political violence in mindanao: the state of play in 2016

MAY 2016

THE STATE OF PLAY IN 2016

POLITICALIN MINDANAO:

VIOLENCE

9.5VOLUME

PAPEROCCASIONAL

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In recent decades, significant portions of the Mindanao archipelago in the southern Philippines have endured violence from armed groups with political and predatory objectives. From the turn of the twentieth century, these groups have been broadly defined as representing either ethno-nationalist, communist, or Islamic insurgencies, criminal syndicates, or political/communitarian rivalries. Despite continuous efforts by the Government of the Philippines to broker political bargains with major groups, this constellation of violent actors remains a grave impediment to just and sustainable peace.

Given the long-standing nature of Philippine domestic insecurity, there is substantial literature on the histories of many of these actors, especially the Communist Party of the Philippines’ New People’s Army (NPA), the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Their storied pasts notwithstanding, these specific organizations and other militant groups such as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) have demonstrated the ability to recast themselves to fit the times.

* The views and opinions expressed in this Paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute.

THE STATE OF PLAY IN 2016

POLITICAL VIOLENCEIN MINDANAO:

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OCCASIONAL PAPER MAY 2016

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ARMED GROUPS IN MINDANAOThe study of adaptation as a phenomenon among armed groups

within Mindanao has been largely overlooked in the academic literature, despite occasional references in policy analyses of Southeast Asia

The ASG, in particular, has been the subject of recent interest. The group pledged loyalty to the international terrorist network called the Islamic State (alternatively ISIS) in 2015. Their pledge occurred despite ASG operations having been curtailed after years of counter-terror operations carried out by Philippine armed forces working with the advice of the United States.1 Such developments challenge researchers, who must situate fresh reports within the histories of the groups, while acknowledging these groups’ capacity to adapt and change.

The study of adaptation as a phenomenon among armed groups within Mindanao has been largely overlooked in the academic literature, despite occasional references in policy analyses of Southeast Asia. Scholarly understanding has tended toward historicized views of Mindanao, with the character and motives of the violence taken for granted and focus placed on its general frequency. This understanding, while valuable, has resulted in a perceived policy dichotomy between ‘all out war’ and ‘all out peace,’ with the former characterized by armed assaults of rebel strongholds (e.g. the 1998-2001 Estrada administration) and the latter by grand political bargains with the foremost armed group of the time (e.g. the 1992-98 Ramos, 2001-10 Arroyo, and 2010-16 Aquino administrations).

After examining the geographic distribution of contemporary violence, the armed groups’ targets, weapon and attack choices, and what these imply,

the authors conclude that the incoming Philippine government should pursue a third path that combines political, military, and police action.

Ready support for the development of conflict-ridden areas in Mindanao, as is often suggested, is laudable and will increase the rewards of peace, but such initiatives are difficult to implement in turbulent areas and are inherently long term in their impact. Focusing military and police action on impeding illicit transfers of and training in arms, including across country borders, on the other hand, can increase the barriers to violence. With regard to one category of violence, namely the assassination of local political figures, the latter option will be especially important in curbing the practice of hired guns on local Filipino politics.

Initiated as a mapping project aimed at visualizing the frequency and gravity of violence occurring in Mindanao, this research project transformed into a systemic data-gathering effort of news reported incidents from 1 January to 15 May 2016. This effort is modeled on the open-source Global Terrorism Database (GTD) of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism based in the University of Maryland2, and inspired by the Bangsamoro Conflict Monitoring System (BCMS) run by International Alert.3 At the time of writing, both the GTD and the BCMS have data available only through 2014, making the partial 2016 database generated by this project a complementary tool for further analysis.

As a caveat, incident and casualty counts derived from this database should not be interpreted to fully represent the violence in the southern Philippines, nor does it independently validate figures provided by either the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) or by other combatants to journalists. Further, the relatively small sample size and timeframe of this database renders our work inappropriate for extensive statistical analysis at this time. Nevertheless, we have counted 176 incidents in Mindanao during this period, during which between 259 and 265 people were injured and a further 207 to 249 people lost their lives.

The remainder of this paper is divided into four parts. First, an explanation of the project’s data-gathering process and the scope and limitations of the research. Second, brief backgrounds of the non-state armed groups represented in the database. Third, 2016 observations for each armed group and their implications for the Philippine government. Fourth, and in conclusion, policy recommendations for the new administration.

Finally, with the election of Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Roa Duterte to the presidency, the Philippines will have its first president from Mindanao. Having run on a platform focused on peace and order, Duterte will presumably pay more detailed attention to Mindanaoan security than his predecessors. Such attention would be excellent if it ushers in effective cross-Mindanao policy and practice. This research project represents the authors’ contribution to the policy process.


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Who conducts violent activities? Where do they conduct them? How do they conduct them?

What are factors that enable or constrain specific violent activity?

Which factors can the government control or influence?

How might it do so?

Research Objective and Process

In brief, this research project explores three broad sets of questions. First: Who conducts violent activities in Mindanao? Where are they conducted? How are they conducted? Second: Is it possible to identify factors that enable or constrain specific violent activity? Third: Which of these factors can the government influence or control? How might it do so?

To find answers to these questions, this research project began as a simple, open-source effort to track and map the violence in Mindanao. The database could then be used to form some basis of seeing patterns in the violence on the archipelago. Conceived in February 2016, the project represents the researchers’ response to an apparent uptick in violence being reported in Mindanao. In reports, the increase in violence was set against a backdrop of the expected failure of the Bangsamoro Basic Law in the 16th Philippine Congress and, later, the renewal of a ceasefire agreement between the MILF and the Philippine government in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

After a few weeks, the project expanded to include events reported from 1 January up to 16 May 2016. Coincidentally, this period of time spans beyond the campaign period for the 2016 elections. Thus, in total, this compilation of incidents provides an up-to-date source of news-reported incidents in Mindanao for the first four and a half months of the year.

Where incidents have been reported in multiple news outlets, we have retained in our Source column the specific article from which we based our casualty counts. Where we have used information from multiple outlets (e.g. when using lower numbers from one article as ‘minimum’ counts and higher numbers from another as ‘maximum’), we have kept sources to all articles we considered in the same Source column.

