political economy of immigration policy: lecture 6
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Political Economy of Immigration Policy: Lecture 6. Gordon H. Hanson UCSD and NBER. Introduction. What we’ve done so far Scale, selection and sorting in international migration Labor markets impacts of emigration and immigration Public finances and international labor flows - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Political Economy of Immigration Policy:
Lecture 6
Gordon H. Hanson UCSD and NBER
Introduction
What we’ve done so far Scale, selection and sorting in international migration Labor markets impacts of emigration and immigration Public finances and international labor flows Illegal migration
Final lecture Political economy of immigration policy Why do receiving countries restrict labor inflows?
Immigration Policy Regimes
Governance of immigration policy
Regulation of entry By quantity (quota on visas) or price (entry fee) By ex ante or ex post selection criterion
Scope of residency rights Broad (path to citizenship) or narrow (temporary admission)
Immigration policy regimes
Legal immigration Combination of quantity regulation (quotas), ex ante selection
criteria (family, skills, asylees), broad residency rights
Illegal immigrants Combination of price regulation (implicit entry fee), ex post
criterion (behavior), minimal residency rights
Political Economy of Immigration Policy Why do countries restrict labor inflows?
Protect income of median voter or specific factors Benhabib, de Melo et al Facchini and Willmann, Scheve & Slaughter, Hanson &
Spilimbergo, Mayda, Facchini and Mayda
Address distortions due to welfare state Wellisch & Walz, Sinn et al, Boeri and Brücker, Facchini & Mayda,
Hanson, Scheve & Slaughter Scholten & Thum, Razin & Sadka, Poutvaara
Preserve cultural or ethnic homogeneity Huntington, Dustmann and Preston
Design of Immigration Policy Regimes Actual policy regimes have at least three dimensions
(1) entry regulation, (2) selection criterion, (3) scope of residency rights
Basic tensions in policy design
National welfare gain from free immigration vs. loss in income of favored groups (focus of literature to date)
Providing incentive to assimilate versus obtaining information on the “desirability” of an immigrant
Do bilateral migration treaties address these issues?
Why are poor consigned to illegal migration? Whom do rich countries admit as legal immigrants?
Where do rich countries govern entry through quantity regulation, ex ante selection, broad rights?
Use for immigrants whose type (eg, skill, family) is observable Ex ante screen + broad rights = strong incentive to assimilate
Whom do rich countries admit as illegal immigrants?
Where do rich countries govern entry thru price regulation, ex post selection, & narrow residency rts?
Use where type (eg, motivation) is unobservable Mix of entry price, ex post screen, narrow rights selects
desirable types (but reduces incentive to assimilate) Narrow rights also lower fiscal cost, softening opposition
Trade versus immigration policy Many countries appear to have adopted relatively liberal
trade policies but relatively illiberal immigration policies
This pattern is replicated in public opinion data with support for liberal trade policies being stronger than support for liberal immigration
Why does freer immigration seem to be less politically palatable that freer trade?
Some Answers
Non-economic concerns such as attitudes toward foreign cultures and minority groups are more influential for immigration than trade
Pat Buchanan, Samuel Huntington (2005)
Economic concerns about immigration and trade differ and may favor trade over immigration as a strategy for international economic integration
Foreign-born share of the US population is rising
10.3
13.5 13.9 14.211.6
10.3 9.7 9.6
14.1
19.8
35.2
13.6%
14.7%
13.2%
11.6%
8.8%
6.9%
5.4%4.7%
6.2%
7.9%
12.1%
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2005
-1%
1%
3%
5%
7%
9%
11%
13%
15%
Year
Mil
lio
ns
Pe
rce
nt
of
Po
pu
lati
on
Immigrants in the US, Number and Share of Population
30%
26%
17% 17%
10%8%
32%31%
20%
10%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
Less than highschool
High school Some college Bachelors degree Grad. or Prof.Degree
Immigrants Natives
Education levels of US immigrants, natives
Concerns about immigration
In the US, immigrants are concentrated at the extremes of the skill distribution
Strongly over-represented among the least educated Moderately over-represented among the most educated
Economic consequences of immigration: Changes relative supplies of labor Expands US tax base, increases demands on public services Expands cross-border flows of ideas, capital, trade
Are consequences of immigration reflected in individual attitudes toward immigration policy?
