1

LEAYPI

LondonSchoolofEconomicsandPoliticalScience

FROMREALISMTOACTIVISM:ACRITIQUEOFRESIGNATIONIN

POLITICALTHEORY1

forthcominginGerardRosichandPeterWagner(eds.)PoliticalModernityintheXXIst

Century(Edinburgh:EdinburghUniversityPress,2015)

Thispaperpresentsacritiqueofrealisminpoliticaltheory.Itfocusesontwoissuescentralto

therealistagenda:theproblemofpoliticsascharacterisedbyradicaldisagreementandtherole

of motives in conceptualising political action. It introduces an activist approach to political

theorywhich is close to politicalmoralists' concern for justicewhile also acknowledging the

force of some realist critiques.On this approach, norms of justice develop in response to the

concernsandcommitmentsofreallifepoliticalagents,butalsoappealtohistoricallydeveloped

moral criteria in criticallyassessingdifferentpracticesofpolitical contestation.Theyare thus

sensitivetothecircumstancesofpoliticsandabletomotivatepoliticalagentsbutalsohelpus

avoidthepoliticsofresignationtowhichsomestrandsofrealismseemtogiverise.

1.Therealismcontroversyinpoliticaltheory

Philosophers,afamoussloganreads,haveonlyinterpretedtheworldinvariousways;

thepointisnowtochangeit.Onewaytounderstandtherealismcontroversyinpolitical

theoryisasadisputeaboutthemeaningandplausibilityofthisslogan.Ononesideof

the dispute stand those, call them political moralists, who read the argument in a

1IamgratefultoEvaErman,RainerForstandEdHallforcommentsonanearlierversionofthis

paper.2ThetermpoliticalmoralistscomesfromBernardWilliamswhocriticizesauthorsintheso

called highliberal tradition (e.g. Rawls) for their exclusive reliance on moral norms in

articulatingconstraintsapplyingtothepoliticalsphere,seeBernardWilliams,IntheBeginning

2

disjunctive form, and then proceed to deny its validity.2 Political change and moral

argument,theycontend,arenotamatterofeitheror,theyappearclosely intertwined

witheachother.Thechoiceisneverbetweeneitherinterpretingtheworldorchanging

itbutrathertryingtochangeitinawaythatreflectsthemostappropriate(collective)

interpretation of fundamental moral norms. On the other side of the dispute stand

those,call thempoliticalrealists,whoreadthesecondpartof thestatementas taking

priorityoverthefirst.Politicalactionandchange,theyclaim,belongtoaspherethatis

irreducible to the demands ofmorality and the particular interpretations that follow

from it.3 The domain of the political, so their argument goes, is characterized by

profound disagreement and radical conflict amongst a plurality of perspectives.

Endorsingmoralcriteria(howeverwearriveatthem)toorientthereformofpolitical

institutionswouldatbestbeinconclusive,atworstdangerous.

Politicalmoralistsareoftenaccusedofunderstandingpoliticaltheoryasakind

ofappliedethics.Theirapproach,althoughdistinctiveinitsorientationtowardsjustice

ratherthanthegoodmorallife,issufficientlyinformedbymoralprinciplestobelievein

in the possibility of reforming institutions compatibly with some collectively agreed

moralprinciples(eitherminimalproceduralprinciplesormoresubstantiveones).For

2ThetermpoliticalmoralistscomesfromBernardWilliamswhocriticizesauthorsintheso

called highliberal tradition (e.g. Rawls) for their exclusive reliance on moral norms in

articulatingconstraintsapplyingtothepoliticalsphere,seeBernardWilliams,IntheBeginning

Was the Deed : Realism and Moralism in Political Argument (Princeton: Princeton University

Press, 2008), see also Raymond Geuss, Philosophy and Real Politics (Princeton: Princeton

UniversityPress, 2008).The label is sufficiently general to capture a varietyof other authors

(fromG.A.Cohen to JrgenHabermas toRonaldDworkin, tomentionbut themost influential

ones)whoshare the view thatmoralandpolitical theorisingareclosely intertwined,despite

theirdisagreementsonhowexactlytoconstructthatrelation.3Forexcellentdiscussionsandreviewsoftherecentliteratureonpoliticalrealismandthemany

authorsassociatedtoitseeWilliamAGalston,'RealisminPoliticalTheory',EuropeanJournalof

PoliticalTheory,9/4(October1,20102010),385411,MarcStears,'LiberalismandthePolitics

ofCompulsion',British JournalofPoliticalScience,37/03(2007),53353,EnzoRossiandMatt

Sleat,'RealisminNormativePoliticalTheory',PhilosophyCompass,9/10(2014),689701.

