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POLITICAL REFLECTION

VOL. 3 - NO. 1 SPECIAL ISSUE: CHINA and The WORLD

2012 | “ADVANCING

DIVERSITY”

4 WORLD STORIES

5 NEWS OF CHINA 2011

8 DOMESTIC ANALYSIS

The Cosmopolitanisation of

Cartography? Raising the

Specter of Legitimacy in

Geography

BY DR JEAN-PAUL GAGNON

16

China as a Law-Ruled

State: From Top-Down

Rhetoric to Bottom-Up

Expectations

BY ANNA KLOEDEN

20 New Regulations Governing

Social Organizations in

China: A Civil Society on

the Rise?

BY KOSTANTINOS D.

TSIMONIS

28 China in the 21st Century:

Is Global Leadership

Possible? Sustainable

Development, Political

Legitimacy and

Foreign Policy

BY GEORGI IVANOV

34 The Case for Li Yuanchao

as Premier

BY NICHOLAS MILLER

38 Return to Countryside:

A New Attempt of

Rural Financial

Transformation

BY JIAN GAO

42 CHINA AND THE WORLD

Sino-Indian Relations:

Competition or Cooperation?

BY ANANYA CHATTERJEE

48 Russia and China: Reconcilia-

tion or Strategic Friendship?

BY LIN REN

52 Asia’s New Great Game?

The Geopolitics of the South

China Sea

BY TILMAN PRADT

56 China’s Aid Program in Africa:

A Primer

BY SAM BYFIELD

60 ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYS-

TEMS?

An Interview with Professor

Sonny Lo:

Political Reflections in Hong

Kong

BY DR JEAN-PAUL GAGNON

64 Cross-Strait Relations and HK

BY MATTHEW KENNEDY

70 The Impact of Renminbi

(RMB) Appreciation on the

Hong Kong Property Market

BY SUNNY LAM

76 CULTURAL ANALYSIS

Bitter Love: A Silenced Movie

of China and Its Implication

BY ANTONY OU

82 Kang Youwei’s (1858-1927)

Study and Vision of the Chi-

nese Calligraphy

BY MASSIMO CARRANTE

88 RECENT BOOKS

28

34

48

64

76

WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 4

WORLD STORIES | BY AKSEL ERSOY

South Korea’s national assembly ratified a free-trade agreement with the United

States, four years after the two countries first signed the deal and a month after it

was approved by Congress. Despite a projected boost to the Korean economy and, the prospect of closer ties

with America at a time of worsening relations with North Korea, the agreement was strongly resisted by the

opposition. One assembly member disrupted the vote by letting off a tear-gas canister.

Kazakhstan’s long-serving president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, called a parliamentary

election for January. The vote was supposed to usher in a multiparty system,

though the only other party expected to join the race is sympathetic towards Mr Nazarbayev. The president

brought forward the date of the election, he said, in anticipation of a global economic crisis; politicians should-

n’t be campaigning at such a time, apparently.

Japan released the captain and crew of a Chinese fishing boat, three days after

they were arrested for entering Japanese coastal waters. A similar case last year in

disputed waters sparked a diplomatic confrontation, but China called this incident a “regular fishery case” and

accepted Tokyo’s handling of it.

Kyrgyzstan’s first presidential election as a parliamentary democracy was won by

Almazbek Atambayev, leader of the Social Democratic Party. He will replace Roza

Otunbayeva, the country’s interim president, who took office after a coup unseated her predecessor in 2010.

True to her word, Ms Otunbayeva did not run for re-election. The new president-elect announced plans to

close a large American military base.

Authorities in Thailand gave people five days off work to allow residents of Bang-

kok to leave the capital ahead of expected flooding. The government had already

imposed rationing on food. Hundreds of people have been killed by the deluge in other parts of the country

and thousands of factories closed.

Vietnam confirmed that the last rhinoceros in the country was killed earlier this

year, most likely by poachers. It was the last of its kind to have lived on the Asian

mainland; a few dozen remain on Java. Other species of large mammals in Vietnam are in imminent danger of

extinction, because of deforestation and illegal trade in wild-animal parts.

The Malaysian government promised to repeal the Internal Security Act, a draconi-

an law that allows the authorities to detain people charged with a crime indefinite-

ly and without trial. In Singapore former political prisoners urged their government to follow suit.

China again accused the Dalai Lama of encouraging Tibetans to commit suicide.

The latest claim came after the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader offered prayers for

eight monks and a nun who have set themselves on fire to protest against Chinese rule in Tibetan parts of Si-

chuan province. China said the self-immolations were “terrorism in disguise”.

Haiti got a new prime minister, at last. Having rejected the first two nominees pro-

posed by Michel Martelly, who took office as president in May, the country’s Sen-

ate approved Garry Conille for the job. Aid donors had become increasingly alarmed by the lack of a govern-

ment. Mr Conille has worked for Bill Clinton in his role as a UN envoy to Haiti.

25.11.2011 | South Korea

19.11.2011 | Kazakhstan

11.11.2011 | Japan

4.11.2011 | Kyrgyzstan

28.10.2011 | Thailand

26.10.2011 | Vietnam

22.10.2011 | Tibetans

24.10.2011 | Malaysia

08.10.2011 | Haiti

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NEWS OF CHINA 2011 | BY KOSTANTINOS D. TSIMONIS

Ai Weiwei:

The Chinese artist Ai Weiwei

has become an icon for critics

of the CCP and proponents of

free speech, as he continuous-

ly exposes the party’s authori-

tarianism and hypocritical

stance in a wide range of is-

sues. Ai Weiwei has also

gained the support of netizens throughout the country,

who in an act of defiance in November collected dona-

tions to help the artist pay what they perceive as a po-

litically motivated fine imposed by the Chinese authori-

ties on the charge of tax evasion.

POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012 5

Chen Wei:

On December 23rd, Sichuan

dissident Chen Wei (photo),

42, received a sentence of 9

years of imprisonment for

allegedly attempting to

“subvert state power”. Chen

has published 26 essays in

China and abroad calling for

constitutional democracy and an end to the CCP’s au-

thoritarian rule. He has also signed the “Charter 08”, a

political manifesto for democratic reform that was co-

authored by the imprisoned dissident and 2010 Nobel

Peace Prize Winner Liu Xiaobo.

Mai fangzi:

Limits on home pur-

chases and require-

ments for high

down-payments in

order to qualify for

mortgages have

brought China’s

property bubble

under control dur-

ing 2011, with pric-

es only marginally

increasing and in

some cities even dropping in comparison to last year.

PLA:

In January the PLA

tested successfully

China’s first home-

grown Stealth

Fighter, the J-20.

Although the fight-

er will not be opera-

tional any time

soon, Taiwan mili-

tary experts have

raised their concern

about the prospect of the PLA’s air supremacy and its

increasingly sophisticated war machinery.

Wenzhou train accident:

On July 23rd, a collision involving two

high speed trains resulted in 40 deaths

and many injuries, raising concerns on

the safety of China’s latest fleet of bul-

let trains. Initially the government

wanted to hastily wrap-up the story,

blaming the collision to a lightning

that supposedly struck one of the

trains, issuing directives to limit media coverage, and speedily concluding the rescue

operations. However, the cover-up attempt sparked public outrage among online com-

munities and invited criticism by media outlets, even those state-controlled.


The Wukan incident:

On September 21st months of

fruitless peaceful petitioning es-

calated on an uprising in the vil-

lage of Wukan in Guangdong

when disgruntled villagers vio-

lently ousted local officials accusing them for illegal land

sales. The protesters took the administration of the vil-

lage in their hands, set up barricades and elected a 13-

member village committee. Initially the government

responded violently to the first ever fall of CCP local au-

thority during a rural protest, abducting 4 village repre-

sentatives, one of whom died in custody, and forming a

blockade of the village using riot police.

South China Sea:

Tensions over the unresolved

South China Sea dispute have

remained high throughout

2011 as Beijing feels threat-

ened by the renewed interest

of the US in the region that

the PRC leadership interprets

as a plan to contain China. In November, Secretary Clin-

ton signed an agreement with her counterpart from the

Philippines to increase defense cooperation between

the two countries, while President Obama attended the

ASEAN Summit and announced plans for an expansion

of US military cooperation with Australia.

The CCP turns 90:

The Chinese Com-

munist Party celebrated

the 90th anniversary of

its founding with large-

scale commemorative

events, extravagant TV shows with plentiful revolution-

ary kitsch, and smaller interventions in everyday life

such as billboards, flower displays, videos in the sub-

way, banners on popular websites etc. Throughout the

country, students and employees in state-owned en-

terprises and the government were mobilized to watch

a new propaganda movie on the CCP’s founding titled

“The Beginning of the Great Revival”.

One anniversary, two mean-

ings:

Celebrations for the 100th anni-

versary of the 1911 revolution

took place in both sides of the

Taiwan straights but with mark-

edly different content and mean-

ing. In Taiwan the “100th anniver-

sary of the Republic of China” was

celebrated lavishly with large public events and pa-

rades. In the Mainland, CCP leaders commemorated the

“100th anniversary of the Xinhai revolution” in small-

scale events, carefully designed not to outshine the 90th

anniversary of the founding of the CCP.

Ethnic Tensions:

In December new clashes between Uy-

ghurs and Han Chinese in Urumqi re-

sulted in Hu Jintao skipping the G8

Summit in Italy in order to deal with the

crisis. Previous clashes in Xinjiang last

July left 20 dead. On the Tibetan “front”,

2011 marked the 60th anniversary of the

annexation of Tibet by the PRC and 12 monks set themselves on fire protesting against

Chinese rule. In December, Tibetan students of the Chengdu Railroad Engineering

School were attacked by their Han classmates who were allegedly angry over the pref-

erential treatment given to minority groups.



Local elections:

Approximately 140

independent candi-

dates throughout

the country decided

to stand in local

elections for peo-

ple’s congresses dur-

ing 2011. Many of

them were harassed

and threatened by

the authorities in

order to withdraw

their candidacies.


Haimen:

Between December

20th to 22nd villagers

of Haimen went on

protest against local

government plans to

expand a coal-fired

power plant that has already caused environmental deg-

radation in the area, reducing the villagers’ annual fish

catch. A police crackdown followed, reportedly leaving

between 1 to 6 villagers dead and around 200 injured.

On December 21st, Zhou Yongkang, China’s Security

Chief, commented that authorities “should enforce the

law in a civil manner to avoid further disputes”.

State of the

Internet:

On April 5th,

China an-

nounced the

establish-

ment of the

State Internet

Information

Office (SIIO),

the government’s latest Internet surveillance agency. In

December, new regulations by the SIIO stipulated that

microblog users are now obliged to provide their real

identities.

Leadership

reshuffle

ahead of 2012

transition:

In the second

half of 2011

China initiated

the very secre-

tive process of

reshuffling ministers, chiefs of agencies, provincial gov-

ernors and top economic officials ahead of the power

transition in 2012. The changes will be concluded in the

18th Party Congress next year and then be rubber-

stamped by the NPC annual session in 2013.

Intellectuals and protest:

Despite accusations for conformism, Chinese

intellectuals last year took the lead in advo-

cating reforms and protesting over local is-

sues. Their criticism was directed on issues

such as the railway management system and

the College Entrance Exam, while in Novem-

ber professors in Yangtse University publicly

protested against a highly polluting steel

plant. In the same month, one of China’s most prominent legal scholars, Professor

Jiang Ping (photo), warned that China is increasingly resembling a dictatorship while

addressing a gathering of more than 50 legal scholars.

Com

pile

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Sou

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I ntroduction

This work is about arguing that the maps of the

world should be reconsidered in a global dia-

logue: in a process that opens the dispute of

boundaries between union-states, regions, zones,

or other similar geo-political terms. David Mar-

quand, in his important opus The End of the West

(2011) reminds us that West and East perhaps

never existed and in the case wherein we are told

that they do, have, and are: such are parochial

and illegitimate claims.

We shall have to put the (Indian) inventors of

Arabic numerals in our pantheon alongside

the Greek inventors of geometry, and Ibn

Rushd alongside Aristotle. We shall have to

abandon our self-centred and patronizing

belief that democracy and free discussion

were exported to a backward “East” by a pro-

gressive “West,” and reconstruct our mental

universe to take account of the indigenous

Indian tradition of public reasoning and reli-

gious toleration that long antedated the

“Western” presence in the subcontinent. More

generally, we shall have to recognize that the

familiar “Western” narrative of global history,

in which uniquely precious and, in evolution-

ary terms, uniquely successful “Western” val-

ues moulded the modern world in our great-

grandparents’ image, is a parochial distor-

tion of a far more complex truth. (Marquand,

2011: 176-77)

His argument, I feel, is important because it chal-

lenges what many in this world have come to

take for granted. In the case of this paper, it is the

maps we are familiar with, the design of the globe

that we have on our desks or which are offered to

our children, which are parochial and relics of

imperial abuses. This discussion is a needed one,

as we have for example, no clear indication as to

where Europe stops and that indigenous peoples

for example have not had the inclusive and legiti-

The COSMOPOLITANISATION

Of CARTOGRAPHY Raising the Specter of Legitimacy in Geography

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON*


mate chance to contest the territorial boundaries

which often split their nations. It is an attempt to

bring a democratic legitimacy to cartography

which is patently lacking.

This will be done firstly by discussing in a broad

and simple way why current maps are parochial

and relics of imperial domination. We will then

follow this argument up with another broad argu-

ment detailing how we could begin a global dia-

logue designed to spark debate over maps and to

form a call for the democratic reform of cartog-

raphy. Essentially, it argues that we must give

people and groups a chance to define their

boundaries and not have them imposed on us by

those holding the Maxim Gun. Lastly, we will en-

gage this discussion in relation to China’s territori-

al claims.

The Imperial History of Maps

Depending on climatic conditions, hunter-

gatherer societies have a population density

from 0.1 to 1 person per square kilometre,

while the invention of agriculture permits

densities to rise to 40-60 per square kilometre.

Human beings were now in contact with one

another on a much broader scale, and this

required a very different form of social organ-

ization. – Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of

Political Order, 2011

A new work by Francis Fukuyama has established

a logical understanding of the way in which hu-

man beings probably came to organize them-

selves politically through evolutionary terms.

Should we consider Locke, Hobbes, and Rousseau

for example, their conceptions of the social con-

tract began with the heuristic device of a “blank

slate.” From this blank slate (or state of nature)

human beings were theorised to have joined for a

variety of reasons. Fukuyama takes the aforemen-

tioned evolutionary approach and argues rather

that it is perhaps improbable to trace wherein we

exactly developed our methods of socio-political

organization (those parameters which even un-

derpin hunter-gatherer humanoids). Rather, we

were perhaps born into already established sys-

tems and contributed to them over millions of

years.1 Because of this potentiality, we perhaps

never had a chance in our history to collectively

decide in non-violent democratic processes not

only how we should like to organize ourselves

politically, or what our deepest desired long-term

goals are, but also (for the purposes of this paper)

how our union-states or nation-states are bound-

ed territorially.

This discussion has a variety of comparative ex-

amples to support it. One of those can perhaps be

the way in which nation-states were formed from

the inception of the Treaty of Westphalia (or earli-

er during the Qin Dynasty in 221 BCE China, see

Fukuyama 2011 for more). We need only ask if

individuals and groups informing a variety of pre-

modern ethnicities were present when not only

Europe but parts of Asia and Africa were being

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON


Francis

Fukuyama

territorially defined in imperialist discussions. It is

common knowledge at this stage that they were

not.

When the union-states and, in much more limited

circumstances, nation-states, in North America,

Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Asia-Pacific, and so

forth were territorially determined, this was not

done in a manner that could be considered dem-

ocratic or republican. There was little to no inclu-

sion of local populations in this decision making

and as commonly known, many indigenous na-

tions had and continue to suffer because of this.

Such is perhaps commonly seen with the difficul-

ties Palestinians have in forming their own sover-

eign state: normatively and consistently blocked

for the most part by a minority of individuals

within the current and previous Israeli administra-

tions. This might also be said in reference, but not

limited, to the Kurdish Nation, the Welsh, Cornish,

Scottish, Corsican, Aboriginal and Torres Straight

indigenous and a wide variety of indigenous

Americans.

It is, of course, an anachronism to expect that ref-

erenda, “town hall meetings,” polling, and other

such practices would have been held during the

mapping of the world and other regions therein.

From the Middle Ages onwards to perhaps even

post-modern times (some argue this period be-

gan in post-war Europe) democracy and republi-

canism were not normative and might even be

said to be in the practical minority today despite

the amount of rhetoric these two bodies receive.

Both realpolitik and soft-power were mechanisms

by which empires expanded to try and perhaps

fulfil the material and power desires of the auto-

cratic polities and cultures found during those

times (like Great Britannia, Imperial France, Portu-

gal, Spain, Belgium, the USA, China, Russia and so

forth).

This discussion is purposefully broad to convey

this message. Even a cursory glance at various

bodies of literature dealing with the history of

geo-politics will add robust evidence to this argu-

ment. The point is that in majority (at least to my

paltry knowledge) this argument is not typically

made. Yes, certainly, we have a great deal of sepa-

ratist contestations in many union-states by eth-

nic nations seeking recognition and some greater

degree of sovereignty and or autonomy. But what

we do not have are the much “higher” politics of

individuals and groups throughout the world

challenging the way in which the world is territo-

rially depicted. Where, in fact, has our say been in

the way our countries look on a map? If we are an

oppressed peoples, like indigenous Americans,2

or the Naga of India: where is our right to distin-

guish our boundaries in discussion with other

citizens and not those with the Maxim Gun (e.g.

sometimes violent state governments)?

Democratising Maps

This is why I would like to call for a democratisa-

tion of maps using cosmopolitan theory. It is in-

creasingly evident that union-states and whatev-

er nation-states might be left are losing their terri-

torial legitimacy. It makes greater sense to let eth-

nic nationalities determine if they wish to sepa-

rate than to try and keep them within a bounded

territory through violent means (see Chechnya for

an example). For one, it may for the most part

diminish or remove the impetus for violence. For

two, it may add another sovereign trading part-

ner and player on the international scene. And for

three it will be a step supporting democracy over

autocracy.

But how could we go about doing this? Is it not a

bit dreamy? I reason that the answer lies in our

budding international civil society. Via interna-

tional non-governmental organizations, indige-



Via international non-governmental organizations,

indigenous organizations, national organizations,

and supranational bodies, we might have the capacity

to form an international movement of solidarity for

the cosmopolitan democratisation of cartography in

order to give legitimacy to what we see visually in geo

-politics.

nous organizations, national organizations, and

supranational bodies, we might have the capacity

to form an international movement of solidarity

for the cosmopolitan democratisation of cartog-

raphy in order to give legitimacy to what we see

visually in geo-politics.

Another question concerns the solidarity

of “what.” To contextualise the spectre of

legitimacy we must throw our support and

solidarity behind the premise that democracy is

part of the human story. That it is not something

that must be exported, but it is something

that humans have had since arguably pre-modern

(if not pre-human) times. For a great example

of this I encourage the reader to investigate

Fukuyama’s (2011) work The Origins of Political

Order, or an interview I conducted with Benjamin

Isakhan (2011) or his latest edited volume the

Secret History of Democracy (2011). If we

understand democracy as a pre-modern and post

-modern probability and as something of a

natural predisposition for social organization

(a.k.a politics and governance) then the spectre

must be that of global or cosmopolitan democra-

cy.

Addressing China3

With the aforementioned points made, we would

do well to begin discussing cases. And in this in-

stance, I should like to address China and formally

challenge its claim to territorial sovereignty. This

extends not only to Taiwan, Macau, Hong Kong,

and Tibet, but also to Inner Mongolia, the Xinjiang

Uyghur Autonomous Region, and all other re-

gions within “mainland China”. For a country that

maintains it is a socialist democracy, where in fact

is the legitimacy of democracy in this State? Sure-

ly any boasted “victory” stemming from 1949 and

the violence over the Chinese plurality that then

ensued concerning the Great Leap Forward and

the Cultural Revolution cannot convey legitimacy.

Those living within the “Greater China Region”

must have the opportunity opened to them to

discuss and decide if and how they want to be a

part of the current PRC. In this regard, none of

what we see on the

map has any meaning.

Without legitimacy,

the boundaries of Chi-

na are emptied of

significance. They in

turn become symbols

of illegitimacy and

must come to be

challenged. China’s

territorial lines are a

visual depiction of

boundaries that were

established through

dynastic and ideologi-

cal empire: one that

secured not the con-

sent of the plurality

but rather the fear and

bloodshed of a great

number of individuals

– further entrenching

evolutionary autocra-

cy.


People in Greater China, as well as those through-

out this world, must come to think of their coun-

tries in this manner. We must come to terms with

evolutionary autocracy and realize that rarely (if

ever) in human history have we established peri-

ods wherein there was a complete and demon-

strable process of pluralistic, transparent and ac-

countable involvement of people concerning

questions of “national” importance: in other

words, deciding on a matter central to everyone

in a manner that established a democratic legiti-

macy.

With this heuristic device employed, it is reasona-

ble to say that the plurality of nations that have

become absorbed by illegitimate imperialist

Chinas (over time) have the right to reconsider

their role in the union-state. Collectively, the

Chinese plurality has the right to call into

question the union-state itself as little if any of it is

democratically legitimate. Will Tibet, Inner

Mongolia and the Xinjian Autonomous Region

want to be part of the PRC or will they wish

to form (or rather reform) their own sovereign

states as they come to recall the independence

of their nations lost to violent absorption? Will

this be mirrored by Macau, Hong Kong and the

separate/inseparate Republic of China? It is

hoped that we may one day come to answer the-

se questions. And to be fair to those that hold the

PRC near and dear, this argument can be made

concerning any other union-state (not just China)

and this article is not meant to lambast a geo-

political space that has made many important

and significant achievements through time and

space. The PRC is but one example in a world

filled with examples and we would all do well to

start thinking of our geo-political spaces in this

way.

Conclusion

The aforementioned will certainly take a

great deal of time, but time is of course a neces-

sary component of communication (which in it-

self is a parameter of democracy preferably de-

signed to trump violence). I should like to ask for

greater minds to comment on this paltry piece

which will undoubtedly allow me to create a

much stronger call for solidarity and a more ro-

bust argument.

Notes:

* Dr. Jean-Paul Gagnon is a social and political the-

orist with a Ph.D. in political science. He completed

his doctorate at the Queensland University of Tech-

nology under the aegis of Australia’s prestigious En-

deavour Award.

1. This point forms the argument of

“evolutionary autocracy.” We and our

ancestors have, over millions of years,

been born into already established systems

wherein we (in most cases) did not have

an equal voice to contest the telos of

our times. Democratic legitimacy is a

method to break this time-bound autocratic

norm.

2. When “America” is used in this article, it is re-

ferring not to the USA but to the majority of

the “Western” hemisphere.

3. Although I have taken China as a case for dis-

cussion, we may use this argument on any

other union-state in this globe.

Works Cited

Fukuyama, Francis. 2011. The Origins of Political

Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolu-

tion. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Isakhan, Ben and Stephen Stockwell (eds). 2011.

The Secret History of Democracy. London: Palgrave

MacMillan.

Isakhan, Benjamin. Interviewed by: Jean-Paul

Gagnon. 2011. “An Interview with Dr.

Benjamin Isakhan: On the Alternative Histories of

Democracy,” Journal of Democratic Theory, 1(1): 19

-26.

Marquand, David. 2011. The End of the West: The

Once and Future Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press.



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Columbia International Affairs Online (CIAO)

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Index Islamicus

International Bibliography of Book Reviews of

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W hat is the role of law in maintain-

ing spaces of order in modern

Chinese society? In 1996, Jiang

Zemin adopted a new official

policy of ruling the country in accordance with

law, and establishing a socialist law-ruled state

(yifa zhiguo, jianshe shuhui zhuyi fazhiguo), a policy

that is now incorporated into the PRC Constitu-

tion. Such law-lauding ideology and rhetoric has

been increasingly evident in China since the end

of the Cultural Revolution, and in conjunction

with decades of rapid and prolific legal institution-

building, has provided rich fodder for ample

scholarship and discourse on the trajectory of Chi-

na’s legal system, and the nature of rule and order

in modern Chinese society.

The main empirical issues addressed in this field

include the retreat of the Party-state; the evolu-

tion of the legislature, judiciary, legal profession

and administrative law regimes; and the nexus

between rule of law and economic development,

democracy and human rights. The ‘law and order’

meta-narrative is visibly played out in Party dis-

course, Five Year Plans, Constitutional evolution

and the astounding pace of development of the

formal legal system. The thickest descriptions and

predictions of the story are those that also take

into account trends and trajectories in popular

and Party legal consciousness and ideology.1

The basic distinction made in studies of the role of

law in maintaining order is between rule by, and

rule of, law:

Whereas the core of rule of law is the ability of

law and legal system to impose meaningful

restraints on the state and individual

members of the ruling elite, rule by law refers

to an instrumental conception of law in which

law is merely a tool to be used as the state

sees fit.2


CHINA AS A LAW-RULED STATE:

FROM TOP-DOWN RHETORIC

TO BOTTOM-UP EXPECTATIONS

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY ANNA KLOEDEN*

In China, the distinction has proved difficult

to make empirically (which is nicely reflected

in the lack of a linguistic distinction, both

concepts generally translated as fazhi, literally

‘law-ruled’). While generally scholars are in

agreement that the direction of legal reform

over the last three decades has been away

from rule by man and towards rule by law, the

extent to which rule of law is emerging empirical-

ly, and its optimal nature and role in the Chinese

context, are matters of much debate in the litera-

ture.

