “The World Fact Book”, Sri Lanka, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ce.html 190 “Asia: A glimpse of peace; Sri Lanka,” The Economist, June 25, 2005, 74, http://www.proquest.com 191 Government of Sri Lanka, Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding, 2003 (Colombo, Sri Lanka, 2003), http://www.imf.org/External/NP/LOI/2003/lka/01/index.htm

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The electricity reform bill was enacted in December 2002 to pave the way for restructuring the state electricity monopoly (CEB). The restructuring of the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (CPC) is progressing in step with the liberalization of the petroleum sector. Twelve percent shares of Sri Lanka Telecom (SLT) were sold through an IPO in December 2002, and the privatization of the bus companies is expected to be finalized in March 2003.192

In order to obtain peace, these claims must be followed through and the economy must be privatized. This is also essential for foreign investment in the country once the peace process has stabilized the region. People in the north of Sri Lanka will benefit from the addition of the shipping industry, while privatization will allow for the stabilization of this region on all accounts. As a scholar points out, “however, in terms of human capital it stands out from all other war-ravaged societies. Tamils happen to be one of the most industrious communities.”193 Through the inclusion in the economy and the addition of new industries the Tamils will rise from poverty and be integrated into a successful society with the Sinhalese.

For the peace process to continue and for there to be a lasting peace in Sri Lanka, a stable economy free of discrimination is necessary. The following recommendations would create a positive economic status for Sri Lanka. These recommendations must be instituted after the peace process has allowed for a peaceful settlement between the Tamils and the Sinhalese.

Recommendations:

• Create a single, Sri-Lankan national identity that presides over ethnic identification. Celebrate that Sri Lankan national identity and multiculturalism.

• Direct programs toward alleviating psychological problems. • While the education system should be run on a system of local autonomy, the core

curriculum should be nationally written and in English. The textbooks in the primary schools should involve dual languages, English and either Sinhalese or Tamil, but by the secondary level of education all texts should be written entirely in English. School attendance should no longer be voluntary but would become mandatory for all children under the age of fourteen. National examinations should be implemented to assess the level of basic knowledge of Sri Lankan students. Several thousand teachers need to be supplied through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Peace Corps. The English teachers brought in to Sri Lanka should work alongside the native teachers, thus both instructing the next generation of Sri Lankans and training the current educators. Scholarships should be made available to low-income students, the funding of which would come from international aid.

192 Government of Sri Lanka, Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding, 2003 (Colombo, Sri Lanka, 2003), http://www.imf.org/External/NP/LOI/2003/lka/01/index.htm 193 Amalendu Misra, "Rain on a parched land: Reconstructing a post-conflict Sri Lanka," International Peacekeeping 11, no. 2 (2004): 285, , http://www.proquest.com

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• It is necessary for the Sri Lankan government to give businesses incentives to have their employees participate in English classes and the employees themselves should be given advancement opportunities upon completion of such courses and the passing of an English fluency examination.

• Rural public libraries should be built to bring literacy to remote areas. Folk tales should be written to build a common Sri Lankan identity. A Selective Dissemination of Information (SDI) program should be used in libraries to work with surrounding neighborhoods to invest in resources that would cater to the people’s needs.

• Institute an economic policy that will prevent discrimination of any ethnic group specifically through the use of the English language in major businesses.

• Ensure investment into the economy on a long-term basis by the IMF and World Bank.

• Create a national apparel brand in Sri Lanka, which will be a competitive company in the global market. The creation of a free trade shipping zone in the northern region of Sri Lanka, potentially the Jaffna peninsula, is essential. Create free Trade agreements between Sri Lanka and developed countries, in particular the U.S. and the EU. The free trade zone would be government property with private organizations bidding for contracts in the port.

• Privatize the entire Sri Lankan economy and the ensure the availability of IPOs from the major Sri Lankan industries, in particular the new international apparel company. The major industries in Sri Lanka, especially the new apparel industry must be open to foreign investment as well.

• Ensure reconstruction and rebuilding of the infrastructure in the northern and eastern regions and the construction of a major port on the Jaffna peninsula. Create improved telecommunications and transportation especially in the traditionally underdeveloped Tamil regions in the north and east.

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