phpr 2011sep dhs allhazardsreceiptfacilitybestpracticesguidelines
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All Hazards Receipt Facility
Best Practices GuidelinesA Tiered Approach
September 2011
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A Tiered Approach
September 2011
All Hazards Receipt FacilityBest Practices Guidelines
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Prepared by:
The U.S. Army Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC)
Submitted to:
Donald A. Bansleben, Ph.D.
Science and Technology Directorate (S&T)
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Division: Chemical and Biological Defense Division
Thrust: Chemical
Program: Chemical Attack Resiliency
Project: Fixed Laboratory Response Capability
Performer: ECBC
Appropriation Year: FY09
Budget Authority: No Year R&D
Program Manager: Donald A. Bansleben, Ph.D.
Lead Support Staff: Erik Lucas, Ph.D.; Neal W. Cole
Modification to HSHQDC-06-X-00503
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Disclaimer
This document was prepared for the Science and Technology Directorate of the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) under Interagency Agreement HSHQDC-06-X-00503. This document ispresented here in its final version. The contents of this document do not necessarily reflect the views
of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security or any other parts of the U.S. Government, nor do DHS
or any other parts of the U.S. Government endorse the purchase or sale of any commercial products or
services. Peer review comments should be submitted to the DHS program manager below.
Donald A. Bansleben, Ph.D.
Science and Technology Directorate
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
245 Murray Lane
S&T CBD Stop 0201
Washington, DC 20528-0201
202-254-6146
Email: [email protected]
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TableofConten
ts
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Disclaimer .....................................................................................................................................................iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................................... iv
TABLE OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................................... vi
1.0 Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................1
1.1 Scope and Application .......................................................................................................................1
1.2 AHRF Effectiveness ............................................................................................................................2
1.2.1 Containment ............................................................................................................................2
1.2.2 Assurance .................................................................................................................................2
1.2.3 Training ...................................................................................................................................3
1.3 Assumptions ......................................................................................................................................4
2.0 Lessons Learned ......................................................................................................................................5
3.0 Tiered Approach .....................................................................................................................................8
3.1 Tier 1 Description ..............................................................................................................................8
3.2 Tier 2 Description ............................................................................................................................11
3.3 Tier 3 Description ............................................................................................................................14
3.4 Summary .........................................................................................................................................18
4.0 Equipment, Design, & Operational Considerations ............................................................................19
4.1 CBR Filtration ..................................................................................................................................19
4.2 Capabilities and Limitations of Carbon Adsorbers ...........................................................................20
4.3 Glovebox Considerations .................................................................................................................21
4.4 Class II BSCs and Fume Hoods ........................................................................................................24
4.5 Testing of CBR Containment & Filtration Systems ............................................................................27
4.5.1 Leak & Performance Testing ...................................................................................................27
4.5.2 Monthly Inspection ...............................................................................................................28
4.6 Filter Service Life & Replacement Considerations ............................................................................29
4.6.1 Carbon Adsorber Service Life .................................................................................................29
4.6.2 Carbon Adsorber Replacement Considerations ......................................................................294.6.3 HEPA Service Life & Replacement Considerations .................................................................. 30
4.7 Design considerations for building decontamination ......................................................................31
4.7.1 Retention of CBR Agents Released into a Building ................................................................. 31
4.7.2 Design objectives to facilitate decontamination .....................................................................31
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5.0 AHRF Prototype Documentation .........................................................................................................33
5.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................33
5.2 Features of the AHRF Prototype .......................................................................................................36
5.2.1 AHRF Layout ..........................................................................................................................36
5.2.2 Sample Movement & Primary Containment ...........................................................................37
5.2.3 Anteroom & Main Entrance....................................................................................................385.2.4 Change Room ........................................................................................................................38
5.2.5 BSL-2 Area .............................................................................................................................38
5.2.6 Bleaching Station ...................................................................................................................38
5.2.7 BSL-3 Area .............................................................................................................................39
5.2.8 HVAC/Filtration Room ..........................................................................................................41
5.2.9 Utility Room .........................................................................................................................41
5.2.10 Airflow Through the AHRF (HVAC Systems) ........................................................................41
5.2.11 Color Coding & Labeling .....................................................................................................42
5.2.12 Electronic & Computer Systems ...........................................................................................42
5.2.13 Security Cameras & Closed Circuit TV System ......................................................................42
5.2.14 Intercom System ..................................................................................................................43
5.2.15 Fire Alarm & Smoke Detectors .............................................................................................43
5.2.16 Electrical Power Systems & UPS ...........................................................................................43
5.2.17 Water ...................................................................................................................................44
5.2.18 AHRF Entrances, Exits & Interior Doors ...............................................................................45
5.2.19 Mobile Platform Considerations ..........................................................................................45
Appendix A List of CBR Materials ...........................................................................................................47
Glossary ......................................................................................................................................................48
Bibliography ...............................................................................................................................................51
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TABLE OF FIGURES
Figure 1. AHRF Prototype Floor Plan. ............................................................................................................. 8
Figure 2. Photograph of the AHRF Prototype Exterior. ................................................................................... 9
Figure 3. Photograph of the Class III and Class II A2 Biosafety Cabinets in the AHRF Prototype. ................... 9
Figure 4. Photograph of the Receiving Laboratory (BSL-2) in the AHRF Prototype........................................9
Figure 5. Overview of the AHRF Protocol (Tier 1). ...................................................................................... 10
Figure 6. Example Glovebox & Floor Plan for a Tier 2 AHRF. .......................................................................11
Figure 7. Overview of the AHRF Protocol (Tier 2). ...................................................................................... 13
Figure 8. Range of Glovebox Types for Tier 3. ..............................................................................................14
Figure 9. Overview of the AHRF Protocol (Tier 3). ...................................................................................... 17
Figure 10. Example Filter Unit for AHRF Applications. ................................................................................20
Figure 11. Class III BSC (Glovebox) as Illustrated in the BMBL. ................................................................... 22
Figure 12. Interior Design Concept of the AHRF Prototype..........................................................................36
Figure 13. Photograph of a Bleaching Station. .............................................................................................39
TableofFigur
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1.0 Introduct ion
1.1 Scope and Appl ication
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (USEPA), U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Association of Public Health
Laboratories (APHL) have combined efforts to develop, construct, and
implement All Hazards Receipt Facilities (AHRFs) for screening samples
of unknown and potentially hazardous character prior to laboratory analysis.
The effort was initiated in response to requests from state and federal agencies,
particularly public health and environmental laboratories, to help protect
laboratory facilities and staff.
The first two AHRFs are in operation at the Wadsworth Center, a public
health laboratory of the New York State Department of Health, and the
USEPA New England Regional Laboratory in Chelmsford, MA (EPA Region
1). Valuable information has been obtained through these AHRF prototypeoperations as described in this report.1In addition, an AHRF protocol
was developed and published by the DHS and EPA in September 2008
(publication DHS/S&T-PUB-08-0001, EPA/600/R-08/105). This protocol
is directed at screening unknown samples for chemical, radiochemical, and
explosive hazards prior to laboratory analysis. A supplement to the protocol
was recently completed and published in December 2010 (publication
EPA/600/R-10/155).
With the AHRF protocols detailed in other documents, the scope of this
document is to describe the facility and equipment design principles in
such a way that others may apply these principles using a graded approachin keeping with the organizations available funding. To this end, a tiered
approach is suggested to encourage laboratories to adopt an AHRF capability
and implement AHRF protocols.
