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1. Lambino v. COMELEC- The S.C. may exercise judicial review over any matter relative to the process of amending or

revising the Constitution. Revision of the Constitution cannot be carried out through People’sInitiative.

G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

Facts

1. On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino

Group"), with other groups1 and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the

1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that

will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative

and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").

2. The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per

centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of

its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures

of the 6.3 million individuals.

3. The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI

(Legislative Department)4and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department)5 and by adding Article XVIII entitled

"Transitory Provisions."6 These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a

Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their petition,

the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification:

DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGINGTHE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-

PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THEORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?

4. On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications inthe proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.

Issues:

w/n the proposed changes constitute an amendment or revision

w/n the initiative petition is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement on direct proposal by the people

Held:

Initiative petition does not comply with Sec. 2, Art. XVII on direct proposal by people

Sec. 2, Art. XVII…is the governing provision that allows a people‘s initiative to propose amendments to the

Constitution. While this provision does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed

amendments, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that:

a. the framers intended to adopt relevant American jurisprudence on people‘s initiative; and

b. in particular, the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the

people must sign on a petition containing such full text

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_174153_2006.html#fnt1














The essence of amendments ―directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition‖ is that the entire

proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present:

a. the people must author sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf

b. as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people

who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. The full text of the proposed amendments

may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of

such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen

the full text of the proposed amendments before – not after – signing.

Moreover, ―an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that which is

proposed‖ and failure to do so is ―deceptive and misleading‖ which renders the initiative void.

In the case of the Lambino Group‘s petition, there‘s not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the proposed

changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes isattached to it. The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-

Presidential to the Unicameral- Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the

people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. This omission is fatal.

The initiative violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution disallowing revision through initiatives

Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is through

Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through a constitutional convention. The

third mode is through a people‘s initiative.

Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to ―any amendment to, or revision of, thisConstitution.‖ In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to ―amendments to this

Constitution.‖ This distinction was intentional as shown by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. A

people‘s initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision.

In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution.

Does the Lambino Group‘s initiative constitute a revision of the Constitution?

Yes. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary

system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond

doubt a revision, not a mere amendment.

Tests to determine whether amendment or revision

In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in our

Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test:

Quantitative test—asks whether the proposed change is so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the

substantial entirety of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions. The court

examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change.

Qualitative test—inquires whether the change will accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic



governmental plan as to amount to a revision. Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a

proper subject of inquiry. Thus, a change in the nature of the basic governmental plan includes change in its

fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches. A change in the nature of the basic governmental

plan also includes changes that jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check and balances.

Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group‘s initiative is a revision and not merely an

amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group‘s proposed changes overhaul two articles – Article VI on the

Legislature and Article VII on the Executive – affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution.

Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to

parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.

A change in the structure of government is a revision

A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches

of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the

Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a

revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of

government. The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation

of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of

Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the

Constitution.

The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between amendment and revision is only one of procedure, not of

substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution,

substantive changes are called revisions because members of the deliberative body work full-time on the changes.

The same substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative, are called amendments because the changes

are made by ordinary people who do not make an occupation, profession, or vocation out of such endeavor. The SC,

however, ruled that the express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the

Lambino Group‘s theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly

stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language.

Alternative digest:

Issue:

Whether or Not the Lambino Group‘s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on

amendments to the Constitution through a people‘s initiative.

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 ―incomplete, inadequate or wanting

in essential terms and conditions‖ to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Group‘s

petition.



Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for conducting a people‘s

initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by thePeople

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signing of the

nature and effect, failure to do so is ―deceptive and misleading‖ which renders the initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between ―amendment‖ and ―revision, it is intended that the

third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of

the legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17

to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before complying with RA 6735

Petition is dismissed.

2. Ampatuan, Jr. v. De Lima et. al.,

- Consistent with the principle of separation of powers, the Supreme Court held that it is

sound judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of the preliminary investigation

conducted by the DOJ.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 197291, April 03, 2013]

DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR., Petitioner , v. SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE, CSP CLARO ARELLANO, AS CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR, NATIONAL PROSECUTION SERVICE,AND PANEL OF PROSECUTORS OF THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE, HEADED BY RSP PETERMEDALLE, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BERSAMIN, J .:

In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus cannot be used to direct the manner or theparticular way the judgment and discretion are to be exercised. Consequently, the Secretary of Justice may be



compelled by writ of mandamus to act on a letter-request or a motion to include a person in the information, but maynot be compelled by writ of mandamus to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request or motion.

The Case

This direct appeal by petition for review on certiorari has been taken from the final order issued on June 27, 2011 inCivil Case No. 10-1247771 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26, in Manila, dismissing petitioner‘s petition

for mandamus.2

cralawvllred

Antecedents

History will never forget the atrocities perpetrated on November 23, 2009, when 57 innocent civilians were massacredin Sitio Masalay, Municipality of Ampatuan, Maguindanao Province. Among the principal suspects was petitioner,then the Mayor of the Municipality of Datu Unsay, Maguindanao Province. Inquest proceedings were conductedagainst petitioner on November 26, 2009 at the General Santos (Tambler) Airport Lounge, before he was flown toManila and detained at the main office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The NBI and the PhilippineNational Police (PNP) charged other suspects, numbering more than a hundred, for what became aptly known as theMaguindanao massacre.3cralawvllred

Through Department Order No. 948, then Secretary of Justice Agnes Devanadera constituted a Special Panel ofProsecutors to conduct the preliminary investigation.

On November 27, 2009, the Department of Justice (DOJ) resolved to file the corresponding informations for murderagainst petitioner, and to issue subpoenae to several persons.4 On December 1, 2009, 25 informations for murderwere also filed against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court, 12th Judicial Region, in Cotabato City.5cralawvllred

On December 3, 2009, Secretary of Justice Devanadera transmitted her letter to Chief Justice Puno requesting thetransfer of the venue of the trial of the Maguindanao massacre from Cotabato City to Metro Manila, either in QuezonCity or in Manila, to prevent a miscarriage of justice.6 On December 8, 2009, the Court granted the request for thetransfer of venue.7 However, on December 9, 2009, but prior to the transfer of the venue of the trial to Metro Manila,the Prosecution filed a manifestation regarding the filing of 15 additional informations for murder against petitioner inBranch 15 of the Cotabato City RTC.8 Later on, additional informations for murder were filed against petitioner in theRTC in Quezon City, Branch 211, the new venue of the trial pursuant to the resolution of the Court.9cralawvllred

The records show that petitioner pleaded not guilty to each of the 41 informations for murder when he was arraignedon January 5, 2010,10 February 3, 2010,11 and July 28, 2010.12cralawvllred

In the joint resolution issued on February 5, 2010, the Panel of Prosecutors charged 196 individuals with multiplemurder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre.13 It appears that in issuing the joint resolution of February 5, 2010the Panel of Prosecutors partly relied on the twin affidavits of one Kenny Dalandag, both dated December 7,2009.14cralawvllred

On August 13, 2010, Dalandag was admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ.15 On September 7,2010, the QC RTC issued its amended pre-trial order,16 wherein Dalandag was listed as one of the Prosecutionwitnesses.17cralawvllred

On October 14, 2010, petitioner, through counsel, wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to request the inclusion of Dalandag in the informations for murderconsidering that Dalandag had already confessed his participation in the massacre through his two sworndeclarations.18 Petitioner reiterated the request twice more on October 22, 201019 and November 2,2010.20cralawvllred

By her letter dated November 2, 2010,21 however, Secretary De Lima denied petitioner‘s request.

Accordingly, on December 7, 2010, petitioner brought a petition for mandamus in the RTC in Manila (Civil Case No.10-124777),22 seeking to compel respondents to charge Dalandag as another accused in the various murder casesundergoing trial in the QC RTC.

On January 19, 2011,23 the RTC in Manila set a pre-trial conference on January 24, 2011 in Civil Case No. 10-124777. At the close of the pre-trial, the RTC in Manila issued a pre-trial order.

In their manifestation and motion dated February 15, 201124 and February 18, 2011,25 respondents questioned the



propriety of the conduct of a trial in a proceeding for mandamus. Petitioner opposed.

On February 15, 2011, petitioner filed a motion for the production of documents,26 which the RTC in Manila grantedon March 21, 2011 after respondents did not file either a comment or an opposition.

Respondents then sought the reconsideration of the order of March 21, 2011.

On March 21, 2011,

27

the RTC in Manila issued a subpoena to Dalandag, care of the Witness Protection Program ofthe DOJ, requiring him to appear and testify on April 4, 2011 in Civil Case No. 10-124777.

On April 4, 2011, respondents moved to quash the subpoena.28 Petitioner opposed the motion to quash thesubpoena on April 15, 2011.29 The parties filed other papers, specifically, respondents their reply dated April 26,2011;30 petitioner an opposition on May 12, 2011;31 and respondents another reply dated May 20, 2011.32cralawvllred

On June 27, 2011,33 the RTC of Manila issued the assailed order in Civil Case No. 10-124777 dismissing the petitionfor mandamus.34cralawvllred

Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari .

Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

1. WHETHER THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS MAY BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE KENNY DALANDAG AS AN ACCUSED IN THE INFORMATIONS FOR MULTIPLEMURDER IN THE MAGUINADANAO MASSACRE CASES IN LIGHT OF HIS ADMITTED PARTICIPATIONTHEREAT IN AFFIDAVITS AND OFFICIAL RECORDS FILED WITH THE PROSECUTOR AND THE QCRTC; and,

2. WHETHER THE SUBSEQUENT INCLUSION OF KENNY DALANDAG IN THE WITNESS PROTECTIONPROGRAM JUSTIFIES EXCLUSION AS AN ACCUSED AND HIS NON-INDICTMENT FOR HISCOMPLICITY IN THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE NOTWITHSTANDING ADMISSIONS MADE THAT HETOOK PART IN ITS PLANNING AND EXECUTION.35

The crucial issue is whether respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge Dalandag as an accused

for multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre despite his admission to the Witness ProtectionProgram of the DOJ.

Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department of the Government whose principal power andresponsibility are to see to it that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of the power to executeour laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the public prosecutors with a wide rangeof discretion – the discretion of what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord offactors that are best appreciated by the public prosecutors.36 The public prosecutors are solely responsible for thedetermination of the amount of evidence sufficient to establish probable cause to justify the filing of appropriatecriminal charges against a respondent. Theirs is also the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not

criminal cases should be filed in court.

