plea april draft

8/8/2019 Plea April Draft

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APleaforUnderstanding

GuyLongworth1

WarwickUniversity

April2009

1.Introduction.

ThePhilosophyofLanguageseeksultimatelytoaddresstwoquestions:Whatarethelinguisticfacts,andinparticularthefactsthatdeterminewhatmaybesaid

onoccasionbytheuseoflanguage?Andhowarespeakersinapositiontoexploit

those facts? In a slogan, the first question requests a theory of meaning, the

second a theory ofunderstanding.AsMichaelDummetthas long advocated, a

theoryofmeaningmustengageproperlywithatheoryofunderstandingsothat

the two questions ultimately receive an integrated answer.2 However,

historically,thesecondquestionhasbeenrecessive.Mybriefinthispaperistomakeamildpleainitsfavour,throughapreliminaryexplorationofsomeissues

thatarisewhenitisbroughttoprominence.

In thebackgroundaresomelargequestionsabout theproperdivisionof

labourbetweenthetheoryofmeaningandthetheoryofunderstanding.Should

we view linguistic understanding as a form of propositional knowledge of

independentlydiscerniblemeaningfacts?Orismeaningmoreintimatelyrelated

tounderstandingthanthatpicturewouldrequire,sothatfactsaboutmeaningare partly absorbed into, and so only accessible through, a theory of

understanding? Indeed, is there even a separable question for the theory of

meaning to address, or is understanding an achievement that makes no

independentlyspecifiabledemandsupon thefacts?3Thesearelargequestions,

andIshallnotattempttoforegroundthemhere.Butitisimportanttorecognise

thatasatisfactoryanswertoouropeningquestionsmustengagewiththem.

Ishall begin in 2by distinguishingsome varieties of understanding. 3

sketchesanargumentagainsttheviewthatpropositionalknowledgesufficesfor


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understanding. The aim is not simply to support that conclusion, but also to

suggest that understanding is distinguished from other forms of epistemic

standingbyitsdependenceuponaspecificformofintegrationofothertypesof

epistemic standing. 4 marks a further distinction, between what I shall callintake anduptake. 5discusses the prospects of two accounts ofuptake, and

suggestssomedesiderataona unifiedaccountofintakeanduptake. It ishere

thatthelargeissuesmentionedaboveloomclosesttothesurface.Toreiterate,

myaimhereisnottoprovidedetailedargumentsfororagainstspecificpositions

ordesiderata,but rather to outline some central issues and to indicate some

topicsthatIthinkareworthyoffurtherreflection.

2.Somevarietiesofunderstanding.

Dummettdistinguishestwosensesoftheverbtounderstand:

that in which someone is said to understand a word, phrase or sentence,

consideredasatype,andthatinwhichhemaybesaidtounderstandaparticular

utterance.Wemaycallthesethe dispositionalandtheoccurrentsensesofto

understand.(Dummett,1993:58)

Why is there a need tomark (or to keep track of) this distinction? Dummett

offerstwosortsofreasons.Thefirstadvertstoadistinctionputativelyamongst

theobjectsofunderstanding.Thesecondadvertstoadistinctionamongstmodes

ofunderstanding.

Weneed anoccurrent senseof understand for two reasons: indexicality and

ambiguity.If,forexample,IhearsomeonesayThereisasinistersmellhere,

howmuchdoIneedtoknowaboutwhereheistoknowwhatstatementhewas

makingorwhatthoughthewasexpressing,inthatsenseunderwhich,iftrue,itis

true absolutely? If someone utters an ambiguous sentence, his hearers may

understanditinaparticularway,whetherasheintendedornot;wemayspeak

also,notonlyofhowthespeakermeantit,butofhowhewasunderstandingit.

(1993:60)


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This firstreason resideswithadistinctionbetweenwhata typeofexpression

meanswhatthestandingmeaningoftheexpressiontypeisandwhatissaid

by the use of that expressionwhat thought is expressed by the use of the

expressiononanoccasion.Thesecondreasonresideswithadistinctionbetweenpossession of a capacity to understand expression types or utterances and

properexerciseofthatcapacityonparticularoccasions.Dummettfocusesupon

the latter reason in response towhathe takes tobeWittgensteins refusal to

acknowledgeoccurrentunderstanding:

it is difficult to see how it can be maintained that no occurrent notion of

understandingisrequired:foritispossibletobeperplexedbyasentenceonfirst

hearing,throughafailuretotakeinitsstructure,andtoattainanunderstandingof

itonreflection.(1993:103)4

Whenthetwotypesofreasonaredistinguished,theneedforanatleastfourway

distinction emerges: (i) dispositional understanding of standingmeaning; (ii)

occurrentunderstandingofstandingmeaning;(iii)dispositionalunderstanding

ofwhatissaidinparticularutterances;and(iv)occurrentunderstandingofwhat

issaid.

To see the need for (i)(iv), consider attending to an utterance of the

sentencetypein(1):

(1)Heistoointelligenttoexpectustobeat.

A typical response to an utterance of (1) would be blank incomprehension:

absence of occurrent understanding even of the standing meaning of the

sentence type employed. On reflection, however, one is able to take in its

structure, and to attain understanding. To a good first approximation, the

standingmeaningof(1)isgivenin(2):

(2) A contextually determinedmale is too intelligent for one toexpect a

contextually specified group including the speaker to beat the

contextuallydeterminedmale.


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Sincethisfeatureof(1)isaccessibleonreflection,itisplausiblethatoneanyway

had dispositional understanding of the sentence type. Clearly, occurrent

understandingofthesentencetypedoesnotsufficeforoccurrentunderstandingoftheutterance:forthat,oneneedstograspwhatwassaidintheutterance,in

thesenseinwhichwhatwassaiddeterminestruthconditions.5Andforthat,one

wouldneed tobeinapositiontoascertain (at least) the referents of he and

us.6Inatleastathinsense,thefactthatonewouldordinarilybeabletodothis

supports theappropriateness of attributingdispositionalunderstandingof the

utterancei.e.acapacitytofigureoutwhatwassaidintheutterance.Butone

mighthedgehereifthetransitionfromoccurrentgraspofmeaningtooccurrent

graspofwhatissaidrequiredtheacquisitionofspecificcognitivecapacitiesfor

instance, if, in order to grasp occurrently what the speaker said, one had to

acquireacapacitytothinkabouthimthroughbecomingperceptuallyacquainted

withthemaledemonstratedbythespeaker.7

Afurtherdistinctioncanbedrawnatthispointbetweenthestatethatis

theupshotofonescomingtounderstandaparticularutterance,andtheepisodic

achievementthroughwhichoneentersthatstate.Andoccurrentunderstanding

isnotentirelyappropriateforuseinapplicationtothestateratherthanitsonset,

aswitnesstheoddityofcombinationofoccurrentwithotherverbsforstates,as

in occurrent knowledge, occurrent belief, etc.8 However, emphasis on the

distinction between states and episodes can be suppressed in the present

context. What matters here is the distinction between a mere capacity to

understandonoccasionandtheupshotsofproperexerciseofthatcapacityonan

occasion,whateverthespecifictemporalprofileofthelatter.9

I propose in the remainder to focus upon occurrent understanding, or

grasp, of what is said. And I shall prescind, as far as is practicable, from

consideration of constitutive connections amongst the four categories, except

those that arise due to occurrent understanding involving the exercise of

dispositional understanding.Wewill thus be attending to phenomena at the

interface between understanding language and understanding the users of

language whilst attempting to ignore issues that arise on either side of the

interface.


