SADF Policy Brief N. 10

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POLICY BRIEF 10 – Tablighi Jamaat and its role in the Global Jihad

Keywords:

Tablighi Jamaat, Religious Ideology, Transnational Organisation, Islamic

Movement, Islamist Ecosystem, Islamic Fundamentalism, Global Jihad, Terrorism,

Intelligence, Radicalisation, War of Ideas, Tablighisation.

Abstract

This SADF Policy Brief deals with Tablighi Jamaat (TJ), a transnational Islamic

missionary movement. Despite declaring itself as officially apolitical and non-

violent, TJ is cited by German and other European intelligence reports that

underline (manifold) threats originating from the movement. An increasing number

of assessments emphasise TJ’s function as a catalyst, gateway, springboard, or

antechamber for an extreme and militant interpretation of Islam – indoctrinating

Muslims into Jihadists. Experts point out that TJ ‘has appeared on the fringes of

several terrorism investigations, leading some to state that its apolitical stance

simply masks a “fertile ground for breeding terrorism”’.

In spite of this, up until this point, the majority of critical evaluations by

international intelligence have not reached public discourse or political decision-

making processes in the states where TJ holds a significant presence. Especially in

Europe and the US, TJ remains largely unknown outside Muslim communities –

and when known, actions and motives are misread. This lack of knowledge

regarding the dissemination of an Islamic supremacist agenda facilitates TJ’s

function as a driving force for Islamic extremism and as a major recruiting agency

for the cause of Global Jihad - the movement bluntly threatens societies based on

liberal and democratic norms. TJ has a relatively clandestine character, but reports

point to TJ being extremely effective at spreading Islamic fundamentalism. In sum,

TJ is seen as an essential component of a phenomenon which the French political-

By South Asia Democratic Forum

11 December 2020 – DOI: 10.48251/SADF.ISSN.2406-5625.PB.10

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sociologist Bernard Rougier (2020) calls an ‘Islamist Ecosystem’. We believe this

concept is most useful to understand the role that TJ plays in the Global Jihad.

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Table of contents

List of Abbreviations

1. Tablighi Jamaat – A brief introduction

2. The concept of ‘Islamist Ecosystem’

3. Tablighi Jamaat in the focus of the international intelligence community

3.1 German intelligence

3.2 French intelligence

3.3 Perspectives of other European intelligence forces

3.4 Views from Russia and Central Asia

4. Tablighi Jamaat and international terrorism – A symbiotic relation

5. Concluding remarks: TJ as an engine of Islamist Ecosystems

6. Recommendations

References

List of Abbreviations

AFPC American Foreign Policy Council

AVID General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands

BBC British Broadcasting Corporation

BfV Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz/Federal Bureau for the

Protection of the Constitution

BMI Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat/Federal

Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community

BND Bundesnachrichtendienst/Federal Intelligence Service

BSTMI Bayrisches Staatsministerium des Inneren, für Sport und

Integration/The Bavarian Ministry of the Interior, Sport and

Integration

COBA/ SOVA Center for Information and Analysis

CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization

DGSI Direction générale de la Sécurité intérieure/General

Directorate for Internal Security)

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation (US)

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HHBI Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg. Behörde für Inneres und

Sport/Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg. Department of the

Interior and Sport.

HT Hizb ut-Tahrir

IBW Innenministerium Baden-Württemberg/ Baden-

Württemberg Ministry of the Interior

LfV Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz/ State Office for the

Protection of the Constitution

LfVBW Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz Baden-Württemberg/

Baden-Württemberg State Office for the Protection of the

Constitution

LfVNW Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz Nordrhein-

Westfalen/North Rhine-Westphalia State Office for the

Protection of the Constitution

MAD Militärischer Abschirmdienst/Military Counterintelligence

Service

MIKNW Ministerium für Inneres und Kommunales des Landes

Nordrhein-Westfalen/ Ministry of Home Affairs and Local

North Rhine-Westphalia

MB Muslim Brotherhood

NDB Nachrichtendienst des Bundes, Schweiz/ Federal

Intelligence Service/FIS, Switzerland

NMIS Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Inneres und Sport/ Lower

Saxony Ministry of the Interior and Sport

RFE/RL Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty

SADF South Asia Democratic Forum

SIS Serviço de Informações de Segurança, Portugal (Intelligence

and Security Service)

TJ Tablighi Jamaat

UK United Kingdom

US United States of America

VG Verwaltungsgericht/Administrative Court

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1. Tablighi Jamaat – A brief introduction

Not much is known about TJ. The group’s founder, Maulana Muhammad Ilyas

(1885–1944) was not in favour of writing about the movement and made it a

principle to keep away from the press (and other media) as well as avoid detailed

publications elaborating on the movement’s membership and activities. It was one

of Ilyas’ convictions that ‘action and practice were the best method to effectively

change minds’ (Putra, 2013, p.19). The movement presents itself as officially

apolitical, preferring ‘word-of-mouth instruction to public, written or online

communiqués; [thus] TJ has heretofore flown largely under the analytical radar’

(AFPC, 2012, p.1). This stands in sharp contrast with other pan-Islamic groups (for

example, the Muslim Brotherhood or Hizb ut-Tahrir).

Academic and mainstream literature describes TJ as a ‘Islamic missionary

movement’, ‘Islamic revivalist organization’ or ‘transnational Islamic pietist

movement’ (Horstmann, 2007, p.107), ‘transnational Islamic reform movement’

(Siddiqi, 2018, p.1), among other terms. TJ originated in India in the 1920s as a

reaction to what was perceived as the depraved state of Islam in the South Asian

region (Pieri, 2012, p.103), and Ilyas largely directed the principles guiding the

organisation’s ‘formal structure’. Since its formation, and to this day, TJ adopts the

form of an ‘informal organization and keeps an introvert institutional profile’

(Putra, 2013, p.22). Importantly, the movement did not build up any formal

bureaucracy or employs paid staff. TJ consists of small groups (jamaats) of perhaps

eight or ten people, who are expected to finance themselves.1

Officially, TJ (as an organisation) does not ask for donations and depends in

financial terms upon the resources of its senior members’ (Putra, 2013, p.22).

‘Double-memberships’ with other religious organisations are not unusual for

Tablighi. Jamaats are based on regular meetings and (preaching) journeys. Tablighi

educational and missionary endeavours are organised in four ways: one day a week,

one three-day period a month, one forty-day period a year, and one four-month tour

(ideally abroad) at least once in a lifetime. One of the core activities of local jamaats

involves going out door-to-door on converting missions (Putra, 2013, p.22). It is

1 Each Tablighi has to manage his/her own expenses for travel and dawah. ‘They are encouraged to

share in the cooking, cleaning, and other menial tasks that they would usually not engage in at home’

(Pieri, 2015, p.63; Siddiqui, 2018, pp.98, 136).

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important to note that belonging to - or being a member of - TJ does not involve

any formal registration process.2

Ilyas also formulated a set of principles3 to guide preachers as well as instructions

to carry out the organisation’s core mission: to revive and revitalise Islam among

its adherents, dilute the influence of other religions, and renew the purity and spirit

of Islam as conceived by Prophet Muhammad and his companions. Riyaz Timol

states that TJ’s ‘distinct style of activism’ seeks to reinvigorate basic Islamic piety

among Muslim communities, through the persistent creation and dispatch of its

jamaats composed of ‘itinerant lay preachers to sympathetic mosques around the

world’ (Timol, 2019, p.20).

TJ sees ‘Muslims as being under threat of becoming corrupted by the modern

world’ (Freedman, 2006, p.32), as such, the movement’s core raison d’être is

da’wa, or Islamic proselytization, (Timol, 2019, p.20) ‘making Muslims into true

Muslims’. The group’s apolitical and peaceful nature is much stressed. Alexander

R. Alexiev states that ‘from its inception, radical Deobandi attitudes permeated

Tablighi philosophy. The movement rejected modernity as antithetical to Islam,

excluded women, was hostile to Shiites and syncretic Muslims, and preached that

Islam must subsume all other religions’ (Alexiev, 2011, p.83).