This research project tracks sixteen variables, as enumerated below:

(1) Date of the incident; (2) Town or Barangay where the incident occurred; (3) Philippine province where the incident occurred; (4) Party A and (5) Party B to the incident, where there are two parties;(6) Party initiating the violent incident; (7) Primary weapons and (8) Secondary weapons used in the incident; (9) Attack type;

(10) Minimum and (11) Maximum estimated injured from Party A; (12) Minimum and (13) Maximum estimated fatalities from Party A; (14) Minimum and (15) Maximum estimated injured from Party B; (16) Minimum and (17) Maximum estimated fatalities from Party B; (18) Minimum and (19) Maximum estimated injured from civilians; and (20) Minimum and (21) Maximum estimated fatalities from civilians.

In identifying the locations of the incident, the project collects township and village (barangay)-level information, where this is available, and the Philippine province. We note that armed actors’ areas of operation are not contained within the boundaries of these political units as defined by Philippine legislation. As a result, the proximity of incidents in neighboring provinces is best seen through maps, examples of which we also provide below.

The remainder of the variables are encoded in line with the definitions and standards set out by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism based in the University of Maryland. These definitions are especially useful for two variables: the type of weapon used (either primarily or secondarily) and the type of attack conducted. The GTD treats the type of weapon as a categorical variable of thirteen (13) options: biological, radiological, chemical, nuclear, firearms, explosives/bombs/dynamite, fake weapons, incendiary, melee, vehicle, sabotage of equipment, and others. In the Mindanao case, no use of biological, radiological, chemical, or nuclear weapons has been reported. Firearms, explosives, incendiary, melee, and sabotage categories are represented in the database. Rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) are categorized as explosives.

The definition of attack type deserves particular interest, as a set hierarchy accompanies the categorical options where more than one attack type may apply. In implementing this system, we have entered only up to one attack type for each event. For the definition and hierarchy, please see below:


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“[Attack Type] captures the general method of attack and often reflects the broad class of tactics used. It consists of nine categories, which are defined below. Up to three attack types can be recorded for each incident. Typically, only one attack type is recorded for each incident unless the attack is comprised of a sequence of events. When multiple attack types may apply, the most appropriate value is determined based on the hierarchy below. For example, if an assassination is carried out through the use of an explosive, the Attack Type is coded as Assassination, not Bombing/Explosion.”4

“Attack Type Hierarchy: Assassination Hijacking Kidnapping Barricade Incident Bombing/Explosion Unknown Armed Assault Unarmed Assault Facility/Infrastructure Attack”

Following this process, the dataset includes information on 176 violent incidents reported that span the whole of the Mindanao archipelago from 1 January to 15 May 2016. The researchers note that while the use of open-source reporting on the violence may not comprehensively capture the frequency of incidents, the abovementioned figure provides more than sufficient basis for concern.

As in all conflict-ridden areas, it is difficult to independently ascertain the validity of the figures provided by either the Armed Forces of the Philippines or by other combatants to journalists. However, with regard to casualties, exact figures and precise estimates are often available, allowing us to reflect the magnitude of the violence. Nonetheless, our tallies of combatant and civilian casualties should be treated with particular care.

Profiles of Mindanaoan Insurgency

The current constellation of insurgent groups, terrorist cells, and their respective political affiliates has deep roots in Philippine history too extensive to chronicle in this paper. Even so, the histories of Moro independence movements and Communist insurgencies provide a context that informs an assessment of these organizations in the present. This backgrounder will begin with profiles on Moro insurgent groups followed by that of the Communist insurgency.

As many scholars keenly observe, traces of the contemporary Moro movement for greater autonomy or outright secession may be found as far back as the Spanish conquest of the Philippines. At the same time, historians and anthropologists like Thomas McKenna warn that Moro political and militant movements should not be rendered as the byproduct of homogenous resistance to colonialism. The notion of “Morohood”, or a shared sense of consciousness among the various Muslim ethnic groups of Mindanao convalesced among

the Moro during the early days of the United States occupation in the early twentieth century.5

More democratic forms of political organization among the Moro, beyond traditional elite rule, matured in the post-independence period.6 A variety of factors spurred the rise of prominent Moro politicians and civil society organizations, ranging from increased numbers in the intelligentsia despite underfunded national education initiatives, to burgeoning international ties with Institutions, such as the Al-Azhar University of Egypt, and to successive waves of Christian migrants to Mindanao that ultimately ended Muslim demographic majorities in many polities.7

I. Moro Islamic Liberation Front

After 1976, the failure of the Tripoli Agreement between the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Government of the Philippines heralded a schism within the MNLF. The rift occurred between the leadership of Nur Misuari on the one hand and Hashim Salamat on the other, exacerbated by ideological and personal differences between the two. Salamat ultimately founded the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 1978, a group that he led from exile first from Cairo, Egypt, and later from Lahore, Pakistan. In contrast to the ethno-nationalist bent of the MNLF, the MILF was an explicitly Islamist organization that drew upon the theological leanings of a leadership comprised of many clerics educated in madrassas throughout the Middle East, the so-called “new ulema.”8


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The MILF proved more adept at combining militant operations with local governance initiatives to generate widespread popular support. The MILF’s less centralized organization enabled the emergence of parallel MILF administrations throughout Mindanao.9 Over the same period, the MNLF faded further from prominence following the breakdown of negotiations with new Corazon C. Aquino government in 1987; the MILF instead assumed a greater role in ceasefire talks beginning in 1989 with the passage of the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao.