3

their realist critics, to act politically places constraints that no philosophical

examination of the dilemmas ofmoral agents can fully capture.Whatever itsmerits,

justice isnot the first virtue of political institutions. On the contrary, ifwe really are

interested in the conditions of political action, realists emphasize, we need to draw

attentiontotheexerciseofpowerbythosewhoseektoachievepoliticalaims.Thatin

turnraisesquestionsconcerningthebasisonwhichpowercanbeexercisedinorderto

legitimatelyconstrainthosewhoareaffectedbyit.4Andalthoughjusticeandmorality

willhavearoletoplayinarticulatingthebasisforthelegitimateuseofpoliticalpower,

these are by nomeans the only criteria influencing political decisionmaking and the

theoreticalreflectionthataccompaniesit.5

Itiseasytoseewhatrealistsaredoingwhentheywarnusthatactingpolitically

isdifferent fromofferingan interpretationof thepoliticalworld,especiallywhenthat

interpretationcentresonidentifyingasetofmoralvaluesastheArchimedeanpointon

thebasisofwhichpoliticalactionunfolds.Butitisdifficulttoseewhattheypositively

stand for. One thing is to say that in seeking to legitimize the use of power, other

considerations (apart from, say, the justice of a system of rules) must be taken into

account. Another thing is to say what these considerations are. With regard to the

former, the critique appears trivial: no political moralist denies that a number of

4ThisiswhatBernardWilliamscallsthebasiclegitimationdemand,theideathatthosewho

claim political authority over a group must have something to say about the basis of that

authority,andaboutthequestionofwhytheauthorityisbeingusedtoconstraininsomeways

andnotothers.Moreover,hecontinues,thereisasenseinwhichtheymusthavesomethingto

say to eachpersonwhom they constrain. If not, therewill be peoplewhom they are treating

merelyasenemiesinthemidstoftheircitizens,p.135.5Formoreemphasisontheroleof legitimacyandthe importanceof focusingonvaluesother

than justice see, in addition to Bernard Williamss classic contribution, Raymond Geuss,

Philosophy and Real Politics (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), Glen Newey, After

Politics: TheRejection of Politics in Contemporary Liberal Philosophy (Basingstoke: Palgrave,

2001) and Matt Sleat, Liberal Realism: A Realist Theory of Liberal Politics (Manchester:

ManchesterUniversityPress,2013).

4

differentvaluesinformourattemptstounderstandpoliticalchangeorthatwhatwecall

thepolitical isaverycomplexdomaintheanalysisofwhichdoesnotneatlyoverlap

withwhateveraccountofitemergesasaresultofabstractmoralanalysis.6Withregard

tothelatter,theissueappearsmorecomplex.Arealistmightresistthecalltocomeup

withamorepositivesetofcriteria forhowweshouldunderstandpoliticalactionand

change,insistingthatthepointofthecritiqueispreciselytoavoidcommittingtoalistof

positivevalues.Iftheyweretodeveloptheirowncriteriaforinterpretingthebasison

whichpowerisexercised,realistswouldbecommittingthesamemistakeasthatwhich

they ascribe to their adversaries: reifying the political process by imposing on it

constraintsthatarenotthemselvesdrawnfrompoliticallife.Butthisresponsesounds

implausible. No realist says (orwouldwant to say) thatwhatever emerges from the

sphereofpoliticalconfrontationisipsofactoplausiblebecauseithasemergedfromthat

process,or that there isnoway inwhichnormativecriteriaare invokedtoadjudicate

betweendifferentattemptstojustifytheuseofpower.Soperhaps,thecritiqueismore

limited: in selecting standards for evaluating political action, political moralists

implausibly focusondistinctivelymoral criteriaat theexpenseofdistinctivelypolitical

ones.Thustheyfundamentallymisunderstandthenatureofthepoliticsfirstslogan.In

order to examine whether that critique of political moralism has force, we need to

considerwhatthesuggestedcriteriaare.

In this chapter Iwill focus on two ideas that are often invoked to identify the

distinguishing line between the conception of the political that political moralists

implicitly endorse and an analysis of political action that is more attuned to realist

6Indeed,herethepositionsofpoliticalmoralistsandrealistsseemtooverlap,seeforexample

EvaErmanandNiklasMller"PoliticalLegitimacyintheRealNormativeWorld:ThePriorityof

MoralityandtheAutonomyofthePolitical",BritishJournalofPoliticalScience,45/1(2015),pp

215233andMarkPhilp,"RealismwithoutIllusions',PoliticalTheory40/5(2012),pp.62949.

5

concerns. Although the literature on realism has only recently began to offer more

systematicanalysisoftheseconcepts,theyappearwithsufficientregularityinanumber

ofdiversetextstowarrantanattempttoscrutinizethemaspartofacoherentbodyof

thought.Theseare, firstly, the issueof radicaldisagreementand, secondly, theroleof

motives(otherthanmoralmotives)intheanalysisofpoliticalchange.Inthefollowing

pagesIwill trytoassesstherealistcritiqueofpoliticalmoralismwithregardtothese

twopointsandoutlineanalternative(activist)conceptionofthepoliticalthatdevelops

in tune with a realist analysis of existing instances of political agency. Although

ultimatelysidingwithpoliticalmoralistsonthenatureandpurposeofpoliticallife,this

alternativeconceptionissufficientlyattentivetothesedimensionsofrealistcritiqueof

politicalmoralismtoactasabasisforproductiveexchange.OrsoIhopetoshow.7

2.Politicalconflictandtherealnatureofpolitics

The first dimension along which to express the disagreement between political

moralistsandtheirrealistcriticsconcernstheverynatureofthedomainofthepolitical.

