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'A very salutary effect': The Counter-Terror Strategy in the Early MalayanEmergency, June 1948 to December 1949Huw Bennett a

a Defence Studies Department, King's College London, UK

Online Publication Date: 01 June 2009

To cite this Article Bennett, Huw(2009)''A very salutary effect': The Counter-Terror Strategy in the Early Malayan Emergency, June1948 to December 1949',Journal of Strategic Studies,32:3,415 — 444

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‘A very salutary effect’: TheCounter-Terror Strategy in the

Early Malayan Emergency, June1948 to December 1949

HUW BENNETT

Defence Studies Department, King’s College London, UK

ABSTRACT The counter-insurgency lessons commonly drawn from the MalayanEmergency ignore strategy in the opening phase or dismiss it as characterised bymistakes committed in a policy vacuum. This article argues that the British armypursued a deliberately formulated counter-terror strategy until circa December1949, aiming to intimidate the civilian Chinese community into supporting thegovernment. Mass arrests, property destruction, and forced population move-ment, combined with loose controls on lethal force, created a coercive effect. Theconsequences of these policies were mounting civilian casualties, which thegovernment allowed to continue because its intelligence assessments suggestedthey were militarily effective.

KEY WORDS: Counter-insurgency, Malaya, Brutality

Drawing lessons from the Malayan Emergency is a familiar practice incounter-insurgency studies. Admiration for ‘minimum force’ and‘winning hearts and minds’ redounds, while failings by the securityforces are often marginalised and ascribed to ineptitude.1 Politicalscientists have bolstered the campaign’s didactic position inshowing how the discriminate use of force causes strategic success.2

1Examples include: David Ucko, ‘Countering Insurgents through Distributed Opera-tions: Insights from Malaya 1948–1960’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 30/1 (Feb.2007), 47–72; John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: CounterinsurgencyLessons from Malaya and Vietnam (London: Univ. of Chicago Press 2005).2Ivan Arreguın-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict(Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2005), 202; Alexander Downes, ‘Draining the Sea byFilling the Graves: Investigating the Effectiveness of Indiscriminate Violence as aCounterinsurgency Strategy’, Civil Wars 9/4 (Dec. 2007), 440.

The Journal of Strategic StudiesVol. 32, No. 3, 415–444, June 2009

ISSN 0140-2390 Print/ISSN 1743-937X Online/09/030415-30 � 2009 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/01402390902928248

Downloaded By: [King's College London] At: 16:25 30 June 2009

These studies draw on an established sub-genre in the field whichconstructs ideal-type models for winning based on the juxtaposition ofsupposedly inherent American incompetence in counter-insurgencywith an equally assumed British superiority.3 Yet there is a discrepancyhere with the historiography on the Emergency, which acknowledgesthe practice of a ‘counter-terror’ by the government.4 This articleargues that social scientific studies on the targeting of civilians, andcounter-insurgency, should take into account historical interpretationsof the campaign’s opening phase.

Expecting to eradicate brutality from any war is unduly hopeful; butthis does not preclude exploring the dialectic relationship betweenrestraint and excess.5 There are many ways to investigate non-combatant suffering. Scholars have explored the subject from theperspectives of ethics, international law, social psychology, organisa-tional culture, and policy.6 To a large extent, the perspective adopteddepends upon the source material available. The release of new archivalevidence on the opening phase in Malaya allows a re-appraisal of thenexus between intelligence and strategy in government efforts to defeatthe rebellion. Official management of historical records, and thelimitations imposed by largely relying on one category of source, meansuch an approach can never pretend to be the final word on thesubject.7 Hopefully, future studies ‘from below’, and from ‘the otherside of the hill’ will qualify the arguments presented here.8

This article explains the treatment of Chinese squatters (about500,000 people, or a quarter of the Chinese population of Malaya)

3The tradition runs from Robert Thompson to Thomas Mockaitis to John Nagl. For acritique, see: Richard Popplewell, ‘‘‘Lacking Intelligence’’: Some Reflections on RecentApproaches to British Counter-insurgency, 1900–1960’, Intelligence and NationalSecurity 10/2 (Summer 1995), 336–52.4Karl Hack, ‘‘‘Iron Claws on Malaya’’: The Historiography of the MalayanEmergency’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 30/1 (1999), 99–125.5Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge UP2006), 6–7.6A helpful overview is contained in: Kalyvas, Logic of Violence, 52–86.7Richard J. Aldrich, ‘‘‘Grow Your Own’’: Cold War Intelligence and HistorySupermarkets’, Intelligence and National Security 17/1 (Spring 2002), 135; RichardAldrich, ‘Policing the Past: Official History, Secrecy and British Intelligence since1945’, English Historical Review CXIX/483 (2004), 929.8Manuel Bollag, ‘‘‘For What and For Whom?’’ British and French Servicemen duringthe Wars of Decolonisation in Malaya and Indochina, 1945–1960’. PhD thesis (inprogress), King’s College London; Martin Thomas, ‘Insurgent Intelligence: InformationGathering and Anti-Colonial Rebellion’, Intelligence and National Security 22/1(2007), 155–63; C.C. Chin and Karl Hack, Dialogues with Chin Peng: New Light onthe Malayan Communist Party (Singapore: Singapore UP 2004).

416 Huw Bennett


living in the jungle fringe during the opening phase of the Emergencyfrom the perspective of government counter-insurgency strategy. Beforeoutlining the arguments put forward, it is helpful to briefly explain theopening phase’s place within the context of the entire Emergency. Thecampaign broadly evolved in three phases.

In the first phase, from the Emergency’s declaration in June 1948 upto around December 1949, the security forces deliberately aimed tocoerce the population into supporting the government with massarrests, property destruction, and forced population movements,including deportation. At the same time, lethal force was controlledin a loose manner. A transition then occurred, up until around March1950, as a strategic re-evaluation decided military measures alonewould fail, while increasing discrimination in the use of force andpopulation control would succeed.

In the second phase, the Briggs Plan started to place the Chinesecommunity under tighter administrative control and protection fromthe insurgents. This involved mass resettlement and the use of collectivepunishments which were, however, increasingly accurately applied andless severe.

In the third phase, from December 1952 to the end in 1960, so-calledhearts and minds measures, comprising improved social provision andintensified propaganda, were applied to the population. The insurgentswere effectively isolated from the population and gradually reduced innumber by offensive action.9

This article presents new evidence on Phase One, developing theargument in four parts.10

The first section summarises existing accounts in the historiographyon the Malayan Emergency, arguing they tend to downplay thestrategic dimension of the counter-terror.

Section two examines how a dual intelligence failure influenced thedecision to adopt a policy aimed at intimidating the whole Chinesepopulation in Malaya into submission. Existing studies rightlyemphasise the organisational problems faced by the intelligenceapparatus in 1948–49. Compounding this mechanical flaw, thecognitive appreciations about what threat the government faced, howthe Chinese would react to pressure, and self-assurance about policystrengths served to promote and perpetuate the coercive approach.

The third section assesses strategy formulation, finding that thegovernment adopted a distinctive plan from the Emergency’s start. With

9See Hack, ‘Iron Claws on Malaya’, for the periodisation.10Colonial Office law and order files for 1948–49 were believed destroyed untilrecently. A.J. Stockwell, ‘Chin Peng and the Struggle for Malaya’, Journal of the RoyalAsiatic Society 16/3 (2006), 290.

The Counter-Terror Strategy in the Early Malayan Emergency 417


little usable intelligence, the government reverted to the default strategyfor quashing rebellion in British colonial history – inflicting collectivepunishments and hoping the population would squeeze out the insurgentsthemselves. Thus discriminating between civilians and combatantsassumed a low priority, as reflected in the highly permissive EmergencyRegulations put in place, which effectively legalised extant practice. Thedecision to exempt the security forces from criminal investigation andprosecution brings into question the widely held view that British counter-insurgency operated within meaningful legal constraints.