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somethingsimilar.Theimmediatehypothesishastheadvantagethatitinvolves

onlyminimal departure fromwhatwouldordinarily be the casewereone to

understandFlorencesutterance.Butitsuffersfromnumerousdisadvantages.

Thehypothesiscanbeunderstoodinatleastthreeways.First,itcanbeunderstoodasembodyingtheclaimthatonesunderstandingofanutteranceisa

simplematterofonesknowingwhatwassaidinthatutteranceandsoisneutral

with respect to anymore specific account of how one knowswhat was said.

Second,itcanbeunderstoodasembodyingtheclaimthatonesunderstandingof

anutteranceisabrutalmatterofonesknowingwhatwassaidinthatutterance

andsorequiresthatthereisnomorespecificaccountofhowoneknowswhat

was said. Third, it can be understood as embodying the claim that ones

understanding of anutterance is anunspecified matter of ones knowing in a

particularwaywhatwassaid.

Theunspecifiedunderstandingofthehypothesis,withitsuncomfortable

conjunctionofacceptanceof thepossibilityof furtherspecificationwithrefusal

to supply it, can be rejected immediately in the present context. Reasons for

rejectingthesimpleandbrutalunderstandingsarealittlelessstraightforward.

Toafirstapproximation,bothshouldberejectedduetotheirrespectivefailures

appropriately to distinguish understanding from other forms or ways of

knowing,eitherthroughfailingtomarkunderstandingofffromotherformsor

waysofknowing,orthroughmarkingunderstandingoffinawaythatrendersits

standingmysterious. I shallbegin toexplain those failingsby considering the

hypothesisthatunderstandingisasimplematterofknowingwhatwassaid.

Seeingthingscanputoneinapositiontohavepropositionalknowledge

aboutthosethings.Andwethinkofseeingthingsasaspecificwayinwhichone

canbeputinaposition toknowaboutthosethings,awaydistinctfrombeing

putinapositiontoknowthroughunderstanding.Thepointisnot(yet)thatan

accountofunderstandingmustunderwritespecialtreatmentofunderstanding;

butrather,thattheaccountofunderstandingmustnotdisruptspecialtreatment

ofothercases.Yetthesimpleunderstandingofthehypothesisisconsistentwith

casesof knowledge throughsensory perceptionfor instance, seeing that the

game has begun or hearing that the clock has stoppedalso being cases of

understanding. Hence, the simple understanding of the hypothesis fails


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appropriately todistinguishunderstanding fromotherwayswehaveofbeing

(orcomingtobe)inapositiontoknow.

Oneresponseatthispointwouldbetorejectthecomplaintaspremised

onafailuretoexploitalloftheresourcesavailabletothedefenderofthesimplehypothesis.Thehypothesisis,notsimplythatunderstandingofanutterancemay

beanyformofpropositionalknowledgeaboutit,butalso,morespecifically,that

itisamatterofbeinginapositiontohavepropositionalknowledgeofwhatwas

said in the utterance. And, the response continues, the special nature of the

objectsofunderstanding,thattheyarefactsconcerningwhatwassaid,forcesthe

requireddistinctionamongstourwaysofbeingputinapositiontoknow.Forthe

involvementofwhat is not senseperceptiblei.e. contentinwhatwas said

meansthatonecannotinotherspecificwaysi.e.byseeing,hearing,etc.come

byknowledgeconcerningwhatwassaid.AsTylerBurgeputsit,

We do not perceive the contents of attitudes that are conveyed to us; we

understand them. We perceive and have perceptual beliefs about word

occurrences. We may perceive them as having a certain content and subject

matter,butthecontentisunderstood,notperceived.(Burge,1993:478)

Thereisroomfordiscussionatthispointconcerningtheunderstandingofthe

bounds of the (sense) perceptible required by the envisaged defence of the

simpleunderstandingofthehypothesis.Inparticular,thosewhowishtoemploy

thedefenceandwhoalsowishtoendorseaviewofsenseperceptionsasbearers

of propositional contentwill have work to do in ensuring a difference in the

modesofengagementwith content involved inperception and understanding

thatwouldmakeappropriateBurgesdifferentialattitude.Anditisnotobvious

thatmaking out the requireddistinctionwouldnot require goingbeyond the

simplehypothesis.Butamoreimmediateproblemwiththeenvisageddefenceof

thesimplehypothesisisthat,ratherthanevadingtheneedfurthertospecifythe

nature of understanding, it positively invites further specification. For the

distinctionwith senseperception relies, not upon the impossibilityofsensory

engagement with content, but rather upon the impossibility of engagement


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throughunderstandingwith the proper objects of sense. Andmaking out that

impossibilitywouldseemtorequireasubstantiveaccountofunderstanding.

The brutal understanding of the hypothesis has the resources to

distinguishunderstandingfromknowledgegotthroughsenseperception.Onitsbrutalunderstanding,thehypothesisprovidesanegativespecificationoftheway

ofcomingtoknowcharacteristicofunderstanding,accordingtowhichthereis

nomorespecificcharacterisationofthewayofcomingtoknowthatconstitutes

understanding.Onthisview,whatdistinguishesbeinginapositiontoknowon

thebasisofseeing,hearing,etc.,frombeinginapositiontoknowasamatterof

understanding is that in the former cases, by contrast with the latter, it is

possiblefurthertospecifythewayinwhichoneknows.Bycontrastwithcasesof

knowledgegotthroughseeing,hearing,etc.,acompleteanswertothequestion,

how one knows what was said in that utterancewhere the question

presupposesthatwehaveanexhaustiveanswertoallsubquestionspertaining

toperceptualsources,forinstancethequestionofhowyouwereinapositionto

knowaboutthatutteranceratherthanthisonemightbe:Onejustdoes.

Although it is plausible that the brutal hypothesis can underwrite a

distinction between understanding and senseperceptual sources of epistemic

position,itappearsunabletoregisteradistinctionbetweenunderstandingand

othersources.Atleast that issoonthe plausible view thatwith respect toat

least certain basic pieces of ones a priori knowledge, there is no articulate

answertothequestionofhowoneknowsthem.10Onthatviewofbasicapriori

knowledge,thebrutalhypothesisfailstoacknowledgeagenuinedistinction,by

classifying understanding together with any way of having nonperceptual

knowledgeor,atleast,withallwaysofhavingsuchknowledge forwhichno

articulate characterisation is available. And the immediate corollary of that

failure is apt to appear even more pressing. By classifying understanding

together with basic a priori knowledge, it treats understanding as a way of

havingsuchknowledge.Andthatwillseemtomanytocountdecisivelyagainst

thehypothesis.

The consequence will seem decisive against the brutal hypothesis to

manytheorists,thoughnottoall.Foroneprominentexample,Burgeisrendered

immune tothepresentchargebecausehe anyway holdsthat, inat leastsome


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intellection.Althoughsuchanaccountwouldgobeyondthesimpleidentification

ofunderstandingwithknowingwhatwassaid,itwoulddosobydrawingonlyon

specificationsanywayimplicatedincharacterisingitscomponentachievements.

Second thoughts serve to scotch the suggestion. Although the proposedaccount is able to distinguish understanding from the upshots of sense

perceptionorintellection,itisunable,withoutsupplementation,todistinguishit

fromothercasesofknowledge got throughboth.For one example, it appears

unable, absent supplementation, to distinguish understanding from ordinary

cases of knowing on the basis of sense perception, where this involves the

applicationofconceptssointellectiontothedeliverancesofthesenses.For

another example, it appears unable, without further ado, to distinguish

understanding from a posteriori knowledge of necessities, where such

knowledgeistheupshotofintegratedoperationsintypicalcases,inferentially

integratedoperationsofintellectionandperception.