The focus of most studies of Chinese law and

order has been fixed on the most visible manifes-

tation of the working out of that nexus,

namely institution-building, rhetoric and policy

at the central/top level of the Party-state. The

rule of law question has been asked through

the lenses of globalisation, modernisation, and

economic development. Opinions diverge in

the literature on whether and to what extent

the Chinese polity possess a notion of law that is

consistent with that required by rule of law.

Alford, for example, argues that ‘the principal

state architects of China’s post-Cultural Revolu-

tion law reform project have a genuine

ambivalence toward their undertaking’.3 Dowdle,

on the other hand, argues that any such

ambivalence ‘manifests itself in practice, not

conception. Normatively, the Chinese, including

the leadership, are overwhelmingly consistent in

proclaiming the supremacy of law over other

forms of political authority and over private inter-

ests’.4

However, the ‘top-down’ approach, predicated on

these meta-narratives, and focusing on official,

state-endorsed conceptions of law and order,

must be supplemented by increased attention to

the experiences and expectations relating to law

and order (which I will broadly term ‘legal

ideology’) of citizens in society. Traditional and

historical cultural factors, in which Chinese con-

ceptions of law and order are grounded, have

been discussed in depth in the literature,5 but

tend, like the rule of law debate generally, to be

examined at the level of the elite polity. If, as

Peerenboom argues, rule of law is a function of

both institution-building and legal culture, the

question must be asked: to what extent is central

law-lauding rhetoric penetrating local spheres in

which ‘law’ (fa) is traditionally regarded as an infe-

rior means of social ordering than ‘reason’ (li)? To

what extent are Beijing’s winds of change, includ-

ing the state’s ‘verbal homage to the sanctity of

law’,6 penetrating the local sphere and popular

ideology?

A useful case through which to examine the local

state-society interface is that of grassroots, citizen

-led NGOs. China’s NGO sector has been steadily

growing in size, visibility and power since 1978,

accompanied by a dramatic increase of state

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY ANNA KLOEDEN


A Mosaic Law

by Frederick

Dielman

oversight and ostensible regulation of the sector.

Through the promulgation, beginning in 1989

with the regulations on ‘Social Organisa-

tions’ (shehui tuanti), of a number of new laws

relating to charities and NGOs, the Chinese gov-

ernment has evinced its concern with maintain-

ing tight control over the newly emerging state-

society relationship. While NGOs are increasingly

seen as indispensable to economic and social de-

velopment, they are also seen as potentially

threatening for the civic organisation and

agendas they represent.7 Accordingly, although

laws provide a pathway to recognition and

legal status for NGOs, in practice such registration

is difficult to obtain. For example, a recent

study by Ashley and He of Beijing NGOs found

that registration status is in practice ‘limited

to [government-organised NGOs] and similar

organisations with continued close government

ties’.8 It remains the case that most NGOs in

China today are not registered with the

Ministry of Civil Affairs (at the end of 2008 there

were approximately 415 000 registered NGOs in

China, of an estimated two to eight million in to-

tal).9

Existing ‘civil society’ literature tends to focus

on registered NGOs at the state-dominated

end of a spectrum of autonomy, simplistically

assuming that ‘[unregistered] grassroots NGOs …

do not encounter too much interference from

the government’, and are not directly

controlled in any way by the government

in the absence of registration,10 there being

a supervision gap which allows for greater

NGO freedom. However evidence from the

author’s research on charitable organisations

run by the underground Catholic church of

Henan province suggests that, on the contrary,

at the local interface between state and

society, oversight and control are at times also

very much evident, but in much more veiled, and

less formal/policy-centric ways than we see cen-

trally.

At this local interface between state and society,

ordinary citizens and government officials

bring their own traditions, histories and

expectations about law to their engagement

with the legal system and the officials who

represent it. In the case of the underground

Catholic church and its unregistered/quasi-legal

charities, most players demonstrate deftness

at functioning in the absence of legally defined

relationships, and negotiating paternalistic/

disciplinarian-type interactions with local

officials. In fact, the local picture painted therein

is one in which law is not supreme, either in

practice or rhetorically, and many features

of even a thin conception of rule of law are

missing. The ‘real’ rules of engagement between

grassroots charities and the state are more to do

with attaining legitimacy, garnering supportive

connections, and ‘giving face’ to local govern-

ment by treading politically-contentious lines

(such as evangelism and drawing attention to

gaps in government provision of welfare) careful-

ly.

Above all, the dominant expectation regarding

law at this local level is not that law will be

impartially, consistently and unambiguously

defined and applied, but rather than flexible

norms will govern individualised, paternalistic

relations with the state. This is not widely

regarded as problematic, or in fact widely

regarded at all, due to a lack of esteem for the

notions of ‘law’ and ‘legality’ as intrinsically/



...most NGOs in China today are not

registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs

(at the end of 2008 there were approximate-

ly 415 000 registered NGOs in China, of an

estimated two to eight million in total).

ideologically valuable. It may be surprising, from

a Western law-centric perspective, that the pic-

ture that emerges from this particular (non) le-

gal ideology is not one of ‘lawless chaos’.11 In-

stead, the local snapshot is one imbued with

themes of paternalism, game-playing, give-and-

take, suspicion and subordination. Above all, it

is one of order – not, admittedly, a type of order

associated with rule of law and its threshold re-

quirements such as predictability and certainty,

but order nonetheless.

Chinese and foreign scholars alike have put

forward a vast array of opinions and descrip-

tions, from conservative to liberal, on how

the macro legal culture of China continues to

be shaped by the winds of change blowing from

Beijing and (purportedly) throughout China.

But further empirical studies and examination of

the law-order nexus locally is required to better

understand the extent to which such winds

have penetrated notions and ideas about law

and order in Chinese culture and society. By

moving in this way from the macro to the micro,

texture and distinction is added to our under-

standing of the ideologies and traditions in

which ‘law and order’ concepts in China contin-

ue to be grounded today, and a contribution

will also, reflexively, be made to the bigger pic-

ture themes of rule of law and legal conscious-

ness.

Notes:

* Anna Kloeden is a PhD candidate in law at the

University of Oxford.

1. See, for example, Randall Peerenboom,

China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law

(CUP, New York 2002) especially Chapters

2–3; Geor Hintzen, ‘The Place of Law in

the PRC’s Culture’ (1999) 11 Cultural Dy-

namics 167; Zhiping Liang, ‘Tradition and

Change: Law and Order in a Pluralist

Landscape’ (1999) 11 Cultural Dynamics

215; Karen Turner, ‘The Criminal Body and

the Body Politic: Punishments in Early

China’ (1999) 11 Cultural Dynamics 237;

Thomas Stephens, Order and Discipline in

China: The Shanghai Mixed Court 1911–27

(Asian Law Series, University of Washing-

ton Press, Seattle 1992).

2. Peerenboom (2002) 8.

3. William Alford, ‘A Second Great Wall? Chi-

na’s Post-Cultural Revolution Project of

Legal Construction’ (1999) 11 Cultural

Dynamics 193, 198.

4. Michael Dowdle, ‘Heretical Laments: Chi-

na and the Fallacies of ‘Rule of

Law’ (1999) 11 Cultural Dynamics 287,

301.

5. The most seminal works include

Peerenboom (2002) and the 1999 special

edition of Cultural Dynamics, with contri-

butions from (inter alia) Alford, Hintzen,

Turner, Dowdle, Defoort and

Peerenboom, and Liang.

6. Peerenboom (2002) 217.

7. Qiusha Ma, ‘The Governance of NGOs in

China since 1989: How Much Autono-

my?’ (2002) 31 Nonprofit and Voluntary

Sector Quarterly 305, 311.

8. Jillian Ashley and Pengyu He, ‘Opening

One Eye and Closing the Other: The Legal

and Regulatory Environment for

“Grassroots” NGOs in China Today’ (2008)

26 Boston University International Law

Journal 29, 55.

9. China NPO Website <http://

www.chinanpo.gov.cn/web/listTitle.do?

dictionid=2201> accessed 30 November

2009;

10. Tony Saich, Governance and Politics of

China (Palgrave MacMillan, Hampshire

2004) 232.

11. Compare with Hintzen (1999) 169,

arguing that the picture that emerges

on examining the social realities

behind ‘China’s vociferous legal

aspirations’ is ‘one of lawless chaos,

where status, connections and money set

the ‘real’ rules’.



O n November 22, 2011 Chinese me-

dia reported that the Guangdong

provincial government published

the ‘Plan Concerning Further Foster-

ing and Regulating Social Organizations of

Guangdong Province’, which contains new provi-

sions governing the establishment of social or-

ganizations in the province. According to the new

regulations, to come into effect on July 1, 2012,

social organizations may directly apply to civil

affairs departments for registration without the

requirement set by the ‘dual registration system’

of first securing sponsorship by a state agency or

organization.

Eliminating dual registration is an important de-

parture from the status quo. Under this system

social organizations are required to register and

receive periodic inspections by the local civil af-

fairs departments, and seek the professional

sponsorship of a state agency or organization in a

related policy area. The sponsoring unit is allowed

significant involvement in the social organiza-

tion’s internal operation and decision-making.

This system has prevented many organizations

from registering, as either due to their “sensitive”

area of work or the weak social capital of found-

ing members with local authorities, they do not

succeed in securing such a sponsorship. Conse-

quently, this policy has either driven most of the

social organizations underground or has led them

to use a loophole in the system and register as

business units, a practice that exposes them to

taxation. It comes to no surprise that the dual reg-

istration system is often presented as the most

clear indication that social organizations in China

lack autonomy. Therefore, initial reactions to the

announcement of the changes in Guangdong

province have been very positive. Scholars in the

mainland argue that if this provincial level legisla-

tion finds its way to national level policy, it will

signal a “breakthrough” for the development of

“civil society” in China, as the requirement of se-

curing institutional patronage will be removed

from the equation between state and social or-

ganizations.

For academics outside China who work on state-

society relations, the new regulations in Guang-

dong and their possible adoption as a national

policy will inform the ongoing discussion on the

form and direction of state-society relations in the

PRC. In the last 30 years since the initiation of the

reforms, sociologists, political scientists and area

studies scholars and students, have been preoc-

cupied with a series of interrelated questions: Is


NEW REGULATIONS GOVERNING

SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS IN CHINA:

A CIVIL SOCIETY ON THE RISE?

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY KOSTANTINOS D. TSIMONIS*

China developing a civil society that will eventual-

ly challenge the Party-state? Can the social envi-

ronment as developed after the reforms, sustain a

civil society that will begin from sectorial de-

mands and eventually push for liberalization and

political reform? Is, perhaps, the concept of cor-

poratism closer to describing the direction of so-

cial organization in China as Unger, Chan and oth-

er scholars have argued1? So far, the regulatory

framework has hindered this discussion as the

very visible top-down authoritarian dynamic has

distorted actual trends on the ground. If the

state’s immediate grip on social organizations in

the form of the sponsorship requirement is re-

moved, the actual structural configuration be-

tween state and society will be unveiled, allowing

researchers to examine how social organizations

are utilizing the freed social space to advance

their aims and influence policy making. Are they

going to break free and even antagonize state

authority or they will remain directed to the state,

largely seeking cooperation in exchange of its

assistance and resources? Ultimately, the pro-

spect of removing the dual registration system

could permit a more convincing answer to wheth-

er a civil society or a corporatist arrangement is

actually present or not. In fact, this discussion

exceeds the confines of academic life. How one

perceives the future directions of China’s sphere

of social organization has repercussions for: (a)

foreign policy making, by fueling or diffusing

arguments on China’s “peaceful evolution”; (b)

international bodies and NGOs seeking to fund

impactful projects and social organizations in

China; (c) China itself, as projecting an image

of “normality” is essential in the way it is per-

ceived abroad either as a “threat” and the authori-

tarian “other” or as a “partner”; and (d) the

social organizations in China themselves that will

operate in a new institutional context. Thus,

for academics and policy-makers alike, the remov-

al of restrictions in the operation of social organi-

zations, such as the dual registration system,

could signal a “moment of truth”. Are we to

expect the slow rise of a civil society in China? The

answer given here to this question is a negative

one.

By applying concepts such as ‘civil society’ and

‘corporatism’ that are so heavily associated with

western historical experience we may obscure

more than we actually explain as we adopt a

certain agenda of what to look for and how to

interpret it. Wong2 alerts us to this danger saying

that “even as Chinese historical changes are sepa-

rated from European developments, they are reu-

nited as functional equivalents to European

changes”. Consequently, our understanding of

social developments in China remains implicitly

defined by European experiences. In the Chinese

experience of state-society rela-

tions we can identify elements of

Leninist organization; corporatism

in its state or societal forms; and

even characteristics associated

with civil society. If this coexist-

ence of such a plethora of trends

seems “contradictory” to us, this is

because we expect to see some-

thing else, something more famil-

iar. Wong’s remark that “the mod-

ern world is filled with states but

the ones we have today still bear

the marks of the different paths

they have travelled” serves as an

important guide in how we ap-

proach state-society relations in

China and elsewhere.

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY KOSTANTINOS D. TSIMONIS

19

Lenin Prof.

Roy

Bin

Wong

The discussion on social organizations in China

initially developed within a framework construct-

ed around civil society-centred explanations that

have exhibited serious empirical limitations. For

example, why in the context of marketization,

many social organisations in China continue to

seek the state’s recognition and patronage rather

than pursuing independence? And how can the

ambiguously named Government Organized

NGOs (GONGOs) be approached by social scien-

tists trained in the works of de Tocqueville or Ha-

bermas? In this discussion, the preoccupation

with civil society in the 80s and 90s gave its turn

to ‘corporatism’, a concept that captures some of

the institutional arrangements at place, yet only

partially.

What we may identify as ‘corporatist arrange-

ments’ can be approached as state responses in

old problems with deep roots in China’s late im-

perial past. The 1998 regulations on the registra-

tion of social organizations are direct ascendants

of similar attempts by the Nationalist state, that in

turn reflect the Chinese experience of state mak-

ing since the late empire and its central concern

with penetrating local society in order to finance

the modernisation program and retain social or-

der. The late imperial state had to rely on the local

gentry and its institutions in order to finance its

attempt to meet the challenge of imported

‘modernity’, its guns, trains and ideas. Its National-

ist successor aspired to penetrate local rural and

urban society to an unprecedented degree as a

means of extraction or resources and for social

control. The Chinese state today is trapped be-

tween opposing social dynamics of market re-

form and its continuing attempt to hold a (much

more pluralistic) society under control and in line

with its developmental and political goals. The

enduring feature in all historical phases is that the

ability of the state to penetrate society depends

on the state’s “capacity to create new organiza-

tions in the localities and influence, if not control,

those that are non-governmental”3. But does this

process need to create patterns of state-society

relations that are identical with western experi-

ences and the ways they have been codified in

concepts like ‘corporatism’ and ‘civil society’?

Acknowledging variation in historical experiences

can explain phenomena such as the ‘Government

Organized NGOs’, and the shifts and

“contradictions” in the orientation of China’s so-

cial organizations between greater ‘relevance’ to

the social groups they target, or ‘loyalty’ to the

state, that cannot be captured by ‘corporatism’

and ‘civil society’, unless we redefine the content

of these concepts. Saich4 examining the develop-

ment of social organizations argues that both

‘civil society’ and ‘corporatism’ when applied in

the Chinese context, have serious explanatory

limitations; he describes, instead, a symbiotic rela-

tionship, and multiple models of state-society

relations that are operating at the same time. The

picture that Saich presents is that of a continuous

process of negotiation that takes place within the

state (as broadly defined to include party organs,

state agencies and the mass organizations), and

between state and society. Dickson5 also disa-

grees with arguments that see corporatism as a

process of decay of the Leninist political system

either through a transformation from state to so-

cietal corporatism6 or as a tendency of civil associ-

ations evolving to the direction of civil society.7

According to Dickson, the transformation from

state to societal corporatism is the outcome of

political reform, not the dynamic behind it, hint-

ing that democratization is a prerequisite to soci-

etal corporatism rather than the opposite. In-

stead, he identifies simultaneously practiced ex-



The Chinese state today is trapped

between opposing social dynamics of

market reform and its continuing

attempt to hold a (much more plural-

istic) society under control and in line

with its developmental and political

goals.

clusionary and inclusionary policies within state

corporatism that may account for trends identi-

fied by scholars without “stretching the concept

of societal corporatism beyond recognition”. Yiyi

Lu, in her recent book8 has argued very convinc-

ingly that careful empirical research shows a so-

cial reality that exceeds the analytical capacity of

the western-centric concepts of civil society and

corporatism. According to her analysis, social or-

ganisations in China exhibit more autonomy than

imagined under the corporatist prism while sim-

ultaneously they are more directed to the state

than western civil society organizations. Lu de-

scribed the relation of social organisations to the

Chinese state as “depended autonomy”.

The difficulty of capturing social realities in China

by using west-centric models becomes more ap-

parent when attempting to interpret conditions

observed on the ground. During fieldwork in

north China, I visited an “NGO” that operates in

the area of migrant workers’ welfare. The organi-

zation succeeded due to the devotion, skills and

passion of its founder, a migrant worker himself,

who started by establishing a hotline for legal

issues, offering advice on workers regarding Chi-

na’s labour law. After a few years of operation the

organisation expanded by opening a community

centre offering classes and after-school care for

children of migrant workers, followed by the es-

tablishment of an additional recreation and edu-

cation centre within an industrial park. In each

step, the founder was very careful to include the

local state agencies in his initiatives in order to

gain support, a strategy that secured him great

autonomy, despite setting up a Party, Workers

Union, Youth League and Women’s Federation

branch within his organisation. The founder

gained financial support and accepted material

contributions from local authorities in the form of

facilities and equipment that made the expansion

of the organisation’s services and presence possi-

ble. More importantly, the official backing it re-

ceived from one of China’s major mass organiza-

tions enabled the organisation to present itself as

an advocate of the rule of Chinese labour law,

fending away suspicions from factory owners. The

latter now often require its assistance in order to

educate the workers on their lawful rights and

thus prevent them from making demands that

transcend the legal obligations of the employer.

The organization educates Chinese migrant work-

ers on their rights on a daily base, making a valua-

ble and immediate contribution to raising their

level of awareness on legal affairs. In addition, it is

building a community of migrant workers by of-

fering welfare and recreational services. Part of

the organization’s success was that it consciously

pursued the state’s help, accepting its penetra-

tion by agencies and mass organizations, but sim-

ultaneously maintained a very high degree of

autonomy in terms of its operation, internal or-

ganisation and activities. Thus, while the organi-

sational setting is antithetical to a ‘civil society’

entity, the high degree of autonomy of the organ-

ization does not fit a corporatist model either.

This is only one example of many similar cases

recorded by scholars working on state-society

relations in China who argue that a close relation-

ship with the state is a strategy often pursued by

social organizations that seek access to resources

and official sanctioning of their work in order to

be more effective and autonomous9.

The above argument against interpreting state-

society relations under the distortive lenses of

‘civil society’ or ‘corporatism’, reorients the ex-

planatory framework of the new changes in the

dual registration system from the ‘grand theory’

level to more immediate interpretations. The new

guidelines are simultaneously a recognition and a

very pragmatic answer to the failure of the cur-

rent registration policy for social organizations.

From the state’s perspective the current frame-


A Chinese Migrant Worker

work is counterproductive in two ways. First, the

registration regulations drive social organizations

underground, to a level that state agencies can-

not monitor or control. It is estimated that more

that 3 million non-registered NGOs operate in the

mainland presently for which the authorities

know little or nothing about, approximately 10

times more than the registered ones. My own re-

search on the Communist Youth League has re-

vealed that communication with its own approxi-

mately 3 million branches -a large number of

which is only nominally active- is hardly main-

tained, while CYL Committees throughout the

administrative hierarchy of the PRC are in the dark

regarding the exact number of youth social or-

ganizations operating informally. Second, in the

context of the state’s “declining capacity to imple-

ment policy consistently”10 towards a society that

is demanding more state attention in the form of

welfare services in order to ameliorate the ine-

qualities created by marketization, the social

functions of these social organizations are often

welcomed by local authorities. These social

services are targeted on groups under heavily

moralistic institutionalized prejudice, such as the

case of AIDS-related NGOs and those operating

in the field of sex workers, or those gaining in-

creasing public and official sympathy such as

welfare services for children of migrant workers.

Therefore, by removing the “bottleneck” of offi-

cial sponsorship, state authorities will not only

benefit from the social welfare functions of these

organizations, but will also get a better access to

them, as the latter will seek registration in order

to start operating openly, making themselves

known.

In addition, the Guangdong guidelines should be

viewed in comparison to other local and national

state initiatives in the field of governance of social

organizations. In 2008 Shenzhen was the first city

in China to abolish the dual registration system

for social welfare and charity organizations, which

now only have to register with the Civil Affairs

departments, a decision that was regarded as ex-

perimental and served as a blueprint for future

policy changes. Then, in April 2010, the central

government, in an attempt to control the inflow

of donations from foreign institutions, enforced

stricter regulations regarding foreign money

transfers to Chinese social organizations. Next,

in February of 2011 Beijing municipal govern-

ment allowed industry and commerce, charities,

welfare and social services’ organizations to

register directly with the civil affairs departments

without the requirement of dual registration.

This announcement was followed by reports

on the press last summer regarding discussions

for an eminent nationwide elimination of the

dual registration requirement in 2012. Therefore,

the recent Plan by the Guangdong provincial

government, falls in line with an attempt to

streamline the operation of social organizations

by making use of their social work capacities,

exposing them by ‘luring’ them over ground,

and devising new ways to influence their activi-

ties and growth. The new Guangdong Plan also

permits the establishment of more than one

business associations for the same industry

from the prefecture (diji) to the township level

(xianji). Furthermore, it stipulates that the

sponsorship units formerly offering ‘professional

management’ will now be in charge of

‘professional guidance’, a term that remains

unclear as of its exact content. The above are

indications of the CCP’s careful and pragmatic

approach regarding the governance of social or-

ganizations, that solves the problems of current

regulations and partially harmonizes law with

social reality.



It is estimated that more that 3 million non-

registered NGOs operate in the mainland

presently for which the authorities know little

or nothing about, approximately 10 times

more than the registered ones.

In conclusion, the new regulations will consist

a ‘breakthrough’ only to the degree that they

will allow existing underground organizations

in the field of social work to come to the surface

and new ones to start their operation with

less red tape in their registration process. Howev-

er, the actual impact of these changes is far

from certain as the conservative reflexes of

bureaucracies tend to dilute institutional reforms,

while social organizations, as the case of last

year’s changes in Beijing demonstrated, remain

vigilant and apprehensive of new state regula-

tions. Ultimately, despite the gradual abolish-

ment of the ‘dual registration system’ there is

no indication of a swift in the priorities of the

local and central state on the one hand, and

social organizations on the other. State and socie-

ty relations in the PRC will continue to develop in

a symbiotic context that is malleable to the

center’s political priorities and pressure from

the base, yet it is very unlikely that a ‘civil society’

mirroring western historical experience is on

the rise.

Notes:

* Konstantinos D. Tsimonis is a PhD candidate

at the School of Oriental and African Studies,

University of London. His doctoral research is on

China’s mass organisations and their potential

as political representation mechanisms, using

the Communist Youth League as a study

case. During 6 years of study and work for various

organisations in China, he has published on

current Chinese affairs, North Korea, social

research methods and modern Chinese literature

(translation).

1. Unger, Jonathan and Chan, Anita, ‘China,

corporatism, and the East Asian Model’ The

Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs No 33

(Jan 1995) ; Jonathan Unger (ed.), Associa-

tions and the Chinese State: Contested Spac-

es (M.E. Sharpe Inc: New York, 2008)

2. Wong, Roy Bin, China Transformed: Histori-

cal change and the Limits of European Expe-

rience (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,

1997)

3. Ibid:192

4. Saich, Tony, ‘Negotiating the State:

The develoment of Social Organizations in

China’ The China Quarterly No161 (March

2000)

5. Dickson, Bruce J., ‘Cooptation and Corpo-

ratism in China: The logic of Party Adapta-

tion’ Political Science Quartery Vol 115, No 4

(winter, 2000-1)

6. Unger and Chan, op. cit.

7. White, Gordon ; Howell, Jude and Shan

Xiaoyuan, In Search for civil society

(Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1996)

8. Lu, Yiyi, Non-govermental organisations in

China (Routledge: London, 2009)

9. See characteristically the book of Lu Yiyi in

which she analyzes similar centripetal dy-

namics at play in the case of 55 Chinese

“NGOs”, that inform their relation to the

party-state.