The argument
In the absence of distortionary tax and spending policies, free immigration and free trade would often be supported by similar groups thanks to similar labor-market effects
Either tends to depress relative wages for low-skilled US natives Borjas, Freeman & Katz (1997), Feenstra & Hanson (1999), Scheve
& Slaughter (2001), Borjas (2003), Mayda (2004), Card (2005)
However, government policies that redistribute income alter the distributional consequences (and so the politics) of globalization
Immigrants pay taxes, use public services, and vote – imports do none of these things
The net fiscal impact of immigration appears negative (at least in short run), especially in high-immigration states and for high-income citizens who pay most of the tax bill for public services to immigrants
Smith et al. (1997) $200 net transfer per HH in US, $1200 in CA
Smaller fiscal effects are expected as a result of international trade
Views on fiscal consequences of immigration "California's addiction to 'cheap' illegal alien labor is bankrupting the state and posing
huge burdens on the state's middle class tax base." Dan Stein, Federation for American Immigration Reform
“It uses tax dollars to provide illegal workers with educational services, medical care, and unemployment compensation for those that are injured on the job. They are a drain on the taxpayers of Canyon County, the state of Idaho, and the US in general.“Robert Vasquez, Commissioner of Canyon County, Idaho
"The bottom line is that businesses are benefiting from the cheap illegal labor. They're making extra profits and they're shifting the whole benefits package over on to the taxpayer.“ Rick Oltman, Yuma County, Arizona
“Federal immigration policies should ensure that new immigrants do not become a
public charge to federal, state, or local governments.” National Governor’s Association
A tale of two governors
In the 1990s, California and Texas both had Republican governors Governors Bush and Wilson were fiscal conservatives
and rising stars within the national Republican party Both supported NAFTA and free trade, but took very
different approaches toward immigration Bush courted the Latino vote (even campaigning in
Spanish) and tried to appear pro-immigration
Wilson endorsed Proposition 187, a ballot measure to deny access of illegal immigrants to public services in California (later blocked by the courts)
A tale of two governors
What accounts for these different approaches toward immigration? California provides generous public benefits to
immigrants financed by progressive income taxes
This may have given high-income voters in the state an incentive to join the anti-immigration coalition
Texas provides meager public benefits financed by a regressive state sales tax This may have made high-income voters in the state more
pro-immigrant and created political space to attract socially conservative Latino immigrants to the Republican party
A simple model of policy preferences Let V(p, Ii) be indirect utility received by individual i, as a
function of commodity prices, p, and after-tax income, Ii
Consider change in indirect utility due to immigration:
Expressed in monetary terms this is:
Immigration changes commodity prices (1st term), pre-tax income (2nd term), and net fiscal transfer (3rd term)
iiii g)t1(yI
MM
I
I
VM
M
p
p
VV i
ii
MM
ty
M
gM)t1(
M
yM
M
p
I/V
p/V
I/V
V ii
ii
i
ii
i
Welfare effects of immigration Let V(p, yi) be indirect utility received by individual i, as a
function of commodity prices, p, and income, yi
Change in aggregate welfare due to change in low skilled labor supply of dL is (where αi is share of group i in the pop. for two groups, skilled (H) and unskilled (L))
If marginal utility of income (λλ) ) is constant across people
where
ii
i i
yV VpdW dL
p L y L
L Hy ydW L H dL
L L
( V / p )( p / L )dL
Welfare effects of immigration
Change in welfare as share of GNP (Y) is
where is the elasticity of income for factor type i w.r.t. the supply of low skilled labor, θi is the share of factor i in GNP, and M is inflow of L
y is post-tax income, given by
where wi is the pre-tax wage for group i, ti is the tax rate for group i and gi are gov’t transfers for group i
L LL H HL
dW M M
Y L H
iL i i( y / L )( L / y )
1i i i iy w t g
Welfare effects of immigration
How does post tax income respond to immigration?