The fourth section analyses how the security forces translatedsometimes ambiguous strategic guidance into actual tactical practice.The official guidelines on shooting those ‘attempting escape’, namelythose whose identity as either civilian or combatant was unclear, werevague. New evidence suggests Batang Kali was not unique, yet thegovernment failed to clarify the rules or investigate thoroughly. On theother hand, quite a large number of those attempting escape werecaptured instead of shot dead. The variation seen here is explained withreference to the ambiguity in the guidance given and the absence ofclarificatory disciplinary proceedings. However, mass arrests andforced population movements were quickly articulated as specificofficial tactics. Evidence is presented to add to our understanding ofhow these practices evolved in the opening phase. Therefore, the articleconcludes by positing that besides the usual exploitation of Malaya forlessons on how to win in counter-insurgency, it also offers importantinsights into ‘how not to do it’.11

The Historiography of the Malayan Emergency

The historiography of the Malayan Emergency coalesces around therecognition that in 1948 and 1949 the counter-insurgency approachconsisted of a ‘counter-terror’.12 In order to adjudge the new archivalevidence’s significance, it is necessary to outline existing interpretationsabout what happened in the opening phase and why.13 The majority ofstudies follow Anthony Short’s lead, partly due to his access to officialpapers. Men who ran from the security forces and failed to stopwere regularly shot, without incriminating evidence ever being found.14

11Michael Howard, ‘Military History and the History of War’, in Williamson Murrayand Richard Sinnreich (eds.), The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to theMilitary Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2006), 13.12Hack, ‘Iron Claws on Malaya’, 102.13Stockwell, ‘Chin Peng’, 291.14Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948–1960 (London:Frederick Muller 1975), 161.

418 Huw Bennett


The most infamous incident of this kind happened in Batang Kali,Selangor, in December 1948, when a patrol from 2nd Battalion TheScots Guards shot dead 24 suspects, who apparently tried to escape.15

Short is not alone in viewing the case as unexceptional.16 However, hecarefully qualifies this observation with three assertions. First, thepolice and Army were trying to operate within the law. Second, ‘peoplewere not shot out of hand as a matter of policy’ and third, suchinstances were ‘the exception’.17 It is logically incoherent to hold that aphenomenon is simultaneously commonplace and a rarity. Short alsocelebrates the absence of more killings, and is self-exculpatory incriticising the American military in Vietnam.18 These techniques fordownplaying British shootings have influenced some other writers. Forexample, Ramakrishna describes Batang Kali as an ‘indiscretion’, and a‘misdemeanour’.19 There is greater clarity where less controversial actsare concerned. A consensus exists on the normality of mass arrests,deportations, and the burning of villages as a central part of thegovernment’s opening phase counter-terror.20

In explaining the counter-terror, the historiography proposes fourinterwoven factors.

15It is difficult to find an account omitting Batang Kali. Some examples: RichardStubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948–1960(Singapore: Oxford UP 1989), 73; Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper, Forgotten Wars:The End of Britain’s Asian Empire (London: Allen Lane 2007), 449–53; KumarRamakrishna, Emergency Propaganda: The Winning of Malayan Hearts and Minds,1948–1958 (Richmond-upon-Thames, UK: Curzon 2002), 63.16For example, Bayly and Harper, Forgotten Wars, 455.17Short, Communist Insurrection, 160. The emphasis on legality is also evident in KeithJeffery, ‘Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency Operations: Some Reflections on theBritish Experience’, Intelligence and National Security 2/1 (Spring 1987), 119.18Short, Communist Insurrection, 160.19Kumar Ramakrishna, ‘‘‘Bribing the Reds to Give Up’’: Rewards Policy in theMalayan Emergency’, War in History 9/3 (2002), 336; Kumar Ramakrishna,‘Transmogrifying Malaya: The Impact of Sir Gerald Templer, 1952–54’, Journal ofSoutheast Asian Studies 32/1 (2001), 82.20Karl Hack, ‘Screwing down the people: the Malayan emergency, decolonisation andethnicity’, in Hans Antlov and Stein Tonnesson (eds.), Imperial Policy and SoutheastAsian Nationalism (London: Curzon 1995), 87; Hack, ‘Iron Claws on Malaya’, 102;Karl Hack, ‘British Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency in the Era of Decolonisation.The Example of Malaya’, Intelligence and National Security 14/2 (Summer 1999), 126;Stockwell, ‘Chin Peng’, 290; Ramakrishna, ‘Transmogrifying Malaya’, 82; RichardStubbs, ‘From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds: The Evolution of BritishStrategy in Malaya 1948–60’, in Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (eds.),Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare (Oxford: Osprey 2008), 116; Short, Commu-nist Insurrection, 162.



First, the government came under pressure from a fearful Europeansettler community to act against an insurgency that killed civilians anddamaged property.21 In their desire to eradicate the communists rapidly,the security forces retaliated. When the insurgents had launchedparticularly injurious attacks, the security forces vented their frustra-tions on those nearby, with little concern for culpability.22 The tendencyto punish civilians for the insurgency was influenced by beliefs about theChinese community. Because they only understood force, using themilitary instrument against them made sense.23 General Sir NeilRitchie, commanding Far Eastern Land Forces, in September 1948ordered units in Malaya to maintain a constant offensive.24 On theground this meant large-scale sweep operations; on occasion, fleeingcivilians were shot.25

Thus the second explanation, articulated by Ramakrishna, is thatmassacres such as Batang Kali resulted from a ‘bashing the Chinesementality’.26

Third, most accounts propose the inevitability of such an approachgiven the lack of alternatives. Discrimination would require eitherdoing very little (difficult considering the demands for action), or asophisticated intelligence system. In June 1948, the intelligenceapparatus was in a woeful condition. The system had little contactwith the community and could not generate the information needed forselective military operations.27 The government failed to understandthe effects of its counter-terror campaign on the population.28

Finally, the historiography stresses the deleterious effects of ‘vague’planning, ‘disorganisation’ and poor leadership.29 By early July 1948,with the High Commissioner killed in an air crash, the acting OfficerAdministering the Government was assisted by an acting Chief Secretary,an acting Attorney-General, an acting Finance Secretary, and an actingCommissioner of Police. The General Officer Commanding Malaya,

21A.J. Stockwell, ‘‘‘A widespread and long-concocted plot to overthrow government inMalaya’’? The Origins of the Malayan Emergency’, Journal of Imperial andCommonwealth History 21/3 (1993), 85.22Stubbs, ‘Search and Destroy’, 115–16.23Hack, ‘British Intelligence’, 125; Ramakrishna, ‘Bribing the Reds’, 335.24John Coates, Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948–1954 (Oxford: Westview Press 1992), 149.25Stubbs, ‘Search and Destroy’, 115.26Ramakrishna, ‘Bribing the Reds’, 336; Ramakrishna, ‘Transmogrifying Malaya’, 82.27Hack, ‘Screwing down the people’, 87; Hack, ‘British Intelligence’, 127–8; Coates,Suppressing Insurgency, 34.28Stubbs, ‘Search and Destroy’, 116.29Short, Communist Insurrection, 136; Hack, ‘Screwing down the people’, 87; Coates,Suppressing Insurgency, 38–9.

420 Huw Bennett


Major-General Sir Charles Boucher, had only been in post for a fewweeks.30 These circumstances lead to the assessment that the Britishlacked a firm strategy, and relied upon ‘poorly directed counter-terror andcoercion’.31

In this policy vacuum, ‘undisciplined’ units sometimes killed civilians ordestroyed theirproperty.Shortmentionscaseswherecoronersandanarmyboard of inquiry whitewashed allegations of illegal killings and propertydestruction.32 His book suggests a general sense of impunity in the openingphase, though the connection to policy-making is eschewed. While Shortreadily concedes the mistakes in policy circles, there is a contradictionbetween asserting the leadership’s desire to punish the whole Chinesepopulation, and that the logical consequence of such a goal, shootings andproperty destruction, were the acts of undisciplined units on a small scale.Part of the problem is Short’s expectation of evidence for formalauthorisation, which in reality no sensible politician would create.33

What is required therefore, is an explanation that lies somewherebetween the polar opposites of policy-dictated killing, and sporadicbreakdowns in discipline. The remainder of the article will develop atentative alternative interpretation, suggesting that policy-makers,though constrained by certain structural considerations, allowed astate of ambiguity to develop with regards to the treatment of civilians.More importantly, this ambiguity was tolerated even when theconsequences became clear.

Early Policy Formulation in Malaya: Intelligence

Writings on the intelligence situation during this period uniformlyportray the collection and assessment apparatus as deficient. In short,an insufficient number of agents and analysts were employed, and theywere poorly organised. The focus is normally on the failings of theMalayan Security Service and the police, arguing more operatives andbetter coordination eventually brought success.34 There is merit in thisinterpretation, and evidence for structural weakness in politicalintelligence persistently arising during Britain’s decolonisation wars.35

30Short, Communist Insurrection, 120.31Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 146; Hack, ‘Iron Claws on Malaya’, 123.32Hack, ‘Screwing down the people’, 87; Short, Communist Insurrection, 161–6.33Short, Communist Insurrection, 162.34Hack, ‘British Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency’, 127–8; Riley Sunderland,Antiguerrilla Intelligence in Malaya, 1948–1960 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1964),3–10.35Georgina Sinclair, At the End of the Line: Colonial Policing and the ImperialEndgame 1945–80 (Manchester: Manchester UP 2006), 189.