10. Saich, op. cit. p. 133

References:

I. Dickson, Bruce J., ‘Cooptation and Corpo-

ratism in China: The logic of Party Adapta-

tion’ Political Science Quartery Vol 115, No 4

(winter, 2000-1)

II. Lu, Yiyi, Non-govermental organisations in

China (Routledge: London, 2009)

III. Saich, Tony, ‘Negotiating the State: The

development of Social Organizations in

China’ The China Quarterly No 161 (March

2000)

IV. Unger, Jonathan and Chan, Anita, ‘China,

corporatism, and the East Asian Model’ The

Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs No 33

(Jan 1995)

V. Unger, Jonathan (ed.), Associations and the

Chinese State: Contested Spaces (M.E.

Sharpe: New York, 2008)

VI. White, Gordon ; Howell, Jude and Shan

Xiaoyuan, In Search for civil society

(Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1996)

VII. Wong, Roy Bin, China Transformed: Histori-

cal change and the Limits of European Expe-

rience (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,

1997)



Joürnal of Global Analysis endeavoürs to become the foremost international forüm for academics, researchers and policy makers to share their knowledge and experience in the disciplines of polit-ical science, international relations, economics, sociology, international law, political history, and hüman geography.

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Joürnal of Global Analysis is an interdisciplinary refereed e-joürnal, edited by a groüp of interna-tional scholars indicated in the Editorial Board and International Advisory Board. The joürnal is püblished at its own web site http://www.cesran.org/globalanalysis. Joürnal of Global Analy-sis welcomes sübmissions of articles from related persons involved in the scope of the joürnal as well as summary reports of conferences and lecture series held in social sciences.

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www.cesran.org/jcts

T he Journal of Conflict Transfor-

mation and Security (JCTS) pro-

vides a platform to analyse conflict

transformation as the processes

for managing change in a non-violent way to

produce equitable outcomes for all parties that

are sustainable. Security is understood as encap-

sulating a wide range of human security con-

cerns that can be tackled by both ‘hard’ and

‘soft’ measures. Therefore, the Journal’s scope

not only covers such security sector reform is-

sues as restructuring security apparatus, reinte-

gration of ex-combatants, clearance of explosive

remnants of war and cross-border management,

but also the protection of human rights, justice,

rule of law and governance.

The 21st century is witnessing the decline of the

United States as the foremost power in the world,

and the gradual emergence of a multipolar order

with China at the top, on track to becoming the

world’s economic powerhouse. The purpose of

this paper is to provide an overarching survey of

China’s future role in the world, in parallel with

some of the challenges it faces in the coming

years and decades. The central theme is going to

talk about sustainable development and the cor-

responding need for China to provide both politi-

cal leadership and the lead in materializing poli-

cies that respect and work with the natural envi-

ronment, rather than destroy it. At stake is the

idea and vision that will replace the American-led

world order since the end of the Cold War and it

may very well fall to China to provide the needed

leadership and insight.

Why is China important?

Since the death of Mao Tse Dong in 1976, China

began a gradual opening to world markets, in a

framework that combined strong political control

of economic policy with a capitalist-influenced

model of production and demand. For over three

decades now, China has grown at astounding

annual rates and has effectively become the se-

cond largest economy in the world after the Unit-

ed States1. Alongside, it has overtaken America as

the biggest exporter and consumer of energy2. In

the foreseeable future, we are going to witness

America’s gradual decline from the world stage,

to be taken up by China in the 21st century. Amer-

ica came to the fore after World War II largely due

to the fact that it was the only intact economy not

destroyed and decimated by war. However, today


CHINA IN THE 21ST CENTURY:

IS GLOBAL LEADERSHIP POSSIBLE? Sustainable Development, Political Legitimacy and Foreign Policy

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY GEORGI IVANOV*

C hina’s rising star on the world stage is accompanied by significant economic challenges that

bring extensive domestic and foreign political implications. To ensure its growth and stability,

China must turn to sustainable development, which, accompanied by rising personal wealth,

will cause problems for the current one-party political system in China. Beijing must adjust to

allow more political pluralism if it hopes to gain the internal political legitimacy to be a global leader in

legitimating a multilateral foreign policy in the context of an increasingly multipolar world.

we live in a unique time – our world is bigger and

more connected than anytime in recorded histo-

ry. China is becoming a central engine that must

not only provide economic leadership, but also a

vision for the world with the political will to carry

it out.

Sustainable Development

On a world scale, fossil fuels continue to be the

primary method of meeting the energy needs of

major countries. One exception is France, whose

energy mix is heavily favoured towards nuclear

power. However, since sustainable development

became a mainstream phrase in the 1980s, the

ecological footprint of human activity has be-

come an important consideration for projects

both in developed and developing countries. The

first step in sustainable development lies in devel-

oping power generation techniques that mini-

mize the reliance on fossil fuels. In the first decade

of this century, we have seen several major mile-

stones achieved toward renewable energy pro-

duction. In absolute numbers, the growth of solar

and wind investment has been startling, but rela-

tive to overall world energy production, still re-

tains a very small share3. Policy-wise, Europe is a

leader in encouraging the development of re-

newable energy: by 2020, 20% of power generat-

ed in the EU must come from renewable sources4.

While China’s investment in renewable energy is

greater than that of any other country, it is still

only having a small impact on the overall energy

mix of the country and it is necessary for Beijing

to implement a long-term focus in this regard5.

However, the emissions of CO2 emitted by China

in the coming years are set to increase, and that

must be taken into account when talking about

renewable energy targets.6

Sustainable development extends beyond power

generation. It also encompasses industrial capaci-

ty, particularly capital-intensive industries, such as

mining and heavy industry. As the world’s manu-

facturing center, emissions and waste products

from factories in China are a growing environ-

mental and health problem. Polluted air in cities,

acidified soil, unacceptably quality of drinking

water and the negative impact on groundwater

and rivers are fundamental challenges for Beijing

to address, if it has any pretensions for becoming

a superpower in this century7. Carbon neutrality is

a term that refers to developing manufacturing

processes that ideally have a net emission of no

sulphur and carbon-based gases. On a practical

level, it means developing means of scrubbing

emissions for harmful gases, storing them under-

ground or developing links with other industries

that might have a use for these waste products;

they are not limited to gaseous emissions, but

also solid waste products that can be used in dif-

ferent manufacturing processes.

An additional challenge that comes to China with

a rapidly growing economy is increased prosperi-

ty. While a new wealthy class of industrialists,

bankers and other professionals is taking shape in

China, the average person will also feel the effects

of a more powerful economy: better wages and a

higher level of consumption of both goods and

services. When talking about 1,3 billion people,

one needs to consider the kind of demand in-

creased consumption will create on existing infra-

structure, energy usage, the surrounding natural

environment, and the global impact it might have

from additional imports as demand for more and

different kinds of goods increases. The response

by the Chinese government can take a number of

dimensions: from slowing the growth of incomes,

and thus, demand, to creating a culture in the

general population that is sensitive to environ-

mental issues, or promoting goods and services

that are construed with an appreciation of mini-

mizing their ecological impact. In essence, the

role of the government is central in creating a

hybrid of these policies that will give priority to

ecologically-sensitive consumption habits and

the goods and processes that will support them.

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY GEORGI IVANOV


Policy-wise, Europe is a leader in encouraging

the development of renewable energy: by 2020,

20% of power generated in the EU must come

from renewable sources.

Overall, the premise of this section is as follows:

the first tier of China’s coming global role is found

in encouraging and implementing sustainable

development. The three main themes are an em-

phasis on emission-free power generation (wind,

solar, nuclear), reforming heavy industry and capi-

tal-intensive activities to ultimately achieve car-

bon neutrality, and finally encouraging ecologi-

cally-friendly habits in a large population that will,

on average, become increasingly wealthier in this

century and consumer more as a consequence.

China must consider these three areas very care-

fully, because they can set the paradigm for envi-

ronmental global leadership by the Celestial Em-

pire.

Implications of Economic Growth for Internal

Political Challenges and Foreign Policy

The growing affluence of China is going to bring

with it a set of political problems that the coun-

try’s one-party rule will find increasingly difficult

to confront. The first challenge is that the average

person will have the ability to increasingly ques-

tion the existing order, catalysed by greater per-

sonal wealth. In other words, democratic tenden-

cies in a population are correlated with increased

economic means and this development will come

to odds with the paradigm of one-party rule in

China.

The effective question is qualitative: can pluralism

exist in the context of a charismatic or one-party

political system? The historical precedents point

to a negative answer: the USSR, for instance, or

Franco’s Spain, show that this kind of regime does

not stand the test of time and once collapsed, is

replaced by imperfect, nascent pluralism.

The trouble for China’s Communist Party is that

economic growth has the potential to hasten the

demise of its political legitimacy. The historical

experience of the last major democratic throes in

China is not flattering: the forceful suppression of

the 1989 Tiananmen Square uprisings raised

questions about Beijing’s ability to deal with large

-scale protest8. Dealing with dissent is crucial for

political legitimacy, because a regime that does

not have ability to change in the long run is not

sustainable. In other words, China needs to find a

different, peaceful means of handling difference

of opinion and dissent in order for the current

regime to maintain political legitimacy.

Domestic political legitimacy, gained through

wider spaces for public discussion, participation

and influence in the political process, will be cru-

cial if Beijing is to have a more influential global

role in turn. There are several political reasons for

this: one is that predictable domestic politics with

conflict management methods that do not in-

volve military means give China the ability to pro-

mote political predictability in other conflict-

prone areas of the world, such as the Middle East

or conflict-ridden areas of Africa without being

perceived as hypocritical. The second reason is

the heightened trust credit it would receive from

other major international partners on issues relat-

ed to a wide variety of policy types: security coop-

eration, environment, economic and trade rela-

tions and peace promotion.

Chinese foreign policy will operate in a multipolar

world.9 With the gradual exit of the United States

as the dominant power in international relations,

there is no single power to replace it that can ex-

ercise the kind of political, economic and military

dominance that the United States did for the se-

cond half of the 20th century. In effect, we are see-

ing the formation of several power centres in the



The trouble for China’s Communist Party is

that economic growth has the potential to

hasten the demise of its political legitimacy.

The historical experience of the last major

democratic throes in China is not flattering:

the forceful suppression of the 1989

Tiananmen Square uprisings raised questions

about Beijing’s ability to deal with large-scale

protest

world, of which China will be likely the most pow-

erful, but not the dominant one.

Decisions in a multipolar world are taken in a mul-

tilateral manner. The unique circumstances of our

world that I mentioned in the first paragraph –

population and interconnectivity – will mean that

the problems we face in the world will be global

in nature, and so will their solutions. This is pre-

cisely the challenge to Chinese foreign policy: if

America set global paradigms according to its

own prisms in the 20th century, China has to in-

vent the prisms of effective multilateralism in the

21st to a much higher degree than any country

has up until this point in history that also con-

verge its national interests with those of other

countries to equivalent depths – also a practice

without precedent in history in the perceived

complexity it will have when applied to the mod-

ern international system.

However, to meet the above goal, Chinese politics

have to mature to a higher level, to match the

accelerating economic influence of the country.

The challenge there, as also mentioned above, is

to bring about effective domestic pluralism in the

medium to long term, if a multilaterally-based

leadership on foreign policy is going to have any

credible legitimacy on the international stage.

One might ask why cannot tight political control,

tied with gradual economic liberalization, as is the

current trend in China, not produce an outcome

that would make China a world leader in produc-

ing a style of effective foreign policy that is com-

prehensive, robust and multilateral in nature and

make it a global trend of foreign policy design?

The answer is straight-forward and complex at

the same time: this kind of foreign policy requires

a culture of nuanced decision-making that is hard

to find in the current behaviour of Chinese do-

mestic, let alone foreign policy.

Contemporary practices of Chinese domestic and

foreign policies are not encouraging: the impris-

onment of political dissenters10, a more confron-

tational military presence in Southeast Asia11, and

shaky and unstable relations with some regional

powers – such as Japan and India – need to be

resolved before China can effectively begin to

think about a global presence in political, and not

just economic terms.12

The point of this section is simple: China will have

the economic might to be one of the global lead-

ers in a multipolar world, and perhaps the most

influential one, as the United States gradually de-

clines over the 21st century. Yet, to become that

leader, a political maturation is required that

would enhance the political legitimacy of the

Communist Party in China through much greater

political pluralism and from there, give Chinese

foreign policy both the culture of nuance and the

needed legitimacy to become an effective multi-

lateral leader in the emerging multipolar world.

Conclusion

To sum up the paper, China’s economic growth

makes it one of the engines of the global econo-

my and it gives Beijing an enhanced position in

global affairs. Yet, a focus on sustainable develop-

ment through the implementation of environ-

mentally-friendly electricity production capacities

and vast industrial reform that will not only make

industry cleaner, but also sustain its rate of

growth, must become the two main policy objec-

tives if China’s economic experiment is to be sus-

tainable in the long term. The more important



consideration concerns the political implications

of China’s more influential global position, be-

cause it is happening in a time of increasing pres-

sures to open up space for political pluralism,

which has the potential to overwhelm the current

regime. Combined with the two unique aspects of

our world, in terms of population and intercon-

nectivity, the challenge is doubled when Chinese

foreign policy is taken into consideration, be-

cause it will have to function in a multipolar

world; in that world, the legitimacy of foreign pol-

icy is derived from the domestic political legitima-

cy of the regime. The reason is that China will nev-

er be able to replicate American unilateralism of

the post-war period – the world is simply too big

and complex now. To function in a multipolar

world then, Chinese foreign policy needs to learn

to be grounded in popular public legitimacy and

have a nuanced approach to global problems and

solutions that involves negotiating and convinc-

ing a number of international partners. Much of

this attitude can be learned through opening up

space for pluralism domestically, and it is the only

way for China to mature politically to have the

foreign policy needed in a multipolar world – thus

the imperative for Beijing to focus not just on

growing the economy, but also to vastly improve

its political sophistication as soon as possible.

Notes:

* Georgi Ivanov is a graduate student in political

science and international affairs at Carleton Uni-

versity in Ottawa, Canada.

1. The British Broadcasting Corporation. (2011,

Febraury 14). China overtakse Japan as

World’s Second-Biggest Economy. The British

Broadcasting Corporation.

2. Oster, Shai and Swarts, Spencer. (2010, Jul

18). China Tops U.S. in Energy Use. The Wall

Street Journal.

3. Al-Jaber, Ahmed et al. (2011). Renewables

2011: Global Status Report. REN21. P.18

4. European Commission. (2010). The EU Cli-

mate and Energy Package. Retrieved August

25, 2011, from European Commission Web-

site http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/

package/index_en.htm

5. Harvey, Fiona. (2010, November 29). China

Surges Ahead on Clean Energy Investment.

Financial Times.

6. Grumbine, R. (2007). China’s Emergence and

the Prospects for Global Sustainability. Bio-

Science, Vol. 57, No. 3 (March 2007), pp. 249-

255. P.252

7. Harris, Paul and Udagawa, Chihiro. (2004).

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International Political Economy, Vol. 11, No.

3 (Aug., 2004), pp. 618-640. P. 619

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emergence-of-a-multipolar-world/

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Artist Ai Wei Under House Arrest. Retrieved

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site http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/

worldnews/asia/china/8112700/Chinese-

artist-Ai-Wei-Wei-under-house-arrest.html

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sights: China’s Military Build-up Stokes Re-

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buildup-stokes-regional-arms-race

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ber 23, 2011, from World Politics Review

Website http://

www.worldpoliticsreview.com/

articles/4553/to-balance-china-india-turns-

to-japan



T he Central Committee met over the

weekend of October 15, 2011 to de-

termine how the upcoming succes-

sion during the 18th Party Congress

in 2012 should occur the current candidate to suc-

ceed Hu Jintao is Xi Jinping with Li Keqiang, one of

the Vice-Premiers is believed to succeed Wen Jia-

bao as the Premier at the 12th National People’s

Congress in 2013.

There has been less focus by the media and China

Watchers on who will succeed Wen Jiabao as Prem-

ier. While Li Keqiang is considered to be the front-

runner and is the current ‘senior’ Vice Premier, I

contend that Li Yuanchao, former party boss of

Jiangsu Province and current head of the Organiza-

tions Department, still has an equally suitable can-

didate for the position of Premier. Mainland Chi-

nese news sources have described Li as one of Chi-

na’s most ‘unconventional leader’, ‘independent

minded’, and known for strong ‘forward thinking’

concerning how China should be governed. Li Yu-

anchao has the most hands on experience

amongst the elites in implementing policies for the

problem areas that the CCP need to manage in the

21st century. During his reign as Jiangsu Party Boss

he improved Party relations with the people,

curbed corruption, implemented inner-party de-

mocracy on a provincial level, improved the condi-

tions of migrant workers, and brought greater gov-

ernment attention to the dangers of environmen-

tal pollution.

Nothing is ever certain in Chinese politics. One of

the more recent examples of what China Watchers

thought was a certain event that did not go as pre-


THE CASE FOR LI YUANCHAO AS PREMIER

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY NICHOLAS MILLER*

dicted was the failure of Xi Jinping to be promoted

to Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commis-

sion (CMC) during the Fourth Plenum of the 17th

Party Congress in September of 2009. Though the

Party gave no reason as to why he was passed over

for promotion it left analysts wondering that per-

haps there was infighting amongst the elites and

that Xi could be experiencing a fall from grace.

Eventually Xi was promoted to the Vice-Chairman

position of the CMC at the Fifth Plenum of the 17th

CPC in 2010. It should be noted that a military lead-

ership position is not a requited position for one to

become Party Secretary. China Watchers inferred

the importance of this position because Hu Jintao

held this position before he was made Party Secre-

tary and it was believed that Xi would follow Hu’s

path. The Party’s failure to promote Xi’s only high-

lights the unpredictability of accurately forecasting

elite level politics and how ‘certainties’ can be

wrong.

In May and June 2010 there were widespread

worker strikes and migrant unrest throughout sev-

eral provinces. Premier Wen Jiabao highlighted

that the Party must work to ensure better treat-

ment and more resources need to given to migrant

workers. Wen also commented that the govern-

ment must do more to curb environmental pollu-

tion and incorporate green development into Chi-

na’s ‘rise’. This shows the prescience of Li Yu-

anchao’s policies in Jiangsu Province as he sought

to widely improve the lives of migrant workers and

spur greater environmental reform since 2002. Li’s

policies seem to have taken greater notice by high-

er Party officials otherwise he would have never

been promoted to the Organizations Department

during the last Party Congress.

It is standard procedure for the state media not to

speculate about the upcoming succession or reveal

information about the inner workings of the Polit-

buro. This is done to prevent outsiders from seeing

any public displays of internal fighting. While China

analysts have more information at their disposal

today the CCP still remains determined to keep

outsiders always uncertain about what happens

behind the closed doors of the Politburo.

Li Yuanchao - The Dark

Horse

Li Yuanchao was born in

Changzhou City, Jiangsu

Province in 1950. His father

was Li Gangcheng, a veter-

an Communist official,

while his mother was Lu

Jiying, was a revolutionary

veteran, whose first hus-

band, Li Chaoshi, was a

general in the Red Army

who was executed by the

Kuomintang (KMT) in 1931.

By birth Li Yuanchao

should be considered apart

of ‘princeling’ faction,

which is comprised of

elites who are descended

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY NICHOLAS MILLER


from important Party officials but since Li’s career

was advanced through the Chinese Communist

Youth League (CCYL) this puts him a member of

‘populist’ faction. The populists are elites that rose

from more humble backgrounds and have ties to

the CCYL and Hu Jitano, who previously ran the

CCYL in the 1980s.

Like a majority of today’s elites within China Li

Yuanchao was sent to work as a laborer during the

Cultural Revolution. After the revolution he

received a Bachelor’s Degree in Mathematics from

Fudan University in Shanghai in 1982, a Master’s

Degree in Economic Management from Beijing

University in 1990, and a PhD in Law from the

Central Party School in 1995. Li’s political career

started in 1983 when his first patron, Chen Pixian,

the former Party Secretary of Shanghai, recom-

mended him to Hu Yaobang to serve as CCYL Sec-

retary in Fudan University. By the end of 1983 Li

was made Vice Minister of the CCYL Central Com-

mittee.

During Li’s tenure as Deputy Party Secretary of

Jiangsu Province in 2000 and Party Secretary of

Jiangsu Province in 2002 he implemented a variety

of political and administrative reforms such as

‘service-orientated government’, fuwuxing zhengfu,

in which the public evaluated government leaders

and those who received the lowest evaluations

were either demoted or fired. His reforms im-

proved Jiangsu standing from the 5th most peti-

tioned province to 23rd in 2006.

In 2002 Li called for a greater focus on sustainable

development that balances growth of urban areas

with environmental protection. In 2007 rapid algae

growth caused by pollution threatened Lake Tai, Li

ordered it to be cleaned under the strictest guide-

lines, which cost Nanjing’s GDP to drop 15% that

year. The Jiangsu Provincial Government closed

2,150 chemical factories by 2008 and allocated be-

tween 10%-20% of the city and county revenues

towards environmental protection.

China’s leaders are aware that China’s economic

rise is threatened by worsening environmental pol-

lution. A Chinese governmental report that was

released in February 2010 showed that the water

pollution throughout China in 2007 was more than

two times greater than what officials originally had

originally reported. China’s leaders have begun

stressing the importance of sustainable develop-

ment and now China is one of the world’s leaders

in the development of green technology.

Li Yuanchao is one of the few provincial leaders to

make explicit calls to change how the government

stands on protecting stability throughout the

country. In 2005, he commented that some

leaders were too ‘concerned with stability’,

taiping guan, and that the government’s policies

were making minor incidents into major ones.

Li stated that China’s leaders lacked the courage

to pursue bolder reforms. Widespread social unrest

and riots in Tibet and Xinjiang show that Li

Yuanchao’s criticisms of the Party’s approach to

social stability were justified, though the CCP’s

response after the 4th Plenum was to reassert the

status quo on ethnic minorities and make it illegal

to discuss independence or separatism from the

PRC.

Yu Jianrong, of the Chinese Academy of Social Sci-

ences, who is regarded as the leading expert on

the problems of peasants and migrant workers, has

reported to the central leadership that rural prob-



Li’s political career started in 1983 when

his first patron, Chen Pixian, the former

Party Secretary of Shanghai, recommended

him to Hu Yaobang to serve as CCYL Secre-

tary in Fudan University.

lems need to be urgently addressed if the Party

wishes to prevent social unrest on an unprecedent-

ed scale. Li Yuanchao has an advantage over

other candidates in that he has extensive

experience in improving the migrant situation.

Jiangsu Province has over twelve million migrant

workers, or 16% of the Province’s population of

76 million people. In 2006 the Jiangsu Provincial

Government began to set up free vocational

training schools and by 2011 all migrant workers

are to be trained in other skill areas, and

migrant children will be allowed access to educa-

tion, which was not normally allowed within

Chinese law.

Li’s has the experience in handling a wide range

of the problems China will need to tackle if it is

to sustain its economic growth. Though he is not

considered a front-runner to succeed Wen Jiabao

in the estimations of most China Watchers,

his overall practical experience is precisely

what the ‘fifth generation’ leadership need for the

CCP maintain its power throughout the 21st

century.

The 18th Party Congress in 2012 and the 12th

National People’s Congress in 2013 are going to

be major tests for the CCP’s ability to secure

an orderly political succession. While Li Yuanchao

may not be the front-runner in the race for the po-

sition as Premier but China Watchers should not

ignore his chances for success. Li Yuanchao’s past

success in lessening corruption, improving the ac-

countability of the government to the people, ad-

dressing environmental pollution, and migrant

worker issues are all challenges that need to be

addressed and his current position of head of the

powerful Organizations Department shows that

the elites within the CCP have tremendous faith in

his abilities.

If China wants to continue its rise throughout the

21st century it will have to address growing eco-

nomic and social inequalities, ethnic tension, and

endemic corruption. Whoever is appointed within

the ‘fifth generation’ leadership at the 18th Party

Congress and 12th National People’s Congress will

have to meet the challenges needed to keep Chi-

na’s economic rise secure.

Notes:

* Nicholas J.S. Miller is a PhD candidate at the

University of Sydney.

1. This article is an abridged version of my

Master Thesis in International Relations for

Flinders University titled, “The CCP Leader-

ship Succession After Hu Jintao in 2012.”

