phmsa update significant accidents revie · lf-erw – widely manufactured from 1920 to 1970’s...

U.S. Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

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PHMSA Update Significant Accidents Review

2015 RRC/PHMSA Training and Qualification Conference

Thursday, September 17, 2015

11:15 – 11:45 AM


What We Regulate Pipeline Miles by System Types – end of CY 2012, as-of 3/7/2014

System Type Miles %Total # Operators

Hazardous Liquid 185,629 7% 410

Gas Transmission 303,308 11% 953

Gas Gathering 16,728 1% 342

Gas Distribution (Mains & Services ) 2,138,676 81% 1,356

Total 2,644,341 Some Operators

have multiple System Types

Liquefied Natural Gas 130 Plants 203 Tanks 82


Categories of Incident Reports

3

All Reported – everything operators report

Serious – fatality or injury requiring in-patient hospitalization, but Fire First excluded. Fire First are gas distribution incidents with a cause of “Other Outside Force Damage” and sub-cause of “Nearby Industrial, Man-made, or Other Fire/Explosion”

Significant include any of the following, but Fire First excluded: 1. Fatality or injury requiring in-patient hospitalization 2. $50,000 or more in total costs, measured in 1984 dollars 3. Highly volatile liquid (HVL) releases of 5 barrels or more 4. Non-HVL liquid releases of 50 barrels or more 5. Liquid releases resulting in an unintentional fire or explosion


Serious Incidents All System Types Downward Trend

Continues in 2013

4

Gas Transmission Dips Down to One Again in

2013


Significant Incidents

All System Types Slight Rise 2013

5

Gas Transmission Slight Rise in

2013


2014 Pipeline Safety Challenges • Spate of High Consequence, High Profile Accidents

– Multi-stakeholder interest/concern

– Reauthorization in about 18 months

• Aging Infrastructure Being Overly Amortized - Band-Aids

• Impact of Shale Oil/Gas: New, Reversed, Converted Pipelines

• Separate Rate Recovery Authorities Worried About Rates

• Challenges to Recruit, Train and Retain Qualified Workforce

• Growing Expectations for Change in a Change Averse World

• The World is Watching – Bloggers and the Internet

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Top Priorities for FY 2014 Anticipate & Avert High Consequence Events by: i. Issue High Priority Rulemakings ii. Improve State Program Oversight iii.Implementing Congressional Act Mandates and Recommendations iv. Identify and Promote a Suite of Meaningful Performance Metrics v. Promotion of Pipeline R&D and Technological Advancement Build & Broadcast Understanding of Safety Risks by: i. Engage, Educate, and Empower the Public and ER Community (Damage

Prevention, PIPA, 811, ER Training) ii. IMP-2.0 – Sharpening Understanding and Communication

Catalog & Curtail Highest Risks by: i. Improve Consistency, Unification and Data Driven Inspections for Federal

and State Actions ii. Develop and Deploy a Pipeline Safety Workforce Management Strategy

(succession planning, training, resource allocation)

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High Profile Accidents

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High Profile Accidents • Marshall, Michigan (Federally Regulated)

– Major Crude Oil Spill Dramatically Impacted Several Communities in Michigan

• San Bruno, California (State Regulated)

– Major tragedy – Unimaginable Proportions

• Allentown, Pennsylvania (State Regulated)

– Cast Iron, low pressure

• Excavation Damage Fatalities (State Regulated)

– Texas, North Dakota, Georgia – to name a few

• Yellowstone River; Billings, Montana (Federally Regulated)

– Significant Oil Spill near Billings, MT

• Bison Pipeline; Rural Wyoming (Federally Regulated)

– Newly constructed natural gas pipeline

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High Profile Accidents • Chevron; Salt Lake City, Utah (Federally Regulated) - 2012

– Crude oil and refined products

– Multiple accidents: 6/10, 12/10, 3/13

• Sissonville, West Virginia (Interstate Agent) – 2012

– Impact to major interstate highway; questions on HCA determination

– Led to Congressional oversight hearing

– NTSB investigation

• Mayflower, Arkansas (Federally Regulated) - 2013

– Canadian heavy crude

– Keystone implications?