Elasticity of post tax income w.r.t. supply of factor i is
where ρv,I is share of income type v for factor i and ηv,iL is the elasticity of income type v w.r.t. the supply of low skilled labor for factor i
We expect:
ηw,LL < 0, ηw,HL > 0 (immigration of L raises wH and lowers wL) ηt,LL > 0, ηt,HL > 0 (immigration of L raises tax rates) ηg,LL < 0, ηg,HL > 0 (immigration of L lowers gov’t transfers)
1iL w,i w,iL i t ,i t ,iL g ,i g ,iL( t )
Estimating equation
Assume pre-tax income and the net fiscal transfer are linear functions of individual characteristics
(where X is defined such that β>0)
Assume ∂β/∂M=θ, in which case we expect: With low-skilled immigration: ∂yi/∂M=Xiθ+∂εi/∂M > 0 for high-skilled labor
∂yi/∂M=Xiθ+∂εi/∂M < 0 for low-skilled labor
Assume ∂γ/∂M=λ λ will vary across US states according to their spending and
tax policies and the size of their immigrant populations
iii Xy iiiii Xytg
Estimating equation
Putting this together, we obtain
Preferences on immigration policy depend on individual characteristics, state characteristics, and their interactions (use categorical variables to allow for non-linearities)
All else equal, Overall, the low-skilled will be more opposed to immigration (than
the high-skilled) and their opposition will be stronger in states with larger immigrant populations
The opposition of the high-skilled to immigration will be stronger in states that (a) make larger fiscal transfers to immigrants, or (b) have more-skilled immigrant populations
Policies that weaken redistribution will also weaken high-skilled opposition to immigration
iiiii4i3ii2i10i X)FiscalExp(1X)m(Im1XZ)FiscalExp(1)m(Im1V̂
Identification
Empirical estimation
We estimate the correlation between opposition to immigration (or trade) and schooling and how this varies with size of state immigrant population, skill mix of state immigrant population, and state fiscal exposure to immigration
Given controls for state fixed effects, our focus is on how slope coefficient on schooling varies across states – identification is based on cross-state variation in how opposition to immigration responds to schooling (and whether this is conditional on the fiscal regime of the state)
Identification Estimation issues (and partial corrections)
Endogeneity of state of residence, state welfare policies Issue is possible correlation between unobserved determinants of
individual attitudes toward immigration and size of state immigrant population (or nature of state welfare policies)
Would likely cause us to understate cross-state variation in opposition to immigration (since those more opposed to immigration or to generous welfare policies would be more likely to settle in low-immigration, low-welfare states)
Over sample period, few individuals change states and ranking of states in terms of welfare generosity to immigrants is stable – issue may be ameliorated by controlling for state fixed effects
Measurement error in preferences (Bertrand & Mullainathan) Issue is that measurement error in stated preferences may be
correlated with individual characteristics (eg, education) Exploit information on other opinions (including those seemingly