On both accounts, politics is marked by sharp conflict concerning both the ends of

public life and the means through which such ends ought to be pursued. Political

moralistsattempttochannelsuchdisagreementbyidentifyingdecisionproceduresable

to generate reasonable consent around the fundamentals of social and political

institutions.Theirrealistcriticsinsistthatsuchprocedureseitherunderminetheextent

to which political agents disagree even on such procedural fundamentals (the

7 For more detailed analysis of the concept of avantgarde political agency and the kind of

political theorythatplaces itat itscentre,seeLeaYpi,Global JusticeandAvantGardePolitical

Agency(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2012).

6

unavoidability of conflict thesis) or threaten to depoliticize areas of public life by

removingparticularlyagreeduponprinciplesfromthelegitimatesphereofcontestation

(theprimacyofpoliticsthesis).

Theserealistcritiquesofpoliticalmoralismareveryimportantbutbothofthem

arealsosignificantlyunderdeveloped.Considertheunavoidabilityofconflictthesis.We

can interpret the thesisasattempting tocapturesomedescriptive featuresofsociety;

the fact for example that different people hold different values, that these values are

plural and often incompatible, and that it is an illusion to think that they will ever

generateanykindofagreement, includingonminimalnormslikelytobeendorsedby

everyone. Although a political moralist might at first be inclined to dismiss this

objection as merely empirical, it is in fact far from that. Realist critiques of political

moralism do not limit themselves to pointing out empirical obstacles on the way to

realisingparticularnorms(and if theyweredoing just that, the insightsgeneratedby

realist critiques would be no different from those generated by straightforwardly

empiricaldisciplinessuchassociology,anthropologyorpoliticalscience).8Whatrealist

critiquesurgeustodoisreflectonthewaysinwhichsuchempiricalobservationsmight

be incorporated ina theory that addressesbasic factsofpolitical life (i.e. the issueof

legitimateexerciseofthecoerciveuseofpower)byappealingtonormsinternal,rather

thanexternaltopoliticsitself.Letusexamineinmoredetailwhatthatmightmean.

Ifwe take seriously the unavoidability of conflict thesiswewill come upwith

twodifferentinterpretationsoflegitimacydemandscompatiblewithnormsinternalto

it.9 One interpretation leads to the idea that since politics is by its nature inherently

8 See Stears, 'Liberalism and the Politics of Compulsion', and Matt Sleat, 'Liberal Realism: A

LiberalResponsetotheRealistCritique',TheReviewofPolitics,73/03(2011),46996.9SeefordiscussionsStears,'LiberalismandthePoliticsofCompulsion'andGalston,'Realismin

PoliticalTheory',

7

coerciveandillsuitedtopromoteavarietyofends,weshouldseektocontainitsreach

bytheorizingalternativeassociations(economic,cultural,religious)whereindividuals

canpursue their interestsandact together inamorespontaneous form.10Thus, ifwe

limitourambitionstotheattempttosecureorderratherthanguaranteejustice,wewill

containthepotentialforabusingpowerinseekingtorealisethelatter.Buttheproblem

withthisviewisthatitconflatesthestatementthatpoliticsisessentiallycoercivewith

anotherone,whichappearsmorecontroversial,namely,thatonlypoliticsisessentially

coercive. Although it is plausible to say that any exercise of political power, however

noble its inspiration, is likelytoresult ina fewelites imposingtheirownstandardsof

legitimacytotherestofthecivicbody,itisnavetosupposethatonlypoliticalelitesare

vulnerable to a similar critique. If disagreement among individuals exists and is

unavoidable,itwillshapeanyassociationinwhichtheytakepart.Ifrulesareneededto

contain suchdisagreement, thequestionofwhomakes such rules and inwhatname,

will apply to all circumstances characterized by division of labour, structures of

coordination, and collective decisionmaking. Thus, not just political institutions, but

also families, the market, religious organisations (to mention but the most relevant

examples)willentailsomedegreeofcoercioninordertoflourish.Itiscontrarytothe

spiritofrealismtoassumethattheywillspontaneouslyguaranteethepursuitofagents

ends free from any degree of unilateral interference. Even more importantly, if

disagreement pervades all areas of human interaction, the distinctiveness of the

political as that realm inwhichcollectivedecisionsmustbemadeon the faceof such

disagreementsseemsdifficulttocapture.

10SeethediscussioninStears,'LiberalismandthePoliticsofCompulsion',at548.Seealsothe

defences of what we might call modus vivendi liberalism in e.g. John Gray in Two Faces of

Liberalism (New York: New Press, 2000) or Chandran Kukathas in The Liberal Archipelago

(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress2003).

8

The second alternativeway of incorporating the unavoidability of conflict in a

realistic agenda leads to its positive endorsement in an agonistic account of public

life.11 Here the alternative to political moralism is to celebrate rather than suppress

disagreement, maintaining awareness that only in the creative engagement with

differentformsofpoliticalexpressionisgenuineemancipationeverpossible.Ifpolitics

isbyitsnatureparadoxical,thenthereassurancethatpoliticalmoralistsofferintrying

toshapeinstitutionsthatrespondtomoralconcernsisafalseone.Asagonistictheorists

emphasize, no legal and political arrangement, not even those that are relatively

enablingandempowering can ignore the fact thateverypolitics has its remainders,

that resistances are engendered by every settlement.12 It is on behalf of these

resistancesthattheperpetualnatureofconflictiscelebratedratherthansuppressed.