– Investigation pending


Sissonville Pipeline Incident • Dec 11, 2012: Rupture of a 20” X-60 gas

transmission pipeline (1967 vintage)


Sissonville Pipeline Incident

• No injuries or fatalities (thankfully)

• Three neighboring homes destroyed, others damaged

• Interstate 77 damaged and temporarily closed

• Three pipelines in vicinity – SM-80 20” diameter PIR = 495 feet

– SM-86 26” diameter PIR = 626 feet

– SM-86 Loop 30” diameter PIR = 713 feet

• PHMSA issued Corrective Action Order

• WV PSC and PHMSA Investigation ongoing

• NTSB launched to investigate cause http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/2012/sissonville_wva/sissonville_wva.html

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Mayflower, Arkansas Pipeline Accident

• March 29, 2012: A 20” crude oil pipeline ruptured in Mayflower, Arkansas;

• An estimated 5,000 bbl of crude was spilled;

• Pipeline carrying Canadian crude oil (Wabasca) from Patoka, Illinois to Nederland, Texas;

• Pipeline installed in 1947/1948.

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Enforcement Actions • Enforcement actions for accidents and incidents

now regularly incorporates IM principles

• Operators are responsible for performing and prioritizing integrity assessments based on all risk factors that reflect the risk conditions on the pipeline segment

• CPF No. 4-2013-5027 issued to ExxonMobil Pipeline Company, LP on 11/6/2013 resulted from investigation of the Pegasus Pipeline rupture

• The Remedial Work Plans required by the CAO for the Pegasus Pipeline have been submitted and are under review by PHMSA

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Issues Identified in CPF 4-2013-5027 • Majority of issues (8/9) involved IM regulations

– Did not include consideration of certain manufacturing information in their determination of risk factors (reasonably available information)

– Failed to declare discovery of immediate repair conditions from information received in preliminary reports from the in-line inspection (ILI) vendor (information)

– Risk assessments not updated as changes occur, which includes potential threat changes (MOC)

– failure to determine an "Identified Threat" related to Manufacturing existed on the segment, and failed to elevate the threat for risk reduction activities (MOC)

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Observations and Concerns

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Pipeline Infrastructure (% by Decade in USA)

Decade Hazardous Liquid

Gas Transmission

Gas Distribution Main Service

Unknown & <1920 2% ---

1920s 2% 2% --- ---

1930s 3% 4% 6% 3%

1940s 8% 7% 2% 2%

1950s 20% 22% 10% 8%

1960s 21% 23% 17% 13%

1970s 16% 11% 12% 14%

1980s 9% 10% 14% 17%

1990s 11% 11% 21% 22%

2000s 8% 10% 18% 21% 17

54

%

44

%

58

%

42

%

47

%

53

%

40

%

60

%



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0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

< 1940 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s

Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Vintage 55% installed prior to 1970

(182,615 miles/ 74,472 HF-ERW/50,740 LF-ERW)



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0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

< 1940 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s

Gas Transmission Pipeline Vintage 59% installed prior to 1970



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0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

< 1940 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s

Gas Distribution Pipeline Vintage 31% installed prior to 1970


All Incidents – USA

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05

101520253035404550

Gas Transmission and Liquid Pipelines 2002 to 2012

All Other Causes

Corrosion

Excavation Damage

Incorrect Operations

Material/Weld/Equip.FailureNatural ForceDamageOther OutsideForces

%


Pipe Seam Failures in USA (2002-2012)

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Seam Type Gas Hazardous Liquid TOTAL % of

Total

DSAW 9 5 14 18

Flash Welded 1 5 6 8

HF ERW 3 15 18 23

LF ERW 5 23 28 35

Lap Weld 1 2 3 4

SAW 2 3 5 6

Other 4 2 6 7

Total 25 55 80 100


Pipeline Seam Welds

DSAW Pipe Lap Welded Pipe

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Spiral Weld – SAW Pipe LF and HF - ERW Pipe

SMLS Pipe


What are some of the integrity issues? Materials – pipe and coatings Pipe material –