The Wadsworth Center, with funding provided by DHS, has developed and
implemented a training program on the use/maintenance of an AHRF and on
the application of the screening protocol.
Implementation of the guidance provided in this document should reflect the capabilities and
goals of the particular implementing entity at a given location. Applicable laws, regulations, and
guidance must be considered in addition to the guidance provided in this document.
The scope of this document
is to describe All Hazards
Receipt Facility (AHRF) des
principles in such a way
that others may apply these
principles at various levels o
facility investment. A tiered
approach is proposed to ena
laboratories to adopt an AH
capability and implement A
protocols.
1 The purpose of presenting detailed information about the AHRF prototype design in section 5 of this guide is
not to make it the standard but to allow others to understand the design considerations and choices made so
that the reader can apply what is appropriate for their laboratory. This prototype design includes containment
and engineering controls that are defined in this document as a tier 1 AHRF capability.
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1.2 AHRF Effect iveness
1.2.1 Containment
Effective containment of potentially harmful substances and materials is one
of the fundamental design principles of the AHRF.2This principle is well
established in the Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories(BMBL)document, as well as its counterpart chemical agent safety and radiological
safety programs. To paraphrase the BMBL, the term containment is used in
describing safe methods, facilities, and equipment for managing hazardous
agents in the laboratory environment where they are being handled or
maintained. The purpose of containment is to reduce or eliminate exposure
of laboratory workers, other persons, and the outside environment to
potentially hazardous agents.
The effective use of gloveboxes, fume hoods, filtration systems, and
air handlers fall within this definition of containment. These topics are
discussed in detail in this guide.
It is important to keep in mind that containment measures for the AHRF
should provide adequate protection for the safe handling of samples that
might contain hazardous biological, chemical, radiological, or explosive
material. A mixed threat is also possible. Measures that provide protection
against a single threat category are therefore inadequate when used alone for an
all-hazards application.
1.2.2 Assurance
The AHRF and its protocols should provide both quality assurance and
safety assurance. These matters are generally handled by different partsof a laboratory operation, but are both important to AHRF operation.
Quality assurance is needed to meet the standards necessary for scientific
and evidentiary acceptance of the results obtained by the AHRF as well as
the condition and authenticity of samples forwarded to a confirmatory
laboratory or otherwise preserved for evidentiary purpose. Safety assurance
is required for protection of people, laboratory, and the environment.
Implementation of proper qualification and selection standards for AHRF
staff and periodic proficiency testing to ensure that those standards are
maintained are important elements of the assurance program. Similarly,
proper design of the facility, installation of appropriate engineering
controls, effective procedures and training of personnel, and performance
testing of safety equipment such as gloveboxes, fume hoods, filtration
AHRFEffectivene
ss
CONTAINMENT, ASSURANCE
& TRAINING as described
in this section are the three
key elements to AHRF
effectiveness and safety.
2 This design principle is reflected in the three primary reference documents for this guide, which are: Biosafety
in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL), Fifth Edition, February 2007; Army Pamphlet 385-
61 Toxic Chemical Agent Safety Standards, 17 December 2008; and Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-024-01
Security Engineering: Procedures for Designing Airborne Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Protection for
Buildings, 10 June 2008. Website URLs for these documents are provided in Section 4.0.
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systems, air barriers, and the like will provide assurance that effective
systems are available and operating as intended.
In addition to maintaining proper safety and environmental standards, the
AHRF and its protocols should maintain chain of custody consistent with
evidentiary requirements, not cross-contaminate, adulterate or otherwise
compromise the sample, and preserve an adequate amount of sample
for confirmatory testing and evidentiary purposes. The local FBI WMD
Coordinator, laboratory director, and appropriate local authorities should
be consulted on the development and implementation of these practices.
1.2.3 Train ing
Laboratory staff as well as facility/engineering support personnel should
be properly trained in their respective AHRF functions to ensure safe and
effective AHRF operations. This training should reflect the specific concerns
and operating environment for each organization that undertakes an AHRF
capability.
The Wadsworth Center has been tasked by DHS to develop hands-on training
that leverages the availability of an AHRF prototype at the Wadsworth Center
as well as the experience gained by Wadsworth Center personnel in AHRF
practices. Additional information about Wadsworth Center conferences and
workshops is available at http://www.wadsworth.org/conferences/index.htm .
Two of the course descriptions follow.
Course 1: All Hazards Response Training for Laboratory Personnel
This hands-on training program will concentrate on the All Hazard
approach to identifying unknown threat substances and will follow
the established DHS/EPA All Hazard Receipt Facility testing algorithms.
An integrated approach will be taken in order to tie in chemical,
biological, radiological, and explosive hazards. Emphasis will be placed
on appropriate containment requirements, testing options, and workflow
considerations as well as key characteristics of hazardous agents. Public
health laboratories will benefit from this training as they begin to explore
the necessity of melding existing lab testing with an all hazard screening
approach. The final days of this course will include testing of unknowns
according to the DHS/EPA algorithm available on the APHL website.
Course 2: All Hazards Receipt Facility Training for Engineering and Support Personnel
This course will focus on training facilities staff and engineers on
the state-of-the-art AHRF air handling, security, liquid handling, and
biosafety systems. Staff will be trained in the routine maintenance and
upkeep of these highly specialized units and will gain an understanding
of the requirements for their annual certification. Emphasis will be placed
on critical considerations needed for the integration of a stand-alone
Training, and the awareness
created through training, is
vital part of any AHRF oper
regardless of the level of fac
investment, even for those
laboratories that do not inte
to receive all-hazards or mix
threat samples.
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All Hazard Receipt Facility or as a retro-fit space within an existing
laboratory structure. The extensive experience gained by the Facility
and Engineering staff at the Wadsworth Center during the integration
of the AHRF into the Public Health Laboratory will be shared with
attendees in order to facilitate their experience with such a complex
project. This course will include both operational and didactic
components.
Additional courses and training material are available from other sources.
For example, the National Select Agents Registry (NSAR) is an important
information source as it oversees activities involving possession of
biological agents and toxins that have the potential to pose a severe threat to
public, animal or plant health, or to animal or plant products. The various
Select Agent Regulations and other useful information on biohazards are
available from the NSAR website at http://www.selectagents.gov/ .
1.3 Assumptions
It is assumed that the information contained in this guide will be reviewedand applied by a multidisciplinary team working under the guidance of a
laboratory director.3The team should include expertise across the following
disciplines: laboratory building design, occupational safety and health, and
forensic science laboratory practices.
The AHRF Protocol (publication DHS/S&T-PUB-08-0001,
EPA/600/R-08/105 of September 2008) contains additional assumptions
regarding AHRF staff and laboratory procedures.
AHRFEffectivene
ss
3 The term laboratory director as used here refers to the person serving in the position with ultimate authority
and responsibility for the day-to-day operation of the organization in which the AHRF resides. This is not
intended to refer to the team leader who is likely to be one of the subject matter experts who leads the team
and reports to the laboratory director.
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2.0 Lessons Learned
A summary of the findings obtained to date through this AHRF Best Practices
project follows. These findings are based on site visits to the two AHRF
prototype operations and numerous discussions with AHRF subject
matter experts.2.1. AHRF prototypes are serving a useful function at the Wadsworth Center
and EPA Region 1 laboratories in demonstrating the utility of a specially
designed facility and protocol for screening samples of unknown and
potentially hazardous character prior to laboratory analysis (Detailed
design specifications of the AHRF prototypes are provided in Section 5).