37

cralawvllredConsistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the Court deems it a sound judicialpolicy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to allow the Executive Department, through theDepartment of Justice, exclusively to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause forthe prosecution of supposed offenders. By way of exception, however, judicial review may be allowed where it isclearly established that the public prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion, that is, when he has exercised hisdiscretion ―in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patentand gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined bylaw.‖38cralawvllred



accused and shall be a bar to his future prosecution for the same offense, unless he fails or refuses to testify againsthis co-accused in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for his discharge.40 The discharge isexpressly left to the sound discretion of the trial court, which has the exclusive responsibility to see to it that theconditions prescribed by the rules for that purpose exist.41cralawvllred

While it is true that, as a general rule, the discharge or exclusion of a co-accused from the information in order that hemay be utilized as a Prosecution witness rests upon the sound discretion of the trial court,42 such discretion is not

absolute and may not be exercised arbitrarily, but with due regard to the proper administration of justice.

43

Anent therequisite that there must be an absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is sought, thetrial court has to rely on the suggestions of and the information provided by the public prosecutor. The reason isobvious – the public prosecutor should know better than the trial court, and the Defense for that matter, which of theseveral accused would best qualify to be discharged in order to become a state witness. The public prosecutor isalso supposed to know the evidence in his possession and whomever he needs to establish his case,44 as well as theavailability or non-availability of other direct or corroborative evidence, which of the accused is the ‗most guilty‘ one,and the like.45cralawvllred

On the other hand, there is no requirement under Republic Act No. 6981 for the Prosecution to first charge a personin court as one of the accused in order for him to qualify for admission into the Witness Protection Program. Theadmission as a state witness under Republic Act No. 6981 also operates as an acquittal, and said witness cannotsubsequently be included in the criminal information except when he fails or refuses to testify. The immunity for thestate witness is granted by the DOJ, not by the trial court. Should such witness be meanwhile charged in court as anaccused, the public prosecutor, upon presentation to him of the certification of admission into the Witness Protection

Program, shall petition the trial court for the discharge of the witness.46

The Court shall then order the discharge andexclusion of said accused from the information.47cralawvllred

The admission of Dalandag into the Witness Protection Program of the Government as a state witness since August13, 2010 was warranted by the absolute necessity of his testimony to the successful prosecution of the criminalcharges. Apparently, all the conditions prescribed by Republic Act No. 6981 were met in his case. That he admittedhis participation in the commission of the Maguindanao massacre was no hindrance to his admission into the WitnessProtection Program as a state witness, for all that was necessary was for him to appear not the most guilty.

Accordingly, he could not anymore be charged for his participation in the Maguindanao massacre, as to which hisadmission operated as an acquittal, unless he later on refuses or fails to testify in accordance with the swornstatement that became the basis for his discharge against those now charged for the crimes.

Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance ofan act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the actagainst which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. In matters involving the

exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in order to compel respondent tribunal,corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but it cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular waydiscretion is to be exercised,48 or to compel the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of

judgment or discretion.49cralawvllred

As such, respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the letter-request of petitioner, but may not becompelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request. Considering that respondent Secretary ofJustice already denied the letter-request, mandamus was no longer available as petitioner‘s recourse.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari ; AFFIRMS the final order issued on June 27,2011 in Civil Case No. 10-124777 by the Regional Trial Court in Manila; andORDERS petitioner to pay the costs ofsuit.???ñr?bl?š ??r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ

SO ORDERED.

3. Republ ic v. B ayaoet. al .,

- The relocation of a government center is a prerogative of the executive branch unless theimplementation is contrary to law, morals, public policy and the Court cannot intervene in thelegitimate exercise of such power.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. NO. 179492, June 05, 2013



REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ABUSAMA M. ALID, OFFICER-IN-CHARGE,DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE-REGIONAL-FIELD UNIT XII (DA-RFU XII), Petitioner , v.ABDULWAHAB A.

BAYAO, OSMEÑA I. MONTAÑER, RAKMA B. BUISAN, HELEN M. ALVARES, NEILA P. LIMBA, ELIZABETH B.PUSTA, ANNA MAE A.. SIDENO, UDTOG B. TABONG, JOHN S. KAMENZA, DELIA R. SUBALDO, DAYANG W.

MACMOD, FLORENCE S. TAYUAN, IN THEIR OWN BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE OTHER OFFICIALS ANDEMPLOYEES OF DA-RFU XII,Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

LEONEN, J .:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45. This Petition prays for the reversal and settingaside of the Court of Appeals' (1) Resolution dated March 21, 2007 that dismissed the Petition for Certiorari underRule 65 filed by petitioner for failure to resort to a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed trial court Order datedOctober 9, 2006 and (2) Resolution dated August 16, 2007 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

Petitioner Department of Agriculture—Regional Field Unit XII (DA-RFU XII) is a government office mandated toimplement the laws, policies, plans, programs, rules, and regulations of the Department of Agriculture in its regionalarea, while respondents are officials and employees of DA-RFU XII.1chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On March 30, 2004, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 304 was passed designating Koronadal City as the regional center

and seat of SOCCSKSARGEN Region.2

It provides that all departments, bureaus, and offices of the nationalgovernment in the SOCCSKSARGEN Region shall transfer their regional seat of operations to KoronadalCity.3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In an April 1, 2005 Memorandum, the Department of Agriculture (DA) Undersecretary for Operations Edmund J. Sanadirected Officer-in- Charge (OIC) and Regional Executive Director of DA-RFU XII Abusama M. Alid asfollows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In compliance with Executive Order No. 304 of which Section 2 states "Transfer of Regional Offices. All departments,bureaus and offices of the National Government on the SOCCSKSARGEN Region shall transfer their regional seat ofoperations to Koronadal City," you are hereby directed to immediately effect the transfer of the administrative, financeand operations base of RFU XII from Cotabato City to Koronadal City. On the interim, part of the staff can temporarilyhold office at either or both the ATI building in Tantangan and Tupi Seed Farm, but the main office shall be withinKoronadal City.

The action plan for transfer should be submitted to my office not later than 6 April 2005 so that appropriate fundingcan be processed soonest. Further, execution of the plan should commence by 16 April 2005 or earlier so thatconcerned personnel can benefit from the summer break to make personal arrangements for the transfer of theirwork base.

For strict compliance.4

In a Memorandum dated April 22, 2005 addressed to DA Secretary Arthur Yap, private respondents opposed theimplementation of the April 1, 2005 Memorandum.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

They alleged that in 2004, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo made a pronouncement during one of her visitsin Cotabato City that the regional seat of Region 12 shall remain in Cotabato City.6Only three departments were notcovered by the suspension of E.O. No. 304, namely, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Department ofTourism (DOT), and Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Respondents alleged further in their Memorandum to the DA Secretary that on March 7, 2005, they appealed to theSecretary of Agriculture that the implementation of E.O. No. 304 be held in abeyance. A copy of the Petition wasattached to the Memorandum. It cited reasons such as the huge costs the physical transfer will entail and the plight ofemployees who have already settled and established their homes in Cotabato City.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On March 8, 2005, their Petition was endorsed by Department of Agriculture Employees Association-12 (DAEAS-12)President Osmeña I. Motañer to then President Macapagal-Arroyo, and on April 12, 2005, this was referred to DASecretary Yap for his information and appropriate action.9 Respondents justified their appeal saying that a buildingwas constructed in Cotabato City that can accommodate the whole staff of DA- RFU XII. On the other hand, there isno building yet in Koronadal City where rent is very expensive.10 Moreover, if the regional office remains in Cotabato



City, the government need not spend over P7,200,000.00 as dislocation pay as well as other expenses for equipmenthauling and construction.11 Finally, respondents alleged that the proposed third floor of the ATI Building in Tantanganhas a sub-standard foundation and will not be issued a certificate of occupancy by the City Engineering Office ofKoronadal City as per information from an auditor.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On May 17, 2005, OIC Abusama M. Alid held a meeting and ordered the transfer of the regional office to ATI Buildingin Tantangan and Tupi Seed Farm in Tupi, both located in South Cotabato and Uptown, Koronadal City, to be carried

out on May 21, 2005.

13

chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

This prompted respondents to file on May 18, 2005 a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of Writ ofPreliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 of CotabatoCity.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

By Order dated October 9, 2006, the trial court granted respondents' Prayer for a Writ of PreliminaryInjunction.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In a petition dated December 17, 2006,16 petitioner went to the Court of Appeals via Rule 65 on the ground that theassailed Order of the trial court is contrary to the pronouncement of this Court inDENR v. DENR Region 12Employees.

Through the March 21, 2007 Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Certiorari for failure ofpetitioner to resort to a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed trial court Order.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Hence, the present Petition under Rule 45.

Petitioner argues that (1) this case falls under the exceptions for filing a Motion for Reconsideration prior to filing aPetition under Rule 65; (2) the trial court Order enjoining the transfer is contrary toDENR v. DENR Region 12Employees

18 that upheld the separation of powers between the executive and judiciary on the wisdom of transfer ofregional offices; (3) the trial court interfered into this wisdom of the executive in the management of its affairs; and (4)the trial court disregarded basic rules on amendment and revocation of administrative issuances and the propriety ofinjunction as a remedy.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In their Comment, respondents counter that a Petition via Rule 45 is not the proper remedy to assail the disputedResolutions.20 They allege that the assailed Court of Appeals Resolution dismissing the Petition for Certiorari forfailure of the petitioners to file a Motion for Reconsideration is not a "final order or resolution" contemplated by Rule45.21 It is not an adjudication on the merits.22 In fact, the Court of Appeals did not even attempt to resolve thepropriety of the issuance of the assailed trial court Order.23 In any case, respondents argue that petitioner's failure to

file a Motion for Reconsideration is fatal. They contend that this is a condition sine qua non for a Petition under Rule65, and none of the exceptions are present in this case.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Based on both parties' contentions, the issues involved in this case may be summarized asfollows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

I. Whether a Petition via Rule 45 is the proper remedy to assail the disputed Resolutions

II. Whether the present case falls within the exceptions on the requisite for filing a Motion for Reconsiderationprior to filing a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65

III. Whether petitioner can raise other issues not addressed in the assailed Resolutions

IV. Whether the issuance by the RTC of a preliminary injunction against the transfer of the DA Regional Office

to Koronadal City violates the separation of powers between the executive department and the judiciary asto the wisdom behind the transfer

First, we discuss the procedural issues.

Respondents contend that a Petition via Rule 45 is not the proper remedy to assail the disputed Resolutions.25 Theyallege that the assailed Court of Appeals Resolution dismissing the Petition for Certiorari for failure of the petitioners tofile a Motion for Reconsideration is not a "final order or resolution" contemplated by Rule45.26chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary



On the other hand, petitioner argues that if the assailed Resolutions are not elevated via Rule 45, they would attainfinality and consequently, the trial court Order dated October 9, 2006 would become unassailable aswell.27chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

A dismissal by the Court of Appeals of a Petition via Rule 65 for failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration may beassailed via Rule 45.

