politics of the alternative land use and rural economy (alu re) proposals in the uk

The rural land use proposals set out by the Department of the Environment and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food in 1987 have been received as a major benchmark in the changing nature of rural policies. These proposals relating to alternative land uses and rural economies have become known as the ALURE package. This article seeks to explain briefly the political context of ALURE, and to analyse and evaluate the short- and long-term political objectives of the policy group which formulated the proposals. It then assesses the constituent measures of ALURE and their subsequent reinter- pretation in the light of representations by various pressure groups. Finally the article seeks to evaluate the achieve- ments of ALURE in the light of wider issues of rural policy.

Paul Cloke is at the Department of Geography, Saint David’s University Col- lege, Lampeter, Dyfed, SA48 7ED, Wales, UK, and Brian McLaughlin is an Honorary Fellow of Essex Institute of Higher Educa- tion, Victoria Road South, Chelmsford, Essex, CM1 ILL, UK.

Politics of the alternative land use and rural economy (ALURE) proposals in the UK

Crossroads or blind alley?

Paul Cloke and Brian McLaughlin

In February 1987 two sets of proposals were issued by the UK government which brought issues of rural land use and economy to the front line of political debate. One, a Department of the Environment (DOE) draft circular on Development Involving Agricultural Land presented proposals to give regard to the promotion of economic activity as well as protection of countryside when deciding applications for planning permission that affect agricultural land. This raised the spectre of a reversal of previous presumptions against development on land in agricultural use. The second was a f2S million package of measures announced by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) aiming to encourage alternative uses of farmland, the diversification of the rural economy and the further expansion of environmentally friendly farming.

Both sets of proposals arose from a specially constituted government policy group on rural Britain which was given the task of developing policy initiatives within the general framework of promoting alternative land use and stimulating the rural economy. The proposals became known unofficially as the ALURE proposals. The measures comprising ALURE met with a welter of journalistic comment and strong responses from various of the pressure groups concerned. They are seen by some as a major redirection of rural land use policy and by others as a storm in a teacup. This article argues that full appreciation of ALURE requires careful acknowledgement of the political context in which the package was formulated and delivered. Although detailed evaluations of the efficacy of the proposals may take some years to complete, there are clear indications from this context of the priority of political objectives involved.

0264-8377/89/03235-14$03.00 0 1989 Butterworth & Co (Publishers) Ltd 235

‘For the background to these issues see: Ft. Body, Agriculture: The Triumph and the Shame, Temple Smith, London, UK, 1982; R. Body, Farming in the Clouds, Temple Smith, London, UK, 1984; J. Blunden and N. Curry, eds, The Changing Countryside, Croom Helm, London, UK, 1985; and J. Bowers and P. Cheshire, Agriculture, the Countryside and Land Use, Methuen, Lon- don, UK, 1983. See also I. Bowler, Agricul- ture Under the Common Agricultural fob- cy, Manchester University Press, Man- chester, UK, 1985; G. Cox, P. Lowe and M. Winter, Agriculture: People and Policies, Allen & &win, London, UK, 1986; and C. Pye-Smith and Ft. North, Working the Land, Temple Smith, London, UK, 1984. “R. North, ‘Putting on the green to catch the eco-vote’, The Listener. Vol 115. No 2942, 1986, pp 1516.

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The context of ALURE

ALURE was born of a marriage between longer-term political concerns over the European Community’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and short-term expediency in the run-up to the 1987 general election. In many ways, the immediate political needs were intertwined with longer-standing goals, both historical and ideological. One of these evolving concerns was the government’s increasing ideological and financial embarrassment over food surpluses, and the increasing pressure within the UK for government action to correct a situation where the cost of storage and disposal of unwanted food had become the largest component of CAP expenditure.’ Although they had traditionally enjoyed widespread support amongst the farming community, the Conservatives were aware that they were increasingly dependent on middle-class voters for whom manifestations of finanical inefficiency such as surpluses were anathema (Figure I).

Equally, the Conservative Party was aware of the danger of losing political support in rural areas over green issues.’ Consequently it was recognized that although the leaders of, or spokespersons for, environmental pressure groups were unlikely to be Conservative voters, the

Figure 1. A media view of agricultural surplus in the UK

236 LAND USE POLICY July 1989

Politiu of the ALURE proposuls in the UK

membership of such groups might be wooed to support the Conservative Party given appropriate greening of policies. The political consequences of rural repopulation and the changing nature of the new middle-class

constituency were certainly not ignored by Conservative Party planners or their advisers.3 At the same time, the government was being alerted to the possible need to take increasing acreages of agricultural land out of production over the next two to three decades. Estimates by North represent some of the more extreme examples of informed speculation as to the likely extent of land that may be surplus to agricultural requirements (Table l).J For the Conservative Party the political ramifications of unemployed rural land create as many problems as do those relating to rural people.5

Finally, the party recognized the need to treat the rural ‘economy’ as a whole when dealing with any proposals to cut farm surpluses. In particular, the need to stimulate enterprise and competition was seen as an important aim. This was consistent both with the government’s continued commitment to the broader macroeconomic policies of privatization and deregulation and its need to achieve a compatible economic policy package to justify its specific aim of deregulating the land use planning system.