The overall design of the AHRF in terms of floor plan, sample flow, and
work space is advantageous, especially given the design constraint of a
mobile platform.
2.2. The dual-sided feature of the glovebox was noted as useful in allowing
two people to work simultaneously, therefore increasing efficiency andproductivity.
2.3. One lesson learned in this project is that mobility of the AHRF is not
particularly important in applications where the AHRF serves to protect
a particular fixed-site laboratory and therefore is unlikely to be moved
within its service life. An AHRF capability integrated into a permanent,
fixed-site building would provide benefits of reduced energy and
maintenance costs and enhanced dual-use.
2.4. It was noted that the capability provided by the AHRF to safely produce
subsamples, and, in some cases, dilute dissolved solutions, which can
then be brought into the laboratory for further analysis is a key function
of the AHRF.
2.5. As a receipt facility used in conjunction with a laboratory, the AHRF was
intentionally designed without a GC-MS or other advanced laboratory
analysis instruments. However, some of the current designs for AHRF
suites to be built in new laboratories, as well as the design of mobile
laboratories such as those used by the National Guard Civil Support
Teams, include a GC-MS. In addition to unknown sample analysis, the
GC-MS (or another analytical instrument) could be used to monitor
ASZM-TEDA filter performance. If more advanced laboratory analysis
instruments are added to the AHRF, it is important to consider theadditional design requirements that these systems may introduce.
For example, the addition of a GC-MS to analyze chemical warfare
agent (CWA) would require venting of the instrument to the AHRF
engineering controls or dedicated ASZM-TEDA filters to prevent
operator exposure to CWAs.
To safely produce subsampl
and, in some cases, dilute
dissolved solutions, which c
then be brought into the m
laboratory for further analy
a key function of the AHRF.
Mobility of the AHRF is not
particularly important in
applications where it serves
protect a particular fixed-sit
laboratory and therefore is
unlikely to be moved within
service life.
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2.6. The AHRF prototypes have 16x16 interlocking, double-door
air-locks. In practice, samples are often delivered in coolers as the
transport container with both primary and secondary containers
within the cooler. Many of these coolers are too large to fit within
the air-lock and also too tall for the fixed shelf of the bleaching
station/fume hood. Subject matter experts (SMEs) disagree on how
to handle this operational consideration. One option is to makethe air-lock opening larger; a second option is to limit the size
of the transport container; a third option is to open the transport
container outside of the AHRF provided that this does not result in an
unacceptable level of risk to personnel (e.g., the sample is contained
inside an air-tight primary container, and perhaps a secondary
container, within the cooler). All of these options present their own
benefits and risks. Ultimately, the selection of a mitigation strategy for
this operational consideration must be informed by a risk assessment
performed by the laboratory staff and safety professionals.
2.7. It was noted that dual use of the AHRF is important. At Wadsworth,this is currently being done through utilization of the AHRF for
training and proficiency testing. At EPA Region 1, it was noted that
a future AHRF capability could be integrated into the laboratorys
normal sample receipt area. As such, sample flow into the laboratory
could be directed through one path for high-hazard samples
(the AHRF side) and another path for all other samples
(the normal sample processing side).
2.8. The notion of a tiered approach was discussed and received
widespread approval in concept. Further details of such an approach
are presented in section 3 of this guide. The rationale of this approach
is to enable a level of AHRF capability at reduced costs, perhaps as
an interim step until the next laboratory construction or renovation
project in a given area, or as a permanent measure that adequately fits
the needs of a given laboratory.
2.9. Best practices and the adoption of local standard operating procedures
(SOPs), including testing and maintenance schedules appropriate for
a given AHRF, and local hazard analysis are needed in addition to the
Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL)
and other standards. Existing national standards do not fully cover the
AHRF application, and AHRF usage and environmental factors will vary
from laboratory to laboratory. Further guidance on filter inspection,
testing, and replacement schedules are factors that need to be
addressed as experience is gained in AHRF operation. Such experience
will provide valuable data for refining SOPs, equipment selection, and
filter inspection, testing, and replacement schedules.
Current best practices in
designing AHRF exhaust air
systems (CBR filtration) call
for the utilization of two
High Efficiency Particulate
Air (HEPA) filters in series
with two ASZM-TEDA filters
as discussed in Sections 4.1
and 4.2.
LessonsLearn
ed
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2.10. Current best practices in designing AHRF exhaust air systems
encompass filtration of chemical, biological, and radiological hazards
(CBR filtration) and recommend the utilization of two HEPA filters
in series with two ASZM-TEDA filters. The ASZM-TEDA filters should
each have a minimum dwell time of 0.25 seconds with a sample port
provided between the ASZM-TEDA filters for periodic performancemonitoring. These design specifications were built into the AHRF
prototype and are discussed in detail in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 of this
guide.4
2.11. The capabilities and limitations of ASZM-TEDA filters are discussed in
Section 4.2. Other filtration materials and exhaust system components
are under development and can be leveraged by the AHRF community
in the future with some retrofitting. In retrofitting an exhaust system
for the AHRF prototype, consideration should be given to the
installation of an exhaust stack. The retrofitting of any exhaust system
should be accomplished in a way that preserves proper air flows and
pressure differentials.
2.12. An interagency effort led by the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH) has resulted in the recent creation of
respirator standards for use in atmospheres that contain chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) respiratory hazards. These
respirators are generally better suited for an all hazards environment
and therefore recommended for AHRF operators to have on hand in case
of a spill, equipment failure, or an emergency. Information about the
CBRN Respirator standards and a list of NIOSH-certified respirators are
available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npptl/topics/respirators/cbrnapproved/apr/.
National Institute for
Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH) approved
respirators for use in
atmospheres that contain
chemical, biological,radiological, and nuclear
(CBRN) respiratory hazards
are recommended for AHRF
staff to have on hand in case
of a spill, equipment failure
or an emergency.
4 Sample ports were built into the glovebox filtration system for the AHRF prototype. The current
recommendation in this draft guide is to include sample ports in all newly constructed or refurbished filtration
systems within the AHRF.
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3.0 Tiered Approach
A suggested definition for each of the three AHRF capability tiers is
provided below and summarized in Table 1. All three tiers require training
and assurance programs as described in Section 1. These suggested
definitions are intended for discussion among the AHRF community.
Comments should be provided to the DHS program manager forconsideration in any future revision of this guide. While the current
material in this chapter emphasizes safety considerations associated with
AHRF tiers, operational impacts such as decreased throughput, increased
sample transfers between stations, increased decontamination burdens,
limitations of sample types/sizes, and the like should be considered so that
an informed cost-benefit analysis can be performed when selecting the
tier appropriate for a facility. As more quantitative information becomes
available, such data can be added to this best practices guide.
3.1 Tier 1 Description
Tier 1 can be defined as the full AHRF capability as embodied in the
AHRF prototype or equivalent. It need not involve a mobile platform.
A preferred approach for some laboratories is to incorporate these
capabilities into a permanent building. The tier 1 capability as suggested
here, however, does require a dedicated facility in the form of a separate
building, isolated suite, or mobile/modular facility to provide separation
from other laboratory functions. In this way, a minimal number of people
are exposed to the risk of a hazardous sample and robust containment and
engineering controls are provided to mitigate any hazard within the AHRF.
