political parties and foreign policy

8/15/2019 Political Parties and Foreign Policy

1/20

Political Parties and Foreign Policy: A Structuralist ApproachAuthor(s): Gary KingSource: Political Psychology, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Mar., 1986), pp. 83-101Published by: International Society of Political Psychology

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2/20

Political

sychology,

ol.

7,

No.

1,

1986

Political arties nd

Foreign

olicy:

A

Structuralist

pproach1

Gary

King2

This

rticlentroduceshe

heory

nd

approach

f

tructural

nthropology

and

applies

t to

a

problem

n

American

olitical

cience.

Through

his

p-

proach,

he

bipartisanoreign

olicy ypothesis

nd the two

residencies

hypothesis

re

reformulated

ndreconsidered.ntil ow

articipants

nthe

debate ver achhave

nly

arely

uilt

n,

or

ven

ited,

he ther's

esearch.

An

additional

roblem

s that he

widespread

onventional isdomn

up-

port fthe wohypothesess nconsistentithystematiccholarlynalyses.

This

aper

demonstrates

hat he wo

hypotheses

redrawn

rom

he

ame

underlying

tructure.ach

hypothesis

nd

the

heoretical

odel t

mplies

is

conceptually

nd

empirically

xtendedo take nto

ccount

he

ifferences

between

ongressional

eaders

nd

members.

hen,

istorical

xamples

nd

statistical

nalyses

f

House

roll all

data are used o demonstratehat he

hypotheses,

hile ometimes

upported

or

the

ongressional

embers,

re

far

more

pplicable

o

eadership

ecision

making.

onclusions

uggest

hat

conventional isdom e

revised o take

hese

ifferences

nto ccount.

KEY

WORDS:

congress; oreign olicy;

eaders;

political

arties; residency;

tructural

anthropology

INTRODUCTION

Structural

nthropology

s a

theory

nd an

approach

which as not

often

een onsidered

r

used

n

political

cience esearch.

his

paper

n-

'I

appreciate

he

ritical

ommentsn n

earlier ersion

f

hiswork

y

Gerald

enjamin,

eon

D.

Epstein,

arbara

Hinckley,

erbert .

Kritzer,

eatrice .

Lewis,

Ann

McCann,

nd

especially

ichardM.

Merelman.

am

also

grateful

or

he

uggestions

f

the

ditor nd

anonymous

eferees.

2Department

f

Politics,

ewYork

University,

ew

York,

New

York

10003.

83

0162-895X/86/0300-0083$05.00/1

?

1986

International

ociety

of

Political

Psychology


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3/20

84

King

troduces tructuralismnd

applies

t

to a research

roblem

n

American

politics.

ne results that his

houldmake t

easier or thers o use the

theorynd approachn other reas of political cience. tructuraln-

thropology,

s

eloquentlyxplicatedy

Levi-Strauss

1963,

1966,

969)

nd

others,

mplies

everal

ssumptions.

First,

ll of

culture

s

divided

nto wo

ategories:

urfaceevel

r

con-

tent nd

deep

tructure.ocial

scientistsever bservemore han he on-

tent,

utwe

should,

t

s

argued,

lways

ttempt

o nfer o the

tructures.

The

structuralist

oal

s to

discovertructures

hich

nderliend

determine

a

variety

f

surfaceevel

ultural

henomena.

Second,

ll

structuresake he orm f

binaryppositions,

nd

ll

mean-

ing s derivedromheseontrasts.he

ymbol

red, or

xample,

oesnot

mean

stop

without

ts ontrast ith

he

pposing

ymbol

green,

nd

ts

associated

oncept, go

Leach,1970).

Social

psychologists,

or

xample,

have

ong

dentifiedocial

groups rimarily

n

relationo eachother

Com-

mins nd

Lockwood,

979).

Political cientists

sually

efer o

power

ela-

tionships

ith

vertical

metaphor:

s

in

up:down::superordination:subor-

dination::upper

lass:lower

lass:: on

yourway

o the

op : falling y

he

wayside.

Structuralnthropologistsometimesofurtherndassume r assert

that

hese

inary

ppositions

re

fundamental

haracteristicsf

the

human

mind,

ut

lthough

his

ssumption ay

be of

academic

nterest,

t s

in-

herently

nobservablend

usually nnecessary

or

he

nalysis

f he

esearch

problem

eing

onsidered.

chwartz

1981:159),

or

xample,

istinguishes

between hree

evels of

universality

n

dual

classification.

he

most

methaphysical

re formal

niversals,

hich

nclude

undamental

ssump-

tions

bout he

binary

ature f

human

hought.

n

between,

re substan-

tiveuniversals,hich reobservable utdo seem o existn naturee.g.,

hot-cold,

eft-right,

p-down).

inally,

here

re

sociological

niversals,

which

re the

lignment

f

certain

moral

nd

social states o

particular

substantive

ontrasts. t

is useful

o add to

Schwartz's

ierarchyolitical

universals,

hich

define s

the

lignment

f

certain

olitical henomena

with

he

more

asic

substantiver

social-psychological

ontrasts.

Third,

evi-Strauss

rgued

hat t s

unnecessary

o

examine

ll

societies

or to

compare

variety

ftime

eriods

o

discover undamentaltructures.

For ust smessages hich ereceiverom ifferentenses anbetransform-

ed into achother

e.g., visualizing story),

he

past

xists

nly

s a

struc-

tural transformation

f the

present.

hus,

diachronic

overtime)

nd

synchronic

cross-cultural)nalyses

re

wo

ways

f

doing

he ame

hing

looking

or

tructure

nd,

by

o

doing, ncoveringmportant

haracteristics

of human ulture.




4/20

Political

Parties

and

Foreign

Policy

85

Byusing

version

f his

tructural

nthropologicalpproach,

newhich

is

unencumbered

y

many

f

ts

metaphysical

ssumptions,

his

aper

den-

tifies

nd

examines wo

binary ppositions

t

the evel

of

the

political

universal.3hegoal s not o earn bout heformal niversalsf thehuman

brain,

ut nstead

o

earn bout hese

wo

oliticalppositions

nd heir

ela-

tionships

n

American

olitics.eep

tructures

of

nteresthen

e

move

rom

the

political

niversals

o

the

ocial-psychological

nd substantiveniver-

sals

n

order o

assist

n

understanding

nd

explaining

he urface-levelela-

tionships

f concern o

social cientists.