This article originally appeared in The Dip-

lomat as “The Case for Li Yuanchao” on Nov

30, 2011, http://the-diplomat.com/china-

power/2011/11/30/the-case-for-li-

yuanchao/

2. ‘Richard McGregor and Mure Dickie,

“China’s Political Rising Star: Li Yuanchao”,

Financial Times, 15 March 2007; Wong Wah,

“China’s Rising Star”, Asia Times, 04 Febru-

ary 2006

3. Joshua Li, “Who Will succeed Wen Jiabao?

Vice Premier Candidates for the 2008 Chi-

nese government ”, Association for Asian

Research, 25 October 2005, http://

www.asianresearch.org/articles/2719.html.

4. Alice Miller, “The Case of Xi Jinping and the

Mysterious Succession”, China Leadership

Monitor, No. 30, 2009, p. 1-9.

5. James Mulvenon, “The Best Laid Plans: Xi

Jinping and the CMC Vice-Chairmanship

that Didn’t Happen”, China Leadership Mon-

itor, No. 30, 2009, p. 1-7.

6. John Garnaut, “China’s land disputes at

crisis point as revolutionary turmoil beck-

ons, says professor of disenfranchised”,

Sydney Morning Herald, 1 March 2010.



http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2719.html

http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2719.html

I n July 2009, the China Banking Regula-

tory Commission (CBRC) issued a three-

year plan1 on the development of New

Rural Financial Institutions. The plan

proposed to set up 1294 New Rural Financial Insti-

tutions including 1027 Village Banks by the end of

2011. According to the plan, 75.2% of the pro-

posed New Rural Financial Institutions would be

set up in the area where agriculture plays an es-

sential role in local economy, 65.9% in the Central

and Western provinces and 35.7% in the poor

area. It is remarkable that the rural and underde-

veloped areas have been put in the privileged

position in this financial arrangement. To make

sure that fund could flow between the developed

and underdeveloped, rural and urban area, the

plan required that the promoters who intend to

create a new institution in urban or other devel-

oped area have to set up a counterpart in the ru-

ral or other underdeveloped area simultaneously.

However, this plan is not the beginning of the

Rural Financial Transformation. The transfor-

mation in fact has been carried out from Decem-

ber 2006 when the CBRC decided to set up exper-

imental rural financial institutions in Sichuan,

Qinghai, Gansu, Neimenggu, Jilin and Hubei Prov-

inces. The first list experimental institutions in-

cluded 21 Village Banks, 10 Rural Mutual Coopera-

tives and 5 Loan Companies. In 2007, the experi-

ment was extended to 23 provinces. By June

2009, 118 New Rural Financial Institutions had

been established, which were composed of 100

Village Banks, 11 Rural Mutual Cooperatives and 7

Loan Companies, of which 87 were in Central and

Western area. Regardless of the aggressive plan of

2009-2011, the progress from December 2006 to

July 2009 of the Rural Financial Transformation

was also conspicuous.


RETURN TO COUNTRYSIDE:

A NEW ATTEMPT OF RURAL

FINANCIAL TRANSFORMATION

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY JIAN GAO*

In the statement of the three-year plan, one fact

was particularly highlighted, which was the poor

coverage of the financial institution in rural area.

It was reflected by two issues: the first is that

there were still 1424 townships which hadn't

been covered by any financial institutions by

2008; the second is it was still difficult for rural

residents and enterprises to gain loans. Why has

the financial supply in rural area been not able to

meet their demand? Is this situation a newly

emerged problem or a long-term dilemma? To

answer these questions, we should throw light on

the financial scheme in rural area.

Financial Scheme in Rural Area before and af-

ter the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis

By 1997, the rural financial structure was com-

posed of four parts: the Big Four State-owned

Commercial Banks, the Rural Credit Cooperatives,

the Postal Savings Bank and Rural Cooperative

Foundations. During the period of late 1970s to

mid-1990s, with the deepening reforms in Chi-

nese economy, the county territory economy in

China had experienced rapid growth which was

not only revealed by its proportion within the

whole economy, but also characterized by a varie-

ty of growing financial bodies within the county

territory. In addition to the Rural Credit Coopera-

tive and local branches of the Big Four Banks, var-

ied types of Rural Cooperative Foundations had

played an active role in meeting the financial de-

mand of rural people and enterprises. In 1992,

there were 17,400 Rural Cooperative Foundations

set in township and 112,500 set in villages2. Dur-

ing the period from 1993 to 1996, different types

of foundations continued booming under the

policy supports of central government. By the

end of 1996, just before the central government

ordered emergent shutdown of the Rural Cooper-

ative Foundations, the number of foundations at

township level was up to 21,000.

However, in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial

crisis, abrupt changes in the rural financial ar-

rangements had taken place. Although Chinese

government boasted their success in fighting

against the crisis, the rural financial scheme in fact

had suffered immense setback.

In this year, due to the financial crisis and the fol-

lowing deflation in Chinese economy, the Central

Financial Work Conference decided to contract

the branches of the Big Four Banks at the county

and the township. According to the transfor-

mation plan produced in June1998, all the

branches with average savings below 500, 000

yuan per staff should be closed; branches with

average savings between 500,000 and 1,000,000

yuan per staff should be closed selectively and

branches with savings between 1,000,000 and

1,500,000 yuan per staff should be combined. In

the three years be-

tween 1998 and

2001, the Four State-

owned Commercial

Bank had closed

44,000 branches

within China main-

land. All the closed

branches were locat-

ed in rural area under

the county-level. Fur-

thermore, the Big

Four Banks have tak-

en back the authority

of loan from county-

level branches. From

then on, the major

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY JIAN GAO

business of the Big Four Banks in rural area has

become absorbing savings, which caused the

ongoing flow of fund from rural area to the devel-

oped and urban area.

At the same time, to avoid the risks involved with

the rapid development in the unofficial financial

market, the People’s Bank of China and Ministry

of Agriculture made the decision to close all the

Rural Cooperative Foundations. The order was

issued in 1999. The sudden shutdown has caused

credit crash and the run on bank in spite of the

rescue from central government. To meet the

debts, the burden had to be transferred to the

public finance of local government, which even-

tually were passed on to local people.

Why reform?

From mid-1990s, the policies in industrial struc-

ture and strategies have been skewed in favour

of urban and developed area, and the county

territory economy has fallen into recession as

a result. This situation has been worsening since

the funds were continuously extracted to the

major cities and industrial area. This unidirection-

al flow of money left a growing financial gap in

the county territory economy, which has brought

about the prosperity of underground financial

market in rural area. As far as local people

concerned, the supply of underground financial

market has been usually not reliable and

more expensive than that of official financial insti-

tutions. On the other hand, due to its illegal

identity, the underground financial market has

usually been beyond the regulation of financial

regulatory authority as well as the control of

monetary policy. It would very likely increase the

risk of government failure in Macro Economic

Control.

Another context that has to be taken into consid-

eration is the cancellation of agricultural tax since

2005. The influence of this reform is never defined

to the alleviation of farmers’ economic burden,

but concerns the relationship between the gov-

ernment and the people. The agricultural tax as

well as various levies attached has developed in-

dividual farmers’ awareness of their linkage with

the country while the government could keep

their control on grassroots by collecting the tax.

When all these charges were abolished, the local

governments, including the county and lower

level governments, had no longer direct connec-

tions with their people, and the shrinkage of local

financial income resulted from this transfor-

mation has also triggered the retreat of govern-

ance from grass roots society.

Under the above context, the extension of New

Rural Financial Institutions could not only be a

measure to meet the increasing demand for fi-

nancial service in rural area, but also be a govern-

mental strategy of the return to rural society. If we

turn to review the practice of this movement, we

can find this three-year plan is not entirely market

-oriented, but in some sense government-

oriented. Though the main components of the

New Rural Financial Institutions, Village Banks,

were claimed to be run as a profitable institution,

they are in reality subject to the admission control

which requires the promoters to set up at least

one Village Bank in rural or underdeveloped area

while creating a Village Bank in urban or devel-

oped area.

Notes:

* Jian Gao is a PhD student in Economic and So-

cial History, School of History, Classics and Ar-

chaeology, University of Edinburgh.

1. China Banking Regulatory Commission

(CBRC) on the development of New Rural

Financial Institutions 2009-2011: Question

and Answer Session 银监会有关部门负责

人就发布《新型农村金融机构2009年-2011

年工作安排》答记者问http://

www.songyang.gov.cn/zwgk/

xxgk/00266401_1/03/0302/201109/

t20110927_89598.htm

2. Wen Tiejun. “Rise and Fall of the Rural Co-

operative Foundations (Nongcun Hexuo

Jijinhui de Xingshuaishi 农村合作基金会的

兴衰史)”. Zhongguo Laoqu Jianshe, 2009

(9).

DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY JIAN GAO


Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security (JCTS) is for academics, policy makers and practi-tioners to engage in discussions on a wide range of peace, conflict and human security related is-sues in a multidisciplinary forum with contributions from political science, security studies, interna-tional relations, development studies, post-conflict reconstruction studies, economics, sociology, international law, political history, and human geography.

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D espite protests by the Chinese gov-

ernment, the Tibetan spiritual leader

Dalai Lama went ahead with plans to

visit a heavily militarized Tibetan

Buddhist area in northeast India in November

2009, which is the focus of an intense territorial

dispute between China and India. Dalai Lama had

re-iterated that he did not want to be the cause

for escalation of tensions between India and Chi-

na, the former being his host for past six decades.

This visit had ignited the Sino-Indian border dis-

pute and could risk making this region the proxy

battleground where both India and China seek to

proclaim their respective sovereignty. Dalai

Lama’s recent visits and public appearances in

different non-political events in India have once

again irked the Chinese officials who believe that

India is inciting anti-Chinese sentiments leading

to cancellation of high-profile talks at the govern-

mental levels.

Tension had slowly been building up between

the two Asian giants, with media commentators

further inciting the divergence of opinions. There

have been wide-spread speculations regarding

Chinese intentions to wage war on India, which is

unlikely in the current scenario. Reports had also

appeared in Chinese state media alleging that

India was moving troops and fighter aircraft to

the northeast, specifically into Sikkim and Aruna-

chal Pradesh.

The Sino-Indian border dispute continues to re-

main a cause of slightly greater concern as the

two countries have been in mutually antagonistic

and unchanging positions for decades. There also

seems to be a lack of genuine diplomatic initiative

to resolve the tension and a growing differential

in comprehensive national power which increas-

ingly favours China.1

Meeting his Chinese counter-part, Wen Jiabao on

the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in Hanoi on 28

-29 October, 2010, the Indian Prime Minister Dr.

Manmohan Singh set the tone by commenting

that “China’s rise is a fact of life”, implying that Chi-

na has to be engaged, and not contained,

thoughtfully and imaginatively; China needed to

be respected and not suspected, trusted and not

doubted. Referring to Prime Minister Dr. Manmo-

han Singh, the Indian Foreign Secretary Ms.

Nirupama Rao said that dealing with a “peaceful

rise of China requires close analysis, study and un-

derstanding”. 2

But the world has taken little notice of the rising

border tensions and sharpening geopolitical rival-

ry between the two giants that represent compet-

ing political and social models of development.

Even though China and India have more than 20-

years track record of cooperation, both countries

have ample justification for being cautious. On

the one hand, US hegemony and greater US in-


SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS:

COMPETITION OR COOPERATION?

CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY ANANYA CHATTERJEE*

http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/d/_dalai_lama/index.html?inline=nyt-per

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/04/world/asia/04chinaindia.html

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/04/world/asia/04chinaindia.html

http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/india/index.html?inline=nyt-geo

volvement in Asia may push the two neighbours

toward even more cooperation. On the other

hand, the degree to which one nation perceives

the other as a threat could encourage closer ties

with the United States. According to the United

States National Intelligence Council Report on

emerging global trends, by 2015, international

community will have to confront the military, po-

litical and economic dimensions of the rise of Chi-

na and India. How these two countries manage

their relationship will have a tremendous impact

on peace and stability in the regional and, in-

creasingly, global context. Against this backdrop

of a changing international environment, the two

Asian powers find themselves locked into what

Barry Buzan has called the “security complex” with-

in which they are expected to manage their rival-

ry and develop ties of cooperation.3 Historical

evidence shows that although China has been a

major security concern for India, the Chinese were

less wary of India and concentrated more on the

pattern of superpower rivalry existing between

the United States and the former Soviet Union

during the Cold War.

After years of cold peace, mistrust and hostility

since the Sino-Indian border clashes in 1962, the

demands of realpolitik and pragmatism in policy-

making transformed one of Asia's most important

relationships - bilat-

eral ties between

India and China. The

end of the Cold War

witnessed the devel-

opment of two de-

fining characteristics

in the security envi-

ronment of the Asia-

Pacific region: First,

the United States

has become the only

superpower in the

world today. It is also

the most important

external power in

Asia, and plays a key

role in Asian securi-

ty; Second, old rivals,

China and India have emerged as strong regional

powers, as evidenced by impressive economic

growth, the development of nuclear arsenals, and

demonstrated ambitions for respective influences

in the Pacific and South Asian regions.

While China’s role as an economic and geo-

strategic player is more widely recognized, India

is slowly emerging as a regional competitor to be

taken seriously. China and India, the two largest

developing countries in the world, have a com-

monality of history, culture, economy and social

characteristics, despite certain irreconcilable dif-

ferences. Each is concentrating its resources to

expedite internal economic development, carries

out an independent foreign policy and strives for

a peaceful international environment. China is a

big power in East Asia while India is a big power

in South Asia. Each enjoys advantages and influ-

ence in their respective regions. In spite of shar-

ing a glorious civilizational past and having never

fought a single war until their emergence as mod-

ern states, security competition between India

and China is inevitable as their economies grow.

However, the positive note is that this security

competition does not have to be conflictual.

The contemporary picture in China-India relations

today is that both nations are engaged in at-

tempting to put the past behind and forge new

relationships based on the emerging global stra-

tegic realities. Trade and economic ties have

grown exponentially in the last few years and

leaders of both the countries have expressed de-

termination to find solutions to the China-India

boundary dispute which have distorted relations

in the past. The changing reality of India-China

ties is clearly reflected in economic issues which

are increasingly becoming the most vital compo-

nent of official discourse and academic enquiry

both in the Western countries, as well as, in India

and China. As a result of this growing interest

amongst experts and officials of both these coun-

tries, India-China economic engagement has

since come to be recognized as one of the most

reliable CBM (confidence-building measure) in

the trajectory of India-China political rapproche-

ment.

CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY ANANYA CHATTERJEE

POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012

Barry

Buzan

The post-Soviet world system has been character-

ized by the opening up of geographical bounda-

ries of the different nations in the overall perspec-

tive of economic integration. The Cold War rivalry

between two divergent political systems is no

more the parameter for choice of allies. The con-

frontational diplomacy has been replaced by con-

sensus and engagement. The new mood of en-

gagement between India and China has been

influenced by the developments in the interna-

tional sphere, which would shape their domestic

and foreign policies in the days ahead.4

China and India has embarked on what can be

broadly described as the path of “cooperative

security”.5 The concept of cooperative security

derives from the liberal traditionalist paradigm

offering a new approach to managing security

dilemmas that states face in regional and global

contexts. This approach is founded on two essen-

tial arguments. First, threats to security are no

longer solely military. They are increasingly di-

verse and multidimensional ranging from eco-

nomic underdevelopment and trade imbalances,

irregular migration of people and uncontrolled

population growth, human rights abuses and

drug trafficking, conflict over access to natural

resources and environmental degradation and

the most effective being the threat of terrorist

attacks from unidentified elements in society.

Second, the management of these emerging se-

curity issues require multilateral efforts through

the processes of discussion, negotiation and co-

operation between both the governmental (track

I approach) and non-governmental (track II ap-

proach) actors.

The divergences and convergences in Sino-Indian

interests reveal that India and China are two ma-

jor powers in Asia with global aspirations and cer-

tain specific, significant conflicting interests given

their historical legacies. As a result, some amount

of friction in their bilateral relationship is inevita-

ble. Though competition between the two

emerging Asian giants is not ruled out, their rela-

tionship should be sustained for developing a

meaningful positive relationship and contentious

bilateral issues should not deter the process.

While the prospect of a better economic interac-

tion has brought two countries closer in recent

years, external factors play a viable role in deter-

mining the future course of their relationship. The

relations of the two Asian powers with the U.S.

and Russia, the former Cold War adversaries, have

a decisive impact on the future evolution of Sino-

Indian relations. It is inevitable that their efforts

will be affected by the policies of the great pow-

ers that play a decisive role in the international

sphere. India will be closer to the US for defend-

ing their shared values of democracy, freedom

and pluralism and maintaining its policy of broad-

based engagement with the United States partic-

ularly in view of the terrorist attacks. Similarly,

India will be steadfast on its relation with Russia

based on its historical, friendly ties which will fur-

ther strengthen through economic and military

cooperation. Thus, while in the Cold War, ties with

the superpowers strained Sino-Indian relations;

now balancing India’s relationship with each of

them will determine its relations with China.

Both China and India rely heavily on Russian mili-

tary technology and equipment for moderniza-

tion of their defence systems. There has been evi-

dence that the Chinese military is engaged in a

modernization programme although it is very

paradoxical given the fact that China is keen to

develop community-building exercises with its

neighbours to foster a peaceful regional environ-

ment for overall growth and prosperity. The U.S.

Defence Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld speaking

to Asian defence ministers at an annual security

conference about a Pentagon report on China in



The post-Soviet world system has been

characterized by the opening up of geo-

graphical boundaries of the different

nations in the overall perspective of

economic integration.

2005 highlighted that “China appears to be ex-

panding its missile forces, allowing them to reach

targets in many areas of the world, not just the

Pacific region, while also expanding its missile

capabilities. Since no nation threatens China, one

must wonder: Why this growing investment?”6

Chinese analysts have argued, Beijing's increased

defence spending is in line with the country's eco-

nomic growth and the spending is needed to

modernize a force that is well behind in technolo-

gy, hardware and logistics. The government offi-

cials have stressed that China has no intention of

threatening its neighbours or disturbing regional

stability as part of its “peaceful development”

strategy.7 Its mission, they say, is to develop a

credible deterrent such that Taiwan does not de-

clare independence. As Mr Jaswant Singh, Leader

of the Opposition, Rajya Sabha (India’s Upper

House of Parliament) can be quoted in a dialogue

of the Brookings Leadership Forum of the Brook-

ings Institution, Washington DC, on May 31, 2005

that “the People’s Republic of China is currently

so engaged with the great issues like economic

modernization that confront them as a country,

that there is no free play available to engage in

conflict. It has always been China’s strategic phi-

losophy that if your adversary is humbled without

conflict, then that is a much better way to hum-

ble.”8 Although the Chi-

nese military build-up is

not directly targeted to-

wards India, India needs to

prepare itself to face any

such challenges, in the

view of Chinese military

preparedness. The possibil-

ity of a Sino-Indian arms

race can disrupt the strate-

gic stability of the Asian

security system and jeop-

ardize the achievements in

the economic sphere.

However, the Chinese

Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit

to India in April 2005 had

signalled a significant shift

in relations between the two nations after more

than five decades of mutual distrust and suspi-

cion. The statement signed during this visit em-

phasized that the two countries would promote

diplomatic relations, economic ties and work

jointly to address global challenges and threats.9

China and India have agreed that an all-round

expansion of economic cooperation between the

two countries constitutes an important dimen-

sion of their deeply entrenched relationship and

that they should make joint efforts to increase

bilateral trade volume surpassing the $61.7 billion

achieved in 2010.

Both the leadership in New Delhi and Beijing are

displaying greater caution and pragmatism in

managing the differences and working on com-

mon causes of concerns and interests. Therefore,

there continues to remain the possibilities of both

cooperation and competition between the two

countries and the decision-making processes of

their political regimes will play a critical role in

formulating the future agenda of India-China rela-

tions.

Many seem to believe that the American Presi-

dent Obama´s recent visit to India is the indicator

of the forging of a strong alliance against China.

Both China and India being more than 3,000 years

old as nations and with more than 2,000 years of

recorded contacts between them do not neces-

sarily need to tread that path. Both have respect-

ed and trusted each other from the ancient times.

Chinese society believes in maintaining order,

given Confucianism’s influence and the majority

Hindus of India is influenced by the concept of

“Basudaiva Kutumbakam” (universal brother-

hood). Therefore, it is also imperative to look at

what concepts and notions shape the societal

perceptions in these two countries, as the govern-

ment and its policies are nothing but the reflec-

tion of the society.

It is acceptable, that as two neighbours, India and

China will have their differences and they will give

vent to their dissatisfaction and at times may

pose to threaten each other to appease a small

segment of their nationalist population, it is how-



Wen

Jiabao

ever unlikely that either one of them would enter

into a serious strategic alliance against the other.

As Professor Chellaney continues to re-iterate10

that if relations with China need to improve, India

must have an honest and open debate on its dip-

lomatic and military options. Zeng Jianhua, Direc-

tor of Asian, African and Latin American Affairs at

the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs

(CPIFA) has also emphasized on the role of non-

governmental exchange, culture and media in

deepening mutual understanding; how to deal

with trade frictions; and how to enhance bilateral

ties between China and India.11 In the second ses-

sion of the Carnegie Europe Roundtable Series,

Carnegie’s Ashley J. Tellis explained how Sino-

Indian relations have changed and their bilateral

relations are now defined by a complex balance

of competition and cooperation that Tellis charac-

terized as co-engagement.12 It is understandable

that the coming decades will witness growing

interaction between the two countries on a varie-

ty of issues than ever before. The main concern is

whether those areas, in which interaction is mutu-

ally beneficial, such as increased trade, will remain

unaffected by competition over more conten-

tious issues such as both countries’ quest for en-

ergy security.13 It remains to be seen if China and

India are destined for conflict or cooperation in

the transitional multi-polar world order.

Notes:

* Ananya Chatterjee is a PhD candidate at the

University of Reading.