However, the implementation plan for the ARMM was further fleshed out via two statements of understanding (SOU) between the Philippine government (GRP) led by Fidel V. Ramos and the MNLF. These statements of understanding empowered the MNLF to run the newly authorized administrative divisions. Incensed by the 1996 Peace Agreement with the MNLF, the MILF launched a wave of attacks against the Philippine government. The attacks terminated in 1997 with the signing of a ceasefire.10

In 2000, the Joseph E. Estrada administration renewed military operations

against the MILF, precipitating the formation of breakaway groups. In 2008, the government of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo revived negotiations with the MILF, which culminated in the Memorandum of Agreement for Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). The MOA-AD would have replaced the ARMM with a new autonomous region covering a larger territory and devolving more powers to the regional government. The MOA-AD was junked after the Supreme Court ruled the deal unconstitutional.11

Internalizing the lessons learned from the MOA-AD experience, the Benigno S. Aquino III administration made a significant peace overture which led the MILF to drop its separatist aims and embrace a more robust regional autonomy, as articulated in the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) in 2012 and the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) in 2014.12 The latter agreement would have been enacted through the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL), which stagnated in the 16th Philippine Congress after the tragic death of 44 Philippine National Police (PNP) Special Action Forces in an armed encounter in Mamasapano, Maguindanao in 2015.13

befriended Osama Bin Laden in Peshawar, Pakistan and resolved to wage al-Qaeda’s brand of Salafi jihad in his home country.14

Drawing upon Moro Mujahedeen volunteers, significant numbers of MNLF defectors, and the financial and logistical support of al-Qaeda, the ASG began terrorist attacks in the Philippines in 1991. These consisted of kidnappings and bombings that mostly targeted

II. Abu Sayyaf Group

Among the most significant and infamous breakaway factions from the MNLF is the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), formally known as Al-Harakatul al-Islamiya. Its founder, Ustadz Abdurajak Janjalani, was part of the Saudi-educated “new ulema”, and was among the 300 to 500 Moro fighters to join the Afghan Mujahedeen in the 1980s. During his time in the Mujahedeen, Janjalani


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Christian communities and foreigners. The ASG was significantly empowered by its partnership with Ramzi Youssef, one of the eventual planners of the 9/11 attacks and nephew to Khalid Sheik Mohammed. Youssef orchestrated ties between al-Qaeda and ASG, delivering finances and supplies from al-Qaeda in order to maintain ASG’s operations and plan the foiled Bojinka Plot in 1995. Youssef fled the country shortly thereafter, and ASG fell into decline without significant support from al-Qaeda.15

The ASG was further weakened by Janjalani’s death in a shootout with PNP in 1998. The group perpetrated high-profile kidnappings and racketeering to survive, only resorting once more to bombings after the introduction of US counterterrorism advisors in 2002. The US train-and-assist mission undergirded the renewed AFP offensives against the MILF and ASG. The offensives spurred cooperation between the armed groups, who in turn sought the aid of international jihadist organizations like Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Alliances with the most militant factions of the MILF in addition to JI coincided with the ideologically motivated Khadaffy Janjalani’s (Ustadz’s younger brother) ascension to the helm of the group, which was previously occupied by commanders who favored rent-seeking violence (e.g. kidnapping). These new arrangements resulted in the ASG’s execution and planning of several high-profile bombings throughout the mid-2000s. US Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (US JSOTF-P) and AFP counter-terror operations, however, severely damaged the ASG which resorted once again to kidnapping and extortion to survive.16

III. Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters

The latest major breakaway faction of the MILF is the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) which declared its independence from the group in 2010. The BIFF’s founder, Ustadz Ameril Umbra Kato, was a Saudi Arabia-trained scholar and the former leader of the MILF’s 105th Command. Kato repudiated Al Haj Murad Ebrahim’s pursuit of autonomy rather than independence as a betrayal of the Bangsamoro movement. Despite claims to the contrary, the BIFF began with a small force of an estimated 300 members in various location within Maguindanao, sporadically clashing with PNP, AFP, as well as MILF detachments. After Kato suffered a stroke in 2011, Ustadz Mohammad Ali Tambako assumed command over the BIFF.17

Although Tambako rejected the MILF-approved FAB, he did consent to a murky alliance with the MILF in 2014.18 Further, the BIFF pledged bay’a to Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014, likely as a ploy to raise its profile.19 On January 25, 2015, a botched Special Action Force operation to JI bomb-makers Zulkifli Abdhir and Abdul Basit Usman in the small municipality of Mamasapano led to a clash between the PNP and the MILF and BIFF. The SAF succeeded in killing Adbhir, but at the cost of 44 commandos. The Mamasapano Massacre significantly enhanced the profile of the BIFF, and drastically undercut public confidence in the proposed BBL at the national level, though Mindanaoans within the ARMM remained hopeful of the peace process.20 Operating primarily in Cotabato, the BIFF is currently led by Ismael

Abubaka (alias Bungos) and continues to engage in small-scale clashes with the AFP.21

IV. The Communist Party of the Philippines and its New People’s Army

Jose Maria Sison founded the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) in 1968 not long after the cessation of official hostilities between the GRP and the Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon (Hukbalahap/Huk Rebellion) in 1965. After decades of conflict, the Huks were ultimately defeated under the Ramon Magsaysay administration through successful military operations and the promise of significant land reform and social welfare policies that co-opted popular support from the Huks.22 Magsaysay’s victory over the Huks, however, was not total, as there remained a corps of Maoist hardliners within the ranks of the former Huks who joined the CPP, and later founded the NPA.

The NPA began in earnest as a small group of academics, labor organizers, farmers, and other “proletariat” who were eventually forced by the declaration of martial law by Ferdinand Marcos in 1972 to organize in rural localities. This strategy allowed them to avoid being swept up in the massive arrests taking place in major cities. Operating from the countryside of several regions, especially Davao in Mindanao, the NPA gathered a strength of 30,000 members from 1978 to 1986 thanks to the successful implementation of decentralized commands and the preoccupation of the AFP with the MNLF and the MILF. Leveraging


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the strength of its numbers, command, and partnerships with civil society opponents to the Marcos regime, the NPA waged a campaign against AFP and PNP forces, as well as Marcos-aligned politicians and business notables, with casualties reaching a peak of 1,282 military or police killed and 1,362 civilians dead in 1985.23

