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Is Death a Harm? And if so, how?

Whether or not death is a harm has been an age old question tackled by

philosophers through the times. It inquires as to the possibility of the harm to a person

that a state of being can cause. Death seems to have three commonly interchanged

definitions. Firstly there is dying, which is a process; secondly there is being dead,

which is the condition or state; and lastly, there is death, which intervenes between

the two. This is relevant when considering whether death is a harm as it is often

unclear whether or not we are considering its harmful properties in terms of the

process of dying or the state we enter when dead. Various arguments have been put

forward to show that death is indeed a harm. It is my intent in explaining these

arguments to point out their failings, and proceed to explain why I agree with those

philosophers who believe that death is not a harm.

The Deprivation Argument is a clearly outlined argument with a conclusion

that seems to visibly follow from the premises. It states that Death deprives the

subject of all the pleasant experiences of living. Since pleasant experiences are good,

and having less good is worse than having more of it, death must be a harm because it

removes the good. That is to say, this argument claims that Death deprives us of life,

and life is supposedly something good; in being denied this “good” we are being

harmed. Another way of seeing this argument is in terms of value: if life is a value,

and death removes that value, death is a harm for depriving us of that good value. But

there are several problems with this argument. Firstly, why is life arbitrarily classed as

good, and death as bad? It could be argued that if the subject’s life was utterly

miserable and unpleasant, it wouldn’t be worth living, and thus death would not be a

harm. To this objection Nagel would respond that life is ultimately a positive value,

regardless of the bad experiences in it. Nagel argues that “there are elements, that if

added to ones life can make it better or worse, but when these elements are set aside

the remains are not neutral; rather positive.”1 Nagel purports that life will always be

worth living, even when the bad elements outweigh the good since “experience itself

1 Nagel, Thomas. “Death”

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supplies the additional positive weight.”2 Another objection raised against the

deprivation argument is the nature of “harm”. How can something be bad without

being positively unpleasant? That is to say, there are no evils that consist merely in

the absence of “good”, so the deprivation of life isn’t strictly a harm, it is only the

absence of something which we would prefer to have than not. But to this objection

one could reply that we would consider it a harm to deprive someone of the basic

necessities they need to survive- and in the same way that life can be seen as the bare

minimum required for a pleasant existence (as without it you have no existence

whatsoever) death is thus a harm for depriving the subject of it. In mentioning the

subjectivity of life and death we reach another objection: it seems there is no person

to whom we can assign the misfortune of death to. So long as Tom exists he has not

yet died, but once he dies he no longer exists, so there seems to be no actual time

when the misfortune of death can be ascribed to him. That is, once Tom dies, he

ceases to exist, so there seems to be a lack of an interim moment in which we can

assign to him the act of being harmed. He cannot be harmed whilst being dead (as he

isn’t there to harm), and he was most certainly not being harmed when he was alive

(as it is death that is the harm not life) - so at what point does he experience the harm

that is death? To this objection Nagel would reply that Tom does not cease to exist

merely because he is dead, and so he is harmed at any point in his existence before he

died. The person that was Tom is harmed, as he has been deprived of the opportunity

to continue living his life (as he would have done had he not died). Feinberg and

Pitcher take this one step further and state that Tom is actually harmed the instant he

invested an interest in something that would lead to his death in the future, regardless

of his awareness of it. This however seems to be a paradoxical claim: if the harm is

done to the ante mortem person not retroactively when the event occurs (his death)

but before his death simply because it was going to happen then Tom is in a state of

harm throughout his life, instead of after his death. Nagel doesn’t go quite as far, as he

only enforces that Tom’s existence doesn’t cease simply because he has physically

ceased to be. But I question this line of arguing: of course Tom ceases to exist, he is

neither present mentally or physically, so in what way is he in existence? George

Pritcher rightly states that “post mortem persons... are... just so much dust; and dust

2 Nagel, Thomas. “Death”

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cannot be wronged [or harmed]”3. So Nagel’s claim that a person continues to exist

even after his death seems intuitively to be wrong, as it makes sense to consider death

to be the finite end to a person’s existence (not withstanding there is no way of

proving that Tom does indeed continue to exist after he has died). The last objection I

will discuss with regards to the Deprivation argument has to do with the biographical

nature of life. Why do we consider posthumous to be a harm, but prenatal not? It

seems that this argument claims that we are deprived of life as soon as we enter a state

of death (or not having life). But we did not have life before we were born, yet that

doesn’t seem to be considered a deprivation. I could easily protest that having not

been born until 1984 I have been deprived of living all the previous years leading up

to my birth. To this objection Nagel replies that the years before birth are not subject

specific, as there is no subject yet in existence who is being deprived, as opposed to

the time after death, in which a specific person (Tom, for instance) is actually being

deprived of more time to live. That is to say, until we are born we do not exist, so we

cannot be deprived of something, as there is no one to ascribe the deprivation to.

However, after we have lived, we are in existence, so to remove that existence is a

deprivation. In short, pre natal cannot be seen as a deprivation because Tom doesn’t

yet exist for us to ascribe the deprivation to him, but when Tom dies we can ascribe

the deprivation of life to the person that was Tom.