In

the sectionswhich

follow,

wo

binary

ppositions xisting

n

American

olitics

re

ntroduced.

elationships

etweenhe wo re first

explored ith onventionalssumptions.hese ssumptions,owever,re

found o

be nconsistentith

vailable

cholarly

vidence. better

xplana-

tion f

he

elationship

etweenhe

ppositions

s then

resentedlong

with

supporting

ata.

Finally,

fter

rguing

hat one

structural

xplanation

underliesoth

ppositions,

xtensionso

other

urface-level

henomena

re

made. t

turns utthat tructural

nthropologyrovides

useful

pproach

which

elps

ncover

elationships

etween

everaliteratures

arely

onsidered

together,

ut

which

re

n

fact

nexorably

elatednd

beneficially

ombined.

As a result, ewly ypothesizedelationshipsmong everal ata sets re

derived. he

data,

n

turn,

rovide

he

first

ystematic

vidence f several

important

heoretical

elationships.

THE

REPUBLICAN/DEMOCRATIC AND FOREIGN

POLICY/DOMESTIC POLICY

BINARY

OPPOSITIONS

The two

binaryppositions

onsidered ere re thedistinctionse-

tweenhe

arties

ndbetweenwo

ategories

f

public olicy.

onsider irst

the

ppositions

etween

he

Democratic

nd he

Republican

arties.

learly

this

inary

ategorization

xistsn

most

arts

f

theAmericanulture: or

the

verage

itizen,

o be

dentified

ith

he

Democratic

arty

s to

generally

prefer

more iberal

ositions.

o be elected s a

Republican

s,

n

general,

to takemore

onservativessue tands.

Republicans

ndDemocrats eet

n

different

ational,tate,

nd ocal

conventionso

choose

variety

f

party

andidates;

hey

ote

or

ifferent

candidatesndifferentrimariesrcaucuses nd siton differentides f

an aisle

n

bothhouses f

congress,

n all

but

one

of

the tate

egislatures,

3Although

nly

U.S.

culture s

considered,

he

oppositions

ntroduced

elow

can

be

extended

to other

nations

using

slightly

more

general

erminology.




5/20

86

King

and

n

thousands

f ocal

city, ounty,

own,

tc.)

governments.

orexam-

ple,

Social

dentity

s defined

y

Tajfel

1982:

24)

as that

art

f the

n-

dividuals'

elf-concept

hich erives romheir

nowledge

f...

membership

[in] socialgroup...togetherithhevalue nd emotionalignificancef

that

membership.

or officeholdersocial

dentity

efers

irectly

o their

party

dentification.

Although

he

Republican/Democratic

istinctions clear

nough

o

give

parties

eparatemeanings,

he

boundary

etweenhetwo s not wellde-

fined. ates

f

plit-ticketoting,

roll-off,

nd

drop-off

Burnham,

970)

are

high;

he

proportion

f the

lectorate

dentifying

ith

political arty

is

far rom

omplete;

f

hose

who

do

dentify

ith

political

arty,

ariable

numbersote naccordwithheir artyCrottyndJacobson,980); arty

identifications

volatile,

s are

aggregate

lection

eturns;

egislatorsarely

use their

artymembership

s the ole cue for

voting

ecisions

Clausen,

1973);

nd

even

he

deological

istinctivenessf

aspects

fthe

parties

eem

to havedeclined.

In

sum,

he

boundary

etween

he

parties

s

crossed

asily

nd

often,

and can be

considered

loose

see

Leach

1976:

33-36)

or definitionf

a

'boundary'

nd

Merelman

1984)

for

xamples

nd

definitions

f

the

on-

cept s it s usedhere].Buteven houghheboundaryslooser, heparty

distinctions far rom

eing

ost.

n

the

eneral

ase,

Allen ndWilder

1975)

find

hat

ven

when

roup

eliefsre

similar,

he

minimal

rocess

f n

and

out

group ategorization

s

enough

o make

n

group

avoritism

ersist

see

also

Billig

nd

Tajfel,

1973;

Sole

et

al.,

1975).

n

fact,

heres

even ome

counter-intuitive

vidence

hat

when

roups

ave

imilar

alues,

ntergroup

discriminations

actually

eightened

plausibly

n

order o

protect

roup

distinctiveness.

o,

party

oundaries

re

weakening

ut

o not eem n

danger

of

osing

heir

meaning.

The second inary ppositionobe consideredere s thedistinction

between

heAmerican

bipartisan pproach

o

foreignolicy

ndthe

par-

tisan

pproach

o domestic

olicies.

t

s

an often tated

spiration

o

keep

politics

ut

of

foreignolicy,

n

both

ongressional

eliberationsnd

public

discussion.

Politics

tops

t

the

water's

dge,

t

s oftenwritten

Bliss

nd

Johnson,

975).

Thisdistinction

uarantees

hat

ven

when

olitics

s

part

of

foreignolicy

ecisions,

t

s

usually

withinhe hetoricalonstraints

f

bipartisanship.

he

boundary

etween

he

way

itizens

nd eaders eal

with

foreignnddomesticoliciesmay otbe asstrongs toncewas,but tdoes

exist

nd s

clearly

elevant.

There s a

large

ody

f

ocial-psychological

ork

which

may

artially

explain

he

xistence

f

these

ppositions

n

terms

f n

group/out

roup

distinctions.or

xample,

tein

1976)

inds

n

review

f

mpirical

iterature

from

everal

isciplines

hat

nter-group

conflict

oes ncrease

nternalohe-

sion

under

ertain onditions.

ajfel 1982)

finds

greement

ith

his

pro-




6/20

Political

arties

nd

Foreign

olicy

87

position

rom,

mong

thers,

reud nd

arly

rustration-aggression

heorists.

Other

onsequences

f

n

group/outroup

onflict orwhich

ajfel

cites

evidence

nclude he

ncreased

positive

valuation

f

he

ngroup

r ts

pro-

ducts.