To a degree, however, the NPA became a victim of its own successes as disagreements over how to approach the balance between political and military action led to bitter rifts within the leadership. At the operational level, the NPA was further enervated by frequent bloody purges of accused double agents, defectors, and dissenters within their ranks. Responding to these changes, Sison reaffirmed the primacy of Maoist guerilla war against the supposed efficacy of political imperatives touted by other party leaders and affiliated civil society groups. Ultimately, Sison spearheaded the “reaffirmist” movement within the CPP-NPA in contrast to the “rejectionist” cadres that regularized their security forces and subordinated military activities to political imperatives and electoral participation. The atomization of the NPA continued throughout the 1990’s and 2000’s through waves of contested elections, abortive peace talks, and sustained, albeit small-scale militancy.24

Although Sison remains a figurehead of the movement, the CPP-NPA operations in Mindanao through the 2000s were ably led by Benito and Wilma Tiamzon in Cebu until their arrest in 2014 and Jorge “Ka Oris” Madlos in Caraga, and Ka Parago in Davao until his death during a raid in 2015.25 Within

these regions, the NPA conducts ambushes and raids against PNP/AFP outposts, acts of industrial sabotage, abductions, and occasional focoist attacks in Davao, though these have been curbed during Rodrigo Duterte’s tenure as mayor through heavy- handed police actions of questionable legality.

To sustain itself, the NPA has created extortion rackets over the resource-rich areas under its control, most notably collecting “revolutionary taxes” from small-scale miners in Compostela Valley. The

NPA has also targeted multinational corporations operating in the areas to extract protection money and has reportedly charged local politicians in the areas they control for licenses to campaign in elections. They find many recruits among student activists, but likely draw the bulk of their rank and file from disaffected urban and rural youth unable to find meaningful employment. Current estimates of NPA membership by the AFP say their membership has declined to around 3,900 members, while the NPA claims that their organization has expanded in terms of men, materiel, and territory.26


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Philippines 2016: Data and the State of Play

Having provided a context for the major armed groups operating in Mindanao, this paper can now consider the patterns observed within the data collected. Each major group operates in a relatively distinct geographic area that sees little-to-no overlap with the areas of other armed groups. Eastern and Western Mindanao see substantially different typologies of violence, and members of the NPA,for example, do not appear likely to be members of other armed groups. Although there are reports of militants “moonlighting” as assassins, in most cases there appears to be an ‘exclusivity’ of group membership.

MAP 1: ALL INCIDENTS IN MINDANAO BY ARMED ACTOR


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CHART 1: INCIDENT FREQUENCY EACH MONTH

CHART 2: INCIDENTS BY INITIATOR AND ATTACK TYPE

CHART 4: TOTAL SUM OF CASUALTIES

CHART 3: INCIDENTS BY INITIATOR


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MAP 2: UNKNOWN ARMED ACTOR INCIDENTS

Nevertheless, the majority of attacks (102 incidents or roughly 58% of attacks) recorded were committed by unknown perpetrators on typically unidentified civilians. There are many possible explanations for the predominance of unknown perpetrators, including: the clandestine intent of certain violent incidents, specifically those related to political assassination; the fleeting nature of armed skirmishes where shooters are simply labeled as ‘militants’ or ‘gunmen’ in the press; as well as gaps in reporting.


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I. Abu Sayyaf Group

The Abu Sayyaf Group, despite having pledged themselves to ISIS, has not taken up the cudgels against the local Filipino population nor sought to regulate civilian behavior within a controlled territory. By and large, the ASG continues to run kidnap-for-ransom campaigns that target foreigners; without further signals, it would appear premature to cast them as a Philippine ISIS affiliate that shares in ISIS objectives and methods. It is possible that the ASG seeks to benefit from ISIS ‘prestige’ as a terrorist organization, and in doing so raise heftier ransoms for their hostages. Over the period, there were 26 incidents that involve the ASG, representing almost 15% of the incidents collected.

Clashes between the AFP and the ASG have been bloody, however, and during these instances, civilians have been caught in the crossfire. The bloodiest incident recorded in our data was the AFP operation against the ASG on April 9, 2016 in Al-Barka, Basilan Province. This AFP offensive, which is one of many they have undertaken against the AFP in the Sulu Archipelago this year was reportedly launched with the objective of killing or capturing Isnilon Hapilon and culling the ASG. The encounter began when AFP soldiers were caught by IED explosions, followed by an ambush of 100 to 150 ASG militants.27

Over the course of the ensuing encounter which lasted for many hours, 18 AFP soldiers were killed and 56 were wounded, while 24 ASG militants

were killed. The bloodshed continued in nearby Tipo-Tipo the following day, with the AFP killing 13 ASG militants without incurring losses of their own. Notably, the Moroccan bomb maker Mohammad Khattab, Puruju Indama, a notorious ASG kidnapper, and Hapilon’s son Ubaida Hapilon were among the ASG’s dead when the dust settled in Al-Barka, though media reports tend not to portray this operation as a success. Indeed, the operation suffered from logistical shortcomings from its very outset; not only was the AFP caught unaware by the ambush, but the close air support intended for surveillance and fire support could not be deployed due to poor weather conditions that did not abate until the encounter was well under way.28

Of the groups reviewed herein, Abu Sayyaf Group is best placed to further ‘internationalize’ its efforts and is likely to trade for arms with groups outside the Philippines. According to the Indonesian press, Santoso, the leader of the East Indonesia Mujahid, recently attempted to purchase weapons from the ASG to equip his own besieged outfit in Indonesia.29 More worryingly, Malaysian authorities apprehended 14 individuals in connection with fundraising for ASG as well as ISIS in late May.30 Located in the Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi island chain, their kidnapping efforts often occur outside of the Philippines. Despite persistent counter-terror initiatives by the Philippine government, the Abu Sayyaf Group continues to operate with the support of international partners, and has done so with relatively high visibility.

MAP 3: SUSPECTED ASG INCIDENTS


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II. Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front

Despite its location in Central Mindanao, the BIFF does not appear to have had any difficulties in securing or creating explosives. About 65% of their incidents involve grenades, either hand-thrown or RPGs, launched at military detachments as well as at some civilian locations; others involve roadside IEDs; and still others involve remotely detonated devices.

