BOOK RWKM The Sovietization of Poland 1944 - 1962 POLAND I g&- 1962 (THE SOVIETIZATION OF A

CAPTIVE PEOPLE) by Richard F. Staar (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1962, 300 pp.). Price: $7.50. This, the first comprehensive and definitive political

science study of the Sovietization of post-war Poland, has 16 chapters grouped into four parts: (I) Poland’s governmental dynamics, which includes an analysis of “people’s democracy,” the legislative and the adminis- trative foundations of the state. A description not on13 of the electoral procedure but of the elections them- selves, beginning with the crucial one of 1947: Lvhen the only genuine opposition party, the Peasant Party, \vas eliminated through rigged elections and its leader, Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, was forced into exile; (2) Com- munist policies-the changing platform of the Commu- nists in response to strong popular opposition, Commu- nist manipulation of domestic policies. foreign and de- fense policies; (3) The ruling party-that is, the United Workers Party, its composition and leadership, its oper- ational procedures; (4) Political auxiliaries and pres- sure groups-composition of the two quasipolitical or- ganizations which are subsidiaries of the United Work- ers Party, yet pretend to be independent; the status of the Roman Catholic Church and the anti-church move- ments sponsored and fostered by the Communists.

It is clear from this objective and meticulously docu- mented study that to this day the vast majority of the Polish people are anti-Communist. This is due to a number of historic reasons. For one thing, 96% of the people are Catholic. The transformation of Poland into a highly industrial state, one of the main domestic goals of the regime, has led to such ruthless exploitation of the workers and such a low standard of living that the proletarians in whose name they rule have become in- creasingly hostile to the Communists. The drive to make Poland like the Soviet Union has failed in agri- culture, since the Polish peasantry has successfully re- fused to carry out the collectivization program. The nationalization of trade and industry, unlike agricul- ture, has been fairly thorough, since out of a labor force of 71/z million, about 1.7 percent or only 133,733 per- sons are engaged in private enterprises. Yet in spite of this-and here again popular resistance manifests itself -the Communists must cope with the serious problem of illegal commercial transactions, which account for about 15% of all domestic trade.

Poland has not yet quite reached Soviet-style “social- ism,” for it is still a “people’s democracy.” It is now in the third stage of its development as such. During the initial phase the Communists sought to eliminate the strong national feelings of the Poles. During the second phase Poland followed more or less in the foot- steps of the Soviet experience of the twenties. This phase shouId have been completed by 1955, but it was not; it led to the 1956 revolt of the Poznan workers and to the return of Gomulka to power. The present phase of development, which began in October 1956, has finally managed to integrate the Polish economy with that of the Soviet orbit.

Poland has no independence in foreign affairs. In

foreign trade it is controlled by the Soviet-sponsored C.E.M.A. (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance j, and on the military side by a system of alliances and treaties and the Warsaw Pact of 1955. A Soviet officer continues to fill the key position of Chief-of-Staff and the entire Polish military establishment is closely co- ordinated with Soviet plans through the Warsaw Pack.

Yet as of 1962 it was still a question whether Polish troops had been sufficiently indoctrinated to fight loy- ally on the side of the Soviet Union in case of war with the West. Even the Polish Communists would not seem capable of guaranteeing this.

Opposition to Communism in Poland is so strong that even the rapid growth of the Polish United Workers (Communist) Party, has been a source of one of its principal weaknesses. Between 1 g4g and June 1962 over half a million members were purged because they were considered unreliable. The officials are primarily intellectuals or industrial workers no longer engaged in production; hence, their influence on the workers in the mines and factories in minimal by reason of what is known as “bureaucratic formalism,” since they are neither practically minded nor very influential with the rank and file.

Polish internal official propaganda tries to misrepre- sent the American attitude toward Poland and falsely accuses the United States of being aggressive. It tries to identify American attitudes with alleged German revanchism and revisionism, meaning revision of the Oder-Neisse line. Polish governments since 19~ have taken strong pro-Soviet and anti-Western positions. With the change of Communist leadership late in 1956 the Polish official attitude toward Washington has soft- ened somewhat. A cultural agreement was negotiated in 1958. Beginning with 1957 the United States sub- sidized the Communist regime with loans totaling al- most $487 million. In June 1961 the United States government turned down a request for a three-year commitment for larger amounts of grain.

It is noteworthy that as U.S. aid to Poland was ex- tended, Soviet aid was withdrawn or diminished. While accepting money from the United States, Poland has served Soviet interests in extending an 8-year credit of 30 million rubles to Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia, India, Argentina and Brazil and committed itself to an exten- sive and costly economic aid program in Cuba. United States policy of assistance to the Warsaw regime “has not led to a more liberal evolution of Poland,” which might have been expected up to 1956, according to former Ambassador Jacob Beam.

These are but a few highlights of this excellent book which contains an extensive bibliography as well as tables, charts and maps. No country was more con- stantly anti-Communist by historic tradition, by reli- gious faith and by political conviction than PoIand. Yet its Sovietization is an accomplished fact. And in the face of Soviet military domination, its liberation is not likely to be achieved without substantial aid from the Free World; indeed, perhaps not without a funda- mental change in the objectives and power structure centered in Moscow.-C.M.

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