However, it is illusory to believe that intelligence failures are avoidableby managerial reform, for mostly they derive from political andpsychological sources. As Richard Betts argues: ‘Policy premisesconstrict perception, and administrative workloads constrain reflec-tion.’36 This section thus moves the debate forward by summarising thestructural explanation for intelligence failure, and builds upon it bysuggesting an exacerbating failure in perception. Together, these factorsdiminished the likelihood of discriminate force being used, insteadrendering a punishment strategy more attractive, as discussed in thenext section.

The Malayan Security Service (MSS) was roundly condemned forfailing to predict the insurgency.37 Its director, John Dalley,complained the Chinese ‘did not readily give information, andgetting it from them was inevitably a slow and tortuous process’.38

These shortcomings were partly due to the organisation functioningat half strength. The MSS was disbanded in August 1948, andSpecial Branch assumed its functions.39 During the opening phase,the whole of government suffered from a shortage of Chinese-speaking personnel.40 Only 12 British police officers could speak aChinese dialect, and a mere 228 Chinese served in the approximately9,000-strong police.41 There were problems in interrogating cap-tured insurgents and translating documents.42 Six months after theproblem was first recognised, there were still too few interpreters.43

While the Special Branch produced intelligence for arrests ratherthan for military operations, military intelligence itself was little

36Richard K. Betts, ‘Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures areInevitable’, World Politics 31/1 (1978), 61.37Bayly and Harper, Forgotten Wars, 429; Hack, ‘British Intelligence’, 127.38[Kew, United Kingdom, The National Archives] CO [Colonial Office papers] 537/3692: Comment by Dalley, 5th meeting of the British Defence CoordinationCommittee (Far East) [BDCC(FE)], 24 June 1948.39Leon Comber, ‘The Malayan Security Service (1945–1948)’, Intelligence andNational Security 18/3 (Autumn 2003), 128, 135.40Brian Stewart, ‘Winning in Malaya: An Intelligence Success Story’, Intelligence andNational Security 14/4 (Winter 1999), 270.41Comber, ‘Malayan Security Service’, 136; Sunderland, Antiguerrilla Intelligence inMalaya, 4.42CO 537/3692: Minutes of the 9th meeting of the BDCC(FE), 23 July 1948; CO717/171/3: Combined Intelligence Staff Summary [CISS] 5, week ending 12 Aug.1948.43CO 537/4746: Minutes of the 11th Commissioner-General’s conference, 21 Jan.1949.

422 Huw Bennett


better prepared.44 This arose partly from the small size ofintelligence staffs.45

Despite these structural problems the government managed toproduce intelligence assessments throughout the opening phase. Whenconsidering how to use armed forces, decision-makers require continualanalysis of tactical effectiveness in order to adapt strategy to changingconditions. Intelligence officials connected to operational agencies(primarily the military) tend to justify their organisation’s performanceby producing optimistic reports. Conversely, analysts in non-opera-tional units (to an extent the MSS and then Special Branch) tend toproduce pessimistic assessments.46 The British understanding ofChinese society in Malaya affected intelligence assessments and policyformation.47 Stereotypes of the Chinese character as being subject to a‘secret society complex’, and ‘hysteria’ influenced policy. Because theChinese were considered prone to intimidation, it made sense to instillfear of the government to ensure good behaviour.48 Some analysesexpressed hostility, with an intelligence report from July 1948concluding: ‘It is difficult not to feel some contempt for people whocan be so terrorised that they dare not even to defend themselves.’49

There was little sympathy for civilians who paid money to thecommunists, even those subjected to death threats. A report inDecember 1948 concluded that: ‘the motive for paying these sums ofmoney is not political, revolutionary, or even sympathy for the bandits,but cowardice’.50 The Colonial Office noted how for some oftheir counterparts in Malaya, ‘a sympathetic approach to theadministration of the Chinese does not come naturally’.51

44Karl Hack, ‘Corpses, Prisoners of War and Captured Documents: British andCommunist Narratives of the Malayan Emergency, and the Dynamics of IntelligenceTransformation’, Intelligence and National Security 14/4 (Winter 1999), 215; DanielMarston, ‘Lost and found in the jungle: the Indian and British Army jungle warfaredoctrines for Burma, 1943–45, and the Malayan Emergency, 1948–60’, in HewStrachan (ed.), Big Wars and Small Wars: The British Army and the Lessons of War inthe Twentieth Century (London: Routledge 2006), 84.45Sunderland, Antiguerrilla Intelligence in Malaya, 13; Short, CommunistInsurrection, 78.46Betts, ‘Analysis, War, and Decision’, 64.47Bayly and Harper, Forgotten Wars, 443.48T.N. Harper, The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya (Cambridge: CambridgeUP 1999), 151; Ramakrishna, ‘Bribing the Reds’, 336.49CO 717/171/3: CISS 3, week ending 29 July 1948.50CO 717/171/3: Federation of Malaya Police Summary [FMPS] 22, week ending 9Dec. 1948.51CO 537/4752: Letter from Creech Jones (Colonial Office) to Gurney (Malaya), 5Dec. 1949.



The MSS has been criticised for undue optimism about the prospects fora quick victory.52 However, the Army also underestimated the insurgents’abilities and exaggerated its own effectiveness. For example, in July 1948Far East Land Forces (FARELF) was pleased with the course of events:

It seems that the confidence of the civil population in theAuthorities is being restored and consequently more and betterinformation is coming in. As a result of this and as they gainmomentum, military operations in support of the Civil Powerhave in most cases achieved good results.53

The volume and accuracy of intelligence seemed to be improving andenabling effective offensive operations.54 The Combined IntelligenceStaff reported that after large-scale sweeps, even when the enemyavoided contact, insurgent attacks in the area ‘invariably’ decreased forat least two weeks. Reflecting the military mindset at the time, thereport went on to state that defensive action would not have achievedsuch results.55 Thus the sweeps often criticised in hindsight wereconsidered effective at the time. On this basis, General Ritchie thoughtthe insurgents would be pushed out of the settled areas and into thejungles by the end of 1948.56 The police shared his opinion, judging thecommunists would be suffering casualties and ammunition shortages.57

Additionally, the Army assessed its offensive as having seriouslydisrupted the MNLA’s mobilization of reinforcements.58 In Septemberthe first note of caution crept in, as FARELF stated: ‘It is becomingnoticeable that during periods of Military activity the flow ofinformation improves and Gangster acts decrease, but that afterMilitary Operations are completed the reverse process occurs.’59

The next week’s report returned to reassurances about the military’ssuccess in averting the expected communist offensive.60 However, thecautious tone re-emerged, remaining throughout the opening phase asreports alternately manifested optimism and pessimism. In earlyOctober, the police noted the bandits’ capability to launch attacks 30

52CO 537/5068: Memo on organisational lessons of the Emergency, circa July 1949;Stewart, ‘Winning in Malaya’, 268.53CO 717/170/1: FARELF situation report [sitrep] 2, week of 12–19 July 1948.54CO 717/170/1: FARELF sitrep 4, 28 July–10 Aug. 1948.55CO 717/171/3: CISS 4, week ending 5 Aug. 1948.56CO 537/3692: Minutes of the 10th meeting of the BDCC(FE), 6 Aug. 1948.57CO 717/171/3: FMPS 8, week ending 2 Sept. 1948.58WO 208/4838: Telegram FARELF to War Office, 4 Sept. 1948.59CO 717/170/1: FARELF sitrep 10, 13–19 Sept. 1948.60CO 717/170/1: FARELF sitrep 11, 19–25 Sept. 1948.

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or more strong, despite security force offensives in these same areas.61

Nine days later, FARELF sustained its optimistic interpretation,applauding ‘steady progress’ in preventing the communists frommounting large-scale attacks.62 The police and military held differingdefinitions of what constituted a large-scale attack, and thus measuredtheir own effectiveness by distinct yardsticks.

