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Political favouritism and social conflict: a casestudy of the Benazir Income Support Programme(BISP) in Pakistan

Muhammad Waqas & André Torre

To cite this article: Muhammad Waqas & André Torre (2019): Political favouritism and socialconflict: a case study of the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) in Pakistan, AreaDevelopment and Policy, DOI: 10.1080/23792949.2019.1623055

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/23792949.2019.1623055

Published online: 14 Jun 2019.

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RESEARCH ARTICLE

Political favouritism and social conflict: a case studyof the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) inPakistan

Muhammad Waqas a,b and André Torre b

ABSTRACTAlthough the efficiency of social-protection programmes depends on their coverage and theaccurate targeting of those in need, the identification of beneficiaries can result from interpersonalrelationships and political favouritism. This paper explores the impact of political favouritism onthe identification of beneficiaries of Pakistan’s Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) inSargodha district of Punjab in Pakistan. A comparison of beneficiaries identified by parliamentaryrepresentatives with those identified by a Poverty Score Card survey method reveals that the formerwere not the poorest and did not satisfy the stated selection criteria, while the existence of thesetwo methods was a cause of conflict whose probability increased with the degree of politicalfavouritism, lack of education and rural–urban disparities, but decreased with increases in the levelof income.

ARTICLE HISTORYReceived 19 December 2017; Accepted 21 May 2019

KEYWORDSsocial protection, poverty targeting, conflict, Pakistan, Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP)

JELD730, D740, I38

摘要

徇私与社会冲突：巴基斯坦贝娜齐尔收入保障计划的个案研究. Area Development and Policy. 社会保障

计划的效率取决于计划覆盖范围和目标群众的精准定位，而受益人的选取却可能是受到人际关系和徇

私影响的结果。本文以旁遮普省萨戈达区为例，探讨了徇私对于巴基斯坦贝娜齐尔收入保障计划受益

人选取的影响。文章将议会代表确定的受益人与贫困评分卡调查方法确定的受益人进行比较后发现，

前者群体不是经济条件最差的，也并不符合规定的受益人选取标准。这两种选取方法是引发社会冲突

的原因之一，冲突的发生概率会随着徇私程度，教育缺失和城乡差距的扩大而增加，但随着收入水平

的提高而下降。

关键词

社会保障, 精准扶贫, 冲突, 巴基斯坦, 贝娜齐尔收入保障计划

CONTACT Muhammad Waqas muhammad.waqas@uos.edu.pkaDepartment of Economics, University of Sargodha, Sargodha, Punjab, Pakistan

bUMR SAD-APT, University Paris Saclay, INRA – Agroparistech, Paris, France.

AREA DEVELOPMENT AND POLICY2019, VOL. 00, NO. 00https://doi.org/10.1080/23792949.2019.1623055

© 2019 Regional Studies Association

RESUMENFavoritismo político y conflicto social: Estudio de caso sobre el Programa Benazir de Apoyo Económico enPakistán. Area Development and Policy. Aunque la eficacia de los programas de protección social dependede la cobertura y la selección rigurosa de las personas necesitadas, la identificación de los beneficiariospuede derivarse de relaciones interpersonales y favoritismo político. En este artículo se analiza cómo influyeel favoritismo político a la hora de identificar qué personas se pueden beneficiar del Programa Benazir dePakistán de apoyo económico en el Distrito Sargodha (Punjab). Al comparar a los beneficiarios identificadospor representantes parlamentarios con aquellos identificados por el método de estudio Tarjeta dePuntuación de Pobreza, se observa que los primeros no eran los más pobres y no cumplían con los criteriosde selección establecidos; la existencia de estos dos métodos fue causa de conflictos y la probabilidadaumentaba con el grado de favoritismo político, la falta de formación y las desigualdades entre zonasrurales y urbanas, pero disminuía con los aumentos en el nivel de ingresos.