Thediscussionto thispointhasbeen premisedon theassumptionthat

basic a priori knowledge is not subject to further specification. Perhaps that

assumption is the villain.Lets suppose, then, that basicapriori knowledge is

subjecttofurtherspecificationperhaps,forexample,asknowledgegotthrough

intellection or reflection. Obviously, the supposition is subject to its own

explanatorydemands,inparticularthedemandforanaccountofthepowersof

intellectionandreflection. Buteven supposing those demandsdischarged, the

consequent accountofaprioriknowledgewouldbeunable tosave thebrutal

hypothesis. Understanding would be not only special, by virtue of its simple

distinctionfromotherformsorwaysofknowing,butalsoanoddity,byvirtueof

themannerofthatdistinction.Itwouldbetheonlyformorwayofknowingnot

subject to further specification. And the mystery occasioned by that special

standing is deepened by the observation that it would be a brutal way of

knowingtimeboundcontingencies,e.g.concerningwhosaidwhat,andwhen.By

far the most natural view at this point is that no obvious version of the

hypothesisthatunderstandingofanutteranceisknowledgeofwhatwassaidin

thatutteranceshouldbeaccepted.Rather,ifunderstandingisaformorwayof

knowing,thenitisaspecificformorwayofknowing.


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The conclusion to this point is supported by an observation of

Christopher Peacockes. Peacocke observes that it is possible to know what

someone has said in a particular utterance without understanding their

utterance.Forinstance,someoneintheknowmighttellyouthat,inproducingaparticularutterance, Florencesaidthat Viswanathan is disqualified.Supposing

appropriateconditions aremet, it ispossibletoacquireknowledge fromsuch

testimony. Hence, one might acquire knowledge that Florence said that

Viswanathanisdisqualifiedonthebasisoftestimony,soindependentlyofones

understanding Florences utterance to that effect.13 A similar result can be

achievedbyconsideringthedifferencebetweenmerelycomingtoknow,through

beingtold, thatanutteranceof(1)says that (2) and coming,perhaps through

engagementwith (2), simply tounderstandanutterance of(1). Inaddition to

supplyingimmediatesupporttotheconclusionthatunderstandingisnotsimply

knowledgeofwhatwassaid,Peacockesobservationbolstersaninterveningstep

in the argument. For it indicates thatunderstanding isnot distinguished from

other formsofknowledge simply byvirtue ofbeingknowledge specifically of

whatwassaid.Anditsuggeststhatifunderstandingisaformorwayofknowing

whatwassaid,thenitisapeculiarlyimmediateformorway.

4.Intakeanduptake.

Anaturalhypothesisatthispointwouldbethatunderstandingisaspecificform

ofpropositionalknowledge, oradeterminatewayofhaving thedeterminable,

propositional knowledge, akin to other specific forms, or ways of having,

propositionalknowledge,e.g.seeingthatsuchandsuchandrememberingthat

suchandsuch.However,pursuitofthecomparisonwithotherspecificforms,or

ways,ofknowingsuggestsanalternativehypothesis.

Consider seeing that the game has started. If we accept that this is a

specificform,orway,ofknowingthatthegamehasstartedinparticular,thatit

isadifferentform,orway,ofknowingfromhearingthat,orrememberingthat,

thegamehasstartedthenitispressingtosayinwhatitsspecificitylies.Andan

obviousanswerwouldbethat seeing that the gamehas started isamatter of

knowing, by seeing, that the game has started.14 By parity, then, one would


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naturallypredictthat,ifunderstandingisaspecificformofknowing,thenitisa

matterofknowingbyunderstanding.Andifoneunderstoodthecharacterisation

ofthespecificformsofknowinginvolvedhereasgoingviaappealtoanepisodic

basis for the acquisitionofknowledgefor example,anepisodeofseeing thegame start, or of understanding Florences utterancethen it might appear

natural to view the understanding of an utterance, not as the output of an

epistemicachievement,butratherasitsepisodicinput.

The suggested understanding of the structure of specific forms of

knowledge isnot immediately forced.For onemightview the knowbying

specification as indicating involvementof a specific epistemic capacity, rather

than specific input to a general epistemic capacity. For present purposes, weneedntattempttodecidetheissuebetweenthetwounderstandings,forthereis

reasontothinkthat,whateveritspreciseroleindeterminingepistemicstanding,

exercises of dispositional understanding can leave a mark in consciousness

independent of the achievement of epistemic standing. And itwould then be

naturaltoviewthoseepisodesascasesofunderstanding.

Areasontothinkthatexercisesofdispositionalunderstandingcanmake

apsychologicaldifferenceindependentoftheachievementofepistemicstanding

isprovidedbythepossibilityofrationalwithholdingofbeliefaboutwhatissaid

consistent with exercise of understanding otherwise suitable to underwrite

knowledgeofwhatissaid.15Thestructureofthecaseissimilartoananalogous

case for seeing. Inthat case,we beginwitha situation inwhichone sees that

suchandsuch,for instanceasituation inwhichone sees thatachesspieceis

black.Inthatsituation,oneknowsbyseeingthatthechesspieceisblack.Since

knowing that the chesspiece is black entails believing that the chesspiece is

blackatleastmodulothesubjectsrationalityandtheirabilitytobelievethat

thechesspieceisblackonebelievesthatthechesspieceisblack.Butonemight

be inalmost preciselythe samepositionwith respect toonesperceptual and

epistemic standing towards the chess piecewhilst withholdingbelief that the

chesspieceisblack.Ifonehasapparentlygoodreasonsforwithholdingbelief

perhaps one has, or appears to have, good reason for thinking that one is

undergoingabrainmanipulationthatwouldmakeonlyredchesspiecesappear

black to onethen ones withholding belief might be rationally permissible.


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Hence,onemightrationallywithholdbeliefand,so,failtoknowthatthechess

pieceisblack.Plausibly,onemightnonethelessseethechesspiece,andthechess

pieces colour.Moregenerally, the upshot of exerciseofones seeing capacity

mighthavethesamepotentialtodetermineonesepistemicstandingassuchanupshot would have in a healthy doxastic environment. For instance, if the

apparent reason for withholding belief were extinguished, thenceteris

paribusit isplausiblethatonewouldbe inapositiontoknowthatthechess

pieceisblack.

Inthecaseofunderstanding,wecanbeginwithasituationinwhichone

knowson thebasisofunderstanding thatFlorencehassaidthatthegamehas

started.Inthiscase,itappearsplausiblethatonemightinalmostpreciselythe

samewayundergoanexerciseof onescapacitytounderstand inacontext in

whichonerationallywithholdsbelieffromthepropositionthatFlorencehassaid

thatthegamehasstarted.OnemightstilltakeinFlorencessayingthatthegame

has started even if apparently reasonable doubts about brain manipulation

preventedonefrommakingepistemicuseofwhatonetookin.Moregenerally,

onemightbeinapositionsuchthat,ifonesapparentreasonsforwithholding

beliefwere extinguished,thenceterisparibusonewouldbeinapositionto

knowthatFlorencehadsaidthatthegamehasstarted.16

Isuggestedthat,giventhedistinctionbetweenthenonepistemicupshot

ofexerciseofacapacitytounderstandandknowledgeattainedonthebasisof

that exercise, it would be natural to identify understanding with the upshot

ratherthantheknowledge.Butthedistinctionbetweenupshotandknowledge

doesnotdictateadoptionofthatpositiononthelocationofunderstanding.Given

the distinction, a question arises as to the function of knowledgeand, in

particular,thebeliefrequirementonknowledgegiventhatapparentlyonecan

takeinelementsofonesenvironmentinitsabsence.Andaplausibleanswerto

thatquestionananswer givencredence byreflectiononwhatis lacking ina

subjectwhomistakenlywithholdsbeliefinwhattheytakeinisthatknowledge

of a fact is what allows one to exploit that factto have that fact serve as a

reasonforoneinonestheoreticalandpracticalreasoning.Onthatview,what

ismissing,whenonewithholdswhatwouldotherwisebereasonablebeliefabout

whatonetakesin,isacapacitytohaveonespracticalandtheoreticalposition


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controlledbyhow things are.17 If that is right, then exercisesof a capacity to

