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“The hypothesis which we embrace is plain. It maintains that morality is determined by

sentiment. It defines virtue to be whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator

the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the contrary.” (HUME, Enquiry) Explain

and critically discuss.

What determines morality and motivates us into moral action? Often people

intuitively will tell you that such-and-such is wrong, in the moral sense; but how is it that

they can come to know this? This essay will establish why Hume believes that morality is

not dependent on reason and rationality, but instead it is contingent to sentiment and the

passions, which leads each individual to moral obligation from their feeling of sympathy

for other human beings. I will then examine the two possible implications of morality

being determined by the individual’s sentiments: that either morals are subjective and

mutable with each individual, and as such each individual will experience different

sentiments to the same moral action; or that there are objective moral claims and each

individual’s moral faculty is innately aware of them. I will then go on to discuss the idea

of an “ideal spectator” who serves to provide objectivity when determining morality

through sentiment.

Hume argues that since moral decisions affect actions whereas decisions of reason do not,

morality must therefore not be based on reason. He uses the example of murder, where if

we examine the act of murder we discover no idea of the quality of “immorality” (vice)

but instead only the strong feeling of dislike we have for the idea of murder. Morality is

not a “matter-of-fact” derived from experience, but rather it resides in what Hume calls

the passions (the opposite of Reason). Hume draws this conclusion by pointing out that

although we may not like murder, there is nothing actually illogical or contradictory

about it; and therefore the immorality of actions is not contingent to the irrationality of

them. Instead, Hume suggests, murder should be considered immoral because it cannot

be universally justified as beneficial or good to everyone. That is, not everyone would

give assent to turning murder into a universally approved action, because they would be

condemning themselves to the possibility of being victims. With this example in mind,

Hume concludes that immorality isn’t immoral because it violates reason, but rather

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because it is displeasing to us. He draws upon another example, in which a man would

rather destroy the world than harm his own fingers. Hume suggests that this action would

be immoral not because of the irrationality of global destruction simply to save five

fingers on one human being, but instead, because not even the man in question would

give universal assent and allow anyone else to commit this action.

Hume ascribes morality to the passions because it seems to be the only viable

alternative to reason, which he had already argued does not motivate action (and morality

requires motivating action). He also realized after examining his own ideas on murder

that he could isolate his own feelings about the subject but not the clear and distinct ideas

he had about it. Ideas and impressions, he explains, differ in so much that impressions are

formulated from the senses (sound, sight, taste, touch, smell) and emotions, whereas

ideas are formulated from thoughts and beliefs. Hume believes that we have a moral

sense (a feeling of pleasure or pain accordingly connected to virtue and vice) which tells

us when something is moral or immoral. These feelings of pleasure and pain are

impressions, not ideas, and they give rise to the passions and then motivate action. Moral

impressions are only caused by human actions (as they are formulated through our

perceptive faculties and emotions, and as such are reactionary), and should only be

considered from a social point of view. This is because our actions can only really be

considered moral or immoral with regards to how they affect other people. This idea

leads Hume to argue that sympathy, our feeling of pathos for fellow human beings, is the

foundation for moral obligation. Our actions are then caused by a combination of utility

and sentiment. Hume does point out that moral sentiments must be useful to ourselves

and others, or be pleasing to ourselves and others. He emphasizes that morality is not

strictly voluntary, but rather that it is made up of both voluntary and involuntary virtues.

Is Hume right in suggesting that morality is determined by our sentiments? Does

it seem plausible that simply feeling an unpleasant sentiment towards murder is what tells

us that murder is immoral? If Hume is correct, then there are two possible implications:

either these sentiments are subjective and unique to each individual, meaning that each

individual has a different pleasing or displeasing reaction to whatever action is in

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question; or that we must assume that there are universally objective moral claims that

every human being has a fundamental knowledge of. Let us consider the former first: the

idea that morality is indeed dependent on each individual’s personal sentiments. This

would in fact lead to morality being redundant, as there would be no set morals that all

humans could agree to. That is, if morality is subjective, then Hume’s statement that

“morality is determined by sentiment” thus implies that morality is mutable with each

individual who is faced with the situations which they are making a moral judgment on. I,

for example, could witness a man murdering another man, and think it immoral. The

person standing beside me who is a friend of the murderer and knows the reasons for his

actions might disagree and argue that he is morally justified in his murder because the

other man tried to kill him first. Both of us would have differing sentiments (I

displeasing, and the other bystander pleasing) about the murder, leading us to draw

different conclusions about the morality of the murder. But intuitively this seems wrong.