It is at this point that the unavoidability of conflict thesis joins the primacy of

politics thesis. Agonistic realism shares with alternative realist accounts the general

critique of political moralism: attention to existing historical experiences of political

discontentandchallengetotheconstitutedorder,skepticismtowardsuniversalmoral

valuesunderpinningpoliticallife,andsensitivitytothedynamicofpowerandexclusion

presentinallpoliticalcontexts,eventhoseofabenignsort.13Butagonisticrealismalso

differsfromtheseaccountsinitscommitmenttotheessentiallycontestedcharacterof

realityitself,amoveconsideredessentialtopreservethespiritofactivismnecessary

tonurtureongoingpoliticalcontestation.Assomeofitsmostprominentadvocatesput

11SeefortwoprominentexamplesChantalMouffe,OnthePolitical(ThinkinginAction;London:

Routledge, 2005). andBonnieHonig,Political Theory and theDisplacement of Politics (Ithaca:

CornellUniversityPress,1993).12Honig,PoliticalTheoryandtheDisplacementofPoliticsat3.13 For an excellent summary of this position see Bonnie Honig and Marc Stears, 'The New

Realism: FromModus Vivendi to Justice', in Jonathan Floyd and Marc Stears (eds.), Political

PhilosophyVersusHistory? : ContextualismandReal Politics in Contemporary Political Thought

(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2011),177205.Forcritiquesoftheroleofconsentin

therealisttraditionseealso

9

it, diminishing coercion on behalf of amore just, inclusive, consensual practice is, it

seemstous,clearlydesirable,butapoliticsorientedtoreplacingcoercionwithconsent

leaves those who seek justice and equality illprepared for (some of) the battles

ahead.14

Butletuspauseatthispointtoraisesomequestions.Howexactlydowebetter

prepare those who seek justice and equality for the battles ahead? How should we

understand thosebattles?Wheredo they come from?Who is involved in them?Who

shouldbeprepared?Arejusticeandequalityimportanttotheirpursuits?Why,ifatall?

Whoorwhatstandsontheirway?Whatisthereason?Atthispoint,realism,including

realism of an agonistic kind, becomes a vague project. Repeating the slogan of the

essentialcontestationofeverything,eventherealitself15,doeslittletoanswerthese

questions. On the contrary, asking us to cast doubt on reality and implying thatwe

ought to be suspicious of all consolidated facts, all real manifestations of existing

politicalstruggles,alldeterminatecontent,weriskturningpoliticallifeintothenightin

which all cows are black, to use Hegels expression.16 If we are seriously concerned

with exclusion and oppression in the public sphere and with how fit marginalized

subjectsaretofacethechallengesoftheirpoliticalfuture,weneedtoprovidemorethan

a theoretical celebrationofwhat they alreadyknowall toowell: thedaily struggle to

assertthemselvesasequallyworthyofdignityandrespect.Whatweneedinsteadisan

analysisofboththeepistemicandpracticalresourcesnecessarytoarticulatewhatthey

arefightingfor,inwhosename,againstwhom,andinwhatform.Itmaywellbethatno

such package of resources can be elaborated outside these sites of contestation,

14Ibid.,at2045.15Ibid.,at205.16 See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel's Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, ed.

YirmiyahuYovel(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2005)at94.

10

abstracting fromconcreteunderstandingsof the circumstancesof conflict and froma

rootedinterpretationofitscausesandpotentialsforremedy.Anditmaywellbethatno

answerisdefinitiveorsitscomfortablywithalternativeinterpretationsanddiscourses.

Buttodismissmoralattemptstoarticulatesuchsourcesofgrievance,tounderstandthe

agents involved, to interpret and assess competing critiques for fear that any such

commitment to a particular body of thought will serve only to reify some social

arrangement at the expense of all others is itself a reification of scepticism and

discontent as the most appropriate form of political engagement. A similar attitude

replacesthepoliticalmoralistsfaithonappropriateevaluativestandardswithavision

thatbeginsbycelebratingdisagreementbutleadstoapoliticsofresignation.Afterall,

whatisthepointofcontestationifthosewhocontestpowercanneverbesurethatthey

arejustifiedindoingso?17

Thisleadsmetoafinalpointonincorporatingdisagreementinpoliticaltheory:

theneedtoreconciletheprimacyofpoliticsthesiswithanactivistethics.Itisplausible

to agreewith agonistic realists that in trying to construct our futurewith others,we

woulddowelltolooktotheeventsofhistoryandtotheessentiallycontestedrealities

ofourowntime,inordertoinaugurateormaintainfuturesworthhaving.18Butconflict

in modern societies takes many forms, and involves a myriad of different agents.