For

the

Democratic/Republican

pposition,

he most

pronounced

cognitive

ndattitudinalistinctionsre

ikely

o occurwhen he

partiesry

to

change

he tatus

nd

power

f

each

ther

Brown

nd

Ross,

1982).

Rele-

vant

xamples

f

accentuated

arty

istinctiveness,

ut

group

iscrimina-

tion,

nd

heightened

evels

f

nter-party

erbal ombat nclude

egislative

motions orwhich he

president

r

other

eaders

f the

parties

ave

their

reputation

t

stake,

lectoral

ampaigns

n

which heres an attack n

the

veryxistencef the ppositionroup,nd ndebatesnwhich heparties

attack

undamental

rinciples

n

which he

opposition

makes ts

case.

A

majorparadox

f

these wo

oppositions

s that he ame

political

actors

who

re

pushed

part y

he

party

pposition

re

pulled

ogether

n

foreign

olicy

matters. e

will

ee hat or

arty

eaders,

hese

ross-pressures

are

xaggerated.

neofthe

ontributionsfthis

aper,

herefore,

s to

sug-

gest

framework

or

understanding

his

roblem.

OPPOSITION

SIMILARITIES

Traditionally,

hese

wo

ppositions

ave

been

reated

eparately

r

as

only

artially

elated;

fter

ll,

they

re

prima

acie

different

henomena.

But

can

they

e

usefully

tudied

ogether?

rethe wo

binary

ppositions

related?

nd f

they

re,

what

orm

oes

the

relationship

ake?

Guided

y

structuralism,

lternative

nswers

o

these

uestions

re

now

explored.

Oneconventionalndclearly lausibleonnectionsthat eferredo

by

CecilV.

Crabb

1957: 198),

nd

mentioned

y many

thers:

The

two

important

actorshat

normally

ay

e

expected

o favor

he

chievement

of

bipartisan

ooperation

n

foreign

ffairs

re the

nonideological

ature

of

American

arties

nd the

bsence f

strict

arty

iscipline

n

congress.

Put

differently,

hen

here s

less

partisanship

i.e.,

weak

boundaries

e-

tween he

parties),

ipartisanship

n

foreign

olicy

s

easier o

achieve. he

hypothesis

s that

when

he

definitional,

ttitudinal,

nd

behavioral oun-

dary etweenheRepublicanndtheDemocraticartiesreaks own, he

boundary

etween

oreign

olicy

ipartisanship

nd

domestic

olicy artisan-

ship

becomes

ighter

nd

ess

permeable;

hat

s,

partisan

olitics

ould

e

less

ikely

o

cross

he

boundary

nd

nfect

oreignolicy

ecision-making.

That

Professor

Crabb

refers o

the

loose

party

boundary

by

its

nonideological

ature

mphasizes

hat

his

cultural ode is

very

ifferent

from

ightly-boundedodes,

such

as

ideology

or

religion.




7/20

88

King

Although

his

tatementf the

relationship

etweenhe wo

opposi-

tions s

theoretically

easonable,

t s not

upported

y variety

f

evidence.

Consider

hree

ontradictory

istorical

nd

cross-sectional

xamples.

First,lthoughheres considerablevidencehatAmericanolitical

parties

re

becoming

ore

ermeable,

oose,

nd

porous Crotty

nd

Jacob-

son,

1980),

heres also evidence-or

t

least

widespread

xpert pinion-

that

artisan

olitics

re

ncreasingly

nfecting

he

foreignolicy

rena.

As

evidence,

onsider hace

1978)

s

representative

f

scholarly,

ournalistic,

and other

pinion:

Thekind

f

broad

onsensushat btained

uring

he

postwar

ra ndwhich ecame

shibbolethfAmerican

oreignolicy

may

no

longer

e

possible

hort f war.

Consistent ith his s a dramaticncreasensuggestionsf howto

tighten

he

oreign-bipartisan/domestic-partisan

oundary.

hese

roposals

include

reating

d hoc

bipartisan

roups

n

congress

o follow

mportant

foreign olicy

ssues

Hamilton,

978),

ncreasingongressional

xpertise

(Rourke,1977),

establishing

ommitteesf

the

president's

abinet

nd

members f

congress

Manning, 977),

ncreasingolitically

esponsible

behavior

rom

merica's

eaders

Bax, 1977),

nd

having

he

president

ct

in

ways

which ould

ncouragearty

eaders

n

congress

o work

more lose-

ly ogethernforeignolicyssuesFryendRogers,979).Ofcourse, irect

empirical

nalyses

ould

be better

vidence f this

oint,

utnone

xist.4

Therefore,

n

thishistorical

xample,

he

trength

f the

boundary

n

each

of

thetwo

binary

ppositions

eemed o

vary

ogether-oosely

e-

fined

oundaries

etween

oreign

nd

domestic

olitics eing

more

ikely

when here re

oosely

efined

arties.

he nitial

ypothesis

f an

inverse

relationship,

lthough

onsistentith

onventional

isdom,

s not

upported

in

this

irst

xample.

As a

second

xample,

onsiderwo

ypes

f

people enerally

istinguish-

edby ocioeconomicevelswithducation eightedeavilynthedistinc-

tion).

Most

nalyses

ave

hown

olitical

arties

o be

more alient o

those

in

the

pper

ES

groups;

hese

roups

remore

olarized

long artisan

ines

and

aremore

ikely

o

dentify

ith,

nd

be

active

n,

a

political arty

han

lower ES

groups Ladd

and

Lipset,

971;

Ladd with

Hadley,

978).

However,

pper

ES

groups

re also

more

ikely

o

support

bipar-

tisan

oreign

olicy

nd to

prefer

ipartisan

oreignolicies.

or

example,

John

Mueller

1973:

Ch.

5)

identifies

follower

entality

s

characteriz-

ingpeoplewho, take s cuesfor heir wnopiniononwar nparticular

and on

foreign

ffairsn

general]

he

ssue

position

f

prominent

pinion

4There

s

much

esearch

hich

ould

usefully

stablish

his

elationship.

ne

example

might

be

to

content

nalyze

amples

f

debates n

the

House nd

Senate

loors n

foreign

nd

on

domestic

olicy

ssues.

evels

f

conflict

ould

hen

e

compared

nd

assessed.