The AFP has targeted bomb-makers in the past, as demonstrated by the 2015 Mamasapano Massacre. That the BIFF continues to access grenades and materiel with which to fashion improvised explosive devices suggests that they have an accessible supply of and/or know-how in the manufacture of these devices. Unless this capability is curtailed, the BIFF will likely remain the major group to monitor in Mindanao.

Insofar as the BIFF provides a credible threat and remains a source of violent activity, the group has been indirectly used to justify the passage of the Bangsamoro Basic Law. More than the MILF, which in recent times has only engaged the Philippine government in so-called “accidental encounters,” the BIFF is a ready source of potent imagery over the violent potential of the Bangsamoro. The MILF itself has argued that the passage of the BBL is necessary to prevent further violence from erupting in Mindanao.

Despite this, the BIFF has not articulated clear political objectives and it is uncertain precisely what it is that the organization is fighting for. Its basic objectives are presumably aligned with those of the MILF, its progenitor, but on some crucial issues (e.g. whether it would accept autonomy over secession and, if so, in what form), the BIFF has not clearly stated its positions. For the moment, the group is generally understood as one in the shadow of the MILF.

If the BIFF continues to gain strength, it will become a headache for both the Philippine government and the MILF. The MILF have spent the better part of a decade in political negotiations with the Philippine government, and are only just short of achieving an important objective through the Bangsamoro Basic Law. Their selection as the Philippine government’s primary negotiating partner for the Moro people, if often criticized, is premised on their strength as an armed group. Yet, a political deal with the MILF is only worthwhile for so long as the MILF can demonstrate that they have a monopoly on force within their insurgent movement and corresponding geographic territory. The BIFF, which operates well within MILF areas, challenges that monopoly directly.

Without clearly articulating its political goals, however, the BIFF is a problematic negotiating partner for the Philippine government. The Supreme Court’s decision to judge the MOA-AD unconstitutional should disincline the executive branch from pursuing negotiations with a more ‘demanding’ armed group that could lead to nowhere.

MAP 4: SUSPECTED BIFF INCIDENTS


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To the extent that the MILF has shown a willingness to moderate its original aims, it has made for a good negotiating partner and Manila has invested in building that relationship. As part of that relationship, the MILF has washed its hands of the BIFF and on separate occasions has cooperated with the AFP in operations against them. This move has won plaudits in Manila, where the Philippine government and the MILF can boast of the relative lack of incidents between them. From the outside, however, we assess that the MILF must also take care notto marginalize itself as a useful partner to the Philippine government. The MILF may understand from its own history with the MNLF that smaller armed factions may later eclipse their forebears. For this reason, it cannot turn a blind eye to the BIFF’s activity and both the Philippine government and the MILF must cooperate where possible in operations against it.

This triangular dynamic between the Philippine government, the MILF, and the BIFF is where the future of violence in Mindanao is most vexingly political, and thus requires the most careful treatment. Mistakes in this arena will be both politically painful in terms of passing legislation pursuant to the peace process, as well as militarily costly. Despite these concerns for the future, the BIFF is a long way away from the MILF’s numbers in popular support.

While we warn about the BIFF for the reasons above, it is not the only game in town. A large AFP

operation undertaken against a long-disavowed MILF splinter group in Butig, Lanao del Sur from February 20 to the 29th (all coded as one incident due to the authors’ inability to disaggregate the operation) had a better outcome for the GRP. The encounter was initiated by the Maute Group, a small breakaway contingent of the MILF led by the brothers Omar Maute and Abdullah Maute that has been active since 2013 and recently, like the ASG, declared allegiance to ISIS.31 Conducted with the apparent cooperation of the MILF and its local Lanao del Sur Commander Abdurahman Macapaar, the 10-day AFP offensive was a highly coordinated military operation involving the deployment of gunships for close air support, artillery fire, and armored personnel carriers for the infantry-led effort.

Media reports regarding the ultimate number of casualties for the Butig encounter vary widely, with the Maute Group sustaining fatalities ranging from 20 to 56 individuals, which included the Indonesian former JI member Mohammad Muktar as well as Omar Maute. AFP casualties were minimal despite Maute small arms and sniper fire, with 3 fatalities and 11 injuries reported. Although these numbers alone are encouraging, it should be noted that the fighting displaced 5,000 local families. Moreover, Butig is not yet free of violence, given the recent operation launched on May 24, 2016 that killed 34 Maute militants and destroyed their base, and reports that MILF soldiers may be working with the Maute group.32

MAP 5: CLOSER VIEW OF SUSPECTED BIFF INCIDENTSSource:


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III. New People’s Army

The New People’s Army is regularly underestimated as simply another rent-extracting group that terrorizes local businesses. Yet, of the 15 attacks they initiated, 3 involved the destruction of farm equipment and 3 others involved violence against local notables, specifically several town councilors, a barangay chief, and a vice mayor. The remaining incidents involved abductions and clashes with local police and militia members. While acts of sabotage are not particularly sophisticated or worrisome on their own, in the context of other attacks on persons conducted by the NPA that notably only lead to 5 fatalities, these acts are indicative of an organization that uses violence selectively.

To wit, when the NPA abducted 2 AFP soldiers and 3 cops at several checkpoints in Northern Mindanao on April 3, one retired officer was released to the public because he was in poor health. On April 17, the NPA captured 5 cops in a raid in Davao City, who were released on April 25 with the negotiating assistance of Rodrigo Duterte.33 Although the details of the negotiation were not disclosed to the press, NPA propaganda benefits from showing clemency to “the enemy” after successfully executing the abduction of armed officers in a major city. Using this classic “propaganda by the deed” in conjunction with a relatively active media arm, the NPA has succeeded at garnering national attention and perhaps radicalizing new groups.

To the NPA’s advantage is the lack of a unified voice from the business community estimating how much is lost by taxation to their activities. Their racketeering, though well known in the abstract, is seldom publicized with any specificity, which allows them to remain a semi-legitimized arm of the CPP. Severing the CPP-NPA connection by fully discrediting NPA behavior would be a further good step at getting the CPP to come to the table on government’s terms.