Unlike a Petition via Rule 45 that is a continuation of the appellate process over the original case, a special civilaction for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or independent action.28 Consequently, the March 21, 2007Resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing the Petition via Rule 65 as well as its August 16, 2007 Resolutiondenying reconsideration are the final Resolutions contemplated under Rule 45. As correctly pointed out by petitioner,these Resolutions would attain finality if these are not elevated on appeal via Rule 45. As a result, the trial courtOrder dated October 9, 2006 would also become unassailable.29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Respondents also argue that petitioner's failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed Regional TrialCourt Order dated October 9, 2006 is fatal.30 They contend that the reasons raised by petitioner do not justifydispensing with the prerequisite of filing a Motion for Reconsideration.31chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

For its part, petitioner argues that its Petition for Certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals falls under the exceptionsto the necessity of filing a Motion for Reconsideration.32 In its Petition with the Court of Appeals, petitioners explainedits reasons for no longer filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed order in that (a) the questions to be raised

in the motion have already been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court33

and (b) there is urgent necessityfor the resolution of the questions or issues raised.34 Petitioners allege that the trial court presiding judge was notacting on the disposition of the case with dispatch and that any further delay would unduly prejudice the interests ofthe government in pursuing its economic development strategies in the region.35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The settled rule is that a Motion for Reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a Petitionfor Certiorari .36 Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error attributed toit by re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.37chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

This rule admits well-defined exceptions as follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Concededly, the settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petitionfor certiorari .

Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-definedexceptions, such as (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b)where thequestions raised in the cert iorar i proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or arethe same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolutionof the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or thesubject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would beuseless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in acriminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g)where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding were ex

parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law orwhere public interest is involved.38 (Emphasis provided)

The second exception is present in this case.

In Siok Ping Tang v. Subic Bay Distribution, Inc.,

39

this Court found that the non-filing of a Motion for Reconsiderationin the case was not fatal since the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have already been duly raised andpassed upon by the lower court, viz :chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Respondent explained their omission of filing a motion for reconsideration before resorting to a petitionfor certiorari based on exceptions (b), (c) and (i). The CA brushed aside the filing of the motion for reconsiderationbased on the ground that the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed uponby the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court. We agree.

Respondent had filed its position paper in the RTC stating the reasons why the injunction prayed for by petitionershould not be granted. However, the RTC granted the injunction. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA



and presented the same arguments which were already passed upon by the RTC. The RTC already had theopportunity to consider and rule on the question of the propriety or impropriety of the issuance of the injunction. Wefound no reversible error committed by the CA for relaxing the rule since respondent's case falls within theexceptions.40

Similarly, the various issues raised in the Petition with the Court of Appeals have already been raised by petitioner onseveral occasions through its pleadings with the trial court. The lower court, therefore, passed upon them prior to its

issuance of its Order dated October 9, 2006. Specifically, the table below summarizes the issues and argumentsraised by petitioner before the trial court vis a vis those raised in the Petition for Certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

TRIAL COURT COURT OF APPEALS

Motion to Dismiss

dated June 27, 2005

Memorandum

dated September 1, 2006

Manifestation and Reply

dated September 5, 2006

Petition for Certiorari

dated December 17, 2006

The Honorable SupremeCourt had already ruled thatthe propriety or wisdom ofthe transfer of governmentagencies or offices from

Cotabato City to Koronadal,South Cotabato is beyond

judicial inquiry.45

The instant complaint filedby plaintiffs for injunction isan indirect way ofpreventing the transfer ofthe regional seat of DA-

RFU XII which has beenupheld by the SupremeCourt in DENR v. DENRRegion 12 Employees (409SCRA 359 [2003]). If thisHonorable Court cannotcountermand the SupremeCourt's ruling directly, itcannot do so indirectly.46

To reiterate, the SupremeCourt has held in theapplicable case of DENR v.DENR Region 12Employees (409 SCRA 359

[2003])that respondentDENR employees "cannot,by means of an injunction,force the DENR XIIRegional Offices to remainin Cotabato City, as theexercise of the authority totransfer the same isexecutive in nature." TheSupreme Court furtherstated in said case that "the

judiciary cannot inquire intothe wisdom or expediencyof the acts of the executiveor the legislative

department."47

Respondent judgecommitted grave abuse ofdiscretion to lack or excessof jurisdiction when heenjoined petitioner from

transferring DA-RFU XIIfrom Cotabato City to SouthCotabato and KoronadalCity. The assailed order ofthe lower court enjoiningpetitioner from transferringthe seat of the DA-RFU XIIoffice to Koronadal City inSouth Cotabato is contraryto the pronouncement ofthe Supreme Court inDENRv. DENR Region 12Employees (409 SCRA 359[2003]).48

Corollary to the above, theOrder dated May 31, 2005of this Honorable Courtenjoining defendants fromtransferring the seat of theDA-RFU XII office toKoronadal City in SouthCotabato is contrary to theabove pronouncement ofthe Supreme Court.Perforce, the Order must beset aside accordingly.49

The allegation underParagraph 4 of theComplaint that herExcellency, PresidentGloria Macapagal-Arroyoonly made a publicpronouncement that theeffect of E.O. No. 304 issuspended is hearsay andcontrary to the procedureon the repeal, amendment

Executive orders areamended, modified orrevoked by subsequentones. The alleged publicpronouncement of thePresident suspending theimplementation ofExecutive Order No. 304 iscontrary to the ordinancepower of the President asprovided under the

Respondent judge actedarbitrarily, whimsically andin a very bias[ed] mannerwhen he concluded that thePresident of the Republichas suspended theimplementation ofExecutive Order No. 304.52



or modification of rules andregulations.50

Administrative Code of1987.51

By the nature of theirappointment as RegionalOfficials and Employees,plaintiffs can be reassigned

anywhere within Region XIIin the exigency of theservice.53

Respondent judgecommitted grave abuse ofdiscretion when heconcluded that the transfer

of DA-RFU XII to KoronadalCity will affect seriously thestudies of respondents'children and that there willbe no buildings to houserespondents.54

The allegation of possibleinjury to plaintiffs and theirfamilies as a consequenceof the planned transfer ofthe regional seat of DA-RFU XII to Koronadal Cityhad been ruled upon by theSupreme Court inDENR v.DENR Region 12Employees (409 SCRA 359[2003]) to be beyond

judicial inquiry because itinvolves concerns that aremore on the propriety orwisdom of the transferrather than on its legality.55

If the plight and conditionsof the families of the DENRemployees are worthconsidering, like thedislocation of schooling oftheir children, which withoutdoubt has more adverseimpact than the supposedabsence of allowances forthe transfer, the SupremeCourt should have grantedthe injunction prayed for bysaid DENR employees.

Apparently, the SupremeCourt did not find itcompelling to grant theinjunction over and abovethe wisdom of thetransfer.56

The families of theemployees can still stay inCotabato City in as muchas they have establishedresidences in the area. Itmust be emphasized thatthe employees derivesalaries and benefits fromtheir government work, fromwhich they support theirfamilies. The movement ofemployees thus would notcause much financialdislocation as long as theemployees received theirsalaries and benefits.57

The Honorable Court mustfurther realize that theemployees are being paidtheir salaries. In the givenorder of things, suchsalaries are enough toprovide for their basicnecessities. The RegionalOffice can simply providefor transportation toeffectuate the minimumrequired for the transfer toKoronadal City and expectthe employees to live ontheir salaries. Anyallowances due and owingthe employees connectedwith the transfer can begiven to them later as backpayments. This is not toforget that the RegionalOffice has providedtemporary housing for saidemployees to alleviate anyinconvenience that theymay suffer.58

Respondent judgecommitted grave abuse ofdiscretion when heconcluded that the transferof DA-RFU XII wouldstretch out the meagersalaries of respondents andthat it would cause themeconomic strangulation.59

There is absolutely no The issues on the alleged Respondent judge



technical malversation inthe realignment ofbudgetary allocation for theintended transfer of DA-RFU XII to KoronadalCity.60

illegal realignment of funds,unauthorized issuance ofmemorandum and thealleged unjust transfer ofemployees of DA-RFU XIIare acts that are executivein nature x x x.61

committed grave abuse ofdiscretion when he orderedthe issuance of a writ ofpreliminary injunction basedon the absence ofappropriation for thetransfer to Koronadal City in

the amount ofP9,250,000.00.62

x x x the funds needed forthe transfer can be sourcedand met by the DA fromsources such as thediscretionary administrativefund of the Office of theSecretary.Respondent's computationof the amount required forthe transfer in the amountof P9,222,000.00 is bloatedor exaggerated.63

Respondents who areaccountable officers cannotbe coerced to transfer fundsthat are deemed illegal orimproper. Hence, nopersonal liability orirreparable injury would becaused upon them. On theother hand, the rest ofrespondents who areordinary employees wouldnot suffer any irreparableinjury. This is due to the factthat they have no privity to

the alleged illegal transferof funds.64

Respondent judgecommitted grave abuse ofdiscretion when heconcluded that respondentswould suffer irreparabledamage if the transfer ofDA-RFU XII from CotabatoCity to Koronadal City is notenjoined.65

Thus, the present case falls under the second exception in that a Motion for Reconsideration need not be filed wherequestions raised in the certiorari proceedings are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court.

In any case, this Court disregards the presence of procedural flaws when there is necessity to address the issuesbecause of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the public service and the seriousimplications the case may cause on the effective administration of the executivedepartment.66chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The instant Petition involves the effective administration of the executive department and would similarly warrantrelaxation of procedural rules if need be. Specifically, the fourth clause of E.O. No. 304 states as follows:"WHEREAS, the political and socio-economic conditions in SOCCSKSARGEN Region point to the need fordesignating the regional center and seat of the region to improve government operations andservices."67chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Respondents' final contention is that the disputed Resolutions issued by the Court of Appeals dwell solely on theindispensability of the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration with the trial court before filing a Petition via Rule 65;thus, the other grounds in the present Petition need not be addressed.68chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Considering that the Petition has overcome the procedural issues as discussed above, we can now proceed todiscuss the substantive issues raised by petitioner.



4. Ang ara v. Electoral Tribunal, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).

- The Court cannot interfere with an independent body like the Electoral Tribunal under the principle ofseparation of powers. It is premature for the Court to exercise its power of judicial review until afterthe tribunal has terminated its proceedings.

[G.R. No. 45081. July 15, 1936.]

JOSE A. ANGARA, Petit ioner , v. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUELCASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR, Respondents .

Godofredo Reyes for Petit ioner .

Solicitor-General Hilado for respondent Electoral Commission.

Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.

No appearance for other respondents.

SYLLABUS - 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SEPARATION OF POWERS. — The separation of powers is a fundamental

principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in ourConstitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction,

and is supreme within its own sphere.