Over the years, as TJ grew in size and influence, its traditional structure was

strengthened by additional resources and leaders and, in fact, gained the framework

necessary for the creation of a global network. Subsequently, the movement has

expanded from local to national, and further into a transnational movement. It is

reported that TJ operates in at least 165 countries (Putra, 2013, p.17) – some

estimations suggest that TJ is active in around 200 countries – with significant

influence, not only in several majority Muslim, but in ‘non-Muslim’ majority

2 It is reported that TJ ‘does not maintain an account of its members, their names, addresses,

profession, family, and other such details’. ‘There is no card-holding cadre’ and people can join or

leave TJ regarding volition (Salam, 2020b). 3 TJ is guided by the following six key principles: ‘Kalimah: An article of faith in which the tabligh

accepts that there is no god but Allah and the Prophet Muhammad is His messenger; Salaat: Five

daily prayers that are essential to spiritual elevation, piety, and a life free from the ills of the material

world; Ilm and Dhikr: The knowledge and remembrance of Allah conducted in sessions in which

the congregation listens to preaching by the emir, performs prayers, recites the Quran and reads

Hadith. The congregation will also use these sessions to eat meals together, thus fostering a sense of

community and identity; Ikram-i-Muslim: The treatment of fellow Muslims with honor and

deference; Ikhlas-i-Niyat: ‘Reforming one's life in supplication to Allah by performing every human

action for the sake of Allah and toward the goal of self-transformation’; Tafrigh-i-Waqt: ‘The

sparing of time to live a life based on faith and learning its virtues, following in the footsteps of the

Prophet, and taking His message door-to-door for the sake of faith’.

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countries in the West (Putra, 2013, p.17). At present the organisation's activities are

coordinated via centres and headquarters known as ‘Markaz’ (Salam, 2020b). The

organisation’s international headquarter is located at the Bangla Wali Masjid

Nizamuddin Markaz, in New Delhi, India. TJ’s European headquarter is located at

the Dewsbury mosque, UK (Alexiev, 2011, p.45). Like the jamaats, the Markaz are

organized based on voluntary work and its members are self-financed (Putra, 2013,

p.22).

The group holds national headquarters in several countries where they are active.

In some countries, there is a formal shura with an Amir, while in others TJ units are

run without a formal Amir. All local and state workers are asked to appoint an

arbitrator or Amir-e-mashwara for their regular mashwara – consultation on various

programmes from the mosque level to district, state and even in some cases

national-level work. This arbitrator is selected by the local group for a limited

period and the position is rotative (Pieri, 2015). Today, TJ’s annual congregations

(three days gathering, known as Ijtima) in Bangladesh (Tongi, near Dhaka),

Pakistan (Raiwind) and India (Bopal), attract the largest number of Muslims outside

the annual Islamic pilgrimage Hajj in Mecca (Reetz, 2004, p.298; Pieri, 2012,

p.103). With tens of millions of followers,4 TJ is today the largest Islamic globally

operating movement (Sikand, 2003, p.42). In this context, it seems perhaps obvious

that TJ aims to recruit as many followers as possible. This is important because of

TJ’s recruitment process and the secrecy surrounding the internal structure (‘closed

door meetings’5).

The Sunday Telegraph states that ‘no limit was placed on the potential pool of [TJ]

converts, and so, implicitly, the ultimate objective was the Tablighisation of the

world’. Moreover, it is argued that ‘the group, for all the mystique that surrounds

it, has been diligent, and, today, with a growing presence in the West, it is viewed

by anxious critics as a Trojan horse of Islamic fundamentalism’. Furthermore, the

Tablighi possess a ‘scant regard for the logic of loyalties of national territory’

(Putra, 2013, p.17). This can of course become a challenge for the integration of

Tablighi in host countries. Policy Analysts and Islamic scholars are fiercely divided

in their assessments of TJ. On one side some scholars denounce any a-priori ties

between TJ and terrorism and stress that Tablighis implicated in terrorist activities

4 The exact number is difficult to measure due to the absence of a formal registration. 5 Expert Patrick Sukhdeo states that TJ ‘operates in every sense as a secret society…’.

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‘represent a miniscule percentage’ of the movement (Hedges, 2008, p.6). On the

other side, a growing number of experts state that there is clear evidence that TJ as

an organisation is linked to global Jihadism. Despite this debate about the real

nature of TJ and its massive expansion, ‘this movement hardly gets governments

suspicion’ in Western countries (Putra, 2013, p.19).

2. The concept of ‘Islamist Ecosystem’

TJ can be seen as a component of a phenomenon which the French political-

sociologist Bernard Rougier (2020) calls an ‘Islamist Ecosystem’. His example

involves a network established in French suburbs which links schools, mosques,

sports halls, shops, and even prisons. ‘The components of this ecosystem’ –

foremost the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafist groups, and TJ, among others – are

‘"competing" to control social spaces (neighbourhoods, associations, etc.);

however, "they join forces against a common enemy, secularism, which they hate

above all else". All these movements have been "working" within the

neighbourhoods for a long time – through "religious entrepreneurs", preachers

engaged in a real territorial conquest’ (French Sénat, 2020a, p.33). TJ conducts

‘initial preaching that paved the way by bringing young people back to Islam before

they, now interested in the things of faith, turned to a more learned version of Islam’

(Rougier, 2020). As such, TJ contributes to ‘the expansion of ecosystem resources

which in turn feeds the jihadist dynamic, providing its fighters with the ideological

and material bases legitimising the fight against global society (Rougier, 2020).

Preachers and recruiters from TJ are ‘deployed there to detect weak spirits capable

of forming the first line of the Holy War’.

Tablighi are sometimes seen as oscillating on an ideological continuum between

moderate and radical positions, between TJ as organisation and militant Jihadist

groups (Ragazzi, 2014, p.13, referring to CEIS and Change Institute). ‘This

ecosystem does not advocate armed struggle on French soil [as well as in other

countries with a TJ presence] but maintains a logic of rupture with global society

and its institutions. This rupture is then exploited by the theological and political

argument of the jihadists’ (Rougier, 2020). In other words, joining TJ could turn

out ‘to be the first step on the road to extremism’. Farhan Zahid describes TJ as

‘system driver and integral element of Islamist Violent Non-State Actors internal

dynamics’. Furthermore, he identifies TJ as ‘one of the agents responsible for

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Islamist activities’ which acts in many cases as ‘a nursery for indoctrinating Islamist

terrorists’.

3. Tablighi Jamaat in the focus of the international intelligence

community

3.1 German intelligence

In its 2019 Report on the Protection of the Constitution (Verfassungsschutzbericht,

BMI, 2020b, BMI, 2020a), the Federal Interior Ministry of Germany

(Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat, BMI) points to that, even

though the country has not witnessed any major terrorist attack since August 2017,

‘the threat posed by Islamist terrorism remains at high levels’ (BMI, 2020b, p.27).

For the last few years, the country’s domestic intelligence agency – Bundesamt für

Verfassungsschutz (BfV, Federal Bureau for the Protection of the Constitution6)

and its counterparts at the state level (State Bureaus for the Protection of the

Constitution,7 Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz/LfV) – under the BMI –, have

been publishing these reports. Focusing on Germany’s internal security situation,

these reports assess external threats, indigenous left and right-wing groups, and

the threat potential by Islamist extremists and terrorists (organisations and

individuals) in the country, among several other issues.