understandthatdonotresultinknowledge,likeexercisesofacapacitytoseea

black chess pieces colour that do not result in seeing that the chess piece is

black,mightbethoughttoinvolveaformofcognitiveblindness.18

Andwemightthenratheridentifyunderstandingwithaspecificformofopennesstothefacts

aboutwhathasbeensaid,ratherthanwiththetypeofinputthatdeterminesits

specificform.

Again,we arenotrequiredfor present purposesto take a standon the

precise locationofunderstanding.Wehave seen grounds for requiring, of an

accountofunderstanding,thatitgiveaccountsbothoftheepisodesbywhichone

takes in what is saidwhat I shall refer to as an account of intake

understandingandalsooftheformofopennesstowhatonetherebytakesin

that enables one to exploit facts about what is said in ones theoretical and

practicalreasoningwhatIshallrefertoasanaccountofuptakeunderstanding.

I shall turn, in the next section, to the question of the form of uptake

understanding,inthehopethataddressingthatquestionmightprovidecluesas

tothefurtherspecificationofintake.

5.Uptakeandknowledgeoftruth-conditions.

If openness to what one takes in through understanding is a matter of

understandingthatsuchandsuch,inthewaythatopennesstowhatonetakesin

throughseeingisamatterofseeingthatsuchandsuch,thenitistooamorphous

asubjectmattertowarrantfocussedattention.Foronecanseethatachesspiece

is black without seeing the chess pieces colour, for instance by seeing the

coloursoftheotherchesspiecesinaset.AndonecanunderstandthatFlorence

said, in a demonstrated utterance, that the game has started without

understandinganutteranceofFlorencestotheeffectthatthegamehasstarted,

for instance by understanding testimony from someone other than Florence.

Whatisrequiredisarestrictiontotheepistemicpositionsonecanoccupyjust

through exercise of ones capacity to understand. Put another way, what is

wanted is an account of epistemic standing that would be (with appropriate

modalqualification)bothnecessaryandsufficientforuptake.


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Therequirementforanaccountofepistemicstandingthatwouldbeboth

necessaryandsufficientforuptakehasobviousaffinitieswitharequirementof

Donald Davidsons, according to which a theory of meaning for a particular

languageshouldexplicitlystatesomethingknowledgeofwhichwouldsufficeforinterpreting utterances of speakers of the language to which it applies

(Davidson,1976:171).TherearetworelevantdifferencesbetweenDavidsons

formulationandours.First,Davidsonseeksanaccountoffacts,ortruths,thatare

exploited by thosewho understand utterances, rather than an account of the

way(s) inwhich those facts, or truths, are exploited. That provides sufficient

grounds for Davidsons decision not to join us in requiring an account of

knowledgethatisnecessaryforopennesstowhatoneunderstands,groundsthat

Davidsonseekstobolsterthroughgeneralscepticismconcerningtheprobityof

the more demanding aim.19 Second, and related, Davidson seeks to provide

sufficientconditionsforbeinginapositiontointerpret(hisversionofuptake)

throughastatement of the facts, ortruths,knowledgeofwhichwouldsustain

abilitytointerpret.Bycontrast,ourformulationleavesopenwhetherDavidsons

aim is, in full generality, sustainable, by allowing that understanding might

dependuponsomethingotherthanpropositional(i.e.stateable)knowledge.20

Davidsonsproposalformeetinghisrequirementisthatknowledgeofthe

output theoremofan interpretative truth theory that applies toanutterance,

togetherwithknowledge that itwas a theoremofsuch a truththeory,would

suffice for uptake of that utterance.21 Lets begin by considering whether

Davidsons proposal can be transposed into an answer toour questionabout

uptake.Sounderstood,itbecomesthehypothesisthattheknowledgeinvolvedin

Davidsons proposal is both necessary and sufficient for uptake. For example,

uptakeofFlorencesutteranceof(6)wouldbeamatterofknowingthat(7),as

the theorematic element of an interpretative truth theory coveringFlorences

utterance,u.

(6)Viswanathanwillwin.

(7)uistrueiffViswanathanwillwin.


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Fromtheperspectiveofourrequirement,thehypothesishastwomainbenefits

butsuffersfromatleastonecriticalflaw.

The first main benefit is that the hypothesis sustains an attractive

requirementthatIshallcallthetransparencyofunderstanding.Indiscussingthelogicalstatusofsupposition,Dummettnotesthatitisnotlogicallyanimperative

for,heobserves,

Icould,havingsaid,Thinkofanumber,askHaveyoudonesoyet?,butit

wouldbeajokeifIaskedthatquestionhavingsaid,Supposethewitnessis

tellingthetruth.(Dummett,1973:309)22

As is appropriate, Dummett doesnt explain the joke. One obvious source of

humour is the inappropriate form of the verb. In order for supposition tobe

somethingonecoulddo,sosomethingonecouldbeordereddoto,itwouldneed

tobeabletostandfortheoutcomeofaspecifiedprocess.Andthatwouldrequire

theverbsupposetotake(distinctive23)progressiveform,contrarytofact.24But

a second potential source is brought out more clearly by the imperative,

Entertainthethoughtthatthewitnessistellingthetruth.25Thesecondsource

is that one cant understand the order to entertain the thought, or idly to

suppose, without complying thereby with its demand. The transparency of

understandingisresponsibleforthelattereffect,wherebyonecannotingeneral

understand an utterance without entertaining a thought that it is used to

express.More carefully, thetransparencyofunderstandingis therequirement

thatonewhohasuptakeoftheexpressionofaparticularthoughtistherebyina

positiontotreatreasonsfororagainstacceptingthethoughtitselfasreasonsfor

or against endorsing the thought registered through understanding. For

instance,accordingtotransparency,onewhohasuptakeoftheexpressionofthe

thoughtthatViswanathanwillwinisinapositiontotreatreasonsfordenying

that Viswanathan will win as reasons for denying what they understand as

havingbeenexpressed.Inthatway,whatisimmediatelybeforeonesmind,by

virtue ofonesunderstandingofanutterance, is the (putative) subjectmatter

determinedbythethought,ratherthan,forexample,thethoughtitselfbeingthe

immediateobjectofonesthinking.


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ThetransparencyrequirementiscloselyconnectedwithJohnMcDowells

observationthatourmostbasicengagementswithwhatspeakerssayareways

ofacquiringinformationaboutthesubjectmatterofwhattheysayratherthan

about what the speakers have said or believe.26

It is weaker than therequirement that all thoughtsbe transparently communicable, so that for any

thought of any thinker, it is possible for another thinker to entertain that

thought.Thelatterrequirementfacesobviousdifficultiesarisingfromthespecial

natures of certain indexical thoughts.27 And it may be that similar difficulties

afflict the less demanding requirement for transparency of understanding. In

thatcase,oronother grounds,onemightconsidera furtherweakening tothe

requirementthatunderstandingtheexpressionofathoughtwithsubjectmatter

P involves entertaining a thought with subject matter P.28 Further wrinkles

mighttheninvolvespecificationofadditionalconditionsontherelationbetween

expression and entertaining. The requirement obviously warrants further

articulationanddefence,butitsprovisionalendorsementwillbeharmlessinthe

present,exploratorycontext.