8/20

Political

arties

nd

Foreign

olicy

89

leaders,

specially

he

resident.

ueller's

urvey

nalyses

learly

how

hat

higher

ES

groups

ave

higher

roportions

f

followers.

It

may

eem

omewhat

ontradictory

hat

hose

n

upper

ES

groups

arebothmore artisanndmoreikelyobe followers, articularlyince

the

particular

ath

n

which

hey

re

following

he eader

may

not

be

con-

sistent ith

heir

elatively

trong

artisan

redispositions.owever,

omeone

with

clear

understanding

f

the

differences

etween

he

parties

s

likely

to

understandhen

his

oundary

hould

e

breached,

nd

would

herefore

be more

ikely

o

support

uch

n

action

nder

ppropriate

ircumstances.

Thus,

in

this

second

example,

for

those

groups

n

which

the


oundary

s

tight,

he

bipartisan

oreign

olicy/par-

tisan omesticolicyoundarysalso ight.his sadditionalvidencegainst

the

original

ypothesis;

he

oppositions

o

seem

o

vary

ogether.

As

a

final

xample,

onsider

he

differences

etween

members

nd

leaders f

the

House of

Representatives.

ince

eadership

n

the

House s

solely

ased

on the

political

arty istinctions,

t

s

a

safe

ssumption

hat

the


oundary

s

tighter

or he

eaders han he

members.

he

question

hen

oncerns

he

alience f

theother

pposition

to

these

wo

groups;

he

proposition

bove

ndicates

hat

his

oundary

s

tighteror hemembers,hile he wopreviousxamplesuggesthe everse.

Establishing

this

latter

possibility-that

the

porousness

of

the


oundary

aries n

the

same

direction

s the

foreign/domestic

olicy

boundary-would

rovide

he first

ystematic

evidence f

this

bipartisan

oreign

olicy

ypothesis,

n

this

aper

r n

the

iterature.

With

oll

all

data from

he

first

ession

for

omparability)

f

each

of

five

ost-presidential

lection

ongresses

1961-1977),

his

uestion

an

be

explored.

y

ncluding

hose

otes n

which

he

president

ook

publicpositionseeCongressionaluarterly)nd

using

he

epresentative's

ote s

the

nit f

analysis,

hose oll

alls n

which

larger

roportion

f

represen-

tatives

oted

re

weighted

ore

eavily.

lthough

ome

epresentatives

ight

avoid

ontroversial

important )

otes,

cursory

xamination

f

roll

alls

indicates

hat

his

weighting

s

generally

n

ccord

with

onceptual

mportance.

A

potential

roblem

ith

he

nalysis

s the

lustering

f

observations

by

representative

nd

by

roll

all,

possibly

ausing

n

underestimation

f

the

tandard

rrors.

owever,

ecause

he

ata et

s so

arge154,709

oting

decisions),ll of thestandardrrorsrevery mall, nda corrections

therefore

ot

ikely

o

change

his

ppreciably.5

lso,

ince

many

ecisions

in

congress

re

concluded

ong

before r

entirely

ithout

formal

oll

all,

SSincehis

s

a

pooled

ross-sectional

esign,

eteroskedasticity

ould

roduce

nefficient

nd

biased

stimates. n

analysis

f the

residuals,

owever,

ndicates

o

major

problems.




9/20

90

King

there

may

e

a

selection

ias

see

Barnow

t

l.,

1980). inally,

ecause

nly

the

first

ongressional

ession f

each

presidency

as

used,

honeymoon

effects

Manheim, 979) may

cause

problems. owever,

ecause

these

analyses

renot

losely

elatedoa

possible

oneymoon

ffect,t s

unlikely

to

greatly

lter

he

results.

urther

nalysis

f

other essions

ould

never-

theless e

very

seful.

ualifications

side,

hese

ataremain

mong

he

est

which re available t

present

o

analyze

hese

uestions.

In

order o facilitate

omparison,

ll

equations xplain

he

robability

of

voting

with he

president,

nd all control

or the effects

f

region

(north/south),

arty

eadership,

In

i.e.,

president's)

nd

Out

i.e.,opposi-

tion)

party

membership

Republican/Democraticarty

ifferencesre

not

very trongncomparisono In/Out arty ifferences),ssue rea,presi-

dent,

ndtime

eriod.

he

consequence

fthis

rocedure

s to

take

nto

c-

count

everal

lausible

ival

ypotheses

bout

oting

ith

he

resident.6

he

model s a

logistic

nalysis

f tabular ata. n

party

membersre

expected

to

support

he

resident

ore

hanOut

party

members.

n

the ase

of

bipar-

tisan

ecision-making,

he

n/Out

arty

plit

n

support

f the

president

s

hypothesized

o be

greater

n

domestichan n

foreign olicy

ecisions.

In

order

o

allow

for

he

possibility

hat

heres

more

ariation ithin

the road ategoriesfdomesticndforeignolicyhan etweenhem,here

are

three

oreign

olicy

nd

four

domestic

olicy

ategories

f

roll

calls.

This

oding

f

policy

ategories

s

consistent

ith

aried

esultsrom

eparate-

ly

onducted

tudies

see

Kessel

1974)

nd

Clausen

1973)

or

imilar

omestic

codings

nd

Hughes

1978)

for

imilar

oreign

olicy

odings)].

The

figures

re

presented

ith

ll

years

1961-1977)

ombined

ecause

preliminary

nalyses

ndicated

hat

imilar

elationships

enerally

old

up

over

ime nd

because f

he

enefitsf

aving

pace

nd

reducing

omplex-

ity. igure presentshepredictedalues fa logisticquationxplaining

the

robability

f

the

arty

eader

oting

ith

he

resident.'

stimated

ro-

babilities or

he n

and

Out

parties

cross he

even

olicy

reas

ppear

n

the

Figure.

he

arger

he

difference

etween

he n

and

Out

parties

or

particular

olicy

rea

the

vertical

istance

etween

he

ines

n

the

figure),

the

tronger

re

the

party

oundaries or

hat

policy

rea.