Already at the occasion of the presentation of the 2004 Annual Report (BMI, 2005),

the then German Federal Minister of Interior, Otto Schily, warned that Islamic

terrorism poses the greatest global threat to Germany.8 TJ was first mentioned in

the 2004 report (Mukhopadhyay, 2005, p.332). It was classified as one of the

foreign Islamist organisations active in Germany (BMI, 2020a). Among other

concerns regarding TJ, the report specifically mentions a considerable increase in

its support base9 (BMI, 2005, pp.190-191) contributing to the overall rise in

reported membership levels of foreign Islamist organisations in the country. The

6 Besides the Federal Bureau for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) under the Ministry of the

Interior, the most important intelligence authorities in Germany are the Federal Intelligence Service

(BND) under the Federal Chancellery and the Military Counterintelligence Service (MAD) under

the Ministry of Defence. The BfV is given authority to track any activities by extremist groups that

seek to foment ideological or religious strife domestically (Archick, K et. Al., 2006, p.n.n.). 7 State Bureaus for the Protection of the Constitution work independently of each other and

independently of the BfV (Archick, K et. Al., 2006, p.n.n.). 8 Statement by the Bundesinnenminister Otto Schily zum Verfassungsschutzbericht 2004 am 17.

Mai 2005 in Berlin, quoted in focus migration (2005, May). Deutschland: Verfassungsbericht 2004.

Newsletter Ausgabe, 5/2005. 9 It is stated that ‘considering the hard numbers, one can say that the Islamist extremist following

increased by around 5% to a total of 28,020 individuals in 2019 (2018: 26,560)’ (BMI, 2020b, p.26).

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latest BMI 2019 report (2020a, pp.181, 224; 2020b, p.26) – compiled by the

BfV –, as well as reports by several agencies at the state level (for example,

BSTMI, 2020, pp.39-40; NMIS, 2020, pp.230, 232) continue to recognize TJ as

part of the potential threat by ‘Islamist extremism/Islamist terrorism’. German

intelligence agencies hold that several factors justify monitoring TJ as a potential

threat in the context of ‘Islamist extremism/Islamist terrorism’.

When assessing TJ’s threat potential, the ‘2019 Report on the Protection of the

Constitution’ states that ‘the rejection of secular principles and the demarcation

from non-Muslims’ through TJ, ‘can lead to the formation of closed parallel

societies and at least passively promote individual radicalisation processes’ (BMI,

2020a, p.224). These phenomena had already been mentioned by the BfV in 2011,

which stated that ‘the successful proselytizing efforts of TJ often lead to a visible

change in the social behaviour of the recruits. The rejection of Western values can

have a socio-political disintegration effect in non-Muslim countries and contribute

to the emergence of parallel societies. This can promote individual radicalisation

processes and thus create the conditions for a further slide into a terrorist

environment’10 (BMI, 2012, p.308).

Overarching visions of TJ draw additional attention by German intelligence

agencies: namely its long-term goals to establish an Islamist regime (NMIS, 2020,

p.230) and make Sharia law universal.11 From the TJ’s perspective, this requires a

comprehensive Islamization of their host countries’ societies. The purpose of all TJ

activities is to achieve ‘the transformation of the society shaped by Western values

into an Islamic form of society’ (BMI, 2006, p.194). Here, both the BfV and the

LfVs are concerned that the notion of an Islamic societal transition could also

‘extend to jihadist ideas’ (MIKNW, 2013, p.128). The Nordrhein-Westfalen State

Office for the Protection of the Constitution (LfVNW) states that TJ must be

classified as an ‘extremist movement’ (MIKNW, 2013, p.128).12

More specifically, German intelligence sees a threat potential in ‘the pursuit of an

exemplary practice of faith in the sense that TJ includes a largely verbatim and rigid

interpretation of the Koran and its legislation, so that the fulfilment of religious

10 Verfassungsschutzbericht 2019 BMI, p.308, author’s translation. 11 Verfassungsschutzbericht 2019 BMI, p.224, author’s translation. 12 The LfVBW comes to a similar conclusion by questioning TJ’s self-description as a religious,

apolitical, and non-violent phenomenon. Instead, the intelligence agency comes to the conclusion

that TJ must be classified as a ‘extremist organisation’ (IBW, 2012, p.67)

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regulations is given priority in principle over a way of life based on state law13

(NMIS, 2020, p.231). Thus, TJ’s ideology – especially propagating Sharia law as

the basis of its social model, contradicts essential democratic principles, in

particular that of the separation of state and religion’ (BMI, 2012, p.309; NMIS,

2020, p.231).

Here an area of concern for the LfVNW is that ‘TJ calls for the application of all

sharia law provisions’ (MIKNW, 2010, p.109). ‘This includes the application of the

provisions of classical Islamic procedural law, classical Islamic law of marriage and

divorce, and the so-called "Hadd" penalties (e.g., the flogging of offenders), which

are not only incompatible but directed against the liberal democratic basic order

(freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung) of Germany’ (MIKNW, 2010, p.109;

BSTMI, 2020, p.39). Furthermore, the image of women represented by TJ, largely

expressed in the social exclusion of women (NMIS, 2020, p.230; BSTMI, 2020,

p.39)14 cannot be reconciled with Germany’s constitutional principles.

TJ presents itself as apolitical and non-violent (unlike other Islamist groupings such

as Salafist circles) but the assessment of the organisation by security authorities is

different (NMIS, 2020, p.231; IBW, 2012, p.67). In this context, it is interesting to

mention that violent clashes between different factions of TJ occurred in the past,

undermining the movement’s narrative of promoting non-violence. Most

remarkable were the events in the aftermath of TJ’s leadership decision to establish

a ‘governing body’ (Shura15) in 2015 (BMI, 2020a, p.2004). During the following

years, particularly in 2018, strong reactions among the Tablighi led to serious

clashes between opponents and supporters of the innovation in several countries,

foremost in Bangladesh - but also in European states, such as the UK16 (BMI,

2020a, p.224).

13 The LfVB further argues that the ‘traditional prayer clothing and rules of conduct in everyday life,

which are binding down to the last detail, are intended to express the absolute devotion to the Prophet

Muhammad. These aspirations are necessarily disintegrating in non-Muslim societies, so that a

lasting and serious turn to Western social orders, values and models of integration is not possible’

(BSTMI, 2020). 14 This includes ‘the subordination of women to men, the woman's duty of obedience to the man and

the limited freedom of movement of women are postulated as well as their sexual availability’

(MIKNW, 2010, p.109). 15 The Shura is supposed to function as an advisory committee ‘to deal with all important matters

including international congregations (ijtima)’. 16 Shah and Mushtaq are stating: ‘The differences grew so much that several incidents of brawl

occurred, and members and elders assaulted each other in London Markaz – also known as Masjid

Ilyas and Abbey Mills Mosque. Tableeghi Jamaat and police sources have confirmed that the police

were called about 13 times and four people were arrested on different occasions. A source said that

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The Baden-Württemberg State Office for the Protection of the Constitution

(LfVBW) stressed that ‘various investigative procedures and trials in recent years

have clearly shown that the one-sided interpretation of Islamic sources – with the

aim of aligning the behaviour of an individual Muslim strictly according to Islamic

standards – can, in individual cases, lead to an intensive transfer of ideology’17

(IBW, 2012, p.67). As indicated above, the vast scope for interpretation of the

movement’s ideology makes the emergence of a jihadist orientation within TJ

possible (IBW, 2012, p.67; MIKNW, 2013, p.128).

It is noteworthy, that ‘in the literature of TJ a pronounced glorification of the

militant jihad can be found. Therefore, although it is true that there is no explicit

call for militant jihad, jihad is described as the ‘outstanding duty of faith of every

Muslim’ (MIKNW, 2010, p.109). Thus, some Islamist terrorists had life-changing

experiences through their membership and exposure to TJ (MIKNW, 2010, p.109).

TJ became a focus of the German judiciary as well; in fact, the movement’s hostility

towards the country’s constitution has already been the subject of several court

decisions. For example, the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgericht/VG) of

Bayreuth (State of Bavaria/Bayern) concluded in one of its decisions18 that TJ

supported international terrorism.