These contextual objectives required careful political handling, not least because of the potential contradictions inherent in responding to the many interest groups involved. Would it be possible to satisfy the requirements and expectations of farmers, foresters, environmental groups, middle-class residents and catalysts within the new rural economy, as well as other political interests such as that represented by the development and construction lobby‘? Such was the magnitude of the ALURE group’s task. They were charged with achieving major policy realignment while simultaneously developing a manifesto for the countryside that would help to secure a third term of office for the Conservative government. In that context. it is perhaps no coincidence that the first known meeting of the ALURE working party coincided with the Conservative Party Confcrcncc at Bournemouth in October 1986.

The remit of ALURE

The establishment of the ALURE policy group had the highest priority within the most senior members of the Cabinet. The group consisted of - .

3A. Sullivan, Greening the Tories: New Policies on fhe Environment, Policy Study

three government ministers representing MAFF and the DoE, two

No 72, Centre for Policy Studies, London, Westminster backbenchers, one European MP, two members of the

UK, 1985. Upper House and a small group of party specialist advisers. The ‘North, op tit, Ref 2. ‘I?. Norton-Taylor, Whose Land is if Any-

existence of the group and details of its membership and agenda were

way?, Turnstone Press, Wellingborough, confidential, but its remit is known to have included agriculture, rural

UK, 1982. services and amenities as well as green and non-farm business issues.

Table 1. Farmland requirements as assessed by North (million ha).

Enterprise

Milk Cereals (wheat/barley)

Land requirement

1985 2015 Surplus

2.2 0.6 1.6 3.87 175-2 00 1 87-2 12

Note: aLess Favoured Areas. Beef and sheep (LFA)” 65 5.2 13

Source: Ft. North, ‘Putting on the green to catch Beef and sheep (lowland) 1.7 1 .o 07

the eco-vote‘, The Listener. Vol 115. No 2942, Total 14.27 8.55-B 8 5 47-5.72 1986. pp 1516.

LAND USE POLICY July 1989 237

Above all, the need to keep in mind the Party’s overall political objectives was a prime objective for the group.

At the outset, the group identified the sensitive and contentious elements within its remit: the need for caution in attempting to change established land use planning principles; the need to provide the farming community with a clear sense of direction and confidence for the future; the need to maintain and or attract the support of both farmer and green voters in rural areas. and so on.

At subsequent discussions the group’s objectives were placed within a political context which embraced realistic constraints on finance and other resources. In concluding sessions, the importance of providing political ‘nuggets’ - specific and immediately attractive policy proposals - dominated the agenda, and the details of the ALURE package were drawn up with the principle that although there was a continuing need for a planning system to prevent unacceptable development, no unnecessary barriers to rural enterprise should be permitted.

A key feature of the ALURE project was to discuss the future of the countryside attendant upon a revised agricultural policy for the UK which would aim to bring down levels of production and cut the cost of agricultural support. With hindsight it is now evident that, in addition to its longer-term ‘manifesto’ value, the package was also intended by some elements of government to have a more short-term palliative effect on the farming community, which had already been given clear messages in previous ministerial statements that it was no longer possible or desirable to continue supporting the farming industry as in ‘the days of yore’.

The ALURE package

The ALURE proposals were announced in an atmosphere of con- troversy and interdepartmental rivalry. The (then) Agriculture Minis- ter, Michael Jopling, planned to divulge the new diversification ‘nugget’ policies on the eve of the annual general meeting (AGM) of the National Farmers’ Union (NFU) in February 1987. The original intention was that this release would coincide with the DOE’S statement of intent over planning policy with respect to agricultural land. The Minister of Agriculture, however, was well aware that he was facing a motion of no confidence at the NFU AGM, and a number of unofficial leaks continued to leave the impression that the (as yet unannounced) DoE proposals would not only assist farmers to diversify, but would also release considerable areas of land for development. Indeed delegates came to the NFU AGM with the Duify Telegraph banner headlines - ‘End of dig for victory campaign’ - clearly fixed in their minds.