ThehypothesisderivedfromDavidsonsproposal sustains transparency

inthe followingway.Wehaveit thatFlorencesaid thatViswanathanwillwin

and so gave expression to the thought that Viswanathan will win. Hence,

according to transparency, understanding Florences utterance must involve

entertaining the thought that Viswanathan will win. The required result is

secured by the hypothesis because one cannot know that (7) without

entertaining(7),andsowithoutentertaininga thoughtofitsrighthandside,to

theeffectthatViswanathanwillwin.29

Afirstobviousalternative to the present hypothesisis thatuptakeis a

matterofknowingwhatwassaidinanutteranceforinstance,thatuptakeof

whatFlorencesaidinuisamatterofknowingthatwhatFlorencesaidinuwas

thatViswanathanwillwin.Knowingthatisamatterofknowingwhichthought

Florence expressed rather than a matter of entertaining the thought she

expressed.Toseethedifference,andalsoanaspectofitsimportance,consider

thatitisconsistentwithknowingthatFlorencehassaidthatViswanathanwill

win that one should fail to think in accord with the truth conditions of what

Florencesaid.Forinstance,itisconsistentwithaninabilitytotakereasonsfor


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thinking that Viswanathan did not win as reasons for thinking thatwhat one

took Florence to have said is false. Indeed, it is consistent with apparently

rationalrefusaltotreatwhatFlorencesaidashavingtruthconditions,forone

might have apparent grounds for endorsing a view of expressed thoughtsaccording towhich they do not.30 Notice that, if thepossibility of this type of

blockontheappreciationofreasonsmarksoffknowledgeofwhatwassaidfrom

understandingproper,thenitwouldprovideanatleastpartialexplanationfor

Peacockesobservationthatonecanknowwhatwassaidwithoutunderstanding.

Thepartial explanationwould be thatmere knowledge, unlike understanding,

fails the transparency requirement. Anyway, if we assume the transparency

requirement, then the present hypothesis has a key advantage over the first

obviousalternative.

Asecond,related,benefitofthehypothesisisthatitensureswhatIshall

call appreciation of the expressive connection between an utterance and the

thoughtoneunderstandsittoexpress.Appreciationofexpressiveconnectionisa

matterofappreciatingthatreasonsfororagainstwhatoneunderstandstohave

beenexpressedarereasonsfororagainsttheacceptabilityoftheutterancein

whichitwasexpressed.Appreciationissustainedbythehypothesisbecauseif

onederivesknowledgeof(7)fromknowledgeofaninterpretativetruththeory

coveringu,thenone isinapositiontoknowthatthetruthvalueofuiscoeval

with the truthvalue of the thought that one entertains on the basis of

understanding.Oneisthereforeinapositiontoderivereasonstotake utobe

true(/false)fromreasonstobelieve(/deny)thatViswanathanwillwinand vice

versa.31 In this case, there is room for a gap to open up, on the hypothesis,

betweenuptakeanditsderivationalexploitation,forsomeonemightknow(7)as

atheoremofaninterpretativetruththeoryandyethaveapparentgroundsfor

rejecting the derivability of coeval status for its rightand left hand sides, due

perhapstoanidiosyncraticunderstandingofthebiconditional. 32Followingthe

earlier suggestion about Peacockes observation, the gap here might help to

explainwhytestimonialknowledgeoftruthconditionsappearsnottosufficefor

understanding. But perhaps it could be argued that someone with an

idiosyncraticconceptionofthebiconditionalwouldnonethelessbeinaposition


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toappreciateanexpressiveconnectionbetweenutteranceandcondition,despite

theirnotbeinginapositionproperlytoexploitwhattheyappreciate.

Ontheassumptionthattransparencyistoberespected,asecondobvious

alternativetothepresenthypothesisisaviewaccordingtowhichuptakeofwhatissaidinanutteranceisamattersimplyofentertaininganexpressedthought,

withoutentertainingthethoughtonthebasisofknowingatruththeoremforthe

utterance.Suchaviewwouldobviouslypreservetransparency,butatacost.For

someonemightentertainthethoughtexpressedinanutterancewithout,soto

speak,appreciatingitashavingbeenexpressedintheutterance.Inparticular,

onewhoentertainedthethoughtexpressedinanutterancemightfailtooccupy

an epistemic position in which reasons to reject the expressed thought are

availabletothemasreasonstorejecttheutterance. 33Hence,thehypothesishas

akeyadvantageoverthesecondobviousalternative.

Althoughthehypothesishasimportantadvantagesoverthetwoobvious

alternatives thatwehaveconsidered, italso suffers froma criticalflaw.34The

flawcanbepresentedasadilemma.

The first horn of the dilemma arises from the demands that the

hypothesis imposes upon uptake. In the first place, the hypothesis secures

transparencyonlybysecuringmore than transparencyappearstodemand. In

ordertoentertainthecontentexpressedbyanutterance,theproposalrequires

that subjects entertain a richer content, embedding a concept of truth. And it

mightreasonablybedeniedthatitisanecessaryconditiononasubjectshaving

uptake that they have, or are required to exercise in uptake, facility with a

conceptoftruth.35Moreover,inthesecondplace,theproposal,aspresented,is

yetmoredemandingonsubjects,sinceitrequiressubjectstoappreciatethatthe

truththeorems that they apply to particular utterances are elements in an

interpretativetruththeory.Again,itmightreasonablybedoubtedthatuptakein

generaldependsuponthesortofreflectiveassuranceprovidedbyknowledgeof

theinterpretativestatusofatruththeoremapplyingtoaparticularutterance. 36

Thefirsthornofthedilemma,then,istheclaimthat,aspresented,theproposal

isimplausiblydemandingofthecapacities,andexercisesofcapacities,involved

inuptake.


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Onthesecondhornof thedilemma is the claim that the featuresof the

hypothesisfoundproblematiconthefirsthornarenotoptional.Obviously,the

core component of the proposal, that transparency and appreciation of

expressiveconnectioninvolveknowledgeoftruththeorems,cannotbeshornofitsapparentlyextraneouselement,thatitmakesuptakedependuponexerciseof

a concept of truth. And the hypothesis secures appreciation of expressive

connection only by requiring, not only that subjects know truththeorems

applyingtoparticularutterances,butalsothattheyknowthatthetheoremsare

elements in an interpretative truththeory. Someone who knew only the bi

conditional theorems,withoutalsoknowing theirpedigree,wouldnot be ina

position to treat reasons for rejecting (/accepting) one side of a theorem as

reasons for rejecting (/accepting) the other. For example, someone in that

position might view reasons for rejecting either side of the biconditional as

reasonsforrejectingthebiconditionalitself. 37Thesecondhornofthedilemma,

then, involves a version of John Fosters infamous objection to Davidsons

proposal, according to which knowledge of what is in fact an interpretative

truththeorem covering an utterance does not suffice for appreciation of the

utterancesexpressionofcontent.38

On the assumption that the hypothesis is too demanding to supply a

necessaryconditiononuptake,therequirementsthatwehavediscernedonan

adequateaccountofuptakemightappear tobe impossible tomeet.That is, it

mightappearimpossibletoprovideanaccountthatislessdemandingthanthe

hypothesis, and yet able to ensure both transparency and appreciation of

expressive connection.And inthat case,onemightbe inclined either toreject

one of the requirements, or to take their conjunction to sustain a sort of

transcendental argument to the effect that the demands imposed by the

hypothesis are appropriate. However,we signalled at the outset anadditional

featureof thehypothesis thatisnot obviously amandatory componentofany

accountofuptake:therequirementthatanaccountofuptaketaketheformofan

accountofthecontentofpropositionalknowledge.Weconsidered,andrejected,

one alternative hypothesis that involves rejection of the view, the hypothesis

thatuptakeisamattersimplyofentertaininganexpressedthought.Buthaving


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madetherequirementexplicit,itisclearthattherearefurtheralternativestobe

exploredbeforeweaccedetooneofthehypotheseswehavealreadyconsidered.