TieredApproa
ch
Tier 1 can be defined as
the full AHRF capability as
embodied in the prototype or
equivalent. It need not involve
a mobile platform but does
provide separation from other
laboratory operations and has
both primary and secondary
containment systems.
Figure 1. AHRF Prototype Floor Plan.
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As illustrated in Figure 1, the prototype design includes both BSL-3 and BSL-2 areas, a stainless steel Class
III biosafety cabinet (BSC)/glovebox, a second Class II A2 BSC connected to the glovebox, a fume hood or
bleaching station, and two HVAC systems. Figure 2 shows the exterior of the completed AHRF prototype.
It should be noted that the Class III glovebox and Class II A2 BSC in the BSL-3 area of the AHRF are
equipped with CBR filtration (Figure 3). This is also true of the bleaching station/fume hood (Figure
4) and BSL-2/3 areas of the AHRF prototype. Thus, primary containment is provided by the cabinets
and fume hoods, along with any additional containment (e.g., sample containers) used within this
equipment, while an additional level of secondary containment is provided by the facility itself.
Figure 2. Photograph of the AHRF Prototype Exterior.
Figure 3. Photograph of the Class III and Class II A2
Biosafety Cabinets in the AHRF Prototype.
Figure 4. Photograph of the Receiving Laboratory
(BSL-2) in the AHRF Prototype.
The AHRF protocol (publication DHS/S&T-PUB-08-0001, EPA/600/R-08/105) contains four major
operational steps: Sample Receipt and Transport Container Screen, Secondary Containment and Primary
Sample Container Screen, Sample Screen, and Document Results. In a tier 1 facility, the AHRF protocol can
be executed as developed without modification due to facility limitations. Figure 5 provides an overview of
the AHRF protocol as implemented in a tier 1 facility.
The cost to replicate the AHRF prototype as it is described in Section 5, or to create an equivalent tier 1
capability in an existing building, is estimated between $1M and $2M.
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Figure 5. Overview of the AHRF Protocol (Tier 1).
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3.2 Tier 2 Description
Tier 2 can be defined as a dedicated room for AHRF operations which is
isolated from general laboratory air flow and is equipped with a stainless
steel Class III glovebox and a fume hood, both with proper CBR filtration.
Figure 6 illustrates one possible layout for a tier 2 facility.
Unlike tier 1, a single room is allocated to AHRF operations with the roomexhaust isolated from the HVAC return-air for the rest of the building. Supply
air is provided by the building HVAC system, and air is exhausted from the
room through the fume hood and glovebox. While room air intake to the fume
hood and glovebox will exit through CBR filters, some room air could possibly
exit the room into other parts of the building during a failure of the fume
hood and glovebox exhaust system. This is mitigated by minimizing leaks in
walls and ceilings and maintaining a negative room pressure. Construction of
air-lock access to the room will aid in maintaining proper negative pressure.
In addition, it is recommended that a bioseal damper be installed on the room
supply duct as an automatic check valve to ensure that contaminated air cannot
be backdrafted through the ducts in the event of an exhaust system failure.
Care needs to be exercised when balancing the supply air into the room.
This is necessary to avoid turbulence near the fume hood, as well as to
maintain proper negative pressure in the room.
Tier 2 can be defined as a
dedicated room for AHRF
operations which is isolated
from general laboratory air
flow and is equipped with a
stainless steel Class III glove
and a fume hood, both with
proper chemical, biological
radiological (CBR) filtration
Figure 6. Example Glovebox & Floor Plan for a Tier 2 AHRF.
Isolation from the HVAC return-air for the rest of the building is importantto mitigate the risk of exposing people in other parts of the building. Also,
such isolation mitigates the risk of interrupting other laboratory operations,
which otherwise could be adversely impacted should decontamination
beyond the tier 2 space be required.
The AHRF protocol can be performed in its entirety in a tier 2 facility
(Figure 7); however, minor adjustments must be made to how the protocol
is carried out because tier 2 lacks the Class II A2 BSC found in tier 1.
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Sample Receipt and Transport Container Screen is performed outside of
primary containment as described in the protocol and, therefore, could be
performed within a tier 2 facility as presented here. This could, for example,
be performed on the lab bench illustrated in Figure 6 provided that a
tier 2 AHRF is deemed acceptable to the implementing organization.
Secondary Containment and Primary Sample Container Screen is performedinside the bleaching station/fume hood. Again, this can be performed
within a tier 2 AHRF as a fume hood with CBR filtration is available.
Sample Screen is performed primarily in the glovebox, which poses no
problems for the tier 2 capability given that it includes a stainless steel
Class III glovebox with proper CBR filtration. The thermal susceptibility
test for explosives can be performed in the fume hood of the tier 2
facility as it will also have proper CBR filtration and air-flow face velocity to
mitigate risk.
Document Results calls for the resulting sub-sample and primary sample to
be prepared for delivery to the designated laboratory(ies) and/or samplingauthority and kept in the biosafety cabinet to await transfer. In a tier 2
facility, these packaged samples can be placed in the fume hood to await
transfer. Depending on the level of activity, storage space could become
insufficient and/or impede use of the fume hood to process new samples.
A significant difference between the tier 1 and tier 2 facilities is the
presence (or absence) of interconnected engineering controls. In tier
1 facilities, the engineering controls are connected through a series of
interlocked air-locks. This allows samples to remain under engineering
controls at all times. This will not necessarily be the case for all tier 2
facilities, particularly those that re-purpose existing engineering controlsto build an AHRF capability. In cases where the engineering controls are
not connected by interlocked air-locks (as shown in Figure 6), there
is an increased risk of accidental release and exposure to the operator.
Appropriate containment will be needed to move samples between the
fume hood and glovebox, and procedures for decontamination, packaging,
and monitoring of sample containers described in the AHRF protocol
will have to be strictly followed to ensure operator safety. In addition, the
movement of samples will increase the time required to process samples
and negatively impact sample throughput.
Basic CBR materials needed for AHRF applications include detectors,decontamination materials, and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
(A list of such items is provided in the Appendix). The investment needed
for a tier 2 capability as described above is therefore limited to the purchase
of a stainless steel glovebox and CBR filtration system with retrofitting to
an existing fume hood plus basic CBR materials. The initial investment
cost of a tier 2 capability is estimated in the range of $100K to $250K
depending largely on the type of glovebox purchased and the extent of
room modifications needed.
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Figure 7. Overview of the AHRF Protocol (Tier 2).
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3.3 Tier 3 Description
Tier 3 can be defined as a portable glovebox having proper CBR filtration
used in a room which is isolated from building air flow and traffic when
needed for an AHRF operation. As such, it can be considered an improvised
AHRF capability using the lowest cost and minimal number of components
deemed acceptable to a given laboratory. For obvious reasons, this poses agreater risk to the people within the tier 3 room, others that are nearby, and
the environment. Nonetheless, this tier 3 capability provides a CBR primary
containment capability that may be lacking in even an otherwise high-
containment facility such as a BSL-3 or BSL-4 laboratory or comparable
environmental laboratory.
As with tier 2, the risk resulting from the limited equipment investment
of tier 3 can be mitigated to a certain extent through proper training of
staff in the handling of samples, use of PPE, detectors and decontamination
procedures. In addition, through training and awareness, procedures can be
implemented at a tier 3 operation to redirect higher risk samples to a tier 1or 2 facility as opposed to accepting them at the tier 3 facility.