The first

hing

o

notice

bout

Figure

is

that,

s

expected,

n

party

membersf

the

House

of

Representatives

the

op

ine

n

the

igure)

upport

6Including

hese

tatisticalontrols

ubstantially

educeshe

ossibility

hateaders

nd

members

whovote

with he

president

o

so

by

coincidence

atherhan

esign.

7The ormal

eadership

f each

party

re the

nly

eal eaders

n

congress.

or

this

nalysis,

only

he

ighestanking

eader romach

arty

ho otess

considered.f he

op

hree

eaders

do notvote

excluding

he

peaker,

ho

by

raditionotes

nly

n

the ase

of a

tie),

he

oll

call s excluded

rom he

nalysis.




10/20

Political

Parties and

Foreign

Policy

91

the

president

ar

more ften hanOut

party

members

the

ower

ine).

But

Figure

also

ndicates

hat

xcept

or efense

olicy

which ould

lausibly

be

explained

y

Vietnam

ecoming

ore

f

a domestic

han

foreign

olicy

issue which, ncidentally,upportshefirstxample,bove)-there s a

striking

ifference

n

eadership

upport

or

he

resident:

n

foreign

olicy,

the

probability

fan

In

party

ongressional

eader

upporting

he

resident

is

about

5

percentage

oints

more han ut

party

eaders

excluding

efense).

However,

his

plit

n

partyeadershipupport

or

he

resident

s about wice

as

great

n

the

our omestic

olicy ategories.

hus,

mong

he

arty

eader-

ship,

heres a clear

difference,

very ight

oundary,

etween

olitics

n

foreign olicy-which

ends o be

bipartisan-and olitics

n

domestic

policy which endsobepartisan.his s witnessedy he lear istinction

betweenhe eft nd

right

ides f the

figure.

In

a

parallel

resentation,

igure

displays

he ame

data,

but

for

he

general

membership

f

theHouse. The differenceetween

he wo

figures

is dramatic:

mong

he

members

heres

considerably

ess

distinction

i.e.,

looser

boundaries)

etween

oreign

nd domestic

olicy

decision-making

(i.e.,

betweenhe

eft nd

right

ides

f the

figure).

here

s,

however,

till

PROBABILITY

,

F THE

PARTY

.90

IN

PARTY

LEADER

VOTING

WITH

HE

.80

A

PRESIDENT

.70 /

.60

OUT

ARTY

.50

.40

.

\

.30

I

I

I

I

For-

For-

De-

So-

Gov't En-

Agri-

eign

eign

fense

cial

Mgt

ergy

culture

Trade

Aid Wel-

fare

POLICY AREA

Mg.

1.

In

and Out

party

eadership

upport

or he

president.

ource:

ercent-

ages

computed

rom he

PM,MI

ogit

model.

.f.

=

48,

G2

=

10667.35.

ote:

For ll

figures,

odel

bbreviations

re

s follows:ssue r

policy

rea

I),

Presi-

dent

P),

Party

eader's

ositionL),

and

party

embershipM).




11/20

92

King

some

relationship.

or

example,

n

voting

or

foreign

id decisions

here

is

on the

average

o

In

and Out

party

ifference

n

the

probability

f a

representativeoting

with he

president.

n

contrast,

n the

government

managementategory,npartymembersreabout enpointsmoreikely

to votewith he

president

hanOut

party

members.

ut

although

hedif-

ferences

re

n

he orrect

irection,

he oundariesre

nowhereear s

tight

as

for

he

party

eaders

epresented

n

Figure

.

Thus

n this

xample,

s

in

the

previous

wo,

he

wo

binary pposi-

tions end o

vary

ogether:

hen he


oundary

s

tight as

for

the

party eaders),

he

Foreign-Bipartisan/Domestic-Partisa

boundary

s also

tight.

When

here re

somewhat eaker

arty

istinctions

(as forHousemembers),herere lso ooser istinctionsetweenypesf

politics

bipartisan

r

partisan)

ndifferent

olicy

reas

foreign

r

domestic).

It is clear hat

n

alternative

xplanation

s

needed.

TWO

BINARY

OPPOSITIONS-ONE

UNDERLYING

STRUCTURE

The

nitial

roposition

asthat he

wo odesvaried

nversely:

hen

the

boundary

etween ne was

tight

he other houldbe loose. This

.79

.60

IN PARTY

PROBABILITY

MEMBER

OF

A

/

REPRESENTATIVE

50

VOTING

ITH

THE \ / / 1

PRESIDENT

.40

/

OUT

PARTY

V

MEMBER

.30

.20

.1o

I

I

I

I

I

I

.

Foreign

For- De- So- Gov't En-

Agri-

Trade eign fense cial Mgt ergy culture

Aid Wel-

fare

POLICY AREAS

Fig.

2. In and

Out

party epresentatives'

upport

or

hePresident. ource:

Percent-

ages computed

rom he

PLM,MI

logit

model. d.f.

=

108,

G2

=

4982.28;

MI com-

ponent:

d.f.

=

6,

G2

=

315.17.




12/20

Political

Parties and

Foreign

Policy

93

proposition

although

ot

xtensivelyxplored

nthe iteraturewas

sup-

ported

y

plausible

rgument

nd conventional

olitical

ciencewisdom.t

appears

s comments

n

scholarly

rticles

ndas a well

nown

act

n

many

textbooks.owever,mpiricalvidencerom hreexamplesemonstrated

that hiswas

probably

ot

he

ase.

Rather,

he oundariesetweenhe

odes

seemed o

vary

ogether

when

necode

was

oose,

he ther ode

was oose

as

well. his eaves

s

with

vidence

f

relationship

ut

with o

explanation.

In

order o

derive n

explanation,

t s

mportant

o

recognize

hat

m-

plicit

n

thediscussion

hus

ar s that ach

of

these

inary

ppositions

s

a

signal

r

metaphoricymbol

or

he

ther.

t was

mplied

hat he

pposi-

tions

aried

ogether

r

apart

r that ne caused

heother.