PALABRAS CLAVEprotección social, lucha contra la pobreza, conflicto, Pakistán;, Programa Benazir de Apoyo Económico

АННОТАЦИЯПолитический фаворитизм и социальный конфликт: исследование кейса по программе поддержкидоходовБеназир вПакистане.AreaDevelopment and Policy.Хотя эффективность программсоциальнойзащиты зависит от охвата и точного определения нуждающихся, выявление бенефициаров можетбыть результатом межличностных отношений и политического фаворитизма. В данной статьеисследуется влияние политического фаворитизма на выявление бенефициаров пакистанскойпрограммы поддержки доходов Беназир в Пенджабе, в районе Саргодха. Сопоставлениебенефициаров, выявленных парламентскими представителями, с бенефициарами, выявленными спомощью метода обследования по шкале бедности, показывает, что первые не были самымибедными и не удовлетворяли заявленным критериям отбора, в то время как сосуществование этихдвух методов было причиной конфликта, вероятность которого возрастала с ростом политическогофаворитизма, отсутствием образования и неравенством между сельскими и городскими районами,но уменьшалась с увеличением уровня дохода.

КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВАсоциальная защита, борьба с нищетой, конфликт, Пакистан, программа поддержки доходовБеназир

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, social-protection schemes supporting poor and vulnerable households havereceived lot of national and international attention, especially in low- and middle-income coun-tries. These schemes alleviate poverty through direct intervention, help to enhance humandevelopment and have further trickle-down effects (García-Jaramillo & Miranti, 2005).Existing studies show that national social-protection programmes such as Progresa andOportunidades in Mexico (Skoufias, 2005), the Food-for-Work Programme and Food-for-Education Programme in Bangladesh, Bolsa Familia in Brazil (Soares, Ribas, & Osorio, 2007),Bono de Desarrollo Humano in Ecuador (Rosero & Schady, 2007), Red de Protección Social inNicaragua and China’s successive poverty-alleviation programmes are achieving their targets(Dunford, Gao, & Li, 2019). These programmes help to lift the poor out of poverty and protectthem from shocks that lead them to fall (back) into poverty, and are also supposed to empower

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women, support the food expenditures for the poor, enhance household health and nutritionlevels, and increase the school enrolment of the children of target families.

However, the success of social-protection programmes depends on accurate and transparenttargeting of beneficiaries. Besides, inaccurate and misleading targeting of beneficiaries leads toinefficient use of resources (Asian Development Bank (ADB), 2011). It is often claimed thattargeting mechanisms in poor and developing countries are weak and can involve certainfavouritism and political considerations. Like other developing countries, Pakistan has startedseveral social-protection programmes. In 2008, its government launched the Benazir IncomeSupport Programme (BISP), the biggest social-protection programme since the establishment ofthe country with respect to its funding, coverage and reach. The BISP provides a shed to the poorand vulnerable to help them maintain minimum standards of living (Newman, 2013). From theoutset, policy-makers, researchers and think tanks have raised several questions about the target-ing mechanism of this programme. Initially, the poor were identified through the recommenda-tions of the parliamentary representatives of the People’s Party (a political party established in1967 by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto) (Shahid, 2012). At that stage, thousands of cases of beneficiaries ofgrants who were not actually poor were identified.

During 2009, after severe criticism of the targeting of beneficiaries from every corner, andespecially from the World Bank, Pakistan initiated a national Poverty Score Card Survey. Thissurvey used a Proxy Means Test (PMT) to identify the poor (Ghauri, Gishkori, & Khan, 2012)and showed that beneficiaries identified by parliamentary representatives were not actually poorwhile through the Poverty Score Card Survey the poor have been accurately targeted (Shahid,2012). This initiative makes the BISP more transparent, but it also raised certain issues amongtwo groups: a group identified by parliamentary representatives (PIG) and a Poverty Score Cardsurvey identified group (PCS). After the identification of the PCS, conflicts arose between thetwo groups. The PIG takes the view that the original method was better because local repre-sentatives know better who is poor in their area. Their opponents claimed that this method is nottransparent because political figures definitely prefer their voters/supporters.

Several studies have evaluated the impact of the BISP on poverty and household welfare.However, none of these studies has investigated the factors responsible for the conflict thatarises due to the dual-selection criterion. This paper compares the socioeconomic backgroundof the two types of beneficiaries and explores the political, economic and social factors thataffect the conflict between them.

The paper is structured as follows. The next section explores the literature on social-protection programmes and issues regarding the targeting of beneficiaries. The third sectiondiscusses the sources of data, sampling methodology and the empirical methodology. Thefourth section presents the results of the descriptive and econometric analyses. The finalsection concludes and draws some policy implications.

