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Nicholas Vaughn

John Kaag

Existence and Anxiety

12/17/13

Dismissing Kierkegaard’s God

With Ethics of Ambiguity

The ideas of freedom, God, and anxiety are in constant contention within the

contemporary existential canon. Soren Kierkegaard is a recognized existentialist who proposed

in Is There Such a Thing as a Teleological Suspension of the Ethical? that free choice is

contingent upon the suspension of modern society’s norms and values, i.e., ethics. Kierkegaard

continues with the story of Abraham and explains that God is the way to hurdle society’s ethics.

However, Simone de Beauvoir, a later existentialist, makes a claim in a piece called The Ethics

of Ambiguity that “to will oneself moral and to will oneself free are one and the same decision”

(Beauvoir 293). Therefore, I will argue that Kierkegaard’s claim that making a free choice is

contingent upon hurdling society’s ethics through God is undermined by Beauvoir’s claim of

willing oneself free is equivalent to willing oneself moral.

Kierkegaard makes the claim that there must be a teleological suspension of the ethical

but one must first understand the key terms within his argument to understand why he comes to

this conclusion. He says, “the ethical as such is the universal” (Kierkegaard 15), by which he

means to express that something considered “ethical” is also something that everyone is bound

by, i.e., “universal”. He further explains this point in saying that “it applies every instant”

(Kierkegaard 15). So, one is capable of understanding ethics in a Kierkegaardian sense that

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depicts societal norms and values (ethics) as rules that bind everyone at every instant (universal).

“Telos,” is a term that Kierkegaard uses which means, “intentions, goals, and purposes”

(plato.stanford.edu). He claims that “it has nothing outside itself which is its telos, but is itself

telos for everything outside it, and when this has been incorporated by the ethical it can go no

further” (Kierkegaard 15). Kierkegaard is furthering his point about ethics being a universal. He

is claiming that there is no intention, goal, or purpose outside of ethics and rather that ethics

dictates the intention, goal, and purpose to everything outside of it. Thus, Kierkegaard is

claiming that the intentions, goals, and purposes (telos) of ethics is not outside itself but rather

that ethics are the intentions, goals, or purposes of society at large and that you cannot go beyond

it insofar as you are within the ethical sphere.

This leads Kierkegaard to outlining “three spheres of existence: the aesthetic, the ethical,

and the religious” (Solomon 2). The aesthetic sphere is defined by its adherence to materialism.

The ethical sphere is defined by its adherence to societal norms and values. The religious sphere

is defined by its adherence to an idea beyond societal norms and values. These expressions of

existence are analogs for Kierkegaard to help the reader understand why one must take a “leap”

to the religious in order to make what he claims to be a radically free decision. This radically free

decision is anxiety­ridden but Kierkegaard’s claim is that “we can overcome anxiety only

through faith” (Solomon 2). This leads into the story of Abraham in the Bible.

The story of Abraham presents the reader with a dilemma that seems uncompromisable.

Abraham is told by God in an unmediated transmission that he must slit Isaac (his son’s) throat.

Kierkegaard when introducing the story says, “let us see whether in this story there is to be found

any higher expression for the ethical such as would ethically explain his conduct” (Kierkegaard

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15). Which, if there is no higher expression for the ethical to explain his conduct, then the logical

conclusion for Kierkegaard is he took a leap of faith into the sphere of the religious.

Kierkegaard argues this point by introducing the concept of a tragic hero which defines as

someone who “lets one expression of the ethical find its telos in a higher expression of the

ethical… he reduces to a sentiment which has its dialectic in the idea of morality” (Kierkegaard

16). Whereas, Abraham steps entirely outside of the sphere of the ethical in almost slitting

Isaac’s throat. There is no societal norm, value, or relationship between the father and son that

can ethically explain his conduct. He concludes that Abraham had to have “overstepped the

ethical entirely and possessed a higher telos outside of it, in relation to which he suspended the

former” (Kierkegaard 16). The higher telos that he is alluding to is the religious telos.

The overstepping of the ethical is then prosecuted for a reason as to why Abraham would

do such a thing. So, the question that arises is, “Why then did Abraham do it?” to which he

answers, “For God’s sake and for his own sake… God required this proof of his faith… [and for]

his own sake… that he might furnish the proof” (Kierkegaard 16). The feeling that Abraham gets

when he is trying to furnish this proof is anxiety. The anxiety that Abraham feels when he is

holding a knife to Isaac’s throat is the feeling that he is about to make a choice that is entirely

free. Nobody can understand the message that God sent to Abraham because God did so in an

unmediated way. Even if Abraham were to explain to others that he were sent on a mission from

God to slit Isaac’s throat there would be nobody who could understand why. This is why he

considers it a “purely personal undertaking” (Kierkegaard 16). The purely personal undertaking

of slitting Isaac’s throat is directly equivalent to a radically free choice.