For the judges involved it was clear that several persons belonging to TJ had

committed terrorist attacks in different countries – or were linked to TJ in their

terrorist attacks. At the very least, this grouping is used to facilitate individual

terrorists’ journeys or as a point of contact (NMIS, 2007, p.28). The Administrative

Court (VG) Ansbach (State of Bavaria/Bayern) issued two resolutions (9 and 18

May 2005), stating that TJ supports terrorism. In addition, it was stated that TJ

endangered the liberal democratic basic order and the security of Germany. As early

as 24 November 2005, the VG Bayreuth had established that the suspicion of TJ's

support of terrorism was objectively justified (NMIS, 2007, p.28). In its judgment

of 2 March 2005,19 the VG Hannover followed the previous decision of VG

a group of Tableeghi followers from Bangladesh and Indian Gujarat ganged up against the Tableeghi

members from Pakistani background and other countries and as a result the Abbey Mills Mosque

became a battleground’. ‘The two factions now don’t go to each other’s mosques and security

personnel are deputed at the gate of Ilyas Masjid to identify the members who come to the mosque

to attend sermons’. 17 Verfassungsbericht Baden-Württemberg 2011, p.67, author’s translation. 18 Case No. Az.: B 1 S 05.763, 24.11.2005. 19 Case No. Az.: 10 A 5681/04.

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Bayreuth. It classified TJ as an organisation whose objective is directed against the

liberal democratic basic order of the Federal Republic of Germany (NMIS, 2007,

p.28).

The Thüringen State Office for the Protection of the Constitution (LfVT) came to a

similar conclusion and stated that ‘although TJ itself does not actively support

Islamist terrorism, it does seem to serve as a recruitment base for violent Islamist

groups and jihadist networks’20 (TI, 2012, p.142; BMI, 2012, p.308). The BfV

described TJ not only as a recruitment pool but also as a ‘catalyst for Jihadist

recruitment efforts’ (BMI, 2012, p.308). More concretely, TJ is seen as cultivating

such a conservative understanding of Islam among its followers that several

organisations and networks just must add a ‘Jihadist component’ to recruit the

Tablighi (BMI, 2012, p.308). In addition, there are indications that ‘the largely

common ideological base of TJ with Jihadists and other militant groups enables the

latter to make use of the global TJ infrastructure’ (HHBI, 2012, p.51; TI, 2012,

p.142). Here, the Nordrhein-Westfalen State Office for the Protection of the

Constitution (LfVNW) goes a step further by arguing that ‘recent cases suggest that

TJ, on the one hand, endorses Islamist and jihadist ideas in its ranks, and that on the

other hand, its global networks are being used by Islamist terrorists – and that TJ

tolerates this’2122 (MIKNW, 2013, p.128).

It appears that there is a growing awareness within Germany’s intelligence

community regarding potential causal links between TJ’s missionary activities,

particularly religious trainings and instruction courses, and the radicalisation of

individual followers. The BfV warned already in 2005 that ‘trainings by TJ can

constitute for individual young Muslims an entry into Islamism and – subsequently

– also into Islamist-terrorist groups’23 (BMI, 2006, p.194). The federal agency

emphasizes the significance of study tours abroad [namely those to Pakistan]

offered by TJ. It is stated that ‘successfully proselytised people are often provided

several months of training events in Pakistani Qur'anic schools [madrasas]. Such

intensive training courses can indoctrinate participants and make them receptive to

20 Verfassungsschutzbericht Freistaat Thüringen 2011, p.142, author’s translation. 21 It is reported that TJ not only tolerates the use of its networks by extremists but also that individual

Tablighis actively support extremist’s trough the facilitation of contacts to Jihadist groups such as

Al Qaeda and the Taliban – among others – to receive military training and/or serve as fighters. 22 Verfassungsschutzbericht des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen für das Jahr 2012, p.128; author’s

translation. 23 Verfassungsschutzbericht 2005 BMI, p.194, author’s translation.

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Islamist ideas’24 (BMI 2006, p.226). ‘In individual cases, trainees then found their

way to "Mujahideen" training camps in Afghanistan’25 (BMI 2006, p.226).

Finally, it must be mentioned that the targets of TJ’s missionary activities in

Germany are mostly young people from social and weaker segments of society, or

those who feel a lack of belonging26 (BMI, 2006, p.194). Furthermore, in the

sermons it became clear that TJ in Germany has not only ‘fallen-from-faith

Muslims’ as a target group, but also different believers’ (BSTMI, 2007, p.53). The

fact that TJ also wants to appeal to German decision-makers such as mayors and

parliamentarians demands special attention (BSTMI, 2007, p.53). The LfVBW

identifies the potential threat that ‘this can lead to a re-Islamisation, especially

among young Muslims who have been discriminated against or feel disadvantaged.

This revival then leads to a rejection and demarcation from the surrounding society,

whether it is supposedly Islamic or non-Islamic’27 (IBW, 2012, p.67).

3.2 French intelligence

The French intelligence agency Direction Générale de la Sécurité Intérieure (DGSI,

General Directorate for Internal Security) in its ‘2018 Rapport. Etat des lieux de la

pénétration de l’islam fondamentaliste en France’ (2018 Report – state of the

situation regarding the lodging of Islamic fundamentalism in France) describes TJ28

as one of the four most active Islamist movements in the country – besides the

Frères Musulmans (Muslim Brotherhood), Salafistes (Salafists), and the

Mouvement Turc (‘Turkish Movement’) – constituting ‘the ultimate risk’ in the

form of ‘an advent of a counter-society on national territory’ (DGSI, 2018, p.3).

Furthermore, the DGSI states that TJ experienced a strong development in the

1970s – playing a major role in the re-Islamization of working-class Muslims in

24 This assessment of the German intelligence is strengthened by international observers. For

example, after interviewing a Tablighi, Craig S. Smith highlights the causal role of such training

courses not only for radicalising Muslims but also transforming them into militants: ‘Tablighi-

sponsored trips to Pakistan put young men in contact with fundamentalists of many stripes, including

adherents of Salafism, a fundamentalist school of Islam whose radical fringe advocates war against

non-Muslims’. Smith’s interviewee also ‘acknowledged that young men wishing to migrate from

the Tablighi to more militant forms of Islam had no trouble finding their way’ and ‘it's easy to get

into the jihadi network’ since as a Tablighi you know where you can meet Salafists. Furthermore,

the interviewee estimated that half of the Tablighis are being recruited by the Salafists. 25 Verfassungsschutzbericht 2005 BMI, p.226, author’s translation. 26 Verfassungsschutzbericht 2005 BMI, p.194, author’s translation. 27 Verfassungsbericht Baden-Württemberg 2011, p.67, author’s translation. 28 TJ has a main presence in the Paris region, with a centre located in Saint-Denis (French Sénat,

2020a)

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suburban areas (banlieues;29 DGSI, 2018, pp.4, 109). Here, the French intelligence

service sees a major threat. For even though it classifies TJ as apolitical, the

movement ‘constitutes a reservoir of individuals in total break with society’ (DGSI,

2018, p.4).

The DGSI is particularly vigilant regarding TJ’s growing influence within the

educational system. More specific concerns regard the indoctrination of the

teenager and parents by TJ supervisors, the influence of [TJ] imams on children

education, and the immense difficulties faced by non-Muslim families (foremost

Jewish ones) to get their children enrolled in public educational institutions where

the majority of children are Muslims (DGSI, 2018, pp.62-63). This partly reflects

the threat potential of antisemitism among Tablighi identified by German

intelligence agencies.30

Another major concern of the DGSI, is that through to the strong cohesion among

active Tablighi – reinforced through religious practises, teaching missions, and

omnipresent prayers among others –, the social ties of adherents outside the

Tablighi community disappear quickly (DGSI, 2018, p.108). Indeed, many Tablighi

are experiencing a ‘turn-over’ within the movement. Here the DGSI states that ‘in

general, after observing an important rigorism in his practice of Islam, the

individual ends up moving away from the movement. The weakness of the religious

discourse served in the organisation (based on some literalist precepts) and the lack

of prospects offered by the preaching activity have the effect of causing individuals

to leave to other Islamist ‘offers’, especially Salafists’ (DGSI, 2018, p.108).