In an attempt to appease the farming community and in order to steal a march on the DOE disclosure and hence lay claim to the rural portfolio, MAFF changed its plans and rushed out a statement on its proposals 24 hours early. These tactics not only failed to appease the farming community but also attracted the open hostility of the ‘Green Belt backbenchers’ who saw precious votes disappear with every acre of agricultural land that might be lost to development. The premature announcement also angered the environment ministers and, in particular, the Secretary of State who saw it as a public attempt by MAFF to lay claim to the green/countryside portfolio which had always been located within his department.

LAND USE POLICY July 1989

Politics of the ALURE proposals in 1he UK

Perhaps most importantly, the situation both embarrassed and angered the Prime Minister whose management regime does not allow for public disagreement between Cabinet ministers on fundamental issues such as future policies for the use of the countryside. As a result, the DOE draft circular on Development Involvirq Agricultural Land was released hurridly to correct the growing impression in the popular media that farmland in particular and the countryside in general was up for grabs.

The report by Philip Webster and Richard Evans in The Times provides a graphic illustration of how the media portrayed this situation:

Mr Jopling’s colleagues openly accused him of promoting his initiative by allowing it to appear that protected land would now be under threat from the housebuilders One ministerial source said: ‘All this has done is gratuitously upset the policy picture we have successfully put across, which is to restrict house building in the South-east and not build on the green belt and green-field sites. Now he has come out and put his great size 12 gumboots all over our policy and we are now involved in a damage limitation exercise.’ It was said that Mr Jopling’s ‘politically inept performance’ amounted to mishandling on a big scale, involving one of the most sensitive political areas in the south of England. ‘He has sown needless doubt in the minds of electors,’ the source said.”

Without doubt this inept (or calculated?) manner of presentation had a profound effect on the stormy reception given to what are, in effect, fairly straightforward policy announcements. As Johnston suggested:’ ‘It is also sure to have a substantial impact on the form of the new policy if and when it finally emerges, if only because of the public interest it has generated in the subject. The smoothing over of inherent contradictions in the proposals was almost scuttled at birth . . ’ because ministers were exposed in the spotlight of trying to please their own particular sectoral constituencies by interpreting the proposals favourably to a particular interest group regardless of the risk of political alienation of other groups. In particular, if the DOE proposals did not facilitate development on hitherto protected land, it was unclear how they were contributing to the objective of taking land out of production and thereby helping to cut surplus production. The specific wording of the proposals may help unravel this knot.

The MA FFproposals

The f25 million MAFF packageX contained

(1) A sum of f10 million per annum was

four main policy proposals.

proposed to encourage the

(2)

(3)

‘Philip Webster and Richard Evans, The Times, 10 February 1987. ‘B. Johnston, ‘How to get a bad press’, Planning, Vol 716, 1987, pp 8-9. (4)

‘This sum should be viewed in the context of the current UK government’s contribu-

A sum of f7 million was allocated towards doubling the number of Environmentally Sensitive Areas (ESAs) which were first introduced with the 1986 Agricultural Act. Finally a sum of 55 million per annum was to be set aside to encourage diversification of farm businesses by providing grants to assist the establishment of on-farm ancillary business.

tion to the CAP of approximately fl.6 billion. Such proposals are relatively straightforward. Their overall aim is to


development of on-farm woodlands with farmers being offered variable payments to reflect the loss of income from land that was planted. An additional sum of f3 million per annum was to be given towards the expansion of the traditional private sector forestry programme with a specific aim of bringing that sector’s investment ‘further down the hill’.

encourage farmers to move into alternative projects, especially timber which is not only an extensive land user but also represents a major import bill of approximately f4.S billion. In the latter context, the need to allocate limited funds to increase self-sufficiency levels is an argument readily appreciated by the Treasury. The proposals also encourage a further attempt to de-intensify agriculture. In particular, the expansion of the ESA programme is perceived not just as an attempt to reduce production levels, but also as a route towards the development of environmentally friendly agricultural practices with all that this entails in terms of public acceptability and support for the party who was responsible for their introduction. The extent to which the rural economy can be diversified in wide developmental terms, however, depends on how changes to planning restrictions on agricultural land are interpreted.

The DoE proposals

Until the proposed changes in 1987, the planning of agricultural land was guided by DOE circular 75176 which outlined the policy aim: ‘to ensure that, as far as possible, land of a higher agricultural quality is not taken for development where land of a lower quality is available’. Circular 75/76 was the land use planning expression of a government policy for agriculture which was contained in a white paper, Food From Our Own Resources,’ and which unequivocally stated the need to maintain and expand UK food production.