2. ID.; ID.; SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES. — But it does not follow from the fact that the threepowers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely

unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elabora te system ofchecks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of various departments of government. For

example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is 80 far made a check on the legislative power that hisassent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill maybecome a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the

Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates as acheck on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessaryin the appointment of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the

conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court

shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly exercises to a certain extent control over the judicial department. The Assembly also exercisesthe judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final

arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and henceto declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIARY THE ONLY CONSTITUTIONAL ARBITER TO ALLOCATE CONSTITUTIONALBOUNDARIES. — But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines,allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The

overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimesmakes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or

political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirelyobliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called

upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integralor constituent units thereof.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MODERATING POWER OF THE JUDICIARY IS GRANTED, IF NOT EXPRESSLY, BYCLEAR IMPLICATION. — As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection andperfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to soprovide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a

republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checksand balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The

Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powersand agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended, it would be inconceivable if theConstitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along

constitutional channels, for, then, the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere



expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, thelimitations and restrictions embodied in the Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution.In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of

this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been setat rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, thismoderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our

Constitution.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHAT IS MEANT BY "JUDICIAL SUPREMACY." — The Constitution is a definition of thepowers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution

itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciarymediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments;

it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacredobligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution

and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures andguarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly

is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL REVIEW LIMITED TO ACTUAL LITIGATION; WISDOM, JUSTICE OREXPEDIENCY OF LEGISLATION. — Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and

controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to theconstitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to

dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as itsfunction is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency oflegislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments notonly because the Legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the

determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people asexpressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; SYSTEM ITSELF NOT THE CHIEF PALLADIUM OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY;SUCCESS MUST BE TESTED IN THE CRUCIBLE OF FILIPINO MINDS AND HEARTS. — But much as we

might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to beremembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of

constitutional liberty . . . the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its guardians . . . their eyesmust be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the authority of their constitution." Inthe last and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our government in the unfolding years to come be

tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in the consultation rooms and court chambers.

8. ID.; OUR CONSTITUTION HAS ADOPTED THE AMERICAN TYPE OF CONSTITUTIONALGOVERNMENT. — Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutional government, theframers of our Constitution adopted the American type where the written constitution is interpreted and given

effect by the judicial department. In some countries which have declined to follow the American example,provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to

interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that in theabsence of direct prohibition courts are bound to assume what is logically their function. For instance, the

Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides that courts shall have no power to examine the validity ofstatutes (article 81, chapter IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In

countries whose constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power. This is true inNorway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law toConstitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts 121-123, Title IX,Constitution of the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity

of ordinary laws.

9. ID.; JURISDICTION OVER THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION. — The nature of the present controversyshows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two

agencies created by the Constitution. If the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, a void would becreated in our constitutional system which may in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework.

Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reasonand authority, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter ofthe present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional

grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns andqualifications of the members of the National Assembly."cralaw virtua1aw library



Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)

14. ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE WAS TO TRANSFER IN ITS TOTALITY POWER EXERCISED PREVIOUSLYBY THE LEGISLATURE OVER THE CONTESTED ELECTIONS OF THE MEMBERS TO AN

INDEPENDENT AND IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL. — From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention itis evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the

Legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial

tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents,however, as the long-felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations whichprompted the people acting through their delegates to the Convention to provide for this body known as the

Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minorityparties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further

endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court.

15. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION IS AN INDEPENDENT CONSTITUTIONAL CREATION ALTHOUGH FOR PURPOSES OF CLASSIFICATION IT IS CLOSER TO THE LEGISLATIVE

DEPARTMENT THAN TO ANY OTHER. — The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, investedwith the necessary authority in the performance and execution of the limited and specific function assignedto it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intentsand purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to

the legislative department than to any other. The location of the provision (sec. 4) creating the ElectoralCommission under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our Constitution is very indicative. Its

composition is also significant in that it is constituted by a majority of members of the Legislature. But it is abody separate from and independent of the Legislature.

16. ID.; ID; ID.; GRANT OF POWER TO THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION INTENDED TO BE ASCOMPLETE AND UNIMPAIRED AS IF IT HAD REMAINED ORIGINALLY IN THE LEGISLATURE. — The

grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns andqualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it

had remained originally in the Legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission isan implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restrictionupon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep.,1; State v. Whisman, 33 S. D., 260; L. R. A., 1917B, 1). If the power claimed for the National Assembly to

regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the Electoral Commission tolay down a period within which protest should be filed were conceded, the grant of power to the commission

would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such a case would be invested with the power todetermine contested cases involving the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National

Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would thepurpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative body befrustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time totime. A sad spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority oftaking cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that authority

effective whenever and wherever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than thatintended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the National

Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entireproceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional

grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.

17. ID.; ID.; ID; ID.; THE POWER TO PROMULGATE INCIDENTAL RULES AND REGULATIONS LODGED ALSO IN THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION BY NECESSARY IMPLICATION. — The creation of theElectoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time

within which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that wherea general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the oneor the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp.138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed infiling protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules

necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive powers to judge all contests relating to the election, returnsand qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have

been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

18. ID; ID.; ID.; POSSIBILITY OF ABUSE NO ARGUMENT AGAINST GRANT OF POWER. — Thepossibility of abuse is not an argument against the concession of the power as there is no power that is not



susceptible of abuse. If any mistake has been committed in the creation of an Electoral Commission and ininvesting it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of

members of the National Assembly, the remedy is political, not judicial, and must be sought through theordinary processes of democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are not intended to be

corrected by the judiciary. The people in creating the Electoral Commission reposed as much confidence inthis body in the exclusive determination of the specified cases assigned to it, as it has given to the SupremeCourt in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the agencies of the government were designed by

the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each constitutional organ working within its own particularsphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be animated with same zeal and honesty in accomplishingthe great ends for which they were created by the sovereign will. That the actuations of these constitutional

agencies might leave much to be desired in given instances, is inherent in the imperfections of humaninstitutions. From the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with in the exercise of its

legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be challenged inappropriate cases over which the courts may exercise jurisdiction.

19. ID.; ID.; ID.; FACTS OF THE CASE; EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS. — The CommonwealthGovernment was inaugurated on November 15, 1935, on which date the Constitution, except as to theprovisions mentioned in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into effect. The new National Assembly

convened on November 25, of that year, and the resolution confirming the election of the petitioner wasapproved by that body on December 3, 1935. The protest by the herein respondent against the election ofthe petitioner was filed on December 9 of the same year. The pleadings do not show when the Electoral

Commission was formally organized but it does appear that on December 9, 1935, the Electoral

Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing ofelection protests. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of December 3, 1935,confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met;neither does it appear that said body had actually been organized. As a matter of fact, according to certifiedcopies of official records on file in the archives division of the National Assembly attached to the record of

this case upon the petition of the petitioner, the three justices of the Supreme Court and the six members ofthe National Assembly constituting the Electoral Commission were respectively designated only on

December 4 and 6, 1936. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming non-protested elections ofmembers of the National Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling the time for the presentation ofprotests, the result would be that the National Assembly — on the hypothesis that it still retained the

incidental power of regulation in such cases — had already barred the presentation of protests before theElectoral Commission had had time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode and method to be followedin a matter entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result was not and could not have

been contemplated, and should be avoided.

20. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONFIRMATION BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CAN NOT DEPRIVE THE ELECTORALCOMMISSION OF ITS AUTHORITY TO FIX THE TIME WITHIN WHICH PROTESTS AGAINST THE

ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHOULDBE FILED. — Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members against whom

no protests has been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1936, can not be construed as alimitation upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While there might have been good reason for

the legislative practice of confirmation of members of the Legislature at the time the power to decide electioncontests was still lodged in the Legislature, confirmation alone by the Legislature cannot be construed as

depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judgeof all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly",to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of

its members against whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary.Confirmation of the election of any member is not required by the Constitution before he can discharge his

duties as such member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers issufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in the National Assembly and to render him eligible to any office

in said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).

21. ID.; EFFECT OF CONFIRMATION UNDER THE JONES LAW. — Under the practice prevailing whenthe Jones Law was still in force, each House of the Philippine Legislature fixed the time when protests

against the election of any of its members should be filed. This was expressly authorized by section 18 ofthe Jones Law making each House the sole judge of the election, returns and qualifications of its members,as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387) empowering each House respectively to prescribe by resolutionthe time and manner of filing contest the election of members of said bodies. As a matter of formality, after

the time fixed by its rules for the filing of protests had already expired, each House passed a resolutionconfirming or approving the returns of such members against whose election no protest had been filed within



the prescribed time. This was interpreted as cutting off the filing of further protests against the election ofthose members not theretofore contested (Amistad v. Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature,

Record — First Period, p. 89; Urgello v. Rama [Third District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalverov. Festin [Romblon], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, pp. 637-640; Kintanar v. Aldanese

[Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar v.Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The

Constitution has expressly repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No. 3387, section 478, must be

deemed to have been impliedly abrogated also, for the reason that with the power to determine all contestsrelating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is inseparably linkedthe authority to prescribe regulations for the exercise of that power. There was thus no law nor constitutionalprovision which authorized the National Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on December 3, 1935,the time for the filing of contests against the election of its members. And what the National Assembly could

not do directly, it could not do by indirection through the medium of confirmation.-

- D E C I S I O N -

- LAUREL, J .: -

- This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of

prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking furthercognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against the election of said petitioneras member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas.

The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by the respondents are asfollows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, PedroYnsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the National

Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas;

(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-electof the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of votes;

(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office;

(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, passed the followingresolution:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

" [No. 8]

"RESOLUTION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS CONTRAQUIENES NO SE HAPRESENTADO PROTESTA.

"Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados contra quienes no se hubiere presentadodebidamente una protesta antes de la adopcion de la presente resolucion sean, como por la presente, sonaprobadas y confirmadas.

"Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935."cralaw virtua1aw library

(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a"Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filedafter the passage of Resolution No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-things, that said respondentbe declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election ofsaid position be nullified;

(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of whichprovides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se haya presentado en o antes de este dia."cralaw



virtua1aw library

(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in theaforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) thatResolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutionalprerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the election of its members should bepresented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of

said period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period;

(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion ofDismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protestagainst the election of a member of the National Assembly, after confirmation;

(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to the aforesaid"Answer to the Motion of Dismissal" ;

(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution onJanuary 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner‘s "Motion to Dismiss the Protest."cralaw virtua1aw library

The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the issuance of the writ prayedfor:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards themerits of contested elections to the National Assembly;

(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to regulate the proceedings of saidelection contests, which power has been reserved to the Legislative Department of the Government or theNational Assembly;

(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in pursuance of the Constitution, whose exclusive jurisdiction relates solely to deciding the merits of controversies submitted to hem for decision and to mattersinvolving their internal organization, the Electoral Commission can regulate its proceedings only if theNational Assembly has not availed of its primary power to so regulate such proceedings;

(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore, valid and should be respected and obeyed;

(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution and paragraph 6 of

article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the United States) as well as undersections 1 and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2) of article VIII of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has

jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental question herein raised because it involves an interpretation of theConstitution of the Philippines.