This assessment by the French intelligence is further substantiated by reports on

behalf of the Commission31 of Inquiry32 ‘on the organization and means of state

29 TJ fed on an emerging identity crisis among Muslim migrants and the major economic crisis

following the oil shock of 1973 which created fragile socio-economic conditions. It is reported that

not only urban but also rural Muslim populations are in the focus of TJ (DGSI, 2018, pp.4, 109). 30 The BfV states in its 2019 report (summary) that during the period of assessment, again a large

number of anti-Semitic incidents motivated by Islamist extremism occurred. These incidents ranged

from anti-Semitic speeches and sermons to anti-Jewish postings on social media and verbal or

physical attacks on Jewish individuals. Antisemitism serves as an ideological link connecting all

Islamist extremist movements, including TJ. The vast majority of Islamist extremist organisations

operating in Germany holds anti-Semitic ideas, which they disseminate through various channels

(BMI, 2020b, pp.26, 27). 31 Rapport fait au nom de la commission d’enquête sur l’organisation et les moyens des services de

l’État pour faire face à l’évolution de la menace terroriste après la chute de l’État islamique. [Report

created in the name of the enquiry commission regarding the organisation and means available to

the state so as to face terrorist threats following the fall of the Islamic State.’] 32 These reports are based on Committee hearings with academic and non-academic researchers and

other specialists.

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services to deal with the evolving terrorist threat following the fall of the Islamic

State’ by the French Senate. In a 2018 report (French Sénat, 2018, p.34) it is stated

that TJ – described as a sectarian movement – can also be considered as

fundamentalist because of its literalist reading of the Qur'an and its orthopraxy, and

this despite its links to a Sufi tradition which Salafists fight (sometimes through

arms). Islamic fundamentalisms [and their respective representatives –

organisations as well as individuals] have complex, often conflicting relationships

for the control over territories, communities or places of worship (French Sénat,

2018, p.68). In his official rhetoric, TJ stresses its differences with Salafism (which

is seen as a school of ignorance). TJ seems to view itself as a bulwark in the fight

against Salafism: ‘But many young people discover Islam via TJ before joining the

Salafist movement, or even radical organisations’ (French Sénat, 2018, p.68).

In a bipartite report (French Sénat, 2020a; 2020b) by the same Senate Commission

of Inquiry it is declared – referring to expert Bernard Rougier –, that even if there

is no organisation or agreement between the different foreign Islamist groups in

France, they form an ‘Islamist ecosystem’ (French Sénat, 2020a, p.33). The reports

further highlight that despite TJ’s claim of being apolitical, it ‘advocates a logic of

rupture with French society’ (French Sénat, 2020a, p.35) and ‘often sets the stage

for Salafism’ (Bernard Rougier quoted in French Sénat, 2020a, p.35).

It is interesting to mention that the second part of the report, identifies a kind of

hybridisation (French Sénat, 2020b, p.42), obviously referring to the above-

mentioned ‘Islamist Ecosystem’. More concretely, it is stated that some terrorists

are initially trained by TJ and then transited through the Muslim Brotherhood and

Salafist movements (French Sénat, 2020b, p.42). It is also claimed that TJ is

constantly used as a gate of entry for the before-mentioned Islamist organisations

(French Sénat, 2020b, p.42). When TJ is present in a mosque, there is a particularly

good chance that, a few months or years later, the Salafists have taken their place.

It's almost mechanical (French Sénat, 2020b, p.72).

Even though different Islamist groups compete in the control of the version of Islam

(understood as ideology) prevalent in a neighbourhood, territory or prison, they are

bound together when it comes to defining themselves in relation to - and in

opposition with - French society. A strong common ground involves all these

competing and converging components of Islamism, which undeniably share the

same hatred of secularism (French Sénat, 2020b, p.71). TJ in this context ‘advocates

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in a non-violent way a progressive logic of breaking with the institutions of global

society’ (French Sénat, 2020b, p.71). Observers believe that the TJ acts as a

‘foundation for radical Islamic terrorism’. According to one estimate, ‘perhaps 80

percent of Islamist extremists have come from Tablighi ranks, prompting French

intelligence officers to call TJ the “antechamber of fundamentalism”’ (Alexiev,

2011, p.84; 2005). The French expert on Islam Gilles Kepel stresses that

theoretically TJ is opposed to violent action, whether political or jihadist. However,

to this Policy Brief’s interpretation, the religious radicalization they propose

sometimes serves as a foreplay, or even as a gateway to terrorism. Kepel refers – as

does the German intelligence, to the involvement of Tablighis in terrorist attacks.33

A noted French scholar, Marc Gaborieau, closely examined TJ activities in France

and other European countries. He believes that TJ’s philosophy and transnational

goals include the ‘planned conquest of the world’ from the outset (Gaborieau, 1999,

p.21). He further sees TJ as a militant movement, since the Tablighis are able ‘to

organise people quasi militarily’ (Gaborieau, 1999, p.21). The author also rejects

the movement’s pacifist claim and notes that Tablighi have never condemned

violence (Vilela, A. J., et. Al., 2006, p.50). Thus, experts see TJ as ‘a way to join

more radical movements’ in France, as well as in other countries in Europe and Asia

(Vilela, A. J., et. Al., 2006, p.50). Notably, Gaborieau refers to Felice Dasetto, who

describes TJ as a ‘Total Institution’ comparing Tablighi with ‘sects’. Dasetto adapts

Erving Goffman’s (1961) concept of ‘Total Institution’ to TJ context.

A ‘Total Institution’ is ‘a place of residence and work where many like-situated

individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time,

together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life’ encompassing most

day-to-day activities (Goffman, 1961, p.xiii). Furthermore, Gaborieau deemed the

group’s strategy – especially regarding politics –, difficult to understand. Still, it

seems clear to him that TJ is not entirely apolitical since its aim is the Islamisation

of society. The French scholar argues that TJ possesses ‘a far-sighted conception of

politics’ which goes ‘beyond the narrow borders of nation-states’. According to

Gaborieau, the Tablighi strategy is to first build individuals and institutions ‘which

over time may exert a more lasting Tablighi political influence’ (Gaborieau, 1999,

33 For example, the stabbing attack on a soldier patrolling in La Defence, a business district in Paris

in May 2013.

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p.21). For him, this sets TJ apart from other Islamist organisations which have only

a short-sighted conception of politics (Gaborieau, 1999, p.21).

3.3 Perspectives of other European intelligence forces

The observations and assessments by Germany’s intelligence agencies are

supported by other members and experts of the European intelligence community.

Regarding Muslim radicalism in Europe, the General Intelligence and Security

Service of the Netherlands (AVID) identifies a new phase in the development of

Islamic radicalism related to the presence of not only the Muslim Brotherhood

(MB) and the Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) but also TJ (AVID, 2007, p.42). The MB, the

HT and TJ are described as radical da’wah34 movements encouraging the rise of

Islamic neo-radicalism (AVID, 2007, pp.27, 48). They employ different strategies

and tactics, disagree on certain ideological and theological interpretations; however,

their objectives greatly converge (AVID, 2007, pp..27, 48). In another report, AVID

stresses that Tablighi are a variant of radical Islam and ‘manifest themselves in non-

violent, radical-Islamic puritan groups’ which overtly propagate isolationism,

advocating ‘exclusivism35 and parallelism’ (AVID, 2004, p.38).