1. Clarke, Ryan, “Sino-Indian Strategic Rela-

tions: Constrained Competition, Con-

strained Cooperation”, EAI Background

Brief No. 612, East Asian Institute, National

University of Singapore, 1 April 2011, avail-

able online at http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/

BB612.pdf accessed on 10th July 2011

2. Das, R.N., “Fresh Impetus to Sino-Indian

relations”, Institute for Defence Studies and

Analysis, November 1, 2010 retrieved from

http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/

FreshImpetustoSinoIndianRela-

tions_rndas_011110 on 30th November

2010

3. Buzan, Barry, People, States and Fear: An

Agenda for International Security Studies in

the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd ed., Lynne

Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1991,p.209

4. Panda, Snehalata, “Sino-Indian Relations in

a New Perspective”, Strategic Analysis, Jan-

uary-March 2003, 27:1, Institute of Defence

Studies and Analysis, New Delhi

5. Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh & Yuan, Jing-

dong, China and India: Cooperation or Con-

flict?, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder,

2003, p.115

6. Mazzetti, Mark, “Chinese Arms threaten

Asia, Rumsfeld says”, Los Angeles Times,

June 4, 2005 available at http://

www.globalsecurity.org/org/

news/2005/050604-china-asia.htm

7. Ibid

8. Singh Jaswant, “India-U.S. Strategic Part-

nership: Perceptions, Potential and Prob-

lems”, A Brookings Leadership Forum, The

Brookings Institution, Miller Reporting Co.,

Inc., Washington DC, , May 31, 2005

9. Embassy of the Peoples’ Republic of China

in India, “ China, India agree on Strategic

Partnership”, Xinhuanet, Beijing, April 13,

2005 available online at http://

www.chinaembassy.org.in/eng/ssygd/

zygx/t191496.htm

10. Chellaney, Brahma, “Sino-Indian border

tensions: Let the Facts Speak for Them-

selves: Setting Boundaries” DNA, Oct 4,

2009 retrieved from http://

www.dnaindia.com/opinion/main-

article_setting-boundaries_1295064 on 30

November 2010

11. Shen, Li, “Developing Sino-Indian Rela-

tions”, china.org.cn, March 25, 2010, re-

trieved from http://www.china.org.cn/

opinion/2010-03/25/

content_19684860.htm on 30th November

2010

12. Tellis, Ashley J., “India and China’s Rise-

Competition and Cooperation?”, Carnegie



http://www.cpifa.org/en/

http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/BB612.pdf


http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/FreshImpetustoSinoIndianRelations_rndas_011110



http://www.chinaembassy.org.in/eng/ssygd/zygx/t191496.htm



http://www.dnaindia.com/opinion/main-article_setting-boundaries_1295064



http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2010-03/25/content_19684860.htm



Endowment for International Peace, January

16, 2008, available online at http://

www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?

fa=eventDetail&id=1172

13. Price, Gareth, “China and India: Coopera-

tion and Competition”, Asia Programme

Briefing Paper, ASP BP 07/01, Chatham

House, May 2007 available online at http://

www.chathamhouse.org.uk/

files/9174_bpchinaindia0507.pdf

References:

I. Buzan, Barry, People, States and Fear: An

Agenda for International Security Studies in

the Post Cold War Era, 2nd ed., Lynne

Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1991

II. Chellaney, Brahma, “Sino-Indian border

tensions: Let the Facts Speak for Them-

selves: Setting Boundaries” DNA, Oct 4,

2009 retrieved from http://

www.dnaindia.com/opinion/main-

article_setting-boundaries_1295064 on 30

November 2010

III. Clarke, Ryan, “Sino-Indian Strategic Rela-

tions: Constrained Competition, Con-

strained Cooperation”, EAI Background

Brief No. 612, East Asian Institute, National

University of Singapore, 1 April 2011, avail-

able online at

BB612.pdf

IV. Das, R.N., “Fresh Impetus to Sino-Indian

relations”, Institute for Defence Studies and

Analysis, November 1, 2010 retrieved from

http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/

FreshImpetustoSinoIndianRela-

tions_rndas_011110 on 30th November

2010

V. Embassy of the Peoples’ Republic of China

in India, “ China, India agree on Strategic

Partnership”, Xinhuanet, Beijing, April 12,

2005 available online at http://

www.chinaembassy.org.in/eng/ssygd/

zygx/t191496.htm retrieved on 30th No-

vember 2010

VI. Mazzetti, Mark, “Chinese Arms threaten

Asia, Rumsfeld says”, Los Angeles Times,

June 4, 2005 available at http://

www.globalsecurity.org/org/

news/2005/050604-china-asia.htm

VII. National Intelligence Council, “Global

Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the Future

with Nongovernmental Experts”, is availa-

ble at http://www.dni.gov/nic/

PDF_GIF_global/globaltrend2015.pdf ac-

cessed 16th July 2011

VIII. Panda, Snehalata, “Sino-Indian Relations in

a New Perspective”, Strategic Analysis, 27:1,

Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis,

New Delhi, January-March 2003

IX. Price, Gareth, “China and India: Coopera-

tion and Competition”, Asia Programme

Briefing Paper, ASP BP 07/01, Chatham

House, May 2007 available online at http://

www.chathamhouse.org.uk/

files/9174_bpchinaindia0507.pdf

X. Shen, Li, “Developing Sino-Indian Rela-

tions”, china.org.cn, March 25, 2010, re-

trieved from http://www.china.org.cn/

opinion/2010-03/25/

content_19684860.htm on 30th November

2010

XI. Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh & Yuan, Jing-

dong, China and India: Cooperation or Con-

flict?, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder,

2003

XII. Singh Jaswant, “India-U.S. Strategic Part-

nership: Perceptions, Potential and Prob-

lems”, A Brookings Leadership Forum, The

Brookings Institution, Miller Reporting Co.,

Inc., Washington DC, , May 31, 2005

XIII. Tellis, Ashley J., “India and China’s Rise-

Competition and Cooperation?”, Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace, January

16, 2008, available online at http://

www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?

fa=eventDetail&id=1172



http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/9174_bpchinaindia0507.pdf













http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2005/050604-china-asia.htm



http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_global/globaltrend2015.pdf

http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_global/globaltrend2015.pdf




http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2010-03/25/content_19684860.htm%20on%2030th%20November%202010




http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=1172




RUSSIA AND CHINA: RECONCILIATION OR STRATEGIC FRIENDSHIP

CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY LIN REN*

N eed to Re-conciliate: From Broth-

ers to Foes

The postwar period has witnessed an unbreaka-

ble Sino-Soviet brotherhood after their joint vic-

tory in the anti-imperial Japan. The key words that

have described the bilateral relations were: ideo-

logical soul mates, peers and allies. The Soviet

Union and its Marxist-Leninist ideology was the

model of the newly established People's Republic

of China. Yet, the turning point of the bilateral

relations has happened in the late 1950s/1960s.

The former close friends have entered a long-

lasting deteriorating trend of bilateral relations

afterwards. It started with the end of the 1950s

and worsened in the 1960s. The cold war setting

pushed the Soviet to integrate China into the

camp against the U.S. hegemony, which was re-

flected in the attempting project of establishing

long-wave radio stations in China and joint fleet

in 1958. The crack between the two has originat-

ed ever since. After it has been refused, the Soviet

Union has withdrawn the large amount of Soviet

skilled experts from China and tore up 243 bilat-

eral contracts. China has gone through huge loss-

es and difficulties due to the crash of the bilateral

relations. The summit of worsening relations took

place in 1969, when the Soviet armed conflict

provoked Treasure Island. Massed troops also

appeared on the long and disputed territory line.

Why and how does the reconciliation carry out

between the two? What factors work in the case

of Sino-Russian rapprochement? Researches on

reconciliation have devoted to finding out

through what lane former hostile countries could

overcome the “zero-sum game” and arrive at a

healthy bilateral relationship. Substantive recon-

ciliation between former hostilities requires coun-

tries to learn how to live together with each other

not only without emerging conflicts but also get

convinced that the counterpart is not a threat.

The social-psychology serves as an important

foundation of a stable peace, which avoids certain

domestic backlash. Therefore, the former ques-

tions could be transferred to: Have the Sino-

Russian government as well as their societies pre-

pared to a substantive reconciliation?

Government-to-Government Reconciliation in

Complexity

The normalization of relations between the two

parties was initiated since the late 1980s. Deng

Xiaoping showed an open attitude to end the

past and have a new start with the bilateral rela-

tions. The summit meeting was realized in 1989,

which marked the rapprochement. In the 1990s,

Moscow and Beijing have shown an accommo-

dating attitude to each other. The start of recon-

ciliation is nothing about economics or other

ends but the political needs. The changing inter-

national environment and the reassessment of

strategic arrangement could explain the more

and more frequent political interaction: Yeltsin

visited Beijing in 1992 and 1996, while Jiang Ze-

min visited Moscow in 1994, 1995 and 1997.

A series of accommodating policies could be

marked by easing the territorial conflict between

the former antagonistic countries. Moscow decid-

ed to withdraw its troops from Mongolia and ac-

complished the whole process in 1992, and ever

since 1995 Russia reduced 150,000 troops from

the Far East. The two parties have also agreed on

some essential issues in the domestic, regional

and international level: on the Taiwan, Tibet, and

Chechnya issue; to reach a consensus on joint anti

-terrorism; to carry out further cooperate in the

field of trade, economy, and military.

The convergence of interests has served as one of

the main force of conducting reconciliation be-

tween Russia and China, while divergence be-

tween interests could prohibit deepening recon-

ciliation. Two great powers attract great atten-

tions in many fields, such as geopolitics, energy,

and economy. The bilateral relations have been

complex, while the driving force of further recon-

ciliation is therefore not straightforward.

China has been one of the largest energy con-

sumers, while Russia has been one of the largest

producers of oil and gas. A 1,000km oil pipeline

bridged eastern Siberia of Russia and China’s

main oil base-Daqing in 2010. Encouraging coop-

eration in this sphere is expected. Yet, in the ener-

gy sphere, Russia and China’s interest is far more

complicated than matching. Russia wanted to sell

its gas to China, while China demanded the oil

from Russia. The non-complimentary relations in

the energy sphere have kept Sino-Russian eco-

nomic integration at a moderate degree. The two

went through a long and tough negotiation but

without agreement on the price and volume of

the gas. Russia requires amounting amount of

investment, while China needs an affordable

price. But, this process cannot be reversed.

Interest convergence and divergence exists also

in the strategic arrangement of the two countries

in Central Asia. Both China and Russia have a sig-

nificant strategic interest in Central Asia. China

has more than 3,000 km long common border

and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and three

Central Asian countries. Several cross-border eth-

nic groups live along these borders. The emerg-

ing East Turkistan problem bothers China as well.

A stable Central Asia backups the economic de-

velopment in western China. CIS countries were

the Russian former sphere of influence. It has al-

ways been on the priority agenda of Moscow.

At the initiative stage of reconciliation, Russia par-

ticipated in a Commonwealth of Independent

States (CIS) delegation. Moscow also coordinated

China with the CIS countries. With the coordina-

tion of Yelstin, China and CIS countries have

agreed on the force reduction, limitation of re-

sorting to force, and no serious military ac-

tivities within 100km of the common border

in 1996. These accommodating policies

have brought credibility, which contributed

to the further reconciliation.

Nonetheless, the conflicts in the area of re-

sources, trade and energy have brought

instability of Sino-Russian strategic arrange-

ment in this area. Putting the interest under

an institutional framework is necessary,

which could limit conflict and identify com-

CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY LIN REN

CIS Leaders

mon interest. Under this background, China and

Russia initiated the establishment of the Shanghai

Cooperation Organization.

Unprepared Societies ?

Reconciliation is beyond conflict resolution. In

order to bring about a stable peace and eradicate

zero-sum perception, a substantive reconciliation

calls for a fundamental change of the social psy-

chology. As a result, researchers found it is neces-

sary to study reconciliation through socio-

economic aspects.

Are the two societies prepared for a substantive

reconciliation? The serious Pass-control to Chi-

nese tourists mirrors certain tension between the

two societies, especially in the Far East area. Ex-

cept for the positive image of Russia/Russian in

Chinese media, the people from Far East fears

that the Chinese are out to trick Russians through

unfair trade, steal their resources, and expand to

their territory through legal and illegal migration.

Despite the strategic friendship at the govern-

mental level, there has been a domestic backlash

at the Far East district. The immature of reconcilia-

tion is mirrored by the negative perception to-

wards Chinese that held by the Far East Russian.

The Russian society in the Far East has not yet

given up the hostile perception of China’s inten-

tion.

Uncertainty: Questions about Where the Bear

is heading for?

Both China and Russia have gone through

great transactions in the post-Cold War period.

The two have chosen different paths and arrived

at different results. In the term of economic

development, the current history has witnessed

a great success of the “China Model”: the annual

growth rate of GDP has remained around

10%. China gradually gains confidence on the

world stage. On the contrary, Russia has a long

history of ego-searching after the dissolution of

the Soviet Union. The Russian economy has

stagnated comparably, though before the finan-

cial crisis in 2008, the mounting energy price had

contributed to the economic growth. The democ-

ratization was also questioned by the Western

media. Where should the bear heading for in a

dramatically changing world? “Swing back into

Washington’s fold”? Or engage itself more into

the Eastern, especially cooperate more with

China?

The bear has shifted its position on and on. Yelt-

sin put emphasis on the relations with China due

to the geopolitical concern. Yet, after Putin came

to power, the West turned to be overweighing

especially after 911, while amid the “colorful revo-

lution”, Moscow denied its former decision.

In sum, Moscow swayed its attention due to

the strategic arrangement. Beijing feels a psycho-

logical blockade fueled by the shifting position

of Russia. As a result, the substantive reconcilia-

tion surpasses the strategic friendship. The

bear and the dragon have transcended the

former hostility to a certain degree, but are still

distant from arriving at a substantive reconcilia-

tion.

Note:

* Lin Ren is a PhD candidate of Center for Global

Politics, Free University Berlin.

The draft of this article is based on my presenta-

tions, the feedback contributed by the other

participates and the further discussion at the

11th annual Aleksanteri Conference: “The Dragon

and the Bear: Strategic Choices of China and

Russia”.

CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY LIN REN


Except for the positive image of Russia/

Russian in Chinese media, the people from

Far East fears that the Chinese are out to

trick Russians through unfair trade, steal

their resources, and expand to their territo-

ry through legal and illegal migration.

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ASIA'S NEW GREAT GAME? THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY TILMAN PRADT*

T he power struggle between the Brit-

ish Empire and Russian Empire for

influence in Central Asia during the

19th century was afterwards coined

as the Great Game. In this strategic rivalry, Af-

ghanistan played a key role because the British

feared that the Russians would use Afghanistan as

a base for forthcoming invasions into the then

British colony India. The recent statements of US

and Asian policy-makers might suggest that a

new Great Game is underway, this time in the ar-

ea of the South China Sea.

The South China Sea (SCS) is the semi-enclosed

sea from the south of China to the north of Indo-

nesia and from the east of Malaysia to the west of

the Philippines. The territorial demarcations are

disputed for decades as are the questions of sov-

ereignty over the islands and islets which are lo-

cated within the SCS. Several claimants such as

Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, the Philippines, and

China currently possess islets in the SCS and

question each other’s rights to do so. This situa-

tion has only marginally changed during the last

twenty years, upgrading of military outposts on

the islets being the notorious exception.

There are different reasons for the importance of

these areas in the SCS, substantial fish stocks, ex-

isting and assumed energy resources (e.g., oil and

gas resources) and highly frequented sea lanes

are the main causes for interest.

The various fish stocks in the SCS build the eco-

nomic basis for millions of fishermen in the littoral

states, furthermore, the fish catch plays a pivotal

part in the nutrition of the people living in this

area. The demarcation of waters and the posses-

sion islets are important means to claim fishing

rights in the area.

In the SCS are already various offshore oil extract-

ing enterprises taking place, most of them near

the coasts of China, Vietnam, and Malaysia. In the

disputed area of the Spratly Islands are further oil

reserves expected, thus the littoral states try to

ensure their claims to participate in the subse-

quent exploitation of the oil fields.1

Last but not least, the SCS is one of the busiest

routes of global merchant ships, roughly half of

the annual trade shipping is passing through the

bottleneck at the entrance to the SCS, the Strait of

CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY TILMAN PRADT

49

Malacca. These sea lanes possess further signifi-

cance since the majority of Chinese and Japanese

imported oil is transported via the SCS. An inter-

ruption of these pivotal bloodlines would have

significant consequences for the world's second

and third biggest economy, respectively. But

since the majority of European-Asian trade is

shipped through these waters, not only the litto-

ral states have an interest in these busy sea lanes.2

Combined, the economic and strategic im-

portance of the SCS makes it a hotspot of geopol-

itics. Its mixture of energy resources and strategic

sea lanes has a high potential for conflict but sur-

prisingly, the region and its conflicts waned from

the headlines of international newspapers and

the mindfulness of geopolitical strategists. Over

the last ten years, the several efforts to fight ter-

rorism in the Middle East and Central Asia gave

China free rein to arrange the relations to its

south-eastern neighbours.

But since 2010, the conflict over sovereignty

rights and territorial waters in the SCS is gaining

new attention. When Secretary of State Hillary

Clinton stated that the free passage through the

sea lanes of the SCS was an US national interest,

she provoked harsh reactions from Beijing.3

The Chinese view the SCS as their territorial wa-

ters and try to prevent any interference of exter-

nal actors. They see it as a litmus test for Sino-

American relations whether the Americans inter-

fere in these disputes or accept Chinese regional

leadership. The recent visit of President Barack

Obama at the 2011 meeting of the East Asia Sum-

mit (EAS), the first time that America attended the

Summit, further bewildered the Chinese policy-

makers. President Obama used the opportunity

to suggest that America might play a mediatory

role in the dispute over the contested areas and

that the right to free passage was in the interest

of all states.4

These statements probably worried Chinese strat-

egists who expected Beijing on the right track to

gain influence on the region in general and on

the SCS in particular. In the afterwards of the ter-

rorist attack of 9/11, American foreign policy

was focused on the war on terror. This max-

im included a shift of attention towards the

source of Islamist terror in Afghanistan and

adjacent territories. The beginning of the

Second Gulf War against Saddam Hussein's

Iraq in 2003 attracted further American at-

tention and forces, thus the Chinese felt

encouraged to expand their participation

and influence in the Southeast Asian region.

During the past ten years, China participat-

ed in various organisations in the region,

ranging from political (ASEAN, EAS) over

security related (ARF) to economic organisa-

tions (APEC). In view of the lingering territo-

rial disputes in the SCS, China pursued a

policy of bilateral negotiations with other

claimants. Overall, Beijing early promulgat-

ed the idea of shifting the sovereignty ques-

tion for the time being and to jointly devel-

op the energy resources of the region. The

intentions behind this proposal were doubt-

ed and the conducted Joint Seismic Under-

taking during 2005-2008 between Vietnam, Chi-

na, and the Philippines seems to yield a point to

its critics.5

China's growing assertiveness in the region is

causing apprehensions among its smaller neigh-

bours but also beyond the Southeast Asian re-

gion. The announcement of President Obama to

deploy American forces to the Australian base

Darwin is only the latest move of security devel-

opments in the region.

The smaller states of ASEAN are upgrading their

armies, especially their navies and air forces for

several years now, according to the Stockholm

International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the

region has become a hot spot of global arms pur-

chases.6

But besides the US, even India might feel tem-

pered to engage in the area. The Indian oil com-

pany ONGC Videsh Limited is developing Viet-

namese oil fields, exploration of the Lan Tay field

started in 2003. Now, first reflections are under-

way whether the Indian navy should be prepared

to protect Indian assets in the SCS.7

In an article for the 2011 November issue of the

Foreign Policy, Secretary of State Clinton declared

the beginning of America's Pacific Century. In a

preannouncement of President Obama’s attend-

ance at the East Asia Summit she wrote: “Our fo-

cus on developing a more results-oriented agen-

da has been instrumental in efforts to address

disputes in the South China Sea.”8

This surely incurred Beijing’s displeasure.

The following statements of President Obama at

his Asia tour in November 2011 and the subse-

quent initiation of a military base in Darwin fur-

ther illustrate the new American dedication to

developments in the Southeast Asian region. The

strategic importance and especially the sea lanes

of the region are a vital interest of American for-

eign policy and it is to be seen how Beijing will

react on this interference in its perceived regional

affairs. In a response to newly US interest in the

region, China’s Premier Wen Jiabao stated that

the disputes should be resolved by “relevant sov-

ereign states” and that “external forces should not

use any excuse to interfere”.9

Hence, are we attending the beginning of a new

round of The Great Game in Asia, this time in the

location of the SCS? As this text briefly surveyed,

there are various interests at stake and several big

and great powers involved, arguably too many for

such a small area (especially, when concentrating

on the bottleneck of the SCS, the Strait of Malac-

ca). But by analyzing the motivations behind the

big players’ engagement (i.e., the United States,

China, and India) there is reason to believe that a

potentially tragic zero-sum Great Game is still

avoidable.

First, the US has not a real interest in permanently

(and substantially) upgrading its military presence

in the region. Given the still severing US budget

situation and the persistent security situation in

the Middle East and Central Asia, policy-makers in

Washington are trying to reduce its forces de-

ployed to foreign areas not to enlarge them by

opening up a new theatre. Plus, the US is mainly

interested in the security of the sea lanes and its

guaranteed free passage, therefore President

Obama’s push on the littoral states to solve their

SCS disputes. The US is not interested in confront-

ing China directly but to put pressure on Beijing

to be more conciliatory in case of the SCS dis-

putes. The deployment of US Marines to Darwin is

merely presenting the stick not using it (imagine



...the US is mainly interested in the

security of the sea lanes and its

guaranteed free passage, therefore

President Obama’s push on the

littoral states to solve their SCS

disputes.



Beijing’s reactions to the US establishing a mili-

tary base in Vietnam).

Beijing, on the other hand, will now take pains

to somehow ease the situation in the SCS and

to regain trust among its neighbours of the

ASEAN. China has to accept that the US will now

sit at the table of future rounds of territorial

discussions and China no longer can use its

relative power in bilateral negotiations with small

ASEAN states. This is probably hard to swallow

for Chinese policy-makers given their repeatedly

stated premise that the SCS disputes shall be

solely discussed among the regional states con-

cerned. But in this changed situation, the contin-

ued refusal to accept multilateral discussions will

provoke further military build-up and confronta-

tion in the SCS.

Finally, India got only involved because of

perceived Chinese assertiveness in the Indian

Ocean. India’s military build-up and assumed

ambitions towards the SCS is a response to Chi-

na’s actions in what India perceives as its territori-

al waters. A reciprocal withdrawal will avoid fu-

ture naval confrontations among the two Asian

heavyweights.

In the past, China avoided to confront the US

directly in upcoming controversies. This time,

the conflict is located too close and strategically

too important for Beijing to be simply ignored.

The South China Sea will be the theatre of future

trial of strength between the US and China,

a struggle for diplomatic influence and economic

cooperation in the first act. The US has played its

performance well so far, it remains to be seen

what China chooses as an adequate answer. A

new Great Game in the South China Sea is still

avoidable but it needs commitment not power

play.

Notes:

* Tilman Pradt is a PhD candidate at the Freie

Universität of Berlin.

1. (Emmers, 2010)

2. (Erickson, 2009)

3. (Cerojano, 2010)

4. (Grammaticas, 2011)

5. (Lim, 2010) and

6. SIPRI (2010): New SIPRI data on internation-

al arms transfers reflect arms race concerns,

online: http://www.sipri.org/media/

pressreleases/2010/100315armstransfers

(accessed on December 10, 2011)

7. (Gupta, 2011)

8. (Clinton, 2011)

9. (BBC, 2011)

References

I. BBC. (2011, November 18). Wen warns US

on South China Sea dispute.

II. Cerojano, T. (2010, September 19). Obama,

ASEAN to call for peaceful end to sea spats.

The Guardian.

III. Clinton, H. (2011). America's Pacific Centu-

ry. Foreign Policy.

IV. Emmers, R. (2010). Geopolitics and Maritime

Territorial Disputes in East Asia. London +

New York: Routledge.

V. Erickson, A. S. (2009). Maritime Security

Cooperation in the South China Sea

Region. In S. Wu & K. Zou (Eds.),

Maritime Security in the South China

Sea - Regional Implications and International

Cooperation (pp. 51-80). Farnham:

Ashgate.

VI. Grammaticas, D. (2011, November 18).

Obama stirs up China's sea of troubles. BBC

News.

VII. Gupta, R. (2011, October 23). South China

Sea Conflict? No Way. The Diplomat.

VIII. Lim, T.-W. (2010). Oil and gas in China: the

new energy superpower's relations with its

region. Singapore: World Scientific Publish-

ing.


CHINA’S AID PROGRAM IN AFRICA

A PRIMER

CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY SAM BYFIELD*

O ver the past decade China has

emerged as a major donor of inter-

national aid. China’s aid program

has effectively been regarded as a

state secret, and accordingly analysis of China’s

aid program has often lacked in nuance and tend-

ed towards hyperbole. This article will provide an

overview of the nature and purposes of China’s

aid program, and how it contributes to China’s

own foreign policy and domestic economic devel-

opment. It concludes that cooperation between

other major aid donors and China is essential to

break down mistrust and increase the effective-

ness of global efforts to reduce poverty.

The first White Paper on China’s aid program was

released in 2011. The White Paper noted that

from 2004-2009 China’s aid program increased by

roughly 30 percent each year. In 2009 China pro-

vided over 250 billion yuan (around $US 40 bil-

lion) in aid, consisting of approximately 41% in

grants, 30% in interest free loans, and 29% in the

form of concessional loans. The White Paper

notes that China’s aid focuses on agriculture, eco-

nomic infrastructure, public facilities, education,

health care, and, increasingly, climate change.

While China itself is still a developing country, this

level of expenditure establishes it as a major glob-

al aid donor.

In a similar, though perhaps more overt way to

the aid programs of other countries, China’s aid

program is based on both China and the recipient

country benefiting (particularly economically)

and is closely tied into China’s broader foreign

policy aims. China’s aid has served as a tool to

dissuade governments from providing diplomatic

recognition to Taiwan, discourage governments

from supporting Japan for a seat on the UN Secu-

rity Council, enhancing its global diplomatic pres-

ence and creating warmer relations with develop-

ing countries to garner support for China’s poli-

CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY SAM BYFIELD


cies in international fora. Some commentators

have noted that China’s aid program also serves

its own development needs, facilitating the ex-

port of raw materials to China, and requiring that

50% of project materials and services are sourced

within China. This contrasts with the aid programs

of the United States, United Kingdom, Australia

and most other major aid donors, which are gen-

erally removed from their own economic devel-

opment aims. Many Chinese funded public works

– like stadiums, bridges or dams — tend to be

highly visible and offer tangible benefits; and

such activities are often announced at bilateral

summit meetings, acting as a powerful symbol of

friendship between China and other countries.

Accordingly, Chinese aid can be seen not only as

serving ‘hard’ diplomatic and security interests,

but also as an example of Joseph Nye’s notion of

‘soft power’.

China’s aid to Africa, which has increased sub-

stantially over the past few years, illustrates many

of these points. The White Paper indicated that

for the 2009 fiscal year, nearly half (46.7 per cent)

of Chinese aid was committed to Africa. Chinese

aid in Africa can be viewed as contributing to the

diplomatic objective of forging friendships with

‘non-aligned’ nations and competing with Taiwan

for diplomatic recognition. On this point China

has been successful, with only four countries in

sub-Saharan Africa still maintaining official rela-

tions with Taiwan.1 By the same token, however,

China is hardly unique in linking international

development assistance to broader foreign policy

objectives.