The 1987 ALURE proposals reduced MAFF scrutiny of planning applications and removed the presumption that agricultural use of land is paramount for planning purposes. Instead they established a tripartite system of concerns enbracing agriculture, environment and rural economic revival:

The agricultural quality of the land and the need to control the rate at which land is taken for development are among the factors to be included in that assessment. At the same time, full regard must be had horh to the need to promote economic activity that provides jobs, including the contribution of small firms, und to the need to protect Green Belts, National Parks, Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty, and other areas of good countryside.“’

By specifically linking these objectives with the intention to preserve both grades 1 and 2 of agricultural land (where development would involve the loss of 50 acres or more of land) and land in elite conservation areas such as national parks, green belts, Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONBs), Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs) and so on, the proposals provoked the fear that the government had in mind a two-tier system of countryside planning: favoured areas would be protected, and non-favoured areas would be subject to ‘free-for-all’ development. There was at least an implicit suggestion that the development of surplus land where appropriate would be acceptable, and that the change in attitude towards the erstwhile primacy of agriculture in the planning process would allow some financially hard-pressed farmers to buy their way out of

‘Ministry of Agriculture, Food From Our agricultural difficulties with the currency of housing development. Own Resources, Cmnd 6020, HMSO, Lon- Following these assumptions through, however, leads to a tangled don, UK, 1987. “‘DOE, Development Involving Agricultura/

web of national and international policy objectives. Without question,

Land, Draft Circular, DOE, London, UK, the main source of cereal surplus is the better quality land and logic 1987, Para 3. would therefore suggest that this land should also see some measures to


Po1itic.s of the A LURE proyosals in /hr UK

restrict production. To do so, however, might threaten the UK’s position vis-&vis mainland Europe, hence the explicit support for keeping the better quality land in production. From the point of view of the farming community, the best opportunity for taking this land out of agriculture via the development option is in the south-east where such pressures are strongest, but also where land tends to be of higher grade and often subject to other protection.

Reactions to ALURE

From official reactions to the MAFF and DOE ALURE proposals it was the DOE who drew most fire from the various lobby groups with an interest. As a result the agricultural context in which ALURE was conceived was being replaced by an environmental context in which it was growing up. Part of the explanation for this situation is to be found in the fact that, although the two proposals were eventually published together, the proposed reform of the planning system had a context which was broader than the ALURE remit. When seen alongside an earlier green paper on the Future of Development Plans, the planning proposals clearly belonged to the broader objectives of deregulation which have characterized the government’s policies since it came to power in 1979.

Initial reactions to the MAFF package varied. Initial farming reaction was lukewarm as the package was seen as totally insufficient to meet the financial difficulties that were resulting from declining support for mainstream agriculture. This attitude was perhaps most graphically summarized by a delegate at the AGM of the National Farmers’ Union when he described the proposals as ‘a spit in the sea’.

Outside the farming industry, organizations such as the Development Commission, the Countryside Commission and Rural Voice were cautiously welcoming in their reponse although interest groups such as the Council for the Protection of Rural England (CPRE) were quick to express their reservations about some aspects of the package, particularly the woodlands scheme. For them, the encouragement of woodlands could only mean the blanket coniferization of yet more of England’s ‘green and pleasant land’.

The official reactions to the alternatives proposed by MAFF tended to be swamped by the vehement opposition that was directed towards the DOE proposed changes to the planning of agricultural land. Two broad schools of thought emerged:

(I) The ‘Demise of the rural environment’school

Led primarily by environmental pressure groups, and joined by opportunistic political groups, this school of thought tended to see the ALURE package in general - and the DOE proposals in particular - as being an iron fist in a kid glove. Aside from the glaring political rhetoric of those such as Richard Livsey (countryside spokesman for the Alliance) who is reported to have declared that ‘85% of farmland is now up for grabs by developers’, a number of major objections were made public, especially by CPRE who feared that:

0 protection of farmland had been reduced without any compensating mechanisms for countryside conservation. Environmental degrada- tion would be the inevitable outcome;


Politics of the A LURE proposcrls in the UK

“D. Astor, Comments reported in P/an- ning, Vol 706, 1987, p 10. ‘%.R.B. Brown, ‘The future of development plans - a reaction from the counties’, The Planner, Vol 73, May 1987, pp 1516; S. Bvrne, ‘The future of development plans - government proposals’, The ‘P/am&, Vol 73. Mav 1987. DI) 1 l-1 3; and A. Wriaht. ‘The future of ‘development plans T a reaction from the districts’, The Planner, May 1987, pp 14-15. ‘3Malcolm MacEwen, Independent resear- cher, personal comment.

