philosophy and the black experience

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Volume 10, Number 1 Fall 2010

APA Newsletters

2010 by The American Philosophical Association ISSN 2155-9708

NEWSLETTER ON PHILOSOPHY

AND THE BLACK EXPERIENCE

FROM THE EDITORS,JOHN MCCLENDON & GEORGE YANCY

ARTICLES

JOHN H. MCCLENDON III

Angela Davis: Marxist Philosophy, Patricia Hill Collins,and the Matter of Black Feminist Thought

EVERETT GREEN

Monopoly Intellectualism

BOOK REVIEW

Linda Furgerson Selzer: Charles Johnson in ContextREVIEWEDBYKATHYGLASS

CONTRIBUTORS


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APA NEWSLETTERON

Philosophy and the BlackExperience

John McClendon & George Yancy, Co-Editors Fall 2010 Volume 10, Number 1

FROMTHE EDITORS

Next year marks the 40th anniversary of Angela Davis seminaltext If They Come in the Morning. At the time of the releaseof this book, Angela Davis became an icon of the African

American liberation struggle and the emerging Black feministmovement. In his article, Angela Davis: Marxist Philosophy,

Patricia Hill Collins, and the Matter of Black Feminist Thought,McClendon examines Angela Davis as a Marxist and Blackfeminist philosopher. The immediate motivation for his articleis the fact that he discovered that many of his students are, sadlyto say, unaware of Davis monumental legacy.

Also in this edition of the APA Newsletter on Philosophyand the Black Experience, we are pleased to have an articleby Everett Green entitled Monopoly Intellectualism. In thearticle, Green calls into question the ideal of intellectualmulticulturalism, as if ideas in the light of their sheer brilliancemake their way into the market place of ideas. Indeed, Greenlocates the problem of epistemic diversity at the heart ofmonopoly intellectualism, which is linked to the maintenanceof the social order. Hence, Green provides an analysis of the

dissemination of knowledge, the legitimacy of certain formsof knowledge, as a function of those gatekeepers investedin maintaining economic and political power. He locates theforce and operation of this power within higher education andthroughout the broader educational ethos within the U.S. Hissuggestion is that if things are to change then the very heart ofthe State apparatus must be critiqued. This, according to Green,

will have a systemic impact on the legitimacy of existingsocial arrangements.

Lastly, we are also happy to include Kathy Glass review ofLinda Furgerson Selzers groundbreaking book entitled Charles

Johnson in Context. Selzers book does an excellent job ofsituating Johnsons work within the context of African Americanphilosophy, Buddhism, Marxism, and cosmopolitanism. Her

work is philosophically astute and historically rich.It is also with great sadness that we acknowledge the

passing of philosopher Robert A. CheeMooke. In a personalcorrespondence (December 12, 2010), Robert E. Birt, who hadthe pleasure and honor of studying with CheeMooke, sharedthe following:

While at Morgan State University, I took at least threeclasses with him, including a class called Philosophyof Protest and Philosophical Examinations of Slavery.

While I discovered Frantz Fanon due to the influenceof the Movement (especially the Black Panthers),CheeMooke was the first professor under whom I didformal study of Fanons The Wretched of the Earth.

It was under CheeMooke that I also first read HaroldCruses Crisis of the Negro Intellectual. And he wasour faculty advisor when Morgans Philosophy Clubbrought Harold Cruse to speak at Morgan. CheeMookealso introduced me and other students to the writingsof Albert Memmi and Aime Cesaire. He was apparentlya friend of Stokely Carmichael while he was still aphilosophy student at Howard University. And he

was also an acquaintance of C.L.R. James. When Ireturned to Baltimore from Texas in 1991, CheeMooke

shared with me by telephone a very interesting paperin progress which he titled The African-American inthe American Intellectual Tradition. I hope that paper(whether completed or not) has not been lost. Robert

Augustine CheeMooke will be missed.

The following is an obituary found at http://omniclassifieds.com/ad/6538:

CHEEMOOKE: ROBERT A (CHEE), Former deputy mayorof Port-of-Spain, passed away of cardiac arrest on TuesdaySeptember 28, 2010 at Good Samaritan Hospital in Baltimore,Maryland. Robert was born in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad on October16, 1939 to Daphne (dec) and Augustus (Boysie) CheeMooke(dec). He leaves to mourn Linda Plaisance CheeMooke and

daughter Fatima. Sisters Agnes (dec), Yvonne, Shirley andCheryl (dec). Brothers George (Dorian) dec, Ivan, Leon (Taffari),Frank and Patrick. Nephew of Norma Chacha (dec) and James(dec) and Kim Townsend (dec). Cousin of Leo Hoyte (dec),Ronald Lashley, Lyle Townsend, Barry Townsend (dec), LanaGittens, David Als, Michael Als and a host of others. Uncle ofKaren Camejo, Donna Thomas-Hosten, Paula Maselino, NataliePhillips, Simone Phillips, Sharon Clarke, Sherma Clarke, RichardThomas (dec), Gregory McAlpin (dec), Garth McAlpin, Ian andPhillip Joseph, and Stokeley Phillips. Great uncle of Michal Pilar,Nyssa, Rashida, Hasante, Vanessa, Sapphire, Neffer, Sudan,Tigana, Hashim, Omar and Chad. Friend of Mervyn Campbell,Peter Pouchet, Godfrey Gordon, Kenneth Rivas, NapoleonTurner, Calvie Griffith, Mervyn Mohammad, Ray MaDoo,Professor Otto Begus, Professor Alex Hook, the Plaisancefamily and a host of others. Past pupil of Nelson Street BoysRC, Fatima College and Howard University in Washington, DC

where he received a BS degree in Chemistry and a MS degreein Philosophy as well as a PhD from John Hopkins University.He was the former Philosophy Professor at Morgan StateUniversity, Coppin State University and Stephenson University.Faculty Advisor to the Philosophy Club at both Morgan State andStephenson Universities and was awarded an Excellence inTeaching Award in 2001 from Villa Julie College (StephensonUniversity). He was a life-time supporter of Trinidad All StarsSteel Band and his favourite Calypsonian was Shadow. He wasalso the Citys representative for Down Town Carnival duringhis term on the City Council.


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APA Newsletter, Fall 2010, Volume 10, Number 1

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ARTICLES

Angela Davis: Marxist Philosophy, Patricia

Hill Collins, and the Matter of Black Feminist

Thought

John H. McClendon IIIMichigan State University

I was very recently teaching a philosophy class and mentionedthat in addition to Eugene C. Holmes, the long-time HowardUniversity scholar, that Angela Davis was also one of fewprofessional Black philosophers to have adopted Marxistphilosophy. To my surprise, less than a handful of students knewof Angela Davis, let alone her role as philosopher and activistin the African American liberation movement.1

I immediately assigned a student to give a presentationon Davis that would outline her significance as a scholarand activist. The motivation for publishing this paper derivesfrom this particular classroom experience. As a philosophy

professor, I am concerned with the representation of the AfricanAmerican philosophical tradition and I think that Angela Davishas a unique and valuable location within it. After readingthis essay, perhaps the present generation of students of the

African American philosophical tradition can gain a measure ofsubstantive knowledge of Angela Davis as a Marxist philosopherand proponent of Black feminist thought.

In her article Women and Capitalism: Dialectics ofOppression and Liberation, Angela Davis examines the natureof womens oppression by consciously drawing on the worksof Karl Marx. In this aforementioned article, Davis attacksthe theoretical weaknesses associated with the failure offeminists (particularly middle class white women activists) tolink womens oppression to other forms of oppression besides

patriarchy as well as various social movements outside of thefeminist formations. Davis is keenly aware of the ideologicallimitations of bourgeois feminism and critically accounts for itserrors from the standpoint of Marxist philosophy.2

Angela Davis drew upon Marxs materialist conceptionof history to uncover the theoretical weaknesses ancillary to

white middle class womens feminist thought. This theoreticalweakness stemmed from a particular form of feminist thoughtthat in its reductionism rendered all forms of oppression andexploitation as manifestations of male supremacy (sexism).Davis continually demonstrated that womens oppressionis contemporarily grounded in capitalist relations thoughcarefully demarcating the differences between pre-capitalistand capitalist forms of womens oppression in her historical

examination of those conditions.3By the time Davis offers her book review of Patricia Hill

Collins in 1993, we discover her critical insights from Marx areglaringly absent. Could it be that Davis departure from theCommunist Party USA in 1991 also signaled her break withMarxist-Leninist philosophy? Has Davis abandoned Marxismas well as her earlier views on feminism? Or does Davis nowassume a different philosophical position because the matterat hand is Black feminist thought and not white feminism?