On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in behalf of the respondentElectoral Commission interposing the following special defenses:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of theLegislative Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the election, returns,and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly" ; that in adopting its resolution of December 9,1935, fixing this date as the last day for the presentation of protests against the election of any member ofthe National Assembly, it acted within its jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the implied powersgranted it by the Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations essential to carry out the powers andfunctions conferred upon the same by the fundamental law; that in adopting its resolution of January 23,1936, overruling the motion of the petitioner to dismiss the election protest in question, and declaring itselfwith jurisdiction to take cognizance of said protest, it acted in the legitimate exercise of its quasi -judicialfunctions as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department of the Commonwealth Government, and hencesaid act is beyond the judicial cognizance or control of the Supreme Court;

(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of themembers of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed, could not and did notdeprive the Electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of election protests filed within thetime that might be set by its own rules;



(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi- judicial functions, created by theConstitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department, and is not an "inferior tribunal, orcorporation, or board, or person" within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure,against which prohibition would lie.

The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his own behalf on March 2, 1936,setting forth following as his special defense:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, therewas no existing Law fixing the period within which protests against the election of members of the National

Assembly, the Electoral Commission was exercising a power impliedly conferred upon it by the Constitution,by reason of its quasi-judicial attributes;

(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before the Electoral Commission on December 9,1935, the last day fixed by paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral Commission;

(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction over the protest filed by said respondentand over the parties thereto, and the resolution of the Electoral Commission of January 23, 1936, denyingpetitioner‘s motion to dismiss said protest was an act within the jurisdiction of the said commission, and isnot reviewable by means of a writ of prohibition;

(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation by the National Assembly of the election

of its members, and that such confirmation does not operate to limit the period within which protests shouldbe filed as to deprive the Electoral Commission of jurisdiction over protests filed subsequent thereto;

(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created by the Constitution, endowed with quasi- judicial functions, whose decisions are final and unappeallable;

(f) That the Electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an inferior tribunal, corporation, boardor person, within the terms of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that neither underthe provisions of sections 1 and 2 of Article II (should be article VIII) of the Constitution and paragraph 13 ofsection 1 of the Ordinance appended thereto could it be subject in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functionsto a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court;

(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the UnitedStates) has no application to the case at bar.

The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted for decision, the petitionerprayed for the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction against the respondent Electoral Commissionwhich petition was denied "without passing upon the merits of the case" by resolution of this court of March21, 1936.

There was no appearance for the other respondents. The issues to be decided in the case at bar may bereduced to the following two principal propositions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of thecontroversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,

2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to takecognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previousconfirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the merits of the controversy. However, thequestion of jurisdiction having been presented, we do not feel justified in evading the issue. Being a caseprimæ impressionis, it would hardly be consistent with our sense of duty to overlook the broader aspect ofthe question and leave it undecided. Neither would we be doing justice to the industry and vehemence ofcounsel were we not to pass upon the question of jurisdiction squarely presented to our consideration.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not throughexpress provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government hasexclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does notfollow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended



them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for anelaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departmentsof the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on thelegislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the furthercheck that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote oftwo-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the rightto convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National

Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointment of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all itsmembers is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts otherthan the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for theirsupport, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly alsoexercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as thefinal arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, andhence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to theexecutive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing offunctions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just wherethe one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the greatlandmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict,the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper

allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as itwas within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is theexpression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended tooperate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject tospecific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in nouncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If theserestrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided fora mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels, for then thedistribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and theprinciples of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodiedin our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States where noexpress constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of thecourts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular

acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power isgranted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope andextent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as therational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert anysuperiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, butonly asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflictingclaims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rightswhich that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed"judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, thispower of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity ofargument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis motapresented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterileconclusions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption ofconstitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by theConstitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies mustreflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive andlegislative departments of the government.

But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought not theless to be remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladiumof constitutional liberty . . . the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its guardians . . . theireyes must be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the authority of theirconstitution." In the last and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our government in the unfolding



years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and courtchambers.

In the case at bar, the National Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed theelection of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has byresolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against theelection, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding the previous

confirmation made by the National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the resolutionof the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to entertainprotests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, submittedafter December 3, 1935, then the resolution of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is meresurplusage and had no effect. But, if as contended by the respondents, the Electoral Commission has thesole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly, then the resolution ofDecember 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing protestsagainst the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.

Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional naturebetween the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. From the verynature of the republican government established in our country in the light of American experience and ofour own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting theConstitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion torefer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests

relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although theElectoral Commission may not be interfered with, when the while acting within the limits of its authority, itdoes not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that itis not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of thegovernment, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law betweendepartmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in

justiciable and appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutionalgovernment, the framers of our Constitution adopted the American type where the written constitution isinterpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In some countries which have declined to follow the

American example, provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercisingthe power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be therule that in the absence of direct prohibition courts are bound to assume what is logically their function. Forinstance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides that courts shall have no power to examinethe validity of statutes (art. 81, chap. IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. Incountries whose constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power. This is true in

Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law toConstitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX,Constitution of the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validityof ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a finalconstitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution.Were we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the conflictwere left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our constitutional system whichmay in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer them.Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reasonand authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has

jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purposeof determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as"the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of theNational Assembly."cralaw virtua1aw library

Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now proceed to pass upon the second propositionand determine whether the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction inadopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed againstthe election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation thereof by the National

Assembly on December 3, 1935. As able counsel for the petitioner has pointed out, the issue hinges on theinterpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Courtdesignated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shallbe nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second



largest number of votes herein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The ElectoralCommission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of themembers of the National Assembly." It is imperative, therefore, that we delve into the origin and history ofthis constitutional provision and inquire into the intention of its framers and the people who adopted it so thatwe may properly appreciate its full meaning, import and significance.

The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying

down the rule that "the assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of itsmembers", was taken from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the Constitution of the United States providingthat "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members, . . . ."The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the insertion of the word"sole" as follows: "That the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges ofthe elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members, . . ." apparently in order to emphasize theexclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred upon each House of the Legislature over the particularcases therein specified. This court has had occasion to characterize this grant of power to the PhilippineSenate and House of Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and complete" (Veloso v. Boards ofCanvassers of Leyte and Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.) .

The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for the purpose of deciding contested electionsto the legislature was taken by the sub-committee of five appointed by the Committee on ConstitutionalGuarantees of the Constitutional Convention, which sub- committee submitted a report on August 30, 1934,recommending the creation of a Tribunal of Constitutional Security empowered to hear protests not only

against the election of members of the legislature but also against the election of executive officers forwhose election the vote of the whole nation is required, as well as to initiate impeachment proceedingsagainst specified executive and judicial officers. For the purpose of hearing legislative protests, the tribunalwas to be composed of three justices designated by the Supreme Court and six members of the house ofthe legislature to which the contest corresponds, three members to be designated by the majority party andthree by the minority, to be presided over by the Senior Justice unless the Chief Justice is also a member inwhich case the latter shall preside. The foregoing proposal was submitted by the Committee onConstitutional Guarantees to the Convention on September 15, 1934, with slight modifications consisting inthe reduction of the legislative representation to four members, that is, two senators to be designated oneeach from the two major parties in the Senate and two representatives to be designated one each from thetwo major parties in the House of Representatives, and in awarding representation to the executivedepartment in the persons of two representatives to be designated by the President.

Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also preparing its report. As submitted to theConvention on September 24, 1934, subsection 5, section 5, of the proposed Article on the Legislative

Department, reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of either House and all cases contesting theelection of any of their members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, constituted, as to each House,by three members elected by the members of the party having the largest number of votes therein, threeelected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and as to its Chairman, oneJustice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice."cralaw virtua1aw library

The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with comprehensive jurisdiction as proposed by theCommittee on Constitutional Guarantees which was probably inspired by the Spanish plan (art. 121,Constitution of the Spanish Republic of 1931), was soon abandoned in favor of the proposition of theCommittee on Legislative Power to create a similar body with reduced powers and with specific and limited

jurisdiction, to be designated as an Electoral Commission. The Sponsorship Committee modified theproposal of the Committee on Legislative Power with respect to the composition of the Electoral Commissionand made further changes in phraseology to suit the project of adopting a unicameral instead of a bicamerallegislature. The draft as finally submitted to the Convention on October 26, 1934, reads asfollows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and all casescontesting the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed ofthree members elected by the party having the largest number of votes in the National Assembly, threeelected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and three justices of theSupreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of said

justices."cralaw virtua1aw library



"El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.

"El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres miembros a la mayoria, y otros tres a la minoria ytres a la Corte Suprema, ¿no cre Su Señoria que esto equivale practicamente a dejar el asunto a losmiembros del Tribunal Supremo?.

"El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Cremos que si el tribunal o la Comision esta constituido en esa forma, tanto los

miembros de la mayoria como los de la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Suprema consideraranla cuestion sobre la base de sus méritos, sabiendo que el partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunfo.

"El Sr. CONEJERO. ¿Cree Su Señoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de lamayoria como los de la minoria prescindieran del partidismo?.

"El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo."cralaw virtua1aw library- x x x

-

The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and others seeking to restore the power todecide contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly tothe National Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote of ninety-eight (98) against fifty-six (56).

In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft by reducing the

representation of the minority party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral Commission to two memberseach, so as to accord more representation to the majority party. The Convention rejected this amendment bya vote of seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-partisan character of thecommission.

As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assemblyshall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three members elected by the party having thelargest number of votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the members of the party having thesecond largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice,the Commission to be presided over by one of said justices."cralaw virtua1aw library

The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Courtdesignated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shallbe nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the secondlargest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its chairman. The ElectoralCommission shall be the sole judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of theNational Assembly."cralaw virtua1aw library

When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February 8, 1935, the Style Committee, throughPresident Recto, to effectuate the original intention of the Convention, agreed to insert the phrase "Allcontests relating to" between the phrase "judge of" and the words "the election", which was accordinglyaccepted by the Convention.

The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of thelegislature long lodged in the legislative body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is byno means a mere experiment in the science of government.

Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth edition, chapter VI, pages 57, 58), gives avivid account of the "scandalously notorious" canvassing of votes by political parties in the disposition ofcontests by the House of Commons in the following passages which are partly quoted by the petitioner in hisprinted memorandum of March 14, 1936:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"153. From the time when the commons established their right to be the exclusive judges of the elections,returns, and qualifications of their members, until the year 1770, two modes of proceeding prevailed, in thedetermination of controverted elections, and rights of membership. One of the standing committee appointedat the commencement of each session, was denominated the committee of privileges and elections, whose



Commission.