242

local authority planning policies which depended on the protection of agricultural land as their baseline would be rendered useless. thus triggering uncertainty about the overall role of planning in protecting the countryside; the removal of the presumption against development on agricultural land would mean in effect the removal of any rationale for protecting the countryside; when set in the wider context of the Conservative government’s view about the role of planning, these proposals gave grounds for concern about how countryside protection might operate in practice.

CPRE Chairman David Astor summarized these attitudes thus:

CPRE understands and agrees with the government’s wish to find new ways

forward for farmers and the rural economy generally Overproduction

means that creative new ideas and new measures ~ no doubt including new

patterns of development - are needed urgently But the countryside is too

important to the nation to be jeopardised hy proposals as ill-considered as those

in the draft circular. The government should think again. If it does not do so. it

risks losing what is good in its thinking because of what is bad.”

‘Two telling points emerge from the arguments put forward by the ‘demise’ school. First, as the protection of land for agricultural purposes under-pins so much of rural planning policy (even within designated areas), the reduction of MAFF input to decision making in planning leaves the way open for development interests to mount increasingly successful attacks on the countryside. Second, the context of ideological attacks by the government on the planning process is important. The proportion of planning appeals upheld by central government rose from 29% in 1979 to 40% in 1085, and it would seem that the government entertains a wish to relax controls on accumulation by development capital interests. Taken together with the government’s declared intention to reform the Development Planning system,” the DoE planning proposals can be viewed as part of a general attempt to deconstruct countryside planning policy completely, or at best to rcducc it to a system of managing high-quality sites in selected designated areas - a policy expression of what Malcolm MacEwen has described as

‘islands of conservation in a sea of laissez faire’.13 In short, this school of thought argued that the government had

removed the food production priority from countryside policy but had not replaced it with anything but political rhetoric about conservation commitments and the need to revive the rural economy.

Not surprisingly, it was the government which was at the forefront of the defence of the ALURE package. Following a long-established government tradition, the first method of defence was to attack the manner in which the whole package and its intention had been totally misreprc- sented by the press. Environment Minister, William Waldcgrave (who at that time had the ‘countryside’ portfolio), addressing the Planning Inspector-ate in April 1987, criticized the casual approach, bad editing and deliberately misleading comments made by some journalists. Identifying with the interests of his audience, he underlined the effects of such misrepresentation: ‘This will not help public understanding of our approach; it causes unnecessary worry, unnecessary correspondence


and no doubt, unnecessary appeals’. Whatever the thinking behind the ‘attack strategy’, the levelling of blame at the press is really quite difficult to accept. Any uncertainty created by the ALURE package was largely self-inflicted by the government as a result of obvious interdepartmental rivalry which could not be concealed when the package was first announced. Although presented as a joint package, the MAFF and DOE elements of ALURE are difficult to perceive as being hofll compatible and not representing a change to current policy and procedure for planning agricultural land.

In the same address to the Planning Inspectorate, Mr Waldegrave attempted to explain this conundrum. He suggested that essentially the DOE proposals mean that environmental and economic aspects have to be taken into account rogerher with agricultural implications when applications for development on agricultural land are assessed. So much is written into the draft circular. He added, however, that the priority ascribed to maintaining agricultural land USC by Circular 7Y76 could no longer prevail in an era of agricultural surpluses. Following this logic. the expectation has to be that agricultural land will be transferred to other ‘economic’ or ‘environmental’ uses. As the scale of support for environmentally friendly farming is still relatively small, especially when set against the economic problems of the farming industry, it seems reasonable to expect that much of the reallocation of land will be for ‘economic’ uses, however these may be defined. In his public pronouncements Waldegrave was keen to insist that the new proposals did not remove all constraints on the development of non-elite agricultural land. He also argued that the policy emphasis would he concerned with a wider agenda, including the protection of the countryside for its own sake. instead of the outdated idea of the protection of the land for its agricultural production value. This interpretation was subsequently made official in the final version of Development Involving Agricultural Lund (Circular 16/87).

From the outset, the DOE was being challenged by the ‘Demise of the rural environment’ school to clarify the ambiguities of the February 1987 draft circular. The department’s damage limitation strategy made full use of the fact that the original advice had only been in drufr form and that naturally clarification could be introduced in response to public consultation. In its final form, Circular 16/87 states:

The agricultural quality of the land and the need to control the rate at which

land is taken for development are among the factors to be included in that

assessment. together with the need to facilitate development and economic

activity for its own sake rather than primarily for the productive value of the

land (para 3).

