4-Volume Set

Philosophyof MindCRITICAL CONCEPTS IN PHILOSOPHY

Edited and with a new introduction by Sean Crawford, University ofManchester, UK

Philosophy of mind is concerned with fundamental issues about the relation betweenmind and body and mind and world, and with the nature of the diverse variety ofmental phenomena, such as thought, self-knowledge, consciousness, perception,sensation, and emotion. Philosophers of mind explore some of the most perplexingquestions about our mental lives. For instance:

• How exactly is the mental related to the physical?

• How is it that our thoughts can reach out to reality and refer to objects distant in time and space?

• What is consciousness? Can it be explained by science?

For as long as humanity has sought an understanding of its place in the universe,philosophy of mind has been at the centre of philosophy, but it flourishes now as it hasnever done before. This new title in the Routledge’s Major Works series, CriticalConcepts in Philosophy, meets the need for an authoritative reference work to makesense of the subject’s enormous literature and the continuing explosion in researchoutput. Edited by Sean Crawford, a prominent scholar in the field, it is a four-volumecollection of classic and contemporary contributions to all of the major debates inphilosophy of mind.

With comprehensive introductions to each volume, newly written by the editor, whichplace the collected material in its historical and intellectual context, Philosophy of Mind—is an essential work of reference and is destined to be valued by philosophers of mind-aswell as those working in allied areas such as metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophyof language; and cognate disciplines such as psychology—as a vital research tool.

Routledge Major Works

RoutledgeSeptember 2009234x156: 1,600ppSet Hb: 978-0-415-47191-6

1. Bertrand Russell, ‘Mind and Matter’, Portraits from Memory (GeorgeAllen and Unwin, 1956), pp. 142–53.

2. Franz Brentano, ‘The Distinction between Mental and PhysicalPhenomena’ [1874], Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, vol. I, bk.II, ch. I, §5 (Routledge, 1995), pp. 88–91.

3. Bertrand Russell, ‘Knowledge by Description and Knowledge byAcquaintance’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1910–11, XI,108–28.

4. Samuel Alexander, ‘Natural Piety’, The Hibbert Journal, July 1922.

5. C. D. Broad, ‘Mechanism and its Alternatives’, The Mind and its Place inNature (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1925), pp. 44–6, 50–81.

6. Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, ‘On the Idea of Emergence’,Part II of ‘Studies in the Logic of Explanation’, Philosophy of Science,1948, 15, 2, 146–52.

7. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (Hutchinson, 1949), pp. 11–24,43–5, 134–5.

8. Carl G. Hempel, ‘The Logical Analysis of Psychology’, in Herbert Feigland Wilfrid Sellars (eds.), Readings in Philosophical Analysis (Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1949), pp. 373–84.

9. Peter Geach, ‘Ryle’s Rejection of Mental Acts’ and ‘Acts of Judgement’,Mental Acts (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), pp. 4–9.

10. Hilary Putnam, ‘Brains and Behaviour’, in R. J. Butler (ed.), AnalyticalPhilosophy, vol. 2 (Basil Blackwell, 1968), pp. 1–19.

11. Roderick Chisholm, ‘Sentences about Believing’, Proceedings of theAristotelian Society, 1955–6, 56, 125–48.

12. W. V. Quine, ‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes’, The Journal ofPhilosophy, 1956, 53, 5, 177–87.

13. Wilfrid Sellars, ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’, MinnesotaStudies in the Philosophy of Science, 1956, I, 307–29.

14. U. T. Place, ‘Is Consciousness a Brain Process?’, British Journal ofPsychology, 1956, 47, 44–50.

15. J. J. C. Smart, ‘Sensations and Brain Processes’, The Philosophical Review,1959, LXVIII, 2, 141–56.

16. Richard Rorty, ‘Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories’, Review ofMetaphysics, 1965, 19, 1, 24–54.

17. David Armstrong, ‘The Nature of Mind’ [1966], reprinted in DavidArmstrong, The Nature of Mind (The Harvester Press, 1981), pp. 1–15.

18. David Lewis, ‘Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1972, L, 3, 249–58.

19. Hilary Putnam, ‘The Nature of Mental States’, originally published as‘Psychological Predicates’, in W. H. Capitan and D. D. Merrill (eds.),Art, Mind and Religion (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967), pp.37–48.