SOCIAL PROTECTION PROGRAMMES: OUTCOMES AND LIMITS

Social-protection programmes in developing countriesThere is a vast literature on the relationship of social-protection programmes, poverty,inequality, female empowerment, etc. Studies of social-protection programmes in Brazil,Bangladesh, Mexico, Argentina, South Africa and Nicaragua have been shown to reducepoverty and inequality, increase female labour force participation and empowerment, enhancethe health and education status of families, and raise income through self-employment(Devereux, 2002).

A study of Familias en Accion in Colombia showed that it significantly increased theconsumption expenditure, consumption of protein-rich food items and clothing of children.Grants also increased the enrolment rate of the children aged 12–17 years, raised children’s

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nutrition level and enhanced the health condition of the treated families compared with non-treated families. However, urban beneficiaries gained more than rural beneficiaries (Attanasio,Gomez, Heredia, & Vera-Hernandez, 2005).

The Employment Guarantee Scheme of India reduced poverty in rural areas of India.Access to credit and land, a decrease in illness of household members and a decrease inunemployment prevented households from falling into poverty (Imai, 2003). An Indianprogramme acts as an additional safeguard protecting vulnerable households against theprice shocks through highly subsidized prices. The Targeted Public Distribution System(TPDS) contributes to moderate levels of poverty reduction via income transfers. Implicitincome transfers also helped reduce inequality in the distribution of income among thepoor households, with clear benefits to the poorest of the poor (Mazumdar & Sharma,2013).

The OPK (Cheap Rice Programme) in Indonesia) and Padat Karya (Labour IntensiveProgramme in Indonesia) significantly reduced poverty shocks and raised food expenditures(Sumarto, Asep, & Lant, 2000).

Gertler, Martinez, and Rubio-Codina (2012) examined the impact of the conditional cashtransfer of Oportunidades in Mexico. Investment raised the long-term living standards, foodexpenditure and welfare of the treatment group, and their consumption expenditures were5.6% higher than that of the control group. Mexico’s conditional cash transfer programme alsoincreased female empowerment, access to health services and skills training (Camacho &Rodriguez, 2012). Grants improved the health condition of the families of beneficiariescompared with a control group, improved nutrition and were reflected in a low number ofdays of illness and disability. Child labour diminished (Arif, Syukri, Isdijoso, Rosfadhila, &Soelaksono, 2011; Barber & Gertler, 2008; De Janvry, Sadoulet, Solomon, & Vakis, 2006;Haushofer & Shapiro, 2013; Skoufias, 2005).

In Ecuador the conditional Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) increased school enrol-ment fourfold (Rosero and Schady (2007). Parental education is strongly positively relatedwith the enrolment rate of children: the enrolment rate of children with a low level of parentaleducation was just 34.2%.

By 2006, Brazil’s Bolsa Familia (Family Stipend) was one of the largest conditional cashtransfer schemes in the world. Soares et al. (2007) showed that in Brazil it had positiveimpacts on poverty reduction, inequality reduction, education enhancement and employmentgeneration with improved educational attainment facilitating entrance into the labour force.Hall (2012), however, considered that it also had a number of negative dimensions.

In Pakistan, programmes that included a focus on women helped them take part inincome-generation activities, support their families and take part in household decision-making, also increasing household income (Arshad, 2011; Chughtai, Zaheer, & Sania,2015; Shehzad, 2011).

In China, a combination of economic development, poverty-alleviation and social-protection programmes reduced the number of people under the 2010 poverty line from770.39 million in 1978 to 43.35 million in 2016. This number is planned to reach zero in2020 (Dunford et al., 2019).

The targeting issueThe success of social-protection programmes depends heavily on the beneficiary-targetingmechanism. The latter has to be in line with the objectives and aims of the programme andnormally depends on two steps. The first step is to identify the potential beneficiaries of theprogramme with transparent methods of selection of beneficiaries (García-Jaramillo &Miranti, 2015). Normally the target populations of these programmes are poor sections ofsociety (Waqas & Awan, 2017). Improving the coverage and targeting of social-protection

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systems is vital, and will require a multifaceted reform portfolio that promotes more integratedand horizontally equitable systems (Brzeska, Das, & Fan, 2015).