Consider theexamples thatoccupy theheadlinesofnewspapers: theconflictbetween

governmentsand ratingagencies, the conflictbetweenemployers andemployees, the

conflict between secularists and believers, the conflict between foreign residents and

antiimmigrant groups, the conflict between national separatists and central

17Fora critiqueof realism thatemphasisesa similar concernwith the justificatorynarratives

central to these practices of contestation see also Rainer Forst, Justification and Critique

(Cambridge:PolityPress,2014),esp.pp.115.18HonigandStears,'TheNewRealism:FromModusVivenditoJustice',at205.

11

organizations.Areagentsembedded in theseconflictsall thesame?Are their reasons

equallyvalid?Doallperspectivesbearthesameweight?Doallinstancesofcontestation

contributetoinaugurateafutureworthhaving?Ifso,how?Andifnot,whynot?

Ofcourse,agonisticrealismcannotbeexpectedtoanswerallthesequestionsat

once.Butifitistoavoidthepoliticsofresignation,andreallyinauguratefuturesworth

having,therelevanceofthequestionconcerninghowexactlypoliticalconflictcangive

risetoemancipatoryexchangesinthepublicspherecannotbeoverstated.Iftheanswer

totheproblemofthepoliticalcanonlybegivenbyappealingtocategoriesinherentto

the political itself, we need an account of how intelligible and plausible principles of

politicalchangecanflowfromwithininstancesofpoliticalcontestation.Toinsistonthis

pointisnottounderminethatsuchprinciplesought,inanycase,toremainopenended

andwelcomingoffutureexpressionsofpoliticalcontestation.Butitwouldbeilladvised

to renounce even the aspiration to elaborate visions of politics able to capture the

sources of political dissatisfaction and to provide agents engaged in politics with

justifiedprinciplesonthebasisofwhichtoseekpoliticaltransformation.

All this leavesuswith thequestionofhowwemightapproach thequestionof

disagreement and conflict in a way that turns it into an emancipatory source for

political theorists keen to avoid both the abstraction of political moralism and the

resignation of political realism. Elsewhere I have discussed the relevance of

contestationbydefendingtheneedforanactivistapproachwhich issensitivetoboth

practices of contestation and to thenature of claims advanced through them.On this

approach,political theorydevelopsprinciplesof justice from itsengagementwith the

concerns and commitments expressed through social and political movements

12

challenging existing power structures.19 Theories of the political are informed by

observation of real life instances of political contestation and normative analyses

emerge in relation to them.Theyhelp scrutiniseandassess theprocessesandagents

involvedinsuchstrugglesandcontributetoadistinctivelypoliticalformofengagement.

Here, different interpretations of the function and purpose of political institutions

enable agents involved in practices of contestation to appeal to them in articulating

theirgrievancesandputtingforwardvisionsofalternativepoliticalorders.Inthenext

section, I shall consider some key features of political theory in an activist mode,

examine in what way it contributes to answer the realist critique and clarify how it

helps address the second challenge political realists typically address to political

moralists:themotivationalquestion.

3.Politicalmotivesandactivistpoliticaltheory

One additional dimension in which realism is thought to have an advantage over its

politicalmoralistcompetitorsisitsapparentsensitivitytomotivesthataredistinctively

characteristicofpoliticalactionandoftennecessarytoitssuccess.Ifpoliticaltheorists

aretotakepoliticsseriously,realistsargue,theyshouldalsopaycloseattentiontothe

factthatmoralprinciplesoftenfailtoguidepoliticalactioninanydirectway.Oneneeds

topayattentionbothtopotential instancesof ideologicaldistortionand tothewayin

whichthenormativeprinciplesrequireakindofmotivationalendorsement forwhich

rational persuasion alone may be insufficient. On the one hand, this means that

19Ibid.

13

principles forpolitical reformought tobeaccessible topolitically situatedagentsand

thattheyshouldappealnotonlytotheirreasonsbutalsotheirfeelings,emotions,and

partial interests.20 On the other hand, realists are careful to caution us about the

potential for regress as well as progress in seeking to transform existing political

institutions compatibly with certain moral ideals. Failing to take seriously the non

moraldimensionofpolitics,sotheargumentgoes,underminesthefactthatmoralistic

political projects are at best incapable to motivate people to take such projects

seriously, at worst dangerous in either ideologically distorting political goals or

prioritizing the pursuit of justice at the expense of equally important political values

suchaslegitimacyandstability.21

Adopting an activist approach to political theory illustrates that this contrast

might bemisleading. There is no reason to assume that taking the circumstances of

politics22 seriously comes at the expense of demanding political visions oriented to

justicebutservedbymorerealistic(embedded)interpretationsofpoliticalconflict.The

pursuitofpoliticalchangeinthenameofjusticeneednotbedivorcedfrommotivational

considerationsandfromattentiontotheideologicalfactorsthatmightdistortpolitical

discourse.Anormativeprojectcanbemotivationallysustainableifagentsembeddedin

relevantsocialstrugglesfindtheinstitutionalandsocialconditionsgoverningtheirlives

sufficientlyunacceptabletoinitiatepoliticalchangeinarequireddirection.Andyetthat

direction ought also to be acceptable by some relevant normative standard. But it is

20Galston, 'Realism inPoliticalTheory'andMarkPhilp, 'What Is toBeDone?PoliticalTheory

andPoliticalRealism',EuropeanJournalofPoliticalTheory,9/4(October1,20102010),46684.21Theremaybeapartialoverlapherebetweentherealistcritiqueandwhatisoftencallednon

ideal theory, for a discussion of the relation between the two, see Matt Sleat, 'Realism,

Liberalism and NonIdeal Theory, or Are there TwoWays to do Realistic Political Theory?",

PoliticalStudies,forthcoming.22 The expression comes from Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Clarendon,

1999)at102ff.