20. Donald Davidson, ‘Mental Events’, in L. Foster and J. W. Swanson(eds.), Experience and Theory (Humanities Press, 1970), pp. 79–101.

21. Daniel C. Dennett, ‘Intentional Systems’, The Journal of Philosophy,1971, 68, 4, 87–106.

22. Jerry Fodor, ‘Special Sciences’, Synthese, 1974, 28, 77–115.

23. Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Harvard University Press, 1980),pp. 144–55.

24. Hilary Putnam, ‘Meaning and Reference’, The Journal of Philosophy,1973, 70, 19, 699–711.

25. Thomas Nagel, ‘What is it Like to be a Bat?’, The Philosophical Review,1974, LXXXIII, 435–50.

26. Ned Block, ‘Troubles with Functionalism’, Minnesota Studies in thePhilosophy of Science, 1978, 9, 261–325.

27. Paul Churchland, ‘Eliminative Materialism and the PropositionalAttitudes’, The Journal of Philosophy, 1981, LXXVIII, 2, 67–90.

28. Jerry Fodor, ‘Fodor’s Guide to Mental Representation: The IntelligentAunties’s Vade-Mecum’, Mind, 1985, 94, 373, 89–95.

29. John Searle, ‘Minds, Brains and Programs’, The Behavioral and BrainSciences, 1980, III, 3, 417–24.

30. William Lycan, ‘Form, Function, and Feel’, The Journal of Philosophy,1981, LXXVIII, 24–50.

31. Jaegwon Kim, ‘The Myth of Non-Reductive Materialism’, Proceedingsand Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 1989, 63, 31–47.

32. Terence Horgan, ‘From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meetingthe Demands of a Material World’, Mind, 1993, 102, 555–86.

33. Noam Chomsky, Language and Problems of Knowledge (MIT Press,1988), pp. 142–7.

34. J. J. C. Smart, ‘The Content of Physicalism’, Philosophical Quarterly,1978, 28, 113, 339–41.

35. David Papineau, ‘The Rise of Physicalism’, in Barry Loewer (ed.),Physicalism and its Discontents (Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp.3–36.

36. John Heil, ‘Levels of Reality’, Ratio, 2003, XVI, 205–21.

37. Galen Strawson, ‘Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism EntailsPanpsychism’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2006, 13, 10–11, 3–31.

38. Jaegwon Kim, ‘Emergence: Core Ideas and Issues’, Synthese, 2006, 151,547–59.

39. Steven Yablo, ‘The Real Distinction Between Mind and Body’,Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1990, 16, 151–4, 162–70, 177–201.

40. Barbara Montero, ‘What Does the Conservation of Energy Have to Dowith Physicalism?’, Dialectica, 2006, 60, 4, 383–96.

41. W. D. Hart, The Engines of the Soul (Cambridge University Press, 1988),pp. 1–8, 50–9, 62, 65–7, 69, 130, 135–44, 147–50, 179.

VOLUME IFoundations

VOLUME IIThe Mind–Body Problem

Philosophy of Mind CRITICAL CONCEPTS IN PHILOS

Routledge Major Works Intended Contents

42. John Searle, ‘What Is an Intentional State?’, Mind, 1979, 88, 349,74–92.

43. Steven Schiffer, ‘Propositional Content’, in Ernest Lepore and Barry C.Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language(Clarendon Press, 2006), pp. 267–94.

44. Tyler Burge, ‘Belief De Re’, The Journal of Philosophy, 1977, 74, 338–62.

45. Daniel Dennett, ‘Beyond Belief’, in Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thoughtand Object: Essays on Intentionality (Clarendon Press, 1982).

46. Simon Blackburn, ‘Reference’, Spreading the Word (Clarendon Press,1984), pp. 310–28.

47. John McDowell, ‘Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space’, inPhilip Pettit and John McDowell (eds.), Subject, Thought and Context(Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 137–68.

48. Sean Crawford, ‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes: QuineRevisited’, Synthese, 2008, 160, 75–96.

49. Tyler Burge, ‘Individualism and the Mental’, Midwest Studies inPhilosophy, 1979, IV, 73–87.

50. Jerry Fodor, ‘Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Strategy inCognitive Psychology’, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1980, III, 1,63–72.