This bifurcation is clearly seen by comparing two other interpretationsfrom October 1948. Having analysed insurgent activity over threemonths, the police observed a ‘steadily mounting enemy offensive’,unimpeded by the security forces.63 By contrast, FARELF acknowledgedthe lack of a ‘spectacular military success as yet’, but thought its opera-tions were effective at breaking the MNLA down into smaller groups.Meanwhile, popular confidence in the government grew, with an increasein intelligence inflows.64 Police scepticism about large sweep operationsmelted away in late October, when Operation ‘Kukri’, in Johore andPerak states, deprived the insurgents of their camps, improved civilianmorale and increased the intelligence flow.65 Yet the willingness to faceunpalatable facts returned within days, in recognising the overall failureto inhibit insurgent attacks on a national level.66 Meanwhile, a weeklater, and seemingly reporting on a separate country, the military marked‘their most successful week since the beginning of the campaign’.67

These divergent perspectives partly resulted from military statisticscentering upon casualty numbers, whereas police reports analysedincidents launched by the MNLA. However, it might be postulated thatmilitary optimism rested on an underestimation of the enemy and theconviction that large-scale offensives would work. Soldiers andpolicemen alike shared the belief in the efficacy of isolating the insur-gents by pressurising the population. The belief relied upon intelligenceassessments ascribing power to the populace rather than the insurgents:‘if stern action by the security forces is taken against a particularsquatter area and the squatters feel that this is due to recent incidentsprovoked by bandits in their area, then they can demand that thebandits cease activity for a certain period.’68

The connection appeared vindicated during January 1949, when thedecrease in insurgent attacks was attributed to the ‘intensification of

61CO 717/171/3: FMPS 13, week ending 7 Oct. 1948.62CO 717/170/1: FARELF sitrep 14, 10–16 Oct. 1948.63CO 717/171/3: FMPS 14, week ending 14 Oct. 1948.64CO 717/170/1: FARELF sitrep 16, 24–30 Oct. 1948.65CO 717/171/3: FMPS 16, week ending 28 Oct. 1948.66CO 717/171/3: FMPS 17, week ending 4 Nov. 1948.67CO 717/170/1: FARELF sitrep 18, 5–11 Nov. 1948.68CO 717/171/3: FMPS 24, week ending 23 Dec. 1948.



operations’.69 The security forces were gradually instilling confidence inthe populace, leading to increased intelligence and thus more arrests of‘known or suspected bandits’.70 Later in the month the police againadopted a circumspect attitude, warning that insurgent attackshappened in the Batu Arang area despite thorough screening opera-tions.71 From FARELF’s perspective, the broad success of theircountermeasures was undermined in the public’s opinion bythe incessant continuation of ‘small jitter raids’.72 A year into theMNLA’s campaign, the Federation’s police summary lamentedthat the communists still held the initiative.73 Yet this fact seemed tobe lost amid the plethora of reports confirming how ‘action in the squatterareas’ had a ‘salutary effect’; namely that ‘bandit activity has practicallyceased and . . . better tactical information has been forthcoming’.74

On the one hand there was a clear awareness at the highest level ofthe need for intelligence reform, right from the Emergency’s start inJune 1948.75 Malcolm MacDonald, the Commissioner-General forSouth-East Asia, expressed his frustration with the slowness of changein January 1949, and it has been argued that the system still did notfunction properly a year later.76 The important point regarding thecounter-terror seen in the opening phase is that voices sceptical aboutits effectiveness were dominated by those which interpreted it assuccessful. In other words, the counter-terror persisted because apowerful voice – the FARELF intelligence analysis, and at times thepolice too – thought it worked. Confronted with contradictoryevidence, policy-makers in Malaya fell back upon wishful thinkingand old colonial habits of thought. As Betts puts it: ‘The greater theambiguity, the greater the impact of preconceptions.’77

Early Policy Formulation in Malaya: Strategy

Structural and interpretive weaknesses in the intelligence systemcreated the context in which government formulated a strategy based

69CO 717/171/4: FMPS 26, week ending 6 Jan. 1949.70CO 717/170/2: FARELF sitrep 29, 21–28 Jan. 1949.71CO 717/171/4: FMPS 29, week ending 27 Jan. 1949.72CO 717/170/2: FARELF sitrep 30, 28 Jan.–3 Feb. 1949.73CO 717/171/4: FMPS 57, week ending 11 Aug. 1949.74CO 717/171/4: FMPS 44, week ending 12 May 1949; CO 717/170/2: FARELF sitrep48, 3–9 June 1949; CO 717/170/2: FARELF sitrep 63, 24–30 Sept. 1949.75CO 537/3692: Telegram from Malcolm MacDonald to Secretary of State for theColonies, 26 June 1948.76CO 537/5068: Minutes of the 9th Commissioner-General’s conference, 22–23 Jan.1949; Hack, ‘Corpses, Prisoners of War and Captured Documents’, 215.77Betts, ‘Analysis, War, and Decision’, 70.

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on the intention to coerce the Chinese squatter population. This sectionanalyses the evolution of the early counter-insurgency strategy, and thenext section examines some of the consequences. The historiography onMalaya sometimes blames events in the opening phase on vague, ornon-existent planning. General Boucher is criticised for failing todevelop an appropriate strategy.78 Another claim suggests the militarywere flailing around without direction until Henry Gurney was swornin as High Commissioner on 6 October 1948.79

The argument here builds on an alternative view, positing early-phaserepressive strategy as a general attribute of British counter-insurgency.The impetus to punish a recalcitrant population harshly, quicklynipping trouble in the bud, drew on a tradition in British colonialhistory, and was perpetuated via key personnel transfers from campaignto campaign.80 The strategic intention to punish the populationnonetheless left ambiguity in how to use lethal force at the tacticallevel. There were two possible methods for clarifying the situation andensuring the discriminate application of violence. First, codifying preciserules through the Emergency Regulations; and second, creating a formof military case law through disciplinary proceedings which constitutedpractical examples of what was acceptable. The government in Malayadiscarded these restraint mechanisms by enacting highly permissiveregulations, and exempting the security forces from prosecution.

The British Defence Coordination Committee (BDCC) (Far East),and the Federation of Malaya Local Defence Committee, created astrategic plan prior to Gurney’s arrival. These early plans werecoordinated to a large degree by Malcolm MacDonald, as regionalCommissioner-General. Discussing the Emergency with MacDonald,regional governors and their advisers concurred on the desirability ofdealing with the communists ‘speedily and completely’.81 As GeneralRitchie pointed out, there was a danger that the uprising ‘might spreadvery rapidly if not dealt with effectively and immediately’. Air MarshalSir Hugh Lloyd, commanding the theatre air forces, advocated a hardline: ‘Perhaps the best encouragement for people to give informationwould be to hang some of the enemy.’ MacDonald agreed that any

78Marston, ‘Lost and found in the jungle’, 97; Short, Communist Insurrection, 136;Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare, 70.79Barber, War of the Running Dogs, 62; Stubbs, Hearts and Minds, 71.80Karl Hack, ‘British and Communist Crises in Malaya: A Response to Anthony Short’,Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 31/2 (2000), 392; Bayly and Harper, ForgottenWars, 441; Charles Townshend, ‘Martial Law: Legal and Administrative Problems ofCivil Emergency in Britain and the Empire, 1800–1940’, Historical Journal 25/1(1982), 168; Sinclair, At the End of the Line.81CO 717/210/3: Minutes of the Commissioner-General’s conference, 20 June 1948.



‘show of force would be helpful’ in improving the security situation.82

A preliminary strategy emerged quickly. There would be two phases tothe campaign. The first phase would ‘restore law and order in settledareas of the territory and . . . maintain economic life of the country andrestore morale’. The security forces would conduct both offensive anddefensive operations. The offensive role involved making arrests,sweeps, and searches in order to ‘liquidate the enemy forces’, or if thisproved impossible, to drive them into the jungle. Vital economic points,such as power stations, factories, docks, large rubber estates and mineswould be defended. The plan’s second phase called for the destructionof guerrilla forces in the jungles.83 Patrols and flag marches started inthe first week of June, and ‘about 10 June the situation deterioratedand the Army started protective and offensive operations’; that is, priorto the full Emergency’s declaration on the 18th.84 Initial estimatesthought that Phase One would take three months to complete.85

MacDonald emphasised handling the Chinese ‘with great firmness’.86

Responding to the plan, the Colonial Secretary, Arthur Creech Jones,demanded prompt action: ‘we want to strike hard from the start tomake sure that we are not faced with one of those lingering guerrillacampaigns’.87 London wanted success in Phase One, only tentati-vely promising a brigade for Phase Two, rather than the requesteddivision.88 The regional commanders accepted the view that a prolongedcampaign might well damage fragile British prestige throughout Asia.89

In addition, the need for a firm campaign also derived from the weaknessof settler morale, which FARELF worried could crack at any time.90

Therefore there was an urgency to defeating the insurgency before plantermorale collapsed, and with it the economy.91 Britain’s global militaryoverstretch also made rapid victory a priority.92 Knowing this, Malayarefrained from asking for reinforcements.93 Therefore, the troop numbers

82CO 537/3692: Minutes of the fifth meeting of the BDCC (FE), 24 June 1948.83CO 537/3692: Telegram from MacDonald to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 26June 1948.84CO 717/170/1: FARELF sitrep 1, 12 June–12 July 1948.85WO 208/4838: Telegram from FARELF to Ministry of Defence, 28 June 1948.86CO 717/210/3: Telegram from MacDonald to Sec. of State for the Colonies, 6 July 1948.87CO 537/3692: Letter from Creech Jones to A.V. Alexander, 8 July 1948.88WO 208/4838: Telegram from Ministry of Defence to GHQ FARELF, 14 July 1948.89CO 537/3692: Minutes of the ninth meeting of the BDCC (FE), 23 July 1948.90WO 208/4838: Telegram from GHQ FARELF to Ministry of Defence, 9 Aug. 1948.91CO 537/3692: Telegram from MacDonald to Sec. of State for the Colonies, 10 Aug.1948.92Bayly and Harper, Forgotten Wars, 436.93CO 537/3692: Telegram from MacDonald to Sec. of State for the Colonies, 10 Aug.1948.