14

hardtoseejustwhattherelevantrealiststandardis.Itisherethatthequestionofhow

theory relates to political contestation becomes particularly pressing and where the

realistanswerseemsinsufficient.

An adequate account of the criteria for reflecting on the relation between

politicalactivismandpoliticaltheorymustbeabletotackletheproblemofmotivational

sustainabilityraisedbypoliticalrealistsbutalsoallowustointroduceamorenuanced

understanding of political conflict and its contribution to political change. The

development of political theories should be sensitive to social and political struggles

rooted in the political demand for justice. It should engage with the concerns and

commitmentsthatthesemovementsexpress.Thebestwaytoreflectonthisprocessis

to conceive of developments in political theory as closely connected to social and

political changes. Such changes reflect processes of moral and political learning

whereby certain collective commitments and the principles associated to them are

constantly reassessed in in the course of particular historical (social and political)

developments. In the course of such developments, existing interpretations of how

political institutionsought to respond to the claimsofpolitical agents are challenged,

and the engagement with such responses forces us to reflect on the plausibility of

availableprinciplesonthebasisofwhichweseektoorientourpubliclife.

Toillustratethisclaimwemightuseasanexamplethedebateonthenormative

relevance of the state, and the issue ofwhether principles of egalitarian justice have

valueoutsidestateboundaries.23Onsomenormativeaccounts,weshouldthinkofthese

principlesascloselyconnectedtopracticesofcooperationandcoercionthatonlyobtain

withtheboundariesofthestateandthatonlyapplyamongstfellowcitizens.Onother

23IhavediscussedthisexampleatmuchgreaterlengthinGlobalJusticeandAvantGardePoliticalAgency,

cit.above.

15

accounts,labeledascosmopolitan,weshouldexpandthereachofglobalprinciplesto

demand the reform of global institutions compatible with egalitarian principles of

justice.24Tosomeextent,bothcosmopolitantheoristsandtheircritics, fallpreytothe

critique of political moralism outlined in the previous pages. Both these families of

theoriesseektoprovidenormativeguidanceonanexternal,moralisticstandpointfrom

which to assess existing political institutions. They emphasize, in the case of

cosmopolitanism,themoralrelationsthatobtainamongstallhumanbeingsand,inthe

caseof its critics, thevalueof theprinciplesof cooperationor thenegative impactof

coercive institutions on the autonomy of citizens subjected to them. From the realist

point of view, although cosmopolitan critics seems to capture better their

understanding of the nature of political institutions (i.e. their essentially coercive

nature)inbothcasestheoristsunderstandtheirnormativeprojectstoprovidecriteria

thatneglectthereal(oftenunavoidable)obstaclesthatstandinthewaytoconnecting

their theorieswith theconcernsof realpoliticalaction.Forpolitical realists, then, the

wholedebatebetweencosmopolitansandtheircritics,mightbeseentooperateatthe

levelof themostadequatemoralcriteriathatallowustoreflectonrelationsbetween

politicalagents(bethemstatesorindividuals)inaglobalizedworld,thusneglectingthe

priorquestionofwhethertheseconcernsmakesensetosuchagents,inwhatwaythey

canhelptomobilizethem,andhow,ifatall,thenormativeprojectsdevelopedconnect

totheirconcernsandcommitments.

AlthoughIbelievepoliticalmoralistshaveinternalresourcestoresisttherealist

critiquemountedatthislevel,relativelylittlehasbeendoneuptothispointtoexplain

what theseresourcesare. Ifwetakeanactivistapproachtopolitical theory,wecould

24Seeforthemostrecentcontributionstothis literature,GillianBrock(ed.),Cosmopolitanism:

ForandAgainst(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2013).

16

address the realist challenge by providing an account of the ways in which political

theorists candirect their enquiry to tryand connect their theories to the concernsof

agentswhoseconcernsandcommitmentsarenotaddressedbythepoliticalinstitutions

thataresupposedtoberesponsivetothem.Forinthelattercase,politicaltheorytakes

itscuesexactlyfromsuchconcernsandcommitmentsandfromtheclaimsandpractices

ofcontestationthataredevelopedasaresultofthem.

Consider, for one example, the role played by recent global socialmovements

thatseektoexpandtheunitofanalysisfromatraditionalconcernwiththestateandthe

provisionofgoodstoitscitizenstoamoreexpansiveaccountofclaimsandobligations

across borders. Recent research in political science and political sociology has

documentedtheemergenceofnewnetworksoftransnationalprotest(forexamplethe

World Social ForumorOccupymovements) emphasizing the negative impact of neo

liberal globalization processes over the lives of millions of citizens affected by such

processes and criticizing existing institutions for failing to cope with their demands.

