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Phoenix Convention Center • Phoenix, Arizona

Enhancing Electricity Supply Resilience

Integrated Energy

Operational Resilience and Recovery

Jeff Dagle, PEPacific Northwest National Laboratory

August 12, 2015

Energy Exchange: Federal Sustainability for the Next Decade2

Outline

• Historical perspectives on electricity reliability• What is “resilience”?• The recent emergence of the “smart grid”• How smart grid technologies can enhance

electricity resilience• Research underway to further improve the

resilience of the future power system• Concluding remarks


• Operational Priorities1. Safety (public, workers)2. Protect equipment from damage3. Reliability of the bulk interconnected system4. Optimize the economical operation of the system

• Reserve Margins• Redundancy• Backups

– Short-term (e.g., uninterruptible power supplies)– Long-term (e.g., diesel generators)

Power System Reliability

Energy Exchange: Federal Sustainability for the Next Decade

• “The interconnected power system shall be operated at all times so that general system instability, uncontrolled separation, cascading outages, or voltage collapse will not occur as a result of any single contingency or multiple contingencies of sufficiently high likelihood.”

WECC Minimum Operating Reliability Criteria

• Otherwise known as “N-1”• Achieved by:

– Generation having sufficient operating reserve, spinning reserve

– Strict adherence to transfer capacity limits on the transmission grid

• Determined through comprehensive planning studies– Operations discipline, detailed procedures, coordination– When all else fails, rely on emergency controls to limit

cascading failure (e.g., under frequency load shedding)– If blackout occurs, implement restoration plans (e.g.,

“Black Start”)4

Basic Reliability Approach


• Early stability problems associated with large power plants remotely located away from metropolitan load centers– Papers on this topic published as early as 1920

• Complexity of stability problems increased as systems became interconnected, particularly through 1960s

• As some stability problems were solved with advanced technology, others were introduced– Example: fast-acting excitation to solve transient stability

issues resulted in greater oscillatory instability• Computational capability through 1970s-1980s

greatly aided ability to study and analyze complex stability problems– Control theory, analytical tools, transient stability software

5

Historical Perspectives on Stability


• Large-scale remedial action and special protection schemes introduced to increase interregional power transfer capabilities

• Introduction of wide area time synchronized measurements beginning in 1980s leading to better situational awareness capabilities today

• Smart grid technologies that leverage increased utilization of communications and computational capabilities are being increasingly deployed

• Most customer reliability issues today are related to the local distribution system, not the interconnected transmission grid

Historical Perspectives on Stability - Continued


Examples of Major North American BlackoutsUncontrolled Cascading Failures

Date Location Load Interrupted

November 9, 1965 Northeast 20,000 MW

July 13, 1977 New York 6,000 MW

December 22, 1982 West Coast 12,350 MW

March 13, 1989 Quebec 21,350 MW

January 17, 1994 California 7,500 MW

December 14, 1994 Wyoming, Idaho 9,336 MW

July 2, 1996 Wyoming, Idaho 11,743 MW

August 10, 1996 Western Interconnection 30,489 MW

June 25, 1998 Midwest 950 MW

August 14, 2003 Northeast 61,800 MW

September 8, 2011 San Diego 7,835 MW


• Ability to reduce the magnitude and/or duration of disruptive events

• Resilient infrastructure can anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and/or rapidly recover from a disruptive event

• Best when all-hazard “disruptive events” include the unenvisioned– All hazards span naturally occurring events such as storms

or earthquakes and also include malicious human actions– A well-designed resilient system will either maintain

maximum practicable functionality, or enable rapid restoration with minimum downtime, regardless of whether or not that particular event or scenario had been anticipated in the design and planning phase

8

Infrastructure Resilience


• A smart grid uses digital technology to improve reliability, security, and efficiency of the electric system: from large generation, through the delivery systems to electricity consumers and a growing number of distributed-generation and storage resources.

• The information networks that are transforming our economy in other areas are also being applied to applications for dynamic optimization of electric system operations, maintenance, and planning.

9

Smart Grid Defined


• Demand-side resources participate with distribution equipment in system operation– Consumers engage to mitigate peak demand

and price spikes– More throughput with existing assets

reduces need for new assets– Enhances reliability by reducing disturbance impacts,

local resources self-organize in response to contingencies– Provide demand-side ancillary services – supports wind integration

• The transmission and bulk generation resources get smarter too– Improve the timeliness, quality, and geographic scope of the

operators’ situational awareness and control– Better coordinate generation, balancing, reliability, and emergencies– Utilize high-performance computing, sophisticated sensors, and

advanced coordination strategies

10

Smart Grid Vision

Bring digital intelligence & real-time communications to transform grid operations


The smart grid will• Enhance situational awareness

– Improves visibility of the overall systems– Easier detection of deviations– Decreases time to distinguish attacks/events– Better information enables better decisions

• Facilitate increased distributed generation and redundancy– Less reliance on central generation and T&D

• Enable intermittent generation– Integration of renewable resources (minimize reliance on foreign

oil)• Reduce outage propagation

– Self healing characteristics

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Making the North American electricity system less vulnerable to “all hazard” disruptions


The smart grid will• Allow compartmentalization of disturbances

– Through reconfiguration, adaptive islanding, use of microgrids, and failsafe design strategies

• Facilitates informed decision making and response– Through rapid data visualization from sensors– Faster and more precise identification of event root cause

• Enable faster response time responding to multiple (or evolving) events– Restoring stakeholder confidence in the system

• Enhance prioritized power restoration– Based on criticality of loads (i.e., public safety, emergency

response, national security)

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Restoring North American electricity system integrity subsequent to disruptions (i.e. event management)


Grid Friendly™ Appliances Provide Fast, Autonomous Reliability Resource

Autonomously detects under-frequency events and sheds load Not disruptive (or even noticeable) to consumers when activiatedCan displace spinning reserves and increase reliabilityLow cost: no communications required

Prototype Grid Friendly™ Appliance controllers developed by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

An example of an innovative technology that is currently being developed and demonstrated:


Communication and Information Technology will be Central to Smart Grid Deployment

NIST Framework and Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoperability Standards.Release 1.0 (Draft), September 2009


• The same information and communication technologies that enhance the resilience of the power system may also present a new set of vulnerabilities relating to communications and information technologies associated with the control layer of the physical infrastructure

• If there are common modes of failure present in these control layers, there will necessarily be challenges to achieving full degrees of resilience in future smart grid deployments

• Because smart grid technologies transcend the scope of traditional jurisdictional boundaries associated with the bulk electricity system, we cannot rely on existing mandatory cyber security standards and requirements

15

Smart Grid Cyber Security


• The power grid is exceptionally complex, and extraordinarily reliable– Most customer outages are due to issues with radial distribution

feeders vs. the networked transmission grid• Blackouts provide an opportunity to study and apply lessons

learned to further enhance reliability• As advanced technology is being considered for deployment, need

to consider unintended consequences (e.g., cyber security)• Robustness and resiliency are enhanced by considering all threats

to the power system– An “all-hazards” approach

• Facility managers should build relationships with their suppliers to better understand their electrical reliability issues

• Implement best practice designs to minimize impacts of disruptive events, including redundancy and backup equipment

Concluding Remarks

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