Oneimportantalternative,defendedinrecentworkbyIanRumfitt,gives

uptheviewinfavourofatreatmentofuptakeasconstituting,notpropositionalknowledgeaboututterances,butrather,asheputsit,

a secondorder cognitive capacity: [in the case of uptake of assertionlike

sayings]onewho possesses it is in a capacity togain newknowledge fromold

(Rumfitt,2005:444).39

Specifically,

Myunderstandinganutteranceu as [assertionlike] sayingthatPputsmeina

position

(a)toknowthatP,intheeventofmycomingtoknowthatuistrue;

(b)toknowthatuistrue,intheeventofmycomingtoknowthat P;

(c)toknowthatuisfalse,intheeventofmycomingtoknowthatnot P;and

(d)toknowthatnotP,intheeventofmycomingtoknowthatuisfalse.

Understanding a[n assertionlike] saying, in other words, allows knowledge to

spreadbackandforthbetweenthesayingscontentandattributionsoftruthtoit,

and between that contents negation and attributions of falsity to the saying

(Rumfitt,2005:443).40

Rumfittsproposalhastwomainadvantagesover thetruththeoreticproposal.

First,Rumfittsproposaldirectlysustainsappreciationofexpressiveconnection,

ratherthanrunningadoglegthroughpropositionalknowledgeofinterpretative

truth theorems. Or, rather, his proposal makes a single requirement on

understanding do the work we earlier divided between transparency and

appreciationof expressive connection. Second,andclosely related, thetype of

appreciation involved in understanding is, on Rumfitts account, sufficiently

demanding that it apparently removes the need for the sort of reflective

assurance of appreciation of expressive connection supplied, on the truth


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theoreticproposal,byknowledgeoftheinterpretativestatusoftheorems.Both

advantages appear to be consequent upon the transition to a view of

understanding as involving secondorder capacities together with a very

demandingconceptionoftheepistemicstandingofthosecapacities. Atthispoint,anaturalquestionaboutRumfittsproposalconcernsintake.

Whataccountofintakewouldservetheproposal,inparticularinunderwriting

someonescomingtobein thetypeofepistemicpositioncharacterisedthrough

(a)(d)?Evensetting asidethe sortsof issuesarising from the finitudeof our

capacities that give rise toa concernwith compositionality, it isnot plausible

thatwesimplybringtobearonutterancespriorknowledgeofthesortdescribed

in (a)(d). At best, we might have such knowledge about the sentence types

instanced inparticularutterances.And thatappears tobethemodeltowhich

Rumfitt wishes to appeal in accounting for the onsetof the understanding of

particularutterances.Rumfittdescribesappreciationoftheconnectionsin(a)

(d)asakintoknowledgeofderivedrulesofinference,inthiscaseascapacities

derivedfromcapacitieswithrespecttorulesgoverningthecontributionofsub

sentential expressions tosentential level rules.41Whatisrequiredofintakein

suchacontextisthatitshouldaffordknowledgeaboutwhichexpressiontypes

are instanced in a particular utterance. In effect, (a)(d) are to be viewed as

derived from a combination of analogues for (a)(d), or their derivational

sources, governing expression types, rather than utterances, together with

subjects competent exercise of abilities to recognise the instancing of those

expressiontypesinparticularutterances.Itisthereforeplausiblethatthesecond

componentthe exercises of abilities to recognise the instancing of sentence

typesprovides Rumfitts account of intake, his account of the onset of

understandingofparticularutterances.

Although Rumfitt does not explicitly endorse the view of intake as

recognitionoftheinstancingofsentencetypes,itistheviewapparentlymostin

accord with the derivational shape of his proposal. And the appearance is

sustainedbythefactthatheprovidesanexplicitaccountoftherecognitionofthe

instancing of sentence types. According to that account, recognition of the

instancingofsentencetypesisamatterofappreciatingtheintentionswithwhich

speakers make some of the noises that they do, where the relevant range of


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intentions are intentions to be recognised as having produced an utterance

instancingoneoranotherspecifictypeofsentence.42

Rumfitts proposal deserves more discussion than I can afford it here.

Indeed, I think that its core, or something close to that core, can provide anaccountofuptake that isquiteplausible.I shallsimplynoteand set asideone

difficultyandthenalltoobrieflypressasecond.

ThedifficultythatIwishsimplytonoteisthat,asstated,theproposalis

more or less as demanding of conceptual resources as the truththeoretic

accountitisdesignedtosurpass.43Forontheassumptionthatbeinginaposition

toknowthatanutterance is trueorfalse demandspossessionofa conceptof

truth or falsity, understanding will, on Rumfitts account, often depend upon

possessionofthoseconcepts.Moreover,attainmentofutteranceunderstanding

requires, on Rumfitts proposal, the manipulation of rich theoretical

machineryalbeit amachinery, notofpropositions,butratherof connections

amongstpropositions.However,what iscentral totheproposalis that uptake

opens a conduit for the transmission of reasons, however those reasons are

characterised, and however precisely the conduit is opened. And it is not

implausible to suppose that the types of reasons available to a subject will

impactuponthetypeofconnectionsamongstreasonsaccessibletothesubject.If

thatisright,thenitisplausiblethatmoreminimalanaloguesof(a)(d)mightbe

providedtocharacterisetheunderstandingofsubjectswholackfacilitywitha

conceptoftruth.44Andtheconcernaboutthederivationalmachinerythatmust

bemanipulatedinordertoachieveunderstandingisreadilyabsorbedintothe

followingdifficulty.

The difficulty that I wish to press concerns the interaction between

Rumfitts account of uptake and what appears to be his favoured account of

intake.Inthefirstplace,noticethatneitherRumfittsaccountofintake,norhis

accountofuptake,sustainstransparency.Foronemightbeinthepositionthat

Rumfittdescribesasunderstandingandyethavenoviewatallaboutanyofthe

reasonsthatonesunderstandingconnects.Inthatcase,onemightunderstand u

without entertaining a thought that u expresses. As noted, Rumfitt in effect

collapses transparency and appreciation of expressive connection into

appreciation of (a)(d). Accordingly, ones occurrent understanding of an


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utterance need have no impact upon ones firstorder psychology aside from

ones recognition of the instancing of sentences by utterances. That result

anyway appears phenomenologically offkey. But in the present context, it is

especially problematic. For despite ones initial failure to entertain a thoughtexpressed by an utterance, acquiring knowledge that the utterance is true