51. Gareth Evans, ‘Commentary on Fodor’s “’Methodological SolipsismConsidered as a Strategy in Cognitive Psychology’’’, The Behaviouraland Brain Sciences, 1989, III, 1.

52. Brian Loar, ‘Social Content and Psychological Content’, in Robert H.Grimm and Daniel D. Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought (University ofArizona Press, 1988), pp. 99–110.

53. Robert Stalnaker, ‘On What’s in the Head’, Philosophical Perspectives,1989, 3, 287–316.

54. Barry Loewer, ‘A Guide to Naturalizing Semantics’, in Bob Hale andCrispin Wright (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy ofLanguage (Blackwell, 1997), pp. 108–26.

55. Ruth Millikan, ‘Biosemantics’, The Journal of Philosophy, 1989, 86, 6,281–97.

56. Fred Dretske, ‘If You Can’t Make One, You Don’t Know How it Works’,Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 1994, 19, 468–82.

57. Donald Davidson, ‘Knowing One’s Own Mind’, Proceedings andAddresses of the American Philosophical Association, 1987, 441–58.

58. Tyler Burge, ‘Individualism and Self-Knowledge’, The Journal of Philosophy, 1988, 85, 649–63.

59. Michael McKinsey, ‘Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access’, Analysis,1991, 51, 9–16.

60. Sydney Shoemaker, ‘On Knowing One’s Own Mind’, PhilosophicalPerspectives, 1988, 2, 183–209.

61. Gareth Matthews, ‘Consciousness and Life’, Philosophy, 1977, LII, 199,13–26.

62. Sydney Shoemaker, ‘Functionalism and Qualia’, Philosophical Studies,1975, XXVII, 5, 292–315.

63. Frank Jackson, ‘What Mary Didn’t Know’, The Journal of Philosophy,1986, LXXXIII, 5, 291–5.

64. Joseph Levine, ‘Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap’, PacificPhilosophical Quarterly, 1983, 64, 354–61.

65. Brian Loar, ‘Phenomenal States’, Philosophical Perspectives, 1990, 4,81–108.

66. Owen Flanagan, Consciousness Reconsidered (MIT Press, 1992), pp.97–102.

67. David Papineau, ‘Kripke’s Proof That We Are All Intuitive Dualists’(www.kcl.ac.uk/ip/davidpapineau).

68. Gilbert Harman, ‘The Intrinsic Quality of Experience’, PhilosophicalPerspectives, 1990, 4, 31–52.

69. Ned Block, ‘Inverted Earth’, Philosophical Perspectives, 1990, 4, 53–79.

70. David Rosenthal, ‘State Consciousness and Transitive Consciousness’,Consciousness and Cognition, 1993, 2, 355–63.

71. Fred Dretske, ‘Conscious Experience’, Mind, 1993, 102, 406, 263–83.

72. Tyler Burge, ‘Two Kinds of Consciousness’, in Ned Block, OwenFlanagan, and Güven Güzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness(MIT Press, 1997), pp. 427–33.

73. Michael Tye, ‘A Representational Theory of Pains and theirPhenomenal Character’, Philosophical Perspectives, 1995, 9, 223–40.

74. Colin McGinn, ‘Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?’, Mind, 1989,98, 391, 349–66.

75. Kathleen V. Wilkes, ‘Is Consciousness Important?’, British Journal forthe Philosophy of Science, 1984, 35, 223–43.

76. David Chalmers, ‘Facing Up To the Problem of Consciousness’, Journalof Consciousness Studies, 1995, 2, 3, 200–19.

77. John Searle, ‘Consciousness’, Annual Review of Neuroscience, 2000, 23,557–78.

78. Daniel Dennett, ‘A Third-Person Approach to Consciousness’, SweetDreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness (MIT Press,2005), pp. 25–56.

79. Martin Davies, ‘Individualism and Perceptual Content’, Mind, 1991,100, 461–84.

80. Christopher Peacocke, ‘Does Perception Have a NonconceptualContent?’, The Journal of Philosophy, 2001, 98, 5, 239–64.

81. Tim Crane, ‘Is There a Perceptual Relation?’, in Tamar Szabó Gendlerand John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience (Clarendon Press,2006), pp. 126–46.

VOLUME IIIIntentionality

VOLUME IVConsciousness

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