Before we can adequately answer the above questions,it is imperative that I undertake a critical inquiry into PatriciaHill Collins philosophical position. Hill Collins philosophicalposition is not straightforwardly a systematic one; rather, itcomprises an eclectic mixture of mutually exclusive theses,

propositions, and conjectures. Of immediate import, to our

discussion, is the fact that Hill Collins openly rejects Marxismas a viable theoretical framework, and on this point, we find,Davis remains surprisingly silent.

Patricia Hill Collins argues, [Material] conditions of race,class and gender oppression can vary dramatically and yetgenerate some uniformity in the epistemologies of subordinategroups. Thus, the significance of an Afrocentric feministepistemology enriches our understanding of how subordinatedgroups create knowledge that fosters resistance.4

Let us, for now, ignore the viability of Hill Collinsmerger of Afrocentrism and feminism into an integralepistemology. Instead, let us immediately take note of HillCollins presupposition that knowledge is created rather thandiscovered from examining objective material conditions. Thispresupposition clearly indicates that she is committed to a socialconstructivist conception of knowledge. From a materialistperspective, two very significant outcomes emerge from thissocial constructivist theory.

One, social constructivism denotes conventionalismwherein the denial of objective knowledge and objectivetruth is an immediate result. Two, social constructivism in itsemphasis on social context as the primary determination forknowledge conflates and reduces the contextual basis for

social consciousness, as a more general category, with thespecific features of knowledge as a particular form of socialconsciousness. While all forms of social consciousness derivefrom definite social contexts, the specificity of the content,

which constitutes knowledge, must be differentiated from otherforms of social consciousness and determinately establishedas epistem or knowledge.

What follows from the latter point is Hill Collins failureto demarcate how knowledge that fosters resistance differsfrom, lets say,religious beliefs, which are rooted in fideism andare not epistemologically grounded. Nevertheless, althoughreligious beliefs are forms of social consciousness, which fosterresistance, they do not constitute knowledge. Hence, the act (oracts) of resistance need not be informed by knowledge. Various

kinds of beliefs can have utility and function as catalysts forrevolts, resistance, and rebellions. In African American history,the rise of resistance struggles often resulted from an act (oracts) of religious faith rather than knowledge. Different materialconditions surrounding class, race, and gender need not altercommon beliefs, outside of the realm of knowledge, such as acommon religious faith.

Indeed, we discover that, unlike Hill Collins, Angela Davis,in her article Unfinished Lectures on Liberation, makesthis crucial point about fideism, Christianity, and resistance.Davis states, Freedom, liberation, the abolition of slavery, theelimination of human alienationall these notions receivea metaphysical foundation through religion. A supernaturalbeing wills the abolition of slavery and [Frederick] Douglass,

slave and believer, must execute Gods will by striving towardthe aim of liberation. Of course, he was not alone in his effortsto forge a theology of liberation on the basis of Christiandoctrine. Nat Turners rebellion and John Browns attack wereamong the innumerable anti-slavery actions directly inspiredby Christianity.5

Hill Collins tells us nothing about how resistance drawingfrom subjugated knowledge differs from the resistanceemanating from subjugated faith. The sociology of knowledgeand the sociology of faith,prima facie, on Hill Collins account,concomitantly mark the same path. However, epistemologydoes not have faith or unjustified beliefs as its subject matter,rather the domain of epistemology are theories ofknowledgeas justified belief. Consequently, Hill Collins conflates fideism

and other forms of social consciousness with knowledge.


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Hill Collins empiricist assumptions, which undergird hersocial constructivism, are all the more paradoxical given thefact that positivism, which her constructivism overtly opposes,starts from the same premises via the verification principle.

While positivism wrestles with the relationship of observationaland theoretical language and accents the former, the so-called social epistemologists give primacy to lived experienceas the (phenomenological) foundation of epistemology.Positivism and social constructivism constrain knowledge tothe realm of phenomena, i.e., to the appearances revealed inexperience thus overlooking the essence behind phenomenalappearances.

Patricia Hill Collins, in her attempts at an elaboration ofa Black Feminist epistemology, given her phenomenologicalfoundationalism, includes a criticism of positivism. Neverthelessher critique is rather weak and half-hearted; indeed, HillCollins demonstrates a certain ambiguity toward positivism.She argues,

The criteria for the methodological adequacy ofpositivism illustrate the epistemological standardsthat Black women scholars would have to satisfyin legitimating Black feminist thought using aEurocentric masculinist epistemology[M]y focus on

positivism should not be interpreted to mean that alldimensions of positivism are inherently problematicfor Black women nor that nonpositivist frameworksare better.6

If we return to the above citation then it becomes evidentthat located in the first part is the central problem, viz., themethodological adequacy of positivism for Black feministthought. This problem directly relates to the issue of theepistemological standards by which Black women scholars

would necessarily have to satisfy to establish a legitimate Blackfeminist epistemology. What ensues from this problem is HillCollins assumption that positivism is both Eurocentric andmasculinist. Can we gather from the above that the presumptionof Eurocentric and masculinist biases are intrinsic to positivism,thus rendering it mutually exclusive and hence foreign to HillCollins proposed Afrocentric/feminist epistemology?

On first glance it seems to be the case; why, after all,point out the problems attendant to positivism with respect tocriteria for the an Afrocentric feminist epistemology? Yet, HillCollins brings to our attention a very salient point; her focus onpositivism should not be interpreted to mean that all dimensionsof positivism are inherently problematic for Black women andespecially respecting their quest to formulate a relevant anddistinctive epistemology. For that matter, we ought not assumenon-positivist frameworks serve as better epistemologies than

what can be harvested from positivism.

So why bother to elaborate an Afrocentric/feminist

epistemology? Why not embrace Afrocentric/feministpositivism? All it would require is to adopt those portionsof positivism which are not inherently problematic forBlack women. Since non-positivist epistemologies may notserve Black women any better than positivism, perhaps theunproblematic portions of positivism are safer, if not better,grounds for a Black feminist epistemology?

Yet we fi nd posi ti vi sm , on th e one hand , vi a th ismethodological adequacy test, forces Black women to accept

what would constitute their distinctive epistemologicalposition as ultimately an illegitimate one. Furthermore,this constraint is the immediate upshot of Eurocentric andmasculinist biases embodied in positivism as an epistemology.On the other hand, we have the argument that positivism in

all of its dimensions is not inherently problematic for Black

women. And for that matter, the non-positivist frameworks arenot any better than positivism for establishing a Black feministepistemology. These conflicting assumptions, with respect topositivism, are why I argue Hill Collins critique of positivism is

weak and indeed ambiguous.

Here we see Hill Collins epistemological relativism drainsand undermines the very substance of her Black feministepistemology. The earlier and latter segments of the citation arecontradictory and its pushes Hill Collins into what can be simply

described as an epistemological quagmire. What is the basisfor establishing a Black feminist epistemology if the availablechoices have equal warrants, albeit the choice of positivismis tainted with biases? What we have, in effect, is somethingakin to Kantian antinomies, antithetical propositions of equal

validity. For, despite the masculinist and racist biases attachedto positivism, there are those aspects of positivism which areunproblematic with respect to Black feminist epistemology.

What then are the unproblematic dimensions of positivism?Hill Collins unfortunately does not answer this question. There isa noticeable silence, which becomes all the more glaring sinceHill Collins refuses to totally discard positivism, although shede facto rejects it in her actual formulations of Black feministepistemology. Does the failure to discern what is of value from

that which is not of any value in positivism ultimately entailthrowing the baby out with the bath water? If this is so, it isimportant to know why Hill Collins insists on asserting thereare unproblematic aspects of positivism. This, I contend, is anindispensable epistemological condition for such an assertion,and consequently mandates a direct answer to the question.

