philosophy of mind dualism: in addition to the physical/material body, there is an immaterial mind...

Philosophy of Mind

Dualism: in addition to the Dualism: in addition to the physical/material body, there is an physical/material body, there is an immaterial mindimmaterial mind

Physicalism: mind and body are both Physicalism: mind and body are both entirely physicalentirely physical

Dualism

Substance dualism: Substance dualism: The mind is an immaterial The mind is an immaterial substancesubstance, i.e., a , i.e., a

thing that can (logically possibly) exist by itselfthing that can (logically possibly) exist by itself

Property dualism: Property dualism: certain mental phenomena (states, events, certain mental phenomena (states, events,

etc.) are immaterial properties of some etc.) are immaterial properties of some material thing (e.g., brain, body)material thing (e.g., brain, body)

Brie GertlerBrie Gertler

In Defense of Mind-Body Dualism

Disembodiment Argument

1. I can conceive of experiencing this pain while disembodied

2. What is conceivable is possible3. It’s possible that this pain exists in immaterial

being (1, 2)4. If this pain were a physical state or event, it

couldn’t exist in immaterial being5. So, this pain is not identical to any physical state

(3, 4)6. So physicalism is false (5)

Who cares?

pain : C-fiber firing : : water : Hpain : C-fiber firing : : water : H22OOPain is either Pain is either necessarilynecessarily physical or not physical or not

physical at allphysical at allAnalogously for other mental phenomenaAnalogously for other mental phenomena

Since mental events are not necessarily Since mental events are not necessarily physical, they aren’t physicalphysical, they aren’t physical

So So wewe are not entirely physical are not entirely physical

Physicalism Behaviorism: Behaviorism:

What we call mentality is really just proneness to behave in What we call mentality is really just proneness to behave in certain wayscertain ways

‘‘x is in pain’ x is in pain’ meansmeans: ‘x is disposed to cry out, wince, etc.’: ‘x is disposed to cry out, wince, etc.’

Functionalism: Functionalism: Mental states are functional states of a complex systemMental states are functional states of a complex system Pain is any state that plays a certain causal role: e.g., is Pain is any state that plays a certain causal role: e.g., is

produced by kicks and shocks, leads to fear, aversion, pain produced by kicks and shocks, leads to fear, aversion, pain behavior, etc.behavior, etc.

Identity theory: the mind is the brainIdentity theory: the mind is the brain Pain is (but doesn’t mean) C-fiber firing, or brain state #71325, Pain is (but doesn’t mean) C-fiber firing, or brain state #71325,

or whatever we discover it to beor whatever we discover it to be Like ‘water is HLike ‘water is H2O’ or ‘lightning is electrical discharge’, a O’ or ‘lightning is electrical discharge’, a

scientific discovery, not a fact about scientific discovery, not a fact about meaningmeaning

Peter CarruthersPeter Carruthers

The Mind is the Brain

Causal Argument

1. Some mental events cause physical events

2. Every (caused) physical event is wholly caused by some physical event

3. Therefore, some mental events are physical events

Plausibly, if they’re physical events, they’re brain events, and if some are, all are

Arguments for Premise 2:

Conservation laws of physical sciencesConservation laws of physical sciencesMetaphysical principle of the ‘causal Metaphysical principle of the ‘causal

closure of the physical’closure of the physical’Neuroscientific inductionNeuroscientific induction

Objections to Physicalism:Certainty

Leibniz’s Law:Leibniz’s Law: if if aa is numerically identical with is numerically identical with bb, , then then aa cannot have any properties that cannot have any properties that bb lacks lacks

1.1. I am absolutely certain of having certain I am absolutely certain of having certain conscious statesconscious states

2.2. I am not absolutely certain of having certain I am not absolutely certain of having certain brain statesbrain states

3.3. Therefore, these conscious states are not Therefore, these conscious states are not identical with these brain states (by Leibniz’s identical with these brain states (by Leibniz’s Law)Law)

Response: Leibniz’s Law does not hold in “intentional contexts”Leibniz’s Law does not hold in “intentional contexts”

““intentional”: having to do with meaningintentional”: having to do with meaning

‘‘Jocasta is pretty’ implies ‘Oedipus’s mother is pretty’Jocasta is pretty’ implies ‘Oedipus’s mother is pretty’ ‘‘O said that Jocasta is pretty’ O said that Jocasta is pretty’ does notdoes not imply ‘O said that imply ‘O said that

O’s mom is pretty’O’s mom is pretty’ ‘‘O thought that J was pretty’ does not imply ‘O thought O thought that J was pretty’ does not imply ‘O thought

that O’s mom was pretty’that O’s mom was pretty’

‘‘I can tell I’m in pain’ does not imply ‘I can tell I’m in brain I can tell I’m in pain’ does not imply ‘I can tell I’m in brain state #714390’, even if pain state #714390’, even if pain isis brain state #714390 brain state #714390

Objections to Physicalism:Color, etc.

1.1. An afterimage may be green (a taste An afterimage may be green (a taste sensation may be sweet, etc.)sensation may be sweet, etc.)

2.2. Brain events aren’t green (or sweet, etc.)Brain events aren’t green (or sweet, etc.)

3.3. Therefore, afterimages (etc.) are not Therefore, afterimages (etc.) are not brain eventsbrain events

Response:

Note first how this applies to dualism as Note first how this applies to dualism as well: the immaterial soul isn’t green well: the immaterial soul isn’t green either….either….

The afterimage isn’t green in the sense The afterimage isn’t green in the sense that grass is; it’s an experience that grass is; it’s an experience ofof green, green, not a green experience.not a green experience.

Objections to Physicalism:Spatial properties

1.1. Brain events are spatially locatedBrain events are spatially located

2.2. Mental events are not spatially locatedMental events are not spatially located

3.3. Therefore, mental events are not brain Therefore, mental events are not brain eventsevents

Response

It is It is unusualunusual to attribute precise locations to attribute precise locations to specific thoughts (e.g., ‘two inches to specific thoughts (e.g., ‘two inches behind her left eye’), but that doesn’t make behind her left eye’), but that doesn’t make it senselessit senseless

The question is where the event is The question is where the event is occurring in virtue of which Mary is occurring in virtue of which Mary is thinking about her motherthinking about her mother

And And thatthat event is occurring two inches event is occurring two inches behind her left eyebehind her left eye

philosophy of mind dualism: in addition to the physical/material body, there is an immaterial mind...

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