Summary Presentation of Haiti Norway’s Evaluation: Basic Information Challenges Leading to Policy Level Findings Lessons from the Norwegian Portfolio in

Haiti Lessons Learned

Political variables Small number of years under

democratic rule since independence, which include 20 years of US occupation.

Dominant influence of autocratic rulers in the period.

Weak central and local institutions since the mid-1980s.

Major negative effects of embargo during military rule (1990-1994).

Increased economic and political influence of narco-money after 1994.

Split between legislative and executive branches after the return to democracy and throughout the Aristide period.

Socio-Economic indicators Poorest country of the

hemisphere with a GDP: $1,155 USD and a HDI rank of 145th in 2010.

Population in 2007: approx. 9.1M

Life expectancy at birth: 55 Maternal mortality rate: 523

(Norway: 10) Youth literacy rate 2000-07: M:

76%/F: 87% largely funded by external sources, including transfers from the diaspora

Transparency Int. Rank: 146th in 2010

The purpose of the evaluation was to assess whether Norway had, with its transitional assistance, contributed to increased security (and stability) in Haiti, and whether gains achieved were likely to be sustained.

Scope: The time scope for the evaluation was from 1998-2008. It covered all non-humanitarian interventions in Haiti funded by Norway.

The objectives of the evaluation: Assess whether the Norwegian support was

successful in terms of contributing to improving the security situation in Haiti (effectiveness, relevance, coordination).

Determine whether the Norwegian support, and the way it was carried out was on the right track to contribute to sustained peace in Haiti (sustainability and conflict sensitivity).

Assess whether the Norwegian transitional support added value to what other donors could offer.

Identify lessons that could benefit the continued Norwegian engagement in Haiti, and if possible, Norwegian support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities elsewhere.

Fragmentation of funding strategies without clear connection to identifiable national programmes or to Haitian counterparts hindered the portfolio’s capacity to link with overarching objectives.

Late production of an umbrella policy statement capable of bringing together this fragmented portfolio created a vacuum with the correlated lack of clear direction (coherence and linkage).

The balance between political objectives and development objectives was very unstable fluctuating from one to the other. This made evaluation criteria of development projects seem non pertinent.

Important tools were not developed such as conflict analysis and context sensitive management approaches, both weakened the portfolio in the Haitian environment.

Consequently risk analysis came late in the portfolio’s development cycle; it did not inform monitoring and it relative absence was a weak foundation for evaluation operations.

Monitoring mission agenda marked a clear choice of discussing transparently with all parties and stakeholders. Norway’s MFA was viewed as a team player. It had a very positive ripple effect on other donors.

Peacebuilding, dialogue and political processes require flexibility, personal engagement (and support) and risk management, within a programme framework. Commitment (personal or institutional) cannot be a substitute to more organized and reflexive forms of interventions.

Emergency procedures and their shortcuts should give way to rebuilding and consolidating focused approaches.

Doing so requires the breaking down of existing institutional dichotomies between political and development stakeholders in donor countries.

A first step towards improved accountability and learning for stakeholders can be to document key outputs and outcomes through participatory monitoring. Systematic participatory monitoring can be a transparent tool for accountability in project management even in conflict or emergency situations.

The challenge – not to be underestimated – is to find ways to implement participation in data collection and feed-back of information.

As early as possible after the intervention, the objective of creating systems for institutional learning, knowledge management and transfer as well as monitoring/quality assurance by decision makers must become a priority. These activities must include network building operations and information/lessons learned sharing.

A strategy for any fragile or conflict-prone state must address continuity of interventions, local ownership and sustainability of these conflict prevention and peace building interventions.