Rowland 1Robert RowlandPhilosophy 101McGuinness

Free Will

The philosophical problem of free will has remained in the mind of man since our

sentience first emerged. Philosophers as early as Aristotle noted that one of man’s strongest

thirsts is for knowledge. As humanity throws itself towards the stars, unravels it’s own genetic

material, and collides subatomic particles, our knowledge of the universe deepens. However

when these feats of intellect are truly reflected on, one cannot help but realize we are toddlers

just beginning to wet our toes in the lapping waves of a vast ocean of information.

As man first saw the Hubble Deep Field images, he was humbled. A new depth was

added to what already seemed boundless. Our brains neural network had to recalibrate in order

to account for this new vision of space. All the while, our insatiable thirst for knowledge is

merely stoked, not quenched. This begins to reveal something remarkable about a commonly

overlooked and little understood aspect of the human mind, the “will”. The astrophysicist who

finds himself inundated with a flood of new questions after laying eyes on images from the

surrounding cosmos, can little account for his cognitive recalibration after viewing the Hubble

Deep Field images than I can account for my decision to not attend my Philosophy class in the

nude. Surely both of us could offer reasons why we choose to do or act in a particular way.

However through the inquiry of modern neuroscience we are being forced to consider the

possibility that our most coveted command over our own “free will”, is entirely illusory.

To even entertain the idea that we are not in command of our thoughts and choices,

forces many to consider a proposition which is deeply incompatible with how most of us feel.

For instance, my decision to come to class clothed appropriately seems an obvious choice to

me. However when I began to inquire as to the reasons behind my reasoning, and the reason

Rowland 2which precede even those, the origins of choice become murky.

The philosophical debate over “free will” persists not so much because it is an interesting

idea, but because as a notion “free will” emerges from a felt experience we all have. Two main

divisions of thought to examine on the subject of “free will” are those of “determinists” and

“Compatibilists”. The latter group believes a person is free in choice as long as there are no

outer or inner compulsions preventing action of these desires. If I want coffee instead of tea,

and it is not due to my being deathly allergic to tea, or a gun to my head forcing the choice, then

this should be demonstrative of my freedom of will. The determinists argue on the contrary.

Every aspect of our behavior is determined by preceding causes of which we have no control.

While the deterministic view makes me feel less of a savvy fashionista for my choice in clothing

this morning, it is the only philosophical view on “free will” which remains congruent with what

we know about the neurophysiology of the brain.

3Noted physiologist Benjamin Libet famously demonstrated some deterministic aspects

of cognition using an EEG. By asking participants in his research to report which letter they saw

on a random letter “clock” the moment they chose to push one button or another, Libet was able

to find two distinct brain regions that contained information about which button a subject would

push a full 7 to 10 seconds before they consciously made the decision. These finding have

been extended by a more recent experiment in which the activity of 256 neurons was sufficient

to predict with an 80 percent accuracy, a persons motor actions 700 milliseconds before they

become aware of it themselves. This means, in the moments before you are aware of what you

will do next, and space in which you feel as though you have the choice to do anything, your

brain has already made the decision. As some philosophers and neuroscientist point out, this is

hardly reconcilable with the belief that we author our own actions.

1Some compatibilists such as Daniel Dennett argues that even if our thoughts are the

product of unconscious causes, they are still our own. He makes a point to show that while

Rowland 3these processes may be unconscious, they are still a part of us. While in a broad sense this is

true, we must realize that as conscious creatures we feel identical to a stream of information in

our mind. Dennett asserts that we are more than this, but in doing so, trades the psychological

fact of being a conscious agent having a subjective experience, for a conceptual understanding

of ourselves. It similar to the statement “we are made of the cosmos”. While it is true the

subatomic particles that make us were born in the cosmos, we don’t feel like the cosmos. We

also do not let this knowledge of the extraterrestrial origins of the atoms in our bodies drive our

morals.