China’s aid program in Africa is also widely seen

as focusing on its objective of securing oil, miner-

als and broader trade opportunities for its

growing economy. An article in the Economist

noted that ‘China has become the continent’s

most important trading partner after America;

trade between Africa and China has surged

from just over $6.5 billion in 1999 to $107 billion

in 2008.’2 African oil reportedly accounts for

80 percent of China’s trade in the region and

about one third of its oil imports. China’s aid

projects are often backed by the natural

resources of recipient countries. In war torn Ango-

la, for instance, reconstruction was helped by

oil-backed loans from Beijing, under which

Chinese companies have built roads, railways,

hospitals, schools and water systems. Nigeria

took out two similar loans to finance projects

that use gas to generate electricity. As a 2010

article in Foreign Affairs noted, in poor, oil-

rich countries, which are often cursed by

their mineral wealth, ‘resource-backed infrastruc-

ture loans can act as an ‘agency of restraint’

and ensure that at least some of these countries’

natural resource wealth is spent on development

investments.’3 This leveraging of natural

resources in Africa closely resembles the relation-

ship between Japan and China in the 1970s

and 1980s, where China leveraged its natural

resources to receive loans and access to

much-needed infrastructure and modern technol-

ogy.

Joseph

Nye

Critics – particularly in Western media – have

highlighted a number of perceived weaknesses of

China’s approach to aid in Africa. Chinese aid is

often made available quickly and easily, without

the social, political and environmental safeguards

and bureaucratic procedures that major OECD

donors and multilateral financial institutions typi-

cally impose. A recent Human Rights Watch re-

port on Chinese-run copper mines in Zambia il-

lustrates these concerns, finding that Chinese-run

companies regularly flout labor laws and regula-

tions, and have consistently poor health and safe-

ty standards. This is a point the White Paper rec-

ognises:

‘China still has a long way to go in provid-

ing foreign aid. The Chinese Government

will make efforts to optimize the country’s

foreign aid structure, improve the quality

of foreign aid, further increase countries’

capacity in independent development,

and improve the pertinence and effective-

ness of foreign aid.’

China’s relative newness in the business of giving

aid partly explains some of these limitations, as

does China’s quite small aid bureaucracy – there

are only around 70 professionals in the Ministry of

Commerce’s Department of Aid to Foreign Coun-

tries, and 100 in China Eximbank’s Concessional

Loan Department.4 It should be remembered that

such criticisms – about environmental sustainabil-

ity, or human rights, for instance – are in essence

the same criticisms made about China’s domestic

development. As one Economist article notes,

‘Chinese expatriates in Africa come from a rough-

and-tumble, anything-goes business culture that

cares little about rules and regulations. Local sen-

sitivities are routinely ignored at home, and so

abroad.’5 In contemplating the Human Rights

Watch report on Zambia, it should be remem-

bered that China’s own mines are considered to

be the most dangerous in the world – it’s not so

much a case of double standards, but of an over-

all lack of capacity. It’s realistic to expect that as

China’s own governance and project manage-

ment capacity improves, so too will its approach

to the delivery of aid.

To an extent, this is already happening. Chinese

banks have recently begun to require more elab-

orate environmental impact appraisals for loans,

which are often contracted out to European firms.

Increasingly as well, Chinese aid projects in Africa

are staffed primarily by Africans, not Chinese.

There are also areas in which China is seen to be

ahead of more established donors. For instance,

the terms of Chinese loans are often better than

those deals from Western companies. Congolese

President Joseph Kabila has pointed out that a $3

billion joint mining venture in the DRC provides

his government with a 32 percent share, com-

pared with the 7 to 25 percent share that is typi-

cal of mining deals with other companies.6

The ability of developing countries to absorb the

increases in Chinese aid has been questioned,

including gin Africa. This is an issue commonly

discussed in international development, though

there appears to have been more public criticism

of China’s aid program in this area. There

have been reports in Africa of Chinese infrastruc-

ture projects falling apart or being washed

away, of classrooms with no students to fill them,

and health clinics with no supplies. The level of

Chinese aid as a proportion of GDP, and therefore

the ability of countries to service their loans,

has also been questioned. This concern has also

been raised in the Pacific. In 2009, China’s loans

to Tonga were equivalent to 32 percent of

GDP, while in Samoa and Cook Islands the figure

was 16 percent.7 While the issue of new debt



...the terms of Chinese loans are often bet-

ter than those deals from Western compa-

nies. Congolese President Joseph Kabila

has pointed out that a $3 billion joint min-

ing venture in the DRC provides his govern-

ment with a 32 percent share, compared

with the 7 to 25 percent share that is typi-

cal of mining deals with other companies.


burden is a real one, another way of looking at

this issue is that as Chad’s Finance and Budget

Minister has noted, ‘We borrow for our industriali-

zation projects and the debt will be repaid from

their profits.’8

In international development circles ‘partnership’

is an important buzzword. It even has its own

Millennium Development Goal (MDG 8). As

the role and influence of emerging aid donors

like China and Brazil continues to grow, and

economic problems continue to impact the

West, placing pressure on the aid budgets of

OECD countries, closer engagement between

China and other donors will become increasingly

imperative. Such cooperation is a vital element of

enhancing the effectiveness of aid programs, not

only in terms of what can be learnt through the

exchanges but also as a way of reducing duplica-

tion and increasing complementarities – which,

after all, are fundamental to delivering effective

aid.

Engaging China in regional development dia-

logues and structures is one way of enhancing

cooperation. For instance, China still isn’t a mem-

ber of the Cairns Compact, which was agreed to

in 2009 by leaders in the Pacific as a means of

enhancing development cooperation and effec-

tiveness. Signing the Cairns Compact would

be valuable in terms of enhancing cooperation

with China, and would also have an important

symbolic effect in terms of some of the negative

perceptions around China’s aid program. In

Africa, engaging China in discussions around

cohesive, long term strategies for economic

growth will enhance the effectiveness of all do-

nors.

Increased transparency around China’s aid

program will also contribute to cooperation and

reduced mistrust. It should be remembered,

however, that China is still home to the world’s

second largest population of people living on

less than $1.25 per day, and that desire for

greater aid program transparency needs to

be balanced against what is domestically palata-

ble.

Notes:

* Sam Byfield works as a policy adviser in the in-

ternational development sector and was a dele-

gate at the inaugural Australia China Youth Dia-

logue in 2010.

1. Congressional Research Service, China’s

Foreign Aid Activities in Africa, Latin America,

and Southeast Asia, 2009, p9.

2. ‘Chinese Aid to Africa: hedging its bets and

its gold’, Economist 2 July 2009.

3. Deborah Brautigam, ‘Africa’s Eastern Prom-

ise’, Foreign Affairs, January 2010, p2.

4. Deborah Brautigam, China in Africa: What

Can Western Donors Learn? Norwegian In-

vestment Fund for Developing Countries,

August 2011, p10.

5. ‘The Chinese in Africa’, Economist

20 April 2011.

6. Deborah Brautigam, ‘Africa’s East-

ern Promise’, 2.

7. Mary Fifita and Fergus Hanson,

China in the Pacific: the new banker in

town’,. The Lowy Institute for Interna-

tional Policy, April 2011, 8.

8. IMF, Video of Press Briefing, Afri-

can Ministers, World Bank/IMF Spring

Meetings, 16 April 2011, accessed 25

November 2011- http://www.imf.org/

external/spring/2011/mmedia/

Christian

Georges

Diguimbaye

Chad’s

Finance and

Budget

Minister

J ean-Paul Gagnon: What do you see as

Hong Kong's democracy future?

Professor Sonny Lo: HK's democratic

future depends on two main factors: China's inter-

nal democratic changes and Hong Kong's push

for democratization. At the moment, the push for

internal democratization in Hong Kong has pitted

the pan-democratic forces against the govern-

ment of the People's Republic of China (PRC). On

the other hand, Beijing as the central government

is reluctant to see a Western-style democratic

Hong Kong which will be vulnerable to Western

influences and become a means through which

foreign powers like the United States seek to de-

mocratize the mainland. As such, democratization

in Hong Kong is now touching upon the bottom

line of the central government in Beijing, which

remains a largely paternalistic regime although it

has become more politically liberalized and plu-

ralistic than ever before. It is very likely that Hong

Kong's democratic changes will proceed gradual-

ly and at a snail pace, if we use the yardstick of

measurement from the viewpoint of Western-

style democracies where there are rotations of

parties in power and competitive struggle among

political leaders for people's votes. Yet, Hong

Kong remains the most politically pluralistic socie-

ty in the PRC as many of its citizens are not only

pro-democracy in terms of supporting the direct

elections of both the Chief Executive and the en-

tire Legislative Council, but also assertive in mak-

ing their demands known and criticisms heard.

Hong Kong also enjoys a relatively high degree of

civil liberties, the rule of law and by and large

clean government under the supervision of a re-

spectable anti-corruption agency. Hence, Hong

Kong is having a large degree of horizontal ac-

countability, although not vertical accountability

in terms of competitive struggle among political


AN INTERVIEW WITH PROFESSOR SONNY LO**:

POLITICAL REFLECTIONS IN HONG KONG

ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS? | BY DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON*

leaders for people's votes, not to mention the

possibility of rotation of party in power. However,

it must be said that democratization in Hong

Kong, and the corresponding resistance from Bei-

jing, illustrate a clash of two political cultures and

civilizations, the more Western civilization held by

many Hong Kong people and the more Chinese

civilization in the psyche of the PRC leaders. As

long as the PRC is ruled by a Leninist-style Chi-

nese Communist Party, democratic changes in

Hong Kong are bound to be seen as politically

dangerous, socially unstable, economically detri-

mental to the interests of the co-opted pro-

Beijing business class, and territorially entailing

cross-border impacts on mainland China.

JPG: Is organized crime a significant obstacle to

realizing these democratic goals in HK?

SL: Organized crime does not constitute any ob-

stacle to the realization of democratic goals in

Hong Kong. Arguably, some elements of the or-

ganized crime even participated in the rescue

operations of the student democrats in mainland

China shortly after the Tiananmen incident on

June 4, 1989. Hence. organized crime in Hong

Kong has been displaying multiple political orien-

tations. On the one hand, it has remained a patri-

otic force rescuing mainland student democrats

from a humanitarian perspective. On the other

hand, it has remained an economic interest group

trying to enrich its own profits by both legal and

illegal means. The leaders of organized crime

groups in Hong Kong are also the targets of sup-

pression and co-optation by the PRC authorities.

Politically, organized crime has not yet evolved

into a political interest group keen to topple any

regime in power, in both the mainland and Hong

Kong, unlike the triads in the Qing dynasty as they

were upholding the banner of overthrowing the

Qing dynasty and restoring the Ming dynasty. The

PRC government sees organized crime as harmful

to its national security interests, and therefore its

elements have to be controlled and suppressed.

Any attempt by organized crime groups to turn

into political interest groups is disallowed, albeit

in practice they are economic interest groups

thriving in the midst of a whole range of legiti-

mate and illegitimate businesses.

JPG: Do you think mainland China will impede

these democracy developments?

SL: In the long run, Mainland China will democra-

tize but it will change in its own way at its own

pace without accepting the pressures from out-

side. China historically has been affected by for-

eign pressures, especially foreign humiliation dur-

ing the Qing dynasty. Therefore, democratic mod-

els, if experimented in mainland China, will be

basically indigenous without the need to borrow

excessively from the West, an attempt that would

counter the national pride of the Chinese people.

Although Taiwan's political transformations in the

1980s, 1990s and 2000s have demonstrated that a

Chinese society can democratize along the West-

ern model, mainland China is likely to reject this

Western-style democracy. In the first place, the

PRC harbors deep suspicions of foreign powers,

especially the United States which appear to con-

tain the PRC regime and foster the so-called

peaceful evolution. Moreover, the PRC version of

democratization entails the strengthening of the

work of the anticorruption agency, the consolida-

ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS? | BY DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON


61

tion of the audit office to check the expendi-

ture and maladministration of government agen-

cies, the emphasis on media scrutiny of the gov-

ernment in a politically loyal manner, the im-

provement in the oversight of the legislature on

the government, and the gradual consolidation of

village elections to enhance cadre and party ac-

countability at the grassroots level. These Chinese

-style characteristics will persist and it is unlikely

that the Western-style democracy would sudden-

ly emerge, even though crises, such as economic

and social crises, may suddenly propel China for-

ward along the path of a more democratic re-

gime.

JPG: Are there any paradoxes of democracy in

Hong Kong that you would like to address?

SL: Hong Kong's democratic experiments are

unique in the world. On the one hand, it has a

strong middle class where Western-educated and

locally educated citizens are increasingly embrac-

ing the Western-style democracy and values. But

on the other hand, the strong capitalist class

whose interests have been so protected by both

the colonial regime and the post-1997 govern-

ment as well as Beijing is staunchly anti-

democratic in the Western sense. Given the fact

that Beijing has to rely on the influence and rule

of the capitalists in order to maintain the capital-

ist lifestyle of Hong Kong and its related econom-

ic prosperity, the Hong Kong city-state remains

capitalistic and highly exploitative in terms of the

protection of the interests of the poor and the

needy, especially the proletariat and the lumpen

proletariat. The tax system, housing policies and

land policies are highly biased in favour of the

strong capitalist class, which however is politically

inactive and spoiled to a large extent. Yet, the

politically active citizenry and groups involve the

pro-democratic and pro-Beijing groups. The re-

sult is that Hong Kong is a deeply political divided

society where the capitalist class is politically

anachronistic and anti-democratic, where the

liberal segment of the middle class is highly pro-

democratic and pro-Western, where the pro-

Beijing local forces are tasked by Beijing to check

the power and influence of the liberal segment of

the middle class, and where the government is a

politically conservative one allying with

the capitalist class, Beijing and the pro-

Beijing forces. Yet, as class contradictions are in-

tensifying in Hong Kong where the productive

forces are growing quickly due to the develop-

ment of capitalism, sooner or later such contra-

dictions will not only split the pro-government

and pro-Beijing camp and forces, but also per-

haps propel democratic changes in Hong Kong

further. Class politics and contradictions are argu-

ably most prominent in this vibrant Chinese city,

which is like a political sandwich between a very

Chinese central government in Beijing and an

increasingly pro-Western and politically asser-

tive citizenry in Hong Kong.

Notes:

* Dr. Jean-Paul Gagnon is a social and political the-

orist with a Ph.D. in political science. He completed

his doctorate at the Queensland University of Tech-

nology under the aegis of Australia’s prestigious En-

deavour Award.

** Professor Sonny Lo is the Associate Dean

(Research & Postgraduate Studies) of Faculty of Arts

and Sciences and Head and Professor at the Depart-

ment of Social Sciences at the Hong Kong Institute of

Education. Before joining HKIEd, he had worked at

the University of Waterloo in Canada, The University

of Hong Kong, The Hong Kong University of Science

and Technology, Murdoch University, Lingnan Col-

lege (now Lingnan University), and the University of

East Asia (Macau).

ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS? | BY DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON


...Hong Kong is a deeply political divided socie-

ty where the capitalist class is politically

anachronistic and anti-democratic, where the

liberal segment of the middle class is highly

pro-democratic and pro-Western, where the pro

-Beijing local forces are tasked by Beijing to

check the power and influence of the liberal

segment of the middle class, and where the

government is a politically conservative one

allying with the capitalist class, Beijing and the

pro-Beijing forces.

CESRAN Papers

CESRAN Papers | No: 6 | November 2011 FREE CORSICA! A Study of Contemporary Chinese Nationalism By James Pearson CESRAN Papers | No: 5 | July 2011 COMPETITIVE REGULATION: Stepping Outside the Public /Private Policy Debate By Dr. Jean-Paul Gagnon CESRAN Papers | No: 4 | May 2011 Turkey: The Elephant in the Room of Europe By Hüseyin Selçuk Dönmez CESRAN Papers | No: 3 | April 2011 "Whither Neoliberalism? Latin American Politics in the Twenty-first Century" By Jewellord (Jojo) Nem Singh CESRAN Papers | No: 2 | March 2011 "Civil-Military Relations in Marcos' Philippines" By Richard Lim CESRAN Papers | No: 1 | March 2011 "The Paradox of Turkish Civil Military Relations" By Richard Lim

http://cesran.org/dergi.php?id=47









I ntroduction

Taiwan is a primary flashpoint in East Asia. Its ex-

plosiveness results from China’s ongoing insist-

ence – and Taiwan’s refusal – that Taipei fall under

Beijing’s auspices. It’s a periodic dispute which

has lasted for over 60 years. China has not openly

attempted to force Taiwan to reunify, yet there

have been several times when it has initiated bor-

derline provocations. Both sides are starting to

reconcile their differences albeit slowly and with

little progress. The key to resolving the dispute

will probably occur within one-to-two genera-

tions, plus via a currently unthoughtof solution.

The article is divided into several sections. First, it

will briefly analyze the issue; Second, the piece

will examine the current state of affairs between

Taiwan and China. And finally, the article will ex-

plore the difficulties of finding an answer to the

reunification controversy.

Analysis

The Taiwan-China Relationship is one of the most

paradoxical affiliations in Pacific Rim affairs. Both

countries have strong economic, yet strained po-

litical ties as a result of the reunification issue.

The controversy could disappear overnight, if

Beijing recognized Taipei’s status as an independ-

ent country; acknowledging Taiwan’s stature

would require China to abandon a primary

foreign policy objective. Chinese policymakers

and independent analysts have suggested a solu-

tion is for Taiwan to adopt Hong Kong and/or

Macao type model. The proposition’s difficulty is

both entities and Taiwan share dissimilar back-

grounds. Taipei would lose its de facto political

and economic independence, if it agreed to simi-

lar conditions. The other solution is for China to

force Taiwan to accept Beijing’s jurisdiction. The

scenario will probably not occur considering the

United States is obligated by American to law to

militarily intervene if China attacks Taiwan (an

issue for another article). Resolving the contro-


THE CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONSHIP: CURRENT STATUS AND POTENTIAL DIRECTIONS

ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS? | BY MATTHEW KENNEDY*

versy probably won’t occur within the current

generation’s timeframe, since leaders on both

sides of the Taiwan Strait are from or are distantly

linked from the era when the dispute started.

The most likely scenario is the reunification

issue will remain unresolved for years to come –

and that a discounted and/or unconsidered solu-

tion will present itself when a new generation

of leaders occupies Beijing and Taiwan’s political

reins.

Background:

Historical roots, China’s Perspective, and Taiwan’s

Viewpoint

The Taiwan conflicts’ origins are historical and

political in nature. Its roots are traceable to

the 1940s, while the current difficulties are linked

to differences between how Beijing and Taipei

interpret a settlement of the reunification prob-

lem.

The dispute started in 1949. Throughout the

1930s forces loyal to the Chinese Communist Par-

ty and General Chaing Kai-Shek clashed in a

civil war. Both sides set aside their differences

and coordinated their efforts between 1937

and 1945 against the Japanese when Tokyo

invaded and occupied a significant part of the

country. Their dispute reemerged after Japan’s

defeat. The civil war lasted for another four years

until 1949 when Chaing Kai-Shek fled to Taiwan

after his forces were defeated by the CCP. A key

objective of the Chinese authorities has been the

reunification of Taiwan under Beijing’s auspices

since.

China’s policy towards Taiwan is defined in the

Chinese Constitution’s Preamble and the 2005

Anti-Secessionist Law. The Constitution’s Pream-

ble states,

“Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the

People's Republic of China. It is the inviola-

ble duty of all Chinese people, including

our compatriots in Taiwan, to accomplish

the great task of reunifying the mother-

land..”1

Beijing’s 2005 Anti-Secessionist Law further

explains China’s policies towards Taiwan. Article 2

notes that there is only “One China” and Taiwan

is a part of it. Article 5 contends Beijing will seek

reunification with Taipei under peaceful means.

Article 6 details issues China will collaborate

with Taiwan over to encourage peace and stabil-

ity in the Taiwan Straits. These subjects

range from economic activities, such as trade,

to combating crime and encouraging cultural

exchanges between both entities. Article 7

examines the steps Chinese authorities are willing

to initiate with Taiwan on the reunification

matter. These include ending hostilities, estab-

lishing procedures for the development of

cross strait relations plus a peaceful reunification,

ascertaining the political status of Taiwan’s

authorities within the Chinese government

hierarchy, determining Taipei’s international sta-

tus within Beijing’s strategic apparatus, and relat-

ed issues relevant to Taiwan’s status within China.

And finally Article 8 endows Chinese authorities

with the latitude of utilizing military force against

ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS? | BY MATTHEW KENNEDY


Ma Ying-jeou

Taiwan, if Taipei’s officially declares independ-

ence from Beijing.2

Taiwan’s policy towards China was spelled out in

a June 2008 interview President Ma Ying-jeou

furnished to the New York Times. Ma called for an

enhancement of economic ties between the PRC

and Taiwan to include a broader access to China’s

markets for Taiwan’s businessmen, plus direct air

flights between Taiwan and China among many

proposals. He said Taiwan is willing to negotiate

its political status with China but only when Bei-

jing removed its short-and-medium range mis-

siles targeting Taipei.3 He officially opposes reuni-

fication4, yet the Taiwan leader is willing to con-

sider indirect discussions on the matter. Ma noted

during the 2009 Presidential Campaign that he

accepts the non-documented 1992 understand-

ing between Beijing and Taipei leaders of the

“One China” concept. What neither side resolved

is what officially does the “One-China” idea mean?

Neither side has revisited the issue since the 1992

meeting.5

The Reunification Issue:

Complexities, the Hong Kong-Macao Solution, and

Realities

The Chinese-Taiwan relationship is divided into

economic and reunification related affairs. The

direction Beijing and Taipei have made on the

issues is paradoxical in nature. Both sides have

made notable progress in the financial realm; the

political issue remains deadlocked, especially re-

garding the reunification subject.

Beijing-Taipei relations were almost non-existent

from 1949 to the early 21st century. A thaw in

the rapport started in 2004, when Taiwan elected

a president, Chen Shui-bian, who was receptive

to closer relations, unlike his predecessors. The

changed attitude led to a meeting between

China's President Hu Jin Tao and the chairman of

Taiwan's leading political party in April 2005.

Both sides increased their interactions, conse-

quently, and signed several economic

agreements shortly thereafter. Their efforts were

complimented by additional accords signed

since 2008. The agreements allowed for direct

flights, maritime and mail links, and an augmenta-

tion of trade and investment opportunities

between China and Taiwan.6 Both countries

signed a significant accord called the Economic

Co-operation Framework Agreement (ECFA)

in June 2010. It seeks to reduce tariff barriers

and obstacles to commercial interactions.

The ECFA additionally provides favorable

tariffs for over 500 types of Taiwanese exports

to China, while Chinese companies will receive

preferential tax breaks on approximately 260

products.7

The relationship’s most difficult issue relates to

reunification. Various solutions have been pro-

posed to address the matter. One suggested

idea is to place Taiwan under a similar administra-

tive arrangement as Hong Kong and Macao.

It’s an issue many Taipei policymakers oppose,

since they contend it may cause Taiwan to lose

its independence.8 The situation requires explor-

ing several questions: under what type of

jurisdiction is Hong Kong under? Is it similar to

Macao? And could Taiwan accept an administra-

tion arrangement akin to Hong Kong and Macao’s

status?

One approach to understanding the commonali-

ties/disparities between Beijing’s governorship

over Hong Kong and Macao is an examination of

the agreements China signed with the United

Kingdom and Portugal over both areas. The

prime documents between Beijing and London/



Beijing-Taipei relations were almost non-

existent from 1949 to the early 21st centu-

ry. A thaw in the rapport started in 2004,

when Taiwan elected a president, Chen Shui

-bian, who was receptive to closer relations,

unlike his predecessors.

http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/ma_yingjeou/index.html?inline=nyt-per

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chen_Shui-bian



Lisbon are called “The Joint Declaration of the

Government of the 1) the United Kingdom of

Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Gov-

ernment of the People's Republic of China on the

Question of Hong Kong; and 2) People's Republic

of China and The Government of the Republic of

Portugal on the question of Macao.”

Hong Kong and Macao share similar administra-

tive arrangements. Both areas are described as a

“Special Administrative Region……in accordance

with the provisions of Article 31 of the Constitu-

tion of the PRC”9 A second commonality is Hong

Kong and Macao are managed by the PRC’s Cen-

tral People's Government (CPG). The “Special Ad-

ministrative Region” designation allows Hong

Kong and Macao’s Executive, Legislative, and Ju-

dicial authorities to create and implement their

own laws and regulations; the designation pro-

hibits both entities from formulating their own

defense and foreign policies – a responsibility

given to the CPG.10 Another similarity relates to

the appointment of governing officials. Both Dec-

larations give the authority for assigning Hong

Kong and Macao’s chief executive to the CPG,

which will make its determination based on each

entity’s local electoral results. Both entities’ prin-

ciple officials will be nominated by the executive

officer for appointment by the CPG.11 Hong Kong

and Macao are allowed to establish economic

relations with their original London and Lisbon

overseers, plus any other nations of interest.12

The last major issue relates to the right of Hong

Kong/Macao’s citizens. Individuals from both are-

as will retain their original political, economic, and

commercial privileges under the Joint Declara-

tions; both documents mandate Hong Kong and

Macao authorities with guaranteeing these

rights.13

Utilizing Hong Kong and Macao’s administrative

arrangements with Beijing as a model for Chinese

-Taiwan reunification is unrealistic. There are

similarities between Taiwan, Hong Kong, and

Taipei; the differences outweigh the commonali-

ties. Hong Kong and Macao were originally

established as Colonies by the British and Portu-

guese, whereas Taiwan’s polity was formed by

the late General Chang Kai-Shek and the KMT

party. Taiwan occupies a larger geographical area,

and consists of different jurisdictional areas.