Perhaps, her ambiguity is due to the fact that positivismand social constructivism each respectively constitute a speciesof empiricism, which, in line, rest on conventionalism. Wediscover both are examples of subjective idealism. Hence,theyontologically deny objective reality andepistemologicallydiscard the idea of objective truth. The philosopher of scienceRobert Klee, with respect to positivism, reports how these twofeatures are so manifested. The positivists held that scientific

theory is a linguistic representation,not of external realitybutof actual and possible human experience.7 [Italics added]

He then adds this important insight about positivistepistemology,

The positivists were radical empiricists in the spiritof the British philosopher David Hume, and they sawthe anatomy of scientific theories through the filter ofHumean principles. What theory does is to capture inlinguistic form the causal regularities that hold withina domain of phenomena.8

Positivism, unlike materialism, reduces the cause/effect relationto the status of conventional regularity. Since knowledge isnot anchored to external reality or human experience then

objective reality accedes to the conventions and constructionsmolded out of experience. Hill Collins, in sequence, refers to

various oppressed groups and their attendant subjugatedknowledges and calls for a dialogical conception of truth.Collins argues that with each group using the epistemologicalapproaches growing from its unique standpoint, [it] thusbecomes closer to the most objective truth. Hill Collins useof scare quotes effectively indicates what amounts to the denialof objective truth. She further explains,

Each group speaks from its own standpoint and sharesits own partial, situated knowledge. But becauseeach group perceives its own truth as partial, itsknowledge is unfinished. Each group becomes betterable to consider other groups standpoints without

relinquishing the uniqueness of its own standpoint or


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suppressing other groups partial perspectives.9

So instead of objective truth, grounded in material reality, wehave a notion of truth founded on consensus. Consequently,this broader truth derives from various partial truths as situatedknowledges. Hill Collins seems to suggest it is only by meansof the aggregation of partial perspectives and hence partialtruths are we thus able to embark upon the path to wider truth.

We, in turn, must embrace this wider truth, which is born ofconsensus, in lieu of the fact that for us there is no real possibility

in obtaining objective truth itself.Hill Collins conception of truth as derivative from a

consensus of partial perspectives is one of the cardinal trademarksof conventionalism. The irony here, as demonstrated by Klee,is that positivism is also conventionalist in its epistemologicalfoundations and orientation. Hill Collins epistemologicaldistance from positivism is not as far as it initially seems to be.There are epistemological links emanating from the commonsource of conventionalism. Furthermore, since Hill Collinsupholds the epistemological premise of social constructivismthen she is invariably caught in the conventionalist web. Thedifferences between Hill Collins phenomenology of socialconstructivism and positivism centers on distinctions withinempiricism, thus they share in the same epistemological

starting point.In his criticism of positivism, Lenin highlighted its

conventionalist character. With positivism, rather than thematerialist notion of knowledge as a reflection of materialreality, we are left with convenient fictions. The reader shouldnotice the strong similarity that Hill Collins aforementionedcitation shares with Lenins characterization of positivism. Hecogently argues,

Henri Poincar is an eminent physicist but a poorphilosopher, whose errors Yushkevitch, of course,declared to be the last word on positivism, so recentindeed, that it even required a new ism viz., empirio-symbolism. For Poincarthe laws of physics are

symbols, conventions, which man creates for the sakeof convenience. The only true objective reality isthe internal harmony of the world. By objectivePoincar means that which is generally regarded as

valid, that which is accepted by the majority of men,or by all. And as regards harmony he categoricallydeclares in answer to the question whether it existsoutside of usundoubtedly no.10

Given Hill Collins critique of positivism, Euro-masculinistepistemology, gender/racial oppression, and other forms ofdomination, it is perplexing that she views Marxism as anuntenable epistemological alternative. Hill Collins claims that

Western socio-political thought displays two major tendencies,positivism and relativism. Positivism seeks absolute truth based

on objective, unbiased tools of science to measure thesetruths.11

Quite paradoxically Hill Collins dismisses Marxistepistemology on the grounds that it, as a foundation forearlier forms of standpoint theory, fosters a reverse form ofpositivism. Hill Collins misunderstands that under her definitionof positivism, Marxism cannot be both standpoint theory, whichrejects absolute truth and objectivity, and a reverse form ofpositivism. This putative reverse form of positivism containedin Marxism, Hill Collins informs us, is the result of assuming theoppressed have a better insight into truth and the presumptionthere is one true interpretation of reality. This, of course,is an openly crude distortion and vulgar treatment of Marxistepistemology and its relationship to positivism.12

Marxism-Leninism starts from the standpoint of

materialism, viz. there is an objective reality independent ofour consciousness of it. To know the objective features andlaws of motion governing this objective (material) realityrequires not mere interpretations of it but objective knowledgegained by scientific inquiry. Positivism and Hill Collins socialconstructivism, sequentially, reject the notion of knowingobjective reality for various forms of conventionalism. Hence,

we have the import of the Lenin citation.13

However, there is a larger problem of significant political

insinuation with Hill Collins dialogical notion of Afrocentricfeminist epistemology. Despite Hill Collins disavowal ofrelativism, it is most apparent that any critique of dominationand oppression facilitated by means of the concept of reciprocaltruth becomes problematic. The necessity for dialogueemanates from, what I view as, an implausible presumption.Namely, that in order to gain a greater perspective on truth anaccount must be taken of all partial truths, including those whichattach to the interests of the oppressor.

Moreover, on closer scrutiny we find embedded in theimplausibility of Hill Collins presupposition are grave politicalimplications. Since this dialogue mandates the recognitionof the oppressors truths (on the part of the oppressed) thenany political outcome will be far from an innocent exchange

of situated knowledges. Philosophically we have no morethan a subjectivist form of relativism. In the tradition of MikhailBakhtins dialogism, Hill Collins posits each subject hasa partial truth that must be respected and recognized byall concerned. Therefore, it follows the oppressed ought toacknowledge their oppression is not the whole (objective)truth. Perhaps in the tradition of HegelsPhenomenology, HillCollins implicitly desires to make known to us that the oppressor(as much as the oppressed) is the real victim in an oppressiverelationship. If this is not her implicit intention, it is certainly theexplicit implication contained in her conception of truth.

This subjective relativism, founded of a part/wholedichotomy, simply reduces to the proposition that Just asthe oppressor does not have an objective claim to the truth,

so it is for the oppressed. The truth of oppression intrinsicto slavery, for example, cannot be gathered only from theslaves standpoint. Hill Collins rejection of the slave narrativespropriety to objective truth is constituted in her aim to establishtruth on the grounds ofinter-subjectivity. Consequently, wediscover a significant philosophical implication of politicalimport, when objectivity gives way to inter-subjectivity then

subjective relativism reigns supreme.

On this account the slave narrative must be adjoined withthe slave masters in order to acquire the greater truth. The slavemaster brings partial truth, which complements the perspectiveof the slave narrative. Hence, the slave must be just as open tothe masters partial truths as the slave master must be of theslaves. For this is an entrenched imperative inextricably tied to

Hill Collins notion of truth resulting from consensus.14

Such an epistemological position ushers in nothing lessthan a politics of compromise. Ostensibly the suggestion isa most debilitating political proposal, viz., pursue the politicsof recognition. Moreover, the upshot of this epistemology ofdialogical truth is not a politics of liberation but an ethics ofreconciliation between the oppressed and the oppressors. Inideological terms, we are left with inept liberal moralism servingas a surrogate for a political struggle guided by revolutionarytheory and scientific epistemology.

There is another aspect to Hill Collins liberalism, whichJoy James brings to our attention. Noting the generic mode ofHill Collins depiction of Black womens thought and practice

wherein all political and ideological tendencies among Black

women are seen as radical or revolutionary, James posits,


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Unfortunately, Black Feminist Thought also elidesblack female radicals. Reconstructing historicalradicals as liberals, it deradicalizes militant women togeneralize movement women activists as wedded toliberal politics. Collins redefines most forms of black

womens anti-racist work, including social work, asradicalism. In so doing, her text serves as a primaryexample for the erasure of the black women radicalCollins implicitly defines as revolutionary all black

women who survive and thereby resist oppression,even if they do not engage in public activism orconfrontation with the state.15

Liberation, as opposed to liberalism, requires the completeeradication of oppression, the full recognition of the truthcontained in the struggle of the oppressed, exploited, and

wretched of the earth. A struggle waged over and against thematerial conditions and ideological justifications of oppressionand exploitation. My critique offers a sharp distinction betweenthe social constructivism and Marxism-Leninism as a scientificepistemology. Unfortunately, not all considered as Marxist-Leninist philosophers among African American thinkers, have,in turn, made a sharp distinction between social constructivismand Marxism-Leninism as scientific epistemology.