irrelevant to immigration) to absorb idiosyncratic error terms
Data
Examine public opinion across US states, for which there there is variation in fiscal costs of immigration
Define US states as tax jurisdiction (states set income, sales, and property taxes, provide many public benefits)
Sources National Election Studies Surveys, 1992 and 2000 Census of Population and Housing, Census of
Governments, CPS
Immigrants are geographically concentrated
Share of State Population in Immigrant Headed Households
Imm
igra
nt S
har
e 2
000
Immigrant Share 19900 .1 .2 .3 .4
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
Ohio
Florida
MassachuArizona
District
WyomingIndiana
Texas
Maryland
North Da
New Hamp
Arkansas
Illinois
KentuckySouth Da
Hawaii
New York
West Vir
Michigan
Delaware
Colorado
Mississi
North CaNebraska
Georgia
Tennesse
Washingt
Wisconsi
Utah
Rhode isConnecti
Californ
New Jers
Missouri
Virginia
KansasMinnesot
Alabama
IdahoAlaska
Nevada
Maine
New MexiOregon
Montana
Vermont
Pennsylv
South CaOklahomaLouisianIowa
But recent immigrants follow job growth
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of ColumbiaFlorida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
KansasKentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts Michigan
Minnesota
MississippiMissouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
1
2
3
Imm
Po
p S
hare
20
00
/ Im
m P
op S
hare
19
90
(log
sca
le)
.8 1 1.2 1.4Native Employment 2000 / Native Employment 1990 (log scale)
Growth in Immigrant Population and Native Employment, 1990-2000
Fiscal costs of immigration vary by state
1990
Imm
HH
s o
n W
elfa
re /
Na
tive
HH
s
Immigrant HHs / Native HHs0 .1 .2 .3 .4
0
.01
.02
.03
.04
.05
Connecti
Nevada
IdahoK ansasUtah
North Ca
ColoradoMichigan
A rkansasIowa
Tennesse
Mary landOregon
K entucky
Rhode is
GeorgiaA labamaOhio
Massachu
Ill inois
S outh CaNew Hamp
W est V irW yoming
P ennsylv
Louisian
New Mexi
New Y ork
Delaware
Distric t
V irginia
New Jers
NebraskaMiss issi
A laska
Californ
Florida
Haw aii
Oklahoma
W isconsi
North Da
W ashingt
V ermontMissouri
Minnesot
Indiana
A rizona
Montana
Maine
S outh Da
Texas
2000
Imm
HH
s o
n W
elfa
re /
Na
tive
HH
s
Immigrant HHs / Native HHs0 .1 .2 .3 .4
0
.01
.02
.03
.04
.05
Oregon
K ansas
New Y ork
A rkansas
Texas
North DaV ermont
Colorado
Haw aii
GeorgiaNebraska
K entuckyNorth CaW yoming
NevadaIll inois
New Jers
OklahomaMissouriIdaho
Rhode is
S outh Ca
Distric t
Iowa
Californ
Utah
S outh DaNew Hamp
A labamaIndiana
P ennsylv
FloridaMassachu
W ashingt
A laska
V irginiaLouisian
Minnesot
New Mexi
Maine
Delaware
OhioW est V ir
Connecti
MichiganW isconsi
MontanaMiss issiTennesse
Mary land
A rizona
1990
Imm
Sc
ho
ol A
ge
Po
p /
Na
tive
HH
s
Immigrant HHs / Native HHs0 .1 .2 .3 .4
0
.05
.1
.15
Connecti
Nevada
IdahoK ansasUtah
North Ca
ColoradoMichigan
A rkansasIowaTennesse
Mary landOregon
K entucky
Rhode is
GeorgiaA labama
Ohio
MassachuIll inois
S outh CaNew Hamp
W est V irW yoming
P ennsylvLouisian
New Mexi
New Y ork
DelawareDistric tV irginia
New Jers
NebraskaMiss issi
A laska
Californ
Florida
Haw aii