The equipment investment for tier 3 as defined here is limited to the
purchase of a portable glovebox having a CBR filtration system and basic
CBR materials (A list of CBR materials is provided in the Appendix). The
glovebox can be made of stainless steel or thermoplastic such as acrylic.
Figure 8 shows two potential glovebox configurations that could be
used in a tier 3 facility. The use of soft glovebags, while cost-effective, is
not recommended. Since the primary sample container is opened in the
glovebox, it represents the area of highest potential contamination within
the AHRF. In addition, the AHRF protocol makes use of an exposed heating
element and several pieces of equipment with sharp edges, which could
puncture the glovebag and break containment. A loss of containment due to
accidental puncture of a soft glovebag would present a risk of exposure to
the operator that far outweighs the cost savings.
TieredApproa
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Tier 3 can be defined as a
portable glovebox havingproper CBR filtration used
in a room which is isolated
from building air flow
and traffic when needed
for an AHRF operation.
The use of soft glovebags,
while cost-effective, is not
recommended.
Figure 8. Range of Glovebox Types for Tier 3.
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The majority of the AHRF protocol can be performed in a tier 3 facility
(Figure 9). Adjustments must be made to how the protocol is carried out
because tier 3 lacks both a fume hood and a BSC. In addition, the thermal
susceptibility test for explosives must be eliminated due to safety concerns
as described in the Sample Screen section below.
Sample Receipt and Transport Container Screenis performed outside of primary
containment as described in the protocol and, therefore, could be performed
within a tier 3 facility. This could, for example, be performed on a lab bench
provided that a tier 3 AHRF is deemed acceptable to the implementing
organization.
Secondary Containment and Primary Sample Container Screenis performed inside the
bleaching station/fume hood in tier 1 and 2 facilities. Within a tier 3 facility,
all of this screening would be performed within the glovebox. This could
present challenges to the operator if the secondary containment is too large
to fit in the air-lock or takes up too much usable space inside the glovebox.
Unpackaging the primary sample container inside the glovebox means that alarge amount of solid waste will be generated in a potentially contaminated
area; this waste will have to be decontaminated and removed from the
glovebox frequently to prevent clutter.
Sample Screen is performed primarily in the glovebox, which poses no problems
for the tier 3 capability given that it includes a stainless steel or thermoplastic
Class III glovebox with proper CBR filtration. The thermal susceptibility test
for explosives must be eliminated in tier 3 testing. This test requires the use
of an open flame, which is not recommended in a glovebox. Normally, the
elimination of this test would represent a significant reduction in capability
for tier 3 facilities. However, the AHRF protocol includes a colorimetricscreen for explosives that is used on the primary sample container. While
the colorimetric test does not offer the full-range of detection capability
and level of detail provided by the thermal susceptibility test, it could be
used by the AHRF operators to screen the sample directly thereby mitigating
loss of the thermal susceptibility test for explosives. In addition, since all
of the AHRF protocol testing must be performed in the glovebox, this may
require operators to move screening equipment into and out of the glovebox
frequently to avoid clutter.
Document Results calls for the resulting sub-sample and primary sample to
be prepared for delivery to the designated laboratory(ies) and/or sampling
authority and kept in the biosafety cabinet to await transfer. In a tier 3 facility,
these packaged samples can remain in the glovebox to await transfer if there
is room. Depending on the level of activity, storage space could become
insufficient and/or impede use of the glovebox to process new samples. If
supported by a risk assessment performed by the laboratory, packaged samples
could be removed from the glovebox and stored appropriately to await transfer.
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Since both the Secondary Containment and Primary Sample Container Screenand
Sample Screensteps must be performed in the glovebox, managing working
space is the greatest challenge for operators in a tier 3 facility. Accumulation
of waste and equipment in the glovebox could lead to spills or other
accidents. Frequent movement of waste and equipment out of the glovebox
could lead to breach of containment and an increased risk of exposure to
the operator. A robust risk assessment must be performed to understandthe operational limitations and potential hazards. In addition to the greater
risk presented when using a tier 3 facility, the movement of waste and
equipment and the resulting clutter will increase the time required to
process samples and negatively impact sample throughput.
Basic CBR materials needed for AHRF applications include detectors,
decontamination materials, and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
(A list of such items is provided in the Appendix). The investment needed
for a tier 3 capability as described above is therefore limited to the purchase
of a stainless steel or thermoplastic glovebox and CBR filtration system plus
basic CBR materials. The initial investment cost of a tier 3 capabilityis estimated at less than $100K.
TieredApproa
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Figure 9. Overview of the AHRF Protocol (Tier 3).
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3.4 Summary
Table 1 briefly describes each of the tiers detailed in Sections 3.1 through
3.3, along with the associated costs, benefits, and risks. It is important
to emphasize that all three tiers must be supported by robust operator
training, careful risk assessment processes, and assurance programs as
described in Section 1.
TieredApproa
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Tier Description Estimated Cost Benefit/Risk
1 Full AHRF capability as embodied
in the prototype or equivalent, i.e.,
a dedicated facility in the form of a
separate building, isolated suite, or
mobile/modular facility. Includes
BSL-3 and BSL-2 areas, a stainless steel
Class III glovebox, a second Class II
A2 BSC connected to the glovebox,
a fume hood or bleaching station,
and dedicated HVAC system(s) with
proper CBR filtration.
Between $1M and
$2M to replicate the
AHRF prototype as
it is described in
Section 5, or to create
an equivalent tier 1
capability in an existing
building.
Minimizes risk to AHRF
staff and practically
eliminates the risk to other
laboratory personnel and
operations by isolating
the AHRF function.
Utilizes both primary and
secondary containment
equipment plus separation
distance.
2 A dedicated room for AHRF
operations which is isolated from
general laboratory air flow and is
equipped with a stainless steel Class
III glovebox and a fume hood, both
with proper CBR filtration.
Room exhaust is isolated from the
HVAC return-air for the rest of the
building. Supply air is provided by
the building HVAC system, and air is
exhausted from the room through the
fume hood and glovebox equipped
with CBR filtration.
Between $100K and
250K depending
on the type of
glovebox purchased
and the extent of
room modifications
performed. Cost
includes CBR filtration
equipment, handheld
detectors, PPE, and
decon kits.
Provides a level of
protection to AHRF
staff similar to tier 1 via
primary containment but
to a lesser extent given the
fume hood and glovebox
may be separate. Some risk
to other personnel and
operations remain as AHRF
room air could exit into
other parts of the building
and there is little or no
separation distance.
3 An improvised AHRF capability using
the lowest cost and minimal numberof components deemed acceptable
to a given laboratory. E.g., a portable
glovebox having proper CBR filtration
used in a room which is isolated from
building air flow and traffic only
when needed for an AHRF operation.
Less than $100K with
an acrylic gloveboxhaving CBR filtration
and a minimal set of
handheld detectors,
PPE, and decon kits.
Poses a greater risk to
AHRF staff, others nearby,and the environment
compared to tiers 1-2, but
provides a CBR primary
containment capability
that may be lacking in
even an otherwise high-
containment facility.
Table 1. Summary of Suggested Tier Definitions with Associated Costs and Benefit/Risk Aspects.