Hume’s means of determining virtue and vice seems to assume a universality of how

people evaluate a given situation. This is clearly not the case: every individual has their

own reactions based on their upbringing and circumstance. One person may be pro

abortion, another against, and both absolutely convinced of their correctness, and both

experiencing the internal validation Hume refers to (pleasing sentiment). The same can

be said of more general social practices that differ across cultural lines. To define virtue

or vice by the approval or disapproval of a spectator is ludicrous. If morality exists- and

let us assume it does for the sake of this argument- then surely it must have an objective,

certain definition. What makes a rose a rose is what it smells like, and not how sweet the

smeller thinks it is. Similarly, what makes something moral or immoral is not who is

judging it, but the thing itself. This is the difference between morality and judgment, or

justification. An immoral act, such as killing, can have many reasons, and some may be

judged by society as justifiable cause. However, the act of taking a life is still an immoral

one. Hume replies to this objection by pointing out that there are two different types of

virtues: artificial virtues that are dependent on social structure, and as such vary from

society to society (such as justice, fidelity, promises, duties, etc) and natural virtues that

are universal (such as ambition, compassion and generosity). By splitting virtues into

these two categories Hume can then counter argue that whilst some virtues are subjective

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and based around society, others are in fact objective and universal to each rational

human being.

But are there objective moral values? Having considered the possibility of our

moral sense (our “sentiments”) being subjective, now we turn to the possibility of it being

a universal and intrinsic to every rational human being. The mere fact that our society

creates its own moral code relative to our ideals, and that this code differs from society to

society implies that there are no objective moral claims. Some cultures don’t share the

same virtues which Hume calls “natural”. For instance, would a lack of compassion

constitute immorality? It may create a feeling of disapproval from some individuals, but

does that necessarily mean that the action is immoral? Furthermore, are all actions that

create a displeasing sentiment suddenly immoral? If we imagine that there is a patient

that is suffering and in severe pain, who will die in two days time, but a doctor shows

compassion and, at the patient’s request, ends their life early: if I experience a displeasing

sentiment because such is the nature of death that it brings about displeasing impressions,

does that render the doctor’s actions immoral? People seem to disagree about moral

claims because there is no fact of the matter (as opposed to disagreements about non-

moral claims where the correct information, or fact of the matter, can be sought and

verified). Moral claims are reflective of different ways of life rather than expressive

perceptions of objective values; therefore there cannot be any objective moral values. It

seems absurd to rely on our sentiments towards things as a perceptive moral faculty. We

have no way of proving it does indeed exist as an objective and innate moral guide, and

isn’t merely a reactionary faculty that is heavily influenced by our own personal interests

and sympathies.

In response to the objection that our “sentiments” can be misguided or swayed by

different circumstances, Hume relates the sentiments directly to a “spectator” In his

conceptual analysis of “virtue” and “vice”. It is widely believed that Hume was in

agreement with Adam Smith’s idea of the “ideal observer”. Hume refers to a spectator

who must fulfill a set of conditions, making him “ideal” as a judge of morality in

situations. For Hume’s spectator to be able to make moral judgments based on his

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sentiment, “all the circumstances and relations must be previously known”1 (that is, he

must have full knowledge and awareness of anything that is relevant to the case being

evaluated). He must also adopt “steady and general points of view”2, meaning he must

overlook the private interests and relations of the people and remain completely

impartial. In order to adopt a “steady and general” point of view, the spectator must take

into account facts about human nature, overlook his own personal relations to the parties

involved in the case he is evaluating, and finally, overlook his own personal interests.

Essentially, this spectator makes it possible for morality to be determined by sentiment

whilst maintaining that there are objective moral claims. If each individual who is

attempting to determine whether a situation is moral or immoral assumes the role of the

ideal spectator, then he should be able to view the situation impartially and objectively.

This solves the problem of subjectivity that exists because each individual has differing

sentiments towards an action: it forces the individual to imagine himself in a situation of

complete impartiality, helping him to see what the correct moral action in that scenario

would be.

To conclude, if morality is in fact determined by sentiment, then there are two

possible implications. Either morality is completely subjective, as each individual has

different sentiments and feelings towards moral actions based on factors such as social

upbringing, personal history, etc; or morality is completely objective, meaning that

everyone has the same innate ideas about what is right and wrong, and our sentiment is

the metronome which reminds us of them. If the former is true, one of the main

implications that follows is that there are no strict morals, making one person’s moral

action another person’s immoral one (and vice versa). If the latter is true then the

implications that follow is that everyone must have a sort of “6th

sense” lodged in our

sentiments that tells us the right and wrongness of actions. The idea of the “ideal

spectator” bridges the gap between moral claims being subjective or objective whilst

being determined by sentiment. It allows each individual to view a situation impartially

and objectively in order to determine the correct course of action, by examining whether

1 Hume (1751) Appx. 1.11

2 Hume (1739-40) 3.3.1.15

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they would experience a pleasing or displeasing sentiment whilst following the

requirements of the spectator. This solves the problems surrounding the possibility of

moral sentiments being completely subjective: all individuals will experience either a

pleasing or displeasing sentiment towards actions, but it is only when they remove their

partiality and examine the situation through the eyes of the “ideal spectator” that they can

experience the sympathy for fellow man that leads to moral judgments.

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Works Cited

Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Hackett Pub Co Inc. 1993

Rachels, James. The Elements of Moral Philosophy. McGraw-Hill Companies Inc. 2003