High operational and administrative costs and complex design of social-protection pro-grammes are amongst the hurdles in the way of success (Morley & Coady, 2003). However,the main issues and challenges are linked with the targeting method (Coady, Grosh, &Hoddinott, 2004a, 2004b). One of the major criticisms is that these programmes are unableto reach all the intended beneficiaries. In poor and developing countries, interpersonalrelationships, political attachments and political favouritism are obstacles to effective targeting.Often social-protection programmes are linked to political parties and selection criteria are notvery transparent. Political favouritism and interpersonal relationships with the authoritiesmake the selection criteria bogus and ultimately cause conflict (Cunningham et al., 2005).

Several methods of making targeting of social-protection programmes transparent havebeen used. The Social Welfare Fund Cash in Yemen applied four different targeting methodsto make the targeting process more transparent and effective, reaching the intended bene-ficiaries. Coady et al. (2004a) examined the targeting performance of 25 social-protectionprogrammes in different countries. The social welfare fund cash programme of Yemenperformed best due to its transparent and effective beneficiary-targeting methods, it alsobeing free from favouritism, bias and political interference.

The case of the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP)The BISP was started in 2008 by the government of Pakistan to give relief and empowerwomen. To qualify for the grant, an individual has to satisfy certain eligibility criteria. Grantsare made to women who are widowed, divorced or married. The woman’s family incomeshould be less than Rs6000/US$67 per month. The applicant must have a valid identity card.The World Bank, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), ADB andDepartment for International Development (DFID) are the donors and facilitators of thisprogramme. The initial grant was for Rs1000 per month, subsequently raised to Rs1300 permonth. Currently, the grant stands at Rs1500 per month.

BISP initiatives include several schemes: Waseela-e-Haq, Waseela-e-Rozgar, Waseela-e-Sehat and Waseela-e-Taleem. The Waseela-e-Haq programme empowers women throughthe provision of small loans. A vocational training programme, Waseela-e-Rozgar, offersmembers of eligible families up to one year of professional training. The Waseela-e-Sehatprogramme provides financial assistance specifically for obtaining basic healthcare. In the firstBISP programme, cash payments were conditional on schooling. The Waseela-e-Taleeminitiative requires families receiving cash payments to enrol children aged 5–12 years inprimary education.

The selection of beneficiaries is characterized by two major stages. In the first phase(2008–09 to 2010–11) beneficiaries were identified by parliamentary representatives.Application forms were handed out to all members of federal legislatures. Peoples’ Partyparliamentary representatives (PPPR) had formed a coalition government with the PakistanMuslim League after winning the February 2008 election.

Other political parties and civil social activists criticized this selection method arguing thatpoliticians selected people who supported and voted for them (Khan & Qutub, 2010).Discrepancies were noted. In Multan district (the home town of the then prime minister), twiceas many people as in the large Lahore district were in receipt of the grant. Areas with the lowestshare of beneficiaries were those where opposition parties were strong (Ghauri et al., 2012).

Critics claimed that this method was non-transparent and created unrest and conflictamong beneficiaries, the general public and members of political parties. Moreover, politicalfavouritism involved mishandling public resources with grants given to people who were notpoor and some poor people not receiving grants.

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The second phase (2010–11) started after the World Bank and other donors expressedconcern about the selection criterion. To make this programme transparent and to achieve thedesired goals, the nationwide PSC was started. It measured the welfare status of a householdon a scale between 0 and 100. In addition, the mode of payment passed through two phases.In the first phase, the transfer payment was made through Pakistan Post. Currently, almost78% of BISP payments are made through the ‘Benazir Debit Card’.

Owing to its coverage, targeting and mechanism, the resources allocated to this pro-gramme were increased in every government budget. During 2015–16, Rs102 billion wereallocated to the programme, a 9.7% increase over the previous year. The number ofbeneficiaries of BISP programmes increased over time from 1.8 million people at first to5.3 million in 2015–16 (Table 1).