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needed for a restrained, minimum force-style response were unavailable.The alternative, encouraged by views of the Chinese as subject to pressure,and exacerbated by a faulty intelligence system, was a campaign based onfear. The Chinese were considered ‘very prone to intimidation’.94 Andthey deserved whatever hardships came their way:

the majority of squatters are feeding the enemy and are oftensheltering and ‘covering’ him as well; therefore we must deal withthem. . . . Government has no alternative but to deport them totheir country of origin as undesirables. If several areas are clearedof squatters in this way, with sufficient attendant publicity,it should have a considerable effect on the remainder.95

In mid-September 1948 the Local Defence Committee published thefirst part of a review of internal security, dealing with the securityproblems facing Malaya. It provided the most sophisticated analysis ofthe relationship between the squatters and insurgents so far. Whilerecognising the MNLA’s forces were largely based in squatter areas,and relied upon them for food and intelligence, the report appreciatedthat ‘only a portion of the Chinese community . . . are willinglysupporting them.’ Most people supported the communists throughfear, and their loyalties would fluctuate with the course of events.Conversely, the report repeated stock phrases about secret societies,and merely recommended ‘the squatter areas be at least covered’ whilea detailed plan was worked out.96 Despite the qualifications aboutpopular support for the insurgency, within weeks the BDCC (FE) againarticulated its belief that ‘the Chinese were governed by the propagandaof force’.97 On 8 October the Local Defence Committee completed thereport’s second part, on measures to combat the uprising, whichreceived BDCC (FE) and the Commanders-in-Chiefs’ approval.98 Theoverriding priority lay in separating the insurgents from the population,by ‘strong police action’. A method of achieving this was to impressupon people the consequences of helping the insurgents, or remainingneutral observers. The report advised:

94WO 208/4838: Telegram from GHQ FARELF to Ministry of Defence, 9 Aug. 1948.95CO 717/171/3: CISS 4, week ending 5 Aug. 1948.96CO 537/3688: Local Defence Committee, Kuala Lumpur, ‘A paper on the dimensionsand nature of the security problem confronting the government of the Federation ofMalaya’, 16 Sept. 1948.97CO 537/3688: Minutes of the 12th meeting of the BDCC (FE), 27 Sept. 1948.98CO 537/3688: Letter to J.J. Paskin, Colonial Office, from Ralph Hone,Commissioner-General’s Office, Singapore, 15 Oct. 1948.



Imposing responsibility on the inhabitants of any area in whichcrimes are repeatedly committed and in which the community failsto give adequate information to the security forces. Suchresponsibility will include the deportation of some of the leadingfamilies known to have been implicated.

Thus the poor intelligence situation would be improved by punishingpeoples’ lack of cooperation. A few high-profile businessmen should bedetained or deported as an example to others who paid protectionmoney to the MCP. The report dismissed any sympathy for thoseintimidated into paying, instead stressing the ‘profound effect’ sucharrests or deportations would have. However, such moves firstnecessitated clearing the backlog in those awaiting deportation, whichmight imply short cuts leading to ‘somewhat arbitrary deportation’.Any disadvantages incurred were easily outweighed by the need tostamp out the insurgency ‘quickly and ruthlessly’, to avoid the furtherloss of innocent life and property. Revivifying the familiar faith in amass imitative response, the report supposed the ‘salutary effect’ ofdeportations, which ‘may well swing the balance in favour ofGovernment’. The police were instructed to build up case files againstentire squatter areas ‘clearly implicated in bandit activities’. Actionwould proceed depending on the circumstances:

(a) Where there is a strong case against the area and the numbersinvolved do not make the problem too great, all the inhabitants ofthat area to be deported. All huts, buildings and cultivations to bedestroyed, in order to prevent bandits or neighbouring squatter areasmaking use of them. This form of action will, undoubtedly, have avery salutary effect upon their neighbours and all who hear of it.

(b) Where there is reasonably strong evidence not quite warrantingmass deportation or where the numbers affected would constitutean administrative impossibility, the squatters should be roundedup and held in a temporary cage in the neighbourhood for nationalregistration or screening.

These policies promised to remedy the squatters’ incomplete fear of thegovernment and would be supplemented by a plan to improve theirposition, to be drawn up in the future.99 The language employed inthe situation reports demonstrates how plans were translated intoaction. For example, Operation ‘Radio’, launched in Kedah State on

99CO 537/3688: Local Defence Committee, ‘A paper on the strategical and tacticalmeasures required to deal with the internal security problem in the Federation ofMalaya’, 8 Oct. 1948.

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21 October 1948, was ‘directed against squatters’.100 Operation ‘Kukri’in neighbouring Perak State was described as an ‘anti-‘‘squatter’’operation’.101 On another occasion, the police aspired to rendersquatter areas ‘uncomfortable’.102 The military shared the sentimentthat these operations promised a ‘salutary effect’.103 From early on inthe campaign, senior policy-makers decided punishing whole commu-nities would set an example and resolve the conflict quickly. Because thelanguage in the documents is often euphemistic and vague, it isimplausible to argue that the government authorised deliberate killingsof civilians, whereas mass arrests, deportations and property destructionwere planned. Rather, the government created a permissive environ-ment by encouraging a hostile attitude towards an entire population,without initially setting out specific guidelines on the use of force.

Over an eight-month period, the government passed a series of sta-tutory instruments legalising certain acts.104 Five regulations in particularhad a bearing on arrests, property destruction, and shootings. First, on 31July 1948, the government gazetted Regulation 27, conferring policepowers on the military. Second, Regulation 24, enacted on 16 October1948, allowed arrest on suspicion and detention without trial for up to 14days. Third, Regulation 18B, added on 13 November 1948, authorised theofficer in charge of a police district to ‘destroy or authorise the destruction’of a suspect building or structure. Importantly, clause four retrospectivelylegalised any prior destructions. Fourth, on 30 November 1948 theFederation created Regulation 10A, whereby a chief police officer coulddeclareany locationa ‘special area’. In these areas, the regulationpermittedthe security forces to arrest anyone who failed to stop and submit to asearch when called upon to do so. If necessary to effect the arrest, forcecould be used, which could ‘extend to the use of lethal weapons’.

Finally, Regulation 27A of 22 January 1949 authorised the securityforces to arrest suspects, overcome resistance to arrest, and preventescape from arrest with ‘reasonably necessary’ force. Again, this mightextend to lethal force. Before opening fire, the soldier or policemanshould ‘call upon him, in a loud voice, to stop and the person so calledupon shall be given a reasonable chance to stop’. After arrest, awarning would be given about the liability to be shot if attempting toescape. The Regulation’s last sentence declared anything done before it

100CO 717/170/1: FARELF sitrep 16, 24–30 Oct. 1948.101CO 717/170/1: FARELF sitrep 19, 12–18 Nov. 1948.102CO 717/171/3: FMPS 21, week ending 2 Dec. 1948.103CO 717/170/2: FARELF sitrep 48, 3–9 June 1949.104Thanks to David French for pointing this out. For a comparative analysis of EmergencyRegulations see his forthcoming book: Army, Empire and Cold War. The British Armyand British Military Policy, c.1945–1968 (Oxford: Oxford UP forthcoming).



came into force which would have been legal under it, as retrospec-tively lawful.105

The command’s disinterest is demonstrated by its response to themany instances of people ‘shot whilst attempting to escape’, includingthe notorious Batang Kali massacre (discussed in the next section). Nonewere investigated by the military police’s Special Investigation Branch(SIB). Indeed, a mere lieutenant commanded the Malaya SIB section inthe opening phase.106 Sir Henry Gurney’s attitude here is enlightening:

[T]errorists can be defeated only by the initiative being taken by thePolice and other security forces against the terrorists on their ownground and according to their own rules. This offensive actionagainst civilian members of the community, not always clearlydistinguishable, raises most difficult questions of law. It is in factimpossible to maintain the rule of law and to fight terrorismeffectively at the same time. I have publicly said that it is paradoxicalthough none the less true that in order to maintain law and order inpresent conditions in Malaya it is necessary for the Government itselfto break it for a time. . . . At the present time the Police and Armyare breaking the law every day. A spate of Emergency Regulationsto provide legal cover could if necessary be issued, but to givethe sanctity of law to pieces of paper signed by the High Commis-sioner only and not subject to ratification by any legislature mustlead, if taken too far, to justified criticism and misconceptions dero-gatory of the law itself. . . . it is most important that police and sol-diers, who are not saints, should not get the impression that everysmall mistake is going to be the subject of a public enquiry or that itis better to do nothing at all than to do the wrong thing quickly.. . . The process of isolation of the ‘hard core’ can only be perma-nently successful if some alternative object of affiliation, strongerthan the bandits and at the same time inspiring greater fear, can beintroduced to which the floating Chinese can attach themselves.107

This decision by Gurney to effectively absolve the security forces fromtheir duty to act within the law had terrible results. It meant that each

105CO 717/167/3: Federation of Malaya, Regulations made under The EmergencyRegulations Ordinance, 1948, together with The Essential (Special Constabulary)Regulations, 1948, incorporating all Amendments made up to the 22nd March, 1949(Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer 1949).106DEFE 70/101: Letter from A.C. Burcher, HQ Provost Marshal, to Ministry ofDefence, 16 Feb. 1970.107CO 537/4753: Statement by the High Commissioner for Malaya, Annexure ‘A’ tominutes of the 16th meeting of the BDCC (FE), 28 Jan. 1949.

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unit bearing arms worked in a world with no clear rules aboutacceptable behaviour. Consequently how a regiment, company,platoon or police patrol behaved depended largely upon the inclina-tions of the commanding officer. While further micro-comparativeresearch is required into the disciplinary characteristics of individualunits, this article’s contention is that the agency allowed these smallgroups was permitted by the ambiguity inherent in higher-level policy.The next section highlights some of the implications for the Chinesesquatters of Malaya.

Translating Strategic Intentions into Action

Because the policy decisions analysed above incorporated a certainelement of ambiguity, it is essential to consider how they wereimplemented. A wide range of policies and tactics were used in theopening phase, including deep-penetration special forces’ patrols, massarrests and national registration. Clearly, these affected the civilianpopulation in quite different ways, and the degree of discriminationvaried depending upon the specific policy and the area concerned. Thisarticle cannot offer a comprehensive account of all government actionin the opening phase. Rather, the focus is upon three illustrative typesof action resulting from the coercive strategy: the use of armed force,arrests, and forced population movements.

Armed Force

Suspects were killed in Malaya individually and in groups.108 Theworst known incident occurred at Batang Kali in December 1948,when 24 villagers were ‘shot whilst attempting to escape’.109 Thegovernment hailed the episode as a success against the communists,until January, when it announced that an inquiry (by the AttorneyGeneral) had decided no further action was necessary.110 However, thefirst recorded incident arose on 20 July 1948, when police shot dead aman they were questioning after he ‘tried to make off’.111 On 21 July,when military and police responded to an attack on the Elphil Estatethey ‘shot two Chinese who refused to stop when called upon to do

108Stubbs, Hearts and Minds, 73.109Bayly and Harper, Forgotten Wars, 449–53.110Ibid., 455.111CO 717/173/1: Telegram from Officer Administering the Government of Malaya[OAG] to the Sec. of State for the Colonies, 22 July 1948.



so’.112 Numerous other incidents took place where one or two personswere shot. For example, on 8 August in Bentong, police shot deada Chinese person ‘while trying to escape after arrest’.113 Here, aselsewhere, there can be no certainty about whether these people weretruly shot trying to escape, or if it was a euphemism for murder, as BatangKali suggests. An incident happened south of Lenga on 7 November:‘Operation RUGGER continues. Army/Police party search ‘‘Kampong’’-[village] and detain 102 suspects, of whom 39 identified as Bandits orassociates. Eleven Bandits killed while attempting escape.’114

What is important here is that 11 people were killed in suspiciouscircumstances, without an investigation being launched. Indeed, in thenext two days three more people were killed in this manner.115 On 10November another six suspects were shot while evading arrest in theKuala Kubu area.116 Reports noting individual shootings could easilygo undetected by the strategic leadership, especially considering thetendency for optimistic interpretations explored above.

However, three incidents in November and December involving thekilling of upwards of six people at a time should have arousedsuspicion. Perhaps this very realisation explains the passing ofRegulation 10A, permitting lethal force in arrests, on 30 November,and Regulation 27A retroactively legalising shooting people trying toescape on 22 January 1949. Whether these incidents were justifiable isalmost impossible to objectively discern from the sources available. Butit is significant that the official response was to legalise existing practicerather than order inquiries or tighter rules of engagement. The reportsoffer some insights into how the security forces themselves legitimisedthese killings, such as that ‘One man tried to break through cordon hewas shot dead.’117 Having shot three men dead escaping in Johore inAugust 1948, the police found a Bren gun, two rifles and assortedammunition.118 One woman was wounded and another killed carrying‘Communist documents’.119 A police patrol shot a bandit who refusedto surrender in Kajang, and another killed a bandit who unwisely‘pretended to surrender and then threw a grenade at security forces’ inKuala Pilah.120

112CO 717/173/1: Telegram from OAG to Sec. of State, 21 July 1948.113CO 717/170/1: FARELF sitrep 4, 28 July–10 Aug. 1948.114CO 717/170/1: FARELF sitrep 18, 5–11 Nov. 1948.115Ibid.116CO 717/173/1: Telegram from Gurney to Sec. of State, 10 Nov. 1948.117CO 717/173/1: Telegram from OAG to Sec. of State, 7 Aug. 1948.118CO 717/173/1: Telegram from OAG to Sec. of State, 9 Aug. 1948.119CO 717/170/2: FARELF sitrep 33, 18–24 Feb. 1949.120CO 717/173/1: Telegram from OAG to Sec. of State, 24 Sept. 1948.

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Accidents also accounted for several deaths, although the fact thatthey were recorded as such suggests the other shootings werepurposeful. For example, during an operation near Ipoh, Perak in April1949, ‘Police killed one bandit and arrested four male and two femalesuspects. One female civilian accidentally shot.’121 On 27 April, near BatuPahat, Johore, a 1st Battalion The 10th Gurkha Rifles patrol ‘killed one oftwo Malay fishermen mistaken for bandits’.122 Security forces sometimeswounded those escaping, though whether due to a desire not to kill orsimply poor marksmanship is unclear. Towards the end of August 1948,an escaping prisoner was wounded rather than killed.123 At times, thosewounded were re-captured, along with other suspects apprehendedwithout weapons being fired. In a notable success on 4 August, a com-bined police-military patrol found weapons and explosives in addition tocapturing 19 fleeing people.124 On 25 September, ‘Police wounded andarrested bandits in Batu Gajah area of Perak.’125 On 20 January 1949, 1stBattalion The Seaforth Highlanders apprehended three people attempt-ingescape, and three others were arrested the next day. Yet on 23 January,police south of Segamat killed a person escaping.126

These examples suggest that a completely indiscriminate shootingpolicy was not authorised, but that the variation between killings andcaptures was quite random, depending upon local interpretation of theambiguous rules. The failure to clarify these rules at the highest level evenfollowing the Batang Kali incident, and the decision to exempt the securityforces from legal inquiry, highlights the disregard for protecting civilians.

Table 1 below summarises the total casualties inflicted to the end ofApril 1949. These figures are probably incomplete as not all incidentsmay have been recorded. Nonetheless, they provide a useful indicationof the scale of violence applied towards civilians, and the relative effortsmade to wound or capture suspects rather than kill them.