In Portugal, too, TJ became a focus of the country’s intelligence services, foremost

for the Serviço de Informações de Segurança (SIS, Intelligence and Security

Service). According to Maria do Céu Pinto, since 2001, the country’s intelligence

and law enforcing agencies have identified links ‘between individuals residing in

Portugal and radical Islamic operatives within the ideological network of Al Qaeda,

as well as logistical and support activities for terrorism, namely of a criminal nature’

(Pinto, 2012, p.115). According to SIS sources, aside detecting organisation's

structures and monitoring individuals (especially their travels abroad), TJ’s funding

34 Dawah (literally ‘call’ or ‘invitation’) is understood as ‘the propagation of the radical-Islamic

ideology’ (Mukhopadhyay, 2006, p.333). According to Siddiqi, TJ interprets the concept of Dawah

‘as Allah’s way of bringing believers to faith’ which ‘includes both activities with other people in

one’s own locality and missionary journeys to other places’ (Siddiqi, 2018, p.2). 35 According to Mukhopadhyay, exclusivism ‘denotes the trend of a general aloofness of Muslims

in the European host societies. They have less interest in local and national politics and refuse to

integrate into the mainstream of European societies. There exists among them, a general attitude

towards their countries of residence as a temporary halt, from where they would eventually return.’

(Mukhopadhyay, 2005, p.333).

Parallelism he defines as ‘the idea of establishing an alternate society, i.e., a transplanted version of

their countries of origin with rituals, religious practices and mosques in a foreign land. If extended

or as propagated by the global Islamic movements, this idea of parallelism may eventually lead to

parallel Muslim societies (totally based on the literal interpretation of Islamic texts by these global

Islamic movements) in a predominantly Christian setting. In the long run, such parallelism will result

in greater division and ghettoisation in European societies solely on the basis of religion.’

(Mukhopadhyay, 2005, p.333).

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has constituted one of the most important points of SIS surveillance (Vilela, A. J.,

et. Al., 2006, p.49-50; Marques, T., & Vilela, A. J., 2006, p.52). This funding

constitutes a major cause for concern among observers of TJ. This for several

reasons: firstly, there are contradictions between TJ leadership’s official rhetoric as

regards the funding of missionary tours and gathering abroad of its adherents.

On the one hand, as mentioned above, TJ claims that members are responsible for

covering expenditures themselves. Conversely, however, it is reported that TJ offers

financial support for such travel activities. For example, Marc Gaborieau – referring

to investigations by the French police – points out that TJ funded trips to India and

Pakistan for unemployed young Muslims. This defers from TJ’s principle of self-

financing (khuruj), supposedly an inherent characteristic of Tablighi. Furthermore,

the movement appears to hold enormous financial resources. This is relevant since

‘the envoi of missionaries all over the world is expensive to the institution’

(Marques, T., & Vilela, A. J., 2006, p.52). Secondly, TJ is apparently ‘averse to

financial and banking records’ (Marques, T., & Vilela, A. J., 2006, p.52). Thus, TJ

does not use formal banking channels so as to avoid any scrutiny of its funds. It

seems to rely instead on the informal Hawala money transfer system based on

transactions in cash.36

Lastly, funding sources remain anonymous and there is no accessible data regarding

the numbers or profiles of those who visit (and donate to) TJ offices and centres.

According to Francesca Marino, TJ is being investigated by Italian intelligence and

law enforcing agencies. Italian authorities suspect that a ‘cultural centre’ of the

movement as well as individuals are involved in collecting and/or transferring

money to fund Jihadist activities abroad. During its investigation, the police

36 With the ‘Hawala system’ it is possible to deposit an amount in one country to be raised in another

by an indicated person. The method functions on the ‘basis of honor’ and there are no records.

Besides being hardly traceable (if at all), the Hawala system is vulnerable to misuse (infiltrations by

criminals for money laundering) Marques, T., & Vilela, A. J., 2006, p.52). However, one must

mention that TJ does maintain some bank accounts with the funds needed to carry out activities. On

a more general note, regarding TJ’s financial affairs, experts believe that the movement relies

heavily on voluntary contributions (collection and contributions) of largely unknown amounts

(Salam, 2020b; Siddiqui, 2018, p.136). There are also cases in which land or property are offered as

donations. Construction work, community outreach programmes and other types of developmental

work are sponsored by wealthy supporters. It is reported that a large amount of contributions flow

to TJ from Gulf countries so as to fund large congregations, the construction of mosques, and other

activities (Salam, 2020b). Larger known patrons include Saudi Arabia and several among the

Pakistani establishment.

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detected an ‘illegal funding network’ – with ties to Pakistani sources – not only

running associations and activities in Italy, but also maintaining links to TJ.

Drawing on interviews with members of the country’s intelligence community as

well as the press, Pinto states ‘that in some Wahabi and conservative mosques the

religious discourse has become stricter and more intolerant’ and that there is the

possibility that TJ ‘developed more extremist tendencies, at least on the fringes’

(2012, p.199). Noivo, who also refers to Portuguese intelligence, states that TJ uses

‘Portugal as a platform for spreading its pan-Islamic message to Portuguese-

speaking countries in Africa and Latin America, particularly Brazil, and that there

are indications that ‘the movement’s message has been the catalyst for the

radicalisation of some of its members’ (Noivo, 2010, pp.4-5). Furthermore, as is the

case in other European countries, Noivo stresses that in Portugal too there is the

threat perception that due to its action and self-exclusion from social and political

participation, TJ constitutes an interpretation of Islam ‘that perpetuates ‘otherness’,

thus possibly jeopardising integration and, consequently, social harmony’ (Noivo,

2010, p.5).

Based on publicly available information collected by the Nachrichtendienst des

Bundes (NDB), Switzerland’s intelligence agency, and the Swiss Federal Office of

Police, the Centre for Security Studies (CSS, ETH Zürich) describes TJ (besides

the HT) ‘in regard to Islamist inspired violent radicalization’ as ‘most commonly

been considered a gateway organization’ (Vidino, 2013, p.27).

3.4 Views from Russia and Central Asia

The Center for Information and Analysis COBA,37 emphasises that already over a

decade ago, Russia (as well as other several Central Asian nations) banned TJ for

constituting an extremist group.38 It is reported that the ban of TJ is based on a

37 COBA (Center for Information and Analysis) is a Moscow-based Russian non-profit

organisation. 38 It is reported that in Russia TJ has been making inroads through underground cells. The

movement’s underground activities in the country have been noticed in Moscow, St. Petersburg and

in the Muslim-dominated Republics of Bashkortostan, Tatarstan and Karachai-Cherkessia. In 2016,

the Russian police busted several TJ underground cells. Cadres were detained and extremist

literature as well as communication tools and electronic data storage devices were recovered. A few

Tablighi cadres arrested in Moscow were planning to travel to Afghanistan and Pakistan for training

in extremist camps. In one instance, a busted cell operated by Central Asian nationals also included

Russian citizens. In August 2020, the Russian Federal Security Service's Directorate for Mordovia,

in interaction with other law enforcing agencies, withheld a TJ cell for its extremist activities. TJ

cell unearthed in St. Petersburg was run by a Tajik national suspected to be the head of a local HT

cell. This is indicative of TJ’s alliance with other extremist groups. Russia banned the group in 2009

for ‘assistance to international terrorist organisations’ and for actions ‘aimed at the violation of the

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recommendation by the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO39). The

recommendation was adopted by Russia and other Central Asian states - all except

Kyrgyzstan. TJ was included in the Russian Federal List of Extremist

Organizations. After an appeal in May 2009, the Russian Supreme Court ruled (and

thus confirmed) that TJ was to be considered an extremist organisation and banned

its activity.

According to the Prosecutor General's statement, the court had resolved that the

activities of TJ's structural divisions ‘threaten interethnic and inter-religious

stability in Russian society and the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation’.

Russian prosecutors argued that ‘the said religious association's purposes include

the establishment of global supremacy through disseminating a radical form of

Islam and the foundation of a unified Islamic state called the Global Caliphate on

the basis of regions with traditionally Muslim populations’. According to Russian

political analyst E.N. Yegorov, ‘in the long run, the influence of this movement on

the religious-political situation should not be underestimated’.40 The researcher

further states that TJ ‘defiantly refuses to participate in politics, but there are reasons

to believe that the strategic goals of its activities are connected precisely with

politics and power’. There is a notion that Tablighi do ‘not call for a change in the

social system or creating caliphate’. Then again, according to Kyrgyz expert K.