QUESTIONS, DATA AND METHODOLOGY: THE RATIONALE OF THISSTUDY

Goal of the studyThe aim of this study was to compare the results of PPPR and PMT selection methods ofbeneficiaries of BISP programmes, and to identify the impact of political favouritism on theselection of beneficiaries and the conflicts that these decisions generated. For this purpose,a multistructured questionnaire was designed and administered to beneficiaries in both groups.The questions were designed to identify people who really were in the poor group, theindividuals who fulfilled the eligibility criteria of the grant and should be target of the policyand the actual beneficiaries. Other questions sought to identify the causes and consequences ofconflict between the two groups.

Gurr’s (1970) Relative Deprivation Theory suggests that a huge gap between groups can fuelinter- or intra-group conflict. Gaps arise due to economic, social, political and cultural inequalities(Stewart, 2008). Economic inequalities include differences in access to income and employmentopportunities (Murshed, 2003; Nelson, 1998). Social inequalities include differences in access tohousing, land (Skidmore, Staatz, Dembélé, & Ouédraogo, 2016), education and health, witheducational attainment affecting opinions and perceptions. An uneven distribution of the publicresources possibly due to political favouritism and corruption adversely affect the rights of some

Table 1. Grant disbursement and beneficiaries of the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP),2008–09 to 2015–16.

YearGrant (billions of

rupees)Percentagechange

Beneficiaries(millions)

Percentagechange

2008–09 15.8 1.8

2009–10 31.9 101.9% 2.6 44.4%

2010–11 30.0 −6.0% 3.1 19.2%

2011–12 41.0 36.7% 3.7 19.4%

2012–13 42.9 4.6% 3.7 0%

2013–14 65.1 51.7% 4.6 24.3%

2014–15 93.0 42.9% 5.0 8.7%

2015–16 102.0 9.7% 5.3 6.0%

Source: http://www.bisp.gov.pk/.

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groups and can generate unrest and conflict (Rugaber & Boak, 2014; Stewart, 2008). Culturalinequalities include difference in religion, norms and practices, customs and language (Stewart,2008). Territorial differences can also fuel conflict (Østby, 2008), making the real inclusion ofunder-privileged groups an important priority (Randolph, 2019). Empirical data suggest thata combination of political and socioeconomic inequalities leads towards political violence designedto addresses injustices (Swearingen, 2010).

In spite of the suggestion that some BISP beneficiaries were not poor but were chosen forinterpersonal and political reasons, few academic studies exist. Arshad (2011) interviewed andcollected data from 120 beneficiaries in Islamabad. Naqvi, Sabir, Shamim, and Tariq (2014)targeted seven union councils of Tehsil Mankera districts and tried to identify the consump-tion patterns of the beneficiaries. Shehzad (2011) investigated the impact of the BISP on theconsumption patterns of beneficiaries in southern Punjab. Durr-e-Nayab. and Farooq (2014)used the 2010 Pakistan Household Panel Survey data to explore the impact of the BISP onpoverty alleviation and women’s empowerment. This study differs in that it is the first to targetthe two groups and seeks to identify the real poor. Second, it seeks to identify the impact ofpolitical favouritism on social conflict associated with BISP beneficiary selection criteria.

Data sourcesData were collected from doorstep interviews on 100 BISP beneficiaries in Sargodha districtbetween January and March 2016. Sargodha district is a third-tier administrative unit (as ofAugust 2000, Pakistan’s provinces were divided into districts) and is divided into seven tehsils1:Sargodha, Sahiwal, Sillanwali, Shahpur, Bheera, Bhalwal and Kotmomin. Using a probabilityproportional to size sampling technique, two tehsils (Sargodha and Shahpur) were selected. Ineach, one rural settlement and one urban settlement were randomly selected. In each tehsil, 50beneficiaries (25 in settlements and 25 in urban settlements) were selected randomly. In all,100 beneficiaries were interviewed from each of the two groups, namely PCS and PIG.

A semi-structured questionnaire comprised four parts: a roster file with household ques-tions; questions about the residential conditions of the beneficiary; questions about access tothe grants; and questions about the beneficiary’s perceptions of the BISP, the targetingcriteria, the reasons for conflict among beneficiaries and people due to the dual selectioncriterion. The aim of the questions in the first and second parts was to identify those who werereally poor. Third part is about the access of the grant. The fourth part is related to thequestions regarding the perception of beneficiary about the BISP, her perception about thebeneficiary targeting criteria, the reason of the conflict among the beneficiaries, and peopledue to the dual selection criterion.