The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is recruited both from the legislature and the judiciary is by no means unknown in the United States. In the presidential elections of 1876 there was adispute as to the number of electoral votes received by each of the two opposing candidates. As theConstitution made no adequate provision for such a contingency, Congress passed a law on January 29,1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral

Commission composed of five members elected by the Senate, five members elected by the House ofRepresentatives, and five justices of the Supreme Court, the fifth justice to be selected by the fourdesignated in the Act. The decision of the commission was to be binding unless rejected by the two housesvoting separately. Although there is not much of a moral lesson to be derived from the experience of

America in this regard, judging from the observations of Justice Field, who was a member of that body onthe part of the Supreme Court (Countryman, the Supreme Court of the United States and its AppellatePower under the Constitution [Albany, 1913]-Relentless Partisanship of Electoral Commission, p. 25 et seq.), the experiment has at least abiding historical interest.

The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority menmature in years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and politicaldevelopment of other countries of the world. When, therefore, they deemed it wise to create an ElectoralCommission as a constitutional organ and invested it with the exclusive function of passing upon anddetermining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they musthave done so not only in the light of their own experience but also having in view the experience of other

enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certainevils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition ofsome members of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by thatbody by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the approval of the Constitution, thecreation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom and "ultimate justice of the people."(Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.) .

From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in itstotality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections ofits members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and appreciation ofcontemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need of determining legislative contestsdevoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people, acting through their delegates to theConvention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a compositebody in which both the majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence inits deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership three

justices of the Supreme Court.

The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in theperformance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although itis not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting withinthe limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department than toany other. The location of the provision (section 4) creating the Electoral Commission under Article VIentitled "Legislative Department" of our Constitution is very indicative. Its composition is also significant inthat it is constituted by a majority of members of the legislature. But it is a body separate from andindependent of the legislature.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns andqualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if ithad remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission isan implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restrictionupon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep.,1; State v. Whisman, 36 S. D., 260; L. R. A., 1917B, 1). If we concede the power claimed in behalf of theNational Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off thepower of the commission to lay down the period within which protests should be filed, the grant of power tothe commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case would be invested with thepower to determine contested cases involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of theNational Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only wouldthe purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative body befrustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time totime. A sad spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of



taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that authorityeffective whenever and wherever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than thatintended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the National

Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entireproceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutionalgrant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.

We are not insensible to the impassioned argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding theimportance and necessity of respecting the dignity and independence of the National Assembly as acoordinate department of the government and of according validity to its acts, to avoid what he characterizedwould be practically an unlimited power of the commission in the admission of protests against members ofthe National Assembly. But as we have pointed out hereinabove, the creation of the Electoral Commissioncarried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protestsintrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power isconferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performanceof the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In theabsence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protestsbefore the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for theproper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualificationsof members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged alsoin the Electoral Commission.

It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral Commission may abuseits regulative authority by admitting protests beyond any reasonable time, to the disturbance of thetranquillity and peace of mind of the members of the National Assembly. But the possibility of abuse is notan argument against the concession of the power as there is no power that is not susceptible of abuse. Inthe second place, if any mistake has been committed in the creation of an Electoral Commission and ininvesting it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating to the election, returns, and qualifications ofmembers of the National Assembly, the remedy is political, not judicial, and must be sought through theordinary processes of democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are not intended to becorrected by the judiciary. We believe, however, that the people in creating the Electoral Commissionreposed as much confidence in this body in the exclusive determination of the specified cases assigned to it,as they have given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the agencies ofthe government were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each constitutionalorgan working within its own particular sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be animated withthe same zealand honesty in accomplishing the great ends for which they were created by the sovereignwill. That the actuations of these constitutional agencies might leave much to be desired in given instances,

is inherent in the imperfections of human institutions. In the third place, from the fact that the ElectoralCommission may not be interfered with in the exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts,however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be challenged in appropriate cases over which the courts mayexercise jurisdiction.

But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the present case, there are considerations ofequitable character that should not be overlooked in the appreciation of the intrinsic merits of thecontroversy. The Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on November 15, 1935, on which date theConstitution, except as to the provisions mentioned in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into effect. Thenew National Assembly convened on November 25th of that year, and the resolution confirming the electionof the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, was approved by that body on December 3, 11935. The protest by theherein respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the petitioner was filed on December 9 of the sameyear. The pleadings do not show when the Electoral Commission was formally organized but it does appearthat on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixingsaid date as the last day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed itsresolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, theElectoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body has actually been organized.

As a matter of fact, according to certified copies of official records on file in the archives division of theNational Assembly attached to the record of this case upon the petition of the petitioner, the three justices ofthe Supreme Court and the six members of the National Assembly constituting the Electoral Commissionwere respectively designated only on December 4 and 6, 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assemblyconfirming non-protested elections of members of the National Assembly had the effect of limiting or tollingthe time for the presentation of protests, the result would be that the National Assembly — on the hypothesisthat it still retained the incidental power of regulation in such cases — had already barred the presentation ofprotests before the Electoral Commission had had time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode and



method to be followed in a matter entrusted to is exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result wasnot and could not have been contemplated,and should be avoided.

From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members againstwhom no protests had been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be construed as alimitation upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While there might have been good reason forthe legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time when the

power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislaturecannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutionalpower to be "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the membersof the National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the National

Assembly of the returns of its members against whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legalpurposes, unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral Commission in its resolution of January 23, 1936,overruling the motion of the herein petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua,confirmation of the election of any member is not required by the Constitution before he can discharge hisduties as such member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers issufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in the National Assembly and to render him eligible to any officein said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).

Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons and in the Congress of the UnitedStates, confirmation is neither necessary in order to entitle a member-elect to take his seat. The return of theproper election officers in sufficient, and the member-elect presenting such return begins to enjoy the

privileges of a member from the time that he takes his oath of office (Laws of England, vol. 12, pp. 331, 332;vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C. A., Title 2, secs. 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is in order only in cases ofcontested elections where the decision is adverse to the claims of the protestant. In England, the judges‘decision or report in controverted elections is certified to the Speaker of the House of Commons, and theHouse, upon being informed of such certificate or report by the Speaker, is required to enter the same uponthe Journals, and to give such directions for confirming or altering the return, or for the issue of a writ for anew election, or for carrying into execution the determination as circumstances may require (31 & 32 Vict., c.125, sec. 13). In the United States, it is believed, the order or decision of the particular house itself isgenerally regarded as sufficient, without any actual alteration or amendment of the return (Cushing, Law andPractice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166).

Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still force, each house of the Philippine Legislaturefixed the time when protests against the election of any of its members should be filed. This was expresslyauthorized by section 18 of the Jones Law making each house the sole judge of the election, returns andqualifications of its members, as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387) empowering each house to

respectively prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contest in the election of members of saidbodies. As a matter of formality, after the time fixed by its rules for the filing of protests had already expired,each house passed a resolution confirming or approving the returns of such members against whoseelection no protests had been filed within the prescribed time. This was interpreted as cutting off the filing offurther protests against the election of those members not theretofore contested (Amistad v. Claravall[Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature, Record-First Period, p. 89; Urgello v. Rama [Third District, Cebu],Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero v. Festin [Romblon], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record — FirstPeriod, pp. 637-640; Kintanar v. Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record-FirstPeriod, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar v. Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine Legislature, Record-First Period, vol.III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The Constitution has repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No. 3387, section478, must be deemed to have been impliedly abrogated also, for the reason that with the power todetermine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National

Assembly, is inseparably linked the authority to prescribe regulations for the exercise of that power. Therewas thus no law nor constitutional provision which authorized the National Assembly to fix, as it is alleged tohave fixed on December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of contests against the election of its members. Andwhat the National Assembly could not do directly, it could not do by indirection through the medium ofconfirmation.

Summarizing, we conclude:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of separation ofpowers into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.

(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often makes difficultthe delimitation of the powers granted.



(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary,with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolvethe conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.

(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases andcontroversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends

the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.

(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers andfunctions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of theother two departments of the government.

(f) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns andqualifications of members of the National Assembly.

(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect, each house of thelegislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their electivemembers.

(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature withrespect to contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral

Commission.

(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete,and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as tothe time and manner of filing protests.

(j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent constitutionalorgan pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National

Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conductingsaid contests.

(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making eachhouse of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications ofits elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by

resolution the time and manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the time and manner ofnotifying the adverse party,and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses ofcontest.

(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether hiselection is contested or not, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoythe privileges of a member of the National Assembly.

(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest hadbeen filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidentalpower to prescribe the time within which protest against the election of any member of the National

Assembly should be filed.

We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of itsconstitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsuaagainst the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assemblyof December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the election, returns andqualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as therules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral Commission as aconstitutional creation and as to the scope and extent of its authority under the facts of the presentcontroversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral Commission is an inferior tribunal,corporation, board or person within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure.



The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with costs againstthe petitioner. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Diaz, Concepcion and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.- Separate Opinions

-

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I concur in the result and in most of the views so ably expressed in the preceding opinion. I am, however,constrained to withhold my assent to certain conclusions therein advanced.

The power vested in the Electoral Commission by the Constitution of judging of all contests relating to theelection, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, is judicial in nature. (Thomasv. Loney, 134 U.S., 372; 33 Law. ed., 949, 951.) On the other hand, the power to regulate the time in whichnotice of a contested election may be given, is legislative in character. (M‘Elmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet., 312;10 Law. ed., 177; Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S., 496; 50 Law. ed., 572.) .

It has been correctly stated that the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally thetheory of the separation of powers into legislative, executive, and judicial. Legislative power is vested in theNational Assembly. (Article VI, sec. 1.) In the absence of any clear constitutional provision to the contrary,the power to regulate the time in which notice of a contested election may be given, must be deemed to be

included in the grant of legislative power to the National Assembly.

The Constitution of the United States contains a provision similar to that found in Article VI, section 4, of theConstitution of the Philippines. Article I, section 5, of the Constitution of the United States provides that eachhouse of the Congress shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members.Notwithstanding this provision, the Congress has assumed the power to regulate the time in which notice ofa contested election may be given. Thus section 201, Title 2, of the United States Code Annotatedprescribes:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Whenever any person intends to contest an election of any Member of the House of Representatives of theunited States, he shall, within thirty days after the result of such election shall have been determined by theoffice or board of canvassers authorized by law to determine the same, give notice, in writing, to the Memberwhose seat he designs to contest, of his intention to contest the same, and, in such notice, shall specifyparticularly the grounds upon which he relies in the contest." (R.S., par. 105.)

The Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known as the Jones Law, also contained a provision to the effectthat the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections,returns, and qualifications of their elective members. Notwithstanding this provision, the PhilippineLegislature passed the Election Law, section 478 of which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall by resolution respectively prescribe the time andmanner of filing contest in the election of members of said bodies, the time and manner of notifying theadverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and shall fix the costs and expenses of contestwhich may be paid from their respective funds."cralaw virtua1aw library

The purpose sought to be attained by the creation of the Electoral Commission was not to erect a body thatwould be above the law, but to raise legislative election contests from the category of political to that of

justiciable questions. The purpose was not to place the commission beyond the reach of the law, but toinsure the determination of such contests with due process of law.

Section 478 of the Election Law was in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, Article XV,section 2, of which provides that —

"All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth of thePhilippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution, untilamended, altered, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly, and all references in such laws to theGovernment or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to theGovernment and corresponding officials under this Constitution."cralaw virtua1aw library

The manifest purpose of this constitutional provision was to insure the orderly processes of government, and



to prevent any hiatus in its operation after the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. It wasthus provided that all laws of the Philippine Islands shall remain operative even after the inauguration of theCommonwealth of the Philippines, unless inconsistent with the Constitution, and that all references in suchlaws to the government or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, torefer to the government and corresponding officials under the Constitution. It would seem to be consistentnot only with the spirit but with the letter of the Constitution to hold that section 478 of the Election Lawremains operative and should now be construed to refer to the Electoral Commission, which, in so far as the

power to judge election contests is concerned, corresponds to either the Senate or the House ofRepresentatives under the former regime. It is important to observe in this connection that said section 478of the Election Law vested the power to regulate the time and manner in which notice of a contested electionmay be given, not in the Philippine Legislature but in the Senate and House of Representatives singly. Inother words, the authority to prescribe the time and manner of filing contests in the election of members ofthe Philippine Legislature was by statute lodged separately in the bodies clothed with power to decide suchcontests. Construing section 478 of the Election Law to refer to the National Assembly, as required by ArticleXV, section 2, of the Constitution, it seems reasonable to conclude that the authority to prescribe the timeand manner of filing contests in the election of members of the National Assembly is vested in the ElectoralCommission, which is now the body clothed with power to decide such contests.

In the light of what has been said, the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, could nothave the effect of barring the right of the respondent Pedro Ynsua to contest the election of the petitioner. Bythe same token, the Electoral Commission was authorized by law to adopt its resolution of December 9,1935, which fixed the time within which written written contests must be filed with the commission.

Having been filed within the time fixed by its resolution, the Electoral Commission has jurisdiction to hearand determine the contest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the petitioner Jose A. Angara. Writdenied.

5. Pimentel v. Joint Comm it tee of Congress , G.R. No. 163783, June 22, 2004.

- The Congress is a continuing body and must fulfill its constitutional mandate to conduct the presidential canvass of votes even it if is in recess. The Senate shal l convene in jo in t

session dur ing any voluntary or compulso ry recess to canvass the votes for President and

Vice-President not later than thirty days after the day of the elections in accordance with Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.

G.R. No. 163783. June 22, 2004]

PIMENTEL vs . CONGRESS

EN BANC

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUN 22 2004.

G. R. No. 163783 ( Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. vs. Joint Committee of Congress to Canvass the Votes Cast for Presidentand Vice-President in the May 10, 2004 Elections.)

R E S O L U T I O N

By the present Petition for Prohibition, petitioner Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring nulland void the continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress (Joint Committee) to determine the authenticityand due execution of the certificates of canvass and preliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in the May 10, 2004 elections following the adjournment of Congress sine die on June 11,2004. The petition corollarily prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Joint Committee to cease anddesist from conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress onCanvassing.



Petitioner posits that with "the adjournment sine die on June 11, 2004 by the Twelfth Congress of its last regularsession, [its] term ... terminated and expired on the said day and the said Twelfth Congress serving the term 2001 to2004 passed out of legal existence." Henceforth, petitioner goes on, "all pending matters and proceedings terminateupon the expiration of ... Congress." To advance this view, he relies on "legislative procedure, precedent or practice[as] borne [out] by the rules of both Houses of Congress."

Given the importance of the constitutional issue raised and to put to rest all questions regarding the regularity, validity

or constitutionality of the canvassing of votes fro President and Vice-President in the recently concluded nationalelections, this Court assumes jurisdiction over the instant petition pursuant to its power and duty "to determinewhether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part ofany branch or instrumentality of the Government" under Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution and its original

jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition under Section 5 of the same Article.

After a considered and judicious examination of the arguments raised by petitioner as well as those presented in theComments filed by the Solicitor General and respondent Joint Committee, this Court finds that the petition hasabsolutely no basis under the Constitution and must, therefore, be dismissed.

Petitioner's claim that his arguments are buttressed by "legislative procedure, precedent or practice [as] borne [out]by the rules of both Houses of Congress" is directly contradicted by Section 42 of Rule XIV of the Rules adopted bythe Senate, of which he is an incumbent member. This section clearly provides that the Senate shall convene in

joint session during any voluntary orcompulsory recess to canvass the votes for President and Vice-

President not later than thirty days after the day of the elections in accordance with Section 4, Article VII of theConstitution.

Moreover, as pointed out in the Comment filed by the Senate Panel for respondent Joint Committee and that of theOffice of the Solicitor General, the precedents set by the 1992 and 1998 Presidential Elections do not support themove to stop the ongoing canvassing by the Joint Committee, they citing the observations of former Senate PresidentJovito Salonga.

Thus, during the 1992 Presidential elections, both Houses of Congress adjourned sine die on May 25, 1992. On June16, 1992, the Joint Committee finished tallying the votes for President and Vice-President.[1]cralaw Thereafter, onJune 22, 1992, the Eighth Congress convened in joint public session as the National Board of Canvassers, and oneven date proclaimed Fidel V. Ramos and Joseph Ejercito Estrada as President and Vice-President,respectively.[2]cralaw

Upon the other hand, during the 1998 Presidential elections, both Houses of Congress adjourned sine die on May 25,1998. The Joint Committee completed the counting of the votes for President and Vice-President on May 27,1998.[3]cralaw The Tenth Congress then convened in joint public session on May 29, 1998 as the National Board ofCanvassers and proclaimed Joseph Ejercito Estrada as President and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President andVice-President, respectively.[4]cralaw

As for petitioner's argument that "the [e]xistence and [p]roceedings [o]f the Joint Committee of Congress [a]re[i]nvalid, [i]llegal and [u]nconstitutional [f]ollowing the [a]djournment [s]ine [d ]ie [o]f [b]oth Houses of Congress [o]f[t]heir [r]egular [s]essions on June 11, 2004," he cites in support thereof Section 15, Article VI of the Constitutionwhich reads:

Sec. 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless adifferent date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine untilthirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The

President may call a special session at any time.

Contrary to petitioner's argument, however, the term of the present Twelfth Congress did not terminate and expireupon the adjournment sine die of the regular session of both Houses on June 11, 2004.

Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution cited by petitioner does not pertain to the term of Congress, but to its regularannual legislative sessions and the mandatory 30-day recess before the opening of its next regular session (subjectto the power of the President to call a special session at any time).

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This issue has its roots in the June 8, 2010 Opinion1 issued by the Legal Services Sector, Office of the GeneralCounsel of the Commission on Audit (COA), which found that an underpayment amounting to P221,021.50 resultedwhen five (5) retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the Supreme Court the personal properties assigned tothem during their incumbency in the Court, to wit:Ï‚Î·Î±Ã±rÎ¿blÎµÅ¡ Î½Î¹râ€ Ï…Î±l lÎ±Ï‰ lÎ¹brÎ±rÃ¿

Name of Justice Items Purchased Valuation underCFAG (in pesos)

Valuation under

COAMemorandumNo. 98-569A

(in pesos)

Difference (in pesos)

Artemio Panganiban(Chief Justice)

Toyota Camry,2003 model

341,241.10 365,000.00 23,758.90

Toyota Grandia,2002 model

136,500.00 151,000.00 14,500.00


115,800.00 156,000.00 40,200.00

Ruben T. Reyes(Associate Justice)


579,532.50 580,600.00 1,067.50


117,300.00 181,200.00 63,900.00

Angelina S. Gutierrez(Associate Justice)


115,800.00 150,600.00 34,800.00

Adolfo S. Azcuna(Associate Justice)


536,105.00 543,300.00 9,195.00


117,300.00 145,000.00 27,700.00

Sony TV Set 2,399.90 2,500.00 100.10

Ma. Alicia 5,800.00

The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of the Supreme Court of the wrong formulain computing the appraisal value of the purchased vehicles. According to the COA, the Property Division erroneouslyappraised the subject motor vehicles by applying Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No.35 dated April 23, 1997 and its guidelines, in compliance with the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated March 23,2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01,3when it should have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum No. 98-569-

A4 dated August 5, 1998.

Recommendations of the Office of Administrative Services In her Memorandum dated August 10, 2010, Atty.Candelaria recommended that the Court advise the COA to respect the in-house computation based on the CFAGformula, noting that this was the first time that the COA questioned the authority of the Court in using CFAG JointResolution No. 35 and its guidelines in the appraisal and disposal of government property since these were issued in1997. As a matter of fact, in two previous instances involving two (2) retired Court of Appeals Associate Justices,5 the

COA upheld the in-house appraisal of government property using the formula found in the CFAG guidelines. Moreimportantly, the Constitution itself grants the Judiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling of its budget and resources.Full autonomy, among others,6 contemplates the guarantee of full flexibility in the allocation and utilization of theJudiciary s resources, based on its own determination of what it needs. The Court thus has the recognized authorityto allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided or required by law in the course of the discharge of i tsfunctions.7 To allow the COA to substitute the Court s policy in the disposal of its property would be tantamount to anencroachment into this judicial prerogative.

OUR RULING

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We find Atty. Candelaria s recommendation to be well-taken.

The COA s authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies granted fiscal autonomy is providedunder Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, which states:Ï‚rÎ±lÎ±Ï‰

Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle allaccounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held intrust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, includinggovernment-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post -audit basis: (a) constitutionalbodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution. emphasis ours

This authority, however, must be read not only in light of the Court s fiscal autonomy, but also in relation with theconstitutional provisions on judicial independence and the existing jurisprudence and Court rulings on these matters.

Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence

In Angara v. Electoral Commission,8 we explained the principle of separation of powers, as follows:Ï‚rÎ±lÎ±Ï‰

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through expressprovision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of

matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the threepowers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained andindependent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to securecoordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with theSupreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determinethe law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.9Ï‚rÎ½ll

The concept of the independence of the three branches of government, on the other hand, extends from the notionthat the powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; thedivision, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or thecitizenry.10 To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of government that areequally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates; lack of independence would result inthe inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or others.11Ï‚rÎ½ll

Under the Judiciary s unique circumstances, independence encompasses the idea that individual judges can freelyexercise their mandate to resolve justiciable disputes, while the judicial branch, as a whole, should work in thedischarge of its constitutional functions free of restraints and influence from the other branches, save only for thoseimposed by the Constitution itself .12 Thus, judicial independence can be "broken down into two distinct concepts:decisional independence and institutional independence."13 Decisional independence "refers to a judge s ability torender decisions free from political or popular influence based solely on the individual facts and applicable law."14 Onthe other hand, institutional independence "describes the separation of the judicial branch from the executive andlegislative branches of government."15 Simply put, institutional independence refers to the "collective independence ofthe judiciary as a body."16Ï‚rÎ½ll

In the case In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr. Amado P. Macasaet Published in MalayaDated September 18, 19, 20 and 21, 2007,17 the Court delineated the distinctions between the two concepts of

judicial independence in the following manner:Ï‚rÎ±lÎ±Ï‰

One concept is individual judicial independence, which focuses on each particular judge and seeks to insure his orher ability to decide cases with autonomy within the constraints of the law. A judge has this kind of independencewhen he can do his job without having to hear or at least without having to take it seriously if he does hear criticismsof his personal morality and fitness for judicial office. The second concept is institutional judicial independence. Itfocuses on the independence of the judiciary as a branch of government and protects judges as a class.

A truly independent judiciary is possible only when both concepts of independence are preserved - wherein publicconfidence in the competence and integrity of the judiciary is maintained, and the public accepts the legitimacy of

judicial authority. An erosion of this confidence threatens the maintenance of an independent Third Estate. italics andemphases ours Recognizing the vital role that the Judiciary plays in our system of government as the so le repository











































of judicial power, with the power to determine whether any act of any branch or instrumentality of the government isattended with grave abuse of discretion,18 no less than the Constitution provides a number of safeguards to ensurethat judicial independence is protected and maintained.

The Constitution expressly prohibits Congress from depriving the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction, as enumerated inSection 5, Article VII of the Constitution, or from passing a law that undermines the security of tenure of the membersof the judiciary.19 The Constitution also mandates that the judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy,20 and grants the

Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and judicial personnel. Jurisprudence21 has characterizedadministrative supervision as exclusive, noting that only the Supreme Court can oversee the judges and courtpersonnel's compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. No other branch of government may intrude into thispower, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.22Ï‚rÎ½ll

The Constitution protects as well the salaries of the Justices and judges by prohibiting any decrease in their salaryduring their continuance in office,23 and ensures their security of tenure by providing that "Members of the SupremeCourt and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years orbecome incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office."24 With these guarantees, justices and judges canadminister justice undeterred by any fear of reprisals brought on by their judicial action. They can act inspired solelyby their knowledge of the law and by the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting influence of base orunworthy motives.25Ï‚rÎ½ll

All of these constitutional provisions were put in place to strengthen judicial independence, not only by clearly stating

the Court s powers, but also by providing express limits on the power of the two other branches of government tointerfere with the Court s affairs.

Fiscal Autonomy

One of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy. Just as theExecutive may not prevent a judge from discharging his or her judicial duty (for example, by physically preventing acourt from holding its hearings) and just as the Legislature may not enact laws removing all jurisdiction fromcourts,26 the courts may not be obstructed from their freedom to use or dispose of their funds for purposes germaneto judicial functions. While, as a general proposition, the authority of legislatures to control the purse in the firstinstance is unquestioned, any form of interference by the Legislative or the Executive on the Judiciary s fiscalautonomy amounts to an improper check on a co-equal branch of government. If the judicial branch is to perform itsprimary function of adjudication, it must be able to command adequate resources for that purpose. This authority toexercise (or to compel the exercise of) legislative power over the national purse (which at first blush appears to be a

violation of concepts of separateness and an invasion of legislative autonomy) is necessary to maintain judicialindependence27 and is expressly provided for by the Constitution through the grant of fiscal autonomy under Section3, Article VIII. This provision states:Ï‚rÎ±lÎ±Ï‰

Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by thelegislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically andregularly released.

In Bengzon v. Drilon,28 we had the opportunity to define the scope and extent of fiscal autonomy in the followingmanner:Ï‚rÎ±lÎ±Ï‰

As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, theCommission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee offull flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes

the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest ratesauthorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as maybe provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions.

Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it needs 100 typewriters but DBMrules we need only 10 typewriters and sends its recommendations to Congress without even informing us, theautonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude.

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibilityneeded in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the














































independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscalautonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the SupremeCourt, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system isbased. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional Commissions, and theOmbudsman have so far limited their objections to constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that thisgrant of autonomy should cease to be a meaningless provision.29 (emphases ours)

In this cited case, the Court set aside President Corazon Aquino s veto of particular provisions of the General Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired justices of theSupreme Court and the Court of Appeals, on the basis of the Judiciary s constitutionally guaranteed independenceand fiscal autonomy. The Court ruled:Ï‚rÎ±lÎ±Ï‰

In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General Appropriations Act is tantamount to dictating tothe Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of the ChiefJustice to make adjustments in the utilization of the funds appropriated from the expenditures of the judiciary,including the use of any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or shortages in other items of the Judiciaryis withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the fundsallocated to it in the appropriations law. It knows its priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The ChiefJustice must be given a free hand on how to augment appropriations where augmentation is needed.30Ï‚rÎ½ll

The Court s declarations in Bengzon make it clear that the grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary is more extensive

than the mere automatic and regular release of its approved annual appropriations;31

real fiscal autonomy covers thegrant to the Judiciary of the authority to use and dispose of its funds and properties at will, free from any outsidecontrol or interference.

Application to the Present Case

The Judiciary s fiscal autonomy is realized through the actions of the Chief Justice, as its head, and of the SupremeCourt En Banc, in the exercise of administrative control and supervision of the courts and its personnel. As the CourtEn Banc s Resolution (dated March 23, 2004) in A.M. No. 03-12-01 reflects, the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciaryserves as the basis in allowing the sale of the Judiciary s properties to retiring Justices of the Supreme Court and theappellate courts:Ï‚rÎ±lÎ±Ï‰

WHEREAS, by the constitutional mandate of fiscal autonomy as defined in Bengzon v. Drilon (G.R. No. 103524, 15 April 1992, 208 SCRA 133, 150) the Judiciary has "full flexibility to allocate and utilize (its) resources with the wisdomand dispatch that (its) needs require";

WHEREAS, the long-established tradition and practice of Justices or Members of appellate courts of purchasing forsentimental reasons at retirement government properties they used during their tenure has been recognized as aprivilege enjoyed only by such government officials; andcralawlibrary

WHEREAS, the exercise of such privilege needs regulation to the end that respect for sentiments that a retiringJustice attaches to properties he or she officially used during his or her tenure should be in consonance with the needfor restraint in the utilization and disposition of government resources.

By way of a long standing tradition, partly based on the intention to reward long and faithful service, the sale to theretired Justices of specifically designated properties that they used during their incumbency has been recognizedboth as a privilege and a benefit. This has become an established practice within the Judiciary that even the COA has

previously recognized.

32

The En Banc Resolution also deems the grant of the privilege as a form of additionalretirement benefit that the Court can grant its officials and employees in the exercise of its power of administrativesupervision. Under this administrative authority, the Court has the power to administer the Judiciary s internal affairs,and this includes the authority to handle and manage the retirement applications and entitlements of its personnel asprovided by law and by its own grants.33Ï‚rÎ½ll

Thus, under the guarantees of the Judiciary s fiscal autonomy and its independence, the Chief Justice and the CourtEn Banc determine and decide the who, what, where, when and how of the privileges and benefits they extend to

justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within the parameters of the Court s granted power; theydetermine the terms, conditions and restrictions of the grant as grantor.























In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is a part ofthe Court s exercise of its discretionary authority to determine the manner the granted retirement privileges andbenefits can be availed of. Any kind of interference on how these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised andavailed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon theconstitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciary s ownaffairs.

As a final point, we add that this view finds full support in the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual (GAAM),Volume 1, particularly, Section 501 of Title 7, Chapter 3, which states:Ï‚rÎ±lÎ±Ï‰

Section 501. Authority or responsibility for property disposal/divestment. The full and sole authority and responsibilityfor the divestment and disposal of property and other assets owned by the national government agencies orinstrumentalities, local government units and government-owned and/or controlled corporations and their subsidiariesshall be lodged in the heads of the departments, bureaus, and offices of the national government, the localgovernment units and the governing bodies or managing heads of government-owned or controlled corporations andtheir subsidiaries conformably to their respective corporate charters or articles of incorporation, who shall constitutethe appropriate committee or body to undertake the same. italics supplied; emphases ours

This provision clearly recognizes that the Chief Justice, as the head of the Judiciary, possesses the full and soleauthority and responsibility to divest and dispose of the properties and assets of the Judiciary; as Head of Office, hedetermines the manner and the conditions of disposition, which in this case relate to a benefit. As the usual practice

of the Court, this authority is exercised by the Chief Justice in consultation with the Court En Banc. However, whetherexercised by the Chief Justice or by the Supreme Court En Banc, the grant of such authority and discretion isunequivocal and leaves no room for interpretations and insertions.

ACCORDINGLY, premises considered, the in-house computation of the appraisal value made by the PropertyDivision, Office of `Administrative Services, of the properties purchased by the retired Chief Justice and AssociateJustices of the Supreme Court, based on CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997, as directed under theCourt Resolution dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01, is CONFIRMED to be legal and valid. Let theCommission on Audit be accordingly advised of this Resolution for its guidance.

SO ORDERED.

7. Consolidated Petitions: Belgicaet. al. v. Executive Secretary et. al. G.R.No. 208566, Alcantaraet. al. v. Drilon et. al. G.R. No. 208493, and Nepomucenoet. al. v. Pres. Aquino et. al., G.R.No.209251, Nov. 19, 2013:

- The Court resolved issues related to procedural matters and substantive matters.

8. BOCEA v. Hon. Teves, G.R. No. 181704, December 6, 2011.- R.A. No. 9335 otherwise known as the Attrition act of 2005 is constitutional and the adoption of its

Implementing Rules and Regulations is a valid delegation of powers.

9. Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary et al., G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012.

- The power of the President to reorganize is a prerogative under his continuing “delegated legislativeauthority to reorganize” his own office pursuant to E.O. No.292.

10. Banda et al. v. Ermita, G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010.

- The power to reorganize executive offices has been consistently supported by specific provisions ingeneral appropriations laws.

11. Judge Angeles v. Hon. Gaite et al., G.R. no. 176596, March 23, 2011.

- The President’s act of delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice is well within the doctrine ofqualified political agency.

12. Hacienda Luisita v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011.



- The operative fact doctrine is not confined to statutes and rules and regulations issued by theexecutive branch that are accorded the same status as that of a statute or those which are quasi-legislative in nature.

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