Murzakhalilov, TJ does impose demands and transmit these into the social and

political processes in host countries around the world.

Besides domestic concerns, the Russian news agency Interfax highlighted that ‘the

law enforcement agencies of some Central Asian states consider the Tablighi

Jamaat as a potential threat to their national security’. In Tajikistan, ‘Tablighi

Jamaat's activities were banned by a court too’. In Kazakhstan in 2012, law

enforcement agencies broke off the activities of over 200 TJ missionaries operating

illegally as an unregistered organisation. Subsequently, the Kazakh Prosecutor-

General's Office declared on February 26, 2013, that TJ ‘had been designated as

extremist and all its activities in Kazakhstan were now considered illegal’. In both

Tajikistan and Kazakhstan numerous Tablighi were arrested and given lengthy jail

territorial integrity of Russia and religious discrimination of its citizens’. 39 The CSTO is a Russia-led military alliance of seven former Soviet states created in 2002. For

more information see: Avedissian (2019). 40 For the original text, see: «The Tablighi Jamaat» movement: The Ideology and the Activity

Specifics http://islam.dgu.ru/Stat/Islamoved%202016-3-1.pdf

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sentences for running afoul of national laws against miscreant versions of Islam and

for advocating extremism (AFPC, 2012, p.6-7). It is interesting to note that as is the

case in France and other European countries, also here TJ influence in education

causes concerns to authorities and regional experts. According to Tologon

Keldibayev, educational grassroots activities by Tablighi preachers are hardly

noticed, if at all

Finally, it is also interesting to mention that concerns by European intelligence

agencies and other observers are reflected in US intelligence sources. Susan Sachs

reports that the FBI is much worried with TJ’s influence in the country. Since 9/11,

Tablighi have ‘increasingly attracted the interest of federal investigators’.

According to US law enforcement officials, TJ serves as ‘springboard into

militancy’. More concretely, despite its fundamentalist character, TJ appears to

potential adherents (and authorities) as ‘a natural entree, a way of gathering people

together with a common interest in Islam’ and not as a militant or terrorist outfit.

However, the US intelligence is aware that TJ activities are exploited by

international terrorist organisations such as Al Qaeda. In 2003, Michael J.

Heimbach, Deputy Chief of the FBI's International Terrorism Section, stated: ‘We

have a significant presence of Tablighi Jamaat in the United States, and we have

found that Al Qaeda used them for recruiting, now and in the past’ (Freedman,

2006, p.41). Here, like in most other countries with an active TJ presence, a major

concern among authorities regards TJ’s susceptibility to infiltration and

manipulation. Prosecutors are convinced that extremists using TJ structures,

particularly its gatherings, as an ‘assessment tool to evaluate individuals with

particular zealousness and interest in going beyond what's offered’ by TJ itself. In

brief, like their European colleagues, US intelligence agencies concluded that TJ

serves as a recruiting ground for terrorists. Law enforcement officials and moderate

Muslim scholars state that what worries them most about the Tablighi Jamaat is its

disengagement from society.

4. Tablighi Jamaat and international terrorism – A symbiotic relation

International counter-terrorism officials who monitor TJ state that in several cases

terrorists have emerged from the movement or had at least peripheral links with TJ

(Freedman, 2006, p.47). Mukhopadhyay points out that there are numerous

examples of individuals – including westerners – who joined the armed Jihad in

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Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and other places (2005, p.336) and were involved in terror

attacks in their home countries after being influenced by TJ preaching. A French

intelligence official states that TJ serves ‘definitely as fertile ground for breeding

terrorism’). According to Fred Burton and Scott Stewart, TJ provides a meeting

platform, an unsupervised facilitation centre, which can offer refuge and even a

hiring place to terrorists. There are also indications that TJ serves not only as

recruitment ground but effectively as operational headquarters for terrorist cells. An

example concerns the March 2004 train bombings in Madrid (Neumann & Rogers,

2007, pp.38-39) – it is reported that three leading members of TJ network carried

out this terror attack (Neumann & Rogers, 2007, pp.52-53).

There are numerous other cases in which TJ played a role in leading followers to

violent extremism. For example, some of the individuals allegedly involved in the

plot to blow up several airlines en route on transatlantic flights in August 2006, had

links to TJ (Neumann & Rogers, 2007, pp.53). Other terrorist plots and attacks to

which members of TJ have been connected strengthen the argument that TJ is

‘increasingly active as a recruitment agency for terrorist cadres’ (Alexiev, 2011,

p.86). They include the following: according to Freedman, federal prosecutors in

the US have suggested in October 2002 that TJ was identified as a springboard by

at least one of the defendants of a terrorist group known as the ‘Portland Seven’

(2006, p.48).

This last Jihadist cell was allegedly trying to fight with the Taliban and Al Qaeda

against American forces; it also conspired to bomb a synagogue and was charged

with providing material support to Al Qaeda (Freedman, 2006, p.48). Another

example concerns the so-called ‘Lackawanna Six’ case in September 2002 in which

those involved were coordinating a secret trip by one member to join a terror

training camp in Afghanistan. This group had a clear link to TJ and was using one

of TJ’s training courses in Pakistan as excuse and cover for their activities.

‘American Taliban’ John Walker Lindh was found as traitor for his role in aiding

the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Before joining the Afghan Taliban, he joined a group of Tablighi missionaries on a

proselytizing tour to Pakistan. The Tablighis also helped Lindh to enrol in a

Madrasa so as to handle some of the administrative and logistic hurdles (Freedman,

2006, pp.47-48). Other indicted terrorists include Mohammed Siddique Khan and

Shehzad Tanweer (two of the suicide bombers from the July 7, 2005, London transit

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attacks that killed 52 civilians), the ‘shoe bomber’ Richard Reid, the ‘dirty bomber’

Jose Padilla, and Lyman Harris, who sought to bomb the Brooklyn Bridge. These

were all members of TJ at one time or another (Alexiev, 2011, p.86).

TJ’s name also came up in the July 2007 attempted bombings in London and

Glasgow, Scotland. Furthermore, the fourteen men41 arrested in Barcelona in

January 2008 for allegedly plotting to attack the Barcelona transit system had links

with TJ as well42 (Alexiev, 2011, p.86). The two perpetrators of the San Bernadino

massacre in December 2015 not only pledged loyalty to the IS but had also

worshipped at the local TJ mosque. Furthermore, it is reported that among over 50

Indians who have gone to fight for IS in Iraq and Syria, about a third had links to

TJ (AFPC, 2012, p.7).

5. Concluding remarks: TJ as engine of an Islamist Ecosystem

There have been several instances of violent Islamists who started their path with

TJ. TJ’s activities (particularly at the grassroots level) and the subsequent role it

plays within the Islamist Ecosystem, ensures that Jihadist organisations do not have

to export Jihadism and Islamism from Pakistan and other South Asian countries to

Europe and North America, since the work on the field is already accomplished.

Actually, it can be stated that this Islamist Ecosystem works in two directions. One

direction can be said to evolve from ‘outside’ TJ – through the infiltration of TJ

gatherings and activities followed by manipulation and recruitment of Tablighi.

Another operates from ‘inside’ TJ – by preaching an ultra-conservative

interpretation of Islam -, Tablighi provides not only an intellectual platform but also

a course of action which may result in acts of terrorism.