Arrests

From the outset arresting suspected insurgents and sympathisersassumed a high priority in the tactical responses employed by thegovernment. By 6 July 1948, the Chief Secretary had issued 892 orderspermitting detention without trial.127 The initial arrests aimed to

121CO 717/170/2: FARELF sitrep 41, 15–21 April 1949.122CO 717/170/2: FARELF sitrep 43, 29 April–6 May 1949.123CO 717/170/1: FARELF sitrep 7, 22–29 Aug. 1948.124CO 717/173/1: Telegram from OAG to Sec. of State, 4 Aug. 1948.125CO 717/173/1: Telegram from OAG to Sec. of State, 25 Sept. 1948.126CO 717/170/2: FARELF sitrep 29, 21–28 Jan. 1949.127CO 717/173/1: Telegram from OAG to Sec. of State, 6 July 1948.



capture specifically identified MCP members. However, the dire intelli-gence situation quickly necessitated the adoption of large cordon-and-search tactics, where those caught inside the net were subjected toscreening in order to try and separate the insurgents from the populace.These operations varied in scale. During a combined military-policesweep in the Semenyih area on 25 to 26 July, 500 people were arrested,of whom over 80 per cent were released after questioning.128 Someoperations were on a small scale, for example when 1st Seaforthsscreened 52 people in Johore, arresting two suspects.129 In a largeroperation in Perak, troops screened 1,775 men, capturing ‘fourteenknown bandits’.130 During Operation ‘Rugger’, conducted in Johore inNovember, 600 underwent screening, with 152 detained by thepolice.131 A situation report from October explained the logic behindthese actions: ‘‘‘Squatter’’ areas are the main sources of information andsupplies for the bandits, and their dispersal should have an appreciableeffect on the bandits [sic] ability to operate effectively.’132

Mere suspicion was enough to prompt an arrest, and during 1948 thepolice arrested 13,603 after screening.133 Screening intensified in1949. The smaller-scale efforts, such as the screening of 21 rubber tappersin Selangor on 6 January, became less common as larger operations rose inprominence. For example, on the same day, the 1st Battalion The King’sOwn Yorkshire Light Infantry (KOYLI) screened 2,500 people inPerak.134 Normally the police and military worked together, such aswhen 3rd Battalion The Grenadier Guards and police screened 425

Table 1. Force Used on Persons Escaping, July 1948 to April 1949

Type of Force Number of People Affected

Killed escaping 77Wounded escaping 7Captured escaping (including wounded) 37Accidents 4

Total 125

Sources: CO 717/170/1; CO 717/170/2; CO 717/173/1.

128CO 717/173/1: Telegram from OAG to Sec. of State, 27 July 1948.129CO 717/170/1: FARELF sitrep 21, 26 Nov.–2 Dec. 1948.130CO 717/170/1: FARELF sitrep 17, 30 Oct.–5 Nov. 1948.131CO 717/170/1: FARELF sitrep 19, 12–18 Nov. 1948.132CO 717/170/1: FARELF sitrep 15, 17–23 Oct. 1948.133CO 717/170/2: FARELF sitrep 25, 24–30 Dec. 1948.134CO 717/170/2: FARELF sitrep 27, 7–13 Jan. 1949.

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squatters in Selangor State on 24 February.135 The outcome could bepositive in quite specific ways, as the arrest of ‘three money collectors’following the screening of 200 squatters in Johore illustrates. On the otherhand, an operation by 1st Malay Regiment in Kedah produced nothing.136

In March and April 1949, the 1st Battalion The 6th Gurkha Riflescarried out repeated screenings, arresting 19 out of 1,300 checked overfour days in Kedah.137 Besides rural villages, labour lines were alsosubjected to the process. On 21 April, the 2nd Scots Guards screened arubber estate in Selangor, making ‘eleven arrests including one knownbandit’.138 Cities were not exempt; the police screened 1,800 persons inthe outlying areas of Kuala Lumpur in May.139 Huge efforts could lead tolimited results; the 2nd Battalion The 2nd Gurkha Rifles, 4th Hussars andpolice screened 2,000 in Perak in May, for ten arrests.140 At times arrestswere made to boost the figures, as the following account suggests: ‘Actingon information that some forty bandits with families had moved into asquatter area near SEGAMAT (JOHORE), a strong patrol of 16 Fd bty[Field Battery, Royal Artillery] searched the district. No trace of banditswas, however, found, but twenty-eight male suspects were detained.’141

Reports mention the arrest of ‘collaborators’, raising the question ofwhat proved collaboration? For example, on 8 June, the 1st KOYLI‘arrested three collaborators’ after screening 400 people in Kedah.142

Living in an area where the insurgents launched an attack promptedsuspicion: ‘Patrol 26 Fd Regt [Royal Artillery] led by informer foundoccupied bandit camp, and killed three bandits. One other banditbelieved seriously wounded, and two Rifles were recovered. Allinhabitants of a nearby estate were detained for interrogation.’143

Following the insurgents’ murder of a constable near Kota Tinggi inJohor, the police ‘arrested the entire local settlement who were sus-pected of assisting them’.144 Similarly, the security forces viewed theabsence of men as signifying communist allegiance. After screening 420squatters north of Baling, Kedah, the military reported that ‘No malesbetween ages of twenty and thirty were found to be present.’145 During

135CO 717/170/2: FARELF sitrep 34, 25 Feb.–3 March 1949.136CO 717/170/2: FARELF sitrep 37, 18–24 March 1949.137CO 717/170/2: FARELF sitrep 39, 1–7 April 1949.138CO 717/170/2: FARELF sitrep 42, 22–28 April 1949.139CO 717/170/2: FARELF sitrep 44, 7–13 May 1949.140CO 717/170/2: FARELF sitrep 45, 14–20 May 1949.141CO 717/170/2: FARELF sitrep 46, 21–27 May 1949.142CO 717/170/2: FARELF sitrep 49, 10–17 June 1949.143CO 717/170/2: FARELF sitrep 52, 2–15 July 1949.144CO 717/170/2: FARELF sitrep 73, 3–10 Dec. 1949.145CO 717/170/2: FARELF sitrep 59, 27 Aug.–2 Sept. 1949.



August and September 1949, further large-scale operations, with over800 people screened at once, took place.146 The pattern continued fromOctober to December. In the Kuala Lumpur area alone, in late October1,000 civilians were screened (for only one arrest), 4,000 more between19 and 25 November, and 600 in late November.147

Clearly then, from Operation ‘Frustration’, the arrests of senior MCPleaders in June 1948, right through the opening phase, mass detentionplayed a substantial part in the counter-insurgency strategy.148 Thesearrests often involved punishing people who might be communistsupporters, rather than accurately detaining people based on evidenceof criminality and subjecting them to a fair and open judicialprocess. Whenever possible, the authorities sought to deport thosearrested to China, a measure initially approved by London in June1948.149 Some Chinese squatters apparently went by request, butassessing their proportion of the whole, and whether they trulyvolunteered, is impossible.150 Deportation, or ‘repatriation’, becameincreasingly difficult as Mao Zedong’s communist forces took overthe country.151 Neither detentions nor the deportations authorisedunder the Emergency Regulations allowed any appeal process.152

Forced Population Movement

Another type of pressure exerted on the Chinese squatters consisted offorced population movement. Ultimately this meant resettlement intospecial ‘new villages’, but only about 18,500 people were resettled byMarch 1950.153 The villagisation programme largely transpired in thecampaign’s second phase.154 Assessing the percentages of those moved

146CO 717/170/2: FARELF sitrep 58, 20–26 Aug. 1949; FARELF sitrep 60, 3–9 Sept.1949; FARELF sitrep 63, 24–30 Sept. 1949.147CO 717/170/2: FARELF sitrep 67, 22–28 Oct. 1949; FARELF sitrep 71, 19–25Nov.; FARELF sitrep 72, 26 Nov.–2 Dec. 1949.148Bayly and Harper, Forgotten Wars, 430.149CO 537/4246: Telegram from Sec. of State for the Colonies to Commissioner-General in South East Asia, 12 June 1948.150Hack, ‘Iron Claws on Malaya’, 116.151CO 825/77/1: Monthly report to the Sec. of State for the Colonies and the ForeignSec., No. 2, 2 Sept. 1949.152Rhoderick Dhu Renick, Jr, ‘The Emergency Regulations of Malaya: Causes andEffect’, Journal of Southeast Asian History 6/2 (1965), 21.153John Weldon Humphrey, ‘Population Resettlement in Malaya’ (PhD thesis,Northwestern Univ. Evanston/Chicago, IL 1971), 81.154Renick, ‘Emergency Regulations’, 5; Hack, ‘Corpses, Prisoners of War and CapturedDocuments’, 216.