MAP 6: SUSPECTED NPA INCIDENTS

MAP 7: CLOSER VIEW OF SUSPECTED NPA INCIDENTS


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Analysis, insights and Recommendations

After reviewing the data, crafting a discrete and effective response to such a multivariate conflict presents policymakers with an unenviable challenge. Stability operations are a necessity, but political solutions remain the primary pathway to peace. The primacy of political solutions over military operations is practically a truism in the peacebuilding and counter-insurgency literature, but it is nonetheless worth reiterating. Indeed, with the apparent rejuvenation of the ASG after a decade of lauded kinetic efforts to attrite their capabilities, it is all the more apparent that success on the battlefield can be undone if they are not followed up with political measures that tire militancy.

Despite numerous setbacks, however, the AFP and the PNP will have major roles to play in peace building in Mindanao. Yet, stability cannot be attained through the rote emulation of the American-advised and supported COIN efforts of the past decade, informally referred to as the Basilan Model. Given the predominance of unknown actors in our data, attempting to launch an intensive military campaign against a highly atomized panoply of actors is unlikely to succeed.

More critical than military efforts is the redrafting and enactment of successor legislation to the BBL. Much has already been written about the BBL, its flaws and discontents, and the advice of governance experts such as Soliman M. Santos, Jr should be heeded. To summarize Santos’ argument, the BBL in its current construction is unlikely to pass through the 17th session of Congress due to the political baggage it has gathered over time. The BBL contained many valid and essential provisions for Moro regional governance, but it was never a perfect solution. Popular perceptions of the BBL within and beyond Moro circles cast the

legislation as highly parochial, favoring the interests of the MILF and its ethnic Maguindanaoan base. To reiterate, while the term “Moro” is convenient shorthand for the indigenous Muslim citizens of Mindanao, it must not be forgotten that the Moros are a multi-ethnic nation represented by a variety of social, political, and military organizations. Although no legislation is likely to please everyone, attempts at revising the BBL must include a broader swathe of Moro society beyond the leadership of the MILF or it will risk failure once again.34

Part and parcel to political efforts intended to reach out to broader segments of the population is the issue of electoral violence and elite politics in Mindanao-which is one of the biggest manifestations and likely propellants of the violence we recorded. As indicated by our data, many of the incidents reported with unknown perpetrators are suspected to be motivated by electoral competition and elite rivalries. Considered as part and parcel to the dynastic politics of the Philippines as a whole, or as a uniquely Mindanaoan brand of patrimonial politics, i.e. datu-ism, clan control of local and regional government is well accounted for in the Southern Philippines. Research into the perpetuation of dynastic politics across the whole of the Philippines suggests that elite families win elections not because their family name is significant to voters or because voters vie for families that they are related to. Rather, vote buying (through the dispensation of public goods/services or the actual exchange of cash) is the dominant variable contributing to electoral success.35 The most immediate, pervasive, and dire consequence of this arrangement is the exploitation of public goods and services by corrupt public officials to the detriment of their constituents. Even so, the violence wrought by local political competition cannot be written off due to the human costs it extracts, and the larger patterns of insurgency that it propels.36

The immediate toll of electoral violence is somewhat easily captured in terms of the total number of casualties and fatalities produced by the phenomenon. Beyond this immediate effect, however, electoral violence exacerbates the conditions that sustain insurgency by turning political participation into a contest of arms. The correlation of elections with violence has been thoroughly recorded by many scholars and organizations, notably International Alert.37

Applying descriptive statistics to unpack these findings, the relationship between government security forces and militants was further explored by Nikki Philline C. de la Rosa using data from the Bangsamoro Conflict Monitoring System. Testing the dictum that violence begets violence, de la Rosa reported that politics, as opposed to issues related to the shadow economy or ethno-religious identity tended to be the primary root of conflict strings, and that government security forces, rebel groups, and threat groups were the most deeply and violently embroiled in conflict. This conflict spills over to impact civilians as well immediately before, during, and after elections as the interests of violent and non-violent actors align to secure the benefits of public office.38

Even if public services and local livelihoods improve due to better local governance, one cannot expect economic and human development to stabilize Mindanao in the near-term. Over the past several months, several analysts, peace-builders, and aid organizations have rightly observed that much of the violence in Mindanao occurs within its most impoverished areas, which are themselves the most impoverished localities in the whole of the Philippines. Exacerbating epidemic poverty are declining standards of living owing to the failure of national/municipal governance to cope with food and energy insecurity due to drought caused by El Nino.39


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Although these socioeconomic conditions are likely drivers of the current conflicts, it is unreasonable to expect that policies targeted at improving human security and rejuvenating local economies will succeed in tamping down violence. Empirically, large-N studies of the relationship between macroeconomic performance, the provisioning of social goods (e.g. health care and education), and forms of political violence from terrorism to civil war have presented ambiguous conclusions at their most positive.40 While economic disparities are often shown to have some modest impact on driving civil wars, the relationship is not necessarily causal, and in the case of terrorism, there may not be a relationship at all.41

Further, violent organizations that are known to engage in rent-seeking behavior like the ASG and the NPA do not appear likely to lay down their arms as economic conditions improve. In fact, they may seek to exploit the situation to enrich themselves further, much as the NPA has done in response to the increase of foreign companies and nascent industries operating within their territory. To be clear, the improvement of Mindanao’s economy, health, environment, and public services should continue to be a policy imperative at all levels of governance. However, these policies must be pursued because they represent a crucial public good, and not because they promise to reduce violence in the short term. Economic interventions must be tailored to the security situation.

Conclusion

The media’s coverage of Philippine attacks has become routine: “Mindanao fatigue” is often complained about by academics and journalists alike, who wonder why there has become disinterest in following stories about Mindanao despite the gravity of the violence that ensues. Small-scale incidents are frequent, and where they do not exist, it is difficult to tell whether it is because they are underreported either by the victims or the media owing to lack of broad interest; or because families and businesses have capitulated to paying “revolutionary taxes” or other forms of protection money. In this way, even Filipino audiences in the capital have become inured to the notion of Mindanao violence.