immediatelyputsoneinapositiontoentertainthatthoughtthroughacquisition

ofknowledgewiththeexpressedthoughtascontent.Itisasifoneengageswith

the thought expressed by an utterance only when, in addition simply to

understandingtheutterance,onealsoacquiresreasontoendorseortorejectit.45

That indicates an oddity of the proposal, though perhaps not yet an

objection. An objection comes into view when one reflects further on the

embeddedaccountofintake.Whatisrequiredisanaccountofwhatputsoneina

position to secure uptake, sowhat enables one toappreciate the connections

specifiedin(a)(d).Accordingtotheaccountofintakethatfitsmostcomfortably

withthederivationalshapeofRumfittsproposal,whatputsoneinthatposition

isacombinationof (i)onesrecognition thatthe speaker istrying todirectan

instanceofasentencetypeatoneandonesknowledgeofwhichsentencetype

thespeakeristryingtodirectatone46and(ii)onesderivationofasentential

analogue of the type of secondorder capacity characterised through (a)(d)

appropriatetotheintendedsentencetype.Theoddityremarkedaboveturned

onthefactthatthisproposalappearstoinvolve lessthanisinvolvedinordinary

understandingofutterances.Buttheproposalalsoseemstoinvolvemorethanis

involvedinordinaryengagementwithutterances.For it isnotmerely offkey,

but false, to claim that speakers typically have sufficiently detailed intentions

concerningthetypesofexpressionsthattheyusetoserveasappropriateinput

tothetypeofderivationthatRumfittenvisages.Whatspeakerstypicallyintend

issimplytosaythatsuchandsuch,andperhapstobeunderstoodinaccordwith

theirintentions,withoutprejudiceastothespecificlinguisticmeansbywhich

they achieve those ends. And competent auditors are typically able to

understand utterances despite failing to recognise the details either of

expressiondirected intentions, or the specifics of the expression types with

whichtheyareconfronted.47


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Whatis,perhaps,themostpressingdifficultyforRumfittsproposalarises

fromtheburdenimposedonuptakeasaconsequenceoftheaccountofintakeas

recognition of the instancing of sentence types. The reasonconnections

discerned through uptake, between sentence types, or their instancing inutterances, and thoughts, are contingent: the sentence types couldhavebeen

reasonconnectedwithdifferentthoughts.Anditisdifficulttoseehowepistemic

standingwithrespecttosuchastructurecouldbeacquiredexceptviasomething

akintoinductionfromcasesinthiscase,inductionovercasesinwhichonewas

inapositiontoknowbothP(/notP)andthatuistrue(/false).Butinthatcase,it

is not clear that being in an epistemic position, so derived, would differ in

significantrespectsfromthepositionofsomeonewhoknew,onsimilarinductive

grounds,anappropriatetruththeorem.Inparticular,itisnotclearthatinduction

couldputoneinapositiontotreatknowledgethatPasputtingoneinaposition

toknowthatuistrue,ratherthanasputtingoneinapositiontoknowthateither

uistrueorthereisacounterexampletotheinductivelybasedgeneralisation.

Moreover,evenifitwerepossibletoachievetherequiredpositiononthebasis

of something akin to induction, it is far from clear that ordinary speakers

typicallyexploitsuchameanstothatend.Forordinaryspeakerstypicallylack

detailedappreciationoftheevidentialbaserequiredforsuchinduction,andthey

wouldtypicallyallowtheirapparentunderstandingtotrumpconclusionsdrawn

fromsuchabase.48

Putanotherway,ifonewereinthecognitivepositiondescribedthrough

(a)(d),thenonewouldbe ina betterpositionthansomeonewhohadmerely

inductive knowledge of a relevant truththeorem.But it is not clearhow one

couldattainthatpositiononthebasisofacombinationofthesortofintakethat

Rumfitt appears to allow and ordinarily ascertained, or ascertainable, facts

concerningthecontingentcorrelationsamongsttheleftandrighthandsidesof

(a)(d). Rumfitt seeks to explain knowledge of the type of reasonconnection

involvedinhisproposalbyacomparisonwithknowledgeofrulesofinferencein

logic.IfIamright,thenthecomparisonlimpsatacriticaljuncture.Whatsustains

thespecialpowersofappreciationofreasonconnectionsinlogicappearstobea

property that those connections have and that the connections involved in

Rumfittsproposallack:aprioriaccessibility.49


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6.Conclusion.

The foregoing constitutes a preliminary explorationof some issues that arisewhenanattemptismadetodevelopanaccountoflinguisticunderstanding.The

upshotisnotyetanaccountofunderstanding,eveninsketchform.ButIbelieve

thatmanyofthepiecesrequiredtodevelopatleastasketcharenowinplace.In

particular, I believe that an account of uptake close to the core of Rumfitts

proposalmaybecorrect.Whatisrequiredisawayofintegratingthatcorewith

anadequateaccountofintake.Ishantattempttomakegoodonthatsuggestion

now.AsIsaidatthestart,myaimhereistomakeamildpleaforattentionto

understanding,byadvertisingsomemajortargetsforreflection.Anditwouldbe

inappropriate,giventhataim,torenderfurtherattentionsuperfluous.

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1 Thanks for very helpful discussion toBill Brewer, Stephen Butterfill, Naomi

Eilan, ChristophHoerl,HemdatLerman, JohannesRoessler, Sarah Sawyer,and

especiallyMatthewSoteriou.ThispaperisdedicatedtothememoryofNadine

SheldonGreen.

2 Dummett rarely frames the claim in the strong form according to which a

theoryofmeaningshould be a theoryofunderstanding.Hisdiscussionsof the

claim invariably are shaped by the question of proper integrationof theories,

ratherthantheidentityoftheirtargets,andarehighlysensitivetothedifficulty

of adequately specifying the integration requirement. Seee.g.Dummett,1981,

1991.Forgeneraldiscussionoftheintegrationrequirement,seeSmith,1992.

3Seee.g.Moore,1989.Theissuesherearecloserelativesofquestionsaboutthe

integration of knowledge and fact pursued by Peacocke, 1999, and questions

abouttheirseparabilitypursuedbyFine,2005.

4ThequestionwhetherWittgensteinrefusedtorecogniseanoccurrentsenseof

understandisanswerednegativelyinMcDowell,2009.

5 The need for an additional and less demanding notion of what is said is

defendedinTravis,2006.


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6Inaddition,onemightneedtodiscern,notonlythereferentsoftheunspecified

subject of expect and the anaphoric object of beat, but also the specific

contentsoftoo,intelligent,expect,andbeat.Seee.g.Travis,1997.

7SeeMartin,2002,fordiscussionofrelatedissues.

8Occasionedmightbeanimprovementonoccurrentinsuchcontexts.

9Consistentlywithmyunderstandingofwhatittakesforsomethingtobeastate,

IneednttakeissuewithRundle,2001,andBakerandHacker,2005,whoargue

that what we have labelled occurrent understanding is itself a form of

dispositionorability.AlthoughRundleandBakerandHackertakethemselvesto

be in dispute with Dummett with regard to this claim about occurrent

understanding,itisnotclearthatDummetteithertakes,orneedstotake,astand

ontheissueinthediscussionthattheytarget.Andthatwouldbesoevenonthe

episodicunderstandingofoccurrent,fortheonsetofadispositionorabilityis

anepisode.

10 For a discussion and defence of this view of basic a priori knowledge, see

McFetridge,1990.

11Burge,1993,1997,1998,1999.

12 Longworth, 2008b. One reason for the qualification inany straightforward

wayisthatmydisagreementwithBurgeconcernsonlythestatusofcorecases

of human occurrent understanding. And it is consistent with the a posteriori

status of occurrent understanding that it can sustain acquisition (or

transmission)ofapriori knowledgevia testimony, so that it is open tome to

endorseBurgesfurtherclaimthatsuchacquisition(ortransmission)ispossible.