Both dynamics are mutually reinforcing. The problem of TJ’s ambiguity creates an

enabling environment in which individuals may find jihadism appealing and

ultimately become terrorists (AFPC, 2012, p.7). This ambiguity can also be

described as an attempt to keep a neutral position between different camps. As

Freedman rightly points out, ‘Tablighis do not collaborate with other religious

groups with whom they disagree; neither do they fight them. They do not support

Islam’s jihad obligation neither do they oppose it. They do not support violent

terrorism; neither do they criticize it when it occurs’ (2006, p.32). This ‘neutrality’

41 12 Pakistanis, an Indian and a Bangladeshi. 42 According to Noivo (2010, pp.4-5), at least two persons of this group were members of TJ.

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gives Tablighi flexibility to deny the responsibility regarding terrorist cases

conducted by its (former) members.

Furthermore, it helps to cultivate their image of being apolitical and peaceful,

blurring the line regarding as to which degree TJ supports Jihad and the

implementation of Shari’a law. At the same time, this supports Tablighi efforts to

portray themselves to their host governments as a moderate force able to

counterbalance radicalisation among Muslim communities. This can also lead to

severe consequences, foremost grievances and frustrations among Tablighi.

According to a former Tablighi, these ambiguous positions of TJ ‘can galvanize

identity crises, making individuals more susceptible to extremism and bring them

into contact with more radical actors’ (Mubin Shaikh43 quoted in AFPC, 2012, p.7).

Such an interaction between radicalised elements and an organisation like TJ,

‘which has no political dimension but a sectarian functioning, can be influential in

provoking attitudes and sentiments of frustration in which the more active means

and ideologies of the militants may become of more interest’ (The CEIS and

Change Institute quoted in Ragazzi, 2014, p.13). Such experiences can create a

situation in which TJ might start ‘serving as a front for terrorists and terrorist groups

– either intentionally or unintentionally’ (Freedman, 2006, p.32). Consequently, as

an essential part of the Islamist Ecosystem, TJ functions as an engine that supports

Jihadist aims to ‘produce terrorism’ directly on the soil of target countries. Indeed,

to some experts, the ‘neutrality’ of Tablighi ‘enough to make them culpable’.

It is crucial for the understanding of the TJ as a pillar within the Islamist Ecosystem

to be aware that it does not stay within national parameters, but that it indeed has

an international dimension as well. There are clear indications that Pakistan takes

on a central role in TJ symbiosis with other Jihadist organisations and movements.

As outlined above, the ‘TJ also serves as a de facto conduit for Islamist extremists’

and for groups such as the Taliban, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Al Qaeda, and IS to

recruit new fighters. Significantly, ‘Tablighi recruits do intersect with the world of

militant Jihadism when they travel to Pakistan to receive their initial training’. By

offering Tablighis major facilities for their educational training and preaching tours,

TJ structures provide the key hub for connecting militant Jihadists and Tablighis.

43 Mubin Shaikh is a former Tablighi, who joined a Jihadi group temporarily but later became

engaged in the struggle against violent extremism (AFPC, 2012, p.7).

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In other words, TJ’s facilities in Pakistan offer locations where Jihadist spotters can

look for potential new recruits.

This process can be best summarised in the words of Alexiev, who states: ‘While

there is no concrete evidence of direct recruitment for terrorist purposes by Tablighi

members, there is no doubt that at least some people that first discover radical Islam

through this organisation, eventually gravitate to extremist and terrorist activities.

One way in which this is accomplished is by sending ‘promising recruits’ to the

Tablighi headquarters in Raiwind, Pakistan, for four months of additional religious

training. While there, recruits are approached by Pakistani jihadist organizations

and end up in the terrorist training camps’ (Alexiev, 2011, p.84). According to

Burton and Stewart, ‘this link provides a medium through which Tablighis who are

disgruntled with the group's apolitical program could break orbit and join militant

organizations’.

In sum, the fact that TJ became a focus of the international intelligence community

highlights a growing awareness regarding the need to monitor not only apparent

militant organisations, but also self-described non-violent apolitical religious

movements. Since 9/11 European authorities started to recognise that radical

Islamic groups are finding renewed targets for their anti-West, anti-US, anti-

Semitic, pro-Jihadi rhetoric – which not only challenges European society and legal

order but also serves to transform radicalised Islamists into Jihadists and

international terrorists. TJ exemplifies this symbiotic relation. The Tablighis’

(followers of TJ) rigid understanding of Islam and the movement’s related goals

and activities not only enhance the challenges of indoctrination and counter-

integration but also create a favourable environment for the emergence of Islamist

terrorism.

More concretely, TJ’s ideology stands in clear contrast to the liberal democratic

order (freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung) of Germany as well as the

constitutional principles of other European states. This is relevant because TJ

belongs to those Islamist organisations ‘that endeavour to achieve their anti-

constitutional aims using legal means’ (BMI, 2020b, p.31). The preaching and

teaching by TJ go far beyond the rejection of Western value systems: they makes

Tablighi and their adherents ‘susceptible to Islamist positioning’ (Mukhopadhyay,

2005, p.336) and serves as a gateway for the creation of ‘Jihadist milieus’. As such,

one can state that we are witnessing Tablighi and Jihadists working in tandem

SADF Policy Brief N. 10

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27

within the symbiotic network of an Islamic Ecosystem, enhancing the threat of

international terrorism and Jihadism.

6 Recommendations

1. Due to the secrecy surrounding TJ – the lack of formal membership combined

with a low level of institutionalisation, and the lack of centralized (administrative)

control –, the movement is difficult to monitor. It is reported that European security

agencies are yet to hold the necessary scope of action (authority) to adequately

investigate TJ. Intelligence forces and other law enforcing agencies were not able

to fully articulate the role TJ as an organisation plays in support of Jihadism.

Supervision of TJ (centres and individuals) must be intensified, including financial

transactions. More focus is needed regarding not only suspect surveillance of

(potential) militant Islamists, but also of individuals who are promoting

radicalisation. The case of TJ clearly demonstrates that Islamist indoctrination often

leads to acts of terrorism. It also appears that during the last 15 years, reports by

European intelligence agencies either were not fully considered by much of the

political leadership, or were otherwise not translated in concrete policies.

2. We must send a strong and consistent message that the propagation of an

ideology based on the supremacy of one religion, gender inequality, anti-Semitism,

and other forms of religious intolerance (which pave the way for radicalisation and

the eulogy of violence) will not be tolerated in liberal democracies. This also

includes a ‘zero tolerance’ policy towards the promotion of rigid faith practices

which undermine the integration of societies and lead to an alienation from

democratic norms and values.

3. Due to its large size, it is apparent that not all Tablighi are (potential) terrorists,

and that TJ is not per se a Jihadist group. Nevertheless, we need to change the notion

among (several) political decision makers and experts to deny a-priori links

between TJ and the Global Jihad. It is often seen as extremely effective to

differentiate among Islamist groups based on their attitudes towards violence (and

politics). However, the case of TJ shows the distinction between militant from non-

militant organisations is of limited use. Both usually have the same overall goals:

making ultra-orthodox Islam universal, implementing Shari’a law and establishing

a (worldwide) caliphate. In this sense, the decision regarding whether to use

violence only marks tactical differences between TJ and militant Jihadist groups.

SADF Policy Brief N. 10

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28

The result is the same: the unfolding of a ‘war of ideas’ against the notion of a

society based on liberal democratic norms and value systems.

4. European governments need to understand the movement’s global network,

particularly the dynamics by Tablighi within the Islamist Ecosystem. It is apparent

that TJ activities, foremost recruitment and mobilisation processes, fundraising, and

training are being exploited by global Jihadists – with or without the consent of TJ

leadership. Regardless, preaching an ultra-conservative interpretation of Islam

always creates an enabling environment for the support of international terrorism.

More specifically, TJ teachings promote the legitimacy of (militant) Jihad and do

not leave room for a liberal, moderate interpretation of Islam. As such, the notion

that TJ is ‘helpful in facilitating grassroots counter-radicalisation programmes by

providing the necessary religious arguments’ (Neumann & Rogers, 2007, p.94)

against global Jihadism must be severely questioned.

SADF Policy Brief N. 10

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