Empirical methodologyDescriptive analysis of the data was used to establish the eligibility of beneficiaries. Next,a probit model was estimated to identify the causes of conflict between BISP beneficiaries.A binary dependent variable represented respondents’ answers to a question about whether ornot the two sets of criteria were a source of conflict between beneficiaries. Family income (thesum of all incomes of all household members) was used as an independent variable represent-ing income inequality on conflict. A binary variable represented educational attainment. Thetype of beneficiary was used as a proxy to denote political favouritism (beneficiary belonged toa PCS or a PIG). A binary variable represented the area to which a beneficiary belonged andwas designed to identify the impact of regional differences on the dependent variable. Theresulting econometric model is as follows:

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Probit pð Þ ¼ log p=1� pð Þ ¼ β0 þ β1family incomeþ β2education

þ β3political inequalityþ β4areaþ μ

where the error term (µ) shows the impact of those variables not included in the model.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Descriptive analysisDescriptive analysis was used to identify the characteristics of the two groups paying attentionto the socioeconomic background of beneficiaries, their perception and knowledge about thegrants, and their views about the selection criterion.

The marital status of the beneficiary is an important indicator because that grant mustbegiven to ever married women.In the PCS group, there are no unmarried women, but 12% ofthe PIG group is unmarried. Those 12% do not fall into the eligibility criteria of BISP, butthey were receiving the grant.

The PCS group was less well educated. Only 12% of the PIG group was uneducatedcompared with 86% of the PIG group. Moreover, the educational backgrounds of PIG group’sbeneficiaries are better than the other group (Figure 1).

As Table 2 also shows, PCS beneficiaries had a higher employment rate as 78% were inwork to support their families compared with 22% of PIG beneficiaries. Owing to a highilliteracy rate, PCS beneficiaries were doing less well-paid jobs (Table 2). A total of 64.1%were working as daily wage workers, while 30.8% were working as a maid/servant in thehouses of wealthy people. The PIG beneficiaries had better jobs: 22.2% were tailors and 11.1%were doing embroidery. The shares working as daily wage workers and as a maid/servant weresmaller than for than PCS group.

The PIG beneficiaries had higher incomes than the PCS group: the mean income wasRs4629 rupees per month compared with Rs3004 per month (Table 2). The main reason isthat higher educational attainment led to better jobs and ultimately better incomes. The familyincome of the PIG beneficiary was almost twice that of PCS beneficiaries, indicating that thelatter were poorer. Huge differences in self-reported minimum and maximum incomes wererecorded. The huge difference has also been observed in minimum and maximum familyincomes.

Important differences in housing conditions were recorded (though the research did notcontrol for family size). A total of 64% of PIG beneficiaries had their own house comparedwith 58% of PCS households (Table 2). A larger share of PCS beneficiaries lived in rentedhouses.

In multidimensional poverty measurement, the material of construction of the house is animportant indicator because it depicts the poverty level of the household (Awan, Waqas, &Aslam, 2011). A total of 44% of PCS beneficiaries were living in katcha houses (made of mud,unburnt brick and other related materials), while only 22% were living in pakka houses (madeof burnt bricks, cement, iron and other related material). PIG beneficiaries lived in betterquality houses. The majority of PCS beneficiaries were living in a house with two rooms(66%), while 34% had only one room. A total of 18% of PIG beneficiaries were living in housewith four rooms and 38% in houses with three rooms. In the recent literature of povertymeasurement, access to clean water is also an important indicator used to ascertain the povertylevel of a household (Awan et al., 2011). Beneficiaries in the PIG group had better access toclean drinking water than the other group. A total of 34% of PIG beneficiaries were usinga motorized pump compared with just 18% of PCS beneficiaries. Most of the beneficiariesfrom the PCS group (62%) were using hand-pump water for drinking.

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Table 2. Descriptive statistics (%).