Angela Davis presents an important review of Hill Collinstext in the journal Teaching Philosophy. Davis, who is a Marxist-Leninist philosopher (or at least to my knowledge was at thetime of her review of Hill Collins book), offers a strikinglydifferent analysis than my critique. Davis response to HillCollins, in my estimation, is most congratulatory and viewsHill Collins book as path-breaking. One of the strong pointsof the book for Davis is the syncretic construction of a Blackfeminist intellectual tradition, which draws upon multipletheoretical sourcessociological, gender and race theoryfor examplemethodologically, centralizes Black womenshistorical and contemporary experiences.16

Additional ly, Davis brings to our attention Hill Collinsphilosophical contributions by way of epistemology. An

epistemology I have demonstrated to be locked in the abyssof subjective idealism, relativism, and dialogical conceptionsof truth. Nevertheless, Davis accents,

Collins meditations on epistemology will be especiallyinsightful to philosophy students who are grappling

with contemporary debates about multiculturalismat a time when Eurocentric and masculinist theoriesof knowledge are the targets of multiple challenges.Collins extensively researched and thoughtfullyformulated study demonstrates that such challenges,regarded by some as simply nihilistic, can yieldexciting new approaches to the study of knowledgeproduction.17

Davis continues her praise of Collins work in epistemologyby pointing to the experiential grounds of Hill Collinsepistemology. Collins asserts that the production of knowledgemust be comprehended from the standpoint of the experienceof the knower. Davis holds that this view is a counter topositivism and its idealist notion of abstracting knowledgefrom the lived experiences of Black women. Moreover, Davisgives credence to Collins attempt at joining Afrocentric andFeminist analyses in order to construct what she calls an

Afrocentric feminist epistemology.18

My critical response to Davis review centers on herevaluation of Hill Collins conception of epistemology. Davisnowhere acknowledges as problematic Hill Collins ambiguity

with regard to positivism. Nor do we find a critique of Hill

Collins blatant idealism adjoined to her social constructivism.

Davis completely leaves out of the picture the epistemologicaland ontological connection holding Hill Collins socialconstructivism to positivism. Subsequently, Davis views HillCollins as an opponent of positivism and in granting such astrong endorsement offers no qualifications or caveats.

As I ear lier pointed out, positivism is in fac t a for mof empiricism. Its idealism does not derive from ignoringexperience; instead, it is due to abstracting experience from anymaterialist context or foundation. The chief error in positivism

is consequently not, as Davis argues, the idealist notion ofabstracting knowledge from the lived experiences of Blackwomen. Davis evaluation leaves Hill Collins phenomenologicalform of empiricism as pristine, and beyond the pale ofidealism.

If it is the case that Davis holds a Marxist, dialecticalmaterialist, philosophical perspective, then I find Davislaudatory reaction to Hill Collins syncretic method as mostcontradictory and perplexing. Firstly, it forces a mixture ofdisparate and contrary elements into an organic whole. This, ofcourse, is not the way of a dialectical materialist methodology;instead, what we have is eclecticism; a collage of disjointedphilosophical theses and conjectures. In explicitly commendingHill Collins for the use of such an eclectic method, Davis

abandons the dialectical method of Marxist philosophy.Dialectics as a Marxist concept posits that all unity must

entail an intrinsic connection (internal relation) betweenvariously (apparently) di sparate parts. Th is dialecticalopposition, which is the outcome of a relation of difference,

wherein contradictions appear, cannot be equated withcontradictions between mutually exclusive opposites. As withthe dialogical conception of truth, Hill Collins seeks a synthesisof opposites irrespective of relations of mutual exclusion.Secondly, the distinction between epistemology and sociologyof knowledge is broached when one assumes that experiencealone is the grounds for establishing the truth of knowledge.

The fact that one may have certain experiences does notin itself lend to the grasp of the objective character and features

of a given phenomenon. An epistemology must be objectivelygrounded so that experiences are weighted against materialconditions, which under capitalist conditions are often maskedby ideological illusions and reified social relations of production.Standpoint epistemology ignores this fact since it fails to gooutside the gates of phenomenal appearances.

I am sure that Angela Davis at one point, at least, understoodwhy Marx in Capital made it transparent that all science wouldbe superfluous if all appearances and essences directlycoincided. The very need for a dialectical understanding comesprecisely in the fact that essence necessarily appears in a givenform. This relationship of essence and appearance requires thefunction of a materialist epistemology in conjunction with socialpractice, and revolutionary theory to guide practical action. This

is why, as Marx notes, empiricism is unable to provide a critiqueof capitalism and, at best, points to various types of reformism.Historically, we observe that reformist formulations leave intactthe objective material relations of capitalism.

Yet Davis embraces the kind of agency, which Hill Collinsbrings to the fore, wherein the emphasis is on both/andinstead of either/or. Since this both/and perspective isrooted in syncretism and eclecticism, Afrocentricism andfeminism are unproblematically adjoined. Even if we grantthat agency reduces to the production of knowledge, albeitputative subjugated knowledge, nonetheless, the producersof this knowledge are without a materialist epistemology.More precisely, it would lack any form of epistemology sincethe sociology of knowledge given our prior remarks on

fideism (perhaps a better phrase is the sociology of social


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consciousness) substitutes for epistemology.

Indeed, because Hill Collins disregards and dismissesMarxism and its focus on class analysis, the generic categoryof Black women intellectuals irrespective of class perspective(ideology), assumes centrality in producing Black feministthought. Davis, in her review, stands in full agreement withthis claim about Black women intellectuals, especially thoselocated in the academy, as the creators of Black feminist thoughtand subsequently endorses Hill Collins non-proletarian class

approach to intellectual activity. In most respects, Hill Collinsclaim amounts to a gendered version of Harold Cruses anti-Marxist thesis of Black intellectuals as the catalysts for historicaldevelopment. Joy James argues,

Black women expressed radical commitments inspite of, not because of their teaching positions. Mostinstitutional educators, black women included, likelyavoid activism that jeopardizes their teaching careers.This suggests that teaching, in academia or elsewhere,may be a deradicalizing political site, irrespective ofCollins claims for its intrinsic progressivism.19

Of significance to our critique of Davis is her affirmation of thisanti-Marxist, non-proletarian class approach to Black feministthought. This endorsement and affirmation is a clear indicatorof the significant divide between Davis earlier essay on whitefeminism and her later perspectives on Hill Collins Blackfeminism. The former essay is one which is consciously located

within the framework of Marxist critique, while the latter essayabandons this ideological and philosophical framework.

The philosophical consequences are clear and plain.What we get from Hill Collins is something more in line withKarl Mannheims idealism than with Karl Marxs materialism.

What is most disturbing is that Davis, throughout her review,remains ever so silent on this fundamental philosophical point,the line of demarcation separating dialectical materialism fromthe sociology of knowledge.20

Davis critical Marxist assessment in her first essay of very

similar issues, with respect to white feminism, is now pushedaside in her discussion on Hill Collins Black feminist thought.Although we can only speculate about why she makes such aqualitative shift, the fact remains; Davis makes a philosophicaltransition decisively away from Marxism-Leninism.21

Davis review, by not taking into account the very importantcore of Marxist philosophy, dialectical materialism, and classstruggle, falls prey to subjective idealism, a point which hercritics, such as in the case of Curry and Green, are more than

willing to attach to Davis philosophical perspective. We willlater see that in many ways, Davis review of Hill Collins confirmsmuch of the Curry/Green analysis regarding the postmodernist/pragmatist (idealist) elements enfolding Davis philosophy.22

Davis corpus is marked by inconsistencies and

contradictions thus calling into question her locus as aMarxist-Leninist philosopher. Does Davis still (today?) maintainher earlier philosophical position? Can we conclude Davisis presently committed to Marxist-Leninist philosophy? If thereview of Hill Collins is our indicator then the answer must bean unequivocal no.

Indeed, confusion persists about Davis locus within theMarxist-Leninist philosophical tradition. This lack of clarityis amplified when we observe that Davis first essay, initially

written in 1977, has been republished in anthologies as recentas 1998 and 2000. Joy James is the editor of the first text, The

Angela Davis Reader, and co-editor with T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting of the second one, The Black Feminist Reader. Arewe just reading an old position or is Davis unaware of her

inconsistencies with regard to these two essays? Unfortunately,

there are no editorial remarks in the republished works to guidethe reader in answering questions about Davis consistency asa Marxist-Leninist philosopher.23

The locus of Davis as Marxist philosopher, unlike her placeas a Marxist activist, has been debated among philosophers.

Anatol Anton and Leonard Harris have debated the merits ofDavis contributions qua philosophical argumentation. Antonargues that Davis work lacks sustained theoretical content,

whi le Harris response to this cri tic ism is to amplify the

concrete activist character of her work as a needed way ofdoing philosophy.24

Green and Currys Notorious Assessment of Davis

as Philosopher

Green and Curry in their rather sympathetic article, NotoriousPhilosopher: The Transformative Life and Work of Angela Davis,argue Davis philosophical contributions have essentially beenin the areas of Critical Theory, Black Liberation Theory, andFeminist Theory. Noticeably absent in their assessment is anymention of Davis contributions to Marxist-Leninist philosophyor her locus as philosopher within Marxism-Leninism.