The radically free choice creates a lot of anxiety for Abraham because of how free he is

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in choosing to or to not slit Isaac’s throat. “As the individual he became higher than the

universal” (Kierkegaard 17), is explaining that he transcends the societal norms and values of the

society in making his radically free decision by entering the sphere of the religious. He concludes

that “the story of Abraham contains therefore a teleological suspension of the ethical”

(Kierkegaard 17). A decision within the sphere of the ethical would only ever be a decision that

is made in relationship to societal norms, values, or to others. Therefore, a decision within the

sphere of ethical could never go beyond the telos of the ethical and so to make a radically free

decision one must take a leap of faith into the sphere of the religious. Rephrasing this for clarity,

one could say that every time someone makes a choice that is entirely their own, that person is

making a choice between themselves and God.

However, the excerpt from Simone de Beauvoir’s piece The Ethics of Ambiguity refute

the idea that a radically free decision is contingent upon one transcending to the religious sphere.

Beauvoir opens by claiming that previous theories of ethics, “consider human life as a game that

can be won or lost and to teach man the means of winning” (Beauvoir 292). That is, all ethical

theories create a schematic for the means of conducting yourself in an ethical manner and are

seen as ways to compute your actions in each scenario. She explains that every time someone

attempts to outline plans and ultimately aspire to those plans, the plans fail. The “ends

circumscribed by these plans remain mirages”, so that she concludes that the “original scheme of

man is ambiguous” (Beauvoir 292). Beauvoir makes this claim because the goals of humans are

always indefinite and always elusive. That is, when one goal is achieved, it is considered

complete and then humans erect a new goal and therefore it is perpetually ambiguous what is the

goal of human life.

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Beauvoir is setting the stage to make a larger claim. She says, “but man also wills himself

to be a disclosure of being.” That is, humans desire to understand the secrets of existence. She

says that when a human “coincides with this wish, he wins, for the fact is that the world becomes

present by his presence in it.” So, if a human desires to understand the secrets of existence and is

understanding of his desire then he/she succeeds because the invisible reality of the world

becomes present by a human’s conscious presence in it. Then, she claims that this disclosure of

being, “implies a perceptual tension to keep being at a certain distance, to tear oneself from the

world, and to assert oneself as a freedom.” This means that in an attempt to find out the secrets

of existence, one must detach themselves from existence, and to apply themselves to the world in

a manner that is entirely free. Beauvoir concludes that, “to wish for the disclosure of the world

and to assert oneself as freedom are one and the same movement” (Beauvoir 292). She is saying

that the desire of the secrets of the world and the application of an individual in the pursuit of

freedom are equal.

The point of taking such an analytic approach to a human’s will to discover the secrets of

the world and human’s assertion of freedom is because of the way that Beauvoir defines

freedom. “Freedom is the source from which all significations and all values spring. It is the

original condition of all justification of existence” (Beauvoir 292). This definition of freedom

appears first as a bold, almost deified version of freedom. However, Beauvoir solidifies her

definition of freedom by arguing that freedom is not something constructed. Freedom is an idea

that is “a cause of itself.” It is a value that is “not on the plane of facility, but on the moral plane”

(Beauvoir 293). This is an important transition that Beauvoir makes because it changes the

notion of freedom from one of exertion to one that is ethically bound. Freedom necessitates itself

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because it cannot do otherwise, i.e., “it can not establish a denial of itself, for in denying itself, it

would deny the possibility of any foundation” (Beauvoir 293). The very idea of freedom negates

the denial of freedom because freedom is the foundation of all decisions. That is, there could be

no decisions made if there wasn’t such a thing as freedom and since there is, it cannot deny itself

because that’s a decision.

Finally, “to will oneself moral and to will oneself free are one and the same

decision” (Beauvoir 293), means that when someone is in pursuit of the disclosure of the world

they are simultaneously asserting their freedom which is the same as willing oneself free which

is to will oneself moral. There are many conclusions that can be drawn from The Ethics of

Ambiguity. First, that a consciously free (or radically free) decision is not contingent upon the

religious sphere of existence (or God). It is made evident that this is not the case due to the fact

that throughout the entire dichotomy of Beauvoir’s claims, she never once appeals to a deity or a

religious sphere of existence. Furthermore, it can be ascertained because of the claim that she

makes about freedom being incapable of denying itself. Freedom is something that exists outside

of the ethical sphere and it is what creates the ethical sphere.