Poverty Score Card Surveyidentified group (PCS)

Group identified by parliamentaryrepresentatives (PIG)

Marital status

Currently married 92.0 78.0

Unmarried 0.0 12.0

Widow 4.0 8.0

Divorced 2.0 2.0

Separated 2.0 0.0

Total 100.0 100.0

Employment status

Unemployed 22.0 64.0

Employed 78.0 34.0

Total 100.0 100.0

Occupation

Daly wage worker 64.1 16.7

Parlour/barber 5.6

Tailor 2.6 22.2

Maid/servant 30.8 16.7

Others 2.6 27.8

Embroidery work 11.1

Total 100.0 100.0

Monthly income ofbeneficiary (PKR)

Mean 3004.0 4629.0

Minimum 1700.0 3000.0

Maximum 10,000.0 13,000.0

Family monthlyincome (PKR)

Mean 3393.18 6187.5

Minimum 1700.0 2000.0

Maximum 12,000.0 20,000.0

Type of house

Own 58.0 64.0

Rented 36.0 18.0

Others 6.0 18.0

Total 100.0 100.0

(Continued )

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Table 2. (Continued).

Poverty Score Card Surveyidentified group (PCS)

Group identified by parliamentaryrepresentatives (PIG)

Type of construction

Katcha 44.0 2.0

Pakka 22.0 64.0

Mix 34.0 34.0

Total 100.0 100.0

Number of rooms

1 34.0 0.0

2 66.0 42.0

3 0.0 38.0

4 0.0 18.0

5 0.0 2.0

Total 100.0 100.0

Type of clean water

Tap 4.0 14.0

Piped into house/compound

2.0 34.0

Outdoor tap 14.0 16.0

Hand pump 62.0 2.0

Motorized pump 18.0 34.0

Total 100.0 100.0

Source: Authors.

Figure 1. Educational background of the beneficiaries (%).

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After analysing the socioeconomic situation of both groups, the degree of awareness of thegrant was assessed. The literature suggests that real and needy people have correct informationabout the grant. A total of 48% of PCS beneficiaries responded that they were well aware ofthe selection criteria, while only 10% of PIG beneficiaries were aware. Half the PIG bene-ficiaries responded that they had no knowledge about the selection criteria.

Both groups preferred the selection criterion that led to their own selection. An interestingpoint is that 48% of beneficiaries responded that they were selected because of politicalfavouritism. They were the voters for the politicians who selected the applicants and thatwere aware why they had been selected. A total of 78% of the PCS group also thought that

Table 3. Awareness about the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) grant (%).

Are you aware of the selection criteria of theBISP?

Poverty ScoreCard (PCS)

ParliamentaryRepresentatives

(PIG)

Yes 48.0 10.0

No 38.0 50.0

To some extent 14.0 40.0

Total 100.0 100.0

Which criteria of selection is transparent?

Poverty score card 64.0 0.0

Don’t know 36.0 8.0

Parliamentary representative 0.0 92.0

Total 100.0 100.0

Do you think that politicians gave favour to their votersin the parliamentary selection system?

Yes 78.0 48.0

No 6.0 40.0

Don’t know 16.0 12.0

Total 100.0 100.0

Does political favouritism cause conflict amongbeneficiaries?

PCS PIG

Yes 66.1 63.7

No 33.9 36.3

Total 100.0 100.0

Do different selection criteria cause conflict amongpeople?

Yes 84.0 72.3

No 16.0 27.3

Total 100.0 100.0

Source: Authors.

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selection was due to political favouritism and that PIG beneficiaries were not the real poor(Table 3).

After 2009, grants to PIG beneficiaries stopped due to serious criticism of the selectioncriteria from every corner, and especially from the World Bank and ADB. Beneficiaries inboth groups agreed that the different selection criteria cause conflicts among beneficiaries.However, both groups claimed they were really poor and should be targeted.

The different selection criteria caused conflict not only among the beneficiary groupsacknowledged in this survey. In every channel of society there were debates about whichmethod is better, who are the real poor and why did the government stop the grants of PIGbeneficiaries?

Econometric analysisAs explained above, a probit regression was estimated to identify the drivers of conflict due tothe existence of two sets of selection criteria. To check for correlation among the variablesused, Spearman correlation coefficients were computed (Table 4). Table 4 indicates moderatecorrelations between most of the pairs of the independent variables. The exception is theinverse correlation between political inequality and education.