On close review of Green and Currys article, we discoverthe typology they offer for Davis philosophical stance is eclectic

and tendered from a postmodernist/pragmatist perspective. Onthe one hand, she is viewed as having unfailing inclusivenessin as much as she rejects homogenizing universalisms andhierarchical dualism that downplay the significance of thediverse elements of the complex of gender/race/class...25 Onthe other hand, they find,

[T]heoretical problems that at times blemished Daviswork...including her lack of attention to internationaldifferences; her loyal refusal to criticize...seriousproblems within quasi-Marxist socialisms in Cubaand the USSR; her lack of a post-Soviet conception ofsocialism...and some lingering essentialism, though

within a broader set of social and analytical categoriesthan those she received from the complex of historical

traditions she inherited.26

To better grasp the import of Curry and Greens analysis, I wantto unpack and decode the meaning of the following concepts:unfailing inclusiveness, homogenizing universalisms, andhierarchical dualism. Unfailing inclusiveness as it relatesto the dialectic of race, class, and gender means to accentthe multi-factored character of the struggle for transformingbourgeois society. What is instructive is the notion that eachfactor has the same analytical importance and political weight

within a dialectical relationship.

When homogenizing universalisms is contrasted tounfailing inclusiveness what is philosophically in contentionis a conception of totality. If totality is conceived in terms of

homogenizing universalism, then, for them, what transpiresis the quantitative transformation of the qualitative dimensionattached to this dialectic of factors. Concretely, homogenizinguniversalism reduces the factors of race and gender to theclass categories of proletariat and bourgeoisie. On this account,class analysis, as the central conceptual framework, is de factothe abandonment of the struggle against racism and sexism viaclass reductionism.

The postmodernist/pragmatist response to Marxism asmeta-narrative necessarily employs a pejorative connotationto the primacy of class struggle and materialism. The idea ofhierarchical dualism is again a code word for not followinga factor theory of pluralism. The Marxist-Leninist conceptualframework of social being/social consciousness, materialism/

idealism, base/superstructure, productive forces/relations of


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production, and essence/appearance are instances of so-calledhierarchical dualism. The fact that these authors find Davisacceptable to their postmodernist/pragmatist presuppositionsbecomes an insightful hint for any elaboration of Davisconception of Marxist-Leninist philosophy.

Notice the alleged theoretical problems are all connectedwit h the ostensible Marxist-Leninist elements in Davisworldview. Her support of the for mer Soviet Union andpresent Socialist Cuba, they view as a weakness emanating

from a putative lingering essentialism. What do they meanby lingering essentialism? The postmodernist impetus forcriticizing essentialism derives from the supposition thatessence, enduring substance, or an axiological notion ofintrinsic value is antithetical to relativism.

Postmodernism in relativizing all phenomena incorrectlyasserts that entities are bereft of essence. Without a notion ofessence, intrinsic value, or substance that endures through thecontingencies of change, relativism fosters a protean sort ofidentity. If there are no essences then phenomenalism adjoins

with relativism as a species of subjectivism. Given the contextof Curry and Greens criticism, one can only conclude that thisallegation is a not-so-transparent reference to Davis Marxist-Leninism and political endorsement of the world Communist

movement.Whatever the pit falls of the for mer Soviet Union, it

represented the first Socialist (proletarian) revolution in theworld. Cuba no doubt represents a very significant outpostof proletarian revolution. Curry and Green in their obviousbias against Marxism have not faced the fact that some ofDavis ideological, philosophical, and theoretical development(not only regarding the complexities of race, class, andgender but also anti-imperialism, socialism, and proletarianinternationalism) was the direct result of her experiences andphilosophical work as a member of the Communist Party USAalong with her visits to the Soviet Union and Cuba.

For example, Davis taught philosophy in Cuba and cameto understand how the eradication of class exploitation is the

material basis for the destruction of racism and sexism as wellas socialism as the material expression of anti-imperialism.Since Curry and Green view all three factors as equivalent intheir material force, they are disinclined to accept a materialistanalysis of racism and capitalism. In a comparative analysisof Davis and Habermas philosophies, Green and Curryconclude,

Likewise, both Davis and Habermas assume andin their differing ways argue for post-Freudianpsychologies in which they treat political actors asrelational social beings, rather than treating themas or seeking to help them become self-sufficientautonomous individuals. An important difference,however is that Daviss political actors are also richly

historical beings, sharing their standpoint, desires,and self-conceptions by particular patterns of powerrelations and events that must be taken fully intoaccount and analyzing and transforming their currentsituations towards a preferable though only broadlyspecifiable future. In these respects, Daviss viewseems closer to the pragmatism of William James,George Herbert Mead, and John Dewey, whereasHabermass ideal theoretical approach seems closerto that of John Rawls. Like Davis, James justified hismethodology and his epistemology by the lessons ofexperience and what works.27

Their additional remarks in aligning Davis with the pragmatic

tradition of James, Mead, and Dewey is a gross disservice rather

than a compliment, that is, if we hold that Davis is a proponentof the dialectical materialist (Marxist-Leninist) conceptionof practice. By linking Davis to pragmatism, they offer, albeitthrough the backdoor, a damning indictment to Davis practicaland theoretical work. The Marxist theory of practice is groundedin an ontological and epistemological materialist foundation.Truth in the Marxist tradition is objective and hence compels acorrespondence theory of truth. Pragmatism, in contrast, is aconventionalist approach to truth and thereby subjectivist andpolitically opportunist in character. At the very least, one cansay Davis is far from an opportunist.

These critical remarks on the Curry/Green evaluationnotwithstanding, it is surprising Davis (as a Marxist philosopher?)does not offer any critical analysis of Hill Collins Afrocentricthought. Afrocentrism as a species of petty bourgeois BlackNationalism is a major danger and corrupting force in BlackStudies and the African American liberation movementtoday.28

From the standpoint of a Marxist analysis, ethnocentrismis flawed because it centers reality on a given ethnic group.Such centering, by inference, devalues all other groups by

virtue of their non-membership in the central group. Thedanger in Eurocentrism is its centrist casting. Eurocentrism and

Afrocentricism are paradigmatically species of ethnocentrism.Following this line of reasoning Afrocentrism is a commitmentto narrowly attentive identity politics.

As earlier noted, Joy James is editor and co-editor of thespecified texts, which republished Davis first essay; however,she provides no editorial remarks indicating the lack ofconsistency in Davis corpus in theDavis Reader. Surprisingly,

James does not include in theDavis Readerthe review on HillCollins work and this despite her different take on it from Daviscommentary. Such an inclusion, I think, would have shed morelight on the charge of philosophical inconsistency.

James does offer critical remarks on Davis, in anothertext, published in the year between the aforementioned editedtexts, which seem to imply Davis is no longer, if she ever was,

a revolutionary. James contends, The high expectations thatblack Americans displayed toward Davis as a political leaderupon her acquittal surpassed the twenty-eight-year olds trainingand experience.29

Then, when James refers to Davis in more contemporaryterms, she adds an even stronger criticism. Casting doubtabout Davis locus as a revolutionary, here James provides amarkedly different view than we find with Green and Curry.

James boldly contends,

As an iconoclastic academic and radical intellectual,Davis represents the revolutionary for left liberalsand progressiveness and not necessarily for radicalactivists or impoverished or working-class peoples.Her symbolic representation and appeal are bothtransnational and transracial. Daviss public personais partly fueled by her hybrid nature as a memberof the elite Talented Tenth; this stature of bourgeoisrespectability was cemented by her 1990 appointmentas full professor at the University of California and her1991 expulsion from the Communist Party USA.30

Unfortunately, James own analysis emanates from anamorphous elite/grassroots framework or a kind of C. WrightMills notion of populism contra elites that elide concretespecification of determinate class and ideological positioning.More simply put, James own analysis falls within the realm ofthe left/liberal progressivism posture, which she alludes to inher citation. So we remain unclear, given James contribution

to research on Davis, as to whether Davis is or is not a Marxist-


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Leninist philosopher at any given moment in her intellectualdevelopment or political practice. We can only surmise,granting that James assertion is without thorough examinationand concrete analysis of Davis philosophical/ideologicalposition and corpus, that James claim of Davis bourgeoisrespectability signals Davis departure from Marxism-Leninism.

What we can concretely and unequivocally conclude is thatAngela Davis review of Patricia Hill Collins Black FeministThought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of

Empowerment is an open departure from Marxist philosophy.The task still remains in locating Angela Davis body of works

within the spectrum of Mar xism-L eninism philosophicaltradition. Of course, space does not permit such an undertakingat this time.

Acknowledgment

I want to thank Dr. Stephen Ferguson of North Carolina A & T Universityand Mr. Andrew Woodson of Michigan State University for their editorialand substantive comments on this essay. Their contributions havegreatly enhanced the quality of this paper.