This change of wording, emphasizing countryside protection fitr ifs owt? sake was heralded by the earlier publication of Furming atzd Rural Enferprise - a collection of glossy booklets setting out the government’s views on rural development. One booklet, Rural Enferprise atzd Development, stresses the need to continue policies for the prevention of scattered piecemeal development and to protect the countryside for its own sake.” Whether or not the DoE thought that this would be the

14DoE, Rural Enlerprise and Develop- men&, DOE, London, UK, 1987.

end of the matter is a matter of conjecture. Whatever the objective, the

“B Johnston, ‘Countryside protected for fear of two-tier protection comprising ‘elite’ designated landscapes and

its dwn sake’, Planning, Vol 719, 1987, pp ‘ordinary countryside’ remains. Johnston identifies two trends which a-9. fuel these fears:”


The extension of the Landscape Special Development Order (LASDO) procedure to allow planning authorities to make reprc- sentations about the siting of buildings and roads connected with farming and forestry. These powers are restricted to national parks. The DoE proposals in 1986 to introduce new powers for landscape conservation orders as a last resort policy for compulsory restraint. Again these measures were intended to be directed at the elite landscape areas of national parks.

“DOE The Future of Development Plans, DOE, iondon, UK, 1986. “P J Cloke and CC. Park, Rural Re- source Management, Croom Helm, Lon- don, UK, 1985; M. Whitby and K. Willis, Rural Resource Development, Methuen, London, UK, 1978. ‘8Author’s own emphasis. “Countryside Commission, New Opportu- nities for the Countryside, Countryside Commission, Cheltenham, UK, 1987.

Johnston might also have included the proposed discussion paper on The Future of Development PILULS with its proposals for Rural Conservation Areas as yet further evidence of an emergent two-tier countryside policy.‘” The unresolved question remains - does countryside protection ‘for its own sake’ refer to some countryside which is already recognized as elite, or does it cover all countryside‘? If the former applies, what happens to the residual? If the latter, what measures are forthcoming to maintain protection in ordinary areas to elite standards?

To some extent the debate over the rewording of Circular 16/X7 obscured some of the real issues which the broader details about ALURE and the principle of agricultural land protection rcprescnted. On the one hand, the wide ALURE debate prescntcd the DoE with an opportunity to reappraise a rural resource planning philosophy whose origins lay in a post-war era of food shortages when increasing productivity was the primary aim.” The then ‘countryside’ minister, Mr Waldegrave, showed his hand a little on this intention during his address to the CPRE in February 1087:

an era when the increase in farm production regardless of markets. wits 21

part of the structure of national policy is now ending. I say thank goodness

Let us remember. to set alongside the production achievement, some of the

costs. Of wildlife habitat lost. Of wild species under pressure. Of familiar

landscape altered. Of land and water sometimes overstrained in terms of

chemical inputs The change of direction now gives us the opportunity to

seek 21 i~oper and www de~ensihle return for producers of goods which have real

markets: to redirect farming techniques in sensitive areas to less intensive

methods to recreate the strained alliance -strained sometimes in my experience

within a single individual pulled in two directions ~ between the countryman and

producer of food. Ix

Within a government committed to a philosophy of deregulation and encouraging competition, the DOE were clearly making a play for a more responsible position as the key Department of State in rural policy making. Certainly the ALURE debate placed the environment - and especially the DOE - in a much stronger position than ever in the general rural policy debate. Even the widely welcomed MAFF initiatives were founded on a recognition of the riced to revive the rural economy, a policy responsibility that lies traditionally with the Rural Development Commission which is directly responsible to the DoE. Indeed it is significant that the Farm Diversification Scheme is rcstrictcd to on-farm projects only.

The enhanced position of environment within rural policy should also certainly benefit agencies such as the Countryside Commission and the Nature Conservancy Council who, on the face of it, represent allies for the DoE in any further challenge to MAFF supremacy in rural land use policy and planning. I” How strong any such alliance would ever be. however, must bc a matter of conjecture, especially following the


Secretary of State’s (Nicholas Ridley’s) reported intention to privatize National Nature Reserves.

For MAFF, on the other hand, the ALURE package was published initially as a series of measures to help farmers to diversify their sources of income. This approach is clearly predicated upon acceptance of the arguments about surplus land and the need to find alternative uses for that resource. Such a position is inherently vulnerable, however. because many aspects of the ALURE package as it stands will almost certainly be more appealing to those farmers operating at the geographical and economic margins rather than in the agricultural heartlands where the majority of the surplus in production is generated.

