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Political Economy of International Trade Shahadat Hosan Faculty, MBA Program Stamford University, Bangladesh

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McGraw-Hill/Irwin International Business, 5/e © 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved. 5-3 Agricultural subsidies and development Rich countries of the developed world subsidize farm products Reasons To keep commodity prices low To favor politically active farmers Consequences Surplus production Depressed world prices (a result of surplus)

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Page 1: Political Economy of International Trade Shahadat Hosan Faculty, MBA Program Stamford University, Bangladesh

Political Economy of International Trade

Shahadat HosanFaculty, MBA Program

Stamford University, Bangladesh

Page 2: Political Economy of International Trade Shahadat Hosan Faculty, MBA Program Stamford University, Bangladesh

McGraw-Hill/IrwinInternational Business, 5/e

© 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved.

5-2

Case: Agricultural subsidies and development

Rich nations spend more than $300 billion a year to subsidize their farmers

Subsidies create surplus production Surplus production leads to dumping and

depressed prices UN estimates producers in developing nations

lose $50 billion export revenue because of depressed prices

Page 3: Political Economy of International Trade Shahadat Hosan Faculty, MBA Program Stamford University, Bangladesh

McGraw-Hill/IrwinInternational Business, 5/e

© 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved.

5-3

Agricultural subsidies and development

Rich countries of the developed world subsidize farm products Reasons

To keep commodity prices low To favor politically active farmers

Consequences Surplus production Depressed world prices (a result of surplus)

Page 4: Political Economy of International Trade Shahadat Hosan Faculty, MBA Program Stamford University, Bangladesh

McGraw-Hill/IrwinInternational Business, 5/e

© 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved.

5-4

Instruments of trade policy

Tariffs - oldest form of trade policy Specific Ad valorem

Good for government Protects domestic producers

Reduces efficiency Bad for consumers

Increases cost of goods

Page 5: Political Economy of International Trade Shahadat Hosan Faculty, MBA Program Stamford University, Bangladesh

McGraw-Hill/IrwinInternational Business, 5/e

© 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved.

5-5

Instruments of trade policy-subsidies

Government payment to a domestic producer Cash grants Low-interest loans Tax breaks Government equity participation in the company

Subsidy revenues are generated from taxes Subsidies encourage over-production,

inefficiency and reduced trade

Page 6: Political Economy of International Trade Shahadat Hosan Faculty, MBA Program Stamford University, Bangladesh

McGraw-Hill/IrwinInternational Business, 5/e

© 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved.

5-6

Instruments of trade policy - Quota

Import quota Restriction on the quantity of some good

imported into a country Voluntary export restraint (VER)

Quota on trade imposed by exporting country, typically at the request of the importing country

Page 7: Political Economy of International Trade Shahadat Hosan Faculty, MBA Program Stamford University, Bangladesh

McGraw-Hill/IrwinInternational Business, 5/e

© 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved.

5-7

Instruments of trade policy -Quota

Benefits producers by limiting import competition Japan – limited exports to 1.85 mm vehicles/year Cost to consumers - $1B/year between ‘81 - 85. Money went to Japanese producers in the form

of higher prices Encourages strategic action by firms in order to

circumvent quota

Page 8: Political Economy of International Trade Shahadat Hosan Faculty, MBA Program Stamford University, Bangladesh

McGraw-Hill/IrwinInternational Business, 5/e

© 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved.

5-8

Instruments of trade policy- local content

Requires some specific fraction of a good to be produced domestically Percent of component parts Percent of the value of the good

Initially used by developing countries to help shift from assembly to production of goods.

Developed countries (US) beginning to implement. For component parts manufacturer, LCR acts the

same as an import quota Benefits producers, not consumers

Page 9: Political Economy of International Trade Shahadat Hosan Faculty, MBA Program Stamford University, Bangladesh

McGraw-Hill/IrwinInternational Business, 5/e

© 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved.

5-9

Instruments of trade policy-administrative policies

Bureaucratic rules designed to make it difficult for imports to enter a country. France – video tapes

Japanese ‘masters’ in imposing rules. Tulip bulbs. Federal Express

Page 10: Political Economy of International Trade Shahadat Hosan Faculty, MBA Program Stamford University, Bangladesh

McGraw-Hill/IrwinInternational Business, 5/e

© 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved.

5-10

Instruments of trade policy-anti dumping policies

Defined as Selling goods in a foreign market below

production costs Selling goods in a foreign market below fair

market value Result of

Unloading excess production. Predatory behavior

Remedy: seek imposition of tariffs

Page 11: Political Economy of International Trade Shahadat Hosan Faculty, MBA Program Stamford University, Bangladesh

McGraw-Hill/IrwinInternational Business, 5/e

© 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved.

5-11

Political arguments for intervention

Protecting jobs and industries CAP (Europe) and VER

National security Defense industries - semiconductors

Retaliation Punitive sanctions

Page 12: Political Economy of International Trade Shahadat Hosan Faculty, MBA Program Stamford University, Bangladesh

McGraw-Hill/IrwinInternational Business, 5/e

© 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved.

5-12

Political arguments for intervention

Protecting consumers Genetically engineered seeds and crops Hormone treated beef

Furthering foreign policy objectives Helms-Burton Act. D’Amato Act

Protecting human rights MFN

Page 13: Political Economy of International Trade Shahadat Hosan Faculty, MBA Program Stamford University, Bangladesh

McGraw-Hill/IrwinInternational Business, 5/e

© 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved.

5-13

Economic arguments for intervention

Infant industry. Oldest argument - Alexander Hamilton, 1792 Protected under the WTO Only good if it makes the industry efficient.

Brazil auto-makers - 10th largest - wilted when protection eliminated

Requires government financial assistance. Today if the industry is a good investment, global

capital markets would invest

Page 14: Political Economy of International Trade Shahadat Hosan Faculty, MBA Program Stamford University, Bangladesh

McGraw-Hill/IrwinInternational Business, 5/e

© 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved.

5-14

Economic arguments for intervention

Strategic trade policy Government should use subsidies to protect

promising firms in newly emerging industries with substantial scale economies

Governments benefit if they support domestic firms to overcome barriers to entry created by existing foreign firms

Page 15: Political Economy of International Trade Shahadat Hosan Faculty, MBA Program Stamford University, Bangladesh

McGraw-Hill/IrwinInternational Business, 5/e

© 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved.

5-15

Thank You