Endnotes

1. John H. McClendon. Dr. Holmes, The Rebel Philosopher.Freedomways 22:1 (Spring 1982). John H. McClendon.Eugene C. Holmes: A Commentary on a Black Marxist

Philosopher. In Philosophy Born of Struggle, ed. LeonardHarris (Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt, 1983).

2. See Angela Davis, Women and Capitalism: Dialectics ofOppression and Liberation, in The Angela Y. Davis Reader,ed. Joy James (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1998).

3. Angela Davis. Review of Patricia Hill Collins,Black FeministThought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of

Empowerment.Teaching Philosophy 16:4 (December 1993):351.

4. Hill Collins, Bl ac k Femin is t Th ou gh t: Kn ow le dg e,Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment (New York:Routledge, 1991), 207. For an example of such a conflation,see James E. Turner, Africana Studies and Epistemology:

A Discourse in the Sociology of Knowledge, in The NextDecade: Theoretical and Research Issues in Africana Studies,

ed. James E. Turner (Ithaca, New York: Africana Studiesand Research Center Cornell University, 1984), v-xxv.Beverly Gordon, African-American Cultural Knowledge andLiberatory Education: Dilemmas, Problems, and Potentials ina Post-Modern American Society in Too Much Schooling, too

Little Education, ed. Mwalimu J. Shujaa (Trenton: Africa WorldPress, 1994), 57-78. In African American intellectual culture,the forerunner to this conflation is the African Americanphilosopher, William T. Fontaine. See William T. Fontaine,Social Determination in the Writing of Negro Scholars,

American Journal of Sociology 49 (January 1944): 302-13.

5. Angela Y. Davis. Unfinished Lectures on Liberation. InThe Angela Y. Davis Reader, ed. Joy James (Malden, Mass.:Blackwell, 1998), 58. On Douglass as a precursor to Blackliberation theology read Reginald Davis,Frederick Douglass:

A Precursor of Liberation Theology (Macon: Mercer UniversityPress, 2005).

6. See Patricia Hill Collins,Black Feminist Thought, p. 205.

7. See Robert Klee,Introduction to The Philosophy of Science:Cutting Nature At Its Seams (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1997), 28.

8. See Robert Klee,Introduction to The Philosophy of Science,28. See especially his chapter 2, The Positivist Model ofScientific Theories.

9. Hill Collins,Black Feminist, p. 236.

10. Lenin,Materialism, p. 165.

11. Hill Collins,Black Feminist, p. 235.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Hill Collins does not reference HegelsPhenomenology nor

for that matter Mikhail Bakhtins dialogism as a sourcefor her ideas. My comments rest on the commonalties.For treatment of Bakhtin see Michael Holquist, Dialogism:

Bakhtin and his World(New York: Routledge, 1990). HegelsPhenomenology has had considerable influence on AfricanAmerican intellectual history and the discussion of slavery.See Cynthia Willett,Maternal Ethics and other Slave Moralities(New York: Routledge, 1995). For a book review of Willettstext and a brief discussion of the impact of Hegel on African

American intellectuals see John H. McClendons reviewin Auslegung: A Journal of Philosophy 21:2 (Summer/Fall1996). Among those cited include William Ferris, CharlesLeander Hill, Martin Luther King, Jr., Eugene C. Holmes, andC. L. R. James. For a more substantial treatment of C.L.R.

James with reference to Hegel, read John H. McClendonIII, C.L.R. Jamess Notes on Dialectics: Left Hegelianism or

Marxism-Leninism?(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2005). For anexamination on the impact of HegelsPhenomenology on the

West Indian psychiatrist and revolutionary Frantz Fanon, seeAto Sekyi-Out,Fanons Dialectic of Experience (Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1996). Also consult chapter 2 of

Marxism, Philosophy and the Africana World.

15. Joy James. Transcending the Talented Tenth: Black Leadersand American Intellectuals (New York: Routledge, 1997),94-5.

16. Angela Davis. Review of Patricia Hill Collins Black FeministThought: Knowledge, Consciousness and Politics ofEmpowerment. Teaching Philosophy 16:4 (December 1993):351.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., p. 352.

19. Joy James, Transcending the Talented Tenth, p. 142.

20. Mannheims sociology of knowledge perspective is bestexemplified in African American intellectual culture with

William T. Fontaine, An Interpretation of ContemporaryNegro Thought from the Standpoint of the Sociology ofKnowledge,Journal of Negro History 25:1 (January 1970). Fora dialectical materialist critique of the sociology of knowledge

vis--vis African American sociologist Robert Staples, see JohnH. McClendon, Black Subjectivity: Another Name for Black

Sociology inFreedomways (Spring 1980).21. Angela Davis, Review of Patricia Hill CollinsBlack Feminist

Thought, pp. 352-53.

22. Judith Mary Green and Blanch Radford Curry. NotoriousPhilosopher: The Transformative Life and Work of AngelaDavis. In Hypathia Daughters: Fif teen Hundred Yearsof Women Philosophers, ed. Linda Lopez McAllister(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 301-25.

23. This essay first appeared in Howard Parsons and JohnSomerville, eds.Marxism, Revolution and Peace(Amsterdam:B. R. Grmer, 1977). It has been republished in Joy James, ed.,The Angela Y. Davis Reader(Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1998)and Joy James and T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting, eds. The

Black Feminist Reader(Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2000).

24. On the Harris/Anton debate, see Leonard Harris, More About

Angela Davis: Response to Anatol Anton,Radical PhilosophyAssociation Newsletter21 (Winter 1990).

25. Judith Mary Green and Blanch Radford Curry, NotoriousPhilosopher, p. 301.

26. Ibid., pp. 301-302.

27. In this respect, Green and Curry replicate a similar pragmatistanalysis, which we can find with Cornel Wests treatmentof Du Bois in his The American Evasion of Philosophy.

Judith Mary Green and Blanch Radford Curry, NotoriousPhilosopher, p. 313. Also consult Cornel West, The American

Evasion of Philosophy (Madison: University of WisconsinPress, 1989), see especially pp. 138-50.

28. It is instructive to compare Davis silence about Hill CollinsAfroce ntr ici ty and the art icle, Angela Y. Davis, Black

Nationalism: The Sixties and Nineties in The Angela Y. Davis


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Reader, ed. Joy James (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1998),289-93. For a critical examination of Afrocentricity, read

John H. McClendon, The Afrocentric Project: The Quest forParticularity and the Negation of Objectivity,Explorations in

Ethnic Studies 18:1 (January 1995).

29. Joy James.Shadow Boxing: Representation of Black FeministPolitics (New York: St. Martins Press, 1999), 107.

30. Ibid., p. 109.

Monopoly Intellectualism

Everett GreenRockland Community College

It was the aspiration of many observing the influence of theBlack Arts Movement (BAM) and the emergence of African

American Studies in the intellectual arena that the latter wouldfind permanent intellectual roots and flourish in institutions ofhigher education all over the United States. But this premise

was based on a lack of understanding that the foundation ofthe dominant intellectual tradition, to some extent, was basedon the negation of other traditions and that the conceptual

framework of the philosophical self-understanding of the historyand content of the discourse of many elements or strands ofWestern thought was built on the falsification of the culturaldevelopment of peoples of Africa, Asia, and the Americas. Ideasare born in the context of cultural and political movements and,as a consequence, are never neutral, and their employment andsustenance are always within the context of power relations.

Any cursory reference to the history of ideasBabylonian,Greek, Egyptian, Romansshows that Europeans understandingof themselves in relation to other nations, peoples, andcultures finds expression in their philosophical ideas in termsof preserving and exporting a particular vision of themselvesand the world. A primary mission of the institutions of nationstates or empires is maintenance of a certain kind of social

order and the preservation of that order as one of uniquenessand exceptionality. The promotion of cosmopolitanism isalways related to particularismRoman citizen, French, Dutch,Spanish, English, etc. The rise of nationalism has been merelya sibling rivalry within the family that promotes intellectualmonopoly as evident in the enlightenmentwhether German,French, or English or the revolutionary ideas of the nineteenthcentury and twentieth century, that is, Darwinian, Marxian,Freudian. All these ideas, for the most part, have been used topromote a view of the world that solidifies a monopoly withineducational institutions at all levels of social organization. To bea Roman citizen is to be institutionalized within a certain viewof the world irrespective of ethnicitythe same with respectto being an English, or French, or American citizen. There has

always been ethnic self-assertion over a period of historysometimes ruthlessly suppressed or treated with benign neglectdepending on the perceived threat or lack thereof by rulers ofstate. For the most part, many within these sub-groups proudlybear the insignia of their overlords as some of us proudly reciteunder British imperialism, Rule Britannia, Britannia rules the

waves; the sun never sets on the British Empire.