An

alternative

formulation,ndthebasisfor he xplanationo beoffered,s that he wo

oppositions

re

metonymic;hey

re

ontiguous

oeach ther.

n other

ords,

one

binarypposition

s a structural

ransformationf

the ther:

ne

fun-

damental

tructure

nderliesothdistinctions.

Thecommon

tructuralasisfor

hese

wo odes s thedistinction

e-

tween we nd

they or,

more

enerally,

etween

same nd

different;

theformerre

usedbecause

hey

avemore irect elevanceo the urface-

level

elationships

f

nterest).

he

concept

f

we doesnothave

meaning

until he

pposingoncept

f

they

s

contrasted

nddefined.

his

distinc-

tion s

recognized

n

many

reas: For

example,

avid Truman's Wave

Theory

f

nterest

roup

ormations based n this istinction:

Organiza-

tion

egets ounterorganization,

e

writes

Truman,

956).

mplied

s that

withouthe

riginal

rganization,

he

ounterorganization

ouldnothave

defined

tself

s

a

group

as

we )

withouthe irst

roup orming

and

den-

tifying

hemselvess we and

everyone

lse as

they ).

The ame

rinciple

anbe

applied

o Middle astern

olitics:

oncomi-

tantwith he

harp

ncrease

n

mmigration

f

Jews o Palestine arlier

n

this enturynd their elf-identifications we, nd otherss they, as

the elf-definition

f

the

Arabs

iving

n

the rea as

we,

nd theJews s

they

Safran,

1978);

efforts

t

linguistic

istinctivenesslso

increased

during

his

period

Seckback,

974).

War,

for

example,

ould

not exist

withouthe

we/they

pposition.

There

re,

of

course,

many olitical

henomena

hich o

notderive

from

we/they

istinction,

s when

olitical

ction s based

on a sense f

community

r consensus.n thefirst

residential

lections,

or

xample,

political hetoricmphasizedhat hepolitical artyo whom he peaker

belonged

est

represented,

r

in

fact

ctually

as,

the

will

of

thenation.

JohnAnderson's

976 National

nity arty,

nd

Reagan's

984

ppeal

for new

patriotism

re more ecent

xamples.

The current

emocratic/Republican

pposition

an be reformulated

in this

manner as

my party/other

arty,

and the

Foreign-

Bipartisan/Domestic-Partisan

inary

opposition

can also be viewed as




13/20

94 King

redefining

he

we/they

istinction.

nstead

f he ivision

eing

etween

ar-

ties,

t s betweenhe

U.S. and theworld

or

betweenheU.S. and

parts

ofthe

world).

rom

his

erspective,

hese wo

ppositions

re

really

urface-

level or content)manifestationsr transformationsfthe amewe/they

structural

pposition.

Thus

far

relationship

the

inary ppositions

aryingogether

and

an

underlying

xplanation

a

structural

dentity

have

been ssembled.

ut

althougheep

tructure

s of cademicnd

exploratory

nterest

and

remains

entirely

n

inference),

t s the

political

ontent

s

presently

onceptualized

that s more ften f interest

o

political

cientists.hese

findings

ust

thereforee related

ack o the

riginal

ubstantive

problem.8

n

sum,

why

is this tructuralelationshipf nterest?

The

basicobservations that

trong

nd

clearly

efined

olitical ar-

ties eadto the

bipartisanperation

f

foreignolicy

ndthe sual

partisan

operation

fdomestic

olicy.

he

xplanation

ollows

irectly:

ith

strong

parties,

hat s with

strong e/theypposition,

heres the

possibility

f

an

agreement

etweenhe

party

eaders;

he eaders an

speak

more on-

fidently

or

heir

arty

membersnd

can make

ompromises

ith

pposi-

tion

arty

eaders

more

asily.9

urthermore,

ipartisanship

i.e.,

nterparty

agreement)s mostikely hen he ssuedefineshewe/theyppositions

theUnited tates ersus

ther

ations;

f

course,

ipartisanship

s

possible

in

otherssue

reas,

ut t

seems

ikely

o be

most

requent

n

foreignolicy.

Thus,

strong,

ell-defined

epublican/Democratic

istinctioneads to

clearer

oundariesetween

oreignolicy

ipartisanship

nd

domestic

olicy

partisanship.

ased on

systematic

vidence,

his

ffectively

edefineshe

bipartisanoreignolicy ypothesis.

STRUCTURAL EXTENSIONS

There re

numerous

surface-level)

anifestationsf

the structural

we/theyinary

pposition.

xamples

rom

ruman's ave

heory

f

nterest

group

ormation

nd from

Middle

astern

olitics

ave

lready

een

pro-

vided.

Wide arietiesf

other

pplications

ould

e

explicated

n

onsiderable

detail.

For a few hort

xamples,

onsider:

xplanations

f social

group

solidarity;

rguments

or

he

psychological

nd

ociological

ecessity

f

the

8L6vi-Strauss

ight

avebeen atisfied

ere,

utfor

resent

urposes,

concentraten

using

structural

nthropology

o understand

he

urface-level

henomena

f

primary

nterest

o

political

cientists.

90n

evidenceor hose

ircumstanceshen

nter-group

ompetition

oesnot ead o n

group

cohesion.

ee

Tajfel 1982:

16);

Rabbie nd

deBrey1971);

Rabbie nd

Wilkens

1971);

Rab-

bie and

Huygen1974);

Rabbie t

al.

(1974);

nd Horwitz

nd Rabbie

1982).




14/20

Political

arties nd

Foreign

olicy

95

family

r

ts

urrogates;

nderstanding

thnocentricity

nd

racism;

xplora-

tions fthe

rigins

fthe

nation-state;

xplanations

fthe

evelopment

fthe

politicalarty;

he

oyalty

or

ertain

roducts

hichome

dvertising

reates;

the ppeal f portsnd oyaltyo certaineamswhichrenot oincidently

named

or ocal

products

nd

ities);

nd he

remendous

ppeal

f he

Olym-

pics

one

television

etwork

itles ome

events s

The U.S. verses he

World ).

he ist ould

e extended.

nstead,

he

pproach

uggested

y

his

structuralist

ethod

n

this

aper

s imitedo

examining

ne

political

ssue

related o

the

original

wo

binary ppositions.