The appeal to God or the religious sphere is a leap that Kierkegaard takes which is

unsubstantiated. The best reconciliation between Beauvoir and Kierkegaard that can be made is

to acknowledge that freedom (for Beauvoir) and God (for Kierkegaard) are both outside of the

sphere of the ethical. Beauvoir, however, does not claim it to transcend the ethical sphere or be

apart of the religious sphere. She simply claims that freedom necessitates itself because it is the

originator of values and significations within human life. This necessitation cannot be

undermined because the idea of freedom denies the denial of freedom on the basis that denying it

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would be a free choice and thus it reinvents itself. The term “morality” that Beauvoir is using

within her The Ethics of Ambiguity should not be misinterpreted as “ethical” — or societal norms

and values. She is certainly adhering to an idea that is outside of societal norms and values.

However, what she does not do is postulate a deity or claim that freedom is above or

below the ethical sphere. Freedom, to Beauvoir, is simply something that is outside of the ethical

sphere, necessitates itself, and necessitates morality. The decision that Abraham is contending

with could have been made without an unmediated message from God within The Ethics of

Ambiguity. Instead, Abraham would be viewed as someone who is contending with a decision,

entirely free, thus entirely moral, but still outside of the ethical sphere. God is unnecessary in the

picture of morality and instead is merely a proposition that is produced when people are met with

uncertainty and want security in the most anxiety­ridden times of our lives.

One thing that remains consistent through The Ethics of Ambiguity and Is There Such a

Thing as a Teleological Suspension of the Ethical? is the anxiety that is produced from an

entirely free decision. Anxiety is something that arises when someone is making a choice that is

entirely free. The two different interpretations of the anxiety, as one can see, are biases that are

generated from each author individually. However, the interpretation that Beauvoir presents

seems to be more correct because it does not postulate anything to imbue the particular

individual with their free choices and rather claims that freedom is a necessity intrinsically.

The significance of the arguments presented in both Simone de Beauvoir, Soren

Kierkegaard, and this paper are many. The discussion of freedom, God, and anxiety are

constantly debated amongst some of the greatest philosophers of all time and especially within

the existential criteria. However, the relationship of freedom and anxiety to morality is

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something that has been rarely explored previously and only as of recently has really begun to

see analysis with existential philosophers such as Beauvoir. It is also important and intriguing to

notice how Beauvoir is capable of taking a concept as simple as freedom and exploring it in such

depth as making it a requisite of morality. She casts a light on freedom that is entirely not

understood before her work.

Although, even while Beauvoir claims that it is impossible to willingly choose to

not be free which does seem to be a logical inconsistency or catch­22, people choose to not be

free all the time. Coincidentally, it is the people who choose to not be free that do appear in our

society to be the most morally repulsive people. So, to amend the claim that Beauvoir makes, it

should be acknowledged that those who choose to condemn their freedom are morally abhorrent

while those who choose to assert their freedom are simultaneously asserting their morality. In

either light, the requirement of God or the religious sphere that is proposed by Kierkegaard has

been shown throughout this paper and with the help of Beauvoir’s The Ethics of Ambiguity to be

merely a proposition. “Every man is originally free” (Beauvoir 293), is a claim that she makes to

continue The Ethics of Ambiguity and is implicatively a claim that has been made and disputed

previously; that humans are inherently moral. If this is true, then the entire notion of

Kierkegaard’s sense of freedom and God are entirely unnecessary ideas of freedom and God.

The very act of being, is the act of freedom, and that is the act of morality.

The only way to reconcile Kierkegaard’s claim is to say that in some cases a radically

free decision may be conjured with the postulation of a deity that instills anxiety into a human to

be aware of their decisions. The problem with this reconciliation and the way that Beauvoir

would reply to this would be along the lines of saying that the postulation of a deity (or religious

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sphere) is a superficial and unnecessary catalyst to anxiety and freedom. Furthermore, that in

postulating a deity or taking the leap into the religious sphere, one does so in a way that is not

free. The dictation of a deity to do something would impede on a human’s will to be free and

thus their will to be moral. There is no room for a deity in the picture of morality if we are to

view morality from Beauvoir’s stance as something that is directly equivalent to a human’s will

to be free.

Works Cited

1. Allen, Colin, Allen,. "Teleological Notions in Biology." Stanford University. Stanford

University, 20 Mar. 1996. Web.

2. Solomon, Robert C. Existentialism,. New York: Modern Library, 1974. Print.