In the American experience, this self-assertion found fertileground and international appeal in the Garvey MovementOneRace, One God, One Destinyand fired the imagination of apeople, to such an extent, that in spite of retreats and evenreversals continues its forward march. The aspirations of thesixties and seventies movement and its attendant pockets ofsuccess in a few academic institutions today is part of that

self-assertion of the early twentieth century as well as fields of

gender and ethnic studies. This quest for cultural sovereigntyprimarily within the context of the black experience has beenmerely a side show as academic institutions continue toexercise intellectual monopoly in the service of empire.

Monopoly is exercised in a number of ways includingthe most obvious of canonical text representations. Along

with obvious perennial inclusions of Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas,Descartes, Kant, Hume, Hegel, Marx, and others, there seemsto be an arbitrariness to this selection of inclusion and the

general survey of typical undergraduate introductory courses inthe discipline of philosophy is quite instructive for that matter.The concept of the market place of ideas as an open forum

which generates certain kinds of egalitarian free exchange isno different from the myth of free trade in the economic sphere.

Academic institutions, for the most part, irrespective of loftymission statements, are there to preserve a world-view and

work towards the maintenance of a certain social order whileat the same time strive to give the appearance of free exchangeand the sovereignty of intellectual freedom. The pretense ofcultural and intellectual diversity is readily exposed whenthe content of curricula is examined. Officialdom continuesto make selections of the tried and the true representativefigures over the centuries and, for the most part, works of thoseoutside the official canons are regulated to special topics forconsideration.

As we face continuous economic contraction, there will bereversals of even the minute gains that have been made in termsof other voices being heard in academia. Consequently, thebattle over ideas is not merely an intellectual one, but economic,cultural, social, and political. The free flow of ideas is exercised

within the constraint of decision making within the institution asto who will be hired, who will be fired, and many times how thegeneral public will respond to these ideas. In many instances,it is not a matter of right or left but how to maintain socialorder within and without the academic community, especiallysince knowledge transference has become a commodity likeany other. Many in the movementsixties and seventiesunderstood clearly that education as a revolutionary weaponfor cultural transformation would have to be cultivated outsideof the monopoly of the major intellectual institutions and manyset out to accomplish this task at the community level.1

We are at the threshold of another revolution that might justput a dent in the intellectual monopoly by opening up a new

vista on the information super highway. Out of the confusionof the Internet chatter many more voices will be heard. Untilsuch time (if that is at all possible given the ruling capitalistclass to harness all technological advance within its control),there is hardly any possibility that there will be any real openingto intellectual diversity in higher education especially as statedalready that most of the ideas that are popularized are notculture neutral but are for the most part related to who benefits

and under what conditions. Case in point is the scramble forresearch grants and what topics are considered worthy forthese endeavors.

Intellectual monopoly is all part and parcel of socio-economic structures. Hence, when different ideas intrude onthe revered canons and canonical figures this is perceivedby many within and without academia as an assault on theestablished way of life, namely, social and economic structures.It is nave to believe that one should get a hearing merelybecause of the persuasiveness of ones ideas especially whenit goes against the grain of the established order. Intellectualmonopoly, in its present form, will experience change whenthe legitimacy of the present social arrangement is called intoquestion and new ones are formed. Many institutions that

profess democratic ideasfree flow of informationstand


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scandalized by their suppression of dissenting voices andleaders within the institutions are always engaged in delicateand sometimes dangerous balancing acts between maintainingsocial order and promoting the free flow of ideas, always relatingdecision making to economic forces and the preservation ofinstitutional traditions.

In this context, intellectual traditions are conceived on asliding scale of importance and relevance to those who are atthe commanding heights of preserving what they conceive to

be central to their conception of excellence and maintenanceof social order. The belief by many that politics should not be apart of the screening and hiring of academic practitioners is acompletely unrealistic idea of the hidden and many times quiteovertraison dtre of these institutions. As currently structured,it is most difficult to conceive egalitarianism in the market placeof ideas in institutions of education.

The question is: What would a democratized institutionlook like both in terms of polity and curricula in what someperceive as multicultural society? Whose narratives are

woven in the history of philosophy, psychology, mathematics,religion, etc.? What is the relationship of production in thesedepartments? These are old questions that have been rehashedcontinuously. Must the ruling ideas always be of the ruling class?

As one can see these are not merely academic questions, butthe response might very well determine who shall eat andwho shall not eat not only among academic practitioners, butwhose work will determine national and international policiesthat affect billions of people in areas like health, education,environment, or food distribution. Irrespective of the numerousclaims about the purity of reason, many of us can see clearlythe embeddedness of culture, tradition, and even personalidiosyncrasy in the voices that are being heard. Many of us ashuman beings like to experience some element of culturalaffinity or connection to the information that we appropriate.

As a result, democratization at all levelscontent, curricula,personnelis considered an intellectual birthright.

What we are saying is that intellectual monopoly is at the

very foundation of the state apparatus including economic andpolitical structures, and academic institutions are mere conduitsfulfilling the function of the state and for the most part studentsare consumers of state-controlled commodities. The history ofacademia is replete with incidents of self-censure when faced

with unpopular ideas that meet the disapproval of the watchfuleyes of the state. Many arguments that have been developed forkeeping politics out of academia are quite interesting but basedon false premises since a primary function of these institutionsis to find justification for political and social systems and to trainleaders for the maintenance of the political order. Consequently,in the final analysis, it is a question of whose ideas are worthyof investigation, appropriation, and dissemination and whoseare merely of academic interest to present with perfunctory

remarks and ultimately rejected.Our tepid attempt to hold academia accountable might bethe result of the failure of nerve to confront the state apparatusas a whole. What is the role of academic institutions vis--vis thestate apart from perfunctory mission statements? Should theseinstitutions be in the business of cultivating civic virtues as endsin themselves or should these virtues be a way of enhancingpolicies or goals of the state? We are always confronted withthe perennial question from Plato to the present as to what isthe individual relationship to the state and under what condition

virtue ethics should be practiced as well as when state powershould be respected or confronted.

The Black Arts Movement was self-consciously political andutilized cultural forms as a weapon against oppression. Exponents

fully recognized that their political and social philosophy and

intellectual mission would not be accommodated in academiasince, for the most part, many of these ideas were in directconfrontation with state power. Hence, these modes of thinking

would never get credentialized in respected institutions.Because of the ferocity of the critique of cultural imperialismand intellectual militancy of this movement, accommodations

were made by instituting Black Studies Programs on somecampuses, but their legitimacy is always questioned both froman intellectual and policy point of view and the fact that manyremain merely programs today irrespective of credentials is atestimony to the enduring influence of the hegemony of culturalintellectual monopoly. One is fully aware of the constant debateof costs and benefits of programs or departments but from aninstitutional point of view the resistance for autonomy of theseprograms is without question.

Whether one is engaged in quanti tat ive research orengaged in expository rendition of historical themes isimmaterial to the resistance received from policy makers andacademicians. In the culture of free market, some academicdisciplines might just be allowed to die and as the saying goes,Last hired, first fired.

The Black Arts Movement was not merely an insurgencyphenomenon delivering broadsides to established institutions,

but self-consciously exercising the positive affirmation of theblack experience. Irrespective of internal contradictions andsometimes outright propagandizing, its lasting effect is quiteevident in institutions nationwide, whether Cornell, Harvard,Temple, and San Francisco State. Consequently its pioneering

vision and intellectual militancy provide an occasion forcelebration forty years later and in spite of reversals, there isa modicum of legitimacy of the study of African and African

American experience.

The suspicion and sometimes ridicule by some establishmentscholars white and black of the Afrocentric movement is worthyof investigation as to the assumptions and self understanding asto what constitutes appropriate intellectual research in light ofthe fact of the historical and cultural environment that has given

rise to the acceptance of Black Studies in academic institutions.The question of legitimacy and normativity is always related tocertain assumptions about what constitutes good academicresearch and related to questions of value appropriation.

Culture wars are nothing new as is evident to any student ofintellectual history whether in ancient Greece amongst realistsand idealists, medieval fathers, sixteenth-century reformers,enlightenment rationalists and empiricists, nineteenth-centuryradicals and iconoclasts. What is new is the self-assertion ofa movement representing a tradition that was considerednot worthy of any serious intellectual consideration. Since allintellectual traditions are merely cultural self understandings,to affirm a tradition that has been cemented in onesconsciousness as a kind of radical otherness that pollutes

the body polity involves a deliberate re-examination of onesunderstanding of philosophical anthropology.