Another

urfaceevelmanifestation

fthe

we/theyinary pposition

is the nstitutional

ivalry

etween

ongress

nd the

presidency

n

the on-

duct fforeignolicy.Thisbinaryppositionuggestshatnforeignolicy

legislators

re more

ikely

o

cross

he

pposition

oundary

o

support

he

president.

n domestic

olicy,

owever,

he

ongress/presidency

oundary

becomes

more alient nd

support

or

he

president

hould

rop.

Thus

far,

party, olicy,

nd nstitutional

ppositions

n the evel f

political

niversals

avebeen dentified.

ll

three eem o be related o the

same

ocial-psychological

tructure.rabb

1957:7)

describes

ome f the

distinctions

etweenhese:

While he wo roblemsrelationsetweenhe artiesndrelationsetweenhe x-

ecutivend

egislative

ranchesare

ntimately

onnected,

nly

onfusion

anresult

from

egarding

hem

s

identical

roblems. armony ay revail

etweenhe wo

branchesf

government

oncerned ith

oreign

ffairs;

ut his act lone

will

not

guaranteeipartisano-operation

n

the

foreignolicy

ealm.

Crabb,

1957:

)

The

question

f boundariesetweenheHouse and the

presidency

s

explicitly

ddressed

yPolsby

1968).

An

institutionalized

rganization

e

argues

s,

nter

lia,

relatively

ell-bounded,

hat

s to

say,

differentiated

fromts

nvironment.

n

ncrease

n

this oundednessr nstitutionaliza-

tion sclearlybservedy decreasenthe urnoverfmembers,ncrease

in

the

verageength

f

service,

ncrease

n

the

eniority

f

successful

an-

didates or

peaker,

nd

sharp

ecline

f ateral

areer

movement,

n

and

out

oftheHouse

nd,

n

somenotable

ases,

lso

n

andoutofthe

peaker-

ship.

Thus,

here as

been,

ver

ime,

clearer

e/they

istinctionetween

congress

nd the

presidency.

From heconclusionbovethat he

trength

f the

boundaries

ary

in

the

ame

direction,

he

trongeroundary

etween

ongress

nd

tsen-

vironment,nd thusbetweenongressnd thepresidency,hould ead to

an increased

ossibility

f

agreement

etweenhe wo

branches

f

govern-

ment;

his

greement

hould e most

pparent

n

foreign

ffairs where

he

we/they

pposition

s

reformulatedo

provide

ncentive

or

congres-

sional/presidential

onsensus.

It should e noted hat he

ongress/presidency

istinctions an nstitu-

tional

opposition,

whereas he

others re

cognitive

r

social

oppositions.

he




15/20

96

King

congress/presidencypposition

robably

riginated

n the asis f

cognitive

oppositions

elevant

o the

founders,

ut his nstitutional

istinction,

nce

in

place,

probably ncouraged

nd

exaggerated

he

we/theyognitive

p-

position. he distinctionlurswhen onsideringolitical artieswhich,

although

ever formal

art

f

American

overnment,

avebeen

nsitu-

tionalizedince ts

nception.

Although

he

ongressional/presidential

oundary

s

clearly

ecoming

tighterPolsby,

968),

t s not

pparent

rom

he

iteraturehether

n

foreign

affairs

hishas resulted

n

the

predicted

ncrease n

agreement

etween

members

f

ongress

nd he

resident.

hat

s oftenalled

he wo

residen-

cies iterature

based

n

the

hypothesis

yWildavsky1966)]

s

far rom

on-

sensus n either he evelor the trend f congressionalupport orthe

president

n

foreign

ersus omestic

ffairs.

n

fact,

ven

given

he

plausi-

ble

case

Wildavsky

makesfor

t,

there xists

o

satisfactory

ystematic

evidence

f

this

ypothesis.

It

s

nteresting

hat

ublished

ork

n

the wo

presidencies

nd

bipartisan

oreign

olicy

iteratures

arely

ite achother

or

build

n

each ther's

ork.

he

tructuralist

pproach

mployed

ere

elps

make his

onnection.)

For

example,

eLoup

ndShull

1979)

pdate

Wildavsky'snalysis

nd

appear ofindupportor is hesishat ongressionalupportor he resi-

dent s

greater

n

foreign

han n domesticffairsutfind

hat

he elation-

ship

s not s

strong

n

recent

ears.

he

problem

ith

his

nalysis,

nd

with

Wildavsky's

riginal

rticle,

s that heirmeasure f

support

s no

longer

being ompiled

y Congressional

uarterly

ecause f what

CQ

calls

ts

dubious

uality.

ee

Sigelman

1979)

uses differenteasure

nd finds

no

appreciable

ifferenceetween

oreign

nd

domestic

upport.

or

potential

problems

ith he

Sigelman

tudy

ee

LeLoup

and

Shull

1980).

In

order o

provide

more

ystematic

xaminationf this

uestion,

thedataanalyzednFigures and2 canbeexamined urther.gaindata

are

presented

or he

membersndthe

party

eaders. he

hypothesis

s

that

as a

consequence

f

the

ight

oundaries

etween

ongress

nd the

presi-

dent,

oth

he

eadersndmembers

ill

upport

he

resident

ore

n

foreign

than n

domestic

ffairsoll

alls.

urthermore,

rom

he ffects

f

tratifica-

tion bserved

bove,

he

elationship

hould e

stronger

mong

he eaders

than he

followers.

Figure reports redicted

alues f

a

logisticquation xplaining

he

probabilityf he artyeader oting ith he residentor ach f he even

policy

reas. t

suggests

hat,

ith

efense

olicy

s

a

possible

xceptiongain,

leadership

ecisions n

foreign

ffairsre farmore

ikely

o be

supportive

ofthe

resident

han

redecisions

n

domestic

ffairs. he

difference

s also

striking:

he

probability

f

congressional

eader

f

either

arty

oting

ith

the

presidentpproachescertainty

or

foreign

ffairs ut remains full25




16/20


17/20

98 King

.80

.70

PROBABILITY

.60

OF

A

REPRESENTATIVE

VOTING WITH

.50

THE

PRESIDENT

.4o_

.30

.20

For- For-

De-

So-

Gov't En-

Agri-

eign eign

fense

cial

Mgt ergy

culture

Trade

Aid Wel-

fare

POLICY AREA

Fig.