The island’s government is divided into various

“county’s”, which are similar to Japan’s Prefec-

tures or the American States with their own

local and municipal governments, unlike Hong

Kong and Macao. Taiwan has a viable military,

including an army, navy, air force, and Marine

Corps. It also belongs to several international

organizations including the World Trade Organi-

zation. The one commonality Taiwan shares with

Hong Kong and Macao is a well-developed and

modern economy.14 Taiwan is a country in all but

diplomatic circles, unlike the former British and

Portuguese colonies.

How Beijing and Taipei might resolve the reunifi-

cation issue is unknown. There are several possi-

bilities for addressing the matter. The author

failed to discover reportage of the first two sce-

narios in media and/or academic circles; while the


HONG KONG

final model was suggested by Dr. Cal Clark from

Auburn University.

First, China’s acceptance of Taiwan’s status

under the condition that Taipei officially

designates itself as “The Republic of Tai-

wan”, not the “Republic of China”.

Second, Beijing’s unofficial acknowledge-

ment of Taipei’s independence with the

agreement that Taiwan does not report

China’s policy reversal in media circles.

A final possibility is for reunification to oc-

cur via an EU type model as suggested by

Dr. Cal Clark.15

The last option is the most unlikely. It would

entail Beijing allowing Taipei to possess an equal

vote in all political, economic, military, and

foreign affairs decisions. It’s probably the least

viable scenario considering the CCP might

argue Taiwan only represents of a fraction of

China’s citizenry (even those living outside

the Mainland would not equal the PRC’s

population numbers). Nothing can be discount-

ed, especially an idea an implausible as the

above.

Any resolution of the dispute must entail a

settlement whereby both sides maintain a per-

ceptual credibility in the constituents’ view –

any agreement jeopardizing this tenet could

have political consequences for the party seen

making concessions. This component of any

accord may be the hardest to achieve since

both sides’ positions are clear and seemingly

inflexible.

Resolving the matter will probably occur via

a currently unthoughtof solution plus a new

generation. Beijing and Taiwan’s present leader-

ship are directly or indirectly tied to policies

neither are apparently unwilling to deviate from.

The other aspect is probably a historical linkage

to the leaders and events resulting from the

Chinese Civil War. There is a strong possibility

the leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait

have family members who were involved in

the conflict – fathers, uncles, cousins, or related

kin. The connection may be creating a situation

where pragmatism is non-existent. The reunifica-

tion issue may be settled once a new generation

takes the reins in Beijing and Taipei; a generation

several decades removed from the events of

1949 plus who are willing to consider a new

approach and/or visit old, previously discounted

solutions.

Conclusion

The Taiwan controversy is one of the simplest, yet

most complex issues to resolve. Its simplicity is

that the problem could be resolved within a short

-period, yet there might be strategic ramifications

for the party seen as making concessions (under

the current political climate at least). Taiwan is an

independent country for all intents and purposes.

It has a well-defined political system, a modern

economy, and military. What Taipei lacks is a dip-

lomatic acknowledgement necessary for Taiwan

to function as a standard international player; it’s

a problem Beijing is stymieing because of the

“One China” issue. Any agreement between Bei-

jing and Taipei over the reunification issue will

probably not occur in the foreseeable future. This

will only change if Chinese or Taiwanese policy-

makers develop a political determination that

may adversely impact their professional liveli-

hood. The question is how high priority is the

issue among Beijing/Taipei’s leadership? And is it

a significant enough concern to make the poten-

tial sacrifices necessary to resolve the decades-old

issue? The existing evidence is that the subject is

a secondary matter, plus neither side is willing to

make the concessions needed to end the dispute.

The stalemate over the reunification issue will

most likely remain for the foreseeable future con-

sequently.



Any agreement between Beijing and Taipei

over the reunification issue will probably

not occur in the foreseeable future.

Notes:

* Matthew Kennedy is a guest editorialist at Vail

Daily.

1. Constitution of the People's Republic

of China. Preamble. http://

www.usconstitution.net/china.html#

Accessed 24 November 2011, 1110am MST

2. Anti-Secession Law adopted by NPC.

Articles 2, 5,6,7, and 8. http://www.china-

un.ch/eng/zt/twwt/t187208.htm, Accessed

6 December 2011, 1043pm MST

3. “Taiwan’s Leader Outlines His Policy

Toward China.” Keith Bradsher and

Edward Wong. The New York Times. 19

June 2008. http://

www.nytimes.com/2008/06/19/world/

asia/19taiwan.html, Accessed 7 December

2011, 11:26am MST

4. “No unification talks with China if elected:

Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou’s campaign

manager”. Taiwan News Network. 11 No-

vember 2011, http://

www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/

news_content.php?id=1760089, Accessed

11 December 2011, 814PST

5. “Times Topics: Ma Ying-jeou” The New

York Times. 11 December 2011, http://

topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/

timestopics/people/m/ma_yingjeou/

index.html, Accessed 11 December 2011,

514PST

6. “China and Taiwan sign agreements to

open finance sectors.” Robin Kwong. Fi-

nancial Times (London). 27 April 2009. P.4.

Accessed via Lexus Nexus Academic Au

gust 2011

7. “Longtime rivals China, Taiwan sign

trade pact.” Keith B. Richburg. The Wash-

ington Post. 30 June 2010. P.A08. Ac-

cessed via Lexus Nexus Academic August

2011

8. Jacques deLisle. “’Bless and Keep the SAR

… Far Away from Us’: Taiwan’s Hong Kong

Phobia, Five Years On.” Foreign Policy Insti-

tute. 16 August 2002 http://www.fpri.org/

enotes/20020816.delisle.hongkongphobia.

html Accessed 7 December 2011, 126pm

MST

9. Joint declaration of the Government of the

People's Republic of China and The Gov-

ernment of the Republic of Portugal on the

question of Macao. Article 2, Section 1.

http://bo.io.gov.mo/bo/i/88/23/dc/en/

Accessed 23 November 2011, 1211pm MST

Joint Declaration of the Government of the

United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Northern Ireland and the Government of

the People's Republic of China on the

Question of Hong Kong. Article 3. Section

1, http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~pchksar/JD/jd

-full2.htm, Accessed: 23 November 2011,

1220MST

10. Ibid. Joint Declaration, Hong Kong. Article

3. Sections 2-3 Ibid. Joint Declaration, Ma-

cao. Article 2. Section 2


3. Section 4 Ibid. Joint Declaration, Macao.

Article 2. Section 3


3. Section 9. Ibid. Joint Declaration, Ma-

cao. Article 2. Section 6


3. Section 5 Ibid. Joint Declaration, Macao.

Article 2. Section 4

14. United States Central Intelligence Agency.

The World Factbook. East and Southeast

Asia: Taiwan. 10 November 2011. https://

www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-

world- factbook/geos/tw.html, Accessed 4

December 2011, 946pm MST

15. Cal Clark (2003): Does European Integra-

tion Provide a Model for Moderating Cross-

Strait Relations?, Asian Affairs: An American

Review, 29:4, 195-215 http://

www.tandfonline.com/doi/

df/10.1080/00927670309601506, Accessed

14 December 2011, 753pm PST

COMMENTARY | BY JAMES PEARSON


http://www.usconstitution.net/china.html#

http://www.usconstitution.net/china.html#

http://www.china-un.ch/eng/zt/twwt/t187208.htm

http://www.china-un.ch/eng/zt/twwt/t187208.htm

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/19/world/asia/19taiwan.html



http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=1760089



http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/ma_yingjeou/index.html




http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20020816.delisle.hongkongphobia.html



http://bo.io.gov.mo/bo/i/88/23/dc/en/

http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~pchksar/JD/jd-full2.htm

http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~pchksar/JD/jd-full2.htm

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-%20factbook/geos/tw.html



http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00927670309601506



I n this article, I will point out and discuss

the effect of the reform of exchange

rate institution on the real estate

market, and the discussion suggests

that the appreciation of RMB leads to the rise of

real estate price, but as well as the possible eco-

nomic bubble in Hong Kong. The influx of capital

flows and the real estate price volatility in Hong

Kong real estate market shows that the expecta-

tion of the appreciation of RMB is one of the ele-

ments that inspires investment speculating in the

real estate market causing the possible imbalance

of demand and supply and various social prob-

lems.

RMB appreciation stimulates mainland inves-

tors to enter the Hong Kong real estate market

An appreciating RMB will impact the Hong Kong

economy and hence the real estate market in di-

rect and indirect ways. Indirectly, it spurs capital

inflows into Hong Kong in order to lower the local

interest rates, creates an accommodative mone-

tary environment and yields substantial wealth

effects from a surging stock market. As a result,

such wealth effects are expected to spill over into

the property market. Lower interest rates will also

provide incentives for increased borrowing and

boost asset prices. Under the current currency

system, an increase in liquidity would suppress

Hong Kong-dollar interest rates. If money supply

exceeds the desired money demand, inflationary

pressure will rise. The positive outlook for asset

prices and expectations of further appreciation of

the RMB might attract substantial capital flows

into Hong Kong.

Hong Kong – an alternative exit for Chinese hot

money

In the long run, it is believed that the reform of

RMB exchange rate system and its revaluation will

not have any significant adverse effects on China,

but is rather one of the steps towards China’s stra-

tegic goal of gradual appreciation and loosening

of capital control for RMB.

The domestic policy tightening in mainland China

as well as the appreciation of the RMB causes the

China investors to diversify their investment port-

folio, Hong Kong is expected to be one of the first

spots for it. Chinese investors in search of alterna-

tive real estate options, to reduce the overheating

of domestic market risk exposures. China on the

overseas property market influence eclipsed. Chi-

na real estate investors are mostly limited to in-

vestment in the domestic market, forcing the

Government to take vigorous measures to sup-

press excessive rise in prices of China's domestic

policy tightening in real estate, and the apprecia-

tion of the RMB will, analysts expect more Chi-

nese people to those high returns and low limit of

the overseas market investments such as Hong

Kong.


THE IMPACT

OF RENMINBI (RMB) APPRECIATION

ON THE HONG KONG PROPERTY MARKET

ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS? | BY SUNNY LAM*

Investment Strategy Consideration

The levels of total return due to the RMB appreci-

ation offered by real estate markets in Hong Kong

are likely to be attractive to many Chinese inves-

tors. In particular, in an environment when invest-

ment in low risk assets in Hong Kong offers very

attractive returns, the income return from real

estate is likely to be an appealing characteristic

for many investors. The key to success is in the

speed, scale and timing of the investment. In con-

clusion, the RMB appreciation presents a cross-

border investor with a range of opportunities. It

also offers scope for risk diversification within the

real estate markets.

How might investors respond? Five trends may

be significant:

Increasing investment demands: Firstly in-

creasing allocations to real estate both from

traditional institutional investors (pension

funds, insurance companies and endow-

ments) but also from sovereign wealth funds

and new institutional investors.

Favorable risk adjusted return: Secondly

many investors show an elevated degree of

China heat effect. After all, if the outlook for

returns is strong in Hong Kong many main-

land investors still

keen to find out the

risk adjusted return for

their investment?

More value-

added investment

opportunities: Whilst

many risk adverse in-

vestors may likely con-

tinue to focus purely

on prime properties in

Hong Kong; I suspect

that increasingly some

risk accepting inves-

tors may start to com-

mit to investments in

secondary properties

with a value add strat-

egy to reposition the

property into a core

property as markets continues to grow.

Attractive capital flow environment: Listed

real estate tends to anticipate the perfor-

mance of direct or unlisted real estate. With

healthy balance sheets, many listed compa-

nies have access to capital to redeploy into

the wealthy real estate markets. Many inves-

tors might find this a more liquid way to par-

ticipate in the boosting market environment.

Focus on the core segment: Depending on

the risk level the investor is willing to take,

investors are suggested to invest in the core

segment as part of the overseas portfolio.

Hong Kong being a well developed city in the

region, the core segment is relative stable in

term of price growth and rental income.

So the next question is where are those opportu-

nities? There is not a simple answer to this ques-

tion, but many would answer using the real estate

specific mantra: location, location, location. It will

depend on the market, asset type and strategy to

adopt. Up to now most investors have taken a

'flight to quality' and have focused on prime mar-

kets and assets. Even though this is an under-

standable choice when the economic is still on

the bright side with historic low lending cost and

the synchronized move towards prime assets in

top markets has caused a 'bidding war' for many

opportunities. In some markets the final price has

been primarily determined by too much capital

chasing the same property, rather than by the

outlook for the fundamentals.

Chinese investors convince of the robust pro-

spects of Hong Kong are likely to find this a

tempting time to rotate into the more cyclical real

estate sectors. Some of the sectors such as hotel

and retails are particularly in the strong position

due to favorable policies driven by the central

government.

The current revaluation situation will not be

enough to solve the problem of excess capital

inflows. On the contrary, it will however further

accelerate capital inflows in anticipation of fur-

ther revaluation, intensifying the harmful stimu-

lus to the economy. On the other hand, the gov-

ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS? | BY SUNNY LAM

ernment will set up various measures in order to

control the overheat market. The overheat market

would disadvantage the interior and could even

pose a threat to the city’s long term competitive-

ness. What makes Hong Kong different is that it is

an attractive destination for foreign direct invest-

ment (FDI). Hong Kong is one the largest recipient

of FDI per area in the region, due to its growing

dynamic economy and stable political environ-

ment . On the other hand, rising incomes and

economic growth have also created enormous

inflation pressure for the city.

As Mainland China is a major investment source

of investment income for Hong Kong, external

factor income flows will benefit from the currency

revaluation effect. It is particularly helpful for long

term investors for purchasing properties for rental

income purposes. The market value of investment

holdings will also benefit from the currency reval-

uation, and this could have a positive impact on

Hong Kong’s aggregate demand, and thus infla-

tion as discussed above, through the wealth ef-

fect. The author would like to conclude the fol-

lowing positive impacts on the Hong Kong mar-

ket:

1. To promote its internal economic growth. The

prosperity of fictitious capital, to increase in-

vestor wealth, stimulate consumption and

growth, changes in short-term marginal pro-

pensity to consume and hence increase its

internal spending power especially the luxury

sectors, the multiplier effect of expanding eco-

nomic growth

2. To accelerate the concentration of wealth and

capital accumulation, the process of promot-

ing social capital. Fictitious capital has

changed the way of capital accumulation, cap-

ital concentration more quickly, fast, and pro-

mote the socialization of capital, for efficient

basis for large-scale socialized production.

Property price distortions and market re-

balancing

As discussed above, one of the key factors driving

the market imbalances has been cheap money,

which, together with weak regulation of high-risk

investment, led to the potential bubbles in Hong

Kong. Many investment funds from developed

countries including US and Europe currently

make the advantage of extremely low interest-

rate policy. It brings capital flows into Asia partic-

ularly Hong Kong in anticipation of higher invest-

ment return compared to that in their own coun-

tries. It therefore further boosts the property

price. The appreciation of RMB together with ris-

ing Chinese household income and larger official

reserves mean that there will be rising demand

for diversification by Chinese investors into cross-

border assets. Hong Kong is always one of the top

destinations for such cross-border capital flow. To

facilitate these future cross-border capital flows, it

would be helpful for China to maintain a stable

exchange rate and large foreign exchange re-

serves, both of which are critically important in

reducing the Chinese and foreign investors’ un-

certainty that would result from a volatile ex-

change rate.

Implication on the Hong Kong society as a

whole

The current strong influx of Chinese hot money

causing the real estate market in Hong Kong as

one of the fastest growing investment tools for

the mainland Chinese. However, it has also be-

come an important area of investment, growing

its virtual nature, which led to many social prob-

lems such as excessive inflation, distortion of the

housing market, loss of the city’s competitiveness,

etc. Virtual capital itself is not value, but the virtu-

al capital to generate profits through circular mo-

tion to get some form of “residual value”, it can



The appreciation of RMB together with

rising Chinese household income and

larger official reserves mean that there will

be rising demand for diversification by

Chinese investors into cross-border assets.

not be directly used as real factors of production

or production activities, but only the ownership

certificate, the “reality paper copy of the capital”,

reflects the debt payment. A lot of money flows

from the real economy and financial markets and

real estate market, causing economic false

prosperity as we have seen before in 1997 and

2008. If the flow of funds into the virtual economy

too much, it will cause a lack of real economic

sector funding, the development of fatigue,

there crowding out productive investment.

The fast capital accumulation in the virtual reality

of capital accumulation in the case of

interest-bearing money capital does not reflect

the reality of not only the accumulation of money

capital, and self-aggrandizement, which

led to bubble economy. Increasing the

composition of the bubble economy, people’s

pursuit of profit led to the virtual non-normal in-

flux of a lot of money the virtual capital markets,

people are keen on playing the stock / property

market, futures and other “money game” activi-

ties.

The biggest challenge for the Hong Kong policy-

makers now is how to deal with the property bub-

bles being formed by the hugh purchasing power

caused by the appreciation of RMB and cheap

money from China. As asset prices and the con-

sumer price index rise, it is important for China to

raise its interest rate. It is therefore necessary for

China to improve its capital control mechanisms,

to allow orderly cross-border capital flows for

more efficient investments.

The author would like to share the following

viewpoints:

1. Given the complex institutional and struc-

tural limitations in China, the nominal RMB

appreciation will become a key policy for

China in the near future and the rate of

appreciation is likely to be at a stable and

controlled pace. One important implication

for Hong Kong is that it will be difficult to

pursue a weak-dollar policy as Hong Kong

dollar pegs with US Dollar.

2. For short term measurement, the Hong

Kong Monetary Authority and China

Central Bank can cooperate effectively in

maintaining the stability of the exchange

rate and orderly cross-border flows of capi-

tal. A stable RMB-dollar exchange rate

seems to fit both parties interest. However,

Hong Kong is a free trade port and there is

hardly any existing tight regulation on con-

trolling cross-border capital flow. Any addi-

tional regulations may damage the reputa-

tion of Hong Kong being one of the freest

trading places in the world especially China

is the biggest trading partner for Hong

Kong.

3. The strong cross-border capital flow

may cause a sharp change in the Hong

Kong property landscape as such influx

of money is intensifying demand for

office, retail, and apartment spaces. In the

world’s most expensive high-rise cities,

such as Hong Kong, the free market axiom

that real estate should be developed for its

“highest and best use” has never been

truer.

Notes:

* Sunny Lam is a freelance journalist specialising

in city development, urban planning and proper-

ty market. He is active in various kinds of publica-

tions. He has over 10 years experience in conduct-

ing research in regional real estate markets.


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SOCIAL M

EDIA

A Movie of an Unrequited Patriot

History… a series of genuine history! I didn’t let

anyone rape her, and that is why I am now im-

poverished… This is a book that will not be pub-

lished until after hundreds of years. By that time,

archaeologists will dig out my bones and discov-

er this manuscript. The only thing that I wish for

is that, after reading this manuscript, they will

say, “Ah! I can’t believe that in 1976AD there was

such an honest old chap! A Miracle indeed!”

Enough! I will keep my mouth shut in Hell and be

silent for ten thousands of years…

— Bitter Love, Bai Hua

Ling Chenguang, a gifted artist without a

father, endured hardships during his childhood

with the help of benevolent people. During

his adolescence at the time of the Japanese

occupation, he was forced to join the army of

Kumingtang (KMT). He was saved by a young

lady named Lu from a fisherman’s family who

later became his wife. After joining an anti-

government movement, Ling was warranted

by agents of KMT and consequently escaped

to a foreign country. He eventually became a

successful painter who lived as a bourgeoisie.

When the New Modern China was born, he and

his wife forwent the comfort of their past and

went back to their motherland with patriotic aspi-

rations.

All the hopes were gradually gone when the

Anti-Rightist Movement and Cultural Revolution

came. As a former bourgeois and a “revisionist”

who deviated from Mao’s orthodoxy, Ling’s family

became political outcast. Together with their


BITTER LOVE: A SILENCED MOVIE OF CHINA AND ITS IMPLICATION

CULTURAL ANALYSIS | BY ANTONY OU*

daughter, they were confined and secluded in

a tiny windowless house with no sunlight

and countless spider webs. The painter was even

severely beaten up during his birthday. When

his daughter grew up, he ran away with her

boyfriend. She left him after asking, “You are bit-

terly loving this country, however, does this coun-

try return your love?”

After all the misfortunes, Ling exiled himself into

the wilderness of snow. The hermit finally used

his last footsteps to paint a huge question mark

on the snow, and he finished it with his freezing

body as the dot.

Bitter Love: A Movie of Controversy

Waves of political and social movements

have suffocated millions of common people’s

lives after the establishment of the People’s

Republic of China since 1949. The Land

Reformation, the Anti-Rightist Movement, and

the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) had all

created devastating political, economic, cultural

and environmental disasters. However, the

Great Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), also

known as “Calamity of Ten Years”, had redefined

the conception of political chaos— a further

advancement of Maoist orthodoxy that eventual-

ly led to almost complete collapses of

political institutions, social norms and cultural

artefacts, of which were replaced by lies, igno-

rance and greed.

Bai Hua (白樺, 1930- ), a Chinese intellectual and

former dedicated CCP member, became a

“rightist” from 1958 to 1976. During that time, he

had been deprived of his chances to write basical-

ly anything. His conviction has been removed by

Deng Xiaoping in 1979 and his play manuscript

Bitter Love (苦戀, originally known as Sun and

Man) was firstly published by the same year. It

was subsequently re-published in a Hong Kong

leftist newspaper as well. The short novel was

considered to be one of the pioneers of Scar Liter-

ature (傷痕文學): a new fiction genre that was

fermented specifically right after the waves

of Maoist political movements from the end of

1977 to 1979. It was considered as a cultural

blossom of the “Second Hundred Flowers Move-

ment”.

The work had then been made into a movie,

directed by Pang Ning and screen played by

Bai Hua and the director himself. Before the

actual movie could be possibly shown to the

public, a sample of the movie has been previewed

by the Secretariat of the Communist Party of

China Central Committee and the Committee

strongly opposed it unless the screenplay

was heavily redrafted. Nonetheless, from 1981

onwards, the movie has received an overwhelm-

ing support by intellectuals, directors, movie

critics and screenwriters. For the People's

Liberation Army General Political Department

and the Central Party School, the feelings of

their members were mixed but the majority

was against it. The situation exacerbated by

the fact that the Newspaper of the People’s

Liberation Army reminded the intellectuals

that there were four types of principles that

writers should be abided by them. Together

with tens of other government-controlled

newspaper and radio broadcasts, Bai Hua and

his screenplay Bitter Love were severely

criticized. Consequently, the movie was banned

to show anyone in public. Yet, according to

Bai Hua, the original copy of the movie was

stored in good condition at Changchun Film

Group Corporation. One should be noted that

there was a Taiwanese version (1982) of the mov-

CULTURAL ANALYSIS | BY ANTONY OU


Bai Hua

ie, known as “Portrait of a Fanatic” in English, can

now be bought easily. Thanks to the Internet, one

can also freely download and synchronously

looped somewhere on the web with no English

subtitles.

The Silenced Question Mark

As Maureen Duffy says, “The pain of love is

the pain of being alive. It is a perpetual wound.”

Ling, the painter, loved his country deeply, yet

in return, the country never attempted to heal

the hopeless and hapless man. He was the mod-

ern version of Qu Yuan (340BC-278BC) who

kept on demanding answers from Heaven after

having been expelling by his beloved country of

Chu. We should not enquire for whom the ques-

tion is asked; the question is asked for countless

persecuted Chinese intellectuals. Through the

painter’s life, Bai Hua asked profound questions

about the Maoist era, which are still extremely

crucial and somehow relevant to today’s China.

One of the most important questions is: What is

left in Chinese nationalism if the people of China

were remorselessly ill-treated by the Communist

Party?

According to statistics, the farce of the Great

Leap Forward has resulted in catastrophic deaths

of over 40 million people, mostly due to hunger.

The movement aimed at boosting up the steel

production of the entire country, ambitiously

claiming that the production would surpass

that of the British and American Empires. Howev-

er, when most of the citizens were brainwashed

and the system was socially re-engineered by

setting up People’s Communes, who were going

to grow crops to feed the whole population?

Exacerbated by years of serious and comprehen-

sive droughts, Mao’s political ideal became one of

the massive human exterminations in the 20th

century.

During the Cultural Revolution, innocent lives

were labelled as, very often without any substan-

tial and sound evidence, “counter-

revolutionaries”, “revisionists” and “capitalists”.