Theseprotestshaverevealedtheneedforamoreglobalapproachtopoliticaltheory,an

approach able to scrutinize the causes of such perverse effects, question the

effectiveness of theories focused merely on the distribution of benefits within state

boundaries,andproposingnewnormativeprinciplesand theoriesable tocapture the

concernsandcommitmentsofthesealternativeagents.

A more detailed account of how different theories of global justice fare with

regardtotheseformsofpoliticalagencywouldbeoutofplaceinthesepages.25Butthe

activist approach to political theory that I have outlined in this section allows us to

provideaspecificresponsetothequestionofmotivationalsustainabilitythatpolitical

25ButseeforadetailedanalysisYpi,GlobalJusticeandAvantGardePoliticalAgency,cit.

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realiststypicallyraise.Inthecaseofglobaltheoriesofjustice,forexample,ratherthan

seeingsuchtheoriesofjusticeasemerginginapurelyspeculativerealm,itisimportant

toanalyzethemasdevelopedinresponsetoinstancesofpoliticalaction,attentivetothe

conflictswhichagentsexperienceandsupportingsuchagentswiththeconceptualtools

necessary to better articulate their views. Normative proposals are therefore a

constitutivepartoftheactivityofengagingwithexistingsocialandpoliticalmovements

and paying attention both to the specific justification of their projects, and to the

interests,passionsandemotionsofactorswhosemotivationtoparticipateinthepublic

spheremaynotbereducibletorationalargumentation.

This sensitivity to the psychological basis for certain kinds of political actions,

allows it to also grasp the potential for making normative projects developed in

connection to such activities motivationally sustainable. For in this case, normative

theoriesdevelopwherethereisalreadypublicdemandforaparticularkindofchange,

andservetobetterarticulatetherationaleforthatchangeandtheprinciplesaccording

towhichchangemustbesought.Yet, theydoso in theawareness thatpolitics is,and

remains, an essentially contested enterprise. Therefore although change at one

particularpointintimemightbedemandedtoimprovethestatusquowithregardtoa

specific dimension (e.g. needed reforms to recalibrate the role of the state, and to

expandthereachofparticularprinciplesofsocialjustice),theseprincipleswillremain

valid only for so long as the political institutions they will help create by and large

respond to the expectationsof political agentsmobilizing to support them.Oncenew

developments in the political sphere bring about new agents demanding political

change,thecyclebeginsagainandnewprinciplesaresought.

Inexplainingmorespecificallyhowweshouldapproachfromamethodological

perspective this process of both learning from existing political movements and

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interveningactively togive themamore coherentdirection,wecandistinguish three

stages,whichIhavecalleddiagnostic,innovativeandheuristic.Inthefirstone,political

theorists observe dynamics of political antagonismwith a view to understanding the

attitudes they reveal, the agents involved in them, the kind of dissatisfaction with

political institutionstheyexpress,andtherationalorpsychologicalbasis thatsupport

the public voicing of particular concerns. Political theory here performs a diagnostic

task because it joins other social sciences in observing empirical reality, seeking to

understand the reasons for action of different political agents involved in particular

dynamicsofpoliticalconflict.

Inasecondstage,politicaltheory(againaidedbyothersocialsciences)reflects

on the causes of these conflicts and examines whether the existing social ethos, the

principles that are generally recognized as valid in the public sphere, and available

theoriesofsocialandpoliticaljustice,canhelpthesepoliticalagentsidentifyvisionsof

thepublicgoodthatreflecttheircommitmentsandprovideremediesfortheirconcerns.

Ifexisting interpretationsof the functionandpurposeofpolitical institutionsseemto

capturetheirconcernsandcommitments,theyarepreservedandsimplymodifiedfrom

within.Iftheyfail,theneedforconceptualinnovationpavesthewaytoanewstage,in

whichitisthearticulationofnewfamiliesoftheories(or,wemightalsocallthem,new

normativeparadigms)thatisatstake.

Therefore,inthissecondstage,politicaltheoryperformsaninnovatingrole.That

istosay,thekindofempiricalandconceptualanalysisdevelopedinthefirststage,lays

thefoundationforarenewedaccountofthefunctionofsocialandpoliticalinstitutions,

whichaddsnewcontent toexisting familiesof theoriesand, insomeway,supersedes

them by providing more adequate principled foundation for the claims of relevant

political agents. By relevant political agents I mean those agents whose claims on

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political institutionsareplausibleandacceptable from thepointofviewof thepublic

standards of justice endorsed up to that point. To give a more concrete example,

although, for example, both populist xenophobic movements and alterglobalisation

movementsactiveinmanyWesterndemocracieswillseektochallengeexistingpolitical

institutions and the normative principles underpinning them, the former reject both

whatisacceptableandwhatisproblematicoftheliberalstatusquo.Thelatter,onthe

contrary,seektoexpandidealsofequaltreatmentandreciprocitythatobtainwithinthe

boundaries of the state, and therefore add new demands for change to existing

normativetheories.