Although there is no understating insurgency and sub-state violence as a perennial feature of the Philippine domestic security landscape, hope remains that violence can abate. There are clearly areas of accommodation, if not cooperation, among different political groups, including those that take up arms. Members of the Moro National Liberation Front, a group behind the 2013 Siege of Zamboanga that resulted in the deaths of hundreds and the displacement of thousands, for example, was permitted to parade Davao City two years later in 2015.42 In tending to domestic insecurity, there must be a balance. The authors hope that this balance can be found in the incoming Duterte administration.


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Image Credit:muslimvoices.org

1 Millar, Paul, Does Abu Sayyaf pose a major terror threat to Southeast Asia?, Southeast Asia Globe, June 1, 2016: http://sea-globe.com/19430-2-abu-sayyaf-isis/?fb_ref=FsVMvAf6rr-Twitter

2 For more information on the Global Terrorism Database, please see the website at https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/

3 For more information on the Bangsamoro Conflict Monitoring System, please see the website at http://bcms-philippines.info/vers1/

4 In the interests of saving space, definitions for each individual category have not been repro-duced here. For a complete set of definitions for these attacks, the reader is requested to refer to pp. 22-24 of the Global Terrorism Database’s Co-debook, which can be accessed through this link: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Code-book.pdf

5 See: Thomas M. McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separat-ism in the Southern Philippines. Berkeley: Univer-sity of California Press, 1998.

6 Cesar Adib Majul, “The Moro Struggle in the Philippines,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 2, Islam & Politics (Apr., 1988), pp. 897-922

7 Tom McKenna,” Saints, scholars and the ide-alized past in Philippine Muslim separatism,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 15 No. 4 2002: 544-545

8 McKenna, Thomas M. Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, 200-210

9 “Moro Islamic Liberation Front,” Mapping Mil-itant Organizations, Stanford University, August 24, 2015 https://web.stanford.edu/group/mapping-militants/cgi-bin/groups/view/309?highlight=MILF Marites Dañguilan Vitug and Glenda M. Gloria. “The MILF Story,” Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao, Quezon City, Philippines : Ateneo Center for Social Policy & Public Affairs : Institute for Popular Democracy, 2000.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Zachary Abuza, “The Moro Islamic Libera-tion Front at 20: State of the Revolution,” Stud-ies in Conflict & Terrorism, 28:4, 2005, 53–479, Alpaslan Özerdem and Sukanya Podder, “Grass-roots and Rebellion: A Study on the Future of the Moro Struggle in Mindanao, Philippines,” Civil Wars, Vol. 14, Iss. 4, 2012, 521-527

13 Julliane Love De Jesus, “SAF: Rising from the fields of Mamasapano,” Inquirer.net, January 25, 2016: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/758371/saf-rising-from-the-fields-of-mamasapano

14 Zachary Abuza, “Balik-Terrorism: The Re-turn of the Abu Sayyaf,” Strategic Studies Insti-tute, September 2005, 2-20

15 Ibid.

16 “Abu Sayyaf Group,” Mapping Militant Or-ganizations, Stanford University, August 24, 2015 http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/152

17 Peter Chalk, The Bangsamoro Islamic Free-dom Fighters: The Newest Obstacles to Peace in the Southern Philippines?, CTC Sentinel, Novem-ber 2013

18 Andrei Medina “MNLF, BIFF form alliance – report,” GMA News, February 4, 2014 http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/346990/news/nation/mnlf-biff-form-alliance-report

19 Agence France-Presse “BIFF, Abu Sayyaf pledge allegiance to Islamic State jihadists,” GMA News, August 16, 2014 http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/375074/news/nation/biff-abu-sayyaf-pledge-allegiance-to-islamic-state-jihad-ists

20 “In the Nation, Post-Mamasapano Incident Sentiments on Peace Agreements Are Negative; in the Bangsamoro Core Territory, Sentiments Re-main Hopeful” Social Weather Stations, Special Report May 15, 2015 https://www.sws.org.ph/pr20150515.htm

21 Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, Mapping Militant Organizations, Stanford Univer-sity, August 27, 2015 https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/601

22 For a full history please see Lawrence M. Greenberg, The Hukbalahap insurrection : A Case Study of a Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines, 1946-1955, U.S. Army Center of Military History. & Benedict J. Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philip-pines, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publish-ers, 2002 23 The Communist Insurgency in the Philip-pines: Tactics and Talks, Crisis Group Asia Report N°202, 14 February 2011, 3-4

24 Ibid, 5-10 Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, “‘Revo-lutionary Taxation and the Logistical and Strategic Dilemmas of the Maoist Insurgency in the Philip-pines.” Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 1, no. 3 (2014): 266-267

25 Editha Z. Caduaya, ‘People’s burial’: Thou-sands march for NPA’s Kumander Parago, Rap-pler, July 10, 2015 http://www.rappler.com/nation/98884-kumander-parago-pitao-funeral-davao Glenda M. Gloria, “Benito Tiamzon: Writer, organizer, party man,” Rappler, March 23, 2014 http://www.rappler.com/nation/53686-benito-tiamzon-cpp-leader

26 The Communist Insurgency in the Philip-pines: Tactics and Talks, Crisis Group Asia Report N°202, 14 February 2011, 10-22 Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, “‘Revolutionary Taxation and the Logis-tical and Strategic Dilemmas of the Maoist Insur-gency in the Philippines.” Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 1, no. 3 (2014): 282-287 Francis Domingo, “Explaining the Sustainability of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army,” Small Wars Journal, October 4, 2013 Edwin Espejo, Pay for permit to campaign, Reds tell candidates, Rappler, December 26, 2015: http://www.rappler.com/nation/politics/elections/2016/117159-cpp-npa-2016-elections Alexis Romero, “AFP insists NPA strength down to 3,900,” PhilStar, January 12, 2016 http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/01/12/1541823/afp-insists-npa-strength-down-3900 Mart D. Sam-balud, “NPA at 47: We become large and strong,” Davao Today, March 29, 2016 http://davaotoday.com/main/politics/npa-at-47-we-become-large-and-strong/

endnotes


18


www.policyforum.net/all-conflict-is-local/

40 James Fearon, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” The American Political Science Review. 97.1 (Feb 2003): 75-90. Simeon Djankov and Mar-ta Reynal Querol, “Poverty and Civil War: Revisiting the Evidence,” Review of Economics and Statis-tics, 92:4, 2010, 1035-1041