OklahomaW isconsiNorth Da
W ashingt
V ermontMissouriMinnesotIndiana
A rizona
MontanaMaine
S outh Da
Texas
2000
Imm
Sc
ho
ol A
ge
Po
p /
Na
tive
HH
s
Immigrant HHs / Native HHs0 .1 .2 .3 .4
0
.05
.1
.15
Oregon
K ansas
New Y ork
A rkansas
Texas
North DaV ermont
Colorado
Haw aii
Georgia
Nebraska
K entucky
North CaW yoming
Nevada
Ill inois
New Jers
OklahomaMissouri
Idaho
Rhode is
S outh Ca
Distric t
Iowa
Californ
Utah
S outh DaNew Hamp
A labamaIndianaP ennsylv
Florida
Massachu
W ashingt
A laskaV irginia
Louisian
Minnesot
New Mexi
Maine
Delaware
OhioW est V ir
Connecti
MichiganW isconsiMontanaMiss issiTennesse
Mary land
A rizona
Since 1996, immigrant-native differences in welfare use have declined for all categories except Medicaid
Difference in Immigrant and Native Welfare Participation Rates
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Year
(Per
cen
t of
Im
mig
rant
Hou
seho
lds
Rec
eivi
ng A
ssis
tanc
e)
- (P
erce
nt o
f N
ativ
e H
ouse
hold
s R
ecei
ving
Ass
ista
nce)
Any Type of Assistance
Any Type of Cash Benefit
Medicaid
Food Stamps
Differences remain in welfare uptake across US states (% of households receiving assistance by type)
A. Overall Welfare Participation Rates B. Cash Program Participation Rates
Welfare Generosity of State Welfare Generosity of State
Less More Less More Less More Less More
Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants
1994 16.7 13.9 22.8 25.2 7.7 7.6 8.2 14.3
1998 13.9 12.6 16.9 21.9 5.7 6.0 5.6 10.5
2002 16.0 13.7 20.7 25.5 4.9 4.9 3.4 8.3
C. Medicaid Participation Rates D. Food Stamp Participation Rates
Welfare Generosity of State Welfare Generosity of State
Less More Less More Less More Less More
Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants
1994 14.1 12.4 18.6 23.6 9.6 7.3 14.2 13.6
1998 12.2 11.6 15.4 20.7 6.4 5.2 5.7 9.1
2002 14.5 12.8 19.4 24.7 6.3 4.6 5.8 6.8
Percent of school children with immigrant mothers, 2000
School-Age Pop.(5-17 years)
Young Children(0-4 years)
1. California 43.3 45.02. New York 27.1 27.63. Florida 28.1 22.14. Texas 22.0 23.15. New Jersey 22.1 21.46. Illinois 15.2 18.07. Massachusetts 17.1 12.78. Arizona 23.1 29.9
Entire Country 16.3 17.6
Expenditures and revenues by foreign-born and native households in California (1996)
CaliforniaForeign-Born Native
Expenditures Local 6,208 5,290 Of which K12 education 1,581 768 State 4,973 2,510 Of which K12 education 2,496 1,212 Federal 13,326 13,625Revenues Local 5,377 5,573 State 2,341 3,405 Federal 10,644 16,347Fiscal Balance Local -831 283 State -2,632 895 Federal -2,682 2,722
State generosity in welfare benefits
4 IL MO, NE CA, MA, MD, ME, RI
WA
3 FL OR CT, MN, NJ, NY, PA, WI
HI
Public Assistance Availability to
Immigrants
2 DC, DE, KY, MT, NV, NC, TN, VA, WY
AK, AZ, CO, GA, IA, KA, NM, ND, UT
MI NH
1 AL, AR, ID, LA, MS, OH,
TX, WV
IN, OK, SC, SD
1 2 3 4
Public Assistance Generosity
Ranking of US states in terms of generosity toward immigrants is stable over time
Share of Households Receiving Cash Assistance, 1990
Shar
e of
Imm
igra
nts
on W
elfa
re
Share of Natives on Welfare0 .05 .1 .15
0
.05
.1
.15
Iowa
Oklahoma
Kansas
Tennesse