LF-ERW – widely manufactured from 1920 to 1970’s PHMSA Advisory Bulletins in 1988 and 1989

EFW – produced between 1930 through 1969 Seams – cold welds, lack of fusion, stitched welds, hook

cracks Leads to – selective seam corrosion and corrosion

fatigue

SAW/SSAW – produced in 1930’s through today as DSAW Older pipe has lack of fusion and cracking defects

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Current Rulemakings in Process

Safety of On-Shore Hazardous Liquid Pipelines (NPRM stage)

NPRM moved past PHMSA ANPRM published 10/18/2010 Major topics under consideration:

• Assessments beyond High Consequence Areas (HCAs) • Leak detection beyond HCAs • Repair criteria in HCA and non-HCA areas • Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) • Piggability of lines • Reporting requirements for Gathering lines • Gravity Line exception


Current Rulemakings in Process Integrity Verification Process

Issues and alternatives under development

Subject of numerous public workshops / meetings

Deals with recommendations from NTSB / Hill mandates

Discussed this in previous session

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2013/14 Quality Observations

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Construction

• A typical role of government is to solve problems, often through regulation

• Many of the construction issues we see are not solvable through added regulation

• The operator is solely responsible for building and operating a safe and reliable pipeline system

• It is vital that we develop the infrastructure to move new found resources to market in a safe and environmentally friendly manner

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2013 – Overview of Quality Issues

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30

Overview of Quality Issues


HF–ERW Seams

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32

What caused this coating damage?

• Worn out pads on bending machine


33

Pipe on skids can move and fall. You want to park or stand where!


Welding

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Arc Burns • Melting Water – running onto weld

• Weld Splatter

• Expensive Garbage Can


Coating

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• No cleaning prior to coating • Improper application • All Operator accepted coatings


36

No Coating Coverage


Lower-in and Backfill

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• Rock in ditch?

• Pad dirt under pipe?

• What is being

done to protect pipe from coating and denting damage?


Pipe laid directly on solid rock

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Rocks against pipe (No screening for over 1 mile)

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Backfilling

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• How is soil being installed in ditch?

• Are backhoes

continuously lifting soil padding over pipe without inspection?


Construction Damage

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• Section of Pipe was Replaced • Found by DCVG • Survey-Line was in Service)


Bored Crossing – Failed Hydro Test

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AC Interference Currents

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• Quick and deep • Do not put off

AC surveys


Materials Verification

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• Good Documentation Practices


Serious about risk and consequences? It takes all of us..

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Construction Issues - Summary

Topic Occurrences Coating* 117 Welding* 87

Excavation 20 Nondestructive testing 20

Pipe material* 12 Bending 9

Lowering in* 7 Hydrotesting 4

Design 3 Other 8


Part 195 Citation Number of Citations

Total Civil Penalties Assessed

195.571 Adequacy of Cathodic Protection 26 $163,400

195.573(e) External Corrosion Corrective Action 21 $412,500

195.573(c) External Corrosion Rectifiers 18 $30,300

195.583(a) Atmospheric Corrosion Inspections 18 $65,700

195.569 Exposed Portions of Buried Pipe 16 $44,700

195.577(a) Interference Currents 14 $0

195.579(a) Internal Corrosion Mitigation 13 $145,000

195.573(d) Breakout Tanks 12 $51,200

195.581(a) Atmospheric Corrosion Control 10 $307,900

195.579(c) Internal Corrosion Inspection 9 $26,200

Most Cited Corrosion Regulations Hazardous Liquid Pipelines

(2009-2013)

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Pipeline R& D Activities • 2014 Awarded Projects – Focus Areas:

• Threat Prevention • Leak Detection/Mitigation & Storage • Anomaly Detection/Characterization • Anomaly Repair & Remediation • Design/Materials/Welding-Joining/Valves

• Future R&D Focus Areas: • Legacy Materials • Damage Prevention • Leak Detection • Anomaly Detection/Characterization • Risk Models

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Thank you

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phmsa update significant accidents revie · lf-erw – widely manufactured from 1920 to 1970’s...

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