This is then alsowhat distinguishes activist political theory from the agonistic

accountsexaminedintheprevioussection.Ratherthancelebratingallkindsofpolitical

conflictasimportantfortheoryspurposes,wescrutinizepoliticalagencywithaneyeto

thekindofcollectivemorallearningprocessesthatwehaveendorseduptothatpoint.

Politics is, on this account, neither circular nor paradoxical, it is dialectical. The new

formsofagencythatemergefromthecritiqueofpreviousonesretainthebenefitsofthe

claimsoftheirpredecessorsthathavemetdemandsofpublicjustificationbutimprove

ontheirshortcomings.Thisofcourseisnottodenythatthereisagreyareawhichoften

makes it difficult to distinguish clearly between political practices that promote or

hinder a particularmoral learning process. In those cases, the use of theory tomake

more situated judgments can only give us negative criteria, telling us simply which

agents inpolitics clearly fall shortofqualifyingas supporting suchcollective learning

processes and are unable to provide the political resources necessary to articulate

future plausible normative theories consider again the case of racist or xenophobic

movementsandtheirfrighteningresemblancetofascistprotestsintheearlypartofthe

Twentieth century. In themore ambiguous cases, on the other hand, the decision on

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whatkindsofconcernsandcommitmentsaremostcriticalfortheprocessofnormative

innovationshouldbelefttoprocessesofdemocraticdecisionmakingthatarealsoable

tocapturetheconcernsofvulnerableminorities.

Finally,atheoryorfamilyoftheoriesthatcancontributetoshifttheboundaries

of existing normative interpretations of the function and purpose of existing political

institutionsinawaythatcapturestheclaimsofemergingpoliticalsubjectsshouldalso

containheuristicpotential.Thatistosay,thenewtheoryshouldbeabletocontributeto

existingbodiesof thoughtbyaddingnewquestionsabout theprinciplesandshapeof

future political institutions. If for example, an egalitarian interpretation of global

politicalpracticesisshowntobeabletocapturebettertheconcernsandcommitments

ofnewpoliticalsubjects,thattheorywillbemoresuccessfulinthefutureifitcanalso

anticipate some questions that the previous institutional setup ignored. Examples of

thesequestionsintheglobaljusticedebatearethenormativeandpoliticalsignificance

of human rights, the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention, the accommodation of

cultural minorities and so on. None of these questions could have been raised by

theoriesfocusedexclusivelyontheinstitutionsofthenationstateastheonceplausible

answer to thequestionof social, cultural, andeconomicmodernization thatprovoked

thedeclineofpreviouspoliticalconfigurations.26

These criteria are of course open to further revision and subject to different

interpretations.ButonthewholeIthinktheygiveussomebuildingblocksforthinking

of how political theorists should engage with transformations in the political world,

what attitude they should take to existing politicalmovements and how they should

integratetheiractivityintheoriesthataresensitivetodynamicsofpoliticalconflictbut

26SeeforfurtherdiscussionofthispointJurgenHabermas,TheInclusionoftheOther:Studiesin

PoliticalTheory(CambridgeMass.:MITPress,1998)atesp.10514.

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preservesomecriticalpurchaseintheirwork.Oncewethinkoftheprocessofpolitical

theorizing as developing in conjunction with larger social processes, the risk of

developing theories thatare irrelevant,unable tomotivateexistingpolitical agentsor

vulnerabletoideologicaldistortionisconsequentlyminimized.

4.Conclusion

InthischapterIhaveexaminedaprominentcritiquetomostmainstreamapproachesto

contemporarypolitical theory: the realist critique.Normativepolitical theory, realists

maintain,tendstooverlymoralisediscussionsonthenatureandprinciplesnecessaryto

guidetheconductofexistingpoliticalinstitutions.Theyproducecriteriathatignorethe

essenceofpoliticalexchange(conflictanddisagreement)andthecomplexmotivations

ofagentsinvolvedinpoliticalcontestation.AlthoughIbelievethattherealistchargeis

inprincipleanswerable,manypoliticalmoralistshaveeitherdismissedthequestionsor

failedtoprovideapersuasiveresponse.Havingassessedthestrengthsandweaknesses

of the realist critique, I tried tooutlinewhere anactivistapproach topolitical theory

could interveneto fill thegaps.Byreflectingonthecriteria forhowpolitical theorists

can engage with existing processes of political contestation activist political theory

seeks to draw a balance between sensitivity to real world movements conducive to

soundnormativecriteriaandsufficientcriticaldistanceconducivetoamoreplausible

basisonwhichtoarticulate theirclaims.Asimilarapproach, Ihope,sacrificesneither

thestringencyofnormativeprinciplesnortheirmotivationalsustainability.Ofcourse,

mysuggestionsandtheconcreteexamplesIusedtosupportmycasearebynomeans

immune to critique. Themoremethodological argument I have tried to present here

does not depend on finding uncontroversial examples which are intended more as

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illustration rather thancarrying theburdenofproof. Still, one canonlyhope that the

thoughtsarticulatedhereprovideasufficientbasis for furtherthinkingaboutpolitical

contestation as neither uncritically celebrated nor unduly ignored but rather

reflectivelymediatedbynormativecritique.For it isonly then thatwewillbeable to

avoid the politics of resignation towhich some strands of realism come dangerously

close.