North Da
Californ
Kentucky
South Da
Massachu
Colorado
Alaska
Connecti
MarylandNew Hamp
VermontDelaware
LouisianOhio
Hawaii
Nevada
New Jers
Wisconsi
Wyoming
West Vir
Michigan
New York
Florida
Alabama
New Mexi
District
North Ca
IndianaMontana
Washingt
Georgia
MaineArizona
Nebraska
Virginia Arkansas
Illinois
Pennsylv
Texas
Rhode is
South Ca
Minnesot
Utah
Mississi
Missouri
Oregon
Idaho
Share of Households Receiving Cash Assistance, 2000
Shar
e of
Imm
igra
nts
on W
elfa
re
Share of Natives on Welfare0 .05 .1 .15
0
.05
.1
.15
Wyoming
Massachu
South Ca
MississiMontana
Nebraska
Alaska
Florida
South Da
Utah IllinoisIowa
Minnesot
Wisconsi
Arizona
Maryland
Ohio
New Hamp
Georgia
Idaho
Louisian
Kansas
Maine
District
Texas
Tennesse
Connecti
Californ
West VirNew JersNorth Da
Oklahoma
Alabama
Kentucky
New York
North Ca
Indiana
ArkansasNevada
PennsylvHawaii
New Mexi
OregonVermont
Washingt
Colorado
Virginia
Rhode is
MissouriMichigan
Delaware
Data Measuring fiscal exposure to immigration (start with 4
categories per measure, test down to 2)
Immigration fiscal exposure measures: Fiscal Exposure 1: Equal to 1 if state welfare spending per native
is above ‘90 national mean and if high-immigration state (immigration population share is above ‘90 national mean), 0 o/w
Fiscal Exposure 2: Equal to 1 if ratio of state immigrant HHs on welfare to number of native HHs above ‘90 national mean, 0 o/w
Other fiscal exposure measures (for trade policy analysis): Fiscal Exposure 3: Equal to 1 if state welfare spending per native
is above ‘90 national mean Fiscal Exposure 4: Equal to 1 if state welfare spending as share of
state GDP is above ‘90 national mean
Interactions with schooling (No High School, High School, Some College, College) or income quartile
High immigration and generous welfare states High immigration states
1992: AZ, CA, CT, FL, IL, MA, NJ, NY, TX 2000: ‘92 states plus CO, DC, MD, NV, NM, OR, VA, WA
States with high immigrant uptake of welfare 1992: CA, CT, FL, MA, NJ, NY 2000: ’92 states plus WA
States with high welfare spending Per native household
1992: CA, CT, NH, IL, LA, MD, MA, MI, MN, NJ, NY, OH, PA, TN, WA, WV, WI 2000: CA, CT, DC, IL, KY, ME, MD, MA, MN, MS, NH, NJ, NM, NY, ND, OR,
PA, SC, TN, WA, WV
As share of state GDP 1992: AZ, AK, CA, CT, LA, MA, MI, MN, NH, NJ, NY, OH, PA, TN, WV, WI 2000: AL, AK, CA, IA, KY, LA, ME, MA, MN, MS, NM, NY, ND, OH, OR, PA,
SC, TN, WV
Data
NES immigration policy question
“Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the US to live should be increased a little, increased a lot, decreased a little, decreased a lot, or left the same as it is now?”
Immigration Opinion is coded a 1 for those individuals favoring immigration be decreased a little or a lot and 0 for those individuals favoring immigration be maintained or increased.
Data
NES trade policy question
“Some people have suggested placing new limits on foreign imports in order to protect American jobs. Others say that such limits would raise consumer prices and hurt American exports. Do you favor or oppose placing new limits on imports, or haven't you thought much about this?”