The question must be entertained, of whether or not our current paradigm needs

adjusting meriting these recent insights into “free will”. This area of inquiry is delicate as it

pertains to our deepest convictions. Most of us look down on criminal behavior with utterances

such as, “He shouldn’t have done that.”, or “I wouldn’t have done that.” The fact is, where you

to trade brain, body, and life events piece for piece with any psychopathic killer. You would act

as a psychopathic killer no matter how free of aversive pathologies you feel you are now. These

make the former statements of “He shouldn’t.” and “I wouldn’t” as empty as declaring, “Had I

been born in Canada, I would be Canadian.” It seems luck has a larger role in our thoughts and

actions than previously thought. While I would love to take credit for my ability to live my life to

this point without murdering anyone for fun, I was merely lucky in my genetics, environment,

and life experiences.

1If we examine four theoretical criminal cases, something very telling is revealed about

how our sense of morals and “free will” are tied to our understanding of the brain.

Case 1: A 7 year old boy, after finding a loaded gun in his father’s closet, accidentally

discharges it killing his playmate.

Case 2: A 15 year old boy, who was abused physically and verbally at home, brings his

Rowland 4father’s gun to school and shoots another classmate who has bullied him all year.

Case 3: A 25 year old man buys a gun and murders a stranger “just for fun.”

Case 4: A 25 year old man buys a gun and murders a stranger “just for fun.” During his

subsequent psychological evaluation. Doctors learn a tumor ravaging his medial

prefrontal cortex, the part of the brain responsible for complex cognitive functions,

decision making, and moderating social behaviour.

In each instance one person's life is ended by actions which originated in another

person's brain. However our sense of moral outrage varies given the specifics of each case. In

Case 1, most of us recognize that a 7 year old does not possess the necessary mental functions

to recognize the true consequences of his actions. In Case 2, the history of abuse, as well as

age, seem to partially mitigate the responsibility of the killer. Case 3 would be labeled a

psychopath without hesitation by the majority of the population, however the exact same

scenario, played out in Case 4, is only viewed differently when the murderer’s medical condition

is revealed. This shows that despite the popular notion of “free will”, we all inherently recognize

that our ability to make decisions is largely dependent on the neurophysiology of our brains.

It seems futile to try and remain attached to our prevailing ideas about “free will” given

what we now understand about the neurophysiology of the brain and the processes by which

thoughts arise and give way to actions. A famous case from the annals of psychology, which

demonstrates how very divided our concept of “free will” is from the actual mechanics of

cognition, is that of Phineas Gage. 2While working as foreman of a work gang blasting rock for

a railroad, a mishap during an explosion sent a tamping iron upward into Gage’s face, behind

one of his eyes, and out the top of his skull. While the body of facts surrounding the rest of his

life and that actual accident remain somewhat small, they make an interesting statement

towards the correlation of the physical state of the brain and our thoughts and actions. To the

Rowland 5surprise of physicians, Gages made a full recovery. His personality however, changed

dramatically following the accident. A once highly sociable person and competent worker, Gage

became disagreeable, profane, and inconsistent, ultimately resulting in him being terminated

from his job as foreman.

Should the future bring about a complete understanding of the human brain and what

actually causes our thoughts, it easy to imagine violence becoming as easy as treating a

nutritional deficiency. It would shift justice from a punishment and vengeance mentality, to an

approach focused more on treatment. While this is currently not the case, we cannot ignore

constantly surmounting evidence stripping away the illusion of “free will”. This should certainly

not lead us to stay in bed all day doing nothing since we have no control over our lives. Not

only would you be unable to do this (Due to the endless casualties which would drive us to

some action), but our actions are still important. Whether or not we are the conscious authors

of our thoughts and actions, they still carry weight. No matter the reason for my writing this

paper, it would not have written itself If I did not. We must not be afraid to abandon paradigms

that are comforting, like “free will”. Instead we must press forward with more and more

questions as man has, and will continue to do. It seems, as many philosophers have pointed

out, that this is the nature of man. Albeit this nature is the greatest gift granted to man, what

freedom is this?

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Works Cited:

1. Harris, Sam. Free Will. Free Press, A Division of Simon & Schuster. New York, NY 2012. E-book.

2. Gazzinga, Michael. Psychological Science 3rd Edition. W.W. Norton & Company, Inc, New York, NY 2010. Print.

3. some thing i read one time and internet