I submit that doing successful field work in a traditioninvolves a certain level of appropriation. Therefore, it is notmerely a matter of who is doing the research in a particulardiscipline and in this case, Africana Studies, but also the levelof proximity to the discipline, namely, appropriation. On a morepractical note, the priority given to many disciplines is alsorelated to the place on the world stage, the land, history, andculture from which these disciplines are derived. Therefore,from time to time, there are certain externalities that push

what is worthy of intellectual consideration at different timesin intellectual, political, and economic history.

What were these external ities that gave rise to the

establishment of Black Studies and the waning of many of


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these programs today? Can some of these programs survivewithout another insurgency? Why have some of these programsnot moved from insurgency mode to consolidation? Theseare not merely academic questions but are related to nationalpolicy, institutional polity, managerial skills within departments,economic and political stagnation on the continent of Africa.

There is now an urgent need for a collective reassessmentof the disciplines of African and African American Studies froma historical perspective. If we assume that the discipline is

worthy of study for its own sake, what approaches should weconsider as central to its methodological interpretation, namely,historical, philosophical, psychological, scientific, and how it isrelated to and different from other disciplines known as ethnicstudies? What are the possibilities of cooperating with otherdisciplines, such as Chicano Studies, Womens Studies, IrishStudies? As the discipline moves towards further consolidation,consideration needs to be given to the whole question of itsintellectual identity within academia. Consequently, the debatearound program versus department needs to be criticallyreassessed in the interest of the future of the discipline.

Although there are external factors that contr ibute tomethodological and administrative questions within someprograms and the discipline as a whole, the continuous

movement towards consolidation should be of permanentimportance. In this period of consolidation, not discountingthe significance of ancient African civilization one must fullyrecognize the event par excellence that has shaped the Americanexperience and the emergence of this discipline, namely, theinstitution of slavery and its aftermath. To continuously revisitthe source and reassess its impact on the methodology, content,and assumptions of our current discourse is of paramountimportance. African American Studies is eminently situated toexplore, investigate, and interrogate our self-understanding ofbeing American. The novelty of this discipline because of itshistorical roots is the ability to explore the American experienceapplying the tools of philosophy, psychology, history, literature,etc.

Part of its intellectual richness is indeed this mosaic ofmulti-disciplinary applications. This intellectual agility shouldserve it well in the midst of the current climate of retrenchmentin many departments in the humanities. In spite of unexpectedreversals, there is still much to celebrate these forty years afterthe intellectual uprising of 1968.

Endnotes

1. Harlem Writers Guild, led by John O. Killens. SeeMagic toJuyu: An Appreciation of the Black Arts Movementby Kakamuya Salaam.

BOOKREVIEW

Charles Johnson in Context

Linda Furgerson Selzer (Amherst: University ofMassachusetts Press, 2009). 306 pp.

Reviewed by Kathy GlassDuquesne University

How do disciplinary concerns inform Charles Johnsons art?Which intellectual and cultural groups provide a social contextfor understanding Johnsons fiction? These are some of thequestions that Linda Furgerson Selzer addresses in Charles

Johnson in Context. While previous scholars have often mined

his philosophical fiction for evidence of philosophical concepts,Selzer analyze[s] Johnsons literary production in relationto the critical issues raised by the emergence of three blackintellectual and cultural formations in the late-twentieth andearly twenty-first centuries: black philosophers, black Buddhists,and new black public intellectuals (2). In so doing, Selzeremphasizes not only the philosophical, spiritual, and intellectualtraditions that influenced Johnsons philosophical fiction, butshe also underscores in rich detail his engagement with, andimportant contribution to, American philosophy, WesternBuddhism, and black intellectual thought in the U.S.

In the opening chapter of her book, Selzer traces theorigins of Johnsons fiction to the difficulties faced by the smallcommunity of black scholars who found themselves at odds

with their graduate programs in philosophy in the 1960s and1970s. As Selzer explains, students like Johnson, Cornel West,Lucius Outlaw, and others resisted dominant Anglo-Americanapproaches that emphasized abstract logic and linguistic analysisat the expense of ethics and moral philosophy (3). Committedto applying philosophical questions to the lived experiences of

African Americans and to issues of social justice, these scholarswould go on to engage more practical intellectual approachessuch as neo-Marxisism, phenomenology, existentialism, andpragmatism. As Selzer argues, Johnson vigorously engagesthese philosophical ideals in his short story Aletheia (1979).In this text, the black professor who is alienated from the urbanblack community is noticeably aligned with Immanuel Kant,the European philosopher who privileged the disinterested andrational pursuit of knowledge. Abstract Kantianism is opposedin the story by Schelers phenomenology, which, Selzer argues,acknowledges the role of affectivity in the apprehension of

value (36). However, the latter approach is problematizedtoo, for the story exposes the potential danger that couldresult from the undisciplined expression of emotion. In heranalysis, Selzer effectively illustrates how Johnson uses fictionto both intervene in the disciplinary constraints of academicphilosophy (47) and also to infuse the calcified discourse ofacademic philosophy with phenomenological, narratological,

and artistic force (47-8).

In each of the subsequent sections of her book, Selzersituates and analyzes Johnsons literary production in relationto broader philosophical, intellectual, and/or spiritual traditions.Chapter two explores Johnsons first novel,Faith and the GoodThing (1974), through the lens of his masters thesis on WilhelmReich, Freud, and Marx. In her original analysis, Selzer showshow this allegorical tale draws on the thinking of Marcuseand other intellectuals, simultaneously critiquing selectedtenets of classical Marxismand yet embracing aspects ofcritical Marxism. Chapter three explores the writings of variousblack Buddhists, and develops from these texts an historicalframework within which to comprehend Johnsons fiction. In theOxherding Tale (1982), for instance, Selzer identifies Johnsonsunderstanding of the social effects of engaged Buddhism,

which would mature with his increased participation in anemergent form of engaged Western Buddhism (156). In thefourth chapter, Selzer analyzes Johnsons engagement with andrevision of cosmopolitanism inMiddle Passage (1990); and inthe final chapter, she argues that Johnsons Dreamer(1998)makes an innovative contribution to contemporary scholarshipon Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.s writings and legacy.

Examining Johnsons literary production across a 24-yearperiod, Selzer concludes that his fiction develops a particularresolution to the tension between private conversion and civicaction that is evident from the first in his fiction (212). A timely,unique, and generative study of Johnsons literary works, thisbook is a must read for those seeking to better understand


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Johnsons literar y works, the traditions that have informedthem, and have, in turn, been transformed by his creativecontributions.

CONTRIBUTORS

Kathy Glass (Ph.D. University of California at San Diego) isassociate professor of English at Duquesne University. Herareas of research include African American literature, blackfeminist critical theory, American literature, womens studies,

American studies, and Black Studies. Her publications includeCourting Communities: Black Female Nationalism and Syncre-

Nationalism in the Nineteenth-Century North (Routledge, 2006);Tending to the Roots: Anna Julia Coopers SociopoliticalThought and Activism, in Meridians: Feminism, Race,Transnationalism 6:1 (2006); Calling All Sisters: ContinentalPhilosophy and Black Feminist Theory, in Convergences:

Black Women and Continental Philosophy, edited by MariaLupe Davidson, Kathryn Gines, and Donna-Dale Marcano(SUNY Press, 2010), and Love Matters: bell hooks on Political

Resistance and Change, in Critical Perspectives on bell hooks,edited by Maria Del Guadalupe Davidson and George Yancy(Routledge, 2009).

Everett Green is the founder of the nationally renownedPhilosophy Born of Struggle Conference Series. As such, atthe level of praxis, he has made every effort to support African

American philosophy as a viable and complex philosophicaltradition, having to conceive and organize sessions aroundpivotal black philosophical figures, cultural philosophicalthemes involving aesthetics, axiology, the canon, racism, etc. Hispublished works includeImmanuel Kants Critical Philosophyand the Transcendental Horizon (University Press of America,1997) and Afrocentricity and Western Civilization, and is theeditor of Value Inquiry Book Series, Special Series on African

American Philosophy. He teaches philosophy at RocklandCommunity College. He has had a long career in educationand taught at every level from elementary education to theuniversity. He has taught extensively in different philosophicaltraditions, religion and culture, the history of ideas, African/

African American and Caribbean philosophical and religiousthought.

John H. McClendon III is professor in the Department ofPhilosophy at Michigan State University. McClendons areasof expertise include African philosophy, Philosophy of African

American Studies, Marxist philosophy, and the histor y ofAfrican American philosophers. He is the author of C.L.R.Jamess Notes on Dialectics: Left Hegelianism or Marxism-Leninism (Lexington Books, 2005) and is currently completinga manuscript, Conversations with My Christian Friends; thistext focuses on African Americans from the standpoint of thephilosophy of religion.

philosophy and the black experience

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