In the circumstances, MAFF has latterly chosen the safer ground of locating the ALURE proposals within its broader rural policy responsi- bilities as defined by S.17 of the Agricultural Act 19X6 which charges them to have regard to and endeavour to achieve a reasonable balance between : (a) the promotion and maintenance of a stable and efficient agricultural industry; (b) the economic and social interests of rural areas; (c) the conservation and enhancement of the natural beauty and amenity of the countryside and of any features of archaeological interest there; and (d) the promotion of the enjoyment of the countryside by the public.

Within a government that places so much emphasis on economic revival, it is hardly surprising that MAFF has been particularly keen to emphasize its importance in the task of rural economic revival. Public pronouncements by agricultural ministers since the publication of the ALURE package have underlined this broader context of agricultural concern: ‘. small towns and villages, reliant upon agriculture are looking for sufficient alternative opportunities to provide jobs for those who are no longer needed on the land’.“’ A clearer and arguably more blatant play for the broader rural portfolio is evident in John MacGregor’s speech on the second reading of the Farmland and Rural Development Bill in the House of Commons. In commending Clause 3 of the Bill to the House which allows for an increase in the number of Development Commissioners he argued:

I am glad to have this clause in my Department’s Bill because it is symptomatic

of how closely we now work with our colleagues at the Department of the

Environment, who are responsible for the Development Commission. It also fits

in well with the overall rationale of the Bill and with our new policy in relation to

alternative land use which is to encourage, in a variety of ways - some

experimental - the alternative use of agricultural land; to encourage more

diversity on farms and in the rural economy at large; to encourage more

market-oriented and outward looking farming industry; and ;I different balance

between the interests of the countryside and environmental objectives, and

those of food production in this new world of surpluses.”

The message is clear. In the knowledge that food surpluses are both an ideological and financial embarrassment, MAFF has now begun to embrace the wider portfolio of rural and countryside issues that many of its sternest critics have argued it should have recognized several years ago.

Outside of public and quasi-public authorities, the ALURE proposals *“Extract from Agriculture Minister John Gummer’s speech to the Norsk Hydro

have gained the support of a broad spectrum of opinion. particularly

Conference, March 1987. when presented as another (limited) step towards tackling the problems

“Hansard, Col 778, HMSO, London, UK, of surplus production. Such acceptance is testament to the persuasive 1 February 1988. effects of political rhetoric against a background of limited policy


reality. These short-term exercises in deception, however, obscure the longer-term continuing struggle for policy control in rural areas between agriculture and environment which is bound to have important implications for future rural policies and their implementation.”

What will ALURE achieve?

The ALURE package raises a number of questions which cannot yet be answered. Whether it represents a serious first step on the road to rural policy revision or is merely the worst form of ‘tokenism’ is a matter of debate. One initial reaction must be to question the scale of government finance that has been allocated to the package. With an initial budgetary allocation of f25 million per annum, it is clear that whatever the identity of its beneficiaries, there will not be many of them. Set against the vast scale of the initial problem of surplus agricultural production and the need to revive the rural economy, the initial funding of the package is decidedly modest.

One potential way forward, then. would be to suggest significant increases in the budgets linked with ALURE proposals. In many respects, however, the question of what alternative levels of funding for novel crops and projects should be set by MAFF represents a red herring. This is because the encouragement of farmers to leave agricultural production is not merely 3 question of appropriate levels of financial inducement; it is also a question of the skills and opportunites available to the farming community from which they could develop a viable alternative business.

It is also clear that for many potential beneficiaries, the advantages may be more apparent than real. Innovative schemes for developing alternative rural enterprises seem to originate from ctztl.~~~~rL’“eurial

farmers who see in them an opportunity to develop and exploit new

markets, rather than from less able farmers. By definition. those new markets are limited and as such have little capacity for accommodating any but a small proportion of the farming community. Perhaps. more critically, they are not ‘managed markets’ exclusive to farmers, but are open to entrepreneurs who can find the necessary resources of capital and land. It is not clear whether the farming community has fully grasped the implications of this latter point.

In reality, the market for diversification holds limited opportunities for the farming community as a whole. Experience to date suggests that diversification is only a realisitic option for those farmers with the entrepreneurial skill, financial resources and access to available markets. For those without these skills and resources. diversification could be a financial disaster. There is already some evidence to suggest a

declining interest in the diversification scheme, as the number of applications for grant aid continue to decline (Table 2). It is too early to speculate on the success of the Farm Woodlands Scheme. The current government tree planting target of 33 000 ha per annum has not been met in recent years; the maximum achieved under the Forestry Grant Scheme was 23 000 ha per annum. How realistic an additional target of 12 000 ha per annum is likely to be is a matter of conjecture, although the potential employment and environmental benefits in the long term

**A. Blowers, ‘Transition or transforma- tion? Environmental policy under Thatch-

might lead to some hope for a successful up-take.