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by force compared with those who moved voluntarily is impossible,although it often resulted from a military operation.155 Humphreyhighlights possibly the most extreme example, when on 19 October1948, 5,000 squatters were removed from the Batu Arang area ofSelangor after the MNLA attacked there.156 Bayly and Harper mentionthe eviction of 456 squatters from Sungei Siput, and 700 more fromTronoh, also in October.157 Stubbs and Short suggest the military’staste for destroying squatter homes, usually by fire, developed early onand endured until at least November 1948.158 The situationreports now show the security forces participated in populationmovement and property destruction before the former became officialpolicy in October, and the latter was legalised in November 1948.From July 1948 the military took ‘a very big share’ in the evacuations,acting under civilian direction.159

The predilection for burning suspects’ property was possibly inretaliation for the MCP’s own arson campaign against rubberestates.160 The burnings seemed justified when the fires proved theowner’s culpability: ‘Police and military raided an area near Rawang,Selangor. No opposition. Large stocks of rice and prepared food foundand removed. Houses burnt and ammunition heard exploding inthem. . . .Very few men seen, many new huts burnt down.’161 Policeand Gurkhas also heard explosions after they set fire to huts nearTampin the next day.162 Having killed 22 bandits and captured 18 inBatu Arang, Selangor State, on 30 July 1948, the 26th Field Regimentand police punished the locals by burning down many squatter huts.163

In September, a party escorting prisoners to Kulai was ambushed, sothe security forces intended to ‘evacuate all women and children andthen to destroy village’ in reply.164 A rationale for the propertydestruction often existed then, as shown again on 1 October, when1/10th Gurkha Rifles burnt a village where they found an insurgent

155Renick, ‘Emergency Regulations’, 9.156Humphrey, ‘Population Resettlement in Malaya’, 67.157Bayly and Harper, Forgotten Wars, 448.158Stubbs, Hearts and Minds, 73; Short, Communist Insurrection, 154.159CO 537/4239A: Telegram from Commissioner-General for South East Asia to Sec.of State for the Colonies, 12 July 1948.160For example, the attack recorded in: CO 717/173/1: Telegram from OAG to Sec. ofState, 21 July 1948.161CO 717/173/1: Telegram from OAG to Sec. of State, 17 Aug. 1948.162CO 717/173/1: Telegram from OAG to Sec. of State, 18 Aug. 1948.163CO 717/170/1: FARELF sitrep 4, 28 July–10 Aug. 1948.164CO 717/170/1: FARELF sitrep 10, 13–19 Sept. 1948.



arms dump.165 Intelligence reports shed light on the issue of voluntarymovement. One from October 1948 assessed that:

The Malayan Colleries [sic] and police have made life singularlydifficult for squatters in the Batu Arang area and the police and themilitary have done likewise in the Kajang area [south of KualaLumpur]. A typical Chinese reaction to this would be, that, beingharassed by both the authorities and the bandits, to move to thecomparatively safe areas in the vicinity of a large town.166

Sometimes the burnings happened as part of a screening operation,preventing squatters from returning to a supposedly ‘cleared’ area. Forexample, the 1st Seaforths and 26th Field Regiment screened 600people near Muar, Johore, arrested 33 men, then destroyed all the hutsin the area.167 Forced movements continued throughout 1949,hundreds leaving their homes at a time: 525 people were ‘evicted’ bythe 1/6th Gurkha Rifles and police from Sintok, Kedah on 28February.168 On 8 March, 1st Seaforths and police ‘evacuated somethree hundred squatters’ from Bekok, Johore; and on 11 April they‘cleared a squatter area’ of 280 people near Jementah.169

FARELF considered the ‘evacuations’ were ‘seriously impedingbandit operations’.170 A report from April 1949 documented the‘Voluntary movement of squatters’ in Perak, ascribing this to ‘recentaction by the security forces’.171 In April 1949, the 2nd Scots Guardsreported that they had ‘screened village and removed all squatters. Alltheir houses were destroyed.’172 East of Kulim, Kedah, the policeburned down ‘meeting places in squatter area’ following six arrests.173

On 9 August 1949 squatter huts were destroyed because ‘bandithideouts’ were found in the area.174

These practices clearly conform to the policy guidelines analysedearlier. Yet the punitive dimension remained, as shown when 2ndBattalion The Coldstream Guards and police removed 457 squatters

165CO 717/170/1: FARELF sitrep 13, 3–9 Oct. 1948.166CO 717/171/3: FMPS 15, week ending 21 Oct. 1948.167CO 717/170/1: FARELF sitrep 16, 24–30 Oct. 1948.168CO 717/170/2: FARELF sitrep 34, 25 Feb.–3 March 1949.169CO 717/170/2: FARELF sitrep 35, 4–10 March 1949; FARELF sitrep 40, 8–14 April1949.170CO 717/170/2: FARELF sitrep 37, 18–24 March 1949.171CO 717/171/3: FMPS 39, week ending 7 April 1949.172CO 717/170/2: FARELF sitrep 42, 22–28 April 1949.173CO 717/170/2: FARELF sitrep 52, 2–15 July 1949.174CO 717/170/2: FARELF sitrep 56, 6–12 Aug. 1949.

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from the Bertam valley in August 1949 as a punishment for insurgentattacks a month earlier.175 Therefore there appears to have been a closeconnection between the destruction of property and the forcedmovement of whole populations as a tactical device in the overallpunishment strategy aimed at coercing the Chinese squatters intocompliance. The practices pre-dated official policy, were thenincorporated into the government plan, and continued until at leastAugust 1949. Quantifying the properties destroyed and the peoplemoved is impossible when many reports refer simply to ‘many’, yetthere is no doubt that thousands were affected.

Conclusion

This article has sought to question some common assumptions aboutthe didactic value of Malaya as the key case study of the ‘hearts andminds’ approach to counter-insurgency. The argument has built uponprevious scholarship on the counter-terror in the campaign’s openingphase, adding qualifications and extra information. It challenges theviews, found in the historiography, that the police and Army tried tooperate within the law, and that early mistakes arose from a lack ofplanning. Rather, the evidence demonstrates how a contempt for theChinese squatters combined with intelligence failure to produce apolicy in favour of punishing an entire population.

While earlier studies have rightly emphasised the severe shortages inpersonnel and sources available to the intelligence system, this studysuggests that the assessments were interpretively flawed. They drewunduly optimistic conclusions, underestimating insurgent capabilitiesand exaggerating the effectiveness of government policy. Consequentlya self-fulfilling prophecy emerged whereby a government convinced ofpunishing people for ‘salutary effect’ witnessed the very effect it wishedto see. Because events were understood through the prism of a pre-existing set of assumptions, improvements in the material dimensionsof intelligence would perhaps have made little difference. Whether thepunitive policies enacted in the opening phase actually proved useful isdebatable; the fact that they were substantially modified or abandonedin later phases suggests not. What is important here is that thegovernment thought them effective in 1948–49. It pronounced thisview in a series of policy documents and formal meetings. When officialpolicies were adopted, such as property destruction, they did formalisealready extant tactical practice. This should not lead to the under-estimation of policy’s impact though, as the tactics described becamemuch more widespread after official endorsement.

175CO 717/170/2: FARELF sitrep 58, 20–26 Aug. 1949.



With regards to arrests and property destruction the guidelines wereclear; suspect areas would be punished collectively for insurgentactivities. Elsewhere, ambiguity seemed to reign, especially concerningthe rules on the use of deadly force. However, the document fromJanuary 1949 shows how the Governor permitted the indiscriminateuse of force to continue, despite repeated instances of suspiciousshootings. These were not investigated and the law was modified topermit the unregulated use of lethal force. The real significance camenot from the law being changed or the lack of oversight, but the two incombination. The article then proceeded to demonstrate how thesepolicy decisions manifested themselves at the tactical level, recordinginstances of shootings, arrest operations and property destruction thathave recently come to light. The frequency of these examples supportedthe arguments made about policy as a key causal factor.

The evidence suggests modifications arose in the planning processover time, and further research into how these issues evolved throughthe remainder of the Emergency is needed. The existence of abuses incampaigns in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Aden, Northern Ireland, andIraq suggests that questions about generic causes of abuses, patterns ofbehaviour and the strategic consequences warrant a response, howeverqualified by historical specificity it is wise to be.176 Indiscriminate deathand destruction is, to a greater or lesser degree, inevitable in armedconflicts. It is more likely when policy-makers think that targeting non-combatants is strategically useful. Strategic studies must continue toengage with the question of civilian suffering not simply because of themoral imperatives inherent in democratic states subject to the rule oflaw, but because it effects the question at the subject’s heart – why doarmed forces win and lose?

Acknowledgements

An earlier version of this paper was given at the ‘Intelligence,Strategic Culture and Counterinsurgencies’ workshop, NationalDefense University, Washington DC on 11 June 2008. Thanks toPatrick Cronin and Huw Davies for arranging the event, and theparticipants for their remarks. Thanks to Manuel Bollag, Paul Dixon,David French, Karl Hack, Georgina Sinclair and Christian Tripodi fortheir comments on subsequent drafts. Errors remain the author’sresponsibility.

176Hew Strachan, ‘British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq’, RUSI Journal152/6 (Dec. 2007), 11.

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