In the case of probit regression, one generally interprets marginal effects rather than thecoefficients. Marginal effects show the change in the conditional probability of the outcomevariable, when one independent variable changes, holding other variables constant.

The results show that the probability of conflict between beneficiaries decreases as familyincome increases: a one unit change in family income decreases the probability of conflictamong the beneficiaries. A lower income indicating a higher degree of poverty drives in the

Table 4. Spearman correlation matrix.

Variables Family income Education Area Political inequality Conflict

Family income 1

Education 0.258* 1

Area −0.184* 0.040** 1

Political inequality −0.299* −0.740* −0.020** 1

Conflict −0.044** −0.060** 0.060** 0.166* 1

Source: Authors.

Table 5. Results of probit regression (marginal effects)

Variables dF/dx SE x-bar 95% Confidence interval

Family income −0.0369 0.0692 9.0827 −0.1727 to 0.0988

Education 0.1466 0.1331 0.5154 −0.1143 to 0.4076

Political inequality 0.237 0.1279 0.4948 −0.0129 to 0.4886

Area 0.0492 0.0850 0.4845 −0.1174 to 0.2159

Pseudo-R2 0.0468

Log-likelihood −48.3045

Note: *dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1Source: Authors.

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direction of conflict, as is suggested in existing studies (Murshed, 2003; Nelson, 1998;Stewart, 2008). The probability of conflict is higher among illiterate than literate beneficiaries.Education is a means of increasing awareness and knowledge, reduces conflict among thegroups, and appears to serve as a powerful tool of conflict management (Agbor, 2011;Hewstone & Brown, 1986; Pearl, 1997) (Table 5).

Political favouritism/political inequality also generated conflict between the two groups. Theprobability of conflict was higher for PIG beneficiaries who gain from political favouritism thanfor PCS beneficiaries. Political favouritism/political interests cause conflicts over rights amonggroups (Brown & Stewart, 2015). Spatial disparities also fuelled conflict in that the probability ofconflict was higher among rural than among urban beneficiaries (Lessmann, 2013; Østby, 2008).

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of Pakistan’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) is to minimize povertyand hunger and to expand the coverage and targeting of several national anti-poverty andsocial-protection schemes (Bari et al., 2005). Social-protection programmes have proved to bea significant tool of government, policy-makers and donors in tackling problems of povertyand vulnerability, such as fuel and food crises, aggregate shocks, and other economic crises.However, their main concern is to target precisely beneficiaries. Aiding those in need andstopping leakages and inefficient usage of resources are important objectives as is makingsocial-protection programmes transparent.

This study explored the impact of political favouritism on conflict and transparency in thecase of the BISP, the largest social-protection programme in Pakistan. It also investigated thefactors responsible for conflicts that arise between two groups owing to the use of two sets ofselection criterion, successively based on choices made on the basis of choices made byparliamentary representatives and the results of a PCS survey.

The research compared the socioeconomic background of 100 beneficiaries belonging tothe two groups in Sargodha district through a questionnaire. The results showed that thebeneficiaries identified by politicians did not meet the grant application criteria as it wasawarded to unmarried women. The beneficiaries under this method of selection were perform-ing comparatively better jobs, had a higher mean income and enjoyed better residentialconditions than the beneficiaries identified by PCS survey method.

Not only did political favouritism harm the programme but also it generated conflictamong the beneficiaries. A probit regression showed that political favouritism increased theprobability of conflict between groups, whereas increases in income decreased it. A lack ofeducation and urban–rural disparities also raised the probability of conflict.

Our results support the point that the public welfare programs should not be politicized. Itappears prudent to avoid any type of political tagging, interference, and involvement towardsthese types of programs. This is the only way to make these projects transparent andsuccessful. The favoritism and inequality raised the unrest and conflict among the society.Giving the rights to the right one will not cause these types of problems. Targeting the actualpoor will also be helpful to remove the conflict among beneficiaries.Our study also reveals thestrong disparities among the rural and urban areas. They are not easy to solve but the access tothe basic services across the broad and giving equal opportunities and facilities would help totackle the problem of conflict.

NOTES

1. A tehsil is the fourth level of government in Pakistan, and is itself divided into severalrural and urban union councils. The union councils comprise several settlements.

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