Trade Opinion is coded a 1 for those individuals favoring protection and 0 for those opposing it
Native support for decreased immigration by education and fiscal exposure to immigrants, 2000
Fiscal Exposure MeasureFiscal
ExposureNo High School
High School
Some College
College Grad
Fiscal Exposure 1 Low 0.537 0.571 0.507 0.362
High 0.625 0.558 0.461 0.420
Fiscal Exposure 2 Low 0.498 0.572 0.516 0.361
High 0.658 0.557 0.464 0.435
Native support for trade restrictions by education and fiscal exposure to immigrants, 2000
Fiscal Exposure MeasureFiscal
ExposureNo High School
High School
Some College
College Grad
Fiscal Exposure 1 Low 0.748 0.719 0.590 0.383
High 0.662 0.674 0.560 0.418
Fiscal Exposure 2 Low 0.728 0.719 0.606 0.392
High 0.707 0.674 0.548 0.397
Probit results on native opposition to immigration Estimation
Sample is native respondents
Regressors: Dummies for schooling category alone and interacted with size of
state immigrant population, state fiscal exposure to immigration
Other controls: gender, quadratic in age, race, ethnicity, state unemployment rate, state dummy variables, year dummy variable
Additional controls: Isolationist sentiment, union membership, public sector employment, partisanship, ideology
Standard errors clustered by state
Table 2 Fiscal Exposure 1 Fiscal Exposure 2
High School 0.182 0.168 0.211 0.206
(0.101) (0.107) (0.095) (0.103)
Some College 0.047 0.027 0.102 0.092
(0.097) (0.098) (0.100) (0.104)
College -0.347 -0.356 -0.298 -0.295
(0.119) (0.130) (0.116) (0.127)
No High School * Immigration 0.445 0.474 0.365 0.667
(0.141) (0.173) (0.257) (0.270)
High School * Immigration -0.016 0.034 -0.012 0.248
(0.117) (0.136) (0.122) (0.140)
Some College * Immigration -0.098 -0.033 -0.143 0.116
(0.094) (0.097) (0.088) (0.151)
College * Immigration -0.078 -0.016 -0.183 0.043
(0.111) (0.128) (0.115) (0.165)
No High School * Fiscal Exposure -0.090 0.246 0.102 0.189
(0.200) (0.169) (0.264) (0.259)
High School * Fiscal Exposure -0.008 0.303 -0.011 0.144
(0.141) (0.130) (0.137) (0.136)
Some College * Fiscal Exposure -0.036 0.237 -0.003 0.138
(0.089) (0.109) (0.082) (0.110)
College * Fiscal Exposure 0.219 0.490 0.347 0.526
(0.118) (0.145) (0.127) (0.117)
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Impact of education on attitude toward immigration (Facchini & Mayda, 2006)
Impact of income on attitude toward immigration (Facchini & Mayda, 2006)
Trade policy preferencesFiscal Exposure Measure
Table 5 1 2 3 4
High School -0.111 -0.020 -0.074 -0.033
(0.121) (0.123) (0.151) (0.161)
Some College -0.390 -0.267 -0.268 -0.263
(0.133) (0.146) (0.138) (0.143)
College -0.971 -0.849 -0.908 -0.946
(0.132) (0.128) (0.163) (0.143)
No High School * Fiscal Exposure -0.367 0.232 0.004 0.245
(0.264) (0.360) (0.306) (0.275)
High School * Fiscal Exposure -0.228 0.132 -0.021 0.160
(0.132) (0.196) (0.238) (0.189)
Some College * Fiscal Exposure -0.221 0.111 -0.173 0.064
(0.148) (0.188) (0.236) (0.179)
College * Fiscal Exposure -0.046 0.223 0.045 0.376
(0.161) (0.193) (0.259) (0.164)
Additional results
Results are robust to:
Including interactions between education and skill mix of state-immigrant population (measured continuously or discretely)
Including state share of Latinos in immigrant population, individual attitudes toward minorities, other individual opinions
Substituting schooling with reported income, measured by quartile
Dropping individual high-immigration states (CA, NY, FL, TX, IL, NJ)
Dropping those who self identify as very conservative or very liberal
Using continuous measures of immigrant population, fiscal exposure
Re-estimating using ordered probit instead of bivariate probit
Summary
Puzzle of why we tend to see free trade but restrictionist immigration policy is usually posed as if their distributional politics are the same
While this may be true before taxes, transfers, it is unlikely to be true after taxes, transfers
The distributional consequences and thus politics of immigration and trade appear to differ