41 Martin Gassebner and Simon Luechinger, “Lock, stock, and barrel: a comprehensive assess-ment of the determinants of terror,” Public Choice, Vol. 149, No. 3/4, The Many Faces of Counterter-rorism (December 2011), 235-261 Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty and Ter-rorism: Is There a Causal Connection?,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 17, Number 4, Fall 2003, 119–144

42 http://www.sunstar.com.ph/davao/local-news/2015/04/20/mnlf-belittles-bangsamoro-ba-sic-law-403456

training-camp-in-lanao-del-sur#sthash.fFu3rRKh.dpuf “PH troops regain control of town attacked by terrorists,” Rappler, March 1, 2016: http://www.rappler.com/nation/124287-military-control-butig-lanao Richel V. Umel, IS-linked group beheads 2 captive sawmill workers, SunStar, April 15, 2016 http://www.sunstar.com.ph/cagayan-de-oro/local-news/2016/04/14/linked-group-beheads-2-captive-sawmill-workers-467848 JC Ansis, “Butig clashes: What we know so far,” CNN Phil-ippines, March 3, 2016: http://cnnphilippines.com/regional/2016/03/02/Butig-Lanao-del-Sur-clashes-Maute-group.html ABS-CBN News, “Military finds evidence linking Maute Group to MILF,” May 31, 2016: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OiZ0HHqv3fY

33 Dennis J. Santos, “Communist rebels free 5 cops captured in Davao City,” Inquirer Mind-anao, April 25, 2016: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/781550/communist-rebels-free-5-cops-cap-tured-in-davao-city

34 Soliman M. Santos, Jr. “Plan B: Post BBL Non-Passage,” Institute for Autonomy and Gover-nance, May 2, 2016: http://iag.org.ph/index.php/blog/1341-plan-b-post-bbl-non-passage

35 Cesi Cruz, Julien Labonne, and Pablo Querubin, “Politician family networks and electoral outcomes: Evidence from the Philippines,” Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Associa-tion, 2014

36 Quimpo, Nathan Gilbert. 2005. “Oligarchic Patrimonialism, Bossism, Electoral Clientelism, and Contested Democracy in the Philippines”. Comparative Politics 37 (2), 2005, 229–50.

37 International Alert, Rebellion, Political Vio-lence and Shadow Crimes in the Bangsamoro: The Bangsamoro Conflict Monitoring System (BCMS), August 2014, 2011–2013

38 Nikki Philline C. de la Rosa, “Disrupting con-flict strings in sub-national contexts: Experience from Muslim Mindanao, Philippines,” International Alert UK, September 18, 2014,

39 Joseph Franco, “All conflict is local: Mindan-ao after the Philippine Presidential Elections,” Asia & Pacific Policy Society, March 10, 2016: http://

27 Julie M. Aurelio, “13 Abu Sayyaf men killed in new firefight, says AFP,” Philippine Daily In-quirer, April 12 2016: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/779107/13-abu-sayyaf-men-killed-in-new-firefight-says-afp#ixzz4ANjivwNc Desk Man, “Notorious Sayyaf leader killed in Basilan clash,” Mindanao Examiner, April 12, 2016: http://min-danaoexaminer.com/notorious-sayyaf-leader-killed-in-basilan-clash/ Gerg Cahiles, “AFP downplays ISIS hand in Basilan clash.” CNN Phil-ippines, April 13, 2016: http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/04/12/afp-isis-abu-sayyaf-basilan-clash.html Kaye Imson, “Analyst: PHL govt should reinforce troops in Mindanao,” InterAksyon, April 12, 2016: http://interaksyon.com/article/126365/video--analyst-phl-govt-should-reinforce-troops-in-mindanao

28 Ibid.

29 “Terror Fugitive Santoso Attempts to Buy Weapons From Abu Sayyaf,” Jakarta Globe, May 24, 2016: http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/terror-fugitive-santoso-attempts-buy-weap-ons-abu-sayyaf/

30 http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysian-police-nab-14-isis-suspects-in-4-day-operation

31 Joseph Franco, “Mindanao after the Philip-pines presidential elections,” New Mandala, March 9 2016: http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newman-dala/2016/03/09/mindanao-after-the-philippines-presidential-elections/

32 “Maute Group member slain in Butig involved in 9 murder,” GMA News, June 1, 2016: http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/568349/news/regions/maute-group-member-slain-in-bu-tig-involved-in-9-murder-cases Froilan Gallardo, “Army chief: Maute group is no ISIS,” Minda News, March 24, 2016: http://www.mindanews.com/top-stories/2016/03/24/army-chief-maute-group-is-no-isis/ Florante S. Solmerin, “54 jihadists slain in Lanao Sur,” The Standard, May 31. 2016 http://thestandard.com.ph/news/-main-stories/top-stories/206940/54-jihadists-slain-in-lanao-sur.html “Military retakes Maute Group’s training camp in Lanao del Sur,” GMA News, May 31, 2016: http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/568267/news/regions/military-retakes-maute-group-s-

endnotes


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Image Credit:cnnphilippines.comC 2016 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

is an independent international and strategic research organization with the principal goal of addressing the issues affecting the Philippines and East Asia

Stratbase’s Albert Del Rosario Institute

9F 6780 Ayala Avenue, Makati CityPhilippines 1200V 8921751F 8921754www.stratbase.com.ph

ABOUTLuke Lischinis an Academic Assistant at the National War College. In 2014, he received his MA from Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program, where he concentrated in the study of terrorism and substate violence. Luke’s current research interests include political violence and insurgency in the Philippines and the greater Southeast Asian region. Beyond political violence, Luke also studies grand strategy andcivil-military relations in the American and global contexts.

Angelica Mangahasis Deputy Executive Director of ADRI and a lecturer with the International Studies department of De La Salle University. Immediately prior to joining ADRI, she completed her Masters in Security Studies at Georgetown University. Her writing and advocacy experience spans multiple international humanitarian and diplomatic organizations. Her current research focuses on Philippine and regional security concerns.

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