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4.0 Equipment, Design, & Operational
Considerations
This section borrows heavily from three U.S. Government documents with
editing and arrangement of the source material to fit the AHRF application.
The source documents are:
a. Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL),Fifth Edition, February 2007, available athttp://www.cdc.gov/OD/ohs/biosfty/bmbl5/bmbl5toc.htm
b. Army Pamphlet 385-61 Toxic Chemical Agent Safety Standards,17 December 2008, available at www.armypubs.army.mil/epubs/pdf/p385_61.pdf
c. Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-024-01 Security Engineering:Procedures for Designing Airborne Chemical, Biological, andRadiological Protection for Buildings, 10 June 2008,available at https://pdc.usace.army.mil/forums/ufc/4-024-01
Quotation marks and footnotes to identify the specific quoted material and
source document are omitted as these markings would be a distraction to most
readers. The URL for each source document is provided above so that readers
can easily obtain the source material if desired.
The National Select Agents Registry (NSAR) is an additional information
source as it oversees activities involving possession of biological agents and
toxins that have the potential to pose a severe threat to public, animal or plant
health, or to animal or plant products. The various Select Agent Regulations
and other useful information on biohazards are available from the NSAR
website at http://www.selectagents.gov/.
4.1 CBR Filt ration
It is important to emphasize that all three of the AHRF tier definitions in
Section 3 call for CBR filtration. That topic is explored in this section.
CBR filtration in an AHRF application must provide an effective level
of protection against the release of airborne chemical, biological, and
radiological agents. In tier 1 facilities, such as the prototypes in use at the
Wadsworth Center and EPA Region 1, CBR filtration is provided for the air
streams exiting both the primary containment equipment (Class III glovebox,
Class II A2 BSC, and fume hood) as well as the room air. That is, both the
containment equipment exhaust air and the exhaust air from the interiorof the AHRF are passed through CBR filtration systems before exiting to
the outside environment. Significant and continuous air streams are pulled
through the respective filtration systems in order to maintain a specified
pressure differential between containment and surrounding area. This pressure
differential provides greater assurance that hazardous materials stay within the
containment boundaries.
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Current best practices for filtration systems used in an AHRF application
based on the combined guidance of the BMBL and Army Pamphlet 385-61
call for two HEPA filters with a minimum efficiency reporting value of
MERV 17 in series with two impregnated carbon adsorbers that meet
ASZM-TEDA standards (See Section 4.2 on capabilities and limitations of
carbon adsorbers). A pre-filter is sometimes used upstream of the first HEPA
filter to collect large dust particles and extend the life of the HEPA filters.Pressure gauges are useful in monitoring HEPA loading. Additionally, a
sample port is strongly recommended between the first and second carbon
adsorbers to permit periodic monitoring of CBR filtration performance.
4.2 Capabili ties and Limitations of Carbon
Adsorbers
The carbon adsorbers used in an AHRF application must provide the
capability to remove a broad spectrum of chemical vapors and gases from
an air stream. Carbon adsorbers consist of a packed bed of impregnated,
activated carbon granules. The carbon adsorber employs two different
processes to remove chemicals from the air stream: physical adsorption
and chemical reaction. The ASZM-TEDA filters (U.S. military gradecarbon adsorbers) recommended in this Best Practices Guide employ
activated carbon, impregnated with copper, silver, zinc, molybdenum, and
triethlyenediamine. ASZM-TEDA filters are proven effective in removing
chemical warfare agents (CWAs) and certain toxic industrial chemicals
(TICs) under expected operating conditions. Expected operating conditions
include chemical concentration, air stream temperature and humidity, and
the residence time in the filter. Residence time, also referred to as dwell
time, is the time taken by the air to pass through the carbon adsorber. It is
CBR
Filtration
This filter unit design is based
on the combined guidance of
Biosafety in Microbiological
and Biomedical Laboratories
(BMBL) and Army Pamphlet
385-61. The combination
of HEPA and ASZM-TEDA
filters is needed to provide
protection against airborne
chemical, biological, and
radiological agents.
Figure 10. Example Filter Unit for AHRF Applications.
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therefore dependent on the flow rate of the air stream and the volume of the
adsorber bed. This relationship is described by the following equation:
adsorber volume
flow rate
In this equation, residence time is measured in seconds, adsorber volumeis measured in cubic feet (ft3), and flow rate is measured in cubic feet per
minute (cfm).
The above information is critical to AHRF designers, but it is also important
to operators of an AHRF. For example, an increase in the flow rate of a filter
system will increase the pressure differential between containment and
surrounding area (a good result that could be used to compensate for leaking
gaskets and the like), but will decrease the residence time within the adsorber
(a detrimental outcome for adsorber performance). Similarly, cost savings
achieved through reducing adsorber volume should be avoided if it would
reduce the residence time beyond acceptable limits. The ASZM-TEDA adsorbermaterial is specified and tested based upon a minimum residence time of 0.25
second. An equal, or preferably longer, residence time is therefore required to
ensure adequate filtration for AHRF operations.
It is also important to note that there is no single adsorber material available
that removes all potentially harmful chemical vapors and gases. To ensure
adequate protection, it may be necessary to add a filtration element to the
filter assembly illustrated in Figure 5 to remove specific TICs that are
considered a threat agent to a given laboratory or that become known threat
agents in the future. On the other hand, the dilution that results from large
air flows through the filtration and exhaust system serves to mitigate this risk.Laboratory exhaust stacks designed to provide large dilution factors
are commercially available and recommended for consideration in future
AHRF designs.
4.3 Glovebox Considerations
The BMBL 5th Edition and Army Pamphlet 385-61 both contain important
information about glovebox design and performance considerations applicable
to AHRF applications. Material from these two references is provided below
with minor editing for incorporation into this document.
The Class III BSC (glovebox) is illustrated in Figure 11. This enclosure was
originally designed for work with highly infectious microbiological agents
and provides maximum protection for the environment and the worker. It is
gas-tight (no leak greater than 1x10-7 cc/sec of 1% sulfur hexafluoride,
SF6, or helium at 3 inches pressure Water Gauge, or equivalent).
It is important to note that
no single adsorber material
including ASZM-TEDA, rem
all potentially harmful chem
vapors and gases. Also, that
residence time and therefor
flow rate are key factors tha
effect adsorber performance
5 The BMBL references the use of a dunk tank or autoclave for this purpose. An autoclave is not suitable for AHRF
applications where subsequent assay for biological material is performed and the custom fumehood/decon
station as used in the AHRF prototype is preferred over a dunk tank.
x 60residence time =
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Access for passage of materials into the Class III BSC (glovebox) as designed
for the AHRF prototypes is through a fumehood/decon station, which
can be decontaminated between uses. Reversing the access process allows
materials to be removed from the Class III BSC safely. 5
Both supply and exhaust air are HEPA filtered on a Class III BSC (glovebox).
In accordance with BMBL, exhaust air must pass through two HEPA filters,
or a HEPA filter and an air incinerator, before discharge to the outdoors
(see Sections 4.1-4.2 for AHRF recommendations). Airflow is maintained
by a dedicated, independent exhaust system exterior to the cabinet, which
keeps the cabinet under negative pressure (minimum of 0.5 inches ofpressure Water Gauge).
Long, heavy-duty rubber gloves are attached in a gas-tight manner to ports
in the cabinet and allow direct manipulation of the materials isolated inside.