If it is possible, and if it also possible for beings other than use.g. infinite

beingstohaveaprioriknowledgeofwhatissaid,thenitmaybepossiblefor

humanstoacquirefromsuchbeingsaprioriknowledgeofwhatissaid.

13Peacocke,1976.SeealsoFricker,2003.

14Seee.g.Williamson,2000.

15SeeHunter,1998;Longworth,2008a.

16 It is plausible to view the possibility of rational withholding of belief as

markinga linebetweenakindofreceptivityand akindofspontaneity,where

thatlinemarksaboundaryaroundthedomainofcognitionforwhichasubjectis


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32

responsible.Sinceonehasatbestlimitedcontroloverwhatonetakesinthrough

understandingorsenseperception,andsincethecapacitiesthatsubservethat

intake are fallible, allowing intake to encroach on the domain of spontaneity

would have the potential to make one responsible for errors without ones

control.

17Fordiscussionanddefenceofthisviewofa functionofknowledgeinrational

psychology,asanenablingconditionfortheexploitationoffactivereasons,see

Dancy,2000,2008;Hornsby,2008;Hyman,1999,2006;McDowell,1982,1994,

1995;Williamson,2000.

18Itmaybethatthisconditionappliesonlytocreatureswithacapacitytohave

propositionalknowledge,orevencreatureswithacapacitytoknowofthesort

possessed bynormal humans.Perhaps, for example,knowledge wouldnot be

requiredtoplaythisroleincreatureswithaperceptiondesirepsychology.

19Seee.g.Davidson,1984:125,1986.

20 Indeed, our formulation is consistentwith the required epistemic standing

being contentless, as it wouldbe,on some views, if it were a form of purely

practicalknowledge.SeeespeciallyMoore,1997.Formoregeneraldiscussionof

the content of knowledgehow and practical knowledge see Rumfitt, 2003;

Snowdon,2003;StanleyandWilliamson,2001.

21Davidson,1984.

22ThankstoMatthewSoteriouforremindingmeaboutDummettsobservation

andforhelpfuldiscussionofit.

23 Somespeakerswill find acceptable supposing, believing, etc.,butwithout

accordingthemaconstrualdistinctfromsupposes,believes,etc.

24 The closest relevantprocess in the caseofsuppositionwouldbereasoning

underthesupposition.

25HereandthroughoutIuseentertainingasageneric,ordeterminable,forall

specific, or determinate, ways of engagingwith a thought, including thinking,

believing, knowing,etc.AndI shall assume that entertaining logicallycomplex

thoughtsentailsentertainingtheirelementarycomponentthoughts,so that, for

example,entertainingthethoughtthatifViswanathanwillwin,thenhewillnot


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be disqualified, entails entertaining the thought that Viswanathanwill not be

disqualified.

26SeeMcDowell,1980.Forrelateddiscussion,seeBurge,1999;Hornsby,1989;

McDowell,2005.

27 See e.g. Dummett,1981;Frege, 1918/1956;Higginbotham,2002;Peacocke,

1981,1997.

28Twootherpotentialgrounds:(i)Transparencyembodiesacontroversialstand

onthequestionwhetherunderstandinganutterancerequiresengagingaspecific

thought expressed by the utterance, rather than a thought with the same

referenceastheutterance;(ii)Itisimpossibletransparentlytounderstandan

utterance involving the expression of expletive concepts, or thick ethical

concepts,thatonecannot,orwillnot,thinkwith.

29 Transparency is lost on some formulations of Davidsons proposal. For

instance, one of Davidsons formulations has it that whatsomebodyneeds to

know is that some T-theory forL states that (and here thedots are to be

replacedbyaTtheory)(Davidson,1976:174).Ifthatwereallsomebodyknew,

thentheirknowledgewouldnotamounttoentertainingthethoughtexpressed

byatargetutterance.Animprovedformulationwouldaddtherequirementthat

somebody must know that (and here the dots are to be replaced by the

appropriatetheoremofaT-theory).

30Seee.g.McFarlane,2003.

31Thisistoruntogethertwoaspectsofthesituationthatmightotherwisebe

distinguished:(i) appreciationthatuistrueiffthethoughtoneunderstandsto

havebeenexpressed,P,istrueand(ii)appreciation,viatransparency,thatthe

thoughtoneunderstandstohavebeenexpressed,P,istrueiffP.

32Forexample,onemighthaveapparentlyreasonablegroundsforrejectingthe

generalvalidityofmodusponens.Seee.g.McGee,1985,andforrelateddiscussion

Williamson,2003.

33 The concern here is akin to that raised earlier about Burges account of

understanding. A version of the concern is developed in more detail in

Longworth,2008b.


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34

34Toreiterate,thesearenotdisadvantagesofDavidsonsproposalperse,forthat

proposal concerns themetaphysics of the expression of content and not our

modesofaccesstotheexpressionofcontent.

35Acentralcasefordoubtaboutthenecessityevenoffacilitywithaconceptof

truth derives from reflection on the apparent possibility of uptake by small

childrenwhoplausiblylackfacilitywithsuchaconcept.SeeSoames,1989,2008;

Longworth,2008a.

36Cf.Higginbotham,1992.

37 The most obvious case would be one in which a subject knew the bi

conditionalonthebasisofknowingthetruthofbothsidesofthebiconditional.

38SeeFoster,1976.SeealsoDavidson,1976;Higginbotham,1992;Rumfitt,1995;

Soames,1989,2008;Wiggins,1992.

39 See alsoMoores proposal thatunderstanding is (in general) knowledgeof

howtoprocessknowledge(Moore,1997:189).

40SeealsoRumfitt1995,2001.

41Rumfitt,2005:449451.

42Rumfitt,2005:433437.

43Rumfittisundernoillusionaboutthis:445.

44Onesuggestionherewouldbethatanaloguesof(a)(d)mightbeframedin

termsofacapacitytoexploitconnectionsamongstacceptance(/rejection)ofP

andtrust(/distrust)inu.

45Comparetheearlierdiscussionoftheresidueofwithholdingbeliefinwhatone

takes in through understanding. On Rumfitts view, the residue would be

exhaustedbyawarenessoftheinstancingofsentencetypesinutterances.

46Rumfitt,2005:435.

47Forinstance,itisunlikelythatyouarenowinapositiontoreconstructthe

sentencetowhichthisnoteisappended,despite(Ihope)havingunderstoodmy

useofthatsentence.SeeBurge,1999;Hornsby,2005.

48 Alternatively, if one views the connections between sentence types and

thoughtsasnoncontingent,theburdenwillshifttoexplainingrecognitionofthe

instancingofsentencetypessoconstrued,thatis tothederivationof(a)(d)on

thebasisofknowledgeoftheirnoncontingentsententialanalogues.Noticethat


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thepressureisincreasedwhenoneremovesthesimplifyingassumptionthatthe

reasonconnections made available to one through understanding concern

utterances,rather than thingdonebyspeakers. For it thenbecomes apparent

justhowcontingentthereasonconnectionsare,andhowlittleevidencethatthe

connections hold is typically available to ordinary auditors. For discussion of

issuesinthisarea,seeBurge,1999;McDowell,1994.

49 The tradeoff between austerity of intake and extravagance of resources

requiredforuptakebearscomparisonwithasimilarsituationinthetheoryof

perception. Consider, for example, the demands imposed on ones ability to

attainpropositionalknowledgeaboutordinaryobjectsbyasensedataaccount

ofsensoryintake.

plea april draft

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