They had to go through the political processes of

“criticism” and “self-criticism”— mockery parties

held by winners of the power struggles, aiming at

condemning ones’ political stances, re-

establishing their “correct” political belief system

(i.e. Maoist orthodoxy), and eventually depriving

the will and dignity of the political, social and cul-

tural elites. During the processes, they were often

severely beaten up without any justifications. In

order to preserve ones’ personal safety, the

“dominate strategies” for them were either to

cheat, or betray, even the closest ones. Commit-

ting suicide became the only way out for some of

the victims, and for some of the others, they were

sent to Re-education Through Labour (RTL) in

various remote places like the North-east provinc-

es.

Ling the painter, like every other Chinese

by that time, was living and suffering in a

nation of poverty, chaos and a nation lack of

credibility. Bai Hua attempts to test the limits

of every Chinese patriot: Why do patriots still

love a wounded country if they can no

longer count their very own scars? Why did

some of them stay in China if exit was a

viable option (there was huge number of

illegal emigration during the Cultural

Revolution though)? If Chinese nationalism (or

nationalism in general) is a lie, what could

be an ultimate “resting place” for the Chinese

souls?



According to statistics, the farce of the

Great Leap Forward has resulted in cata-

strophic deaths of over 40 million people,

mostly due to hunger. The movement aimed

at boosting up the steel production of the

entire country, ambitiously claiming that

the production would surpass that of the

British and American Empires.

Implications

China in the 21st century is no longer a Com-

munist nation. As Deng Xiaoping, famously as-

serted, “Only (economic) development makes

hard sense”. In post-Mao China, economic devel-

opment was the only concern of China. As a re-

sult, China is now the second largest economy

and is the world’s fastest growing economy. It has

been sustaining an average growth rate of 9.4%

for the past 30 years.

As a drawback, the economic gap between

the rich and the poor of China (Gini coefficient

in 2010: 0.47) is huge and widening. As Deng

also said, the nation should “let some people

grow rich first”, but we never know when

and how such an ideal can be realised. The

uncontrollable accumulation of wealth is concen-

trated in a handful of party members as well

as some local capitalists. In addition, the

Party firmly believes that by ensuring a high eco-

nomic growth rate leaders can maintain their

legitimacy. Nonetheless, the systematic and

structural corruption is so incurable that as a

result, the Party is losing the “hearts and minds”

of the people.

Economic progress has led to social and irreversi-

ble environmental degradation throughout

the country. Injustice in local provinces and

villages are widespread that has led victims to

point of no return. Without an independent

judiciary system, an extrajudicial political action

formally called “Letter and Complaints” or Xin-

fang in Chinese, becomes a widespread phenom-

enon. Over five million petitions have been re-

ceived each year and the victims have been

packed in Beijing to lodge complaints against

their local authorities and to protect their basic

human rights. Unfortunately, most of the peti-

tioners has failed to redeem their justice and

many of them have been severely threatened and

beaten.

Worse still, the environmental problems are

devastating. For instances, more than 30% of

water in China is not drinkable and more than

500 million people are affected. Moreover, count-

less health problems caused by pollutions are

common namely, respiratory problems, cardio-

vascular damage, heavy metal poisoning, and

cancer.

Together with the recent tragedy of the high-

speed railway system due to unacceptable

governance, ethnic minority conflicts and

terrorism, the daily violence of Chengguan

(The City Urban Administrative and Law Enforce-

ment Bureau) against the street-sellers, the



Chengguan Officers

persecution of public intellectuals and other

countless social problems piece together a mosa-

ic picture of Modern China in the 21st century.

In an earlier article named “Hong Kong Democra-

cy: A Pessimistic Review” of Political Reflection

(PR), I contend that,

The concept of a “harmonious society” has

become an over-arching theme campaigning

over the years in China. The Chinese central

government advocates that it is necessary

to construct a “harmonious society” while

enjoying the economic prosperity. The term

has been repeatedly criticized as a strategy

that underplays the democratic reform of

China.

China is never a “harmonious” place due to its

undemocratic and injustice environment. The

“haves” are the exploiters and the “have-nots” are

severely oppressed. As I said, “the only reason for

a government to promote harmony is because

the society it governs lacks harmony.” (Political

Reflection Issue No.2, Vol.1)

In 2010, there was a successful Chinese Spaghetti

Western style movie written, directed and starred

by Jiang Wen, Let the Bullets Fly. Towards the

end of the movie, the protagonist “Pocky” and

his subordinates were about to overthrow a

local authority (Chow Yun-Fat). They at first

shot many holes onto the gate of a mansion.

Later, one of his subordinates shot an exclama-

tion mark on the gate while Pocky shot a question

mark. Pocky finally said, “Release all of your bul-

lets through that question mark dot!” The symbol-

ic messages here are clear: The gate refers to the

barrier between the people and the government.

The hundreds of fire holes are the grievances of

the people. The question mark can possibly

mean two things. It can mean thousands

of inquiries imposed by the director towards

the regime. It can also be understood

together with the exclamation mark — the

compound symbol actually looks like hammer

and sickle ( ) — meaning that the Communist

Party of China. By shooting all the remaining bul-

lets through the question mark, people can be

then “re-liberated” again.

Like Jiang Wen, the people have been tired

of waiting for meaningless slogans, official

apologies and empty promises. As we can see,

all the tragedies and reactions of the Chinese

citizens are dangerously alarming to the seeming-

ly unshakable regime. Are huge storms about

to come? I do not have a clear answer. However,

as Zhong Zukang, a Chinese author who

now lives in Norway proclaim, “I don’t want

to be Chinese again!” I am sure from time to

time, unacquainted patriots of China will

eventually wake up and strive for a better

change. If patriotism and nationalism are

mythical constructions, a liberal democratic

“irresponsible compound” might be a more realis-

tic utopia.

Note:

* Antony Ou is a PhD Researcher of University of

Sheffield, the China Review editor of Political Re-

flection Magazine, and the China Representative

of CESRAN. His monograph, Just War and the

Confucian Classics: A Gongyangzhuan Analysis,

has been published and is available at ama-

zon.com.

E-mail: [email protected]

Twitter: https://twitter.com/ouantony

Douban: http://www.douban.com/people/

ouantony/



China is never a “harmonious” place due to

its undemocratic and injustice environ-

ment. The “haves” are the exploiters

and the “have-nots” are severely

oppressed. As I said, “the only reason for a

government to promote harmony is

because the society it governs lacks

harmony.”


https://twitter.com/ouantony

http://www.douban.com/people/ouantony/

http://www.douban.com/people/ouantony/

About the

CESRAN | Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis

The CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS (CESRAN) is a private, non-political, non-

profit, internet-based organization of scholars who are interested in world politics, and enthusiastic

about contributing to the field of international relations as not only academics, but also practitioners.

The underlying motive behind the foundation of the CESRAN is a need to bridge the gap between the

students of international relations and practitioners of international politics. In this regard, the main

ideal is gathering people, who come from different backgrounds and have different perspectives,

around the CESRAN in order to yield fresh and illuminating insights as to how the international rela-

tions is carried out in a globalizing world. To this end, the CESRAN aims at establishing and maintain-

ing close contact with and between politicians, bureaucrats, business people, and academics that

would lead to the development of better policies.

We invite anyone who shares these interests to become a member and participate in our activities.

Email: [email protected]

Members of the Executive Board of the CESRAN:

Özgür TÜFEKÇİ, Chairman (King’s College London, UK)

Alper Tolga BULUT, Vice-Chairman (University of Houston, USA)

Kadri Kaan RENDA, Vice-Chairman (King’s College London, UK)

Aksel ERSOY, Member (University of Birmingham, UK)

Ali Onur ÖZÇELİK, Member (University of Sheffield, UK)

Hüsrev TABAK, Member (University of Manchester, UK)

Abdullah UZUN, Member (Karadeniz Technical University, Turkey)

Members of the Council of the CESRAN:

Prof. Mark BASSIN (Södertörn University, Sweden)

Prof. Bülent GÖKAY (Keele University, UK)

Dr. Ayla Göl (Aberystwyth University, UK)

Prof. Bayram GÜNGÖR (Karadeniz Technical University, Turkey)

Prof. Alp ÖZERDEM (Coventry University, UK)

Mr Bill PARK (King’s College London, UK)

Prof. İbrahim SİRKECİ (Regent’s College, UK)

Prof. Birol YEŞİLADA (Portland State University, USA)

WWW.CESRAN.ORG

[email protected]

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http://web.pdx.edu/~yesilada/

T oday, the pertinence of Kang Youwei

relevant figure and the historical role

he played in China during the turbu-

lent years between the 19th and

20th century, is no further object of discussion.

Kang Youwei, who came from a family in which

some of his members served the country as go-

vernment officials, has often been at the centre of

academic debates for his political activities and

for the philosophical content of his writings.

Amongst Kang Youwei’s characteristic traits, the-

re was a vast and heterogeneous cultural forma-

tion, derived by his widespread interest towards

different fields of human knowledge, learned

from the disciplines and the writings of the wes-

tern world and from the more traditional kind of

culture tied to his native homeland. In China, as it

is well-known, the cultural level of a person was

also judged on the basis of the depth of his callig-

raphic education, thus, his inherent knowledge

for this type of visual art, that over the centuries

had developed a strong bond with the scholar-

officials.1 Throughout his life, Kang Youwei, has

dedicated time and energy to the art of callig-

raphy, acquiring a ample theoretical and practical

knowledge, later merged in his compendium

published in 1891, entitled Guang yi zhou shuang

ji 廣藝舟雙楫.

Even in its complexity and through different ob-

servation levels, Guang yi zhou shuang ji, struc-

tured in twenty-seven chapters compounded in

six books, presents itself like a work of criticism to

calligraphy, putting in evidence Kang Youwei’s

approach towards this art which many considered

essentially theoretical. Nevertheless, he produced

an enormous amount of calligraphic works; creat-

ed a personal and characteristic style, and en-

tered, by rights (most of all for his theoretical

competence), in that circle of experts and art con-

noisseurs, who, since the middle of the Qing dyn-

asty, tried to inject into calligraphy new vital

lymph derived from the more ancient calligraphic

tradition - like those of the stone tables dating


CULTURAL ANALYSIS | BY MASSIMO CARRANTE*

KANG YOUWEI’S (1858-1927) STUDY

AND

VISION OF THE CHINESE CALLIGRAPHIC ART

back to the Jin (265–420) and Northern Wei dyn-

asties (386-535) - that, in the course of history,

found themselves ruled out of the process of es-

tablishing the calligraphy classical tradition al-

ready described by Ledderose.

In the Guang yi zhou shuang ji, despite the funda-

mental conceptuality, there are some parts that

the author dedicated to eminently practical as-

pects and are concentrated in the following four

chapters: Zhi bi di er shi (執筆第二十), where Kang

Youwei offers his considerations about the right

method of holding the brush; Zhui fa di er shi yi

(綴法第二十一), discussing on the composition

method of a calligraphic work starting from the

correct movement of the writing tool; Xue xu er shi

er (學敘第二十二), in which the author speaks of

the right sequence to follow in the calligraphy

learning process; Shu xue di er shi san, (述學第二十

三), where, with a prose rich of personal details,

Kang Youwei, relays his personal experience in

studying the chinese calligraphic art, which be-

gan at the age of ten under the guidance of his

paternal grandfather, Kang Zanxiu. His grandfa-

ther, a government official, taught calligraphy in

the administrative residence of Lianzhou, in the

province of Guangdong. Later on, his illustrious

grandson, described his attendance at the course

with this words:

[At that time] I had in my mouth the sweet

taste of sugar and dates2, and I amused myself

playing with the brushes. My defunct grandfa-

ther would begin teaching with [making] imi-

tate [by the students] the Yue yi lun and the

calligraphy of Ouyang Xun and Zhao Mengfu.

The lesson was quite strict3.

On these occasions, Kang Youwei, had the role of

his Grandfather’s young attendant, whom, be-

sides schooling him in the different examination

subjects for entering the bureaucratic career, was

also getting him acquainted with the basics of the

calligraphic art. According to what Kang Youwei

describes in this chapter, for many years, his cal-

ligraphy didn’t make any substantial improve-

ments; for his demeanour, that he defines as laid-

back and slow in understanding things and also

for the absence of good calligraphy rubbings in

the house of his grandfather, with whom Kang

Youwei was living since 3 months after the prem-

ature death of his father in 1868.

Guang yi zhou shuang ji dates the first important

turning point in Kang Youwei’s calligraphy learn-

ing process back to 1876, when, following his fail-

ure at the provincial examinations held the same

year in Guangzhou, he decides to continue his

studies at Lishan, a village near the capital of

Guangdong province, under the auspices of Zhu

Ciqi (1807-1881), an ex government official and a

renowned Confucian scholar, who dedicated him-

self to teaching after his retirement from the ad-

ministrative functions thirty years before at the

Xinglin district in Shanxi province. Zhu Ciqi, de-

scribed in Guang yi zhou shuang ji as you gong bi

zha (尤工筆札) - proficient in the use of brush and

paper - was known also with his sobriquet

CULTURAL ANALYSIS | BY MASSIMO CARRANTE


Kang

Youwei

Jiujiang, from his native place, the country town

of the same name in Nanhai district, twenty-five

kilometers south-west of Guangzhou.

Kang Youwei remained in Lishan for around three

years, where besides the study of different disci-

plines as confucian classics, literature, institutions

and rhetoric, he devoted himself to the refining of

his calligraphy technique through the imitation of

renowned works as the Ouyang Xun's master-

piece Inscription on the Sweet-Water Spring at

Jiucheng Palace, the Stele of the Buddhist Monk

Daoyin written by Ouyang Tong (?-691), Yan

Zhenqing's (709-785) Stele of the Yan Family Tem-

ple, the Stele for the Xuan Mi Pagoda written by Liu

Gongquan (778-865), as well as through model-

ling after the style of Song calligraphers like Su

Shi (1037-1101) and Mi Fu (1051-1107)4.

As Kang Youwei states in his autobiography, the

time spent studying with Zhu Ciqi was for him of

fundamental importance. In the perspective of his

calligraphic education, it was relevant, above all,

in view of his acquired greater technical aware-

ness: the author of Guang yi zhou shuang ji be-

comes aware of the fact that there are no

shortcuts in the art learning process:

The study of calligraphy has a correct se-

quence; it is in fact essential, to know how to

hold the brush. For what concerns the writing,

it is necessary to begin from the structure of

the character, from the horizontal and vertical

strokes, defining first the square form, and lat-

er, concentrate on its characteristics, on its

movement, on its flexibility. Once the charac-

ters have been well traced out, it is possible to

concentrate on the calligraphic composition

with its different parts and their distribution.5

Kang Youwei dedicates the entire twentieth chap-

ter of Guang yi zhou shuang ji in describing the

procedures for achieving the correct brush grip,

and that starts with these words:

Mr. Zhu Jiujiang, in his “Method to hold the

brush”, says: “empty fist and solid fingers, hori-

zontal wrist and perpendicular brush”. Whilst

studying this method, I suffered, seeing that

by putting my wrist horizontally, I could not

hold the brush in a vertical position and vice-

versa. Hence, during daytime, I would scruti-

nize Mr. Zhu’s way to hold the brush […], ac-

cording to this method, by putting the wrist

horizontally, the brush, takes a natural vertical

position. My handwriting became more ele-

gant and balanced but not yet strong and vig-

orous6.

In the winter of 1878 determined to go back

home earlier to dedicate himself to a more indi-

vidual study and to a contemplative life, Kang

Youwei, left Zhu Ciqi’s class, and retired close to

the Xiqiao mountain, a place not far away from

his hometown and specially suited to meditation

for the beauty and peacefulness offered by the

surrounding scenery. While there, in the first

month of the following lunar year (1879), he met

a scholar and compiler of the Imperial Academy

arrived from Beijing, Zhang Dinghua, also known

with his courtesy name Yanqiu. The encounter

between the two, not easy at first, would later

prove to be of great importance. This new ac-

quaintance, led Kang Youwei to gather evidence

on the cultural tendencies of those years, induc-

ing him, to reconsider in a positive way the contri-

bution that some ancient calligraphic traditions

could give to the evolutionary process of the art.

In his autobiography, Kang Youwei wrote few

lines about this encounter:

Whilst I was living at the mount Xiqiao, the

compiler of the Hanlin Academy, Zhang Yan-

qiu, whose name in life was Dinghua, came to



...“empty fist and solid fingers, horizontal

wrist and perpendicular brush”. Whilst

studying this method, I suffered, seeing

that by putting my wrist horizontally, I

could not hold the brush in a vertical posi-

tion and vice-versa.

a visit at the mountain with four or five of his

colleagues. […] I met him and we had a discus-

sion, finding ourselves in disagreement, we

shouted at each other, and then he left7.

The reason for this argument, is explained in

Guang yi zhou shuang ji in greater detail:

At that time, the compiler Zhang Yanqiu, told

me that all the model-books tie were only

a copy of original works and that it would have

been better to study the steles bei [of

the Northern Dynasties]. I contradicted him,

quoting the “Zhanqiu” (the felt cloth) of

Jiang Baishi (1155-1221), but I only did that,

because I was still immersed in an old way of

thinking8.

The old way of thinking that Kang Youwei refers

to, was based on the, till then, supposed superior-

ity of the southern calligraphic tradition with its

“tie” model-books, in contrast with the northern

one, mainly represented by the calligraphy stone

tablets carved during the Six and Northern Wei

dynasties; this, in short, was a calligraphic tradi-

tion of populations that Kang Youwei considered

backward and primitive. His point of view was still

far away from the position held by other im-

portant scholars of the middle and late Qing dyn-

asty, who, by re-qualifying the northern calli-

graphic traditions and combining it with the

southern ones, saw it as the way of instilling new

vigour and creative spirit to calligraphy.

Later on, Kang Youwei became a good friend of

Zhang Dinghua who, together with his teacher

Zhu Ciqi, played a pre-eminent role in Kang

Youwei's technical, teorethical and critical

growth, not only in the field of calligraphy:

From my teacher, Mr. Jiujiang, I have heard the

principles of virtues and justice of the [ancient]

sages, from my friend, Mr. Zhang Yanqiu, I

have received ample explanations on the

northern literary fashion9.

Kang Yowei's calligraphic formation was charac-

terized by a third important moment: the encoun-

ter with Shen Zengzhi (1850-1922), courtesy

name Zipei, a scholar, calligrapher and officer of

the Imperial Board of Punishments. In 1889 he

supported Kang Youwei in his writing a memorial

to the throne, asking for immediate reforms in

order to save China from its arresting decline. The

petition failed and, as Kang Youwei states in his

autobiography:

Shen Zengzhi advised me not to talk any more

about state affairs, and [told me that] I should

happily deploy my time with the study of an-

cient bronze and stone inscriptions.[…] I

planned to write a book [on this topic] but

many other scholars were doing [the same],

and so, I wrote a continuation of the work by

Bao Shichen (1775-1851), that later [I called] An

Expansion of the Twin Oars of the Ship of the Art

(Guang yi zhou shuang ji)10.

After rediscovering the importance of the calligra-

phy of northern tradition, Kang Youwei, dedicat-

ed himself to the study and the copying of differ-

ent works carved on stone tablets dating back at

various ancient dynasties, like The Stone Gate Epi-

taph, but also The Jing Shi Yu Stone Scriptures and

The Epitaph for Zheng Xi11. As a consequence to his

long practice and experience, Kang Youwei,

developed a powerful wrist for calligraphy and

created his own style. Presenting a detailed

visual analysis of Kang Youwei's particular works


goes beyond the scope of this paper; I will pro-

vide some examples to facilitate a minimal visual

contact with some peculiarities of his

brushstrokes.

Taking into exam, in particular, the characters

written in ordinary style (kaishu 楷書) or running

style (xingshu 行書), it is possible to affirm that,

although he gives particular consideration to

constant training and adequate technical

qualification as something essential for a good

calligrapher, the forms of his individual

brushstrokes are rather simple, since they

are lacking in virtuosity and attention to small

details. If we look through his works written in

the above-mentioned styles, his strokes (both

round and square) show a great sense of

strength, fluidity and freedom from the technical

orthodoxy of the calligraphy of the Tang dynasty

(618-907). Nevertheless the freedom he shows

in the way of using the tip of the brush does

not alter the balanced fundamentals of his writ-

ings.

Conclusions: the importance and the role of

calligraphy in Kang Youwei’s thought

In Guang yi zhou shuang ji, Kang Youwei, recogniz-

es the pre-eminent role played by Zhu Ciqi in

introducing him to the right techniques of

calligraphy and in helping him to penetrate

the spirit of the art. Yet, in his essay, he seems

to heighten, more his abilities as a calligraphy

critic and connoisseur rather than as a

calligrapher in the strict sense. This was

directly connected with his conception of calligra-

phy and to his personality, more inclined to the

speculation, rather than the rigid disciplinary rou-

tine that the study of calligraphy naturally re-

quires:

My personality leads me to investigate the

deeper nature of things and I have no inclina-

tion for studies that have no concrete utility.

Therefore I have been extremely lazy in study-

ing calligraphy and I only took its general

idea12.

And more:

Calligraphy is a minor art, not particularly wor-

thy for discussing it. [Nevertheless] even in

other disciplines, if we don’t aspire with deci-

sion at an advanced level of knowledge, with-

out learning something easy, how can it be

done for the more important things13?

These are the conclusive words of the twenty-

third chapter of Guang yi zhou shuang ji, in

which, Kang Youwei, describes his vision of the

art of calligraphy defining it a minor art (xiao yi),

intended as an instrument for reaching a more

important aim: forming the character for patience



and perseverance, for appraising small details and

for a correct overall view. All of these virtues,

should have been part of the personality of that

“sage” or “superior being” that he aimed to be, in

order to carry out in its entirety, the high mission

of which he felt empowered.

Notes:

* Massimo Carrante is a PhD candidate of Centre

for East Asian Studies, Heidelberg University.

1. Ledderose, Lothar, Chinese Calligraphy: Its

Aesthetic Dimension and Social Function,

Orientations, p. 35-50 (October 1986).

2. Kang Youwei talks here about a particularly

happy period of his life.

3. 廣藝舟雙楫注(清) 康有為著, 崔爾平較注, 上

海書畫出版社, 2006.1, p.173.

4. Jiucheng gong li quan ming 九成宮醴泉銘,

(632). Daoyin Fashi bei 道因法師碑 (663).

Yan jia miao bei 顏家廟碑 (780). Xuan mi ta

bei 玄秘塔碑 (841). Works carved in regular

style (kaishu) and presently preserved in

the Beilin Museum of Xi'an.


海書畫出版社, 2006.1, p.169.

6. Ibidem, p.153.

7. 康南海自編年譜 (外二種), 樓宇烈整理, 中華

書局出版, 北京 1992.9, p. 9.


海書畫出版社, 2006.1, p.173.


書局出版, 北京 1992.9, p. 15.


書局出版, 北京 1992.9, p. 16.

11. Shi men ming 石門銘 (509), Jing shi yu 经

石峪 (Northern Qi, 550-577) and Zheng

wen gong bei 鄭文公碑 (511).

12. 廣藝舟雙楫注 (清) 康有為著, 崔爾平較注,

上海書畫出版社, 2006.1, p. 174.

13. Ibidem, p. 175.

References

I. 廣藝舟雙楫注 (清) 康有為著, 崔爾平注, 上

海書畫出版社,1981

II. 廣藝舟雙楫注譯 (清) 康有為著, 鄭代昆注譯,

四川美術出版社, 2003

III. 康南海自編年譜 (外二種),樓宇烈整理,中華

書局出版, 1992

IV. 康有為書法藝術解析, 趙一新著, 江蘇美術

出版社, 2001

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1992

VI. 書法知識千題, 作著:周俊杰等, 河南美術出

版社, 1989

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1996

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術出版社, 1992

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社, 1996

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Years of Chinese Calligraphy, Chicago, Uni-

versity of Chicago Press, 1990

XII. Ch'en, Chih-mai, Chinese Calligraphers and

their Art, Melbourne, Melbourne University

Press, 1966

XIII. Hsiao, Kung-ch'üan; Israel, Jerry, A Modern

China and a New World: K'ang Yu-wei, Re-

former and Utopian, 1858-1927, University

of Washington Press, 1975

XIV. Ledderose, Lothar, Mi Fu and the Classical

Tradition of Chinese Calligraphy, Princeton

University Press, 1979

XV. Ledderose, Lothar, Chinese Calligraphy: Its

Aesthetic Dimension and Social Function.

Orientations, (Oct. 1986), pp. 35-50

XVI. Lo, Jung-pang, K'ang Yu-wei: A Biography

and a Symposium, Tucson, University of

Arizona Press, 1967

XVII. McNair, Amy, Engraved Calligraphy in Chi-

na: Recension and Reception, The Art Bul-

lettin, No.1 (Mar. 1995). pp. 106-114

XVIII. Ouyang, Zhongshi [et al.], Chinese Calligra-

phy, translated and edited by Wang

Youfen, Yale Univesrity Press, 2008



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