Although these gloves restrict movement, they prevent the users direct
contact with the hazardous materials thereby maximizing personal safety.
Use of a dual-sided glovebox with glove ports and viewing plates on facing
Figure 11. Class III BSC (Glovebox) as Illustrated in the BMBL.
Glovebox components:
A. Glo ve po rt s wi th O-ring fo r at tach ing ar m- leng th gl ove s to ca binet
B. Sash
C. Exhaust HEPA filter (include ASZM-TEDA for AHRF applications per Sections 4.1-4.2)
D. Supply HEPA filter
E. Double-ended autoclave or pass-through box
Note: Rapid transport containers, which are mountable to the glovebox via a bayonet-type
connection, are commercially available and can prove useful in AHRF applications.
Note: For an AHRF application, both HEPA and ASZM-TEDA carbon adsorber filters are
required for effective CBR filtration. (See Sections 4.1-4.2.)
Glov
eboxConsideratio
ns
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sides of the glovebox has proven advantageous in AHRF prototype operations.
The dual-sided glovebox enables accommodatation of multiple-operator
sample manipulations and the ability for increased decontamination efficacy
with enhanced access.
Depending on the design of the cabinet, the supply HEPA filter provides
particulate-free, albeit somewhat turbulent, airflow within the work
environment. Laminar air-flow is not a characteristic of a Class III cabinet.
Several Class III BSCs can be joined together in a line to provide a larger
work area. Such cabinet lines are custom-built; the equipment installed in
the cabinet line (e.g., refrigerators, small elevators, shelves) is generally
custom-built as well.
Pressure within gloveboxes will be a minimum of 1/4 inch of water gaugebelow that of surrounding areas (note that the BMBL calls for 1/2 inch, which
is therefore recommended for AHRF applications).
Makeup air or inert gas should be allowed into the glovebox to prevent
stagnation and buildup of agent concentrations. The makeup sources will be
protected by filters, backflow dampers, or other means (Note the BMBL calls
for HEPA filtration of makeup air).
Procedures should be used to avoid breaking containment when a glovebox
is in operation; however, should a temporary opening into a glovebox occur,
the design must maintain an inward flow of at least 90 linear feet per minute
(LFPM) if agent is contained in the glovebox.
If a glovebox has large or permanent open areas, it should be considered a
ventilation hood and subject to criteria in Section 4.4.
The AHRF prototypes were not designed to handle gas bombs, canisters, or
gas cylinders that are under pressure, and the AHRF protocol directs operators
to obtain expert assistance in removing such items from the AHRF, if samples
containing these items are received. However, if a toxic agent operation
requires handling a pressurized vessel within the glovebox, a local risk
assessment should be performed to ensure the operation can be conducted
safely. The risk assessment must take into account the maximum crediblepressure release from the vessel and determine if the glovebox is capable
of handling such a release. When conducting such operations, the glovebox
should be leak-tested prior to each operation.
Glovebox and fume hood
performance specifications
must take into account the a
hazards mission of the AHR
Most venders sell these prod
for either biological or chem
safety; few address both unl
specifically asked to do so.
While the above glovebox considerations are from the BMBL 5th Edition, the following
information is from Army Pamphlet 385-61. Both are applicable to AHRF applications.
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4.4 Class II BSCs and Fume Hoods
As with glovebox considerations, the BMBL 5th Edition and Army
Pamphlet 385-61 both contain important information about Class II BSCs
and fume hoods as applicable to AHRF applications. Material from these
two references is provided below with minor editing for incorporation
into this document.
Per the BMBL 5th Edition, flammable chemicals should not be used in
standard Class II, Type A1 or A2 cabinets since vapor buildup inside the
cabinet presents a fire hazard. The electrical systems of standard Class II
BSCs are not spark-proof. Therefore, three options are available: a chemical
concentration approaching the lower explosive limits of the compound can
be prohibited (difficult to ensure this in an all-hazard or unknown threat
sample), a special-order Class II BSC having the appropriate spark-proof
electrical system and exhaust filtration system can be used, or a chemical
fume hood with the appropriate exhaust filtration system can be used.
Recommendations from the former Office of Research Safety of the
National Cancer Institute (NCI) stated that work involving the use of
chemical carcinogens for in vitro procedures can be performed in a
Class II cabinet which meets the following parameters: 1) exhaust
airflow is sufficient to provide a minimum inward velocity of 100 LFPM
at the face opening of the cabinet; 2) contaminated air plenums under
positive pressure are leak-tight; and 3) cabinet air is discharged to the
outdoors. National Sanitation Foundation (NSF)/ANSI 49 2002 currently
recommends that biologically-contaminated ducts and plenums of
Class II, Type A2 and B cabinets be maintained under negative air pressure,
or surrounded by negative pressure ducts and plenums and be exhausted
to the outdoors. This approach of maintaining negative air pressure is
recommended for AHRF applications.
Volatile radionuclides such as 125 I should not be used within Class II,
Type A1 BSCs; or an A2 BSC unless the exhaust air is discharged out of
doors and appropriate additional filtration techniques are used (See
Section 4.1-4.2). When using nonvolatile radionuclides inside a BSC, the
same hazards exist as if working with radioactive materials on the bench
top. Work that has the potential for splatter or creation of aerosols can be
done within the BSC. Radiologic monitoring must be performed. A straight,
vertical (not sloping) beta shield may be used inside the BSC to provide
worker protection. A sloping shield can disrupt the air curtain and increasethe possibility of contaminated air being released from the cabinet.
A radiation safety professional should be contacted for specific guidance.
As previously noted, standard
biosafety cabinets are notdesigned for an all-hazards
application and therefore
must be purchased as special-
order items or retrofitted for
all-hazards applications.
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While the above Class II BSC considerations are from the BMBL 5th Edition, the following
information is from Army Pamphlet 385-61. Both are applicable to AHRF applications.
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(1) A laboratory hood in which agent operations are conducted will providean average face velocity of 100 plus-or minus 20 LFPM through theworking opening. A traverse of one measurement per square foot(approximately) should be used to compute the average face velocity.No single point velocity may deviate from the average face velocity bymore than 20 percent.
(2) Laboratory hoods in which agent operations are conducted will bechallenged with test aerosols (visible smoke) with the sash in themaximum open position. No visible smoke will escape from thehood while the sash is slowly closed to as much as the operational
set up will allow and then slowly raised to the fully opened position.
(3) Laboratory chemical hoods will be tested and verified under the
following conditions:
(a) When installed and at least annually (within a 12-month period)thereafter.
(b) When substantive changes have occurred to the hood or hood
operating environment, such as
1. When the ventilation system has undergone repairs or changesthat may affect the airflow rate or patterns;
2. When the hood operating environment (for example, supplyair distribution patterns and volume, lab/furniture geometry)has changed such that it may decrease the performance ofthe hood;
3. When there have been changes in hood setup (that coulddecrease hood performance), hood face velocity controltype, set point, range, and response time; and
4. When there have been changes in exhaust system static
pressure, control range and response time.
(4) Sash stops may be used to define the maximum sash position opening.
(5) Hoods used only for storage of double-contained agents (no operations)are not subject to upper limits on airflow when the hood sash is loweredand locked for security.