4.

Party

membership

upport

or he

President.

ource:

ercentages

omputed

fromhe LM,I ogitmodel. .f.= 114,G = 5297.41; LMcomponent:.f.= 19,G

=

39665.76.

therest f

ts

environment).

histrend an

easily

e seen s

resulting,

n

part,

rom

greaterresidential

nvolvement

n

the

egislative

rocess

David-

son and

Oleszek,

981:

36-9;

Wayne,

978:

8,

passim).

n

other

words,

s

a

method

f

protecting

tself

rom

residentialegemony,ongress

as

set

up

nstitutional

rocedures

hich

mphasize

ecision-making

ecentralization.

One ndicationf theprobable onsequence

f

congressad becomemorecentralizeds the

greater

upport

or he

presidentmong

he

formal

arty

leadership:

entralizationould

ive

he eadersmore

nfluence,

hich

n

turn,

ould

robably

romoteresidential

ominance.

he

urrent

strategy

of

decentralizationone

ofdivide r

be

conquered preservesongressional

prerogative.

arbara

inckley

1978:

06)provides

everal

mportant

llustra-

tions f

this

rgument:

The

eniority

ystem

reates

committee

eadershipndependent

f

party

eaders

n-

cluding

he

resident.pecialization

n

committeesnd ubcommitteesan

generatesubgovernmentsmpenetrableopresidentialnfluence. idtermlectionsounter

the ffect

f

Presidential

oattailsromhe

receding

lection,

utting

ack fterwo

years

f a

four-year

erm he

first

ull

trength

f a

president'sartisan

upport.

While the

institutionsnd

groups

mentionedbove

become

very

cohesive

n

the

face

of

stronger

oundaries

e.g.,

what nites he

ountry

better

han

goodwar?),

learer oundaries

n

the

we/they

istinction

ave,




18/20

Political arties

nd

Foreign

olicy

99

in

the

congressional

xample, iscouraged

ntra-group

ohesion.

Always

jealous

f

ts

ower

nd

position,ongress

ook

he

ogical

pproach

whether

intended

r

not)

of

decentralizing

nd,

s

a

result,

educing

residential

n-

fluence.hat s, becausehererefewermembersho an nfluencearge

numbers

ftheir

olleagues,

henumber

f

points

t which

residents

ust

attempt

o

influence

he

congress

s...that much

more.

Davis,

1979).

Therefore,

he

esult

f

stronger

oundaries,

nthis

ase,

s ess

presidential

influence

n

congress

nd

less

nstitutional

greement.

CONCLUSIONS

In

the

anguage

f

tructural

nthropology,

eep

tructure,

nthe

orm

of

the

we/they

inary pposition,

eems

o

havebeen

dentified.

everal

surface-level

i.e.,

content

atherhan

tructural)

anifestations

ave

been

explored

nd

explained.

eminiscent

fLevi-Strauss'

laborate

ontingency

tables

xpressing

nderlying

tructure

n terms f

all

possible

ombinations

of

cultural

rtifact,

his

nalysis

lso found

hat he ranslation

rocess

rom

structure

o surface-level

henomena

as notbeen

uniform.

Profound istoricalhangesn,anddynamicsf,political arties,

congressional-presidential

elations,

ipartisanship

erses

artisanship,

nd

policy

rea

ffects

an

llbe

usefully

nderstood

ithinhis

ramework.

ore

formally,

tructural

nalogies

etweenhe

following

ave

been

stablished:

we:they::Republican:Democrat::foreign

olicy:domestic olicy::con-

gress:president.

hen he

boundaries

etween

ny

f these

airs

s

strong,

the

boundary

etween

ny

other

air

s

also

likely

o

be

strong.

This

pproach

as also

helped

o connectnd

relate

wo iteratures

the twopresidenciesnd the bipartisanoreignolicy iteratureswith

currently

ew ross-references

utwith umerousubstantive

nd tructural

relationships.

his

aper

asdemonstrated

ome f

he

enefits

f

onsidering

these wo

iteratures

imultaneously.

The

pproach

as

lso ed

o

theoretical

ustification

f

nd

ystematic

evidence

or

both

he

bipartisan

oreign

olicy

nd

the

two

presidencies

hypotheses.

n

analysis

f

more

han nehundred

nd

fifty

housand

oting

decisions

rom

ive

residential

erms

ometimes

upports

oth

hypotheses,

but he

elationship

s

substantiallytronger

mong

he

eaders

han

mong

the membersf the U.S. HouseofRepresentatives.hus,conventional

wisdom-

which

may

be based

more n

this

highly

isible

roup-is

more

plausible

hen

eparate

ypotheses

re

pplied

o

congressional

eaders

nd

members.

The

analysis

as

also

helped

o

clarify

he

unique osition

f

the

arty

leadership

n

congresscross-pressured

tthe ntersection

ftwo

tructural




19/20

100

King

oppositions.

he

congress/presidency

pposition

ncourages

he eaders

o

sidewith

ongress

nd

gainst

he

resident.

t

suggests

hat

he

eaders esist

presidentialttempts

t

persuasion

nd

protectongressional

rerogative.

However,heRepublican/Democraticpposition usheshese eadersna

different

irection.or

n

decentralized

rganizations

uch s theU.S. con-

gress,

nformations

power;

o,

to

acquire

nformationnd

perhaps

presidential

ndorsementf

favored

olicy bjectives,

he

eaders ave

n-

centiveso

associatewith he

president.

his

ssociation

ives

he eaders

more fa

presidential

erspective

han ther

members

which esults

n

far

greater

upport

or

he

residenty

he

eaders han

y

he

eneral

member-

ship.Being

leader

n

the

U.S.

House,then,

as

consequences

or

ogni-

tion hat eing memberoesnothave.Theresult or hepartyeadership

is

a

difficult

osition

nd an

ambiguous

ole.

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