The Discontinuity Argument is similar to the aforementioned deprivation

argument, though it states that death is a harm because it doesn’t allow the subject to

carry out his intended achievements. Harm in terms of this argument is considered to

be a set back in the interests of a person, so death is considered a harm for

withholding the living person from completing his achievements. This argument

seems a lot weaker than the Deprivation argument. Kamm objects to the argument by

pointing out that death can benefit someone (in so much that it can improve their

reputation, etc.) so it is therefore not a harm as it does not prohibit the subject from

his achievements. What’s more, the subject could be said to achieve things that he

would not possibly achieve whilst living (for instance, Shakespeare’s fame came after

his death). A reply to Kamm might be that although death permits other

achievements, Tom is still being deprived of fulfilling those things he would have

3 Pitcher, George. “The Misfortunes of the Dead.” p.161

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done whilst being alive. That is to say, no amount of post mortem fame could replace

Tom’s decision to procreate whilst still living: and if he did die before having the

chance to create an offspring, then death indeed has stopped him from carrying out his

achievements, and harmed him. (It could also be said that death has thus harmed his

unborn son as well by not allowing him to be created, born, and reach the

achievements in his life that he would have done had Tom not died!). Having pointed

out this objection and its reply, I would like to point out that they depend on an

assumption that we can prioritize the achievements of life to be more important than

those of death (in order for death to be a harm) and vice versa (in order for death to

not be a harm). Moreover, it could be said that the achievements Tom would have

carried out if he were living are directly dependent on what he desires to fulfil (for

there must be motivation to reach these achievements, else they are not achievements

but mere strokes of good luck). Since desires are conditional on being alive (Tom

cannot desire anything when he is dead), the entire concept of desire satisfaction isn’t

applicable to a scenario in which Tom no longer exists (as he cannot form desires

leading to achievements). This makes it impossible for death to prohibit Tom from

carrying out his achievements, as the instant that Tom enters the state of death he

ceases to have desires and consequently possible achievements from those desires,

and so the argument that death is a harm because it intervenes with the obtainment of

achievements fails.

The arguments on the opposing view that Death is not a harm are not

without their flaws either. Firstly, I will discuss Lucretius’ argument, which states that

there is no time in which death is an evil and there is no subject for who it is an evil,

therefore it cannot be an evil. That is to say, in order for something to be bad (a harm)

there must be a subject who experiences that harm, but since death eliminates the

subject (for Tom ceases to exist when he dies), it is impossible for it to harm him.

Death cannot be a bad experience, because it is no experience at all. In dying we cease

to exist, and so cannot be attributed anything subjectively. Nagel would argue that we

do not cease to exist merely because our bodies and thinking faculties expire, meaning

that we can still be harmed by dying (that is, Tom is still able to be harmed by death,

even if Tom is physically no more). Nagel would also argue that it is not dead Tom

that is being harmed, but rather, the Tom that was living and as a consequence of

dying is no longer alive. The replies to Nagel are very clear-cut: death is finite, Tom is

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no longer in existence, so we could not be harming the Tom that was, as he no longer

exists to be harmed. This argument seems to hinge on the idea that existence depends

on physically being alive, rather than existing in historical memory and in possibilities

(as Nagel would argue). I would argue that as long as the subject has at one point

occurred in the world, harm can be ascribed to him. Similar to Lucretius is Epicurus’

argument, which states that since intrinsic goods and bads require experiences, and

death prevents experiences, death cannot be bad. This mirrors the idea that experience

is contingent to existence, and as death is non-existence, experiences (such as being

bad or a harm) do not apply to it.

The Attribution Argument is fairly similar in its premises, stating that to be

harmed by death there must be a time in which you are harmed by it, and since there

is no specific time in which you are harmed by death, death cannot harm you. This

runs along the same vain as the problem of subjectivity: there is no point in which

Tom can be ascribed the harm of death. He is alive (and not harmed) and then he is

dead, there is no interim in which he experiences death, and so death cannot be a

harm. But it could be argued that we can be harmed by things we don’t experience

(for instance, being deceived)- so the mere fact that Tom doesn’t directly or

consciously experience death does not mean he is not harmed by it. A reply to this

objection would be that we still experience deception, even if we are unaware of it,

we do not, however, experience death. This is because we are still the subject in being

deceived: Tom is being deceived, Tom is the subject of the deception, it is done to

him; whereas with death, Tom is not alive to be the subject, he no longer exists, and

so cannot be harmed.

Lastly, William’s argument explains the necessity for death. He argues that

one cannot appreciate the goods of life if he were to live forever, thus death is not a

harm, but rather a positive experience as it allows us to appreciate life. However, this

doesn’t address the issue of death being a harm, as it can still be an evil regardless of

its necessity. Secondly, does the inevitability of death stop it from being necessary, as

this argument seems to suggest? I would argue that this argument begs the question,

as it avoids addressing whether death is truly a harm and only explains that regardless

of whether it is or not, it is necessary.

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To conclude I would like to reconsider the arguments on both sides in light of

my introductory remarks. Having pointed out that there seem to be three different

states that are encompassed in the word “death” it is difficult to single out which each

argument refers to. Whether or not death is a harm depends on whether we consider

death as the process of dying (which at many instances is indeed quite harmful, in so

much that it causes pain, although in several it is completely painless); or death as the

state of being dead, in which we cease to exist and therefore cannot be harmed; or

death as the intervention between the two. Death is a harm when dying, because we

still are at the moment in existence to experience the harms. However, once we enter

the state of death, it cannot be seen as harmful.

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Bibliography of Works Cited

Nagel, Thomas, “Death”, Nous 4 (1970), repr. In his Mortal Questions,

Cambridge: CUP 1979

Williams, Bernard, “The Makropoulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of

Immortality” in his Problems of the Self, Cambridge: CUP 1973

Pitcher, George. “The Misfortunes of the Dead.” In John Martin Fischer, ed., The

Metaphysics of Death. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993.

Fischer, John Martin. Ed. The Metaphysics of Death. Stanford, CA: Stanford

University Press, 1993.