(6) Previously existing (pre-1984) laboratory hoods designed and approvedat 150 plus-or-minus 30 LFPM may continue to be used until they can bemodified to the above criteria, provided containment is verified by smoke
tests or other appropriate methods.(7) When existing hoods are replaced in a room or a facility, the ability of
the ventilation system to maintain the room or facility at a negativepressure should be verified. Adjustment or renovation to the systemmay be required. Consult with the supporting industrial hygienist for
design guidelines.
(8) When ventilation hood exhaust systems contain filters that have beenused for agent operations, the ventilation system must maintain an inward
Fume hoods for an AHRFshould maintain an average
face velocity of 100 linear f
per minute (LFPM) through
the working opening, plus-
minus 20 LFPM with the sa
set at a proper working heig
This needs to be verified at
annually and when changes
have occurred to the hood o
operating environment.
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airflow through the hood even when the working area of the hoodno longer contains agent or agent-contaminated material. In this case,no minimum face velocities are required; however, inward flow will
be verified by smoke tests or other visual means. If the filter system is
isolated from the hood (for example, back-flow dampers, and blind
hinges), this subparagraph does not apply, though visible indicators
that show the positioning of dampers (open/closed/partly closed)should be provided at the work station.
(9) The design exhaust volume of the hood should provide excessinitial capacity.
(10) New hood installations should make maximum use of proventechnologies such as bypass construction, multiple baffles, and otherenhancements to provide optimal containment of chemical agentvapors and mists. The U.S. Army Public Health Command (USAPHC),Industrial Hygiene Program, APG, MD 210105403 is a good sourceof information for assistance in laboratory hood construction criteria,concept development, and design review services.
(11) Effluent air from laboratory hood systems must not containconcentrations of agent in excess of the Short Term Exposure Limit(STEL) concentration. If the quantity of agent being used or the typeof operation is such that this amount may be discharged into theatmosphere, the discharge of the ventilation system must be equippedwith chemical-type filters or other air treatment systems to reduce the
agent in the effluent to an acceptable level.
(12) Existing hood ventilation systems will be equipped with an audiblealarm device that will give a warning should the ventilation systemfail because of power failure, mechanical malfunction, or if the averageface velocity falls below 80 LFPM. For new construction, hoods will be
provided with both visible and audible alarm devices. Visible alarmswill be located so that they can be readily seen by personnel whileworking at the exhaust hood. For storage hoods, the visual alarmshould be visible from outside the room containing the hood. Alarmsshould be periodically function tested at a minimum every 6 months.
(13) Each laboratory room will have a means of assessing approximatehood face velocity prior to beginning operations each day. A hangingvane velometer is considered sufficiently accurate.
(14) No agent or agent-contaminated equipment will be allowed within20 centimeters (8 inches) of the hood face unless a hazard analysisdemonstrates that worker safety will not be compromised. The20-cm (8-in) zone should be designated by paint or tape.
AHRF exhaust systems should
maintain an inward airflow
through the fume hood and
glovebox even when not in
use because the filters will
likely contain contaminants.The minimum face velocity
is not applicable to sleep
mode. Lower flow rates
during sleep mode will save
energy and filter life.
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4.5 Testing of CBR Containment and
Filtration Systems
4.5.1 Leak & Performance Testing
The CBR containment and filtration systems for an AHRF applicationshould be subjected to in-place leak and performance tests to ensure
adequate performance. Some leaks are not apparent in regular operations
even with careful monitoring of pressure gauges. For example, a leak past
the filter-to-housing seals would seriously compromise CBR filtration
performance given that some air would bypass the filter media, but this
type of leak would not be readily apparent from pressure gauge readings.
Leak testing is recommended upon initial installation of any AHRF
equipment and at least annually thereafter.
The BMBL 5th Edition contains the following guidance for HEPA filter leak
and performance testing: This test is performed to determine the integrity of
supply and exhaust HEPA filters, filter housing, and filter mounting frames
while the cabinet is operated at the nominal set point velocities. An aerosol in
the form of generated particulates of dioctylphthalate (DOP) or an accepted
alternative [e.g., poly(alpha-olefin), di(2-ethylhexyl) sebecate, polyethylene
glycol, and medical grade light mineral oil] is required for leak-testing HEPA
filters and their seals. The aerosol is generated on the intake side of the filter
and particles passing through the filter or around the seal are measured with
a photometer on the discharge side. This test is suitable for ascertaining the
integrity of all HEPA filters.
After testing, adjusting, and balancing individual components of an AHRF,
the system as a whole should be tested to ensure that all componentsperform as integral parts of the system and that pressures, temperatures,
and conditions are met and evenly controlled throughout the AHRF.
Corrections and adjustments should be made as necessary to produce
the conditions indicated or specified. An HVAC engineer experienced
with laboratory CBR containment and filtration systems should conduct
capacity tests and general operating tests to demonstrate that the entire
system is functioning according to specifications. It is recommended that a
CBR containment and filtration system engineer be present to observe the
performance testing, or perform separate certification or performance
testing, to verify that all CBR safety requirements are met.
As noted in Section 4.1, pressure gauges within the filter train are useful
in monitoring HEPA loading. Additionally, a sample port is strongly
recommended between the first and second carbon adsorbers to permit
periodic monitoring of CBR filtration performance. Periodic monitoring
can mitigate the risk of breakthrough and provide valuable data for
monitoring the remaining service life of the first carbon adsorber.
In-place leak and performan
tests should assess both
HEPA and ASZM-TEDA filter
performance. The two types
of filters require different
testing protocols.
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Commercial filter housing systems are designed to meet applicable codes
and performance testing. Testing includes a housing leak test, pressure test,
and airflow capacity test. The filter housing (with inlet and outlet bubble-
tight dampers installed) must be tested in situ by pressure decay testing
in accordance with ASME N510. In addition to the filter housing, supply
ductwork and exhaust ductwork needs to be tested in situ by pressure
decay testing in accordance with ASME N510. Rate of air leakage forthese tests may not exceed 0.1% duct volume/min at 1000 Pa (4 wg)
minimum test pressure.
UFC 4-024-01provides the following guidance for filter bank in-place
testing: After installation, all ColPro (collective protection) filtration systems
should be in-place tested for leaks using a mechanical test method. This
test is used to evaluate the overall performance of the filtration system by
injecting a challenge agent upstream of the filter bank and measuring the
challenge agent concentration upstream and downstream of the filters.
The testing should occur in accordance with applicable sections of ASME
N510. The use of an independent testing agency is recommended. Thetesting agency should be certified in accordance with ASME NQA-1 or an
approved equal. The HEPA filtration system housing and HEPA filter aerosol
penetration should be less than 0.01 percent for the polydisperse aerosol
challenge specified in ASME N510. The carbon adsorber system housing and
carbon adsorber should be challenged with decafluoropentane (HFC-4310)
or an approved equal, with the downstream concentration not to exceed 0.1
percent of the upstream concentration.
4.5.2 Monthly Inspection
In addition to daily checks of differential pressure gauges, the AHRF
components and systems should be inspected at least once each month by
AHRF staff to ensure that they are operating as designed and are in good
operating condition. Continuously operated systems should be monitored
monthly to ensure that they are operating properly. Monthly inspections
and monitoring should include, at a minimum, verification that the
design pressure differentials and air flows are met for all containment
systems (glovebox, Class II BSC, fume hood, AHRF rooms). In addition,
the following should be checked: the pressure drop across the pre-filters
(if used) and HEPA filters; the damper operation; the heating and cooling
equipment; the protective area envelope