er’, Public Administration, Vol 65, 1987, pp Against these obvious limitations, some benefits might be identified

277-294. from the ALURE package. In so far as it has taken the agricultural issue


Table 2. Farm diversification grant scheme: applications from January to October 1988.a

Month

January February March April

May June July August September October

Number of applications received

England

77 159 146 115 107 71 63 61 56 41

Wales

4 24 30 21 12 12 10 9

14 11

Notes: aFigures for Scotland and Northern Ire- Total 896 147 land not available.

and placed it within a broader rural agenda, the package arguably represents a step forward, but fundamental questions remain. Is this the first of many steps, or is the package little more than a politically acceptable tinkering at the margins? How far does the package represent the beginnings of a real policy revision leading towards the development of some form of integrated rural resource policy and how far is it really an attempt to paper over the cracks of division between departmental interests? The performances of MAFF and DOE during the launch of ALURE are the material interest in this context, as were the ‘discussions’ between MAFF and the Development Commission concerning who should be responsible for the administration of resources allocated for an on-farm and off-farm diversification.

How far does the package represent an opportunity for a real reallocation of resources which will benefit all sectors of rural society or even ull sectors of the agricultural community, or how far is it little more than a reshuffle of the cards which are destined to remain in the hands of established sectoral interests? To some extent, such questions are premature both because it is not yet clear how the package will finally be implemented and because it would be foolish to attempt an evaluation outside its broader context. Notwithstanding the political rhetoric, this package clearly does not represent the government’s primary response to the problem of surplus production in the UK. It must be evaluated within the wider context of more direct policy initiatives aimed at reducing surplus production problems. central to which is some version of price support cuts for commodities that are in surplus. The framework for the broader context was laid down in Furming UK which was published as part of the Farming and Rural Enterprise package. That document identifies the UK government’s approach to European agricultural policy as:

the need to reduce budgetary costs and tackle surpluses with measures sufficient to bring supply and demand into better balance through an appropriate price policy supplemented as necessary by other measures; the need to give much greater weight to market conditions by limiting the role of intervention and introducing greater flexibility in support arrangements; the need for even-handed and fair treatment between member states, between the regions of the UK and between individual producers, traders and consumers.

23MAFF, Farming UK, MAFF, London, UK, The emphasis is clearly upon price pressure mechanisms as the stick, 1987. with carrots being provided in the form of incentives to take land out of


Politics of the ALURE proposuls in the UK

production, to diversify into new products and/or activities and to improve the marketing of those already produced. Clearly, it is not the government’s intention to transfer agricultural support directly across to new ventures. Agricultural policy must not only cut surplus production but also achieve cost savings.

Consequently the level of public support being pledged for developing new ventures is minute compared to the level of support that will bc taken out of the food production coffers. Yet it could be argued that the need to help farmers readjust their production sights requires continuing support, not least to help them acquire the essential production and marketing skills that so many currently lack. Indeed many farmers will argue that government has a moral responsibility in this regard as the past encouragement and promoting of central government caused many of them to increase their efficiency and expand production in the first place.

The final outcome is hard to predict. On the one hand, it could be argued that to leave agricultural policy in the hands of the market’ will result in a concentration of farming activities on the better-quality, more versatile land, with a corresponding growth of more extensive farming systems elsewhere. Ironically, it is the higher-quality, more versatile land that is under pressure for development because of its geographical location. It is also the land that is geographically most accessible to the ever-growing suburban and rural populations, many of whom arc already critical of established farming systems and who will undoubtedly continue to agitate for less-intensive and more environmentally friendly systems of production. At the same time, they also represent some of the best markets for the products of a diversified agricultural industry.

By contrast, in other rural arcas, a reduction in farming activities is not just another decline in the agriculture labour force. In these areas agriculture remains an important sector of the rural economy, responsible for a significant amount of upstream and downstream employment. It is not yet clear how these proposed diversification packages will impact on those rural inhabitants who lose off-farm jobs as a direct result of changes in on-farm policy. Indeed this was a major plank of the Development Commission’s arguments throughout this new rural policy

debate. Underpinning all this uncertainty is the implementation of Circular

16/87 and the success or failure of the housebuilding lobby in convincing government ministers of the merits of their arguments about housing demand, housing costs and the role of surplus agricultural land in alleviating housing problems.

In short, although the rhetoric suggests that the first steps are being taken towards a more integrated approach, the recommended structure and the early signs of policy implementation suggest that we may be falling short both in our appraisal of the problem and in the prescribed course of action.


politics of the alternative land use and rural economy (alu re) proposals in the uk

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